

## ABSTRACT

WIDINUGRAHA, DWIYATNA. The Papua Separatist Group and Indonesia in the Age of New Public Diplomacy: A Comparative Analysis of Websites, Facebook Visuals, and Twitter. (Under the supervision of Dr. Melissa A. Johnson).

The rise of digital media in the 21st century caused changes in the society, as networked digital communication decentralized public communication. The presence of Internet and other forms of digital media potentially affected the Free West Papua Movement, one of the oldest minority resistance groups in Indonesia. However, this concern is still unnoticed in the studies regarding the Papua separatist group. Dominated by political and cultural studies, the body of knowledge of the Papua separatists still lacks a communication studies' perspective. Hence, the author argues that communication studies are useful to analyze recent issues of the Papua separatist group, particularly in the age of digital media.

There were three main aspects analyzed in this dissertation by three different but related studies. Study one addressed how the Free West Papua Movement compared to other separatist groups. Drawing from separatism studies and non-profit marketing literature, study one analyzed the marketing taxonomy of the political separatist groups, the ethnic separatist groups, and the terrorist separatist groups. The author employed comparative analysis to examine a total census of 54 separatist groups' websites. Study one particularly analyzed their marketing activities, i.e. funding resources, media channels, and recruitment strategies. The results showed each separatist group category had different characteristics regarding their marketing activities. Some important findings included the political separatist groups exclusively accessed the government funding, the ethnic separatist groups aimed their media

channels to get support from the international audience, and the terrorist separatist groups are more likely to employ a closed (internal) recruitment.

Study two addressed the issue of the Papua separatist group's identity representation in the social media. Since 2009, the Papua separatist group actively posted messages on its Facebook account, particularly in the form of photos. Having more than 200,000 followers, the separatists' had image representation that became an important issue to discuss in this paper. With social media allowing minorities to present their own images, the public's perception towards the separatists might change from the traditional media's perspectives. Many scholars in political and visual communication also shared this view. However, none of them ever analyzed the Papua separatist group identity representation. Using mixed methods visual content analysis, study two analyzed more than 1,200 photos and captions. The results found four themes representing the Papua separatists' photos, i.e. independence, local tradition, oppression, and solidarity. Further, the findings showed that the Papua separatist group employed races, flags, locations, backgrounds, etc. as its photos' signs. The findings also supported study one's conclusion regarding the ethnic separatist groups aiming at international support rather than local support.

Next, study three examined how the Indonesian Government responded to the recent Papua issues in the social media. Drawing from public diplomacy studies, the author analyzed the content of the Indonesian Government's Twitter messages (tweets). A total of 174 tweets were analyzed. The results showed that the Indonesian Government employed more soft power messages than hard power messages when addressing recent Papua issues. In addition, the findings showed that the Indonesian Government used combinations of traditional and new public diplomacy elements.

The findings from the three studies revealed new perspectives regarding the case of the Papua separatist group in the age of digital media. In addition, the three studies also contribute to content analysis as a research method. Nevertheless, the author encourages further studies, particularly studies that employ different research method designs. For example, survey and audience studies will reveal more social scientific findings regarding the case of the Papua separatist group in the age of digital media.

Keywords: Papua, marketing of separatist, insurgent media, website comparative analysis, visual content analysis, public diplomacy, social media, Internet, soft power

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The Papua Separatist Group and Indonesia in the Age of New Public Diplomacy:  
A Comparative Analysis of Websites, Facebook Visuals, and Twitter

by  
Dwiyatna Widinugraha

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APPROVED BY:

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Dr. Melissa A. Johnson  
Committee Chair

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Dr. Jason Swarts

---

Dr. James Kiwanuka-Tondo

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Dr. Andrew R. Binder

## **DEDICATION**

This dissertation work is dedicated to my family and my country, Indonesia. Especially to my wife, Andina, and my son, Mikail, who have been constant sources of encouragement during my graduate school life in North Carolina.

## **BIOGRAPHY**

Dwiyatna Widinugraha was originated from Jakarta, Indonesia. He graduated from Universitas Padjadjaran in 2004 after studying Public Relations. Two years later, Dwiyatna earned his Master degree (M.A.) with distinction following his graduate study in Communication Arts Department, New York Institute of Technology, NY. When he graduated, Dwiyatna pursued a professional career as a journalist. He joined Metro TV, the Indonesian first TV news station, working as journalist and producer. Having loads of experiences in journalism, he believed that in order to solve social problems in Indonesia he needed to work closer to the public and labor more decisive impacts. Therefore, Dwiyatna decided to move to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia in 2010 and started serving as a public officer.

During his third year as public officer, Dwiyatna was awarded Fulbright scholarship for the doctoral degree program. He then joined Communications, Rhetoric, and Digital Media (CRDM), an interdisciplinary PhD. program at NC State University. During his graduate study, he gave presentations to several conferences, such as the 98<sup>th</sup> AEJMC Annual Conference, 11<sup>th</sup> NC State Graduate Research Symposium and 4<sup>th</sup> Annual International Conference on Journalism and Mass Communications (in Singapore). He also made a publication, co-authored with Dr. James Kiwanuka-Tondo, in *Journalism and Mass Communication Journal* (vol. 5/10) for their study regarding the effect of separatism in the society. In 2015, Dwiyatna won the South East Asia Grant from Institute of International Education for his paper regarding Papua separatist group, a similar topic to this dissertation.

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## TABLES OF CONTENTS

<b>LIST OF TABLES .....</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES .....</b>	<b>ix</b>
<b>Chapter One: Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
Historical Background .....	6
The Origins of the Free West Papua Movement.....	7
The Transformation of the Free West Papua Movement in the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century .....	9
<b>Chapter Two: Literature Review .....</b>	<b>12</b>
Framework of a Separatist Group.....	12
Marketing Framework for the Separatist Groups .....	17
The Role of Visual Communication for the Papua Separatist Group.....	25
Public Diplomacy as a Counter-Insurgent Tool .....	27
Hard Power and Soft Power in Public Diplomacy .....	29
Public Diplomacy’s Transformation in the Age of Digital Media .....	31
<b>Chapter Three: Separatist Groups' Websites Comparative Analysis (Study One) .....</b>	<b>35</b>
Sampling .....	36
Units of Analysis and Coding Scheme .....	38
Intercoder Reliability .....	40
Findings .....	41
Discussion.....	57
Research Limitations .....	64
<b>Chapter Four: Mixed Methods Visual Content Analysis (Study Two) .....</b>	<b>67</b>
Methods .....	67
Sampling .....	71
Units of Analysis .....	72
Coding Scheme.....	74
Intercoder Reliability .....	75
Findings .....	76
Research Limitations .....	99

<b>Chapter Five: Public Diplomacy Content Analysis (Study Three)</b> .....	<b>101</b>
Sampling .....	101
Operationalization .....	103
Units of Analysis .....	104
Coding Scheme .....	105
Intercoder Reliability .....	106
Findings .....	107
Discussion .....	117
Research Limitations .....	120
<b>Chapter Six: Conclusions</b> .....	<b>122</b>
First Aspect: The Separatist Groups Comparison .....	122
Second Aspect: The Papua Separatist Group Visual Representation .....	125
Third Aspect: Public Diplomacy as a Conflict Resolution Tool .....	127
<b>REFERENCES</b> .....	<b>132</b>
<b>APPENDICES</b> .....	<b>186</b>
Appendix A. Ethnic Separatist Groups and Their Websites .....	187
Appendix B. Political separatist groups and Their Websites .....	188
Appendix C. Terrorist separatist groups and Their Websites .....	191

## LIST OF TABLES

1. Study one's intercoder reliability .....	142
2. Ethnic separatist groups' funding resources.....	143
3. Political separatist groups' funding resources.....	144
4. Terrorist separatist groups' funding resources.....	147
5. Separatist groups' funding resources.....	148
6. Ethnic separatist groups' media channels.....	149
7. Political separatist groups' media channels.....	150
8. Terrorist separatist groups' media channels.....	154
9. Separatist groups' media channels.....	155
10. Ethnic separatist groups' recruitment strategies.....	156
11. Political separatist groups' recruitment strategies.....	157
12. Terrorist separatist groups' recruitment strategies.....	159
13. Separatist groups' recruitment strategies.....	160
14. Study two's intercoder reliability.....	161
15. Manifest themes from the Papua separatists' Facebook photos.....	162
16. Races on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts.....	163
17. Clothes on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts.....	164
18. Accessories on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts.....	165
19. Locations on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts.....	166
20. Backgrounds on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts.....	167
21. Flags on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts.....	168
22. Languages on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts.....	169
23. Languages (2) on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts.....	170
24. Top 20 words on the Papua separatists' Facebook photo captions.....	171
25. Co-occurrence patterns of races and clothes.....	174
26. Co-occurrence patterns of backgrounds and locations.....	175
27. Hard power among Indonesian Government's tweets.....	176

28. Soft power among Indonesian Government's tweets.....	177
29. Type of communication among Indonesian Government's tweets.....	178
30. Type of actors among Indonesian Government's tweets.....	179
31. Type of interests among Indonesian Government's tweets.....	180
32. Yearly data on the power messages among Indonesian Government's tweets.....	181
33. Combinations of public diplomacy messages.....	182
34. Yearly data on type of public diplomacy messages.....	183

## LIST OF FIGURES

1. Three types of transnational political activity and their frequency distribution.....184
2. Horizon line illustration in a photo..... 185

The Papua Separatist Group and Indonesia in the Age of New Public Diplomacy:  
A Comparative Analysis of Websites, Facebook Visuals, and Twitter

**Chapter One: Introduction**

The rise of digital media in the 21st century caused many changes to the society. Connected digital technologies have notably transformed the ways humans communicate with others (Castells, 2004), whether as individuals or as part of a group. From the organizational point of view, the advance of information technology changed mainly in how information could be delivered to the public (Seo & Thorson, 2012). Ultimately, networked digital communication decentralized public communication. Mainstream media used to reserve their space for powerful organization representatives, such as government employees, corporate CEOs, spokes persons, publicists, etc. In the age of digital media, although this practice is not entirely abandoned, citizens and minority groups now can participate in the public space more than they ever could (Benkler, 2006).

The presence of Internet and other forms of digital media potentially affected the Free West Papua Movement, one of the oldest minority resistance groups in Indonesia. The digital media provided a public sphere for the separatists to be independently operated as insurgent media (Hiltner, 2005). Therefore, the Papua separatists can convey their messages more intensively than ever. However this concern is still unnoticed in the studies regarding the Papua separatist group. Scholars and professionals had debates and discussion regarding the presence of the Papua separatist group around the period of its establishment in 1964 (see Van der Veur, 1963; Kroef, 1968; Lubis, 1968; UN-OPI, 1969). In the 21st century, there

was even more extensive research about the Papua separatist group (see Rutherford, 2012; Chauvel, 2003). The latest research regarding the 21<sup>st</sup> century's Free West Papua Movement was conducted by Eben Kirksey (2012). Through ethnographic investigation, he found that recent changes in the Indonesian political situation and globalization had made changes to the separatist movement. Kirksey argued that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the separatists had more freedom to make connections abroad than they did prior to the third millennium era. Nevertheless, the political sciences' and the cultural studies' perspectives dominated the knowledge regarding the Free West Papua Movement. The body of knowledge still lacked the communication studies' point of view even though the presence of digital media had been around for years. Hence, the author argues that the communication studies are useful to analyze recent issues of the Papua separatist groups, particularly in the age of digital media. Three main aspects will be discussed in this study concerning the separatist's communication practices.

**The separatist groups' comparison.** The first aspect is how the Free West Papua Movement compared to other separatist groups. Asal, Conrad, and White (2014) found that, in general, separatist groups employed three methods when they communicated with foreign audiences; solicitation, non-violent contention, and violent contention. This dissertation extends their model by comparing different categories of separatist groups. Scholars have identified the Papua separatist group as an ethnic separatist organization (Kirksey, 2012; Rutherford, 2012). In addition, there are also different categories of separatist groups, such as the separatist political organization (Greenway, 2007) and a separatist terrorist organization (Fearon, 2004; Forsberg, 2005). The comparison would serve as an extended model of Asal

et al.'s model of the separatist's activity by comparing the separatists' marketing activities. This dissertation is interested in investigating the issue through marketing because the organization's marketing activities practically reflected the philosophies and moral of the organization (Watkins & Hill, 2005). The separatist groups employed marketing activities to improve their organization by winning a competition in international support (Clifford, 2005). In this regard, this dissertation compares different separatist groups by looking at their marketing activities.

**The Papua separatist group visual representation.** Next, from Eric Hiltner's (2005) essay regarding the insurgent media, we learned that the digital media had enabled active separatist groups to represent their organizations in the public sphere. In the Papua case, Kirkseys (2012) identified the Papua separatist's transition in the global stage so far had changed its organizational strategies to interact with the international society. Nonetheless, his analysis was based on the Papua separatists' activities since they moved their office to the foreign territories of Britain and the Netherlands. Besides the change in their physical presence, the Free West Papua Movement also established their digital media existence. Their biggest presence can arguably be found on Facebook. With more than 200,000 likes on Facebook, the Free West Papua Movement's account on Facebook communicates daily to their audiences worldwide through the social media. The author acknowledged that Facebook did not have a "dislike" button. Therefore the presence of the like button could also mean something else, such as the "follow" button on Twitter. However, even if people only follow the Free West Papua activities, their Facebook account still had the ability to convey messages to the massive amount of Facebook's users. Their move could be seen as strategic

given that Facebook, in general, generates one billion users daily (Zuckerberg, 2015).

Research on this biggest social media platform suggested that visual content created more engagement from the public, than content without images (Belicove, 2011). With this assumption, this study is interested in investigating the role of visual communication for the Papua separatist group. Therefore, the second issue addressed by this dissertation is regarding how the Papua separatist group employs images to represent its identity on Facebook.

**Public diplomacy as a conflict resolution tool.** Given the advance of the Papua separatist's methods aimed at international audiences, it also means the Indonesian Government's public diplomacy is facing a new form of challenge. What the author means is as the form of Government communication that deals with the foreign audience, the public diplomacy body of knowledge is facing a direct challenge from the insurgent media activities. Particularly, public diplomacy has rarely been examined in a conflict situation. In most public diplomacy research's cases, the nation-states were assumed to have all the time and resources to implement their goals (see Hall, 2012; Wang, 2008; Rajul, 2013). In one of the limited public diplomacy-conflict resolution studies, Kirova (2012) made an attempt to explain how Russia and Georgia had a territorial dispute over two border territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. She suggested that public diplomacy should be seen "not only as a unilateral form of communication" (p. 8). Subsequently, Kirova's analysis on public diplomacy as conflict resolution was based only from political science's perspective, such as including the Russian immigration system.

Kirova's study demonstrates a lack of conflict set-up in public diplomacy from the communication studies' perspective. Seeing there is a need to improve public diplomacy's

research area in communication, Zaharna (2009) suggested public diplomacy theorists should develop research on dialogue, transparency, trust, and commitment. She saw public diplomacy's potential in her comparison of linear versus relational approaches, "public diplomacy is as much a communication phenomenon as a political one" (p. 86). In this regard, by knowing that the Papua separatist group seeks international support, it is interesting to analyze the Indonesian Government response to this global communication phenomenon. By analyzing the Indonesian Government public diplomacy activities on the West Papua issue, this chapter contributes to the Indonesian contemporary diplomacy's body of knowledge.

Seeing the three topics that are discussed in this dissertation, the author believes that this study enriches the body of knowledge on the Papua separatist group. Notably, this dissertation expands the understanding of the Free West Papua Movement by discussing it from a communication approach, instead of political science's point of view and cultural studies' perspective, which has dominated this issue in the academic world. Also, this study discusses the Indonesian Government's perspective when they encountered a crisis, which was the result of the Papua separatist's effort. The latter discussion would add a dimension of Papua Separatist's contemporary study, by discussing the Papua separatist's counter-organization practices. Further, from this dissertation, communication researchers will broadly learn about how the minority-rebellion groups and the state governments employed new media. Particularly, this dissertation is interested in the marketing activities, visual representation and the message strategies used in the three topics of separatism issues. Before

discussing the three topics mentioned above further, the next section will discuss the background of the Free West Papua Movement.

### **Historical Background**

West Papua is one of the five biggest islands in Indonesia, along with Java, Sumatera, Borneo, and Sulawesi (Jones, 1977). The West Papua region comprises around one-quarter of Indonesia's landmass and is roughly four times the island Java's size, which is where Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, is established. The island of Papua is located in the far eastern area of the Indonesian archipelago, which consists of more than 17,000 islands (Pisani, 2014). The island is home for native Melanesian, an ethnic group that inhabits most of the Pacific islands (Bronislaw, 2013). During the colonial era, both the Netherlands and the British Empire agreed to divide the land into two parts with an imaginary line splitting the two halves equally (Chauvel, 2003). When the Dutch decided to take the western part of Papua Island, they built military bases near the division line of the island and along the coast of Papua.

When the Indonesian Government's founding fathers first declared their independence in 1945, Papua was not included in their administration territory. Their territory was limited only for Java, Madura and Sumatera islands. The other archipelago territories, which we know now as Indonesia, were still in the Dutch government's control. In the first five years after their independence day, the Indonesian Government gained more territory, thanks to their war and diplomatic efforts against the Dutch colonial (Steadly, 2013). In 1954, the Indonesian government, along with the Governments of Sri Lanka, Myanmar, India, and Pakistan, also campaigned to end the Western's colonialism in the

Eastern world. Their vision was supported by 24 other governments and resulted in the Asia-Africa Conference, a summit that took place in April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia (Lee, 2010). After the Asia-Africa Conference, leaders from 29 countries further condemned the Western's colonialism. Eventually, in 1962 the Indonesian Government reached West Papua as the Dutch colony's last territory in the South East Asia region (Cholil, 1971). Seeing that another war was about to come, the two parties agreed to meet in the United States. Their meeting resulted in the "New York Agreement" that saw the Dutch hand over the Papua region (Webster, 2013).

In the beginning of the Papua integration, the Indonesian government was greeted widely by the native people. The first Indonesian President Soekarno "skillfully mobilized nearly unanimous support against the Netherlands and made the struggle for West Papua an issue of national unity" (Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004, p. 3).

### **The Origins of the Free West Papua Movement**

Two years after the integration of West Papua to Indonesia, native Papuans started resisting their land's occupation. In March, 1964, a meeting was held in the city of Manokwari (Boelaars, 1986). Most of them were local ethnic leaders, with prominent figures such as Lodwik Mandacan, Barent Mandacan, John Jambuani, Permenas Ferry Awom, Benyamin Anari, and Jimmy Wambrau. They were united in a group called the Free West Papua Movement.

The separatist group had a mission to secede from the Republic of Indonesia territory and form a new nation in the West Papua region. During the early time of the separatist organization, its struggle was entirely supported by the Netherlands Government (Kroef,

1968). The latter also asked the Indonesian Government to hold the Act of Free Choice in West Papua through the United Nation's procedure. The Indonesian Government agreed to this term but requested that the poll should be according to the rule that was approved by the Indonesian Government (Bhakti, 1985). In 1969, the West Papuan's Act of Free Choice took place under the supervision of the United Nations and the aftermath resulted in the formal integration of West Papua into Indonesia. After the United Nations had recognized the general poll's result in the same year, immediately many of the Free West Papua Movement's foreign supporters abandoned them (Hastings, 1973). This event also ended the diplomatic campaign for the West Papua's independence that had been going throughout the 1960s.

Meanwhile in the Indonesian capital city of Jakarta, there was a major shift of political power. The event, which was popularly called as the revolution movement, made the Lieutenant General Soeharto as the second Indonesian president. Different than his predecessor, Soeharto employed a stricter military approach during his regime period from 1966 to 1998. For example, the Indonesian Government would prosecute any Indonesian individual as criminal if they were proven to criticize purposefully the president and others who upheld the state's policies (Brundige, 2003). In addition, Soeharto's regime positioned Jakarta as the most dominant territory for all Indonesian Government activity, including politics, business, tourism, and military. To run the Government's office, he appointed his closest ally and family as the Indonesian Government's senior figures. Further, Soeharto's administration employed a closed media system. All kinds of media had to be registered and approved under the Department of Information if they ever wanted to be published or

broadcasted. Furthermore, the Department had the ability to close a media outlet instantly without a prior administrative process. Chalmers (1997) suggested that Soeharto's regime successfully "limiting legitimate debate to prevent the institutionalization of public protest" (p. 64).

The Soeharto regime's centralistic policies caused more rejections by the Free West Papua Movement. Besides the disagreement on how the Indonesian Government treated the opposition groups, the Papua separatists accused the Indonesian Government with treating Papuans as stone-age savages. Bone's (2009) investigation revealed that this accusation was based on the secondary school cultural history textbook, which was used throughout Indonesia in the 1980s. According to him, the book portrayed Papuan's culture similar to the culture of people in the prehistoric age. During the period of Soeharto's regime, Papua separatist's actions were mostly remembered as harming Indonesian officials or burning the Government's office in Papua (Boelaars, 1986). However, outnumbered by the military force, the Free Papua Movement failed to inspire fellow Papuans to follow their vision (Chauvel, 2003).

### **The Transformation of the Free West Papua Movement in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

After the Soeharto's regime had ended due to the reformation movement, the Indonesian Government scaled down their military activity in the West Papua region (ICG, 2001). At that time many of the separatist groups in Indonesia, including the Free West Papua Movement, reattempted their mission to gain independence (Jones, 2003).

Unfortunately, due to their lack of experience and the same old methods, the Papua separatists did not get a different result than before. Even worse Indonesian Police captured

their leader, Benny Wenda, and charged him with criminal indictments (Amnesty International, 2002).

The day when the Papua separatist group truly changed their fate came on October 27, 2002. On that day, Mr. Wenda escaped the prison and fled outside Indonesia (Kirksey, 2012). He quickly reorganized his comrades and built their base in Oxford, England. There, the Free West Papua Movement established their organization and hoped to gain more support from international society. By operating in the foreign countries, the OPM chief had a demographic advantage to communicate with foreign prominent political figures. For example, during the year of 2010, Benny Wenda set up a series of meetings with the Fiji Prime Minister, US congressmen, as well as Australian and British parliament members (Rutherford, 2012). Ultimately, Mr. Wenda was successful in clearing all charges on the Interpol database for his past accused activities (Nugroho, 2003).

To connect with the public, the newly organized Free West Papua Movement employed digital media to convey their message. The Papua separatists launched their website in 2004 (Free West Papua Movement, 2015). Mainly, the website has news content and also lists the Free West Papua Movement's political manifesto. Five years later, along with the growing popularity of the social media, the Free West Papua Movement created an official Facebook page (Free West Papua Movement, 2015). Through this social media account, the separatist group possibly reaches a bigger audience than ever. While the separatist's website has only 3,000 active users, their Facebook account had more than 200,000 Facebook's likes. Further, although these numbers represented more than two-thirds

of the population of Jayapura, the West Papua capital city, unfortunately to date there is a lack of attention to the Papua separatist's new media activity.

In summary, the Indonesian Government and the International Organizations paid attention to the West Papua when it engaged in traditional diplomacy but have likely ignored the soft-power build up. To this date, there is no evidence that the Indonesian Government engaged in any campaign about their presence in Papua. Meanwhile, the transformation of the Free West Papua Movement in the 21<sup>st</sup> century enabled the Papua separatists to establish a new medium to communicate with the audience, both domestic and international. In only less than a decade, their Facebook account attracted hundreds of thousands of people. With more than 200,000 people pushing the "like" buttons on the Free West Papua Movements' Facebook account, studying the separatists' new media would not only be interesting, it could also be strategic. The following literature review section discusses an in-depth perspective of how the Papua separatists' transformation would fit among the general concepts of separatism.

## Chapter Two: Literature Review

### Framework of a Separatist Group

According to Harris (2010), three terms, rebel, insurgent, and separatist, have been used to call an act against the Government. He distinguished the term of separatist from the other terms by arguing that the characteristic of the separatist concept always comes with a territory conflict. His argument supports the separatist group definition, which is an alliance of individuals that wants to secede from their country (Horowitz, 1981). Further, Fearon (2004) suggested that the concept of separatism could not be simplified as the rebels that wanted the state government's territory. He explained that the complexity of the separatism definition came from the fact that world's governance system had been developed over time. According to Fearon (2004), "One of the central debates in the literature on separatists has concerned the question of when nationalism began, with some saying it has deep pre-modern roots and others (the 'modernists') arguing that nationalism is a product of modernity" (p. 399). Therefore, he believed that the concept of separatism developed strongly in a society that had less contact with the modern governance system.

From his perspective, the pre-modern definition came from a pre-countries-world-era when there was no formal organization to be called a country. In contrast, the modernist perspective saw the separatist group as a result of nation forming, especially in the 19th century. Although the two views are different, they share one common thing regarding the separatist group. The separatist group has to have a will or vision to be independent and free from the outside group's control.

Approximately 146 separatist cases in 76 countries happened in the last 50 years (Walter, 2006). Typically, in each separatism case, scholars found that the insurgent leaders made many promises to their followers that independence would benefit their group. However, it was not clear that this nationalist/separatist appeal was the sole motivation for supporting the movement, given there were method variations in each separatist movement. From empirical research on 104 separatist groups in the 1990-2004 time period, Asal et al. (2014) found the separatists employed mainly three methods: solicitation, non-violent contention, and violent contention (as seen in Figure 1).

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

Further, Asal et al. (2014) suggested that by choosing one of these methods, a separatist group would affect its fundamental operation. For example, an ethnic separatist group in North Africa was less likely to solicit, engage in violent, or engage in nonviolent contentious politics than a non-separatist organization. In another example, Asal et al. found a separatist group in Egypt that participated in the local election prevented itself from commitments with foreign institutions. From these examples, Asal et al.'s model confirmed that there were differences in how separatist organizations operated. Nevertheless, their model still reviewed separatist groups in general definition. Prior research, however, revealed that separatist groups in the 21<sup>st</sup> century were defined in three different categories.

**Political separatist groups.** A separatist group that falls in the political separatist groups category is likely to utilize a solicitation method. Asal et al. (2014) defined the latter as maintaining an office among the state systems and conducting meetings with constituents. Historically, the rise of democratic countries since 20<sup>th</sup> century allowed people with different

aspirations to criticize their government, even their territorial policy. With a broadly homogeneous population, its currency, flag, army, government and airline, the territories of Québec, Catalonia, Flanders, Wales and Scotland were examples of how people can secede without causing chaos and violence (Greenway, 2007). In each case, the central government granted some self-rule and autonomous rights to the separatist region, preventing the situation from turning violent. Also, the movements were able to argue their case through elected political representatives in a functioning democratic system, which also reduced the likelihood of violence.

To be involved in the political process, the separatist group should transform their organization by tempering down the ambitions of the nationalist factions (Carley, 1996). For example, the Québec separatists agreed to participate in the Canadian regional election after they lost the referendum in 1995. In addition, Asal et al.'s (2014) model of the separatist's method suggested that any separatist group that participated in the local election was found to reduce engagement in political activity abroad.

**Ethnic separatist groups.** In general, an ethnic group was defined as an organization that was formed by a panel of people that shared cultural values, in which the group relied on membership and cultural identity during interactions with others (Barth, 1969). The presence of ethnic organizations lately was investigated by their active communication in the media. For, example Bai (2010) and Lin & Song (2006) found ethnic representations in ethnic media. Similarly, Johnson and Carneiro (2014) found similar ethnic group activities through ethnic museum websites.

Through his research, Chai (2008) concluded that there is a positive feeling regarding separatist groups operating as cultural organizations. “The relevance of separatist movements and ethnicity is apparent since they fundamentally altered the shape of the world’s geopolitical map” (Chai, 2008, p. 1460). The root of this problem is because partition of a state along ethnic lines almost inevitably leads to long-term conflict, particularly if the central government resists the separatist movement (Horowitz, 1981). The ethnic separatists often brought into being dozens of new countries and changed the boundaries of dozens of existing ones (e.g. Kawthoolei in Myanmar, Lozi in Namibia, and Christians, Druze and Kurds in Syria). Muller (2008) suggested that that the ethnic separatists rarely challenged the Government officials according to the national constitution. "Often, these various types of ethnic identities were at a level below the state, but just as often they crosscut state boundaries, bringing into motion regional and international conflicts that threatened state integrity" (p. 45).

In addition, Chima (2015) suggested the ethnic separatist group would not hesitate to show the group’s cultural identity. She gave an example of the Tiger Tamil separatists, who lately appeared in public with their traditional costume and accessories. Further, in the modern state system ethnic identities could be found in both domestic and foreign territories. The term *diaspora* usually referred to the ethnic identity members found in foreign countries, separated from their ethnic homeland. In addition, Asal et al.’s (2014) model of the separatist methods suggested that separatist movements, while gaining a broad diaspora support, were likely leading the nonviolent protests. Their data showed that this kind of group was very active in the civil society level.

**Terrorist separatist groups.** According to Asal et al. (2014), foreign funding and authoritarianism in the domestic political system increases the use of the separatist's violent activities. Recent situations in the Middle East and Eastern Europe provided more evidence that separatism could provoke violent conflict, especially when countries divide along ethnic lines, as the leaderless Middle East countries have done. ISIS's festering rage over the war on terror is a prime example. The rise of ISIS was evidence that secession situations can convert a domestic ethnic dispute into a more dangerous one. "The recurrent temptation to create a multitude of homogeneous mini-states, even if it could be realized, might well increase the total of warfare rather than reduce it" (Breary, 2011, p. 128). For the extremist, a violent method is necessary because it could serve a maximum and powerful impact with minimal resources (Pearlman, 2011). If the separatist group has a lack of voluntary support, then it would also act as another reason to employ this method (Weinstein, 2006).

As a response to global violence, the United States Department of State listed terrorist organizations around the world (US Department of State, 2015). Several separatist groups, which have extremist approaches, were included on this list. For example, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Hamas were all cited for their goal to form a new country separated from their legitimate governments on the territory (White, 2013). When a separatist organization is listed as terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State, it likely loses many abilities because of the sanctions policy that comes with that designation. Typically, the sanctions would sever the economic, cultural and political capabilities of the separatist group (Sullivan & Beittel, 2014). In order to survive these limitations, many terrorist groups established another sub-organization. In the

case of the IRA, the Irish separatists founded Sinn Fein as IRA's political wing that still carried the separatist's identity (Hanley and Millar, 2010).

Overall, this section has discussed the different characteristics among the three kinds of separatist groups. They also had different tactics in their interaction with the public. To give more explanation about how the separatists' activities should be analyzed, the following section will review the framework regarding their marketing activities.

### **Marketing Framework for the Separatist Groups**

Clifford's (2005) work served as an important framework for viewing that digital media not only provided spaces for representing the separatists but it also enabled them to improve their organization. His view was based on the Zapatista and the Ogoni cases that happened in Mexico and Nigeria respectively. The author made a strong case for the multitude of oppressed minorities and other marginalized groups whose international pleas for assistance went overlooked. To overcome this problem, the author argued that a marketing approach to rebellion would allow scholars of transnational social movements to understand significant variations in a local challenging group's ability to attract supporters. Clifford found that Ogoni's and Zapatista's marketing campaigns separated their success from the other insurgent groups who failed to gain assistance in the transnational support market. In short, Clifford argued that the separatist group employed marketing activities to win the competition in luring international support.

In the marketing literature, there are three types of organizations, which cover a heterogeneous array of organizations: the public, private, and nonprofit sectors (Beck, Lengnick-Hall, & Lengnick-Hall, 2008). While the public sector had a close relationship

with the government, and private sector was easily related to the corporations, there was not an agreement upon definition for the third sector. Common terms for the third sector were described as nonprofit, not-for-profit, voluntary, charitable, independent, nongovernmental, and civil society (O'Neil, 2002). To find the answer for which type of organizations fit the separatists group, this study looked at the American government's practice. The US Government's Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and related Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations and state tax laws considered political advocacy groups as non-profit organizations (NPO) (IRS, 2008).

**Funding resources for NPOs.** Marketing scholars emphasized the adoption of a marketing mindset, termed a "customer-centered" mindset (Kotler & Andreasen, 2012, p. 49). They stressed the importance of evaluation of behavioral change in developing the organization resources. Blery, Katseli, and Tsara (2010) suggested that an evaluation framework for a non-profit organization (NPO) should include two organization activities. The first activity that they suggested was the funding. The profit organization's marketing has its core business in selling their product or service. It would serve as the primary goal for all organizational activity. On the contrary, the NPO's marketing is different than the profit organization's because "most non-profit organizations are not selling products, they are selling their organization's mission, their ideas, their programs, and their services" (p. 57).

In the past, the NPO's funding depended mostly on government money. This situation changed in the 1970s, with the non-profit organizations aimed at more diversified sources of financing (Salamon, 2002). Toepler (2006) claimed that this shift has made non-profits turn to commercialization. Nevertheless, Silverman and Paterson (2010) still believed that the

NPO's funding is different than the profit organization's capital resources. They argued that the non-profit organization could collect money from resources that the for-profit organization could not. Through empirical research, they listed financial resources for today's NPO funding: National advocacy organizations, government, foundations, private corporations, membership/ individual contributions, and fees for services. Thus, based on the nonprofit marketing literature, the two first research questions for the dissertation's first study were:

***RQ. 1: Where did the separatist groups get their funding?***

***RQ. 2: What kinds of differences, if any, exist among the separatist groups' types of funding?***

**Media channels for NPOs.** The second marketing activity suggested by Blery and colleagues (2010) was the selection of media channel. They were aware that the NPO was slightly disadvantaged in terms of the limited amount of publicity budget. However, with the right choice, they believed that the NPO could utilize the media "to boost public awareness, increase effectiveness in recruiting volunteers, mobilize advocates, and raise more money" (Blery et al., 2010, p. 59).

To be sustainable as an organization, an NPO should outline clearly their target markets, identify their customers and maintain consistent communication with them (Maynard, 2008; Lake, 2008; Ojiambo, 1994). With the limited budget as their main restriction, the non-profits had to employ the media channel strategically if they wanted to achieve their target. Empirical research showed that non-profit organizations mainly employed an organizational website as their media channel, given that the Internet provided

cheaper media than ever, or even free media (Yeon, Choi, & Kisousis, 2005). Further, Barnes and Matson's (2009) study also found that large-scale non-profit organizations were able to beat corporations and academic institutions in the adoption of social media. The nonprofits' expertise on social media was reasonable because the groups used it heavily to streamline their management functions, interact with volunteers and donors, and educate others about their programs and services (Waters, 2009). Furthermore, besides the website and the social media, NPOs were also known to apply the other trending communication tools, such as email, blogs, photo sharing, and video sharing (Nonprofit Marketing Guide.com, 2012). Based on the literature regarding the NPO's media channels, this dissertation would further ask the following research questions:

***RQ. 3: What media channels did the separatist groups use?***

***RQ. 4: What kinds of differences, if any, existed among the separatist group's types of media channels?***

**Recruitment strategies for NPOs.** In addition to the two marketing activities described above, this study argues that another important aspect of NPO's marketing is regarding the volunteer/ member recruitment. The latter plays a significant role in the NPO's sustainability (Laverie & McDonald, 2007). Further, Kotler and Murray (1975) suggested that the volunteer's contribution in the nonprofit sector has more potential value contributions than equivalent labors in the profit organization or public sector. They argued that since the first and second sector organizations relied heavily on paid manpower, their workers' productivity were likely limited to the hours they were paid for. Meanwhile, the

third sector volunteerism could have unlimited potential productivity because the labors were motivated by the mission of the organization.

In terms of the separatist recruitment's effort, Adhami (2007) believes that the separatist's involvement in the public sphere, particularly the one who depended on a violent method, would only be for gaining sympathy from the public and not for recruitment. He argues that hiring unknown new members would potentially jeopardize the separatist's primary mission. Instead, in terms of hiring new members, Adhami suspects that family-relatives and ideology/religious connection would serve as the recruitment's best practices for the separatist group. However, lately the world was surprised with the ISIS recruiting phenomenon. As many people around the world flew into the conflict zone, Secara (2015) claimed that ISIS employed their web media activities to recruit members. Seeing the importance of recruiting volunteers/ members for an NPO and the evidence provided by ISIS, this study is interested to learn more about the separatist techniques in recruiting volunteers/ members in the public spheres.

***RQ. 5: What strategies did the separatist groups use for recruitment?***

***RQ. 6: What kinds of differences, if any, existed among the separatist groups' types of recruitment?***

Given the increasing amount of the separatists' marketing activity in the age of the Internet, the new media had proved to serve a vital role for the separatist groups. Therefore the second study's literature review will further discuss that issue.

## **The Role of the New Media for Insurgent Groups**

The advance of information technology created the Internet as the new public sphere (Castells, 2004). The new media provided access for more citizens to the communication channels that were traditionally set aside almost exclusively for government representatives (Bennett, 2004). In the digital media realm, people or organizations could send their message without any editorial process from the media workers (Benkler, 2006).

The advantage of new media for the separatist group could be seen primarily from a conflict between them and the Governments. The conflict is usually conducted in two dimensions; the material world and the sphere of information. In traditional wars between the two sides, the government would likely have superiority on both dimensions (Chadwick, 2006). The role of new media comes into play by improving the separatist group's ability in accessing the public sphere (Adhami, 2007). Although the government may still have the upper hand, because they have more resources to utilize legal and surveillance ability such as banning certain websites, due to the decentralized aspect of the internet, any material still could be found in the internet realm as "the diverse servers hosting websites have a hard time filtering the enormous amount of information present" (p. 875). More importantly, the new media enables the separatist group to deliver messages at a pace and in the quantity that was exclusively possessed by Governments before the Internet came into play (Cull, Culbert, & Welch, 2003).

Further, the ability to send a message to their media also serves as the next advantage for the separatists. As mainstream media in general work on a fixed schedule, there is a big chance that they would not air nor publish the full statement from the separatist organization

(Peled, 2012). Often times, this editing process would alter the separatist's central message. For example, Al-Jazeera TV station was frequently found to select certain parts of the Hamas' videos because the full version of the videos contained threats to the Qatari Government, the principal owner of the news network (Elmasry, El Shamy, Manning, Mills, & Auter, 2013).

Another advantage of the Internet is that it provides the interaction space between the separatist groups and their supporters. The interaction came with the fact that organizations, in general, used the Internet to establish their own home page (Palmer, 2002). Research on website content has found that an organization's interaction with the public came in the form of information exchange, organizational culture, training opportunities and online recruitment (Cober, Brown, Keeping, & Levy, 2003).

Radical movement scholar Eric Hiltner (2005) saw that the advantages of the Internet enabled insurgent groups to create insurgent media. He defined insurgent media as the public sphere that was used by an insurgent group because their voice was ignored by the mainstream media. He explained that there was a growing danger of the mainstream media's practice because they were owned by limited number of corporations. Therefore the importance of insurgent media laid "in the stories of millions that would never be heard or seen by anyone else" (Hiltner, 2005, p. 106). Further, Hiltner suggested three fundamental differences between the mainstream media and the insurgent media. First, the mainstream media's existence is influenced highly by economic constraints, which sees profit as the most important factor. The mainstream media would calculate the cost of creating media content and compare it with the expected return. In some cases, mainstream media would support an

enormous amount of money if there is a chance to get more revenue afterward. Meanwhile, the insurgent media would consider their idealism, such as nation and ideology, as the main reason for producing the media. An economic factor would not stand in their way if there were a chance to create content that is in line with their vision.

Second, the mainstream media operates vertically in a hierarchal system. They are “concentrating power into fewer corporations, eating up smaller markets, and eliminating competition” (Hiltner, 2005, p. 103). In other words, the mainstream media act similar to the industrial system, where the most dominant media have the most influence and exclusive content. In contrast, insurgent media moves horizontally. They are likely to embrace diversity and allow others to share their content limitlessly.

Seeing these differences, there is a sense that insurgent media would have a disadvantage of having less funding. In that case, how do they produce content that in the end would attract the audience? Hiltner suggested that insurgent media avoid the mainstream media approach to creating content. From his perspective, the mainstream would likely use a generic attitude in reporting an event, mostly by presenting a faceless object. The main recommendation for the insurgent media is to produce content that is entirely different than the mainstream media. An example of a comparison between the two types of media could be found in the way they reported in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy. While most mainstream media captured the statement and asked government official routine –type questions in a press conference, the Guerilla News Network asked tougher questions such as “Why has George W. Bush not fired those who made the mistakes? Why did the Air Force not follow

standard operating procedures that would have shot down the planes before they hit the World Trade Center?” (Hiltner, 2005, p. 104).

With a limited budget, insurgent media could also try making a more personal connection with their story and developing a critical approach to attract an audience. In social media, the insurgent group could even employ the medium more effectively. For instance, Hamas was perceived as more credible when they posted images of up, close and personal victims in the Middle East (Peled, 2012). In short, insurgent media should be able to offer more passion and courage to the audience than the mainstream media.

### **The Role of Visual Communication for the Papua Separatist Group**

By aiming at more idealistic content yet with an entertaining approach, we should suspect that visual communication would be the fittest form of insurgent media. As described thoroughly by Rose (2012), visual communication rises to the top of the communication platform since social media stormed into the online media a few years ago. It offers content that is simpler and easier to understand than written, even when it illustrates something abstract like an emotion or another type of sensation. For instance, empirical research on Facebook found that visual communication, such as pictures and videos, generated more actions and reactions from the audience than written posts (Belicove, 2011).

Scholars of visual communication claimed that the role of visuals plays a significant role in the contemporary age, especially when aimed at different cultures and countries (Cloud, 2008; Seo, 2014; Brantner, Lobinger, & Wetzstein, 2011). Further, visual communication has a strong influence on the viewers’ emotional responses, evaluations of communicative quality, and perception of actor representation (Brantner et al., 2011). The

role of visuals for an insurgent type group is mainly different from the “mainstream” organizations (Hiltner, 2005). The latter has a tendency to communicate visually with “talking heads without much action” (ibid, p. 103). Most of the insurgent web space, however, touches more human-interest themes than government websites (Seo, 2014). For example, research on Hamas’ activity on Twitter empirically found that the Palestinian rebels used their social network activity to spread propaganda by mostly sending an “emotional propaganda frame” (Seo, 2014, p. 157).

The Papua separatists, however, were not only representing political views but also representing their cultural tradition (Rutherford, 2012). Their presence was motivated to oppose the strong influence of the Malay and Javanese culture that dominated many Indonesian lives. From the Papua separatists’ point of view, the dominant cultures in Indonesia did not want the Papuans to preserve their culture (Rutherford, 2012). It could be argued that to maintain their culture and existence, Papua separatists employed their Facebook account to convey visual messages to their audience, especially to foreigners. Therefore, this study is interested in revealing the essential aspects of the Papua separatist's visual messages on Facebook. Those aspects could be analyzed by finding the salient themes of the Papua separatists’ Facebook posts. By determining the themes, this study attempts to seek their official representation in the public sphere. In addition, the themes could potentially enable this study to determine the organizational transformation of the Free West Papua Movement in the 21st century.

***RQ. 7: What were the manifest themes that emerged from the Papua separatists’ Facebook photos?***

Further, the semiotic study suggested that to understand or decode the message, a study should look for the signs and the signifiers from the picture objects (Saussure, 1983; Lidov, 1999). Since limited research has been done to study the Papua separatists' visuals, the following research questions are examined.

***RQ. 8: What were the signs and signifiers employed by the Papua separatists' Facebook photos?***

***RQ. 9: Were there patterns of co-occurrence among the visual signs in the Papua separatists' Facebook photos?***

The separatists' effort to gain international support had proven to be successful, at least in Indonesia's case. Back in 1999, the East Timor separatist group gained their independence and established a new state by appealing to the international society in the process (Novais, 2007; Steele, 2007). This campaign successfully attracted the United Nations' attention, which later ordered the Indonesian Government to hold a self-determination vote in the East Timor region (Martin, 2001). The latter resulted in the separatist's favor. East Timor separatist group's success could potentially lead to similar cases against the Indonesian Government. In the case of the Free West Papua Movement, the separatist group constantly called for the UN's intervention to reiterate the self-determination act in the West Papua (Tebay, 2005).

### **Public Diplomacy as a Counter-Insurgent Tool**

Given that the Free West Papua Movement is still engaged in their campaigns abroad means its counter insurgency's organization, the Indonesian Government, would respond in a similar fashion. Regarding counterinsurgency, Cox and Ryan (2015) described the concept as

a group response to every insurgent's attempts. "If successful, the entire insurgency can be undermined by addressing some of the core complaints or tensions that the insurgent had previously used to develop the insurgent cause undermining the insurgent's cause" (p. 45).

As the separatist group sought more from the international audience, that issue connects directly into the practice of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy literature has traditionally defined the discipline as the communication between the government and foreign audience (Tuch, 1990). Cull (2006) suggested that public diplomacy was different than traditional diplomacy because public diplomacy's inquiry believed in the method of influencing the foreign public to shape another nation's foreign policy. His argument came from the fact that the most state governments were formed to serve their people. In addition, Servaes (2012) saw the role of public diplomacy in involving culture and mass communication to form the dialogue between the governments in the public sphere.

Public diplomacy is targeted at the foreign public that bears directly on another government's foreign policy decisions, performed by both government and private individuals and groups, through influencing directly and indirectly those public attitudes and opinions; and its ultimate purpose is to promote the national interest. (Servaes, 2012, p. 644)

According to L'Etang (2009), public diplomacy has two distinctive features. First, as an official form of communication, public diplomacy has a responsibility to represent the government in public. Next, public diplomacy actors are also responsible for gathering information surrounding government image and for further planning an appropriate response. In the practical level, Walter's empirical study (2006) showed that European State Governments were handling the issue of separatism by improving their reputation.

Unfortunately, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the separatist issue does not stop only with just one act of positive image building. The reason is the rise of globalization and digital media. The new media have enabled some government opposition groups to participate in the conversation held for civilians (Bennett, 2004; Castells, 2004; Chadwick, 2006). Further, the new media also gave some liberties to the insurgent groups. “Recent changes in video, audio, and Internet technology have done for independent media what the copy machine did for print media: democratize the medium” (Hiltner, 2005, p. 101). The development of the public sphere also transformed the way nations influenced foreign audiences.

### **Hard Power and Soft Power in Public Diplomacy**

Nye (1990) argued that the form of power is the ability to influence foreign governments and international publics. Nye described that power was traditionally defined as the ownership of a big population, wide array of territory, a vast amount of natural resources, huge economic size, and strong military forces. These elements are what Nye called hard power. He gave a hard power example from the case of Cold War in the 20th century. At that time, many countries had to support either the USA or USSR to continue their lives because of the necessity to align with a hard power nation. In the post-Cold War era, Nye believed that “today...the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier periods. The factors of technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more significant in international power” (Nye, 2008, p. 154). In other words, small countries could challenge bigger countries in a new environment competition.

The term soft power referred to the attraction of “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its

foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2008, p. 97). An example of soft power is the case of tourism nowadays. Small population countries in Asia such Singapore and Hong Kong are more ahead in terms of tourist arrivals than Asian big population countries, such as India and Indonesia (WTO, 2015). A soft power example could also be reflected in the business world. One recent example could be found in the case of Russia’s investment. While always ranked in the world’s GDP top 10 countries, indicating that they have enough monetary resources to generate business, since 2007 other smaller countries have surpassed Russia in terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Since 2007, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reported that small countries such as Vietnam and Poland had a better FDI rank than Russia (UNCTAD, 2015). This fact indicated that Russia, as a bigger country, failed to attract more people to do business in their home nation. Certainly, what made the small countries successful did not come from their wide array of territory or huge population. They are becoming champions of the world because of soft power resources. Given that there were changes on how state governments performed on the international stage, this phenomena could relate to the states’ different communication methods. Further, regarding his concept of powers, Nye (2011) argued lately that the Governments were reluctant to only employing soft power in order to influence the foreign publics. As a result, he believed that the concept of smart power was the ideal concept of the future of power. According to Nye, smart power was the government ability to influence by combining hard power and soft power.

## **Public Diplomacy's Transformation in the Age of Digital Media**

In the age of digital media, Altinay (2011) found that the communication in the foreign public sphere faced challenges with differences in political, economic and cultural systems. Therefore, he suggested that the governments be proactive in mutual understanding and show respect about those differences. These ideal approaches, however, had a limitation in the traditional form of public diplomacy.

**The traditional form of public diplomacy.** From a communication perspective, traditional public diplomacy leaned toward one-way communication practice (Brown, 2009). The latter was reflected in a process that began when the government sent a message to foreign publics and ended when its national interest was fulfilled (Tuch, 1990; Gullion, 1965, in Cull, 2006). From that communication flow, we could see that the flow stopped when the message was delivered. There was no indication that traditional public diplomacy study was interested in the way the foreign public responded to that message. Traditional public diplomacy also had a tendency to claim that the state government serves as the main actor. In this regard, only state-government employees could convey public diplomacy. For example, Zhang and Benoit (2004) studied the Saudi Arabia response over 9/11 tragedy by asserting that the Saudi's government handled all their image-restoration campaign in the United States territory.

The next traditional public diplomacy's characteristic was regarding the goal of traditional public diplomacy. In a study concerning a public diplomacy program, national interest was used as the ultimate goal of public diplomacy. For example, when analyzing the United States' public diplomacy program under President Obama's administration, both

Gregory (2011) and Snow (2009) saw the United State's domestic and foreign development as the most important thing to achieve. Lastly, the traditional public diplomacy bears limited media selection. A traditional public diplomacy program was considered active when something happened in the mainstream media, such as TV, newspapers, radio, etc., or in Cull's (2013) phrase as "public diplomacy 1.0" (Cull, 2013, p. 1). These traditional public diplomacy characteristics were often viewed as simple propaganda (Brown, 2009). The differences between the two concepts were the public diplomacy's "brashness and self-glorification" (Brown, 2009, p. 155).

**The new form of public diplomacy.** Melissen (2005) was the first to describe the possibilities of public diplomacy's new approach. He mentioned the first reason to consider a new form of public diplomacy as a response to the globalization in which non-state actors have gained increased power and influence. The non-state actors are particularly coming from international non-government organizations and public figures. The other difference is how a new public operates in the international stage. Regarding this matter, Melissen stressed the importance of the adoption of more relational approaches. His suggestion, in short, is close to the approach of public relations' two-way communication design, which appeared in Grunig's (1992) excellence theory.

Different from traditional public diplomacy, new public diplomacy extends its goal beyond national interest. Melissen suggested that the goal of new public diplomacy should be toward international community development as he hoped it to be more effective in a global environment. By aiming their target for a greater good, Melissen saw the possibility of more cooperation and more results when the governments implemented new public diplomacy.

Historian and public diplomacy scholar Nicholas Cull (2013) agrees that there was a development in public diplomacy's practice. As technology develops in today's digital era, Cull named the changes in public diplomacy with the terms of 1.0 and 2.0. While the term 1.0 was identified as the traditional mass communication tools such as movies, newspapers, and radio, the latter term referred to the age of the Internet with its social media. Cull believed that the new platform of digital media could bring the two-way communication's interaction and the government's transparency in the public eye.

However, based on a case of the United States Government, he revealed that the transition from public diplomacy 1.0 to 2.0 was not as smooth as people would think. In fact, the U.S. Department of State was very slow to adapt public diplomacy 2.0. This situation was a contrary compared to the Department's adaptation when they implemented the public diplomacy 1.0 in the past. For example, the United States of Information Agency (USIA) quickly implemented radio technology when it was available for mass use in the 1930s. The same case was also found in the USIA's implementation of motion pictures technology. The slow adjustment to employ the social media as a new public diplomacy tool was also found in the Chinese Government (d'Hooghe, 2010) and in the Indian Government (Hall, 2012). Post (former) President Soeharto's regime, the Indonesian Government applied a new approach to their diplomatic endeavor (Jiang 2012; Gaillard, Clavé, & Kelman, 2008). Nonetheless, this view was based mainly on the examples of the Indonesian Government's traditional diplomacy actions. Given that the Free West Papua Movement actively employed the social media, it would be interesting to see what message the Indonesian Government's gave regarding the Papua issue.

*RQ. 10: What messages did the Indonesian Government address concerning the recent Papua issue in the social media?*

*RQ. 11: What kinds of differences, if any, existed among the Indonesian government's social media messages regarding the recent Papua issue in different time periods?*

Overall, this chapter discussed three key issues regarding the Free West Papua Movement. First, it discussed how the Papua separatist group was placed in the separatist cultural group by comparing it with other contemporary separatist groups. Second, the literature review discussed further how visual communication could enhance the organizational representation of the Papua separatists. Third, the literature review also looked at how public diplomacy could be employed by the Indonesian Government to respond to the growing web activities of the Free West Papua Movement. The following chapter will discuss a comparative analysis of separatist groups' websites.

## **Chapter Three:**

### **Separatist Groups' Websites Comparative Analysis (Study One)**

Study one aimed for analyzing the comparisons among the different categories of separatist groups. The literature in Chapter Two mentioned that there were three classifications of separatist groups. To look deeper into the differentiations among the three groups, this dissertation looked at their marketing activities to determine whether they could give indications on what strategies they employed to grow their organizations. Therefore, this study employed a comparative analysis of separatist groups' websites in order to establish a relationship between separatist groups' marketing efforts and the portrayal of their groups on the Internet.

#### **Methods**

In social research, comparative analysis is used to generally aim at comparison within different populations (Ragin, Marx, & Rihoux, 2014). In doing so, the comparative method employed mainly quantitative analysis on two typical objects. In the late 1980s, scholars began to conduct different ways of comparative analysis. Ragin (1987) suggested that qualitative analysis was sufficient for a comparative analysis. In addition, Walk (1998) argued that comparative analysis' research objects could be two un-identical objects that shared similar forms and purposes. He also suggested that a lens or keyhole method comparison would be sufficient for social science study. Lens method was a comparison analysis, in which the researchers were allowed to weight one sample more than the others. "Lens comparisons are useful for illuminating, critiquing, or challenging the stability of a

thing that, before the analysis, seemed perfectly understood” (Walk, 1998, p. 1). As an extension of content analysis, the comparative analysis focused on observations of categorical variables (Rihoux, 2006). After all the combinations of categories were listed, the analysis continued with descriptive explanations and data supported implications.

### **Sampling**

A census of separatist groups was used in this research because this study wanted to know the separatists’ marketing activities (RQ. 1, RQ. 3 and RQ. 5) and whether there were differences among the categories (RQ. 2, RQ. 4 and RQ. 6). As described in this section, three resources were used to create the census of separatist groups in Study One.

One consideration was to use the dataset employed by Asal et al’s (2014) study, the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) data set. The data was the result of studies conducted by the University of Maryland (2009), which contained yearly data for ethnically based political organizations from 1990-2006. This study determined that such data was useful but too old to be analyzed a decade later. The 21<sup>st</sup> century political dynamics in the developing regions, such as in Africa, Asia and, Europe, changed faster than ever (see Minkenberg, 2015; Hagmann & Péclard, 2011). Therefore this study looked for the most updated data from valid and related organizations to the study. As for the first category, the list of ethnic separatist groups was gathered from the latest Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization’s (UNPO) dataset. UNPO is a Belgium based international organization that deals with indigenous people and minorities. These groups pushed for forming a new country in their territories, thus they could be considered as separatist groups.

UNPO's report (2015) showed that there were 45 ethnic minority organizations. The Papua separatist group was listed among this list. In the present study, the author only excluded Taiwan because the organization has been recognized as the Government of the Republic of China since the 1912, which did not match with the purpose of this study. Among these groups, the author found only 11 groups that have an organizational website. These groups were also listed in MAROB data set (see Appendix A).

For the second category that looked at websites for the political separatist groups, this study gathered the data from the European Free Alliance (EFA) dataset. EFA is an organization whose membership came from stateless nations, regions, and traditional minorities in Europe. On EFA's latest publication (2012), they listed 36 organizations as their members. As the literature review mentioned, outside Europe the Québec separatist group in Canada and The Partai Aceh in Indonesia are political separatist groups as well. Therefore, this study included these two groups in addition to the EFA's list, thus totaling 38 political separatist groups in the sample. Among these groups, 16 of them (marked by \* in Appendix B) were also listed in the MAROB data set.

For the third category, which looked for the extremist organizations category, the list was gathered from the Department of State's foreign terrorist organizations list. According to the Department of State (2015), the list was updated periodically to ensure that the organizations were the harmful organizations that needed to be watched carefully. The list contained 59 organizations. However only five groups have their own websites (as seen in Appendix C). Those five groups were also listed in the MAROB data set.

The author gathered the data from these websites during the one-week data-gathering period, which was done from December 15 to December 21, 2015. In addition, the author wanted to ensure that the websites represented truly the group that they mentioned. Therefore, prior to the study, the author selected 20% of the total samples, which constituted for 11 websites, by using stratified random sampling for confirmation. The strata process was to ensure that each of the separatist group categories was represented in this sampling method. The author then made a phone call to the political separatist telephone number listed on their websites. All 11 organizations confirmed that the websites indeed represented as their official website. In the literature, an official website was defined as the web page that was used as official representation for every organization (Downing, 2007). The web's administrator typically had the ability to create and continually upload contents to the web server.

### **Units of Analysis and Coding Scheme**

To get information about how the separatist groups do their marketing, this study looked at certain aspects of their website. The first thing this study looked at was the home page. Every organization, including the separatist group websites, put most of their content, or at least links "button" to the content, in the web's homepage. On this main page, this study took a note if we found anything associated with their marketing strategies. For example, should there be a link for "donation" in the homepage, then this study considered it as a funding resource from a member's contribution. Another example was the link to the "shop" section, which would be reflected as service fee. Included in the homepage were the links to the separatist group's social media accounts. Further, the separatist group's homepage also

had many articles written regarding the movement. Should the coders find something that was related to the marketing separatist activities, which this study defined as funding resources, media channels, and recruitment strategies, then the coders took a note and made some considerations. For example, one of the articles from the Free West Papua Movement's website reported a fund raising event in London.

The second unit of analysis this study analyzed was the "about us" section (or in some websites it was called the organization's name itself). Typically this section was basically a short narrative that told a story about an organization. Besides describing the separatist profiles, these paragraphs sometimes also contained several hints of separatist groups' marketing activities. For example, the separatist group revealed where they generated money from in this section. They also asked the viewers to support their movement for specific causes, which this study then considered as part of their message strategies.

Third, this study looked at what was listed in the "calendar" section (or in some websites it was labeled the "agenda" or "events"). This section contained every agenda that had happened and also planned ahead. Since the articles on the homepage already covered what had happened in the past, this study only examined the separatist agenda for the future. This section was analyzed by looking at what was written during the next two months, from January to February, 2016.

Further, the author found that some of the websites used languages other than English. For example, the Partido Andalucista employed Spanish and the Parti Québécois used French as the only language in their websites. Since the author was not fluent in those two languages, Google translate was used to translate them into English. Google translate is a

popular application that is used by 200 million people daily and has the ability to translate 90 foreign languages into English and vice versa (Shankland, 2013). Scholars have had some debates whether Google translate could reflect accuracy in translation. For example, when the free application was used in a medical department, a few years ago Sheppard (2011) found Google translate had a major problem in translating technical terms. However, Groves and Mundt's recent study (2015) showed Google translate ability could be useful. "While flawed, the translations are comprehensible, and in some places impressive" (p. 112). In addition, the author also asked foreign language speakers to double-check the translation on the web pages.

### **Intercoder Reliability**

This study employed a second coder for a reliability check. The second coder holds a social science bachelor's degree from a reputable Indonesian university. The selection for the second coder was based on the familiarity with the issue and the language displayed on the visuals. The inter-coder reliability procedure was utilized as a pre-test. The purpose of the pre-test was to improve the clarity over the coding scheme selection (Rose, 2002). During the pre-test, this study used 20% of the sampling that were selected randomly. This number is the recommended number by Riffe, Lacy, and Fico (2005). Further, this study used Krippendorff's Alpha to measure the intercoder reliability (Krippendorff, 2011). The result for the intercoder reliability process was .91 for funding resources, .95 for media channels, and .81 for recruitment strategies. Since all the three results were above .80, as the recommended minimum scores for Krippendorff's Alpha, this study continued analyzing the original sample.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

After the actual research was done, this study performed another intercoder reliability process. The results showed that all category had more than .80 (as seen in table 1). This summarizes the method used in study one. The next two studies will use mixed method content analysis.

## **Findings**

### **RQ. 1: Where did the separatist groups get their funding?**

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

*Ethnic separatist groups' funding resources.* As seen in table 2, this study found no evidence that the ethnic separatist groups had government support. All sampled ethnic separatist groups indicated that they received funding from individual/ member contributions. The main indicator that the ethnic separatist groups looked for individual/ member contributions could be seen on their “about us” web page. For example, the Papua separatists clearly stated on their web page that one of their funding resources came from donations. The Rehoboth Basters also explained on their web page that many people in Namibia provided funds for the separatist organization.

The other indicator for individual/ member contributions could be seen on the ethnic separatists' home page, which had “donate” or “support us” button. While many ethnic separatist groups provided a general form for contributions (such as the Balochistan, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Khrom Kmer, and the Tibet), which asked only the name and the phone numbers of the donors, the Free West Papua Movement provided a sophisticated websites' interface. Their website allowed the donors to conveniently choose the amount of

the donations, ranging from 10 – 100 GB pounds and a choice of one-time only or periodic donation. In addition, the Papua separatists' website was linked directly to credit card numbers or Paypal as a payment processor.

The Papua, Afrikaner, Balochistan, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Khmer Krom, Rehoboth Basters, and Tibet separatists indicated that they received funding from the service fees. In order to get funding from this resource, the ethnic separatist groups showed their creativity for selling merchandise. For example, the Free West Papua Movement sold t-shirts, flags, posters, music CDs, badges, greeting cards, hats, and traditional Papuan bags. The items' prices varied from 7 to 20 GB pounds. Next, the Afrikaner also sold similar merchandise. In addition, the ethnic separatist group that was based in South Africa sold statues of their founding father and complete Afrikaner's uniforms, which had hats, clothes, pants, and shoes. Perhaps, the most advanced ethnic separatist's web store could be found in the Tibet's website. They sold more than 100 items, such as bookmarks, books and DVDs, clothing and accessories, greeting cards, jewelry, notebooks, posters, flags, and even Tibetan Dolls.

The other funding resource that the ethnic separatist groups relied on was from foundations. The Papua, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Degar Montagnards, and Tibet separatists indicated that they received funding from at least one foundation. The Degar Montagnards proudly listed Degar Foundation as their main supporter. Meanwhile, the Free West Papua Movement listed the Bertha Foundation as one of its supporters.

The Papua separatists also was the only ethnic separatist organization that indicated private organizations as their sponsors. On their home page, the Papua separatists listed

LUSH (a British cosmetic brand) and Court Lodge (a dairy organics brand) as their supporters.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

***Political separatist groups' funding resources.*** Different than the other separatist group categories, the political separatist groups indicated that they received funding from the governments (as seen in table 3). There were 22 political separatist groups that claimed they accepted the central government's grant. For example, the Québec separatists asserted that part of their income were from public funding. The Catalan separatists stated clearly on their about us page that they received "public subsidies according to the election results and to the number of representatives we have in the legislatives Chambers and City Councils".

Similarly, the Bretton separatists also claimed public funding for the endowment of the state, which was based on their results in the parliamentary elections. Further, the Valencia separatists received capital when their members were elected as well as grants for functioning as a political party. In fact, they even showed that the government's grants counted as a quarter of their 2015 total income.

The next funding resource for the political separatist groups came from the foundations. There were 11 groups that claimed they received funding from the external independent organizations. For example, the Catalan separatists listed the Josep Irla Foundation as a related entity when they discussed financial matters on the "our organization" page. Meanwhile, the Valencia separatists put Barley Group Institutional Commitment as one of income resources. They also presented a graphic that showed that less than a half of their income came from this type of funding.

Individual or member contributions remained the most popular income resource. All sampled political separatist groups indicated that they relied on this funding. The political separatist groups tried to convince their donors in various ways. The Lausatia Alliance stated that a donation to the separatist group could be used as a tax deduction. Meanwhile, the Bayern Partei made a convenient way to donate by providing payment access via credit card and Paypal. Besides receiving donations, the political separatist groups also collected monthly or annual fees from their members. For example, Bayern Partei indicated that they offered several options to public. For the general public, the membership cost 5 euros per month. Next, they offered a membership to lower-income citizens, which would have a reduced 3 euros per month membership fee. They also offered a membership for students, which would cost 1.5 euros per month. Meanwhile, the Québec separatists wrote that their membership fee was fixed for C\$5 per year. Their website also explained there was a restriction regulated by the Canadian government, where the Parti Québécois operated, that C\$100 was the maximum single donation for political institutions in Canada.

The political separatist groups showed their creativity in collecting money through service fees. This research found 25 groups indicated such business. For example, the Québec separatists collected meals fare of C\$15.00 on their fundraising events. They also sold exclusive fundraising event tickets for C\$100 per ticket. The other creative groups were the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, which sold tickets for its new year's reception and music concerts; Ruch Autonomili Slaska, which held cultural days and marching events to get funds; and Schleswig Parte, which had a fancy shop section that sold watches, jackets and hoodies. Meanwhile, Partai Aceh indicated on their organizational constitution that they did

commercial business in order to receive funds for the group. Further, not all separatist groups sold fancy items or held fundraising events. The Mouvement Région Savoie was found to sell simple items, such as books written by its members. The service fees funding comprised quite substantial portions of the political separatist groups' funding resources. For example, the Catalan separatists listed that they received 172,241 euros from their sales revenue in 2014. In addition, the Valencia indicated that they received around 186,500 euros from revenue outside the institutional grants and members' commitment.

The political separatist groups were also able to receive funding from private corporations, though Ruch Autonomili Slaska was the only group to collect such money. The Polish based separatist group put donations from companies as one separate section on its home page. With this type of funding, the Slaska separatists earned 20 percent of their annual revenue from foreign countries. The Valencia separatists also indicated that they were looking for a private company's money. However, their 2014 income report showed that the private company's account as 0 euro.

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

***Terrorist separatist groups' funding resources.*** This research did not find any indication that any terrorist separatist groups receive funding from governments, foundations, or private corporations. Four terrorist affiliated groups indicated that they acknowledged individual/ member contributions. For example, Sinn Fein's website provided a direct link for donors to donate their money. People who intended to support them needed to put their credit card numbers along with the amount of donation on their website. Sinn Fein also mentioned that they limited the donations by 2,500 euros per year from a single person. They

would also honor any single person who donated at least 1,500 euros by mentioning the donor on their annual donation statement. Meanwhile Hamas and the Basque separatists urged their supporters to be involved in their upcoming actions. The two separatist groups explained that the support was critical for their continuation against the act of oppression from the central governments. Further, the Colombian separatists indicated that some of their group supporters were coca farmers. The Colombian separatists explained how the coca plants became part of their culture. Even though they realized that their commercial activity might be rejected by international society, because the coca plants could produce a narcotic substance, the separatists believed that what these farmers were doing was right. FARC argued that should the international society want to ban this plant, they needed to work on cultural and social aspects first before taking any legal approach. For example, FARC proposed that the Government provide funding for an alternative program for the coca farmers.

This research also found another funding resource for the terrorist separatist groups was from the service fee. The Irish separatists had a decent shopping web page. The online store sold books, jewelry, flags, crafts, posters, and clothing. They also sold a tour package, which would invite the supporters to follow the footsteps of the IRA founding fathers. Meanwhile, the Boko Haram indicated having illegal business to do as well. They claimed to capture schoolgirls and asked something in return. Certainly holding captives for ransom is a horrific form of a service fee.

**RQ. 2: What kinds of differences, if any, exist among the separatist groups' types of funding?**

INSERT TABLE 5 HERE

Individual/ member contribution seemed to be the most popular funding resources among the three separatist group categories (as seen in table 5). All separatist groups, except the Boko Haram from the terrorist separatist group, claimed to get donations from their members or regular supporters. Besides donations, member fees was the other form of this type of funding. However, only political separatist groups asked for member fees from their supporters. Neither ethnic separatist groups nor terrorist separatist groups indicated that they ever asked their members for a certain amount of money.

The service fees were found to be the next popular funding resource among separatist groups. More than half of the sample from each group indicated that they had business activities to conduct. The most obvious service fees could be found in the appearance of “shop” sections on the separatist websites. Further, several separatist groups were also found to hold fundraising events, for which they would sell tickets and meals to the supporters. Different than the ethnic and political separatist group categories, two separatist groups from the terrorist separatist group category were found to claim that they purposefully did illegal activities in order to collect service fees.

Among the separatist group categories, the terrorist separatist group was the only category that did not claim to receive funding from foundations. The political separatist groups category had more groups that claimed receiving foundations’ funding than the ethnic separatist group. However, since there were more groups in the political separatist category, the ethnic separatist group had a higher percentage of receiving the foundation funding.

Similar situations also came up in the private corporations' funding. While none of the terrorist separatist groups claimed to receive such funding, the ethnic separatist groups could gain a higher percentage in receiving private corporations funding because they had smaller samples than the political separatist groups, even though only one separatist group from both categories claimed to receive the private corporations' funding.

The political separatist group was the only separatist group category that claimed to get funding from their central government. Out of 38 political separatist groups, this research found 22 separatist groups stated that they received funding from the government. According to their claim, the government mainly gave subsidies to the political separatist groups based on the election results. In the Valencia separatist group case, the Government also gave the political separatist groups money because the local law provided funding for a local political institution. On the contrary, no separatist group from the ethnic separatist group and terrorist separatist group categories claimed to receive such funding.

**RQ. 3: What media channels did the separatist groups employ for their marketing activities?**

INSERT TABLE 6 HERE

*Ethnic separatist groups' media channels.* As seen in table 6 all sampled ethnic separatist groups had websites. In addition, this research found English as the websites' main language. The Afrikanners was the only exception. They employed Afrikaans, their local language, as the main language. However, the South African separatists' website still had English content in their web pages. Further, the Crimean Tatar offered options on their website of which language for the audience to choose. The choices were Crimean, English,

Russian, and Ukraine. From the 11 ethnic separatist groups' websites, this research found nine separatist groups used ending .org (dot-o-r-g) on their websites (see Appendix A). However, the use of the endings did not affect the content of the websites. The Papua separatists' website had contents of: home, about us, info, news, resources, shop, contact, and donate. In one hand, the Free West Papua website's content, which had an .org ending, was almost similar to the Afrikaner, which had.co.za (dot-c-o-dot-z-a) ending. On the other hand, the Ogoni's website, which had .org ending, had content of: Ogoni ethnic nationality, Ogoni bill of rights, Ogoni news and resources, about MOSOP, and privacy policy.

Next, this research found that all sampled ethnic separatist groups indicated that they had media relations. Ten ethnic separatist groups had a news section, with only the Khmer Krom using the term "Press Releases" on their home page. This research also found that photo sharing was widely used among the ethnic separatist groups. Eight ethnic separatist groups were found to put the photos on their social media accounts, such as Facebook and Twitter. Besides putting the photos on those two platforms, the Chittagong separatists also created an account in Flickr for photo sharing purposes. In contrast, the Afrikaner, Khmer Krom and Degar Montagnard only shared their photos through their websites. This finding was also related to the social media usage among the ethnic separatist groups, as the latter two ethnic separatist groups were found with no link to social media accounts.

Among the eight separatist groups that had social media accounts, Facebook was the most widely used by the ethnic separatist groups as those nine groups' websites had a link to their Facebook account. The next popular social media for the ethnic separatist groups was

Twitter. Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Lesghin, Tibet, Ogoni, and Papua separatists' websites were found to have a link to their Twitter.

This research also found seven ethnic separatist groups employed video sharing as their media channel. The Baloch, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Degar Montagnards, Lesghin, Tibet, and Papua separatists' websites were found to have video content on their websites. Some of them, such as Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Lesghin, Tibet and Papua separatists, linked the videos to their YouTube accounts. Lastly about the ethnic separatists' media channel, this research found that no ethnic separatist groups employed blogs as their media channel.

INSERT TABLE 7 HERE

***Political separatist groups' media channels.*** As seen in table 7, all sampled separatist groups in this category were found to have an official website. Most of the political separatist websites used their own local language. In addition, they also provided an English version. From the 38 separatist groups, only the Québec (website in French only), Mouvement Région Savoie (French), Partit Occitan (French), Partitu di a Nazione Corsa (French), Unser Land (French and German), Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie (Italian), Liga Veneta Repubblica (Italian), Partito Sardo d'Azione (Italian), and Partai Aceh (Indonesian) groups did not provide English on their website. This research also found that all political separatist groups' websites had a calendar of events, which described their agenda in the future.

The political separatist groups seemed to be active on social media. Thirty-six separatist groups were known to have social media accounts, such as Twitter and Facebook, and only the Unitat Catalana and Omo Ilinden Pirin did not link their website to any social

media account. Beyond the two popular social media, several political separatist groups also employed more social media, e.g.: Parti Québécois (had Instagram and Pinterest accounts), Catalan (Instagram and Spotify), Scottish (Instagram and Google Plus), Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista (Flickr), and Partai Aceh (Google Plus). These social media were also employed as their photo sharing and video sharing media channels. For example, the Parti Québécois' Pinterest account uploaded 219 photos and the Catalan separatists uploaded 255 photos on their Instagram account. The political separatist groups were also advanced in video sharing. The Scottish separatists uploaded 172 videos, which ranged from a 24-second short interview to a two-hour campaign conference video. Further, the Québec separatists shared more than 500 videos, which ranged from a thirty-second video promotion to a four-hour full meeting conference.

Similar to the ethnic separatist groups, most of the political separatist groups also used the term “news” when they described their media relations. This research found only the Aralar and the Scottish separatists, which used the terms “press room” and “stay informed section” respectively. Among the 38 political separatist groups, the Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands had the most comprehensive press relations' feature. Their press relations section included press releases, interviews, picture service, text service, logo service, and press subscription.

This research also found 18 political separatist groups employed blogs as one of their media channels (see table 7). Most political separatist groups designed their blogs with a straightforward appearance, such as a forum discussion. Among these simple webpages, the Union Démocratique Bretonne had the most comprehensive blogs. Besides being managed

professionally, the Bretonne separatists' blogs also featured seven contributing blogs from different cities that made their main blog as the top discussion.

INSERT TABLE 8 HERE

***Terrorist separatist groups' media channels.*** As seen in table 8, all sampled terrorist groups were found to have websites. While Irish, FARC, and Boko Haram only had websites in English, the Basque separatists and Hamas offered their local language, Basque and Arabic respectively, as an option to choose. The Basque separatists also offered Spanish and French as the website's language. The terrorist websites' overall looked professional, with many tabs and links on their home page. The only website that looked different was the Boko Haram's website. It only had one web page, which listed all of the information surrounding the Nigerian separatists.

This research found that Twitter was the most widely used social media. All five separatist groups indicated that they had Twitter accounts. Only FARC and Sinn Fein indicated that they had Facebook accounts. In addition, Sinn Fein listed Flickr as part their social media. All five terrorist groups were also found to have video sharing and photo sharing. To find this ability, the audience needed only to visit their home pages, which showed many pictures and videos related to them.

All five terrorist separatist groups also indicated that they had media relations. Basque, Hamas, and Irish separatists used the "news" page as media relations indicator. Meanwhile, FARC used the term "what you should know" to show the audience news reports on FARC. Further, Boko Haram listed news that sorted according to the publishing date on their single web page.

Four terrorist separatist groups were also found to have blogs. The Basque and Irish separatists put the author's name as the category to search for the blog's content. Both separatist groups also put the author's picture on the websites. In contrary, Hamas and FARC listed the issues discussed as the main category.

**RQ. 4: What kinds of differences, if any, existed among the separatist group's types of media channels?**

INSERT TABLE 9 HERE

This research found all separatist groups had website, media relations, and photo sharing as part of their media channel strategy (as seen in table 9). The differences could be found on how they presented their websites. While the ethnic separatist groups and the terrorist separatist groups had English versions of their websites, nine political separatist groups did not have a similar feature. The political separatist groups' websites only appeared in their local languages.

Separatist groups indicated that they were involved in social media. While all sampled terrorist groups indicated having social media, a different situation was found for ethnic and political separatist groups. This research found two political separatist groups and four ethnic separatist groups that did not have any link to a social media account on their website. Nevertheless, the percentage of having social media account was still high among all separatist group categories. Further, the political separatist groups indicated that they were involved in social media more than just in Tweeter and Facebook, as the two social media were the most widely used among the ethnic and terrorist separatist groups. Some political

separatist groups linked to Instagram, Pinterest, Spotify, Flickr and Google Plus as part of their social media activities.

The use of video sharing was also high among the three separatist group categories. Looking at their video sharing activity, the political separatist groups were more active than the ethnic and terrorist separatist groups. While the latter two categories groups uploaded only dozens of videos on their websites, many political separatist groups uploaded hundreds of videos.

The blog was found to be the least popular media channel among the separatist groups. Only the terrorist separatist groups were found to favor this media channel. Less than a half of political separatist groups and only one ethnic separatist groups indicated that they did blogging activity.

**RQ. 5: What strategies did the separatist groups use for recruitment?**

INSERT TABLE 10 HERE

*Ethnic separatist groups' recruitment strategies.* As seen in table 10, the Chittagong, Khmer Krom, Tibet and Papua separatists showed that they employed a fully open recruitment by allowing a supporter to become their members and volunteers. The Papua separatists' website did not provide a particular form for their supporters to take action but they indicated clearly to their supporters to come to their events, print the Papua flag and sign the petitions. Similar to the Papua separatists, Khmer Krom allowed supporters to become their members by inviting them to attend The Khmers Kampuchea Krom-Krom Federation annual conference. Meanwhile, Afrikaner and Rehoboth Basters' supporters could apply for membership through their websites. The Afrikaner supporters can apply for membership

through the website by filling in a form. After a member was approved to be a member, he or she then could access web page that was designed for members only.

Through the Baloch, Ogoni, Crimean Tatar, Degar Montagnards, and Lesghin's websites, this research found no evidence that they held an open recruitment. On the Crimean Tatar's website, they explained that the election of their chairmen were elected among the delegates of a secret ballot.

INSERT TABLE 11 HERE

***Political separatist groups' recruitment strategies.*** Thirty-two political separatist groups were found to conduct open-membership recruitments (as seen in table 11). Visitors of their websites could simply fill in a form or create an online account to be part of the organizations. Several political separatist groups, such as Liga Veneta Repubblica, Partito Sardo d'Azione, Plaid Cymru, Unser Land, and the Scottish separatists had a member only section that could only be accessed by putting the members' username and password.

Most of the political groups that had an open membership strategy were also opening their website for volunteer recruitment. From the 32 political separatist groups with open recruitments, 10 groups (Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie (ALPE), Die Friesen, Eusko Alkartasuna, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Liga Veneta Repubblica, Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Szövetség, Partitu di a Nazione Corsa, Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista, Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands, and Unitat Catalana) did not put volunteer recruitment on their websites.

Further, this research found there were many ways for the separatist group's supporters to contribute as volunteers. For example, the Scottish separatists allowed

volunteers to help in event organizing, leafleting, telephone canvassing, doorstep canvassing, or fundraising. Next, the Québec separatists explained that they would like their volunteers to attend a training session first before they were involved. After sending the application, the volunteers then could access training and material on the reasons to declare Québec as an independent country. The most sophisticated group that employed volunteers was the Plaid Cymru. On their website, there was an action center section, which included many activities, such as sharing millions of ideas, distributing poster, spread the word, leaflet to win, branding suite, talk about jobs, community champion, and working for their hospitals. Further, this research found six groups (Catalan, Aralar, Chunta Aragonesista, Rainbow, Slovenska Skupnost, and Partai Aceh) to have closed-membership (internal) recruitments.

INSERT TABLE 12 HERE

*Terrorist separatist groups' recruitment strategies.* As seen in table 12, Hamas, Farc and Boko Haram indicated that they conducted a closed recruitment. Further, this research found no evidence that the terrorist separatist groups recruited volunteers. Instead, this research found Sinn Fein and Basque separatists to hold an open member recruitment. In the Irish separatists case, only residents of Ireland are eligible for membership. On the contrary, Basque separatists did not have such restriction. However, the Basque separatists' member recruitment was available only on their Spanish and Basque web pages and not on the English web pages. Further, both groups indicated their supporters needed to fill in an application form in order to apply for membership.

**RQ. 6: What kinds of differences, if any, existed among the separatist groups' types of recruitment?**

INSERT TABLE 13 HERE

The political separatist groups indicated that they employed a more open policy than the other two separatist group categories in both member and volunteer recruitments. Interestingly, as seen in table 13, only the political separatist groups combined the open member recruitments with the policy to ask for member fees. There was no requirement of member fees for the ethnic and terrorist separatist groups. Further, the political separatist groups had more volunteer recruitments, as indicated by upcoming activities on their websites, while the other two separatist group categories' websites only reported past events.

Furthermore, the majority of terrorist separatist groups opted to have closed recruitment. Consequently, there was no member-only section on the terrorist separatist group. Even Sinn Fein and Basque separatists, as the two affiliated terrorist separatist groups that held member recruitment, indicated that their recruitments had certain restrictions, such as nationality (in Sinn Fein's case) and language (Basque's).

## **Discussion**

The results of this study mainly recognize the biggest difference among those groups is the funding resources. Based on the results of RQ 1 and RQ 2, the political separatist groups are the only separatist group category able to receive government's funding. These results can lead to a slightly different conclusion of Clifford's (2005) claim regarding the marketing of rebellion was about international support. The results of RQ1 and RQ2 reveal that the separatists' marketing activities are looking for international and domestic support. The domestic support notably is expected to come from the bigger vote in the election, in which the political separatist groups are competing. For example, the Valencia separatists list

their sources of income, with a quarter of them coming from the government's grants after the election.

Furthermore, the results on RQ 3 and RQ 4 show the separatists use various media channels, in the age of digital media. As the new media allowed a better access to see the separatist groups' activity, the separatist groups have the opportunities to communicate their vision and develop the separatist organizations. These findings support Hiltner's (2005) claim that the separatists employed their media to share a story from their perspective. In addition, the results on RQ 3 and RQ 4 show that the separatist groups employ not just one but more media simultaneously. In fact, this research found the majority of the separatist groups have websites and social media accounts, with some groups also having blogs.

Furthermore, the results on RQ 5 and RQ 6 show that separatist groups have different strategies on member recruitment. The results show the majority of terrorist separatist groups employ a close recruitment. The findings support Adhami's (2007) claim that the insurgent groups are more likely to conduct a closed recruitment. In addition, the results show that the ethnic separatists and political separatists favor the open recruitment method. These findings could lead to a new conclusion about the separatists' recruitment that their recruitment is more likely to be an open recruitment, if they operate as either ethnic separatist groups or political separatist groups.

Overall, the findings section shows that each separatist group categories have their unique characteristics. Further, the results of study one indicate the political separatist group category has the widest marketing activities than the other two separatist group categories. In addition, the ethnic separatist groups show that they have broader funding resources and

recruitment than the terrorist separatist groups. The latter, however, reveal that they conduct more intensive media channels than the other separatist group categories. To examine further, the following paragraphs will provide more detailed discussion on each separatist group category.

**Political separatist groups.** Having the widest marketing activities, the political separatist groups receive their funding from many resources. The political separatist group even indicates that they receive funding from the governments even though their initial mission was to declare an independent country. This condition seems to be related by the fact that political separatist group had been recognized officially by the central government of their countries of origin. Further, the fact that the political separatist groups purposefully receive government's funding, for which in return they have to compete in the election, can make the definition of separatist broader than Horowitz's (1981) traditional definition of a separatist. Instead of merely an alliance of individuals that wants to secede from their country, political separatist groups choose to cooperate with their government in order to maintain the separatist's identity.

The findings of this study also imply that the political separatist groups are relying on the organization's brands in order to achieve their goals. There are three indications to this conclusion. First, the political separatist groups indicate that they are joining the race on the general election. Research on political communication has shown that marketing is an important aspect in competitive democracy (Scammell, 2014). Further, Neiheisel and Niebler's study (2013) found the use of party brand labels were common in election campaigns. By joining the election, the political separatist groups have to distinguish their

organization from other political party competitors. Second, many political separatist groups asked for certain amount of fees as part of their membership. The political separatist groups indicate that this payment does not come for nothing. They offer some advantages of paying the member fees, such as accessing members-only web pages or subscribing to the newsletter. This type of funding is similar to many non-profit organizations' effort when they built their organization's brand (Huarn & Hui-Kuang Yu, 2011). Third, compared to the other categories, the political separatist groups have more organization's merchandise stores. Empirical research on e-commerce business has shown that besides price and material quality, a brand's prestige had an important value as the reason why consumers made a purchase (Kuenzel & Halliday, 2008).

Further, the results of this study also show that political separatist groups adopt a transparent media strategy. The indication is that they deliberately involve with two-way media channels. Not only do the political separatists manage their websites, but they also engage in blogs and social media. Their engagement in social media can lead to the conclusion that they communicate their vision actively and receive feedback from their supporters. These indications extend our understanding of Hiltner's (2005) description of the insurgent media. His essays of the insurgent media claimed that the insurgent media was important because it could contain a story that was never heard before. Apparently, the stories from the political separatist groups' media channels are transparent and open for discussion.

In addition, the results of this research show the political separatist groups are more likely to conduct an open recruitment. With this fact and all the indicators mentioned above,

the results of this study argued that the political separatist groups have adopted a modern organization concept, which Kotler and Andreasen (2012) suggested is an organization that adopted a customer-centered mindset. For example, the results show the Scottish separatists engage actively with their members and volunteers. The Scottish separatist group's members can also share their ideas on how to develop the organization better.

Based on the findings section, the political separatist groups' customers are most likely the local audiences. This study shows the political separatist groups' websites have both local and international languages. However, the results also show the political separatist groups employ local language on their main homepage. This finding is slightly different than Clifford's (2005) claim that the reason the separatists conducted marketing activities was for only international support. In contrast, this research supports one of Asal et al.'s (2014) claims, which stated the separatist group that participates in the local election prevented itself from commitments with foreign institutions. Therefore, this study argues that the political separatist groups' target audiences are more likely the local peoples. The political separatist groups choose to prioritize local audiences because the groups' goal is mainly to win the election.

By having the widest resources among other separatist group categories, the author believes that political separatist groups can lead examples as effective organizations. From recent global separatism cases, e.g. in East Timor, South Sudan, and Scotland, the political method showed its effectiveness in raising awareness among international society (Cunningham, 2011). In fact, the first two examples mentioned truly achieved their independence in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, while the latter example gained popular support even

though the results of the Scottish election still favored the British Empire (Nielsen & Ward, 2015).

**Ethnic separatist groups.** The next rank of separatist group category that indicates employing a customer-centered mindset is the ethnic separatist group. There are several reasons behind the aforementioned statement. First, being unable to secure government's funding, the ethnic separatist groups look for other resources outside their group's members. They notably have the highest percentage of receiving funds from the foundations and the private corporations, as well as the second rank on the service fees. Second, most of the ethnic separatist groups also embrace the idea of having an open recruitment. Therefore, most ethnic separatist groups created their websites with a clear "join us" button on the homepage.

The ethnic separatist groups are most likely to match with Clifford's (2005) description of modern rebels, which looked for international support. This argument is based on the fact that the ethnic separatists' funding resources are coming from international institutions and audiences. Further, the ethnic separatist groups employ English as their main language, even though their initial mission was to inherit their ethnicity's custom. Furthermore, many ethnic separatist groups also allow their supporters to apply as the group's members and volunteers online. By using an online application, their supporters can engage in the organization's activity from a distance, even from other countries. These combinations of the ethnic separatist groups' marketing activities lead to the author's conclusion that they are looking for international support.

**Terrorist separatist groups.** The results of this study regarding the terrorist separatist groups' marketing activities do not provide sufficient proof that their interaction with the international community is for gathering support. As there is no indication that these groups receive funding from the governments, the foundations, and the private corporations, the terrorist separatist groups express that their funding resources are from individual/member contributions and service fees. Additionally, most of the terrorist separatist groups' websites do not feature any online donation link. The only terrorist separatist group that has such feature is the Irish separatists. However, the member contribution is likely coming from domestic region or diaspora member instead of general international audience because the IRA affiliated group declare to limit their membership from Irish people only.

Further evidence regarding the terrorist separatist groups' target audience for gathering support can be seen on their recruitment strategies. Out of five sampled groups, three groups indicate that they hold a close recruitment. The two groups that hold open member recruitment are the Irish and the Basque separatists, which somehow have limitations on their recruitment strategy. The limitations are the Irish separatists only accept membership from Irish people and the Basque separatists only post their open recruitment in their local language.

These findings are interesting, given the fact that recently another terrorist group called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), not included in this study's sample, had risen because of the exposé on their international recruitment according to news reports (AFP, 2015). The news reported that ISIS tried to recruit members from Morocco, U.K., France, etc. In addition, ISIS was seen sending messages in the social media. Although many

viewed their attempts were to recruit support from abroad; their messages were mostly dominated by the Arabic language. Therefore, the language could be seen as useful for Arabic speaking Diasporas and could be seen as a barrier for those non-Arabic speaking people. These limitations can be evidence that the terrorist groups' target audiences are local people and the Diasporas who live abroad but not from ordinary people.

Nevertheless, the terrorist groups' media channels are mostly in English. Particularly their home pages refer to an English version, instead of their local language version. Adding these facts and the previous facts regarding the terrorist groups' recruitment strategies, this evidence may lead to the conclusion that the terrorist groups' attempts to communicate to the international audience are more likely to share their visions than to gather support.

Furthermore, the results show that some ethnic separatists and terrorist separatists have similar marketing activities with some political groups. Particularly, the results show the Tibet, Papua, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Basque and Irish separatists to have many similarities with the political separatist groups. Except that they do not receive funding from the governments, their other funding resources, media channels and recruitment strategies are similar to the political separatist groups'. This revelation can lead to a view that a separatist group has a chance to move beyond their category's origin. In other words, these classifications on separatist groups can possibly be interchangeable as recent political situations in different countries are very dynamic.

### **Research Limitations**

Despite study one's several important findings, it still has some limitations. The following descriptions will discuss the research limitations along with further possible

research, particularly the communication studies' perspectives. First, with several separatist groups are found to have differences than the other separatist groups on their group's categories, this study suggests that it is possible for separatist groups to move beyond their categories, such as from terrorist separatist group to ethnic separatist group, or vice versa. Thus further research is necessary to find out this phenomenon. A cross-sectional study, like this one, cannot answer how the mentioned phenomenon happens. A longitudinal study regarding the group's evolution will be more suitable to describe the change on separatist group's classifications. With more detailed data across time periods in longitudinal research, the researchers can draw better conclusions regarding that matter.

Second, further research can also be conducted on the supporters' attitude towards the classifications on the separatist groups. The author suggests a study that employs an audience framework to measure the differences among the separatist groups' supporters. In addition, it also would be interesting to design a longitudinal study that analyzes the supporters' attitudes towards the change on their separatist group's categories.

Third, a study regarding the separatist groups' message strategies comparison is also a possibility. Based on the study one's findings, there are differences among the three groups of separatist group's categories. For example, the political separatist groups are found cooperating with their governments and competing on the elections. Their characteristics are different than the ethnic separatist groups and terrorist separatist groups. Thus, it will be interesting to find further differences, particularly concerning message strategies among separatist group's categories. The following study two will discuss a part of such study, particularly by analyzing the Papua separatist group's message strategies.

Fourth, as this study analyzes certain mediated communication artifacts (websites), the accuracy of this study depends on the websites' creators. Should there be a contrasting claim to the findings of this study, the author is certainly open for further discussion.

## **Chapter Four:**

### **Mixed Methods Visual Content Analysis (Study Two)**

Study two aims were discussing the image representation and the cultural identity of the Papua separatist group. In that regard, this study analyzed the Papua separatists' visuals on their Facebook account. The Free West Papua Movement likely posted visual messages daily and rarely posted text messages on their Facebook account. Therefore, understanding their visual communication would reveal their main message strategy. In order to have a better understanding of visual communication on the Free West Papua Movement's Facebook account, this study employed content analysis as the research method. Although Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, and Vetter (2000) lauded content analysis as useful in the written format, the developments of communication media and international politics have allowed researchers to seek other formats for content analysis research, Neuman (1997) had different ideas. He showed a list of content analysis sources and describes it wider as:

A technique for gathering and analyzing the content of text. The 'content' refers to words, meanings, pictures, symbols, ideas, themes, or any message that can be communicated. The 'text' is anything written, visual, or spoken that serves as a medium for communication (Neuman, 1997, pp. 272–273).

#### **Methods**

Using content analysis as a research method has some advantages over other methods. First of all, the advantage of content analysis lies in its unobtrusive ability (Krippendorf, 2004; Babbie, 2012). That ability makes content analysis analyze only the message material but not how the message was created or how the audience would be affected. An unobtrusive method is also important for studying separatist groups, especially

those who are alienated from the mainstream media system. This condition is especially applied to groups who employed terrorist tactics because often their messages were deleted deliberately by the corporate media (Weimann, 2014; Denning, 2009;).

Further, as the message content is often understood as data, it is implied that content analysis stresses the importance of data to find social phenomena. According to some scholars (Sandelowski & Barroso, 2003; Suddaby, 2006), this approach is almost similar to the grounded theory. The grounded theory is different than the traditional method because grounded theory is originated from data and not theory driven (Strauss and Glaser, 1968). According to Strauss and Glaser (1968), the data-driven theory could ease its results from two potential challenges: bigger data and newer theory. With content analysis, these challenges could be addressed from their main characteristic, which focused on the centrality of messages (Riffe et al., 2005). The centrality of messages was important because any communication study was believed to be useful only if it could describe the content of communication. “Absent knowledge of the relevant content, all questions about the processes generating that content or the effects that content produces are meaningless” (Riffe et al., 2005, p. 39).

Given the fact that we live in the age of mediated communication, the centrality of the message also made content analysis robust among fellow research methods (Krippendorf, 2004). The UN Telecom Agency reported that in 2013 around 91 percent of the world populations were connected to a cell phone, and around 42 percent of the world populations were connected to the Internet (the International Telecommunication Union, 2014).

Ultimately, since content analysis looks for a human communication artifact as the research

object, the method is adequate for research that aims for descriptive analysis (Carney, 1971) and prediction of effects if the study is combined with audience measurement methods, such as surveys or polls (Neuendorf, 2002).

While several scholars have suggested that content analysis is suitable only for quantitative research (Neuendorf, 2002; Riffe et. al, 2005), other scholars have responded to that claim by indicating that qualitative content analysis is as useful as quantitative content analysis (Newbold, Boyd-Barrett, & Van Den Bulck, 2002, Gauntlett, 2002; Curran, 2002). Newbold et al. (2002) remind their colleagues that the content analysis function is to seek not only manifest content but also latent content. They also point out the importance of analyzing the context and meaning of the content. In fact, content analysis was proven useful as well when it relied on the “qualities of entities and processes and meanings” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 8).

Lately a genre of research that combined the quantitative and qualitative format was introduced to the public, which popularly called as mixed methods (see Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2005). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) suggested that scholars chose mixed methods because the method offered a logical and practical alternative.

Philosophically, mixed research makes use of the pragmatic method and system of philosophy. Its logic of inquiry includes the use of induction (or discovery of patterns), deduction (testing of theories and hypotheses), and abduction (uncovering and relying on the best of a set of explanations for understanding one’s results) (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, pp. 17-18).

Although the mixed methods seemed to be ideal, Collins, Onwuegbuzie, and Jiao (2007) warned that the mixed methods had a critical challenge, in terms of integration issues.

This challenge occurred when a mixed methods researcher made an attempt to incorporate purposive small samples of qualitative data in a large sample of quantitative data. Regarding this issue, Collins et al. (2007) sensibly asked, “How much weight should researchers and consumers place on qualitative data compared to quantitative data?” (p. 269). They then concluded that mixed methods researchers choose their sampling schemes and sample sizes wisely.

In this regard, Rose (2012) shared similar views on the visual methodologies. She encouraged visual researchers to understand cultures through visual representations. However, there was somehow misunderstanding on Rose’s (2012) interpretation on content analysis because she described content analysis only from the quantitative perspective. With the presence of mixed methods content analysis, the author of this study believes that visual content analysis could analyze both manifest and latent meaning of the visuals. Further, Horn (1998) suggested that the analysis of visual language should consist the visual and verbal components. He argued that an image that had the complexity of more than just an icon, i.e. a photo, would likely to have verbal components that “contain a single sentence at minimum, but may contain two or three sentences” (p.109). Additionally, Horns believed the verbal components could create an integration effect to the picture, such as labeling and visual description.

The description of visual language’s verbal components matched with Lovell’s photo caption definition. Lovell (2002) defined photo caption as the important parts of photo display that had a function to explain the visual. Therefore, this study analyzed both visual and verbal components of the photos language, in the form of the photos and the captions.

## Sampling

One of Facebook's features in regards to posting the message is allowing users to edit the posted messages. Hence, it is important to study Facebook for longer periods of time (months or years) instead of only analyzing it for shorter periods (days). Having a short period of a sample of Facebook research has a significant chance of unreliable data and validity shortfalls if the account administrators delete some of the posted messages. With a longer data collection period, even though the situations mentioned above might occur, the author still could make a better conclusion from the data pattern.

In this regard, this study examined images from the entire period of the Papua separatist's Facebook account (<https://www.facebook.com/freewestpapua>), starting from June 9, 2009, the first time they launched it, to December 31, 2015, the last full calendar period on the day the author collected the data. Although in the Papua separatists' Facebook timeline there was one post from January 1, 2004, this post was actually posted on April 14, 2013. Therefore that post was included in the year 2013 sample data.

From this study's sampling period, the Papua separatists posted 1,267 picture messages and 102 non-picture messages. The picture messages were comprised photos and posters. As for the non-picture messages, they consisted of texts and video posts. Further, this study analyzed only the picture messages. This study did not look into the non-picture messages because the author wanted to have a uniformity of analysis and also the non-picture messages represented a small fraction (less than 10%) of the Papua separatists' total posts.

## **Units of Analysis**

The first unit of analysis for this study was the photos. The photos served as the visual components. Due to the nature of this study's research questions, several recording units were employed (see Riffe et al., 2005, p.82). For RQ. 7, there was only one recording unit. Since the task was regarding to find the themes on the pictures, this research would simply assign one theme per picture. Specifically, the picture's theme was analyzed according to the coding scheme.

INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE

In contrast, RQ. 8 used several recording units. The first recording unit of RQ. 8 was the human. Principally, this study counted one human as one unit. There was an exception to this rule if one picture had more than nine humans, then this research would only count a maximum of nine people. This research used a photography technique called a horizon line (see figure 2). Scott Kelby (2013), a professional photographer, stated that a horizon line was the first step to determine the focus of a photo. He said a horizon line was typically placed on the 1/3 part from the top of a photo. In this research, the coders looked for the horizon line of the photos before determining the units of analysis.

In addition, the author added an extra rule for the units selection. The people that would be counted as the recording units were determined by their position on the horizon line. The first unit was the one on the center of the picture. Next, the second, third, fourth and fifth units were the four persons on the right of the first unit. On the other side, the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth units were the four persons on the left of the first unit. These types

of pictures usually associated with demonstration events that displayed many people but insignificant to the analysis and the statistics if they were counted one by one.

The next recording units were the objects or things found in the pictures. Basically this research employed a rule that counted one object as one recording unit. The first category of objects was the accessories. To analyze the accessories, this research initially used the accessories definition from the fashion perspective. The accessories were meant to be something that could be carried or worn by a person (Cumming, Cunningham, & Cunningham, 2010). In addition, this research also made two distinctive categories of accessories. They were fashion and weapon. These categories reflected the purpose or function of the accessories. It should be noted that the accessories category is different than the clothes category. The latter is something that the humans wore in a principal manner on the pictures.

Besides the accessories, this research also found the flags as the second category and the clothes as the third category. This research employed a special scheme to the clothes' analysis. This scheme contained that only the upper part of the clothes (shirts, jackets, blouses, etc.) was counted as the recording unit. The exception to this scheme was if this research found a person did not wear any upper part of the clothes, then the lower part of the clothes (pants, skirts, bottoms, etc.) would be analyzed as the recording unit. For example, on December 5, 2011, the Papua separatist group displayed a picture of their leader, Benny Wenda, who was wearing traditional pants without wearing any clothes on his upper body. Therefore, the coders should identify this picture as traditional clothes.

The next recording units were the locations, backgrounds and the texts that appeared on the photos. The three above-mentioned recording units were counted one per photo. However, if this research found more than one locations, backgrounds, or texts in one photo, then each recording unit were analyzed one by one.

The second unit of analysis for this study was the captions. The captions served as the text components. This study employed two recording units in analyzing the caption. The first unit was the whole text, which counted one text per one photo. This procedure analyzed what type of languages that the caption used. Nevertheless, should there be more than one type of language, then all languages were analyzed separately. The second recording unit was the word; which all words were counted one by one. For the word counting procedure, the author employed NVivo, a computer software that helped researchers to analyze written texts. Further, the author analyzed the top 20 words found in the captions.

### **Coding Scheme**

To identify the general signs found from the Papua separatist's visual messages, this study employed a grounded theory approach, including the constant comparative method of analysis as was suggested by Strauss and Glaser (1968). As coding categories emerged, they suggested the investigators linked them together back to the theoretical models. Firstly the data were coded into as many kinds of categories as possible.

In the second stage, these categories were compared to each other to find their salient feature. The author tried to make sure that all the categories were exhaustive and mutually exclusive when a category was compared to the other category's attributes. This result of this process would ensure that all the data was analyzed equally and unbiased (Babbie, 2011). In

this regard, this study employed nominal measurement. The nominal measurement appeared even though the categories were found to be different from one another, they did not mean to be better than the other.

In the third stage, these categories were incorporated into broader categories by formulating associations between the categories initially classified. For example, a photo of a small demonstration event on December 23, 2010 and a photo of mass demonstration on November 25, 2010 were assigned into one broader category, the solidarity theme. After the categories for signs (RQ.7) and themes (RQ.9) were identified, this research analyzed each unit of analysis in the pictures. As for the RQ. 8, this study looked for the re-occurrence of signs. Therefore, the author analyzed the signs by tracing the patterns when those signs occurred together frequently.

### **Intercoder Reliability**

Although qualitative analysis generally does not report intercoder reliabilities, the researcher used it at the outset of the study to improve overall coding of the qualitative analysis (see Rose, 2012) in addition to checking the quantitative variables (e.g., source, location). Similar to the previous study's method, this study also employed the same second coder. Similar to the first study, this study used 20% of the image posts that were selected randomly during the pre-test. Further, this study employed Krippendorff's Alpha, as it was one of the six respected intercoder reliability formulations (Neuendorf, 2002). In this process, items were compared between the two coders. When the score was below .80 (Krippendorff, 2011), the two coders discussed it further to find the principal differences and determine the solution regarding the coding. All theme categories and sign categories were included in this

intercoder reliability process. The only exception was the word counting as the result was generated from computer software.

INSERT TABLE 14 HERE

After the research was done, this research did one more intercoder reliability process. All categories showed they all had scores more than .80 (as seen on table 14). These results meant this study fulfilled the minimum intercoder reliability requirements. This intercoder reliability process was also conducted in the following Study Three method section.

### **Findings**

**RQ. 7: What were the manifest themes that emerged from the Papua separatists’**

#### **Facebook photos?**

The Free West Papua Movement posted a total of 1,369 posts. Those total posts consisted of 1,267 photo posts and 102 non-photo posts. The latter comprised 32 videos and 80 text posts. The photo posts were most likely uploaded straight from their original data files because the authors did not find any indication that these pictures were edited prior to their display in the Free West Papua Movement’s Facebook posts. From the Papua separatists’ photo posts, this research found four manifest themes, which represented the political and cultural aspects of the Papua separatists. The following table listed the number of photo themes, along with their year posted to the web.

INSERT TABLE 15 HERE

***Independence.*** This theme showed independence for West Papua region as the main goal of the Papua separatist group. The pictures in this theme represented mainly the spirit of freedom, as part of Papuan’s culture. Many pictures from this theme showed the morning star

as the official flag of the Free West Papua Movement. Since the Indonesian Government had prohibited the Free West Papua Movement's existence, the morning star became a symbol, which showed the world that their movement existed. The flag was pictured waving on many locations, such as at the top of a building, attached to a flagpole, or held by Papuans' hands. Although the morning star flag fluttering pictures were found in many different timelines of the Papua separatists' Facebook account, they appeared more frequently around the date of December 1, which was the anniversary day of the Free West Papua Movements.

The independence theme also covered images of the Free West Papua Movement leaders' activities. Particularly included were the pictures of Benny Wenda, the chief of the Free West Papua Movement. He was known as a fugitive in Indonesia as he was accused of several criminal activities, such as murdering several soldiers and committing treason. After he escaped from prison, Mr. Wenda went abroad. From the pictures, this research found that he was seen mainly in England, and occasionally also visited Australia, United States of America, African countries and other European countries. There was no Asian country among Mr. Wenda's pictures. He was occasionally seen to meet many political figures. In addition, several pictures also showed Mr. Wenda hosting public seminars. In most occasions, he wore the Papuan traditional clothes along with traditional hats. Besides Mr. Wenda, the other Free West Papua Movement leaders, such as Goliat Tabuni, Philep Karma, or Sebby Sambom were also seen in the pictures frequently. From the captions, this research found the Free West Papua Movement leaders mainly discussed the proposal of Papua independence and accused the Indonesian government of several human rights violations.

Another type of picture for this theme was the poster picture. The latter showed some written texts with the morning star flag as the backgrounds. The texts stated Papua separatists' vision and all posters used English as their main language.

Further, this research found that the independence theme was dominant among the Papua separatists' photos. From the day the photos were uploaded, the independence theme pictures had steady numbers around 30% of the entire photos per year (as seen in table 15). However in the last two years, the independence theme pictures dropped slightly to 25% and 13% respectively.

***Local Tradition.*** The local tradition theme reflected the role of Papuan rituals in their culture. This theme showed the Papuan's daily life which showing Papuan beauty and unique traditions. Kirkseys (2012) explained that some tribes in Papua had not been touched by what we call modernity, i.e. electricity, industry, finance/ economy or digital media. Therefore, the Papua separatists wanted to show that unlike other ethnicities that resided in Indonesian cities, many of the Papuans still lived as indigenous tribes.

The Papuan tradition theme covered images of traditional dancing, singing and other local traditions. From the pictures, this research found the Papuans were wearing traditional clothes, hats, bracelets and other accessories while they performed the traditional dances. Aside from dancing, other pictures also covered Papuans singing traditional songs. The captions said that one song was about a brave Papuan that faced danger from the enemy and the other song was about the beauty of Papuan's land. Further, the Papua separatists also showed many Papuan traditional ceremonies, such as the friendship ceremonies and the celebration ceremonies. Most of these pictures also displayed audiences watching from the

side. Also included in this theme were the pictures of a traditional ground woven. The ground woven was a Papuan's traditional ceremony for remembering the families who had just passed away. Interestingly, the pictures of ground woven ceremonies were taken in the western countries' settings and showed the traditional ceremony performed by some Caucasian males.

The appearances of the local tradition theme had the opposite numbers of the independence theme. In the first year of Free West Papua Movement's Facebook account, there was no local tradition theme picture (see table 15). Nevertheless, the percentage numbers among the Papua separatists' pictures grew steadily every year. In 2015, the local tradition theme was the second most frequent with 30% among total pictures.

***Oppression.*** Overall the oppression theme represented the negative sentiment toward the Indonesian government. As a separatist movement, this theme was understandably necessary to be the causal part of separation from a nation state. In other words, without this theme, there would be no reason for the Papua separatist movement's existence. The oppression theme covered images of Papuan suffering from the presence and acts of the Indonesian army. The images showed several Papuan adult males who were put behind bars. They were standing and looking into the camera. Generally, there was no information from the pictures regarding who they were and what they did. However, the captions said that they were arrested after being shot by Indonesian police, thus the Papua separatists demanded that the men behind bars should be freed immediately.

Included in this theme also were pictures of soldiers that captured Papuan citizens. Typical of this kind of pictures was showing soldiers holding rifles and standing beside

unarmed Papuans. In some pictures, the Papuans were forced to lie on the ground while the soldier's gun was pointing at them. Some pictures also showed a Papuan being a victim of violence. The images were very disturbing; they showed Papuans with severe injuries on their bodies. There was no information of the time when these pictures were taken.

The other pictures from this theme were the photos of the Indonesian officials. In many pictures, (former) Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was employed as the pictures' object. He was pictured holding rifles with photo captions or placed beside written texts. The latter stated a suggestion to capture the Indonesian President because he was responsible for the suffering of Papuans.

The oppression theme constantly had low numbers among the other Papua separatists' photos. In the first four years of the Free West Papua Movement's Facebook account, the oppression theme appeared below 10% (as seen in table 15). Though in the last two years, the number increased quite significantly, with this theme comprising 15% and 17% respectively.

***Solidarity.*** The solidarity theme represents mainly cooperation between Papuans and other ethnicities. From the pictures, this research learned the Papua separatists wanted to show that their struggle had support from others. Included in this theme were the images of demonstration events, which used people and locations as their main focus. The people inside the demonstration pictures were coming from different races and from different places around the world. Further, there were two issues that served as demonstration subjects. First, the protesters supported the existence of the Papua separatist movement and expressed independence should be given to them. For this kind of demonstration, the event was

attended by a small number of people, with a range from 20 to 40 people. Most of these pictures were taken in foreign countries. Interestingly, some pictures that displayed small demonstrations were taken outside LUSH cosmetics stores in the United Kingdom and Holland. LUSH was known as one of two private sponsors of the Free West Papua Movement. Second, the issues were against rule violations. For example, the pictures of local demonstrations showed protests against capturing of Papuans by the Indonesian authorities. Although the demonstrations were not large-scale actions, these events were posted consistently throughout the year.

The solidarity theme also covered images of supporting events, such as music concerts, seminars and discussion forums. In the pictures of music concerts, the images were likely to show a main stage, the artists and the crowds. The artists were pictured to hold the Morning Star flag in the center of the stage and the audiences were used as a background. Additionally, the photo captions listed when and where this event happened, which were mostly held in the United Kingdom. The captions also stated how these events acted as fundraising events to support the Papua separatist movement. The seminars and discussion forums pictures displayed the supporters had a pose near the events' banner or the other Papuans' accessories. Most of these pictures came from Melanesian regions.

The solidarity theme dominated the pictures of the Papua separatists' photos. In the first two years, the solidarity theme appeared in more than half of all pictures (see table 15). Although the solidarity theme's appearances had slightly dropped in recent years, it was still the most appearances among the other themes.

**RQ. 8: What were the signs and signifiers employed by the Papua separatists’**

**Facebook posts?**

From the messages posted by the Papua separatists, this research found a total of 1,267 image posts. From those pictures, this research found some cultural signs and signifiers that appeared throughout the photos.

INSERT TABLE 16 HERE

*Races.* As seen in table 16, there were four races that were displayed from the pictures posted by the Papua separatists; Melanesian, Asian, African, and Caucasian. The Melanesian race dominated the Papua separatists’ Facebook posts by appearing 3,594 times or almost three quarters of the people pictured on the images. The Melanesians were people who originated from the eastern islands of Indonesian archipelago and the Pacific Islands. Their physical attributes could be found by their dark brown skin and often were pictured as one community, which shared a supporting attitude toward Papua independence. In some pictures, the Melanesians also acted as the victims of oppression and the actors of cultural performances. Within the Melanesian race were the West Papuans, who were pictured as involved in a movement against the Indonesian government or being a victim of Indonesian military aggression. The Papua separatist leaders, such as Goliat Tabuni, Philep Karma, Sebby Sambom, etc. also appeared several times. However their appearances were not as often as Benny Wenda, the founder of the Free West Papua Movement in Europe, who appeared 218 times or in almost one fifth of the pictures. The other Melanesians in the pictures could be identified by the background locations, which were located in the Eastern Papua and the pacific islands.

The next most common race pictured was the Caucasian individuals. The Caucasians appeared 957 times or 19% of the total sample populations. This research identified them by their white color skin. They appeared mostly in European countries and also in Australia and North America. The Caucasians were pictured as friendly colleagues that supported the Free West Papua Movement. Further, ordinary and public figures of the Caucasians appeared mostly in the pictures with a solidarity theme. For example, the Caucasians were part of the demonstrations that were held in European cities. The other kind of support to the Papua separatists from the Caucasians was in the form of cultural performance. Several Caucasians were pictured performing Papua traditional dances and ceremonies.

The Africans appeared as the least frequently portrayed ethnic group among the Papua separatists' pictures. They appeared only 54 times or around one percent of the sample. Mostly their dark skin could identify them as the Africans. They also had taller bodies compared to the Melanesians. The Africans were found mostly in the pictures that were taken from the African continent. Similar to the Melanesians and the Caucasians, the Africans were depicted as supporters of the Free West Papua Movement. For example, most of the Africans were pictured singing or being friends with the Papua separatist leaders.

The Asians also occurred in the Papua separatists' pictures. They appeared 272 times or around 6% of the sample. All of the Asians pictured were Indonesians. They appeared mostly in pictures that were taken in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital. In most cases, the Indonesians were depicted as the cause of oppression that happened to the Papuans. They were pictured wearing military or police uniforms and holding modern weapons. The Indonesian president and government officers also appeared several times in the pictures.

INSERT TABLE 17 HERE

***Clothes.*** As seen in table 17, there were several signifiers of clothes from the Papua separatist group images. First, the casual clothes were worn by 3,409 people or far more than the other types of clothing. The casual clothes mostly appeared in the form of t-shirts and jeans. The other casual clothes were including active wear, shorts and short-sleeve shirts. The casual clothes were typically worn for the outdoor activities rather than the indoor activities. The people in the pictures who wore the casual clothes mostly combined their fashion styles with the modern casual accessories.

The second most common clothing appearing in the photographs was traditional clothing. The latter was worn 1,122 times or almost a quarter of the sample. They consisted of the Papuans' Batik shirt and traditional pants. The traditional clothes were found mainly in the Papuan traditional activities or worn by the Papua separatist leader Benny Wenda. He wore the Papuan traditional clothes for most of his activities, such as giving speeches, protesting in demo events or socializing with his colleagues.

Next, we found formal clothes as part of the clothing signifiers. It occurred 346 times and was the least appearances in the Papua separatists' pictures. The formal clothes included military or police uniforms and also business attire, which consisted of formal suits. The latter typically were worn by political public figures, such as the Indonesian President, the Papua New Guinea's Governor, the Mayor from British cities, etc.

INSERT TABLE 18 HERE

***Accessories.*** As seen in table 18, this research found there were various accessories from the Papua separatists' Facebook posts. This research found two distinctive accessories,

namely the traditional and the non-traditional accessories. Based on this coding, the traditional accessories appeared more than the non-traditional accessories. The traditional fashion accessories consisted of traditional hats, traditional bracelets, and traditional shoes. In addition, this research also found bows, spears, and blades as traditional weapons. Further, this research found the non-traditional fashion consisted of casual hats, watches, casual shoes, and dress shoes. Some of the non-traditional accessories were displayed to have associations with a corporation called LUSH, one of two private sponsors of the Free West Papua Movement. Furthermore, the modern weapons appeared as steel handcuffs, handguns, and rifles.

INSERT TABLE 19 HERE

**Locations.** Table 19 showed the locations on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts. From a total of 1,267 images, this research could only code 1,147 images. The remaining 120 pictures could not be determined due to unclear support signs, such as close-up pictures and color painting backgrounds. An example could be found in the Papua separatists' new-year posts. In December 31, 2010 they posted fireworks with clouds background in the and a happy new-year greeting. These unclear signs led to an unclear conclusion of where the picture was taken.

The pictures category was divided by two main categories, namely domestic and foreign locations. The domestic location's coding was initially differed by 33 places according to the official province' names in Indonesia, with the Province of Papua and the Province of West Papua combined as one variable. However, the findings showed that Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, was the only location that appeared on the pictures

besides the Papua islands. The latter turned to be the most location appearances than other locations. The number of pictures that showed the Papua islands as their locations was 581 or around half of sampled pictures. On one hand, pictures from the Papua islands showed many undeveloped areas, where there were dusty roads, dirt fields, traditional buildings and modern buildings, jungles, and mountains. On the other hand, Jakarta appeared only five times, which made it as the least frequent among all locations depicted. All pictures from Jakarta had modern buildings as their background.

More modern buildings were also seen from the foreign category. This category was initially consisted of all regions in the world. However this research only found five regions, namely Europe, Africa, North America, Pacific Islands, and Australia. Europe was the foreign region with the most appearances. Specifically, this research found London occurred in more than 90% of the European pictures. Other European countries that appeared in the Papua separatists' pictures were Holland, Scotland, and Germany.

Outside Europe, the Pacific Islands appeared as the second frequent location. Most of the pictures from this region came from Papua New Guinea, which is located in the eastern part of Papua islands. The other regions consisted of Africa, North America, and Australia. These regions appeared on the Papua separatists' pictures mostly because the Free West Papua leaders had events there to attend.

INSERT TABLE 20 HERE

**Backgrounds.** As seen in table 20, this research found the photo backgrounds were also used as a common sign. There were seven different categories that served as the signifiers. Parks (n=274), traditional buildings (n=258), dirt fields (n=234), and modern

buildings (n=226) were the four most appearances. The differences between the modern buildings and the traditional buildings were seen from the materials, the usage and the height of buildings. While the modern buildings had solid materials, served as an office and looked relatively like big buildings, the traditional buildings had wood material and looked relatively like small houses. Further, the parks could be identified by the many trees and paving blocks and dirt fields were literally fields that were made of dirt. Furthermore, the least appearances background was the prison. This type of background occurred when there was a building that had bars.

INSERT TABLE 21 HERE

**Flags.** Table 21 showed the flags on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts. The Papua separatist flags, called the morning star flag, were seen in 503 pictures posted on the separatists' Facebook account. The flag was used in forms of a "real" flag or in other ways, such as on demonstration's banners, casual shirts, body paintings, or as computer-generated image (CGI) backgrounds. The other flags that were seen in the pictures were the Indonesian and the other nations' flags. The latter appeared mostly in demonstration activities in foreign lands and the nations' flags were adjusted to the demonstration locations. For example, on November 1, 2010, the Papua separatists posted a demonstration picture in London that showed the morning star flag beside the United Kingdom's flag.

INSERT TABLE 22 HERE

**Languages (texts on pictures).** As seen in table 22, English dominated the language sign on the pictures, by appearing 387 times or with 78.4% of the total pictures with text. In most cases, the texts were employed to convey a message on a demonstration's poster.

Besides English, Bahasa (Indonesian language) also appeared as the next most appearances on the Free West Papua demonstration pictures in Papua islands. The other language that was seen in the pictures was the Dutch. Similar to the occurrence of Bahasa, the Dutch texts also appeared as part of demonstration pictures in Holland. This research should also note that although Papuans had their own local language, it was not found in the entire sample's photographs.

INSERT TABLE 23 HERE

***Languages (texts on captions).*** Table 23 showed the type of language that appeared as text on the Papua separatists' Facebook photo captions. This research found that 877 times or 99.8% of pictures that had captions employed English as the language. English was the most frequently used language for captions. In the contrary, Bahasa appeared only twice and no other language was found on captions. Further, this research found that there were 388 pictures that appeared without captions. This was due to the fact that the Papua Separatists posted multiple pictures together in one day. Therefore, only the first pictures would have a photo caption on it. The rest of the pictures were posted without a caption.

INSERT TABLE 24 HERE

***Words (on captions).*** Table 24 showed the words that most frequently appeared in the Papua separatists' Facebook photo captions. It was not surprising that the top three words resulted with Papua, West, and Free. The combination of the first two words referred to the conflict territory, West Papua. Further, the combination of the first three words referred to the separatist group's name, Free West Papua. Next, the word "Indonesian" appeared 114 times. This word referred to the antagonist actors, which were the Indonesian President,

Indonesian Armies, Indonesian Police, etc. It was also possible the word “Indonesian” was with conjunction with the word “Embassy”, as “Embassy” ranked 9<sup>th</sup> on the results. Apparently, the Papua separatist group held many demonstrations near the Indonesian Embassies abroad.

From the top 20 words, the author found many photo themes matched with the captions. Terms such as “support”, and “demo” were in line with the solidarity theme. In addition, the words “freedom”, “independence”, “flag” corresponded with the independence theme. The results also showed several terms referred to locations. Besides West Papua as the conflict territory, London, PNG (an abbreviation for Papua New Guinea), and Australia appeared occasionally on the photo captions.

Other than locations, the author found several specific terms were included in the top 20 words. They were “Noken” (the Papuans’ traditional accessories), “Benny” (the first name of the Papua separatists’ leader, Benny Wenda), and “December” (the Papua separatist group’s anniversary day). Perhaps, the weirdest term found in the top 20 was “bird”. When the author looked in the actual caption, the word “bird” referred mostly to the terms “the Bird of Paradise”, as it was the types of birds that only lived in Papua. Evidently, the Free West Papua made documentary videos regarding the threat extinction to the Bird of Paradise as part of their campaigns.

**RQ. 9: Were there patterns of co-occurrence among the visual signs in the Papua separatists’ Facebook photos?**

This research found two categories for the patterns of co-occurrence. The first category was related to the humans. This category occurred when a person was analyzed as

unit of analysis. As a result, this research found patterns of co-occurrence between races and clothes signs. The second category was related to the locations. For this category, the unit of analysis is a photo. Locations and Backgrounds were the pattern of co-occurrence that was analyzed in this research. The following paragraphs described the details of the two patterns of co-occurrence categories.

INSERT TABLE 25 HERE

***Humans related.*** As seen in table 25, there were co-occurrence patterns of races and clothes from the photos. Based on the findings, the casual clothes appeared dominantly on people of Melanesian, Caucasian and African. The casual clothes appeared 2,631 times on the Melanesian individuals or 73.3% of the total Melanesian population on the pictures, 732 times on the Caucasian persons (76%), and 46 times on the African people (85%). The big amount of casual clothes was found mostly on the solidarity theme pictures, specifically on the pictures that showed demonstration events. For this type of event, this research found more multiple persons wearing casual clothes.

The traditional clothes appeared 948 times (26.4%) on the Melanesian, 171 times on the Caucasian (18%), and three times on the African persons (5%). The traditional clothes were found often in the pictures that showed the local tradition theme. The Melanesian people were found wearing traditional clothes when they performed traditional dancing, singing and ceremonies. In addition, Benny Wenda, the Free West Papua Movement leader, was found mostly to wear traditional clothes as well. Further, the Caucasians and the Africans were also seen wearing Papuan traditional clothes on the solidarity theme pictures.

For example, many Caucasians and Africans wore Papuan traditional clothes when they attended a music concert, which had a purpose to support the Free West Papua Movement.

In contrast, the Melanesian, the Caucasian, and the African individuals were seen rarely to wear formal clothes in the Papua separatists' photos. The people who wore formal clothes were the politicians, such as a Mayor in the United Kingdom, a Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, a Governor, and legislative members of Papua New Guinea.

In contrast, the Asians were seen only to wear formal clothes. The Asians wore formal clothes 272 times and did not wear any other types of clothes. As was mentioned before, the only Asians that occurred on the Papua separatists' pictures were the Indonesian Government officials. Therefore the clothes that they were wearing were the suits for the Indonesian President and the uniform for the military and police forces.

INSERT TABLE 26 HERE

***Locations related.*** Table 26 showed the co-occurrence patterns of backgrounds and locations. In the domestic locations, the results showed that only modern buildings appeared in pictures that were located in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital city. In contrast, traditional buildings (41.7%), dirt fields (38%), and forests (12.5%) occurred as the top-three appearances of the Papua pictures. The three backgrounds showed pictures from under-developed areas. Even when the pictures were taken from Jayapura, the Papua Province's capital city, traditional buildings and dirt fields still showed up as the background. The other places that were shown from Papua pictures were mountains (1.9%), and prisons (5.6%). The latter occurred 33 times, which meant that all prison pictures were taken in Papua. The pictures from the prisons appeared as the oppression theme, which showed Papuan activists

were jailed. The other iconic place that was seen from the Papua pictures was the Grasberg Mountain. The latter was the largest gold mine in the world, which was explored by the Freeport-McMoRan Inc. The Papua separatists put the captions of the story of unfair sharing of natural exploration when they posted the Grasberg Mountain photos.

In the foreign locations, a similar pattern like the Papua pictures was found from the Pacific Islands pictures. Although there were no mountain and prison backgrounds, the Pacific Islands showed traditional buildings (50%), dirt fields (40%), and forests (6.7%) as the top-three appearances. However, the other places in foreign locations showed the opposite nature. Pictures that were taken from Europe, Australia, North America, and Africa showed modern buildings and parks as the picture's backgrounds. From these pictures, we could see that the Papua separatists periodically used the parks and areas near the Indonesian Embassy in London to hold demonstration events. In addition, the Free West Papua Movement's Facebook photos often displayed iconic places as backgrounds from these countries. For example, many pictures from London presented the Big Ben clock tower. Likewise, the other locations showed Australian Parliament Houses, Venice Beach of California, Coffee Bay of South Africa, and Amsterdam's Dam Square.

## **Discussion**

**Themes (RQ. 7).** From the Free West Papua Movement's photos, the results showed the Papua separatists' message strategies had four themes. The four themes supported previous studies regarding ethnic separatist group by many scholars. First, the author agrees that the independence theme support the inclusion of the Free West Papua Movement as a separatist group, in accordance with Horowitz's (1981) definition of a separatist. In addition,

the Papua separatists' goal to establish a new nation follows the logic of Fearon's (2004) modern government system.

The second and third themes, which are local tradition and solidarity, support the existence of the Free West Papua Movement as an ethnic separatist group. From the local tradition theme, the author learns that the Papua separatists employ cultural elements as their organizational values. This theme often shows the unique tradition of Papuans' customs, e.g. the traditional dances, songs, and ceremonies. Further, the oppression theme contains messages that stress the fact that Papuans live as an ethnic minority. By contrasting the look of the Indonesian Government Officers, including the police and the armies, with ordinary Papuans, the Free West Papua Movement can show the difference between "us" and "them". These findings supported Chima's (2015) argument that ethnic separatist groups do not hesitate to show the group's cultural identity. In this regard, the Papuans cultural identity is not only the custom, but also the oppression that they receive from the Indonesian regime.

The fourth theme, which is the solidarity theme, shows the Free West Papua Movement's positions towards various issues. For instance, in the political issues, the Papua separatists show that they choose to express their feelings by arranging peaceful demonstrations. In addition, the Free West Papua Movement shows an intense cooperation with other ethnicities, which in the Papua separatists' cases are mostly Caucasian people. These revelations support Asal et al.'s (2014) finding that foreign-supported separatist groups would likely lead to non-violent protests. In addition, the involvement of foreign actors strengthens Asal et al.'s (2014) argument that the diaspora supported separatist group is

different than the political separatist group, because the latter is likely to reduce foreign engagement.

The finding of the four themes also echoes a part of Hiltner's (2005) description regarding the insurgent media. In his essays, insurgent media were described as an important artifact to hear stories other than from traditional power resources, e.g. the governments, corporate media, or corporations. Through their Facebook posts, the Papua separatists show that they have alternate stories of West Papua, which are completely different from the Indonesian Government versions. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2014) assured that West Papua's conditions were safer than before and that more development projects were going as planned, the Free West Papua Movement told different stories. The Papua separatists frequently exposed stories of human rights violations and discrimination from the Indonesian Government Officials.

Next, the findings do not support some parts of Hiltner's description on the insurgent media. In addition to the conclusion mentioned above, Hiltner also described that insurgent media were different than the mainstream media, particularly regarding the creativity aspect of the media contents. Hiltner said the mainstream media were likely to publish tedious stories because they were generated from a "generic attitude" of media reporting (p. 105). In addition, he explained that insurgent media had more colorful content and asked tougher questions than the mainstream media. Nevertheless, the findings from the Papua separatists' photos present another idea of insurgent media. These pictures' contents are far from Hiltner's claim because many of them display posed photos of the Papua separatist leaders or small-scale demonstrations. In the author's eyes, these pictures are not as creative as

Hiltner's description of having creative contents. Moreover, the findings show most pictures are displayed as is or without image editing process. Therefore, the author argues the creative contents on the insurgent media are more likely to show an authenticity from the insurgent's culture. By showing authentic photos, they can show their creativity to the audience and their originality to the mainstream media at once. For example, the Papua separatists frequently displayed the Morning Star Flag on their photos. The flag was positioned in various ways, i.e. Papua flag waving on the top of a building, waving on the flag pole, was hold by hand, hanging on the wall, or being a background of mission statement texts. As the Indonesian Government bans the Morning Star flag, the Indonesian mainstream media does not display such an object.

Another aspect of insurgent media, according to Hiltner, was their ability to be independent from the corporations' interests. In contrary, the results show some pictures display the LUSH cosmetics logo. In other words, as a private sponsor of the Free West Papua Movement, LUSH cosmetics receive some kinds of privileges from the Papua separatists. Therefore, the author's argument that the insurgent media are not entirely independent from the corporations' interest applies for the Free West Papua Movement's media.

Besides supporting and critiquing previous research, the findings also reveal a new perspective regarding ethnic separatist groups. In one hand, the results show independence and solidarity themes' appearance numbers reduced in recent years. On the other hand, local tradition and oppression themes appeared more in recent years than in the past. These findings can be translated to a generalization that the Papua separatists prioritized political

substance messages and disregarded the cultural substance messages in the early life of their organization. In recent years, these trends changed slightly in reverse order. These trends can lead to a conclusion that as the ethnic organization grows more mature, it can change its message strategies according to the organization's needs. This conclusion also means that the Papua separatists can adapt to the new environment of Facebook, as the social media platform kept upgrading its services and reaching more and broader audiences in recent years.

**Signs and signifiers (RQ. 8 and RQ. 9).** Based on the findings, the Papua separatist group employs many cultural signs to symbolize their ethnic representations. The cultural signs consist of clothing, flags, language (text), races, backgrounds, and locations. Most of the pictures contain at least two cultural signs from the coding scheme. To convey their messages, the Papua separatists introduce ethnic differentiation between themselves and the Indonesians. Particularly, while the Papuans are portrayed as ordinary people or heroes, the Indonesians are portrayed as the antagonists in the pictures. In other words, the Papua separatists presented comparing-contrasting signs between the two cultures as their main message strategies. For example, the Papuans were pictured wearing mostly custom traditional clothing or casual clothing. In contrast, the Indonesians were portrayed as authorities with the uniforms of armies or police officers.

The other Papua separatist group's message strategies can be found from the patterns of co-occurrence on human related and locations related photos. The results on humans related photos showed that Papuans, along with the other Melanesians, Caucasians, and Africans races had similar appearances. Other than the Asians that were pictured wearing

only formal clothes, the individuals of three races appeared wearing mostly casual clothes and occasionally traditional clothes. The author argues that the Papua separatists want to show a friendship attitude with the other races and animosity attitude toward the Indonesians.

Further, the locations related photos might have another message strategy. For photos that showed the Melanesian lands, e.g. West Papua, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, etc., the Free West Papua Movement depicted locations of dirt fields, mountains, and forests. Meanwhile, for locations that were outside the Melanesian lands, the pictures were most likely to show modern cities with tall buildings and parks as the signifiers. In this regard, the author argues that the Free West Papua Movement wanted to bring the issue of economic discrimination through their photos. In other words, the Papua separatists want to show their audience that the Indonesian Government is deliberately leaving Papua as an underdeveloped land. The argument is based on the fact that the Free West Papua Movement omitted many tourism places in Papua, such as world-class tourism spot Raja Ampat, downtown Jayapura, Lake Sentani, etc.

The findings regarding signs and signifiers also appear to support other studies regarding ethnic organizations, despite the differences on the organizational nature. For example, Bai (2010) and Lin & Song (2006) found ethnic representation on ethnic media publication. Meanwhile Johnson and Carneiro (2014) also found cultural signs appeared through ethnic museum websites. However, what made the separatist group different than the other types of ethnic groups is their use of language. In their ethnic museum websites study, Johnson and Carneiro (2014) revealed that an ethnic language was used as part of a societal purpose, such as education or as a visual symbol of the culture. On the contrary, this study

did not find any single word from Papuan's local language on the Papua separatists' messages.

The use of Indonesian and English by the Papua separatist group's Facebook account revealed the target audience, which was for national and international scopes. National in this context meant the Indonesian audience as a whole and not the local Papuan. The latter has an ethnic local language that is very different from the Indonesian language. In Papua, every local knows the Papuan language because it is a mother tongue (Rutherford, 2012). Hence the use of languages other than Papuan language showed us that the Papua separatists are after the bigger scope of audiences than only the local Papuans.

Further, the use of English also indicated that the Papua separatist group leaders are looking for support from foreign resources. Clifford (2005) suggested that rebellion groups were doing marketing activity because competition for foreign resources was becoming tighter in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The author argues the kind of support that the Papua separatist group desired might come from the Western countries. This argument is based on the fact that several Western countries' flags appeared frequently on the photos. The other target organizations can be the human rights and indigenous supporter organizations because the themes related to these organizations appeared throughout the pictures.

To this end, the findings show the themes, signs, and signifiers were dominantly coming from Papuan's cultural values; i.e.: independence (freedom), local tradition, oppression (minority) and solidarity. Additionally, the findings on photo captions also confirmed that their text messages mostly used cultural terms. These facts showed that the Papua separatist group is different than other groups of separatists, such as the Islamic State

of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) and Scottish Independence. While ISIS deliberately posted their violent activities on Twitter, i.e. beheading foreigners, capturing hostages and combatting at war, the Scottish separatists broadcasted political text messages on Facebook by campaigning the public to choose on a general election. Therefore, this study shows that the separatist movement in Papua devotes their social media effort for cultural heritage, besides merely getting independence. In other words, the findings from the second study confirm the first study in this dissertation that there are digital media communication differences among the three categories of separatist groups.

### **Research Limitations**

While this study declares that the Papua separatist group used ethnic representations based on their Facebook account, this study has some limitations. The main limitation is this study's research design. From the Free West Papua Movement's Facebook account, this study only looks at the messages posted by the Papua separatists. In contrary, this study does not look at response from the audiences, despite Facebook allowing other users to respond on the posts. Therefore, there is an opportunity for future research to look at the Papua separatists' audience responses, as it would be useful for research that uses an audience study framework.

Further, as this study can only point to the fact that the Papua separatists changed their messages' theme trends in recent years, this study cannot show why the Free West Papua Movement did such actions. Therefore, in-depth interviews to the Free West Papua Movement's Facebook account editors can potentially reveal whether such changes related to the Papua separatists' audience responses or the other factors.

The other limitation lies on Facebook as this study's research focus. The fact that Papuans' image representation can also be found from other media such as the traditional news media and other Papua separatists' media channels, can open a new kind of investigation. A study that is looking for content analysis on Papua separatists' website can compare the consistency of the Papua separatists' message strategies. In addition, content analysis on traditional news media can show how much influence of the Papua separatists' Facebook activity had on the news media's perspective.

## **Chapter Five:**

### **Public Diplomacy Content Analysis (Study Three)**

This study aimed at finding the new form of the Indonesian Government's public diplomacy model regarding the Papua issues. Melissen (2005) suggested that the media for the new public diplomacy should facilitate two-way communication and involve more global agents rather than only state governments and international organizations as the traditional actors. Therefore, the most appropriate method is a content analysis of the Indonesian Government's social media as this platform can serve both aspects of Melissen's new public diplomacy concept.

#### **Sampling**

Currently, there are several platforms of social media, e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Path. When the Indonesian Government started to create accounts on social media, they created Twitter and Facebook accounts in almost the same time period. However, this study analyzed specifically their Twitter accounts.

The author had two reasons for why Twitter was selected ahead of Facebook. First, the purpose of this study was to look for the new form of the Indonesian Government public diplomacy model. According to Melissen (2005) and Cull (2013), the new public diplomacy model enabled the governments to have two-way communication with their audience. Since the beginning of their launching, Twitter has been the leading social media to include two-way communication features. For example, a retweet feature allowed Twitter users to forward the other users' comments. Facebook had a similar feature as well, but it only included this feature in the last two years. In addition, Twitter allowed users to create more

awareness among its population by highlighting the hashtag (#) and at (@) symbols every time. Facebook also had the highlight feature, but it only functioned if the users mentioned other Facebook users. Ultimately, between the two social media platforms, Twitter was the only social media that announced the trending topic ranks to allow the public to identify which topic had the most discussion. Second, even though Facebook had the biggest audience for the social media, its reach was limited compared to Twitter. Social Media expert Todd Warwickshire (2015), claimed Twitter had advantage features among the social media platforms. “On Twitter though you can have a very limited number of followers and still reach a large audience. A simple retweet from someone with a lot more followers can really make a difference” (Warwickshire, 2015, p. 13).

The Indonesian Government has many agencies inside it. However, according to the Indonesian constitution, specifically verse 11 and 13, and to the Indonesian law no. 37/ 1999, the only agencies that can address international affairs are the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hence, the samples that this study selected were the Indonesian President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Twitter accounts. The Ministry (@Portal\_Kemlu\_RI) opened their account in June, 2010. Regarding the President’s Twitter, there have been two Indonesian Presidents since Twitter went live and both of them have a Twitter account. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (@SBYudhoyono) served from October 20, 2004 to October 19, 2014 while the current President Joko Widodo (@jokowi) has served as the leader since October 20, 2014. This study examined both of the Presidents’ Twitter accounts while they served their time as the President. Since President Widodo is still serving his term,

this study analyzed data only until the last full year period of data collection, which ended on December 31, 2015.

### **Operationalization**

This study aimed for analyzing the new Indonesian Government's public diplomacy concept regarding the Papua issues. The Indonesian Government agencies, both the Ministry and the Presidents, launched their Twitter accounts and posted a huge amount of Twitter posts (tweets). The Ministry posted 14,036 tweets, President Yudhoyono posted 4,057 tweets, and President Widodo posted 219 tweets. Since there were thousands of tweets from them, the author made a differentiation between the tweets regarding recent Papua issues from the general tweets. The latter would not be analyzed because analyzing it did not match with the purpose of this dissertation. To differentiate the message about the Papua issues among other issues, the author employed the Twitter's advanced search application. This feature allowed users to search tweets based on words, people, places, dates, or any combination of these categories. The only limitation to the Twitter's advanced search application was its results limited to 1,000 tweets. However, if the search result did not exceed the maximum number, the Twitter's advanced search application could generate results from the first time Twitter was launched, which was from March, 2006.

In order to use the Twitter's advanced search, the author combined search terms on the people and words. While the people were the Indonesian Government agencies (the Ministry and the Presidents), the words were generated from Google Trend application. This feature had the ability to search from the world of web of popular terms that correlated to specific words. When the term "Papua" was placed on Google Trend, it resulted in the

following top ten words: West Papua, Noken (a Papuan's traditional accessories), Raja Ampat (a famous tourist destination in West Papua), Jayapura (West Papua's capital city), OPM (Indonesian words for the Papua separatist group), Merauke (The furthest Eastern borderline of Indonesia in West Papua) Freeport (the world largest gold mining company, which operating in West Papua), Papua New Guinea, and Papua Nugini (Indonesian words for Papua New Guinea). From these results, the author regarded the first eight words were related to Papua issues, whereas the latter two words considered as a different issue. Added with the term "Papua", a total of nine words were employed in the Twitter's advanced search. This procedure resulted in 174 total tweets. Further, this research found 89 tweets employed English and 85 tweets used Bahasa (Indonesian language). In addition, the Indonesian Government posted some photos along with the written texts on their tweets. From the above-mentioned procedure, the author found 47 tweets had pictures (twitpics).

### **Units of Analysis**

The main unit of analysis for this study was the tweet's text. This study did not analyze the twitpics because it had relatively low numbers, below 30% of the population. Further, this study employed the entire text as its recording unit. Even though Twitter allowed 140 characters for each tweet, which would make the tweet contained several words, this study did not analyze for each word because a part of this study's goal was aimed at finding the issues in public diplomacy. Because one issue could have several words on it, it would be appropriate for this study to record one issue at a time. In addition, due to the limited number of words, it was rare for one tweet to contain two issues. However, should

such an event occur, this study would only record the most dominant issue. The analysis of the units of analysis was in line with the following coding scheme.

### **Coding Scheme**

In order to answer RQ. 10, this study employed a deductive-approach coding scheme by first differentiating between hard power and soft power. The breakdown of the hard power and the soft power followed Nye's (2008) definition of both kinds of power. Economic, military, territory and population issues represented the hard power. In contrast, the culture, good governance, and foreign policy symbolized the soft power.

Further, in order to refine the coding scheme, several related keywords were assigned for the hard power messages, such as development, investment, manufacture, infrastructure, commodities, agriculture, trade (for economic category), armies, forces, weaponry, security, surveillance, war crimes, rebellion (military), border, islands, region, province (territory), citizen, natives, population growth (population). In addition, several more keywords were also assigned to reflect the soft power messages, such as traditional, ethnic, celebrity, music, food (culture), democracy, transparency, election, gender equality, human rights, (good governance), diplomacy, bilateral, peace talks, foreign aid, and summit (foreign policy). The Indonesian translation for these words was also considered as the key words. When the coders found different keywords on the tweets, the coders would analyze further and decide where they should belong.

This study also aimed to find how the Indonesian Government used the new public diplomacy concept when they posted about recent Papua issues on the social media. Different than the procedure on the power analysis above, the author employed an alternative

procedure to determine the kinds of public diplomacy on the tweet samples. Instead of looking for manifest issues, the analysis of public diplomacy employed the elements from the tweets. This alternative procedure was needed because the concept of new public diplomacy was defined by elements and not by issues. Melissen's (2005) concept of new public diplomacy consisted the elements of two-way communication, the goals to serve international society's interest, and the involvement of non-state actors. In contrast, the concept of traditional public diplomacy (Tuch, 1990) consisted of the elements of one-way communication, the goals to serve only national interest, and the exclusivity of state officials. As a result, the analysis compared each type of public diplomacy elements.

To further analyze these elements, the following terms were employed as the new public diplomacy keywords: *retweet*, # (hashtag), greeting words (as the two-way communication), global, regional, peace keeping (international society's interest), corporations, public figures, activists, ordinary people (non-state actors). In addition, several more keywords were considered as the representation of traditional public diplomacy. They were speech, announcement, claim (as the one-way communication), national, Indonesia, archipelago (national interest), government officials, military forces, police, foreign officials (state officials), etc.

### **Intercoder Reliability**

Similar to Study One, the same individual fluent in English and Bahasa served as a second coder for the reliability check. This study also conducted the similar intercoder reliability process in Study Two, in which a pre-test was done. However, different than Study Two, which assigned randomly 20% of the total samples, Study Three pre-tested randomly

from 40% of total samples. The author doubled the percentage for the pre-test due to the small sample population. This process aimed at a score of more than .80 for all messages' categories (i.e. hard power, soft power, new public diplomacy, and traditional public diplomacy). Having confidence with the intercoder reliability check, the author advanced with the analysis of this study.

After the actual research procedure was done, this study employed the actual intercoder reliability calculation. This process resulted as: .97 (for hard power category), .95 (soft power), .88 (type of communication), .91 (type of interests), and .97 (type of actors). These intercoder reliability results meant that all the research's categories fulfilled the requirement for Krippendorff's intercoder reliability.

## **Findings**

### **RQ. 10: What messages did the Indonesian Government's public diplomacy address concerning the recent Papua issue in the social media?**

INSERT TABLE 27 HERE

*Hard power.* The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidents all posted messages regarding recent Papua issues on their Twitter accounts. Either hard power or soft power messages were found on their tweets. There was no message that contained both messages together. The hard power consisted of four issues (see table 27). First, economic issues dominated the hard power messages with 51% from the hard power's total count. When posting about economic issues, the Indonesian Government addressed the issues of the Papua economic development, infrastructure, welfare, trade, investment, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These issues were often in the form of the Indonesian Government's claims

regarding their achievements. For example, on August 15, 2015 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tweeted that the Papua's GDP growth equaled the national growth rate over the last two decades. On another occasion, President Widodo stated that the newly operated airport in Sorong could enhance connectivity among Papuan's cities.

Second, the Indonesian Government employed military issues as part of the hard power messages. This research found military forces and separatist conflicts were employed as the focus of the military issues. For example, on July 2, 2013, (Former) President Yudhoyono hailed the fallen armies from Papua separatist conflicts as the national heroes. Another example, on November 10, 2013, he suggested that terror actions from the Papua separatists had caused fear to Papuans. The dates of these tweets indicated that the tweets were meant as responses to recent separatist conflict (war) on Papuan land. (Former) President Yudhoyono tweeted these issues more than the other agencies. The Ministry tweeted only one message and President Widodo did not tweet any message regarding the military issue.

Third, territory issues were used as part of the Indonesian Government's hard power messages. This research found the territory issues ranked second among the hard power messages. However, only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was found to post messages regarding territory issues. On July 1, 2015, the Ministry stated that the British Government should pay respect to the International Law regarding the Papua territory. One month later, the Ministry posted that West Papua was an integral part of Indonesia according to the UN Resolution number 2504, 1969.

Fourth, this research found population issues were employed in tweets, even though these categories ranked the last among the other hard power messages. The population issues addressed how Indonesia had the largest Melanesian population in the world. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 million Melanesians lived in Indonesia. They could be found across the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago. These issues were tweeted on July 1, 2015 and August 15, 2015. Similar to the territory issue category, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the only Indonesian Government agency to post the population issues.

INSERT TABLE 28 HERE

***Soft power.*** Among the tweets regarding recent Papua issues, the Indonesian Government agencies employed more soft power issues than hard power issues (as seen on table 27 and table 28). From 174 tweets regarding recent Papua issues, 122 messages contained soft power or 70% of total samples. The soft power messages contained three categories. The first category was the cultural attraction issues. The Indonesian Government tweeted cultural attraction issues 56 times, which meant they were more often than each of the other categories. There were slight differences among the Indonesian Government agencies on how they tweeted the cultural attraction issues. When tweeted regarding these issues, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs often talked about the general aspect of Papuan's culture. For example, when talking about Papuan's customs, the Ministry only mentioned Papuan's culture as an important heritage and how it would increase the level of understanding between Indonesia & MSG countries. Then, (Former) President Yudhoyono tweeted more details of the Papuan's culture. On August 8, 2014 he expressed his appreciation for the indigenous Wasai people because the (former) President was greeted

with the traditional Mansorandak ceremony when he visited the Papua land. President Widodo also mentioned more detailed aspects regarding Papua. However, instead of posting cultural aspects of Papuan's customs, President Widodo's tweets' themes were more about travelling and tourism places in Papua. For example, he complimented Raja Ampat as the world's heaven because of its beautiful scenery. His praises also went to the other places in Papua such as the port of Waiwo, Merauke, and Pianemo islands. Further, this research found President Widodo only posted cultural attractions and did not post the other soft power categories.

The second soft power category was the good governance issues. This category consisted of the issues of transparency, Papua provincial funding, fair general election, etc. In July and August, 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted several series of tweets regarding facts and myths surrounding Papua. These tweets informed the audience of how the general election was conducted in the West Papua. Additionally, a series of tweets were also posted regarding cooperation between the Papua Provincial Government and the hospitals in Papua to improve the hospitals' service. Meanwhile, this research found (Former) President Yudhoyono's tweets focused on the aspect of transparency. For example, toward the end of his term, (Former) President posted tweets regarding the strategic plan for Papua in the near future.

The third soft power category was the foreign policy issues. When addressing these issues, the Indonesian Government focused on bilateral cooperation with Papua New Guinea, multilateral issues in UNESCO and protest against the British Government when they allowed the Papua separatists to open their office in Oxford. When these tweets were

analyzed based on the date posted and the authors, the results showed the following data. During (Former) President Yudhoyono administration, the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared equal responsibility in posting the foreign policy issues. In contrast, such conditions were not found during President Widodo era. Only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted the foreign policy issues. Meanwhile, this study did not find President Widodo ever addressing foreign policy regarding recent Papua issues.

***Traditional public diplomacy and new public diplomacy.*** The analysis of the Indonesian Government messages regarding the recent Papua issues continued on the differentiation between the traditional public diplomacy and the new public diplomacy.

INSERT TABLE 29 HERE

*Type of communications.* The first aspect that this research looked for was the type of communication, i.e., one-way communication and two-way communication. The results showed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted two-way communication more than its counterparts (see table 29). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively posted messages with popular symbols on Twitter, such as the hashtag (#) and the usages of at symbol (@) before person's name. In many cases, the Ministry put the object of the conversation after the hash tag symbols. In some cases, they also acknowledged the audience with greeting words, such as good morning, good afternoon, etc.

Further (Former) President Yudhoyono was found discussing recent Papua issues with other Twitter users, such as @DitaDeyence on May 29, 2013 and @jarodyudo on April 4, 2013. Meanwhile, among President Widodo's nine tweets regarding recent Papua issues, this research found he only employed once two-way communication's style. The only time

he posted a happy new year greeting along with a hash tag symbol was in the last day of 2015. In contrast, this research found the Presidents to post more one-way communication than two-way communication. Further, this research found typical one-way communication messages were the Indonesian Government agencies posting messages about the claims of their achievement in Papua.

INSERT TABLE 30 HERE

*Type of actors.* The next aspect of public diplomacy analysis was the type of actors, i.e., state actors and non-state actors. This research found the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and (Former) President Yudhoyono posted about more state actors than non-state actors (see table 30). Further, most of the state actors were the Indonesian Government and Foreign Government agencies. Some international organizations under the UN were also found mentioned on the tweets. Furthermore, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and (Former) President Yudhoyono mentioned non-state actors, the messages were dominantly contained with the words “people of Papua”. In contrast, none of the state actors were found on President Widodo’s tweets. His messages were dominantly regarding travelling actors, e.g., tourists, snorkeling divers, surfers.

INSERT TABLE 31 HERE

*Type of interests.* The last aspect that was analyzed was the type of interests. All Indonesian Government agencies tweeted more national interests than international interests (see table 31). The most obvious example could be found on (Former) President Yudhoyono’s tweets with 97% of his tweets containing national interests. In addition, the only time he mentioned international interest was when he discussed tourism affairs on

Papua land. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and President Widodo both posted a fair amount of national interests messages as well as international interests. However, when cross-tab operations were conducted, the results showed there were differences between the national interests and the international interests. On one hand, the national interests more likely contained the issues of economic and territory. On the other hand, the international interests were raised when the Ministry discussed issues regarding health and culture and the President discussed tourism issues.

**RQ. 11: What kinds of differences, if any, existed among the Indonesian government's social media messages regarding the recent Papua issue in different time periods?**

INSERT TABLE 32 HERE

*Differences on the issues.* The analysis of Indonesian Government's public diplomacy message strategies on recent Papua issues showed that the Indonesian Government employed more soft power messages than the hard power messages (as seen on table 32). During 2010 - 2012, the Indonesian Government posted only soft power messages, in the form of the foreign policy issues, which unsurprisingly came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry only tweeted messages contained bilateral cooperation with Papua New Guinea regarding the development progress in Papua during these years.

More various messages were found since 2013, when the Indonesian Government started to use hard power messages and more soft power messages to address recent Papua issues. In addition to foreign policy issues, the Indonesian government employed economic issues, military issues, cultural attraction issues, and good governance issues. In 2014, only

the latter four issues were found on the Indonesian Government's tweets. No foreign policy issues related to recent Papua issues was tweeted during this year. The author noted this five-year period marked the (Former) President Yudhoyono administration, with President Widodo inaugurated as the sixth Indonesian President on October 20, 2014.

During 2015, the Indonesian Government employed all aspects of hard power messages and soft power messages on recent Papua issues. The results also showed that there were significant increases regarding the tweets posted by the Indonesian Government. Nevertheless, the number of soft power messages doubled the hard power messages. This research found similar patterns on 2013 and 2014.

INSERT TABLE 33 HERE

*Differences among the type of public diplomacy messages.* The analysis of public diplomacy types employed a different analysis. Instead of counting how many elements of public diplomacy, the analysis of public diplomacy types counted how many messages employed similar public diplomacy elements. This analysis was required because to find the differences among the messages posted by the Indonesian Government, the analysis should look as the differences on each message instead of each element. For example, the last tweets on December 3, 2015, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the following contents "Happy #NokenDay! (4/12) This day is meant to celebrate #Noken as part of @UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding". From this tweet we could see that the tweet did not contain a straight new public diplomacy concept. Instead, it had a two-way communication as the type of communication, addressed international interest as the type of

interest, but employed state actors as the type of actors. Therefore, there were eight possibilities of public diplomacy messages (as seen on table 33).

INSERT TABLE 34 HERE

As a result, this research found there were differences among the Indonesian Governments' type of public diplomacy messages regarding recent Papua issues (as seen in table 34). On their first three years on Twitter, the Indonesian Government employed genuine traditional public diplomacy messages when they posted tweets related to Papua. The messages contained the elements of one-way communication, state actors, and national interests. Further, when the author did a cross-tab analysis, the author found these messages referred to the foreign policy issues. For example, on March 15, 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tweeted an announcement of a bilateral cooperation with Papua New Guinea to enhance the development in the Papua lands.

During the year 2013 and 2014, the Indonesian Government still dominantly tweeted traditional public diplomacy messages when they addressed recent Papua issues (see table 34). In addition, they also began to alter the messages by including the new public diplomacy elements. The Indonesian Government's messages started to display the elements of two-way communication, non-state actors, and international interests. For example, on April 14, 2013, (former) President Yudhoyono tweeted a greeting to another Twitter user and addressed that Papua is part of Indonesian territory. A month later, he started his tweet by addressing two Twitter users, whom were ordinary people. This tweet was concerning tourism issues in Papua. Nevertheless, the majority of the messages, during the year 2013 and 2014, still comprised one-way communication, state actors, and national interest. Messages that

comprised announcements of Papua development by the Government were still displayed frequently.

The domination of one-way communication on the Indonesian Government's tweets ended in 2015. Throughout that year, one-way communication messages were only found in 10% of the tweets. Two-way communication messages, which were marked with the inclusion of greeting words, hashtags (#) or at (@) symbols, were displayed in the greater part of the tweets. Although genuine new public diplomacy messages were tweeted frequently, the biggest portion of the messages went to the mix of traditional and new public diplomacy elements.

The following examples will explain the differences between the uses of public diplomacy elements. On December 1, 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tweeted "In the preservation of their cultural heritage, Papuans designate December 4 as Noken Day #WestPapua #Papua". Two days later, they tweeted "Happy #NokenDay! (4/12) This day is meant to celebrate #Noken as part of @UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding". From both tweets, the author found hashtags and greeting words as two-way communication. However, the two tweets employed different subjects. On the first tweet, the tweet mentioned Papuans as the subjects, which were later coded as non-state actors. On the second tweet, UNESCO as the subject was coded as the state actors. In addition, the two tweets had different issues. The first tweet implied a national interest, while the second tweet was meant for an international interest. Further, in all their tweets regarding recent Papua issues, the Indonesian Government never employed a category II type message, which consisted of one-way communication, state actors, and international interests.

## **Discussion**

Based on the research's findings, the Indonesian Government employed both hard power and soft power when they addressed recent Papua issues on Twitter. This research also found the Indonesian Government posted messages employing traditional public diplomacy, new public diplomacy and the mix of both types of public diplomacy. Based on these findings, there are several issues that can be discussed as a reflection to the previous studies on public diplomacy.

First, the languages employed by the Indonesian Government can help to reveal the Indonesian Government's target audiences. Based on the research's findings, the Indonesian Government's tweets used English and Bahasa (Indonesian language) almost equally. In other words, the Indonesian Government communicated with an international audience and a domestic audience. In this regard, the findings did not support the traditional public diplomacy concept by Tuch (1990), which aimed exclusively for international audiences, because in the world of social media, the medium can have both audiences simultaneously. Therefore, the author argues that the Government's Twitter public diplomacy is aiming for an international audience and a domestic audience.

Second, the issue is regarding the Twitter's display. Twitter has their own rules regarding posting tweets. One of them is the limitation on the characters (written texts) and file size (photos). This issue affected the findings, in which the research found no message that combined two or more issues. Nye (2011) predicted the future of power would contain the combination of hard power and soft power, or what he called smart power. With Twitter's rules being applied, employing smart power messages in one message can meet a

stumbling block. To answer to this challenge, this research found the Indonesian Government's posted several series of tweets. By having more space, the Indonesian Government can tweet more than one issue per day. However, the tweets on those series are displayed separately, which made the tweets more likely to have either hard power or soft power. Hence, the author argues that the concept of smart power can hardly be applied on Twitter.

Third, the numbers of tweets regarding recent Papua issues were very low in the first three years since the Indonesian Government joined Twitter, but later developed into more significant increases. This finding support Cull's (2013) claim that the Governments were slowly adapting to the public diplomacy 2.0 when he analyzed the United States Government's presence on the social media. His claim was based on the fact that the US Government did not adapt enough to the culture of social media when they displayed their messages in the social media. In the Indonesian Government case, the number of tweets increased significantly in their sixth year.

The other fact regarding the Government's adaptation to the public diplomacy 2.0 can be found from their type of public diplomacy messages. In the earlier years on Twitter, particularly during 2010 to 2012, the Indonesian Government did not seem to engage in a public discussion. Their messages were similar to the public service announcement type, where the messages contained announcement of an event held by the state actors. In contrast, during the sixth year, the Indonesian Government tweeted more than 100 messages by using Twitter's language, i.e. # and @ symbols. In addition, during 2015, they tweeted several series of tweets, which increased the tweets' frequency significantly. According to Zubiaga,

Spina, Martínez, and Fresno (2015), the frequency of tweets was a significant factor of making trends in Twitter. Further, they also found that trends in Twitter could generate more responses from Twitter users. Thus, the author argues that the Indonesian Governments' adaptation in the Twitter's world aims for more public awareness and engagement in the issues discussed.

### **Implications for Public Diplomacy Practitioners**

There are a couple implications from this study that affect public diplomacy practitioners. First, this study found the Indonesian Government tweeted more soft power messages than hard power messages regarding recent Papua issues. As Nye (1990) argued, soft power is the ability to attract foreign governments and international societies. In contrast, hard power was identified as the ability to influence the foreign publics. Therefore, the author argues the presence of the Indonesian Government on Twitter regarding recent Papua issues is aimed more likely for attracting their target audiences rather than commanding hard power. In other words, the author believes that employing soft power is important on Twitter's public diplomacy.

The findings challenge the usages of the new public diplomacy concept by Melissen (2005) in Twitter. In his book, Melissen defined the new public diplomacy as the messages that contained the elements of two-way communication, non-state actors, and international interests. However, the author argues that the Governments still have some reluctance to display those elements altogether, which applies to the Indonesian Government's tweets. This argument is based on the findings, which showed the Indonesian Government employed genuine traditional public diplomacy and new public diplomacy less than the mix of both on

their tweets. Therefore, practitioners should consider these elements first when they are planning public diplomacy message strategies on Twitter.

### **Research Limitations**

Although this study revealed some new aspects of public diplomacy in practice, particularly on Twitter, this study has some limitations. As this study was designed to analyze the media content, the findings cannot reveal the reason why the Indonesian Government posted the tweets regarding recent Papua issues. This limitation can be answered by future research, specifically a study that uses in-depth interviews or surveys of the Indonesian Government leaders.

Further, as this study's analysis comes only from the content on Twitter, there is also another limitation. This study can only reveal the messages on Indonesian Government's tweets and not all Indonesian Government media channels. Should future research employ more media platforms in its sampling, there is a chance that such research can reveal the differences between the type of public diplomacy messages on Twitter and on the other media. For example, this study reveals that the Indonesian Government is more likely to tweet the mix of traditional and new public diplomacy elements. It would be interesting, from a communication studies perspective, to compare this study's findings to other media, such as the Indonesian Government's video advertising, formal speeches at international events, or their press releases.

Next, this study's research design also contains the limitation of on the tweets' effectiveness. As this study analyzed the content of various tweets, this study cannot disclose how the audience reacted to those tweets. Which type of public diplomacy messages brings

the most positive reactions on the audiences? Such research is certainly interesting when it is discussed from strategic communication or audience studies' frameworks.

## **Chapter Six: Conclusions**

Using communication studies' frameworks, the three studies contribute to each of the dissertation's three starting questions regarding the Papua separatist group in chapter one.

### **First Aspect: The Separatist Groups Comparison**

The first aspect, which compares the Free West Papua Movement and the other separatist groups, is discussed in study one. The first study's contributions are mainly in the methodology and the analysis of the separatist groups. In the methodology, the author employs recent data from international organizations that deal with separatism issues. This procedure results in a clear classification of the three separatist group categories' division. In addition, by using a census sampling on separatist groups' population, the results show various separatist groups around the globe that are still active recently. Study one's data is different than Asal et al's (2014) data, which employs the MAROB data set that was gathered from the 1990s to 2005. With the political dynamics happening around the globe, such as the Arab spring, the European separatist movement, and the war on terror, the author believes that using the most recent data is important for a study that aims at analyzing the digital media. Further, study one's analysis employs separatist groups websites, particularly their "home page", "about us", and "calendar" as the units of analysis. By determining clearly its units of analysis, study one provides an example of how to analyze the separatist groups as modern non-profit organizations that employ marketing activities.

Further, based on the study one's analysis, this dissertation provides a different model of separatist groups than that of Asal et al's (2014), which looked into the groups' method. The study one's findings show how the Free West Papua Movement is part of the ethnic

separatists groups. By doing a typology-type analysis, the study one's findings show that the ethnic separatist groups are different than the political separatist groups and the terrorist separatist groups in terms of their marketing activities, i.e. funding resources, media channel, and recruitment strategies. For example, as an ethnic separatist group, the Free West Papua Movement does not receive any funding from the Indonesian Government. This situation is different than the Partai Aceh's funding resources. Operating as a political separatist group, the Partai Aceh was able to secure the government's funding when their members were elected as parliament members in the general election.

Further, study one's findings also show the differences between the current and the past Papua separatist group. The results also show that the Papua separatists no longer receive support from the foreign governments. This condition is different than the Papua separatists had around a half-century ago. At that time, the Papua separatist group needed foreign support in order to retain their existence (see Kroef, 1968). Instead, now the Papua separatists are gathering support from other resources, such as foundations, private corporations, donations, and service fees.

As these resources come from different countries, these findings support Clifford's (2005) claim that the rebellions are after the international support. In addition, the study one's findings extend the understanding of international support, particularly regarding the types of support. First, the Papua separatists are looking for funding support. In this regard, the Free West Papua Movement employs various methods. The study one's finding show that they are receiving funding from the Bertha Foundation (a non-profit organization) to LUSH cosmetics and Court Lodge (two private brands). In addition, the Papua separatists are

charging fees from selling merchandise through their website or holding a music concert fundraiser. Throughout their campaign, the Free West Papua Movement is also urging their supporters to give them donations by doing a wire transfer to their bank account. Based on these findings, the author argues that the Free West Papua Movement is gathering funding like a modern non-profit organization (NPO) because the Papua separatists are truly aiming at more diversified sources of financing (see Salamon, 2002). Further, from the list of 21<sup>st</sup> century NPO's funding resources (see Silverman and Paterson, 2010), the Free West Papua Movement have all types except government funding.

Second, the Free West Papua Movement is aiming for media support. Study one findings show the Papua separatists' employ a wide variety of media channels on the web. Currently, they have an official website, social media, media relations, photo sharing, and video sharing media. Based on these findings, the author argues that the Papua separatists may not have a budget problem for message production. While insurgent groups in general had been claimed to have a limited budget for producing their own media (Blery et al., 2010), scholars suggested that the insurgents would need to choose their media channels selectively. However, in the Free West Papua Movement's case, the separatists seem to have enough resources to display their messages. This argument comes from the fact that the Papua separatists' media channels do not just exist but are also very active. From June 9, 2009, until recently, the Free West Papua Movement posted messages almost daily and most of them contained photos from many countries. Furthermore, the Papua separatists also posted 32 videos, some of them full documentaries, on their Facebook and YouTube accounts.

Third, the Papua separatists are after the contributors' support. Through the recruitment strategies analysis, study one findings show that the Papua separatists are open for accepting new members and volunteers. However, their recruitment strategies seem to be generic. They are not yet implementing segmented recruitment strategies, as was recommended by Randle and Dolnicar (2009) to attract the high contributors.

### **Second Aspect: The Papua Separatist Group Visual Representation**

Study two discusses the identity representation of the Free West Papua Movement. The author believes the first contribution from study two is its research design. The rise of visual communication studies in the age of digital media has brought new challenges for the content analysis method. As different media, particularly social media, platforms employ different formats, the visual analyses are different across the platforms. Even, visual analysis on the same social media platforms can also be different. For example, a visual analysis of the Facebook's profile images, cover photos, and shared images are different because the three images have different rule. As of today, Facebook allows profile images with maximum size of 180 x 180 pixels with no caption, cover photos with 851 x 315 pixels with no caption, and shared images with 1200 x 630 pixels with captions of 60,000 characters (Spencer, 2015). Therefore, in study two, which analyzes the Papua separatists' shared images, the author employs the visual components and the written components as the units of analysis. In addition, since the photos have certain limitations on Facebook, the author employs further rules, such as using the "horizon line" and limiting to nine people counts, to analyze the photos.

The author believes these procedures are suitable to analyze the photos as the recent Papua separatists' visual representation. In the early ages of the Papua separatist group, the Papua separatists addressed mostly discrimination issues as part of their message strategies (Bone, 2009). Because of their violent methods that caused harm to Indonesian officials and burned the Government's office in Papua, people recognized them as an outlaw organization (Boelaars, 1986). In contrast, the study two's findings show that the Papua separatists have different message strategies now,.

Based on the findings, the Free West Papua Movement employs cultural themes on its mission, i.e. independence, local tradition, oppression, and solidarity. Hence, instead of displaying injured Indonesian soldiers, the Papua separatists post pictures of the Papuans being victims, Papuans demonstrating together with foreigners, or Papuans proudly holding the Morning Star flag. In addition, there are also pictures of music concerts, traditional ceremonies, and other cultural performances. These pictures show that the Papua separatists do not want to be portrayed as merely a separatist group that has independence as its goals, but also as an ethnic group that promotes the heritage of Papuan's cultures. Therefore, the author believes that visual analysis is very important to analyze the separatists' identity. In this regard, study two findings reveal that determining visual analysis can reveal comprehensive message strategies employed by the Papua separatists.

Next, the Free West Papua Movement has changed its target audience. In the past, the Papua separatists aimed for national and local audiences by raising the Papuan's ethnic nationalism (Jones, 2003). However, the study two's findings show that nowadays the Papua separatists rarely address messages in the national language and never post anything in their

local language. Instead, the Papua separatists employ English as its main language.

Therefore, the author argues the Free West Papua Movement has changed its target audience in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The author further identifies that the target audiences are the state actors and non-state actors. Based on the content of the Papua separatists' pictures, the state actors are the Indonesian Government officials, United Nations and its affiliated organizations, foreign governments, and foreign parliamentary members. The pictures contain their version of Papuans' history, which in the past had been dominated by the Indonesian Government's version. Further, the Free West Papua Movement's non-state actor audiences are people and organizations that share the same goals as the Papua separatists. As the Papua pictures show, the people have various backgrounds. These people can be activists, artists, general members of the Papuans' diaspora, journalists or ordinary people that happen to watch their demonstrations. In terms of non-state organizations, the study one's findings show that the organizations are foundations and private companies. Based on these target audience, the author further argues that the Free West Papua Movement adapted its methods and message strategies in order to be a modern ethnic organization, which has a "customer-centered" mindset (see Kotler & Andreasen, 2012, p. 49). Should the Papua separatists retain its traditional methods, they might get the same results they had prior to these changes.

### **Third Aspect: Public Diplomacy as a Conflict Resolution Tool**

The study three addresses the issue of public diplomacy, particularly how public diplomacy can be employed as a conflict resolution tool. Therefore, the first contribution of study three is its perspectives as the response to the Papua separatists' social media

campaign. A study (dissertation) that compares two parties in the state's issues conflict is limited in communication studies (see Seo, 2014). Further, it is the first study in the public diplomacy studies. Different than Kirova's study (2012), which analyzed a public diplomacy case with a framework outside communication, this study addresses a conflict between the Papua separatist group and Indonesian Government from communication studies' perspectives. Particularly, study three analyzes the Indonesian Government tweets regarding recent Papua issues. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the use of social media has been dubbed as corresponding to the new public diplomacy approach (Melissen, 2005) and a public diplomacy tool 2.0 (Cull, 2013).

As a response to the Papua separatists' claims regarding recent situations in Papua, the Indonesian Government addresses the issues from their own perspective. The so-called "response" is based on the fact that among the messages regarding Papua issues on their Twitter accounts, some of the messages contain a direct response to the separatists and some others do not. For example, in a series of tweets on August 15, 2015, the Indonesian Government clearly mentioned that the Papua separatist group had released unfounded and unsubstantiated statements regarding human rights abuses in West Papua. In addition, on December 1, 2015, the Indonesian Government also tweeted a series of tweets regarding the strong statistics results of the latest general election in West Papua. In contrast, the very same day, the Free West Papua Movement posted many pictures about their anniversary dates, some with captions encouraging a boycott of the next election. In addition, the examples of the Indonesian Government's tweets regarding an indirect response to the Papua separatists can be found on the tourism theme tweets. By displaying the beautiful scenes on Papuans'

tourism spots, the Indonesian Government showed that the West Papua land is not all about an undeveloped territory.

The second contribution from study three is its findings. The findings show that the Indonesian Government tweets regarding recent Papua issues are employing more soft power messages than the hard power messages. In fact, the number of soft power messages is twice that of hard power messages. There are several Twitter's characteristics that may be clues as to why these phenomena occur. First, as a web medium platform, Twitter has the ability to display creative contents, i.e. written texts, photos, audio materials, or videos. Second, as a social medium platform, the Twitter users can give their responses to the tweet's contents. Third, as a mass medium platform, Twitter engages millions of users simultaneously, even if these users do not know each other. The combination of these Twitter characteristics may inspire the Indonesian Government to post more soft power messages than hard power messages. Thus, the author argues that soft power messages, which stress the importance of attraction, might be more suitable for increasing the awareness to the issues discussed than hard power messages, which merely show the materials or data to be displayed on Twitter.

Another contribution from study three is the attempt to explain the use of new public diplomacy elements (see Melissen, 2005). Based on study three's findings, the elements of two-way communication, non-state actors, and international interests are not always displayed together on the Indonesian Government's tweets. The results on how the Indonesian Government employ traditional public diplomacy elements are also *vice versa*. In fact, there are more tweets employing the combination of new public diplomacy and traditional public diplomacy elements. Therefore, therefore the author argues that Melissen's

(2005) concept of new public diplomacy may be well too idealistic in the practical world of public diplomacy.

According to BuddeComm's (2015) research, the presence of Twitter in Indonesia, especially in its capital city, Jakarta, is not new. According to the leading global independent telecommunications research company, Jakarta was the busiest city in Asia in terms of tweets posting since 2010. In addition, the Association of Indonesian Internet Service (APJII, 2016) reported that Twitter users in Indonesia were around 30 million in 2012 and around 50 million in 2015. In that regard, it is interesting to see study three's findings, which show (former) President Yudhoyono administration's tweets regarding recent Papua issues are fewer than President Widodo administration's. In addition, President Widodo's administration employs more various issues and more new public diplomacy elements than his predecessor. In the past, we also know from the historical background that two (late) Indonesian Presidents, Soekarno and Soeharto, employed different media policies (see Chalmers, 1997). Based on these facts and the study three's findings, the author argues that each Indonesian President has had different media policies regarding the Papua issues. In the age of social media, the current Indonesian President administration has shown that they are adapting into the culture of Twitter to address the conflict in Papua. Therefore, the audience might notice that their tweets nowadays contain symbols (#, @) and greetings, something that rarely occurred in the past.

To this end, the author believes that the three studies regarding the Papua separatist group using communication studies' framework contribute new perspectives to the body of knowledge. However, as it has been mentioned in the limitations of each study, there is still

further knowledge that can be revealed using different methods. Studies that employ surveys and interviews on the separatist group or social media content analysis on the separatists' audience (supporters) are different studies but related closely to this dissertation. Therefore, the author has confidence that conducting such studies may lead into an interesting and a wider understanding of the social phenomena of separatism in the age of digital media.

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## TABLES

Table 1. Study one's intercoder reliability

No.	Categories	Kalpha Scores
1.	Funding resources	.95
2.	Media channels	.97
3.	Recruitment strategies	.85

Table 2. Ethnic separatist groups' funding resources

Funding Resources	Ethnic Separatist
Government	-
Foundations	Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Degar Montagnards, Tibet, Papua
Private corporations	Papuas
Individual/ Member contributions	Afrikanner, Balochistan, Ogoni, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Degar Montagnards, Khmer Krom, Lesghin, Rehoboth Basters, Tibet, Papua
Service Fees	Afrikanner, Balochistan, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Khmer Krom, Rehoboth Basters, Tibet, Papua

Table 3. Political separatist groups' funding resources

Funding Resources	Political Separatist
Government	<p>Alands Framtid, Aralar, Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie (ALPE), Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, Enotna Lista, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Lausatia Alliance, Lista Za Rijeku, Mebyon Kernow, Mouvement Région Savoie, Nieuw-Vlaamse, Alliantie Partido Andalucista, Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Scottish National Party, Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands, Schleswig Parte, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Union Démocratique Bretonne, Parti Quebequois, Partai Aceh</p>
Foundations	<p>Alands Framtid, Bayernpartei, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, Eusko Alkartasuna, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Mouvement Région Savoie, Nieuw-Vlaamse, Alliantie Partido Andalucista, Ruch Autonomili Slaska, Scottish National Party, Parti Quebequois</p>
Private corporations	<p>Ruch Autonomili Slaska</p>

*(continued)*

Table 3. Political separatist groups' funding resources

*(continued)*

<p>Individual/ Member contributions</p>	<p>Alands Framtid, Aralar, Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie (ALPE) , Bayernpartei, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, Chunta Aragonesista Die Friesen, Eusko Alkartasuna, Enotna Lista, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Lausatia Alliance, Lista Za Rijeku, Liga Veneta Repubblica, Mebyon Kernow, Moravané, Mouvement Région Savoie, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Omo Ilinden Pirin, Partido Andalucista, Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Partitu di a Nazione Corsa, Partito Sardo d’Azione, Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista, Rainbow (Vinozhito) , Ruch Autonomili Slaska, Slovenska Skupnost, Scottish National Party, Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands, Schleswig Parte, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Union Démocratique Bretonne, Unitat Catalana, Unser Land, Parti Quebequois, Partai Aceh</p>
<p>Service Fees</p>	<p>Bayernpartei, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, Die Friesen, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Lausatia Alliance, Liga Veneta Repubblica, Mebyon Kernow, Moravané, Mouvement Région Savoie, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Omo Ilinden Pirin, Partido Andalucista,</p>

*(continued)*

Table 3. Political separatist groups' funding resources

*(continued)*

	<p>Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Partito Sardo d'Azione, Ruch          Autonomili Slaska, Scottish National Party, Schleswig Parte,          Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Union Démocratique Bretonne, Unitat          Catalana, Unser Land, Parti Quebequois, Partai Aceh</p>
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Table 4. Terrorist separatist groups' funding resources

Funding Resources	Terrorist Separatist
Government	-
Foundations	-
Private corporations	-
Individual/ Member contributions	Basque, Irish, Hamas, FARC
Service Fees	Irish, Boko Haram

Table 5. Separatist groups' funding resources

Funding Resources	Ethnic Separatist (11 groups)	Political Separatist (38 groups)	Terrorist Separatist (5 groups)
Government	0%	58%	0%
Foundations	45%	29%	0%
Private corporations	19%	3%	0%
Individual/ Member contributions	100%	100%	80%
Service Fees	64%	66%	60%

Table 6. Ethnic separatist groups' media channels

Media Channels	Ethnic Separatist
Websites	Afrikanner, Baloch, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Degar Montagnards, Khmer Krom, Lesghin, Rehoboth Basters, Ogoni, Tibet, Papua
Social media	Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Lesghin, Rehoboth Basters, Ogoni, Tibet, Papua
Media Relations	Afrikanner, Baloch, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Degar Montagnards, Khmer Krom, Lesghin, Rehoboth Basters, Ogoni, Tibet, Papua
Blogs	Tibet
Video sharing	Baloch, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Degar Montagnards, Lesghin, Tibet, Papua
Photo sharing	Afrikanner, Baloch, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Crimean Tatar, Degar Montagnards, Khmer Krom, Lesghin, Rehoboth Basters, Ogoni, Tibet, Papua

Table 7. Political separatist groups' media channels

Media Channels	Political Separatist
Websites	<p>Alands Framtid, Aralar, Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie, Bayernpartei, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia , Chunta Aragonesista Die Friesen, Eusko Alkartasuna, Enotna Lista, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Lausatia Alliance, Lista Za Rijeku, Liga Veneta Repubblica, Mebyon Kernow, Moravané, Mouvement Région Savoie, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Omo Ilinden Pirin, Partido Andalucista, Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Partitu di a Nazione Corsa, Partito Sardo d’Azione, Federació PSM- Entesa Nacionlista, Rainbow (Vinozhito), Ruch Autonomili Slaska, Slovenska Skupnost, Scottish National Party, Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands, Schleswig Parte, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Union Démocratique Bretonne, Unitat Catalana, Unser Land, Parti Quebequois, Partai Aceh.</p>
Social media	<p>Alands Framtid, Aralar, Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie (ALPE), Bayernpartei, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, Chunta Aragonesista, Die Friesen, Eusko Alkartasuna, Enotna Lista, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Fryske Nasjonale Partij,</p>

*(continued)*

Table 7. Political separatist groups' media channels

*(continued)*

	<p>Lausatia Alliance, Lista Za Rijeku, Liga Veneta Repubblica, Mebyon Kernow, Moravané, Mouvement Région Savoie, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Omo Ilinden Pirin, Partido Andalucista, Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Partitu di a Nazione Corsa, Partito Sardo d’Azione, Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista, Rainbow (Vinozhito), Ruch Autonomili Slaska, Slovenska Skupnost, Scottish National Party, Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Union Démocratique Bretonne, Unser Land, Parti Quebequois, Partai Aceh</p>
<p>Media Relations</p>	<p>Alands Framtid, Aralar, Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie (ALPE), Bayernpartei, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, Chunta Aragonesista Die Friesen, Eusko Alkartasuna, Enotna Lista, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Lausatia Alliance, Lista Za Rijeku, Liga Veneta Repubblica, Mebyon Kernow, Moravané, Mouvement Région Savoie, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Omo Ilinden Pirin, Partido Andalucista, Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Partitu di a Nazione Corsa, Partito Sardo d’Azione, Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista, Rainbow (Vinozhito), Ruch Autonomili Slaska,</p>

*(continued)*

Table 7. Political separatist groups' media channels

*(continued)*

	<p>Slovenska Skupnost, Scottish National Party, Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands, Schleswig Parte, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Union Démocratique Bretonne, Unitat Catalana, Unser Land, Parti Quebequois, Partai Aceh</p>
Blogs	<p>Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie (ALPE) , Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, Chunta Aragonesista, Eusko Alkartasuna, Enotna Lista, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Lausatia Alliance, Mebyon Kernow, Moravané, Mouvement Région Savoie, Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Rainbow (Vinozhito) , Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands, Union Démocratique Bretonne, Parti Quebequois, Partai Aceh</p>
Video sharing	<p>Alands Framtid, Aralar, Bayernpartei, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, Chunta Aragonesista, Eusko Alkartasuna, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Lista Za Rijeku, Mebyon Kernow, Moravané, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Omo Ilinden Pirin, Partido Andalucista, Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Partito Sardo d’Azione, Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista, Rainbow (Vinozhito), Ruch Autonomili Slaska, Slovenska Skupnost, Scottish National Party, Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit,</p>

*(continued)*

Table 7. Political separatist groups' media channels

*(continued)*

	<p>Union Démocratique Bretonne, Unser Land, Parti Quebequois, Partai Aceh</p>
Photo sharing	<p>Alands Framtid, Aralar, Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie (ALPE) , Bayernpartei, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, Chunta Aragonesista Die Friesen, Eusko Alkartasuna, Enotna Lista, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Lausatia Alliance, Lista Za Rijeku, Liga Veneta Repubblica, Mebyon Kernow, Moravané, Mouvement Région Savoie, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Omo Ilinden Pirin, Partido Andalucista, Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Partitu di a Nazione Corsa, Partito Sardo d’Azione, Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista, Rainbow (Vinozhito), Ruch Autonomili Slaska, Slovenska Skupnost, Scottish National Party, Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands, Schleswig Parte, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Union Démocratique Bretonne, Unitat Catalana, Unser Land, Parti Quebequois, Partai Aceh</p>

Table 8. Terrorist separatist groups' media channels

Media Channels	Terrorist Separatist
Websites	Basque, Hamas, Irish, FARC, Boko Haram
Social media	Basque, Hamas, Irish, FARC, Boko Haram
Media Relations	Basque, Hamas, Irish, FARC, Boko Haram
Blogs	Basque, Irish, Hamas, FARC
Video sharing	Basque, Hamas, Irish, FARC, Boko Haram
Photo sharing	Basque, Hamas, Irish, FARC , Boko Haram

Table 9. Separatist groups' media channels

Media Channels	Ethnic Separatist (11 groups)	Political Separatist (38 groups)	Terrorist Separatist (5 groups)
Websites	100%	100%	100%
Social media	64%	95%	100%
Media Relations	100%	100%	100%
Blogs	9%	45%	80%
Video sharing	64%	74%	100%
Photo sharing	100%	100%	100%

Table 10. Ethnic separatist groups' recruitment strategies

Recruitment Strategies	Ethnic Separatist
Member recruitment	Afrikaner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Khmer Krom, Rehoboth Basters, Tibet, Papua
Volunteer recruitment	Chittagong Hill Tracts, Tibet, Papua
Closed Recruitment	Baloch, Ogoni, Crimean Tatar, Degar Montagnards, Lesghin

Table 11. Political separatist groups' recruitment strategies

Recruitment Strategies	Political Separatist
Member recruitment	<p>Alands Framtid, Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie (ALPE) , Bayernpartei, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, , Die Friesen, Eusko Alkartasuna, Enotna Lista, Fryske Nasjonale Partij, Lausatia Alliance, Lista Za Rijeku, Liga Veneta Repubblica, Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Szövetség, Mebyon Kernow, Moravané, Mouvement Région Savoie, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Omo Ilinden Pirin, Partido Andalucista, Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Partitu di a Nazione Corsa, Partito Sardo d’Azione, Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista, Ruch Autonomili Slaska, Scottish National Party, Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands, Schleswig Parte, Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Union Démocratique Bretonne, Unitat Catalana, Unser Land, Parti Quebequois</p>
Volunteer recruitment	<p>Alands Framtid, Bayernpartei, Bloc Nacionalista Valencia, Enotna Lista, Lausatia Alliance, Lista Za Rijeku, Mebyon Kernow, Moravané, Mouvement Région Savoie, Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, Omo Ilinden Pirin, Partido Andalucista,</p>

*(continued)*

Table 11. Political separatist groups' recruitment strategies

*(continued)*

	<p>Partit Occitan, Plaid Cymru, Partito Sardo d'Azione, Ruch          Autonomili Slaska, Scottish National Party, Schleswig Parte,          Süd-Tiroler Freiheit, Union Démocratique Bretonne,          Unser Land, Parti Quebequois</p>
Closed	<p>Aralar, Chunta Aragonesista, Esquerra Republicana de          Catalunya, Rainbow (Vinozhito), Slovenska Skupnost,          Partai Aceh</p>

Table 12. Terrorist separatist groups' recruitment strategies

Recruitment Strategies	Terrorist Separatist
Member recruitment	Irish, Basque
Volunteer recruitment	-
Closed	Hamas, Farc, Boko Haram

Table 13. Separatist groups' recruitment strategies

Recruitment Strategies	Ethnic Separatist	Political Separatist	Terrorist Separatist
Member recruitment	55%	84%	40 %
Volunteer recruitment	27%	56%	0%
Closed recruitment	45%	16%	60 %

Table 14. Study two's intercoder reliability

No.	Categories	Kalpha Scores
1.	Independence theme	.82
2.	Local tradition theme	.95
3.	Oppression theme	.91
4.	Solidarity theme	.81
2.	Races	.81
3.	Clothes	.95
4.	Accessories	.85
5.	Locations	.88
6.	Backgrounds	.93
7.	Flags	.98
8.	Language (text on picture)	.98
9.	Language (text on caption)	.99

Table 15. Manifest themes from the Papua separatists' Facebook photos

Year / Themes	Independence	Local Tradition	Oppression	Solidarity
2009	9 (32%)	0 (0%)	1 (3%)	18 (65%)
2010	77 (31%)	20 (8%)	7 (3%)	144 (58%)
2011	84 (37%)	27 (12%)	9 (4%)	108 (47%)
2012	38 (36%)	14 (13%)	6 (6%)	47 (45%)
2013	72 (34%)	32 (15%)	15 (7%)	93 (44%)
2014	50 (25%)	34 (17%)	30 (15%)	86 (43%)
2015	32 (13%)	74 (30%)	42 (17%)	98 (40%)
Total	362 (30%)	201 (15%)	110 (7%)	594 (48%)

Table 16. Races on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts

Races	Melanesian	Caucasian	African	Asian
Person	3594 (74%)	957 (19%)	54 (1%)	272 (6%)

Table 17. Clothes on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts

Clothes	Casual Clothes	Formal Clothes	Traditional Clothes
Person	3409 (70%)	346 (7%)	1122 (23%)

Table 18. Accessories on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts

Accessories	Traditional		Non-Traditional	
	Fashion	Weapon	Fashion	Weapon
Items	3241	103	1574	99
	(64.6%)	(2.2%)	(31.3%)	(1.9%)

Table 19. Locations on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts

Locations	Domestic		Foreign				
	Jakarta	Papua	Europe	Africa	North America	Pacific Islands	Australia
Places	5 (0.4%)	581 (50.6%)	482 (42%)	15 (1.3%)	8 (0.6%)	30 (2.6%)	26 (2.5%)

Table 20. Backgrounds on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts

Backgrounds	Modern Buildings	Traditional Buildings	Parks	Dirt Fields	Mountains	Forests	Prison
Places	226 (19%)	258 (23%)	274 (24%)	234 (20%)	43 (4%)	79 (7%)	33 (3%)

Table 21. Flags on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts

Flags	Morning Star	Indonesian	Other Nations
Items	503 (91.2%)	3 (0.6%)	45 (8.2%)

Table 22. Languages on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts

Languages (Text on pictures)	English	Bahasa (Indonesian)	Other
Pictures	387 (78.4%)	96 (19.4%)	11 (3.2%)

Table 23. Languages (2) on the Papua separatists' Facebook posts

Languages (Text on caption)	English	Bahasa (Indonesian)	Other Language	No Caption
Pictures	877 (69.7%)	2 (0.2%)	0 (0%)	388 (30.1%)

Table 24. Top 20 words on the Papua separatists' Facebook photo captions

No.	Words	Counts	Note
1.	Papua	430	Refers to locations (Papua, West Papua), slogan (Free West Papua), or group's name (Free West Papua Movement)
2.	West	340	Refers to locations (West, West Papua), slogan (Free West Papua), or group's name (Free West Papua Movement)
3.	Free	131	Refers to an adjective (Free), slogan (Free West Papua), or group's name (Free West Papua Movement)
4.	Indonesian	114	Refers to persons (Indonesian President, Indonesian Minister) or places (Indonesian Embassy)
5.	Support	101	Refers to a verb
6.	People	98	Refers to a noun

*(continued)*

Table 24. Top 20 words on the Papua separatists' Facebook photo captions

(continued)

7.	London	97	Refers to a location of Papua separatists' office
8.	Papuan	94	Refers to a person or an object
9.	Embassy	64	Refers to location (Indonesian Embassy)
10.	Freedom	62	Refers to an adjective (Free),
11.	PNG	59	Refers to a location (Papua New Guinea)
12.	Benny	50	Refers to the first name of the Papua leader
13.	Demo	50	Refers to a noun
14.	Noken	45	Refers to the Papua traditional clothes
15.	Independence	38	Refers to an adjective
16.	Wenda	38	Refers to the last name of the Papua leader
17.	Australia	38	Refers to a location
18.	Flag	38	Refers to a noun

(continued)

Table 24. Top 20 words on the Papua separatists' Facebook photo captions

*(continued)*

19.	Bird	38	Refers to a phrase: the bird of paradise
20.	December	30	Refers to the Papua separatists' anniversary

Table 25. Co-occurrence patterns of races and clothes

Races and Clothes	Casual Clothes	Formal Clothes	Traditional Clothes
Melanesian	2631 (73.2%)	15 (0.4%)	948 (26.4%)
Caucasian	732 (76%)	54 (6%)	171 (18%)
African	46 (85%)	5 (10%)	3 (5%)
Asian	0 (0%)	272 (100%)	0 (0%)

Table 26. Co-occurrence patterns of backgrounds and locations

Backgrounds and Locations	Modern Buildings	Traditional Buildings	Parks	Dirt Fields	Mountains	Forests	Prison
Jakarta	5 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
West Papua	2 (0.3%)	243 (41.7%)	0 (0%)	222 (38%)	11 (1.9%)	70 (12.5%)	33 (5.6%)
Europe	175 (36.3%)	0 (0%)	268 (55.6%)	0 (0%)	32 (6.6%)	7 (1.5%)	0 (0%)
Africa	15 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
North America	8 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Pacific Islands	1 (3.3%)	15 (50%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	12 (40%)	2 (6.7%)	0 (0%)
Australia	20 (77%)	0 (0%)	6 (23%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)

Table 27. Hard power among Indonesian Government's tweets

Hard power	Economic issues	Military issues	Territory issues	Population issues
@Portal_Kemlu_RI	17 (48%)	1 (3%)	14 (40%)	3 (9%)
@SBYudhoyono	7 (50%)	7 (50%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
@jokowi	3 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Total	27 (51%)	8 (16%)	14 (27%)	3 (6%)

Table 28. Soft power among Indonesian Government's tweets

Soft power	Cultural attraction issues	Good governance issues	Foreign policy issues
@Portal_Kemlu_RI	43 (44%)	18 (18%)	37 (38%)
@SBYudhoyono	7 (39%)	9 (50%)	2 (11%)
@jokowi	6 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Total	56 (46%)	27 (22%)	39 (32%)

Table 29. Type of communication among Indonesian Government's tweets

Type of communication	One-way communication	Two-way communication
@Portal_Kemlu_RI	29 (22%)	104 (78%)
@SBYudhoyono	29 (91%)	3 (9%)
@jokowi	8 (89%)	1 (11%)
Total	66 (38%)	108 (62%)

Table 30. Type of actors among Indonesian Government's tweets

Type of actors	State actors	Multiple actors
@Portal_Kemlu_RI	88 (66%)	45 (34%)
@SBYudhoyono	29 (91%)	3 (9%)
@jokowi	0 (0%)	9 (100%)
Total	117 (67%)	57 (33%)

Table 31. Type of interests among Indonesian Government's tweets

Type of interests	National interests	International interests
@Portal_Kemlu_RI	78 (59%)	55 (41%)
@SBYudhoyono	31 (97%)	1 (3%)
@jokowi	5 (55%)	4 (45%)
Total	114 (66%)	60 (34%)

Table 32. Yearly data on the power messages among Indonesian Government's tweets

Year	Hard Power				Soft Power		
	Economic issues	Military issues	Territory issues	Population issues	Cultural attraction	Good governance	Foreign policies
2010	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (100%)
2011	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (100%)
2012	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (100%)
2013	2 (8%)	5 (20%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (8%)	5 (20%)	11 (44%)
2014	7 (28%)	2 (8%)	0s (0%)	0 (0%)	10 (40%)	6 (24%)	0 (0%)
2015	18 (15%)	1 (0.8%)	14 (12%)	3 (2.2%)	44 (37%)	16 (13%)	24 (20%)
Total	52 (29.7%)				122 (70.3)		

Table 33. Combinations of public diplomacy messages


Categories	Type of communication	Type of actors	Type of interests
I.	One-way communication	State actors	National interests
II.	One-way communication	State actors	International interests
III.	One-way communication	Non-state actors	National interests
IV.	One-way communication	Non-state actors	International interests
V.	Two-way communication	State actors	National interests
VI.	Two-way communication	State actors	International interests
VII.	Two-way communication	Non-state actors	National interests
VIII.	Two-way communication	Non-state actors	International interests

Table 34. Yearly data on type of public diplomacy messages

Categories	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
2010	2 (100%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2011	1 (100%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2012	1 (100%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2013	16 (64%)	-	4 (16%)	3 (12%)	1 (4%)	-	-	1 (4%)
2014	21 (84%)	-	1 (4%)	2 (8%)	1 (4%)	-	-	-
2015	1 (1%)	-	10 (8%)	1 (1%)	52 (43%)	24 (20%)	7 (6%)	25 (21%)
Total	42 (24%)	-	15 (8.5%)	6 (3.5%)	54 (31%)	24 (14%)	7 (4%)	26 (15%)

## FIGURES

Figure 1. Three types of transnational political activity and their frequency distribution




Did organization engage in activity?	Solicitation	Protest	Violence
No	656 (39.93)	1,617 (96.42)	1,548 (94.05)
Yes	987 (60.07)	60 (3.58)	98 (5.95)
Total	1,643 (100)	1,677 (100)	1,646 (100)

*Note:* Unit of analysis is organization year; percentages are in parentheses.

*Source:* Asal et al., 2014, p. 948

Figure 2. Horizon line illustration in a photo



## APPENDICES

## Appendix A

### Ethnic Separatist Groups and Their Websites

In determining the sample, Study One looked for the most recent data regarding active separatist groups. For the list of ethnic separatist groups, the data was gathered from the latest Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization's (UNPO) dataset. Based in Belgium, UNPO reported active ethnic separatist groups periodically.

Although UNPO's report (2015) showed that there were 45 active ethnic separatist groups, not all groups had websites. There were 11 groups that managed groups' websites. The following list contained the ethnic separatist groups and their websites.

No.	Ethnic Separatist Groups	Website
1.	Afrikaner	<a href="http://awb.co.za/">http://awb.co.za/</a>
2.	Balochistan	<a href="http://www.crisisbalochistan.com/">http://www.crisisbalochistan.com/</a>
3.	Chittagong Hill Tracts	<a href="http://www.iwgia.org/">http://www.iwgia.org/</a>
4.	Crimean Tatar	<a href="http://qtmm.org/en">http://qtmm.org/en</a>
5.	Degar Montagnards	<a href="http://www.degarfoundation.org/">http://www.degarfoundation.org/</a>
6.	Khmer krom	<a href="http://www.khmerkrom.org/">http://www.khmerkrom.org/</a>
7.	Lesghin	<a href="http://lezghinrights.org/">http://lezghinrights.org/</a>
8.	Rehoboth Basters	<a href="http://rehobothbasters.org/">http://rehobothbasters.org/</a>
9.	Tibet	<a href="http://www.freetibet.org/">http://www.freetibet.org/</a>
10.	Ogoni	<a href="http://mosop.org/">http://mosop.org/</a>
11.	West Papua	<a href="http://freewestpapua.org">http://freewestpapua.org</a>

## Appendix B

### Political Separatist Groups and Their Websites

Study One gathered the data from the latest European Free Alliance (EFA) dataset for the list of political separatist groups. On its latest publication (2012), they listed 36 organizations as their members. Added with two political separatist groups outside Europe that was listed in the literature review, the Québec separatist group in Canada and Partai Aceh in Indonesia, the total number for political separatist groups was 38 groups. The following list showed the political separatist groups and their websites.

No.	Political Separatist Groups	Website
1.	Alands Framtid	<a href="http://www.alandsframtid.ax/">http://www.alandsframtid.ax/</a>
2.	Aralar*	<a href="http://www.aralar.eus/eu">http://www.aralar.eus/eu</a>
3.	Autonomie - Liberté - Participation – Écologie*	<a href="http://www.alpevda.eu/homepage.asp?l=1">http://www.alpevda.eu/homepage.asp?l=1</a>
4.	Bayernpartei	<a href="http://landesverband.bayernpartei.de/">http://landesverband.bayernpartei.de/</a>
5.	Bloc Nacionalista Valencia	<a href="http://bloc.compromis.net/">http://bloc.compromis.net/</a>
6.	Chunta Aragonesista (Cha)	<a href="http://www.chunta.org/">http://www.chunta.org/</a>
7.	Die Friesen	<a href="http://www.die-friesen.eu/">http://www.die-friesen.eu/</a>
8.	Eusko Alkartasuna (EA)	<a href="http://www.euskoalkartasuna.eus/">http://www.euskoalkartasuna.eus/</a>
9.	Enotna Lista (EL)	<a href="http://www.elnet.at/start/">http://www.elnet.at/start/</a>
10.	Fryske Nasjonale Partij (FNP)	<a href="http://www.fnp.frl/">http://www.fnp.frl/</a>

*(continued)*

Appendix B. Political separatist groups and their websites

*(continued)*

11.	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)*	<a href="http://www.esquerra.cat/">http://www.esquerra.cat/</a>
12.	Lausatia Alliance (LA)	<a href="http://www.lausitzer-allianz.org/">http://www.lausitzer-allianz.org/</a>
13	Lista Za Rijeku*	<a href="http://www.listazarijeku.com/">http://www.listazarijeku.com/</a>
14	Liga Veneta Repubblica*	<a href="http://ligavenetarepubblica.org/">http://ligavenetarepubblica.org/</a>
15	Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Szövetség	<a href="http://www.mkdsz-mkda.sk/">http://www.mkdsz-mkda.sk/</a>
16	Mebyon Kernow (MK)	<a href="https://www.mebyonkernow.org/">https://www.mebyonkernow.org/</a>
17	Moravané*	<a href="http://www.moravane.cz/">http://www.moravane.cz/</a>
18	Mouvement Région Savoie	<a href="http://www.regionsavoie.org/">http://www.regionsavoie.org/</a>
19	Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie	<a href="http://www.n-va.be/">http://www.n-va.be/</a>
20	Omo Ilinden Pirin (OMO)*	<a href="http://omoilindenpirin.org/">http://omoilindenpirin.org/</a>
21	Partido Andalucista (PA)	<a href="http://nacional.andalucista.org/">http://nacional.andalucista.org/</a>
22	Partit Occitan (PÒc)*	<a href="http://partitoccitan.org/?lang=oc">http://partitoccitan.org/?lang=oc</a>
23	Plaid Cymru	<a href="https://www.plaid.cymru/">https://www.plaid.cymru/</a>
24	Partitu di a Nazione Corsa*	<a href="http://www.p-n-c.eu/">http://www.p-n-c.eu/</a>
25	Partito Sardo d'Azione*	<a href="http://www.psdaz.net/">http://www.psdaz.net/</a>
26	Rainbow (Vinozhito)*	<a href="http://www.florina.org/">http://www.florina.org/</a>

*(continued)*

Appendix B. Political separatist groups and their websites

*(continued)*

27	Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista (PSM-Entesa)	<a href="http://www.psm-entesa.cat/">http://www.psm-entesa.cat/</a>
28	Ruch Autonomii Slaska	<a href="http://autonomia.pl/">http://autonomia.pl/</a>
29	Slovenska Skupnost (SSK)*	<a href="http://www.slovenskaskupnost.org/">http://www.slovenskaskupnost.org/</a>
30	Scottish National Party*	<a href="http://www.snp.org/">http://www.snp.org/</a>
31	Schleswig Partei (SP)	<a href="http://www.schleswigsche-partei.dk/">http://www.schleswigsche-partei.dk/</a>
32	Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands (SSW)	<a href="http://www.ssw.de/de/die-partei.html">http://www.ssw.de/de/die-partei.html</a>
33	Süd-Tiroler Freiheit*	<a href="http://www.suedtiroler-freiheit.com/">http://www.suedtiroler-freiheit.com/</a>
34	Union Démocratique Bretonne	<a href="http://www.udb-bzh.net/index.php/fr/">http://www.udb-bzh.net/index.php/fr/</a>
35	Unitat Catalana (UC)	<a href="http://unitatcatalana.blogspot.be/">http://unitatcatalana.blogspot.be/</a>
36	Unser Land	<a href="http://www.unserland.org/">http://www.unserland.org/</a>
37	Parti Québécois*	<a href="http://pq.org/">http://pq.org/</a>
38	Free Aceh Party*	<a href="http://www.partaiaaceh.com/">http://www.partaiaaceh.com/</a>

## Appendix C

### Terrorist Separatist Groups and Their Websites

Study One relied on the US Department of State (2015) for the list of terrorist organizations. Those list then cross-tabbed with the list of MAROB data set to look for the terrorist groups that had separatist ideology. After these procedures, the author only found five groups that had websites. The following list displayed the terrorist separatists groups and their websites.

No.	Ethnic Separatist Groups	Website
1.	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	<a href="http://farc-epeace.org/">http://farc-epeace.org/</a>
2.	Basque Fatherland and Liberty	<a href="http://sortu.eus/en/">http://sortu.eus/en/</a>
3.	Real Irish Republican Army	<a href="http://www.sinnfein.ie/">http://www.sinnfein.ie/</a>
4.	Hamas	<a href="http://hamas.ps/en/">http://hamas.ps/en/</a>
5.	Boko Haram	<a href="http://bokoharam.net/">http://bokoharam.net/</a>