ABSTRACT

MILLS, LUKE WILLIAM. Julian of Norwich’s Concept of the Human Soul. (Under the direction of Dr. Charlotte Gross.)

This thesis is an examination and discussion of Julian of Norwich’s concept of a two-tiered human soul. Julian believes that the soul of the Christian has a higher, substantial part joined to the divine substance and a lower, sensual part joined to the human body but separate from God until joined to the substantial part by the redeeming work of Christ. Although Julian is writing within a mystical tradition heavily influenced by St. Augustine, her concept of the soul is a striking departure from the Augustinian concept of the soul as an undivided substance at a great ontological distance from God. I argue that Julian’s concept is the result of her contemplation of sin, which inspires her to find a solution to the problem of God’s judgment of the sinful soul. Her solution to this problem is a concept of the soul with a “godly will” unblemished by sin and therefore perfectly loved by God.
JULIAN OF NORWICH'S CONCEPT OF THE HUMAN SOUL

by

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DEDICATION

Whatever’s good about it, Gina, I dedicate to you.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

“One time in graduate school, I was at the apartment of some classicists, getting some help with my Latin, and I saw that they had this enormous pumpkin in the middle of the room that had obviously been there quite awhile. I mean, it had begun to fall in on itself and rot and looked just awful. So anyway, I asked them what it was doing there, and they said it was a memento mori.” (laughter)

Thanks, Dr. Gross, for the learning and the laughter.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Julian on the Soul, Part 1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer, the Soul and God</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soul in the Parable of the Lord and the Servant</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sixteenth Revelation</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Godly Will</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Julian on the Soul, Part 2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Indwelling of the Soul</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Substantial and Sensual Soul</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Motherhood of Jesus</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of Chapters 1 and 2</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: The Augustinian Concept of the Human Soul</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works Cited</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Although a great deal is known of her visions, there is little information available on the life of Julian of Norwich. Even her real name is unknown. She is called Julian simply because she was an anchoress at St. Julian’s church in Norwich, England. Of course, Julian’s relative anonymity is no historical accident but is rather the result of her conscious effort to draw her readers’ attention away from herself and toward the content of her visions. She is certainly very clear about how she ought to be perceived in relation to her work:

And that I say of me, I sey in the person of al myn even Cristen, for I am lernyd in the gostly shewing of our Lord God that He menyth so; and therefore I pray you al for Gods sake, and counsel you for your owne profitt, that ye levyn the beholding of a wretch that it was shewid to, and mightily, wisely, and mekely behold God that of His curtes love and endles godenes wolde shewyn it generally in comfort to us al. For it is God’s will that ye take it with gret joy and likyng as Jesus had shewid it on to you all. (8.313-18)

[Everything that I say about me I mean to apply to all my fellow Christians, for I am taught that this is what our Lord intends in this spiritual revelation. And therefore I pray you all for God’s sake, and I counsel you for your own profit, that you disregard the wretch to whom it was shown, and that mightily, wisely and meekly you contemplate upon God, who out of his courteous love and his endless goodness was willing to show it generally, to the comfort of us all. For it is God’s will that you accept it with great joy and delight, as Jesus has shown it to you. (191)]

Although self-effacing, Julian’s work is remarkable for its sophistication and originality. She seems to claim that she is illiterate—“a simple creature that cowde no letter [a simple, unlettered creature],” but the exact meaning of her statement is up for debate.

According to Georgia Ronan Crampton, Julian could be affecting modesty, or professing ignorance of Latin, or admitting that at the time of her vision, she was illiterate, but is no longer (4). Whatever, the exact meaning, Julian is not, as she would have it, “a simple
creature.” Rather, the content of her work indicates a great familiarity with the Scriptures, theology, and philosophy (Crampton 3). Unlike the typical expositor, however, Julian does not lay out her content in a linear, progressive fashion.¹ Her thoughts tend to come out in bursts, and without warning, she will turn to pick up the loose thread of some earlier argument, or will suddenly allude to some material that will not be covered until later. Thus, the critic who studies Julian with some hope of discovering a coherent narrative on any subject will find himself either frustrated, or, if he is stubborn and foolish enough, making some unsupportable claims on Julian’s behalf.

The visions that inspire Julian’s work occurred in May, 1373, over the course of a few days and nights, as Julian lay on what she (and those gathered around her) thought was her deathbed. Julian claims that the visions came as the result of her continued to prayer to have “three gifts of God.” She desired, first, the “mende of [Christ’s] passion” [“recollection of the Passion” (177)]; then, “bodily sekenesse in youth at thirty yeeres of age” [bodily sickness at the age of thirty]; and finally, “to have of Gods gift three wounds . . . the wound of very contrition, the wound of kind compassion, and the wound of willfull longing to God” (2.44-45, 67-69); [“to have, of God’s gift, three wounds . . . the wound of true contrition, the wound of loving compassion and the wound of longing with my will for God” (177, 179).

God grants Julian these three gifts. At the age of thirty, she becomes seriously ill and has sixteen “Sheweings [visions]” that give her new insights into the nature and activity of God. She eventually recovers from her illness, and soon afterwards

¹ This may be some indication that Julian did in fact dictate her work.
documents her experience in what is referred to as the “short text” of the *Shewings.* Julian’s reputation, however, rests more properly upon the “long text” that she wrote some twenty years after her visions. These twenty years afford her ample opportunity to reflect more closely upon her visions, and in the text that results, there is an obvious refinement and development of the themes in the short text. Thus, most critical commentary has focused on the long text of Julian’s *Shewings,* and in this work, I shall do the same.

There has been a good deal of work done on Julian’s supposed proto-Universalism, on her theological orthodoxy, and most recently, on her presentation of “Jesus as Mother” (Crampton 19). However, there has been very little commentary devoted to Julian’s unique concept of the human soul. It is the purpose of this thesis to focus more attention on Julian’s account of the soul in her *Shewings,* because it is, I think, central to a more complete understanding of her work.

But before beginning my discussion of Julian’s concept of the soul, I should make it clear that the reader should not expect Julian to provide a clear and coherent concept of the human soul. Julian is neither primarily a philosopher nor a theologian, and her work

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2 Nicholas Watson challenges the received view by claiming that the short text was written later. See Watson, Nicholas. “The Composition of Julian of Norwich’s *Revelation of Love.*” *Speculum* 68 (1993), 637-83.
3 The belief in the salvation of all souls.
is obviously devotional in nature.\(^5\) Knowing the purpose of Julian’s work is of the greatest importance when considering her account of the soul because we are ultimately interested in understanding why her concept is necessary for an understanding of the rest of her text. As C.S. Lewis puts it at the beginning of *A Preface to Paradise Lost*, a critic must, before anything else, know a work’s purpose—“what it was intended to do and how it is meant to be used” (1). Until this understanding is achieved, the author and the critic will inevitably be at cross-purposes.

Whether Julian was well-acquainted with any established philosophical doctrines is unknown, but considering the great intellectual interchange that was taking place in fourteenth-century Norwich, it is likely that Julian had at least some familiarity with the work of her predecessors (Crampton 4). Her two-tiered model of the soul reflects (among others) the work of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. Plato, for example, proposes a two-tiered model in one of his later dialogues, the *Timaeus*. In creating humanity, Plato says that the gods “encase” the immortal soul within a round mortal body [the head], and give it the entire body as its vehicle. And within the body they built another kind of soul as well, the mortal kind, which contains within it those dreadful but necessary disturbances: pleasure, first of all, evil’s most powerful lure; then pains, that make us run away from what is good; besides these, boldness also and fear, foolish counselors both; then also the spirit of anger hard to assuage, and expectation easily led astray. These they fused with unreasoning sense perception and all-venturing lust, and so, as was necessary, they constructed the mortal type of the soul. In the face of these disturbances they scrupled to stain the divine soul only to the extent that this was absolutely necessary, and so they provided a home for the mortal soul in another place in the body, away from the other, \ldots\) (1271)

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\(^5\) Julian considers her work “a Revelation of love” (1.1). She says that in composing her *Shewings*, she was “mekil sterid in charite to mine even Cristen, that thei might seen and knowyn the same that I saw, for I would it were comfort to they” (8.303-304); [“In all this I was greatly moved in love towards my fellow Christians, that they might all see and know the same as I saw, for I wished it to be a comfort to them” (190)].
It is not unusual to see Plato exalting the rational faculty at the expense of the appetitive, but his two-tiered model of the soul is an interesting development from the simple, undivided soul in the *Phaedo* and the tripartite soul with a rational, willful, and appetitive faculty in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*.

Aristotle also seems to advocate a two-tiered model of the rational soul in his discussion of the human’s “active” and “passive” intellect in Book 3, Chapter 5 of the *De Anima*. Aristotle begins this short chapter by claiming that in “every class of things” there is matter capable of becoming any particular thing and a requisite “productive” cause that makes the matter into the particular thing. In order to clarify, Aristotle says that this relation is similar to the relation of an art to its material. So, for example, the art of pottery (Aristotle’s “productive cause”) is responsible for cups, bowls, figurines, etc. (particular pieces fashioned from clay, the raw material of the art of pottery). In the same way, thought, according to Aristotle, can become an infinite number of things, but it must be imposed upon to become any particular kind of thought. Potential thought (or knowledge), then, is Aristotle’s “passive intellect” and the active intellect is that which imposes itself upon the passive intellect to create a specific thought. The active intellect is “separable, impassible, [and] unmixed,” being, as it is, essentially “activity.” It is also, Aristotle claims, “immortal and eternal” while the passive intellect is “perishable.” The immortal and eternal aspects of the active intellect are particularly influential.

Finally, Plotinus proposes a fully-developed idea of the two-tiered soul in the *Enneads*. Plotinus believes in a higher and a lower soul, and he claims that the higher soul is “possessed by a nobler humanity and brighter perceptions” (6.7.5) and is closely

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6 I am summarizing here only a very small bit of Aristotle’s very complex idea of the rational soul.
connected to the “Divine Intellect” (3.4.3). Plotinus, like Plato before him, believes that man may eventually reach God by living a life of virtue and by separating himself, as much as possible, from the body. He also believes that the higher soul is, as a distant emanation of God, essentially immortal, impassible, immutable, and divine.

Considering the established precedent of the concept of a two-tiered soul, Julian must have felt its influence in formulating her own concept of the soul. There is, in particular, a striking resemblance between Julian’s concept of the soul and Plotinus’. In places, it even appears that Julian is asserting that the human’s higher soul is substantially the same as the divine substance. Such a belief would be clearly incompatible with Catholic theology, however, and a closer examination of the *Shewings* reveals that Julian is not making such an audacious claim. But, in spite of her firm commitment to theological orthodoxy, she is still making some bold and original claims about the human soul. Unlike so many of her predecessors, she tends to express the intimacy between God and the soul instead of the seemingly inexorable distance wrought by the Original Sin. I shall claim that it is her reaction to sin that makes Julian’s concept of the soul so unique in the history of Christian thought. She realizes that sin has marred the human soul and made it utterly unlike God, but in confronting this reality, her next step is not to emphasize the distance between God and the soul because of the great difference. Instead, the effects of sin create a need for a closeness between God and the soul. This closeness is expressed in Julian’s concept of a higher soul, which is closely joined to God himself.

Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis are an examination of Julian’s concept of the soul, which is found primarily in Chapters 40-58 of the *Shewings*. In Chapter 3, I shall
compare Julian’s concept with Augustine’s. Although Augustine exerts a profound influence on Julian’s work, his concept of the soul is very different from hers, and a comparison of the two is illuminating. Finally, I shall claim that it is sin that ultimately makes the difference between the concepts of Julian and others writing in the Augustinian tradition.
CHAPTER 1

Julian on the Soul (1)

Because Julian’s thoughts on anything—and on the soul, in particular—are so elusive and complex, I have thought it best to present her material in much the same way that she does. That is, in this first chapter, I shall follow the text of the Shewings as it discusses the nature of the human soul, and along the way, try my best to explain what it is that Julian is saying. Julian’s discussion of the soul is located, for the most part, in the text of chapters 40 through 58. Thus, my study will pay most of its attention to the material in these chapters (though, at times, I shall be compelled to look elsewhere). Within each of these chapters, my focus shall be almost exclusively on that which relates to a description of the soul. Further, as I examine these descriptions of the soul, I shall place a particular focus on Julian’s use of the word onyd [joined] because, more than anything else, Julian stresses the “onyng,” or the intimacy of the connection, between God and the soul. At the conclusion of this précis, I shall discuss the significance of this “onyng.”

Also, allow me to provide a quick sketch of Julian’s model of the soul, because in places (no surprise here) she uses some technical terms and distinctions without bothering to explain herself beforehand. We already know that Julian proposes a two-tiered model of the soul. It is also important to know, however, that the two parts of the soul are in a hierarchical relationship. That is, the soul has a “higher” and a “lower” part. The higher soul, which is associated with the divine substance, is referred to as either the soul’s “substance” or as the “substantial soule.” The lower soul, which is associated with the
human body, is referred to alternately as the soul’s “sensualite” or as the “sensual
soule.” This short description should suffice, I hope, for what follows.

Prayer, the Soul and God

Julian’s discussion of the soul begins with a discussion of sin. She tells us that
God reveals sin to us and that by the instigation of the Holy Ghost, we are “steryd . . . be
cotrition into prayers and desire to amending of our life with al our mytes, to slakyn the
wreth of God, on to the time we fynd a rest in soule and softnes in consciens, and than
hope we that God hath forgoven us our synnes. And it is soth” (1351-54) [“moved . . .
through contrition to prayer, and we desire with all our might an amendment of ourselves
to appease God’s anger, until the time that we find rest of soul and ease of conscience.
And then we hope that God has forgiven us our sin; and this is true” (246)]. In other
words, after the individual has seen his sin and sought forgiveness, he is forgiven by God,
who then shows Himself to the soul “wol merily and with glad cher with frendful
welcummyng” [“happily and with the gladdest countenance, welcoming it as a friend”
(246)] and tells the forgiven sinner that He is glad that he has come to Him because now
they shall be “onyd in bliss [joined in bliss]” (1357). “Thus,” Julian concludes, “arn
synnes forgiven be mercy and grace, and our soul worshipfully receivid in joye, like as it
shal be whan it comyth to Hevyn, as often tymes as it comys be the gracious werkyng of
the Holy Gost and the vertue of Crists passion” (1358-61) [“So sins are forgiven by grace
and mercy, and our soul is honorably received in joy, as it will be when it comes into
heaven, as often as it comes by the operation of grace of the Holy Spirit and the power of
Christ’s passion” (246)].

Julian then claims that nothing is more harmful or painful to the soul than sin:
For if afor us were layd al the peynes in Helle and Purgatory and in erth—deth and other—and synne, we should rather chose al that peyne than synne. For synne is so vile and so mekyl to haten, that it may be liken to no payne, which peyne is not synne. And to me was shewid no herder helle than synne. For a kynde soule hat non helle but synne. (1376-80)

[For if it were laid in front of us, all the pain there is in hell and in purgatory and on earth, death and all the rest, we should choose all that pain rather than sin. For sin is so vile and so much to be hated that it can be compared with no pain which is not itself sin. And no more cruel hell than sin was revealed to me, for a loving soul hates no pain but sin. (247)]

Despite the horrible nature of any sinful act, Christians are asked to assume God’s perspective on the sinful soul: “But nakidly hate synne and endlesly loven the soule as God lovith it; than shal we haten synne and endlesly loven the soule as God lovith it; than shal we haten synne lyke as God hatith it, and love the soule as God lovyth it” (1388-90) [“but we must unreservedly hate sin and endlessly love the soul as God loves it. Then we should hate sin and endlessly love the soul as God loves it. Then we should hate sin just as God hates it, and love the soul as God loves it” (247)].

Julian turns next to prayer and its relation to the soul (Ch. 41). Prayer, or, “besekyng,” as she puts it, “is a new, gracious, lestyng will of the soule onyd and festenyd into the will of our Lord be the swete privy werke of the Holy Gost” (1414-15) [“Beseeching is a true and gracious, enduring will of the soul, united and joined to our Lord’s will by the sweet, secret operation of the Holy Spirit” (249)]. Further, through prayer God “makyth us lyke Hymself in condition as we arn in kynd” (1421-22) [“makes us like to himself in condition as we are in nature” (249)]. There are “three thyngs that longyn to prayor” [“three things which belong to our prayer” (250)] (Ch. 42). First, Julian reiterates what she has claimed in the previous chapter (41): that God is the ground of our prayers and that He wills that we pray (1446-47). God also wants us to pray so
that He may conform our will to His own (1448-50). And finally, God would have us know “the frute and the end of our prayors: that is, to onyd and lyk to our Lord in al thyng” (1451-52) [“the fruit and the end of our prayer, which is to be united and like to our Lord in all things” (251)].

Thus, prayer unites the human and divine wills (Ch. 43). The act of prayer is a testament of the soul’s desire to adapt itself to God’s will and is therefore a sign to the Christian that he is in the right relationship to God. Julian actually claims that prayer “onyth” the soul to God, but it is obvious that she is not making a metaphysical statement here. She is describing, rather, prayer’s power to bring the human will into an accord with the divine will:

Prayer onyth the soule to God; for thow the soule be ever lyke to God in kyndes and substance restorid be grace, it is ofte onlyke in condition be synne on manys part. Than is prayor a wittnes that the soule will as God will and comfortith the conscience and ablith man to grace. (1499-1502)

[Prayer unites the soul to God, for though the soul may be always like God in nature and in substance restored by grace, it is often unlike him in condition, through sin on man’s part. Then prayer is a witness that the soul wills as God wills, and it eases the conscience and fits man for grace. (253)]

The different purposes sometimes guiding Julian’s text are illustrated here, for she reveals both theological and devotional interests.

God wills all things and is yet pleased with the Christian who prays for His will to be accomplished: “And thus the soule be prayor accordydy to God” (1512) [And so the soul by prayer is made of one accord with God” (254)]. We are then offered a description of the human soul’s vision of God in prayer:

But whan our curtes Lord of His grace shewith Hymselfe to eur soule, we have that we desire, and than we se not for the tyme what we shuld more pray, but al
our entent with al our myte is sett holy to the beholdyng of Hym, and this is an hey, unperceyvable prayor as to my syte. (1513-16)

[But when our courteous Lord of his special grace shows himself to our soul, we have what we desire, and then for that time we do not see what more we should pray for, but all our intention and all our powers are wholly directed to contemplating him. And as I see it, this is an exalted and imperceptible prayer; (254)]

Perhaps prayer is impossible in such a circumstance because the Christian is realizing, for a moment, “the frute and end of” his prayers.

Such intimate perceptions of the divine lead us to desire God more eagerly: “And wel I wote the mor the soule seeth of God, the more it desyrith Him be His grace” (1520-21) [“And well I know that the more the soul sees of God, the more she desire him by grace” (254)]. This desire for the divine, and the emptied feeling that inevitably comes after the perceived withdrawal of the divine, should lead the Christian to prayer so that he may continue in grace and ultimately possess what he desires—the beatific vision of God.

Julian also contrasts the roles of the individual and of God in the act of prayer: “For whan the soule is tempested, troublid, and left to hymself be onreste, than it is tyme to prayen to maken hymselfe supple and buxum to God. But he be no manner of prayor makyth God supple to hym. For He is ever alyke in love” (1522-25) [“For when a soul is tempted, troubled and left to herself in her unrest, that is the time for her to pray and to make herself supple and obedient to God. But he by no kind of prayer makes God supple to him; for God’s love does not change” (254)]. Julian is determined to stress the intimate connection between God and the human soul, but one also notices her firm insistence that God and the soul are fundamentally different. God can change the soul, but the soul can never change an immutable divinity.
Because God’s will for the human soul is something so wonderful “that it overpassyt al our imagyning and all that we can wenyn and thynken” (1531-32) [“that it surpasses all our imagining and everything that we can understand or think” (255)], a Christian necessarily desires to bridge the gap between God and himself: “We can do no more but behold Hym, enjoyeng with an hey, myty desire to be al onyd into Hym, and entred to His wonyng, and enjoy in Hys lovyng, and deliten in His godeness” (1532-34) [“we can do no more than contemplate him and rejoice, with a great and compelling desire to be wholly united into him, and attend to his motion and rejoice in his love and delight in his goodness” (255)]. This is the desire of those, like Julian, writing within the Christian mystical tradition, who desire an immediate (though intermittent) experience of God during earthly existence.

Finally, prayers “wrowte . . . be the grace of the Holy Gost” [“done . . . by the grace of the Holy Spirit” (255)] will give a human many “privy tuchyngs of swete gostly syghts and felyng” (1536-37) [“secret touchings of sweet spiritual sights and feelings” (255)] till one day we shall behold God as He really is: “The creature that is made shal sen and endlessly beholden God which is the maker” (1543); [“The creature which is made will see and endlessly contemplate God who is the maker” (255)]. The soul is then described as “a creature in God” (44.1557) with the same properties (“endles soverain trueth, endles severeyn wisdam, endles sovereyn love” (1556-57) [“endless supreme truth, endless supreme wisdom, endless supreme love” (256)]) as the Holy Trinity.

Julian then strives to understand the “two domys [judgments]” of humanity (Ch. 45). She seems to feel the tension of an apparent contradiction between what she sees as God’s mercy towards our “kyndly [natural] substance” and the Church’s condemnation
of the human’s sinful soul. This conflict remains, for the moment, unresolved, but it will be directly addressed in the Parable of the Lord and the Servant (Ch. 51). Fallen humans deserve “peyne and wreteth [pain and wrath]” (46.1619) because they do “many evill that we owten to leven, and levyn many good dedes ondon that we owten to don” (1618-19) [“many evil deeds which we ought to forsake, and leave many good deeds undone which we ought to do” (259)]. But in spite of humanity’s failings, there is no anger between God and the human soul because anger has no part in God’s power, wisdom, and goodness (1623-25). Further, the Christian’s “soule is unyd to Hym, onchangable goodnes, and betwix God and our soul is neyther wroth nor forgifenis in Hys syte. For our soule is fulsomly onyd to God of His owen goodnes, that atwix God and soule may be ryth nowte” (1625-29) [“Our soul is united to him who is unchangeable goodness. And between God and our soul there is neither wrath nor forgiveness in his sight. For our soul is so wholly united to God, through his own goodness, that between God and our soul nothing can interpose” (259)].

According to Julian, the human soul deserves the wrath of God, but because it is joined to God in love (“we arn endlesly onyd [endlessly joined] to Hym in love”) there can be no anger between God and it, for “if God myte be wroth a touch we shuld never hav lif, ne stede, ne beyng” (49.1727-28) [“if God could be angry for any time, we should neither have life nor place nor being” (264)]. Salvation comes when the soul is “al in peace and in love, that is to sey, ful plesid with God and with al His werks, and with al His domys, and lovand and pessible with ourselfe and with our even Cristen, and with al that God lovith, as love likyth” (1744-46) [“all in peace and in love, that is to say wholly contented with God and with all his works and with all his judgments, and loving and
content with ourselves and with our fellow Christians and with everything which God loves, as is pleasing to love” (265)]. This condition is the result of the repentance that comes as an awareness of one’s sins. When the soul seeks its salvation, “it is trewly pesid in the self” (1751) [“she is truly pacified in herself” (265)] and “[s]odenly [suddenly] is . . . onyd [joined] to God” (1751). It is not until later (Ch.53) that Julian explains that it is Christ who actually joins the soul to God.

How is it that God can look at the soul and show it “no more blame than if we were clene and as holy as angelys be in Hevyn” (50.1772) [“no more blame to us than if we were as pure and as holy as the angels are in heaven” (266)], when the fact of the matter is that “we synne grevously al day and ben mekyl blameworthy” (1766) [we sin grievously all day and are very blameworthy” (266)] and “the blame of our synne continuly hangith [continually hangs] upon us” (1769-70)? Here again, it is obvious that Julian is preoccupied with human sin and the two “domys,” or judgments, of the human soul.

**The Soul in the Parable of the Lord and the Servant**

Julian’s question about sin is answered in the vision of a lord and his servant (Ch.51) in which she sees a lord sitting on a throne with his servant standing by, “redy to don his lords will [ready to do his lord’s will]” (1801-02). The lord decides to send his servant on an errand, but as soon as the servant leaves to do his master’s bidding, he falls into a slough, badly injures himself, and loses sight of his beloved lord. The lord of the parable represents God the Father and the servant represents two people simultaneously—Adam and God the Son, Jesus Christ. The servant’s falling is symbolic of Adam’s sin in Eden and at the same time, Christ’s “fall” into mankind: “He fell ful low
in the Maydens womb” (1997-98) [“he fell very low into the maiden’s womb” (275)].

“When Adam fell, God Son fell [When Adam fell, God’s Son fell]” (1976), Julian says,
“For the rythfull onyng which was made in Hevyn, God Son myte not fro Adam, for by
Adam I understond all man” (1977-78); [“because of the true union which was made in heaven, God’s Son could not be separated from Adam, for by Adam I understand all mankind” (274)]. At creation, the soul predestined for salvation is apparently joined to
the Second Person of the Trinity, Jesus Christ. Julian provides more detail on this joining in Chapter 53.

The reader is also given a detailed description of the servant symbolic of Adam
and Christ. One part of the description especially worth noting is the thinness of the
servant’s clothing. The clothing itself is supposed to be symbolic of God putting on
man’s flesh, but the thinness of it indicates that “there was ryte now atwix the godhod and the manhede” of Christ (1999-2000); [“there was nothing at all separating the
divinity from the humanity” of Christ (275)]. Further, the human soul was meant to be
God’s “cyte [city]” (1915) and “dwelling place” (1916). It is Christ’s “herd travel
[grievous labor]” (1921) that allows God, once more, the opportunity to dwell in man’s
sensual soul.

The Christian meets with “a mervelous medlur of wele and wo [“a marvellous
mixture of both well-being and woe”]” (2079-80) in this life because he is actually two
men: “We have in us our Lord Jesus uprysen; we have in us the wretchidnes and the
mischef of Adams fallyng” (2080-81); [“We have in us our risen Lord Jesus Christ, and
we have in us the wretchedness and the harm of Adam’s falling”]. In spite of this
spiritual tension, the reader is encouraged to know that God is with him in various ways:
. . . He is lestyngly with us, and that in three manner. He is with us in Hevyn, very man in His owne person, us updrawand, and that was shewid in the gostly thrist. 7 And He is with us in erth, us ledand, and that was shewid in the thrid wher I saw God in a poynte. 8 And He is with us in our soul endlesly wonand, us reuland and yemand. And that was shewid in the sixteenth, as I shal sey. (2102-07)

[. . . he is constantly with us, and that in three ways. He is with us in heaven, true man in his own person, drawing us up; and that was revealed in the spiritual thirst. And he is with us on earth, leading us; and that was revealed in the third revelation, where I saw God in a moment of time. And he is with us in our soul, endlessly dwelling, ruling and guarding; and that was revealed in the sixteenth revelation, as I shall say. (280)]

The Sixteenth Revelation

The sixteenth revelation just mentioned, which begins in Chapter 66, contains important information pertaining to Julian’s concept of the soul. In Chapter 67, she describes the spiritual vision of her own soul:

And than our Lord opened my gostly eye and shewid me my soule in midds of my herte. I saw the soule so large as it were an endles world and as it were a blisfull kyngdom; and be the conditions I saw therin, I understode that it is a worshipful syte. In the midds of that syte sitts our Lord Jesus, God and man, a faire person and of large stature, heyest bishopp, solemnest kinge, worshipfuliest Lord. And I saw Him clad solemnly, and worshiply He sitteth in the soule even ryte in peace and rest. And the Godhede ruleth and gemeth Hevyn and erth and all that is—sovereyn myte, sovereyn wisedom, and sovereyn goodnes. (2791-98)

[And then our good Lord opened my spiritual eye, and showed me my soul in the midst of my heart. I saw the soul as wide as if it were an endless citadel, and also as if it were a blessed kingdom, and from the state which I saw in it, I understood that it is a fine city. In the midst of that city sits our Lord Jesus, true God and true man, a handsome person and tall, highest bishop, most awesome king, most honourable lord. And I saw him splendidly clad in honours. He sits erect there in the soul, in peace and rest, and he rules and guards heaven and earth and

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7 The “gostiyl thrist” is a reference to Chapter 31 of the Shewings: “Therefore, this is [Christ’s] thrist: a love longyng to have us al togeder hole in Him to His blis, as to my syte” (1039).
8 Julian is referring here to the third revelation in the eleventh chapter. It is not entirely clear what Julian means when she claims to have seen God in a “poynyte”. Edmund Colledge and James Walsh take it to mean “an instant of time” (197). However, according to A.C. Spearing, this word can refer either to “a point of space or time” (181). In any case, the important thing is that by this vision of “God in a poynyte” Julian comes to understand that God “is in al things” (11.428).
everything that is. The humanity and divinity sit at rest, the divinity rules and
guards without instrument or effort. And the soul is wholly occupied by the
blessed divinity, sovereign power, sovereign wisdom and sovereign goodness.
(313)

As Colledge and Walsh note, this vision is a vivid illustration of Julian’s claim that Christ
is with the Christian “in [his] soule endlessly wonand, us reuland and yemand [in [his]
soul, endlessly dwelling, ruling and guarding]” (2105-06). Her lofty description of the
sensual soul is particularly striking because it is the part of the soul that was, previous to
salvation, marred by sin. Julian continues to exult in the transformation effected by
Christ’s redemption:

For in us is His homeliest home and His endles wonyng, and in this He shewid
the lekyng that He hath of the makyng of manys soule. For as wele as the Fader
might make a creature and as wele as the Son couth make a creature, so wele
wold the Holy Gost that manys soul were made, and so it was don; and thefore
the blissid Trinite enjoyeth withouten end in the makyng of manys soule. For He
saw fro without begynnyng what shuld liken Him without end. (2800-05)

[for in us is his home of homes and his everlasting dwelling. And in this he
revealed the delight that he has in the creation of man’s soul; for as well as the
Father could create a creature and as well as the Son could create a creature, so
well did the Holy Spirit want man’s spirit to be created, and so it was done. And
therefore the blessed Trinity rejoices without end in the creation of man’s soul,
for it saw without beginning what would delight it without end. (313)]

Adam’s soul—the soul in its first creation—was good and pleasing to the Trinity, and
Christ, as the second Adam, restores the human’s soul to its original state of perfection:

“For I saw in the same shewing that if the blisfull Trinite myte have made manys soule
ony better, ony fairer, ony noblyer than it was made, He shuld not have be full plesid with
the makyng of manys soule” (2817-20); [“For I saw in the same revelation that if the
blessed Trinity could have created man’s soul any better, any fairer, any nobler than it
was created, the Trinity would not have been fully pleased with the creation of man’s
soul” (314)]. God, when he created the universe and everything in it, “saw that it was good” (Gen. 1.12). The human soul was therefore also perfect until Adam fell.

After making reference to the sixteenth revelation, Julian addresses the higher judgment of God by referring to the lord of the parable’s “inward cher [inward demeanor]” (Ch. 52). In this higher judgment, there are none of the “peynes and passions, ruthes and pites, mercies and forgivevenes, and swich other that arn profitable. But in the higher parte . . . [is] hey love and mervelous joye, in which mervelous joy all peynis are heyly restorid” (2151-54); [“pains and sufferings, compassions and pities, mercies and forgiveness and other such, which are profitable. But in the higher part there are none of these, but all is one great love and marvellous joy, in which marvellous joy all pains are wholly destroyed” (282)]. Yet these two judgments are one, “for it is all one love, which on blissid love hath now in us double werking” (2150); [“for it is all one love, which one blessed love now has a double operation in us” (282)]. In other places, Julian claims that suffering, for example, is actually good for the soul because it teaches it to know itself and to seek God. So the activity of the lower soul is, as Julian says, also good at times.

The Godly Will

How is it that God can love and forgive a sinful human soul (Ch. 53)? This question is answered, in part, with the concept of a “godly will.” In each person who will be saved, there is a godly will “that never assent to synne ne never shall: which wille is so good that it may never willen ylle, but evermore continuly it will good and werkyth good in the syte of God” (2165-67); [“which never assented to sin nor ever will, which will is so good that it can never will evil, but always constantly it wills good and it does good in
the sight of God” (283)]. The godly will is, apparently, not something that necessarily belongs to the fallen human soul; rather, it belongs to Christ and is given to the Christian in the process of redemption:

We have all this blissid will hole and safe in our Lord Jesus Christe. For that ilke kind that Hevyn shall be fulfillid with behovith needs, of Gods rythfulhede, so to be knitt and onyd to Him that therin were kept a substance which myte never, ne shuld, be partid from Him, and that throw His owne good will in His endles forseing purpos. And notwithstanding this rythfull knitting and this endles onyng, yet the redemption and the ageyn byeng of mankind is nedefull and spedefull in everything, as it is don for the same entent and to the same end that Holy Church techith. (2168-76)

[We have all this blessed will whole and safe in our Lord Jesus Christ, because every nature with which heaven will be filled had of necessity and of God’s righteousness to be so joined and united in him that in it a substance was kept which could never and should never be parted from him, and that through his own good will in his endless prescient purpose. And despite this rightful joining and this endless uniting, still the redemption and the buying-back of mankind is needful and profitable in everything, as it is done with the same intention and for the same end as Holy Church teaches us in our faith. (283)]

What Julian seems to be saying here is that in redemption, the individual is “joined” to Christ—he “takes on” Christ’s nature. In taking on the nature of Christ, the Christian also takes part in the “godly will that never assent to synne, ne never shall [“godly will which never assented to sin nor ever will”]” that belongs to Christ. Because Christ as the Second Person of the Trinity, is joined to God the Father, Christians are united to God by the redemption of Christ. Christ is mankind’s representative because He is perfect, with a will that does not, and never will, consent to sin. Man can come to God in no other way. As Colledge and Walsh note, Julian now also “sees that this teaching is no novelty in her showings, but belongs, by God’s will, to the faith and belief of the Church” (79).

If Christ is, as it is implied, humanity’s representative, then one can truly claim, as Julian does, that “mankyn德 hath ben, in the forsyte of God, knowen and lovid without
begynnyng [“mankind [has] been known and loved in God’s prescience from without beginning” (283)]” for man is partaking in the eternal love between God the Father and God the Son, is receiving the Holy Ghost: “this is a love made of the kindly substantial goodnes of the Holy Gost, myte in reson of the myte of the myte of the Fadir, and wise in mend of the wisdam of the Son. And thus is man soule made of God, and in the same poynte knitt to God” (2185-88); [“this is [a love] made only of the natural substantial goodness of the Holy Spirit, mighty by reason of the might of the Father, wise in mind of the wisdom of the Son. And so is man’s soul made by God, and in the same moment joined to God” (284)].

The closeness of man’s soul to God is emphasized by comparing its creation to the God’s creation of the body. There is a degree of separation between God and the body because God did not simply create it ex nihilo. Instead, he created it out of already extant matter—“the slyppe of erth [the slime of the earth]” (2191). However, when God created the soul, He did not make it out of something he had already fashioned. He simply made it. There is, therefore, a lesser divide between the soul and God:

When God shuld make mans body, He tooke the slyppe of erth, which is a matter medlid and gaderid of all bodily things, and therof He made mannys bodye. But to the makyng of many soule, He wold take ryte nought, but made it. And thus is the kynd made rytefully onyd to the maker, which is substantial kynd onmade, that is God. And therefor it is that there may, ne shall, be ryte nowte atwix God and mannys soul.⁹ (2190-95)

[When God was to make man’s body, he took the slime of the earth, which is matter mixed and gathered from all bodily things, and of that he made man’s

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⁹ Colledge and Walsh consider this last sentence as not simply a metaphysical statement but also an affirmation of Paul’s words in Romans 8.38-39: For I am convinced that there is nothing in death or life, in the realm of spirits or superhuman powers, in the world as it is or the world as it shall be, in the forces of the universe, in heights or depths—nothing in all creation that can separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord.
body. But to the making of man’s soul he would accept nothing at all, but made it. And so is created nature rightfully united to the maker, who is substantial uncreated nature, that is God. And so it is that there may and will be nothing at all between God and man’s soul. (284)]

The Christian reader is then reminded that his soul is closely joined to Christ’s soul which is, in turn, closely joined to the substance of God the Father:

And furthermore, [God] will we wettyn that this derworthy soule was preciousley knitt to [God the Father] in the makeing, which knott is sotil, and so myty that it is onyd into God, in which onyng it is made endlesly holy. Furthermore, He will we wettyn that al the soules that shall be savid in Hevyn without end ar knitt and onyd in this onyng, and made holy in this holyhede. (2204-08)

[And furthermore, he wants us to know that this beloved soul was preciously knitted to him in its making, by a knot so subtle and so mighty that it is united in God. In this uniting it is made endlessly holy. Furthermore, he wants us to know that all the souls which will be saved in heaven without end are knit in this knot, and united in this union, and made holy in this holiness. (284)]

Julian’s devotional purpose here is obvious, for she is particularly interested in letting her readers know that their salvation is assured by God, emphasizing the security, rather than the peril, of the saved soul. In stressing the intimate union made between God and the human soul in the soul’s creation, Julian edifies her fellow Christians by giving them a firm hope of salvation. If the saved person’s soul is joined to God by God in a union that is described as “endlessly holy,” then it is impossible for the Christian to lose his salvation. Julian’s fellow Christians undoubtedly take comfort in the concept of the higher soul’s loving security in the divine substance.
CHAPTER 2

Julian on the Soul (2)

In Chapter 1, we examined Julian’s description of the soul in prayer, the tension she feels in the judgments of God and the Church, Jesus’ indwelling of the human soul, and the concept of a godly will that cannot intend evil. In Chapter 2, we shall first examine God’s indwelling of the soul; then, a fuller description of the substantial and sensual soul follows; next is Julian’s brief description of the motherhood of Jesus, and finally, the chapter will end with a discussion of the material in Chapters 1 and 2.

The Indwelling of the Soul

All of the souls who will be saved are loved by God equally, for when He looks at these souls, He sees the soul of Christ (Ch.54). Further, Christ’s redemption enables God to dwell within the soul and the soul to dwell within God:

Hevely owe we to enjoyen that God wonyth in our soule, and mekil more hevely owe enjoyen that our soule wonyth in God. Our soule is made to be Gods wonyng place, and the wonyng place of the soule is God, which is onmade. And hey understonding it is inwardly to sen and to knowen that God, which is our maker, wonyng in our soule. And an heyer understondyng it is inwardly to sen and to knowen our soule, that is made, wonyth in Gods substance, of which substance, God, we arn that we arn. (2214-20)

[Greatly ought we to rejoice that God dwells in our soul; and more greatly ought we to rejoice that our soul dwells in God. Our soul is created to be God’s dwelling place, and the dwelling of our soul is God, who is uncreated. It is a great understanding to see and know inwardly that God, who is our Creator, dwells in our soul, and it is a far greater understanding to see and know inwardly that our soul, which is created, dwells in God in substance, of which substance, through God, we are what we are. (285)]

Julian then emphasizes the great intimacy between God and the Christian’s soul. Some care is shown, however, in distinguishing between the divine and human substance:

“And I saw no difference atwix God and our substance, but as it were al God; and yet
myn understandyng toke that our substance is in God; that is to say, that God is God, our substance is a creature in God” (2221-23); [“And I saw no difference between God and our substance, but, as it were, all God; and still my understanding accepted that our substance is in God, that is to say that God is God, and our substance is a creature in God” (285)]. The lines that follow are a continued explanation of the ontological difference between the saved soul and God. At the same time, however, the intimate union between the soul and the Godhead is also stressed:

For the almyty truth of the Trinite is our fader, for He made us and kepith us in Him. And the depe wisdam of the Trinite is our moder in whom we arn al beclosid. The hey goodnes of the Trinite is our lord, and in Him we arn beclosid, and He in us. We arn beclosid in the Fadir, and we arn beclosid in the Son, and we arn beclosid in the Holy Gost; and the Fader is beclosid in us, and the Son is beclosid in us, and the Holy Gost is beclosid in us—Almythed, Alwisdam, Al goodnes: on God, on Lord. (2223-29)

[For the almighty truth of the Trinity is our Father, for he made us and keeps us in him. And the deep wisdom of the Trinity is our Mother, in whom we are enclosed. And the high goodness of the Trinity is our Lord, and in him we are enclosed and he in us. We are enclosed in the Father, and we are enclosed in the Son, and we are enclosed in the Holy Spirit. And the Father is enclosed in us, the Son is enclosed in us, and the Holy Spirit is enclosed in us, almighty, all wisdom and all goodness, one God, one Lord. (285)]

**The Substantial and Sensual Soul**

In her discussion of “feith [faith]” and all the other “vertuys [powers]” that come into the human soul, Julian finally provides a partial description of the two parts of the human soul. There is “our kynd substance [our natural substance]” (2230), from which the Holy Ghost brings powers into the other part of the soul, which is referred to as the “sensual soule” (2231): “And our feith is a vertue that comith of our kynd substance into our sensual soule be the Holy Gost in which all our vertuys comith to us, for without that no man may receive vertue” (2230-32) [“And our faith is a power which comes from our
natural substance into our sensual soul by the Holy Spirit, in which power all our powers come to us, for without that no man can receive power” (286)]. Without these virtues, or powers of understanding, trust, and belief, humanity cannot achieve salvation.

Our sensual souls are grounded in “kind [nature], mercy, and in grace, which ground abylith us to receive gefts that leden us to endles life” (2255-57) [“nature, in mercy and in grace, and this foundation enables us to receive gifts which lead us to endless life” (287)]. The works of nature, mercy, and grace lead Julian to conclude that God is present not only in our substance but also in our sensuality:

For I saw ful sekirly that our substance is in God. And also I saw that in our sensualite, God is; for the very selfe poynet that our soule is mad sensual, in the selfe poynet is the cite of God, ordeynid to Him from withouten begynnyng, in which se He commith and never shall remove it. For God is never out of the soule in which He wonen blisfully without end. (2257-61)

[For I saw very surely that our substance is in God, and I also saw that God is in our sensuality, for in the same instant and place in which our soul is made sensual, in that same instant and place exists the city of God, ordained for him from without beginning. He comes into this city and will never depart from it, for God is never out of the soul, in which he will dwell blessedly without end. (287)]

This is not a claim that God Himself is actually dwelling within the soul at conception. Rather, this is a reference to God’s works of nature, mercy, and grace which lead the soul to salvation. In this sense, God is present in the sensual soul acting as, according to Colledge and Walsh, the formal cause of these works (81).10

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10 The small sections that follow are somewhat confusing. Julian states that God the Father has given His Son the greatest gifts that can be given, and these gifts are ultimately received by us: “All the gefts that God may geve creatures, He hath geven to His Son, Jesus, for us” (2263-64). We will receive these gifts when we are “waxen and growne—our soule with our body, and our body with our soule, neyther of hem takeing help of other, till we be browte up into stature as kynd werkyth. And than in the ground of kind, with werkynge of mercy, the Holy Gost graciously inspirith into us gifts ledand to endless life” (2265-68). Julian’s primary concern here is to emphasize that the entire Godhead is involved in the process of salvation. What is less straightforward is what Julian means by “body” and “soul” and their “neyther of hem takeing help of other.” Elizabeth Spearing’s translation of these lines is fairly literal: “and he, dwelling in us, has enclosed these gifts within himself until such time as we have grown and matured, our
Lines 2269-73 are a reminder that in her concept of the soul, Julian is working well within the Augustinian tradition:

And thus was my understandyng led of God to sen in Him and to understonden, to weten and to knowen, that our soule is made trinite—like to the onmade blisfull Trinite, knowen and lovid fro without begynnyng, and in the makyng unyd to the Maker, as it is afornseid.

[And so my understanding was led by God to see in him and to know, to understand and to recognize that our soul is a crated trinity, like the uncreated blessed Trinity, known and loved from without beginning, and in the creation united to the Creator, as is said before. (287)]

These lines refer to lines 2248-50: “Our feith cummith of the kynd love of our soule, and of the cler lyte of our reson, and of the stedfast mend which we have of God in our first makyng” (emphasis mine); [“Our faith comes from the natural love of our soul, and from the clear light of our reason, and from the steadfast memory which we have from God in our first creation” (286, emphasis mine)]. By identifying the human soul as a trinity of

...soul with our body and our body with our soul, neither of them receiving help from the other, until by the operation of nature we achieve our full stature” (135). Perhaps Colledge and Walsh’s translation is evidence that they also sensed some kind of difficulty in the interpretation: “[Christ], dwelling in us, has enclosed in him until the time that we are fully grown, our soul together with our body and our body together with our soul. Let either of them take help from the other, until we have grown to full stature as creative nature brings about” (287).

It certainly makes more sense to affirm that Julian is simply referring to the physical body in contrast to the two-part soul, for in lines 2273-77, she claims that Christ’s work has saved man from two deaths:

And for the worshipfull onyng that was thus made of God betwix the soule and body, it behovith needs to ben that mankynd shal be restorid from duble deth, which restoring might never be into the time that the Second Person in the Trinite had takyn the lower party of mankynde to whom the heyest was onyd in the first makyng.

[And because of the soul and the body, mankind had necessarily to be restored from a double death, which restoration could never be until the time when the second person in the Trinity had taken the lower part of human nature, whose highest part was united to him in its first creation. (288)]

The “duble deth” to which Julian refers is, most likely, a death of the body and a death of the sensual soul. It is possible that she is referring to death of the lower and higher soul, but this is doubtful, since she describes the higher soul as “a creture in God” (2223) that possesses “a godly wille that never assent to synne” (2165).
love, reason, and memory, Julian reiterates Augustine’s description of the soul in the
*De Trinitate* as a trinity of memory, intelligence, and will.\(^\text{11}\)

Julian concludes by explaining that when God became man, He took on man’s body and sensual soul for Himself, and, by means of His crucifixion and resurrection, restored the soul that existed in man before the Fall:

> And these two partes were in Criste, the heyer and the lower, which is but on soule. The heyer part was on in peace with God in full joy and bliss. The lower partie, which is sensualite, suffrid for the salvation of mankyn. And these two parts were seene and felt in the eighth shewing in which my body was fulfillid of feling and mynd of Crists passion and His deth. (2277-82)

> [And these two parts were in Christ, the higher and the lower, which are only one soul. The higher part was always at peace with God in full joy and bliss. The lower part, which is sensuality, suffered for the salvation of mankind. And these two parts were seen and felt in the eighth revelation, in which my body was filled full of feeling and memory of Christ’s Passion and his dying. (288)]

Because Christ was the second Adam and without the effects of the Original Sin, He was able to possess a complete soul, sensuality joined to substance.

Julian believes that “It is esier [easier] to know God than our soule” (Ch. 56):

> “For our soule is so deep groundid in God and so endlesly tresurid that we may not cum to the knowing therof till we have first knowing of God which is the maker to whom it is onyd” (2288-90); [“For our soul is so deeply grounded in God and so endlessly treasured that we cannot come to knowledge of it until we first have knowledge of God, who is the Creator to whom it is united” (288)]. However, either desire—to know one’s soul or to know God—is “good and trew [true]” (2294), because the human soul is so closely united to God that an individual cannot help but encounter God in his attempt to understand the soul:

\(^{11}\) I shall discuss the Julian/Augustine connection at more length in Chapter 3.
For our soule sittith in God in very rest, and our soule stondith in God in very strength, and our soule is kindly rotid in God in endles love. And therfore if we will have knowledge of our soule and comenynge and dailiance therwith, it behovith to sekyn into our Lord God in whom it is inclosid. (2298-2301)

[For our soul sits in God in true rest, and our soul stands in God in sure strength, and our soul is naturally rooted in God in endless love. And therefore if we want to have knowledge of our soul, and communion and discourse with it, we must seek in our Lord God in whom it is enclosed. (289)]

At this point, it finally becomes clear that the sensuality and substance are two parts, or aspects, perhaps, of one soul. Christ indwells the sensuality and the substance is also enclosed in Him:

And anempts our substaunce and sensualite, it may rightly be clepid our soule, and that is be the onyng that it hath in God. The worshipfull cyte that our Lord Jesus sittith in, it is our sensualite, in which He is inclosid; and our kindly substance is beclosid in Jesus with the blissid soule of Criste sitting in rest in the Godhede. (2302-2306)

[and as regards our substance, it can rightly be called our soul, and as regards our sensuality, it can rightly be called our soul, and that is by the union which it has in God. That honourable city in which our Lord Jesus sits is our sensuality, in which he is enclosed; and our natural substance is enclosed in Jesus, with the blessed soul of Christ sitting in rest in the divinity. (289)]

Even though Julian claims that it is easier to know God than our own soul (2287-88), she insists that an individual cannot come to full knowledge of God until he has a clear knowledge of his own soul: “[W]e may never come to full knowyng of God till we know first clerely our owne soule” (2312-13); [“We can never come to the full knowledge of God until we first clearly know our own soul” (289)]. This is because he cannot be entirely holy until his soul is complete—when the lower soul is borne up into the higher. And holiness is, apparently, a prerequisite for an appropriate knowledge of God:

For into the tyme that it is in the full myts we may not be al ful holy, and that is that our sensualite be the vertue of Crists passion be browte up to the substance,
with all the profits of our tribulation that our Lord shall make us to gettyn be mercy and grace. (2313-2316)

[For until the time that [the soul] is in its full powers, we cannot be all holy; and that is when our sensuality by the power of Christ’s Passion can be brought up into the substance, with all the profits of our tribulation which our Lord will make us obtain through mercy and grace. (289)]

The use of the term “touching” in the following couple of lines makes any straightforward interpretation somewhat more difficult: “I had in partie touching; and it is grounded in kynde. That is to sey, our reson is groundid in God which is substantial heyhede” (2316-18) [“I had a partial touching, and it is founded in nature, that is to say: Our reason is founded in God, who is nature’s substance” (290)]. However we should understand Julian’s use of “touching,” it is clear that the true knowledge of the soul requires more than just intellectual apprehension of its grounding in God. It is also necessary to strive to understand the mercy and grace of God, “in which we have our incre [increase] and our fulfilling [filling up]” (2320): “For only be our reson we may not profiteyn, but if we have verily therwith mynd and love; ne only in our kyndly ground

12 According to Colledge and Walsh, “touching” is a technical term “to convey that [Julian] is being directly affected and moved by the Holy Spirit to experience the reality of God, in a way which is above intellectual comprehension, but which accompanies and supports some form of inner seeing” (289). Crampton agrees with this translation of the word, adding that this usage is tentative evidence of the influence of the Pseudo-Dionysus, who also assigns a figurative meaning to touch (170). Julian uses touch in the figurative sense in at least two other places in her text. In lines 1236-38, she writes that “as long as we arn in this lif, what tyme that we be our folly turne us to the beholdying of the reprovyd, tenderly our Lord God toucht us, and blisfully clepyth us seyand in our soul . . . “ (emphasis mine); [so long as we are in this life, whenever we in our folly revert to the contemplation of those who are damned, our Lord tenderly teaches us and blessedly calls us, saying in our souls . . . “ (240)]. Consider also lines 3346-47: “I had in parte touching, sight, and feling in three propertes of God in which the strength and effect of all the revelation stondith” (emphasis mine); [“In this matter I had touching, sight and feeling of three properties of God, in which consist the strength and the effect of the revelation” (339)]. However, if touching is “in a way above intellectual comprehension,” it is strange that Julian attempts to clarify this sentence by associating touching with reason: “That is to sey, our reson [reason] is groundid [grounded] in God which is substantial heyhede [elevation].” Spearing translates touching less spiritually: “I had some degree of insight into this, and it is a process grounded in nature, that is to say, our reason is grounded in God, who is the summit of essential being” (134). Because the translation of touching is uncertain, it is not apparent whether these two sentences are a continuation of the thought process of the previous lines or rather a transition in Julian’s thinking. Both Colledge and Walsh and Spearing treat these lines as some kind of transition by placing them at the beginning of a new paragraph.
that we have in God we may not be saved, but if we have a connynge of the same
ground, mercy, and grace” (2327-30) [“For we cannot profit by our reason alone, unless
we have equally memory and love; nor can we be saved merely because we have in God
our natural foundation, unless we have, coming from the same foundation, mercy and
grace” (290)]. Julian then explains that from nature, mercy, and grace the soul receives
everything good. For in creation, the sensual soul receives some benefits while the
substantial soul receives others. When the sensuality is drawn up into the substance, the
soul then achieves the greatest good. This method of sanctification was intended by God
from the beginning:

For of those three werkyngs [nature, mercy, grace] altogeder we receive all our
goodnes, of the which the first arn goods of kynd. For in our first makyng God
gaf us al ful goods and also greter godes as we myte receivin only in our spirite.
But His forseing purpos in His endles wisdam wold that we wern doble. (2330-
33)

[For from these three operating all together we receive all our good, the first of
which is the good of nature. For in our first making God gave us as much good
and as great good as we could receive in our spirit alone; but his prescient
purpose in his endless wisdom willed that we should be double. (290)]

Despite the damage that Adam’s sin did the human soul, God is able to work it to the
good.

Julian provides in Chapter 57 a fuller description of the two parts of the soul. The
substantial soul is “nobil [noble]” and “rich” while the sensual soul is weak (“in our
sensualite [sensuality] we faylyn [fail]” [2340]). The substantial soul was joined to God
when it was created, and the sensual soul was joined to God when it was created, and the
sensual soul came into being when the soul entered the body. It is not apparent whether
God creates the substantial soul first. When Christ entered a human body, He received a
sensual soul like every other human. However, unlike the rest of fallen humanity, Christ’s lower, sensual soul was also joined to his higher, substantial soul. Julian never bothers to give a specific description of the fallen human soul, but she seems to imply that in some sense, the fallen soul is split. Its two parts are separated, and it is Christ who rejoins these two parts: “For our kind which is the higher part is knitt to God in the makyng, and God is knitt to our kinde, which is the lower partie in our flesh takyng, and thus in Crist our two kinds are onyd” (2346-48); [“for our nature, which is the higher part, is joined to God in its creation, and God is joined to our nature, which is the lower part in taking flesh. And so in Christ our two natures are united” (291)].

For in that ilk tyme that God knitted Him to our body in the Maydens womb, He toke our sensual soule; in which takyng, He us al haveyng beclosid in Him, He onyd it to our substance, in which onyng He was perfect man. For Criste, havyng knitt in Him ilk man that shall be savid, is perfitt man. (2366-70)

[For in the same time that God joined himself to our body in the maiden’s womb, he took our soul, which is sensual, and in taking it, having enclosed us all in himself, he united it to our substance. In this union he was perfect man, for Christ, having joined in himself every man who will be saved, is perfect man. (292)]

After Christ redeems the soul, faith begins to come into it, proceeding from the substantial soul into the sensual: “The next good that we receive is our feith, in which our profittynge begynnyth; and it commith of the hey riches of our kinde substance into our sensual soule” (2354-55); [“The next good which we receive is our faith, in which we begin to profit; and it comes from the great riches of our natural substance into our soul, which is sensual” (291)]. She also writes that the “commandments of God” proceed from the higher to the lower soul (2358). The reader should, most likely, take this statement to

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13 Julian’s description of Christ as anomaly echoes the words in the Revelation to John, in which Christ is referred to as “the first-born from the dead” (Rev. 1.5).
mean that the redeemed soul is privy to some new kind of moral revelation. Julian
does not specifically mention the Holy Ghost, but it seems that she is describing His
activity here. Unredeemed humanity is, according to Catholic theology, capable of at
least some moral insight, but it seems that by the work of the Holy Ghost, the human soul
can come to a fuller understanding of the mind of God. And, because Christ is
humanity’s representative, His mother, Mary, is therefore also our mother: “Thus our
Lady is our Moder in whome we are all beclosid and of hir borne in Christe, for she that
is moder of our Savior, is moder of all that shall be savid in our Savior” (2371-73); [“So
our Lady is our mother, in whom we are all enclosed and born of her in Christ, for she
who is mother of our saviour is mother of all who are saved in our saviour” (292)].

The Motherhood of Jesus

The next part of the chapter is not altogether straightforward. Julian is beginning
to develop here an idea that will become a major theme in the rest of the Shewings—the
motherhood of Jesus. She claims that Jesus is our “Moder [Mother] substantial” and our
“Moder sensual”: “And ferthermore, I saw that same derworthy person is become our
Moder sensual” (2412-13); [“And furthermore I saw that the second person, who is our
Mother, substantially the same beloved person, has now become our mother sensually”
(294)]. Our substance is joined to God the Father, but Christ is “our Moder in kynde in
our substantiall makeyng, in whome we arn groundid and rotid [grounded and rooted],
and He is our Moder in mercy in our sensualite, takyng flesh” (2416-18). It is not
obvious what Julian means when she says that Christ is our Mother “in kynde in our
substantiall makeyng.” Colledge and Walsh change little in their translation: “and the
second person of the Trinity is our Mother in nature in our substantial creation” (294).
Elizabeth Spearing’s translation is somewhat different: “and the second Person of the Trinity is our mother in nature and in our essential creation” (138). Spearing’s translation causes more confusion than Colledge and Walsh’s, for although it is fairly obvious what it means when we say that Christ is “our Mother in our essential [substantial] creation,” it is not clear what it means for Him to be the soul’s mother in “nature.” Julian has already stated that it is God the Father who creates the substantial soul and joins it to Himself. In what way, then, is Christ a mother to our substantial soul? Perhaps because God is a Trinity, Christ is also mysteriously present in this creation. But it is unlikely that Julian is making such a subtle theological statement.\textsuperscript{14} Colledge and Walsh’s translation may provide a better alternative, which seems to indicate that Christ is “our Mother in nature in substantial creation” because He is mankind’s representative and the first human (since Adam’s fall) to possess a complete soul.\textsuperscript{15} Whatever interpretation we adopt (if either), there is no doubt about what Julian means when she goes on to say that Christ is “our Moder in mercy in our sensualite, takyng flesh” (2417-18); [“our Mother of mercy in taking our sensuality” (294).

**Discussion of Chapters 1 and 2**

As I have said, my analysis of Julian’s concept of the human soul pays special attention to her descriptions of the “onyng” of the divine substance and the human soul. The reader will have noticed that Julian uses the term in a few different ways. She speaks first of the human soul joining itself to God in prayer (Chs. 40-43). As I have already

\textsuperscript{14} See, however, lines 2433-35.
\textsuperscript{15} Cf. Rom. 5.14-15: “But death held sway from Adam to Moses, even over those who had not sinned as Adam did, by disobeying a direct command—and Adam foreshadows the Man who was to come. But God’s act of grace is out of all proportion to Adam’s wrongdoing. For if the wrongdoing of that one man brought death upon so many, its effect is vastly exceeded by the grace of God and the gift that came to so many by the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ.”
noted, Julian is not providing a metaphysical description of the soul here. She is simply pointing out that prayer conforms the individual’s will to the will of God.

Julian’s second description of the soul’s joining to God is metaphysical, however. Her first allusion to this joining comes in Chapter 46, when she claims that there can be no anger between God and the human soul because of the intimacy of their connection. She provides no explanation for the exact nature or method of this joining and is simply using it to advance the notion that God cannot be angry with humanity. A few chapters later (Chs. 53, 56), she then explains that the human soul was joined to God at creation and that there is “ryte nowte [absolutely nothing]” between God and the soul because God created the soul out of nothing. Julian clarifies by stating that human soul is actually joined to God the Son, Jesus Christ, who is Himself joined to God the Father (Chs. 53, 56).

The third way in which Julian discusses the soul’s joining relates to the soul’s salvation, when Christ, as humanity’s representative, joins the lower, sensual soul to the higher, substantial soul. This joining is an obvious difference between Julian and Plotinus. Plotinus, as we have seen, believes that the lower soul may be drawn up into the higher soul by the means of the virtuous life. Julian, though under the indirect influence of Plotinus through Augustine and others, is, like Augustine, a Christianized Neo-platonist, and therefore secure in the belief that this joining is achieved only through the work of Christ.

Because of her concern for theological orthodoxy, I would also argue that Julian differs from Plotinus in her understanding of the joining between the divine substance.

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16 See page 14 of this text.
and the human soul. Plotinus believes that the human soul is, as a distant emanation of
God, essentially divine. But to claim that Julian views the higher soul as the same
substance as God conflicts with the spirit of the Shewings. Julian certainly emphasizes
the intimacy and closeness between God and man, but she is doing so within a religious
tradition that is dogmatic in its assertion that God is ultimately transcendent. Julian
echoes this sentiment, for example, in Chapter 52: “otherwise is the beholdyng of God,
and otherwise is the beholdyng of man” (2132).

The religions “of civilized mankind are divided into two great groups, and two
only, according to the basic belief about God,” Edwyn Bevan writes in Symbolism and
Belief (69). Bevan makes a division between what he calls the “Hebraic” religions
(Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) and “non-Hebraic” religions (“the various forms of
Hinduism and Buddhism”) (70). On the one hand, Hebraic religions emphasize God’s
“infinite transcendence, His eternal difference from any created being” (72). On the
other hand, the non-Hebraic, monistic\(^\text{17}\) religions emphasize the essential similarity
between God and man: “there [is] one Divine Something, the same in gods and men, and
to deeper thought the differences vanish” (73). Julian belongs, obviously, to the Hebraic
tradition, although Bevan admits to some variations within the two traditions. In fact, the
Roman Catholic church has continually had to fight against trends moving in the opposite
direction:

the mystical tradition in Christendom, largely derived, as it ultimately is, from
Neo-Platonism through Augustine and the Pseudo-Dionysus, has always been
liable to incline in that [the non-Hebraic] direction, though Catholic theology had
made a dogmatic fence to save Christian mysticism from tumbling over into the
Monistic abyss, and has condemned would-be Catholic teachers who went, in its
judgment, too near the edge, such as Meister Eckhardt. (Bevan 74)

\(^{17}\) By “monistic” I believe that Bevan means something like “pantheistic.”
Meiser Eckhart was a fourteenth-century German theologian who believed that the union between God and man was “so intimate that there would be no need for kneeling and bowing, no room for a priest in between [man and God]” (Blakney xxiii). Eckhart ended up being formally charged with heresy and posthumously condemned by the Catholic church (xxiv).

The tension between personal beliefs and the dogma of the institutional church is also certainly present in Julian’s work. However, Julian makes it clear throughout her work that she is under the authority of the Church: “I was not drawn therby from any poynct of the feith that Holy Church techyth me to levyn” (33.1129-30) [“I was not drawn by it away from any article of faith which Holy Church teaches me to believe” (234)]; “God shewid ful gret plesance that He hath in al men and women that mytyly and mekely and wilfully taken the prechyng and techyng of Holy Church, for it is His Holy Church” (34.1156-58) [“God showed very great delight that he has in all men and women who accept, firmly and wisely, the preaching and teaching of Holy Church, for he is that Holy Church” (236)]; “. . . the lower dome was lern me aforn in Holy Church and therfore I myte in no way levyn the lower dome” (45.1584-85) [“And the lower judgment had previously been taught me in Holy Church, and therefore I could not in any way ignore the lower judgment” (257); “And now I yeele me to my moder Holy Church as a simple child owyth” (46.1637-38) [“And now I submit myself to my mother, Holy Church, as a simple child should” (259)].

Even if it is fairly certain that Julian is orthodox in her beliefs, there is still something of a contrast between her concept of the human soul and the traditional
Catholic concept. But what is the orthodox Christian concept of the soul and does Julian depart from it? To find out, I shall now turn to Augustine’s concept of the soul.
CHAPTER 3

The Augustinian Concept of the Human Soul

As I have noted, Julian works within the Augustinian tradition and her thought and language are an echo of Augustine’s. For example, in Chapter 55 of the *Shewings*, Julian identifies the soul as a “trinite” of mind, love, and reason, and this description is, as I have said, a repetition of Augustine’s claim in the *De Trinitate* that the human soul is a trinity of memory, intelligence, and will. No doubt, the Augustinian tradition also influences Julian’s thought in other ways. Her view of the nature of evil is one good example. Evil, as Augustine understands it, is not a thing (as his opponents, the Manichees, would have it). It is merely the privation of good: “... evil is nothing but the removal of good until finally no good remains” (*Confessions* 3.7). In the same way, when Julian considers the created universe, she sees that evil has no part in it, for “synne is no dede [sin is no deed]” (11.438-45). The whole tradition has had, in fact, an enormous influence on Julian and forms the basis for her theological and devotional ideas and language. Again, for example, the familiar Augustinian idea of the need for God in every human heart is repeated in a similar fashion throughout the *Shewings*: “we sekyn here rest in those things that is so littil, wherein is no rest, and know not our God that is al wise, al gode; for He is very rest” (5.162-164); [“here we seek rest in this thing which is so little, in which there is no rest, and we do not know our God who is almighty, all wise and all good, for he is true rest” (184)]. Or, consider what is said in Chapter 26: “our soul shal never have rest til it comith to Hym [God] knowing that He is fulhede of joy, homley

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18 adherents of Manicheism, a religion founded by Mani, who regarded himself as the Paraclete. He taught that the universe was controlled by both Good and Evil, which two forces were in permanent conflict with one another. Augustine was actually at one time a “junior member” of this sect, but he eventually left it because it failed to solve many of his intellectual difficulties (Pine-Coffin 13).
and curtesly blisful and very life” (918-20) [“our soul will never have rest till it comes 
into him, acknowledging that he is full of joy, familiar and courteous and blissful and true 
life” (223)].

Julian shows a great familiarity with the Augustinian model and yet departs from 
it in some interesting ways. Augustine’s concept of the soul is most fully set forth in 
Book 9 of the De Trinitate. Here, Augustine offers two different trinitarian models of the 
soul. His first model describes the soul as mind, love, and knowledge. As a preface to 
his description of this model, Augustine delves into the nature of love. There are three 
terms present, he says, in the act of love. The first term is the lover; the second term, the 
love; and the third term, the beloved. For example, consider a mother who loves her 
daughter. In this case, the mother is the lover, the first term. The love that the mother 
expresses for her daughter is the second term, and the daughter who is loved is the 
beloved, the third. This is a fairly simple model of the act of loving. Augustine 
complicates the matter by asking the reader to consider the mind and its love for itself, 
which he defines as “the desire to help oneself to enjoy oneself” (26). In the case where 
the mind loves itself, there are, it seems initially, three terms: the mind, the love, and the 
mind. Obviously, however, the first and third term are the same, so we are reduced to 
talking about two terms, the mind and its love for itself. And, because a mind, in order to 
qualify as a mind, must enjoy itself, these two terms are thus reduced to one. Therefore, 
the mind is love.

19 cf. Augustine in the Confessions: “you made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in 
you” (1.1).
However, if the lover is to have the ability to love the beloved, he must have knowledge of the beloved object. The mind, in order to love itself, must know itself, and because a mind must be self-aware, or knowledgeable of itself, in order to qualify as a mind, the mind must therefore be knowledge. Finally, mind is the third member of this trinity simply because there has to be a subject loving and an object being loved, and, further, a subject knowing and an object being known. According to this trinitarian model, the mind “is not a mind which has a knowledge or love of itself; it is a mind which is love and knowledge substantially and therefore naturally capable of knowing and loving itself pending the time when it will love and know everything else” (Gilson 220).

According to Augustine’s second model, the mind is a trinity of memory, intelligence, and will. For Augustine, memory simply means the mind’s knowledge of itself. Even though the mind is, as Gilson puts it, “substantially inseparable from its self-knowledge . . . our actual knowledge (cogitatio) does not always have to do with our mind, does not always, so to speak, place itself in front of itself and look at it” (221). Intelligence, the second part of this trinity, could be described as the mind’s apprehension of itself, its self-expression, or, as Augustine describes it, its word. Of course, not every mind is capable of this self-expression. It is only the mind that has a memory of itself and that is under “the influence of the eternal reasons” that can achieve this expression (Gilson 223).
The parallel here between the mind’s self-expression, or *word*,\(^{20}\) and the Trinitarian concept of Jesus as the “word,” or self-expression, of the Father, is striking. In the Holy Trinity, Jesus is the word of the Father, and the Holy Ghost is the love that caused God to beget the Word and also the love eternally shared between the Father and the Son. This love desires to express itself and then cherishes the thing that it has expressed. In the same way, the mind desires to express itself and this is intelligence, the second member of this trinity. The mind’s desire to express itself is, of course, the will, the third part of the mind’s trinity. There is a correspondence here between the first and the second trinity—mind with memory, love with will, and knowledge with intelligence. Mind is, by definition, intelligence, or the mind’s self-expression, which is the mind’s love for itself, or its will to express itself. Therefore, the mind is memory, the mind is intelligence, and the mind is will—three and one.

Julian describes the human soul as a trinity of mind, love, and reason, but her actual model of the soul differs significantly from Augustine’s. For Augustine, the soul is a trinity that seems to more closely correspond to the idea of the Holy Trinity than Julian’s. The Augustinian soul is mind, love, and knowledge and also memory, intelligence, and will, but according to Augustine, these terms are all substantially the same. With Julian, however, each member of her model of the soul is a distinct part of a whole. These parts are *not* substantially the same, and no one part can be singled out and labeled as “soul.”

\(^{20}\) cf. John 1:1: “When all things began, the Word already was. The Word dwelt with God, and what God was, the Word was. The Word, then, was with God at the beginning, and through him all things came to be; no single thing was created without him.”
Julian’s concept of the substantial soul reveals an even more dramatic difference between Augustine and herself. Augustine believes that a human is an *image* of God the Creator. The human soul may therefore reflect the Holy Trinity but it may not easily approach it. The soul can create a kind of bond between God and itself by recognizing that it is an image of its Creator (Gilson 223), but there appears to be no close metaphysical connection between the two.

Augustine shows much more care in stressing the transcendence of God. His experience of God in his *Confessions* is an excellent example:

Eternal Truth, true Love, beloved Eternity—all this, my God, you are, and it is to you that I sigh by night and day. When first I knew you, you raised me up so that I could see that there was something to be seen, but also that I was not yet able to see it. I gazed on you with eyes too weak to resist the dazzle of your splendour. Your light shone upon me in its brilliance, and I thrilled with love and dread alike. I realized that I was far away from you. It was as though I were in a land where all is different from your own and I heard your voice calling from on high saying “I am the food of full-grown men. Grow and you shall feed on me. But you shall not change me into your own substance, as you do with the food of your body. Instead you shall be changed into me.” (7.10)

Augustine’s experience is quite different from Julian’s:

And than shewith our curtes Lord Hymselfe to the soul wol merrily and with glad cher with frendful welcummyng as if He had ben in peynand and prison, sayand swetely thus: “My derlyng, I am glad that thou art comen to me; in al thi wo I have ever be with the, and now seist thou my lovyng, and we be onyd in bliss”. (40.1354-57)

[And then our courteous Lord shows himself to the soul, happily and with the gladdest countenance, welcoming it as a friend, as if it had been in pain and prison, saying: My dear darling, I am glad that you have come to me in all your woe. I have always been with you, and now you see me loving, and we are made one in bliss. (246)]

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21 This view is largely derived from the Scriptures: “Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image and likeness to rule the fish in the sea, the birds of heaven, the cattle, all wild animals on earth, and all reptiles that crawl upon the earth.’ So God created man in his own image; in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them” (Gen. 1.26-27).
The difference between the two is certainly remarkable. On the one hand, Julian stresses God’s eager condescension and His desire for intimacy with the human soul. By her account, it is very possible to draw near to God and He is even willing to draw near Himself, with a peaceful countenance and intimate words of comfort. On the other hand, Augustine emphasizes the enormous gulf between God and the soul. When the soul attempts to look upon God, it is blinded by his ineffable glory. God does very little descending; rather, it is man’s duty to ascend to God.

The transcendence of God is a constant theme in all of Augustine’s work. In *de Genesi contra Manichaeos*, for example, Augustine once again emphasizes the utter difference between the soul of man and God:

> And the very spirit of man, now erring, now knowledgeable, proclaims that it is changeable: Something one may in no way believe concerning God’s nature. For there can be no greater indication of arrogance than that the human soul should declare that it is what God is, even as it groans under the enormous weight of its sins and wretchedness. (2.11)

And again, he writes that

> we must above all avoid believing that the soul is not a natural entity created by God, but God’s very substance . . . or some particle of him, as if that nature or substance, in so far as it is God, could be changeable, as the soul is perceived to be by everybody who is aware that he has a soul. (205.19)

Obviously, Augustine makes a considerable effort to clearly distinguish the human from the divine substance.

Of course, the soul will be eventually drawn up to God after death, but as long as man is a mortal creature, he is far removed from the divine substance. There are potentially several reasons Augustine makes this distinct ontological divide between the human soul and the divine substance. One obvious reason for rejecting the theory that
the soul and God are substantially the same is that it does away with any kind of human individuality. Plotinus saw this, of course, and accepted it, but Augustine, and no orthodox Christian, I think, could very well accept the eradication of human individuality.

Augustine’s views were also probably the result of the theological conflicts of his time. That is, he was quite often forced into disputations with the Manichees and the Gnostics, who, among other things, held that “souls emanate . . . from the substance of God” (Hardon 104). Augustine could not follow this thinking, for if the human soul were the same as the divine substance, it must necessarily be the case that the soul, like the divine substance, would be undefiled and unchangeable. But, based on the Scriptures, and his own experience, Augustine could not make this claim. His scriptural support came from Saint Paul, who led him to believe that the Original Sin had created an inviolable gap between God, Adam, and all his offspring. Augustine believed that he saw the effects of the Original Sin in his own soul, and it was sin, I think, more than anything else, that led him to posit a distinct difference between God and the human soul.

In fact, it was probably the concept of sin that was the primary influence for Augustine’s model of the soul. The strong influence of sin on Augustine’s model is particularly interesting because it is also, as I shall conclude, the main influence on Julian’s model of the soul. A comparison of Augustine’s and Julian’s concept of the soul is so intriguing because Julian is undoubtedly influenced by the Augustinian tradition. We have seen the tradition’s pervasive influence on the text of the Shewings and on all of Julian’s theological thinking. And yet, when confronted with the concept of sin, Julian
makes a fairly significant departure from her Augustinian predecessors. It is her concept of the soul that is the result of this departure.
CONCLUSION

In her commentary on the *Shewings*, Denise Baker notes that Julian locates the image of God in the human will (111). In Eden, Adam possessed a godly will that had the capability to refrain from sin but lost this capability when he committed the first sin. According to Julian, the Original Sin split the will, or soul, into two parts—the substance and the sensuality. Christ, the second Adam, rejoins these two parts into one.

Julian’s identification of the godly will as the *imago dei* differs from Augustine’s concept of the *mind* as the image of God in humanity. For Augustine, the mind (i.e., the soul) must bear some resemblance to the Trinity because the mind is the image of it. Of course, he also thinks that the image of God is restored by Christ, but to his way of thinking, a complete restoration of the image is not achieved until after death. This process of restoration, or sanctification, is a long and arduous one. Few, in fact, are able to manage it. The long and difficult process of sanctification is something that Julian reacts against because it implies a severe God at a considerable distance from the human soul. As one within the Augustinian mystical tradition, Julian yearns for an immediate, even if temporary, restoration of the divine image. Or, to put the same thing another way, she wants to experience an immediate, though temporary, union (or joining) of the soul to God. But, more importantly, she wants to reconcile her idea of God with the idea she has learned from the Catholic Church. At the time, Christian theology had so emphasized the transcendence of God that many Christians were not able to see Him in any close relation to the soul.

Julian is, I think, reacting against a theological tendency that causes her to feel a definite tension between Church doctrine and her own experience of God. Knowledge of
this tension is necessary for a complete understanding of Julian’s concept of the soul
and the impulse guiding the Shewings. Her account of the soul and its association with a
maternal Christ is primarily guided by a felt need to overcome sin and achieve union with
God. The Church had stressed the justice of God but also proclaimed His mercy. Julian
wanted to know how these two things—justice and mercy—could be reconciled. How
could God judge sin and yet show mercy to sinners?

The answer comes in Julian’s concept of the soul. The sensual soul errs, and left
to itself, deserves judgment. Because of its sin, it is also far removed from God. The
substantial soul, however, wills no evil, and is therefore exempt from God’s wrath. The
human’s sensual soul, left to itself, cannot rejoin itself to the substantial soul. It is only
Christ who can achieve salvation for the human soul by joining its two parts. Justice and
mercy are merged in Christ, who, as humanity’s representative, suffered God’s justice for
Adam’s sin. Christ, as a representative of all humans, bears the punishment of all
humanity and thereby eliminates the necessity of God’s wrath and condemnation.
Having borne humanity’s punishment and risen from the dead, Christ is now able to show
mercy to the human soul. He does this by lifting the human’s lower soul up into the
higher soul, which is “knit” to God in a knot “endlessly holy.”

In the end, Julian’s concept of the human soul is so interesting and unique
because it is the result of a novel approach to sin. The natural theological tendency had
been to stress the difference and distance that sin had created between the human and
divine substance. In Julian, we see the yearning for a more proper solution to the
problem of sin. The two-tiered soul, with the substantial soul’s intimate union with the
divine substance, is Julian’s reconciliation of God’s justice and mercy.
WORKS CITED


