ABSTRACT

BISSLER, DENISE L.  Fear of Crime and Social Networks: A Study of Two Local Public Housing Complexes.  (Under the direction of William R. Smith.)

This dissertation is an exploration of fear of crime and the impact of social networks on fear among residents of two local public housing complexes. Fear of crime is operationalized as perceived risk of victimization in which interviewees assessed their likelihood of victimization. Several theories of fear will be tested including direct victimization theory, physical vulnerability theory, incivilities theory, social vulnerability theory, and a social network theory. In addition, an exploratory study of the differences among the two complexes is conducted.

The two public housing complexes studied here are similar in sociological characteristics such as demographic composition and size, but differ in management, tenure limitations, and perceptions of incivilities. Support is found for direct victimization theory and the empowerment effect of networks. No support for incivilities theory, physical vulnerability theory, or social vulnerability theory was found. Policy implications point toward increasing community cohesion.
FEAR OF CRIME AND SOCIAL NETWORKS:
A COMMUNITY STUDY OF TWO LOCAL PUBLIC HOUSING COMPLEXES

By

Denise L. Bissler

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
North Carolina State University
in partial fulfillment of the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Raleigh
2003

Approved by:

Patricia L. McCall
Rodney L. Engen
Stacy M. De Coster
William R. Smith
Chair of Advisory Committee
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Nancy and Jack, and in memory of Donald F. Bissler whose support, encouragement, and friendship have inspired my perseverance.
BIOGRAPHY

Denise L. Bissler was born in Maryland, and raised in Ohio since the age of eight. She received her Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology with a minor in Psychology from The University of Akron (Akron, OH) in 1994. In 1995, she returned to The University of Akron to pursue a Master of Arts degree in Sociology. She relocated to Raleigh, North Carolina in 1997 in order to pursue her Doctorate in Sociology at North Carolina State University. Her specialty areas are Criminology and Inequality. In May 2003, Denise received her Philosophy of Science degree and accepted a tenure track position as an Assistant Professor at Randolph Macon College in Virginia.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I extend my appreciation to the people who have shaped my growth as a scholar and provided guidance and tutelage. William R. Smith, my committee chair, has been an advocate, an instructor, and a mentor. Bill has supplied a multitude of opportunities for me to grow as a scholar and a researcher. His knowledge, fortitude, and patience guided my studies and my career. Patricia L. McCall has my utmost respect not only as a scholar, but also as a teacher and a friend. Patty has been a foundation of knowledge as well as both professional and personal advice. Her friendship and mentorship has touched my life and I am truly grateful. I also thank the other members of my committee, Rod Engen and Stacy De Coster, who extended advice that greatly improved this project.

My special regards to Celia Chun-Nui Lo who has been a great inspiration in my life and in my career. Celia has been a wonderful advisor, mentor, and friend. Celia has given unselfishly her honest feedback while always showing respect for me and keeping my best interest in mind. I aspire to be the mentor Celia has been to me by offering the unmitigated understanding, advice, and encouragement that she gave to me. Donald Tomaskovic-Devey has been a brilliant inspiration in my career at North Carolina State University. He was always willing to share his knowledge and has a unique and insightful manner of communicating that knowledge.

There are so many graduate students that have touched my life. My highest regards to Marcy Mason, Amanda Bailey, and Beth Wright whose friendship and
empathy encouraged and motivated me. My deepest gratitude is extended to Kennon Rice and Lorraine Latimore whose cleverness has been an admiration and whose humor has invoked levity when laughter was the furthest from my mind. Diane Gifford, Marion Manton, Kecia Johnson, Shannon Davis, Bill Hall, Matthew Irvin, Linda Treiber, Sheryl Skaggs, and Cheri Chambers have provided unquantifiable emotional and intellectual support over the past years. Also, I received much needed technical support and guidance from Penny Lewter, Peg Brandt, MaryLynn Applegate, and Jeannie Guthrie.

A distinctive thanks to my parents, Nancy and Jack Bissler. My parents have been my greatest advocates and a source of strength in unimaginable ways. They are truly the epitome of perfect parents. I am forever grateful to my parents for their enduring patience, understanding, support, and unconditional love. I also thank my sister, Dawnleigh Helber, and brother, Tyson Bissler whose humor and guidance kept me grounded and motivated. My life has been touched especially by Hannah, Grant, and Sarah Helber, as well as, Kayla, Brittany, and Drew Bissler whose laughter and love constantly reminded me to appreciate and enjoy the world beyond the academic realm.

Last, but certainly not least, heartfelt appreciation goes to Michael Scheff for being my editor, my soundboard, and my leading enthusiast. His altruistic advice, unqualified advocacy, and ambition have changed the way I view the world. I am truly grateful to have Michael as such an integral part of my life.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................. ix

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................... x

CHAPTER 1: Introduction ................................................1
  Statement of the Problem ................................................. 4
  Theories of Fear .......................................................... 5
    Direct Victimization ................................................... 6
    Physical Vulnerability Hypothesis ................................. 6
    Incivilities Model ..................................................... 7
    Social Vulnerability Hypothesis ..................................... 8
    Social Network Model ................................................ 8
  Summary ..................................................................10
  Overview of the Project ...............................................12
    Research Setting .......................................................12
    The Study ..............................................................13

CHAPTER II: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review ..........14
  Victimization Theories ..................................................15
    Direct Victimization Theory .........................................15
    Indirect Victimization Theory .......................................16
  Physical Vulnerability Theory .........................................16
    Gender ...................................................................17
    Age ....................................................................17
  Incivilities Theory .......................................................18
  Social Vulnerability Theory ............................................21
  Social Network Model ..................................................24
    Indirect Victimization ................................................25
    Empowerment ..........................................................25
    Social Control ..........................................................27
    Private Network Ties ..................................................29
    Parochial Network Ties ...............................................31
    Public Network Ties ...................................................31
  Contextual Effects ........................................................37
    Social Disorganization Theory .......................................37
    Incivilities .............................................................38
    Victimization ..........................................................40
    Tenure ................................................................40
## CHAPTER III: Data and Methods

- **Data Collection** .................................................. 44
- **Sample** ............................................................ 46
- **Measurement of Concepts: Dependent Variable** .................. 46
  - Perceived Risk Index ............................................ 46
- **Measurement of Concepts: Independent Variables** ............ 47
  - Direct Victimization .............................................. 47
  - Physical Vulnerability ........................................... 47
    - Age ........................................................................ 47
    - Ability to Defend Oneself ....................................... 47
  - Incivilities ............................................................... 48
    - Serious Incivilities .............................................. 48
    - Minor Incivilities ................................................ 48
  - Social Vulnerability .................................................. 48
    - Education .................................................................. 48
    - Employment ............................................................ 48
    - Tenure ....................................................................... 49
    - Dependent Children .................................................. 49
  - Social Network Ties ................................................... 49
    - Private Ties ............................................................ 49
      - Close Ties ............................................................. 49
      - Visiting Activities ............................................... 49
      - Intergenerational Closure ..................................... 50
    - Parochial Ties .......................................................... 50
      - Network Size ........................................................ 50
      - Ties in the Complex .............................................. 51
      - Ties in the Building .............................................. 51
      - Neighborhood Organizational Participation ............... 51
      - Work Organizational Participation .......................... 51
    - Public Ties .............................................................. 51
      - Quality of Policing ............................................... 51
      - Satisfaction with Management .................................. 52
  - **Statistical Procedures** ............................................. 52

## CHAPTER IV: Phase I: Tests of Theories of Fear

- **Perceived Risk of Victimization** .................................. 56
  - Equation 1: Direct Victimization Equation ....................... 57
  - Equation 2: Physical Vulnerability Equation .................... 58
  - Equation 3: Incivilities Equation .................................. 58
  - Equation 4: Social Vulnerability Equation ....................... 61
  - Equation 5: Social Network Equation ................................ 62
- **Discussion** .............................................................. 70
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Relative Deprivation Effect (Positive Effect on fear such as Hypothesized for Incivilities Variables) ........................................ 80

Figure 2. Relative Beneficial Effect (Negative Effect on fear such as Hypothesized for Networking Variables) .............................. 80

Figure 3. Matthew Effect (Positive Effect on fear such as Hypothesized for Incivilities Variables)—poor get poorer ....................... 85

Figure 4. Matthew Effect (Negative Effect on fear such as Hypothesized for Networking Variables)—rich get richer ..................... 85
## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. List of Hypotheses .................................................. 43

Table 2. Unstandardized (and Standardized) Regression Coefficients for the Perceived Risk of Victimization Equations (Interquartile Range Effects are in bold) .................................................. 59

Table 3. Five Cross-Site Interaction Model .................................. 88
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Fear of crime or victimization in one’s neighborhood is widely viewed as one of the most important aspects of community life. Where fear of crime is prevalent, community life suffers: people typically withdraw from outdoor activities, keep their children indoors, socialize less with neighbors, and are motivated to move their residence elsewhere (see Hale 1996). As people withdraw from residential community activities, there are fewer “eyes on the street” and thus even more crime is likely to occur (Jacobs 1961). This process has been described as a downward spiral in which crime and fear are linked to the declines of many inner city neighborhoods (Skogan 1990). Perhaps more than any other type of neighborhood, those with public housing have been depicted as a magnet for crime and fear of crime (Rohe and Burby 1988). The prevalence of crime and fear in such public housing complexes as Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago are almost legendary. In 1994, there were over 300 shootings reported in this complex over a four day period (Popkin et al. 1996).

Most public housing, however, does not have the extensive crime and fear of crime problems of the more notorious examples covered in the media. In fact, most are probably as safe as other types of neighborhoods with residents of similar socioeconomic background to that of public housing. For example, some evidence suggests that crime rates in most public housing complexes are similar to the rates for the rest of the city (Farley 1982). Regardless of actual crime rates, high crime stereotypes about public housing may increase levels of fear among residents. In addition, residents of public
housing are likely to be those who already feel most vulnerable to victimization. Public housing is often comprised of women, the elderly, and the poor (Rohe and Burby 1988). Thus, measures of both characteristics of communities (such as labeling a community as unsafe) and characteristics of individuals (such as race, gender, and social class) may be relevant for understanding fear of crime.

Theories of why people develop fear of crime vary from those that focus on objective aspects of fear—including the perceived risk of actual victimization—to theories that emphasize subjective aspects of fear processes, including variation in feelings of vulnerability. As an example of an objective aspect of fear, research by Smith and Tortensson (1997) in Sweden shows that one of the best determinants of fear of crime is the official assault rate in the district. As far as the subjective aspect, vulnerability is considered to be a possible explanation of fear. Vulnerability often has been operationalized with measures such as gender. The justification for such a measure is that, women compared to men, are likely to feel less able to defend themselves. Women generally fear victimization more than men, even though they are less likely than men to be victimized in a street victimization event (Hale 1996).

Researchers also suggest that many attributes of the individual and of the individual’s surrounding community may foster and/or inhibit fear of crime (Hale 1996). These include a variety of characteristics, such as individual age and ethnicity, as well as the ethnic and age composition of the community. Social class of the individual and of the community has been considered important (Hale 1996; Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Among the more prominent community factors are population turnover and the extensiveness of social ties (Bursik and Grasmick 1993).
This current project was designed as an exploratory community study of two local public housing complexes in Raleigh, NC. The project was funded by National Institute of Justice as part of the Locally Initiated Research Partnership in which research proposals were designed to create on-going partnerships between university researchers, public housing management, and residents.

Although criminologists have investigated fear of crime among residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods, public housing residents relatively have been neglected as a population of study (for exceptions see: Smith and Torstensson 1997; Rohe and Burby 1988; Normoyle and Foley 1988; Newman and Franck 1982; Feagin 1974; Merry 1981). This is unfortunate for several reasons. First, public housing residents consist of approximately 5% of the renter population (Rohe and Burby 1988). Second, public housing largely is comprised of female-headed families and minorities, who are poor and often have young children. Fear can highly restrict the behavior of this already marginalized population especially when the population is predominantly female heads of household. Research shows that it is precisely such marginalized populations who are likely to feel vulnerable to crime and to suffer the most severe consequences (Rohe and Burby 1988; Skogan and Maxfield 1981). Given the disadvantaged status of public housing residents, it is likely that the consequences of fear are grave. These residents are likely to experience high levels of isolation, avoidance of places, restriction of behavior, and restriction of time outdoors (for both parents and children). If the causes of fear in these public housing complexes can be understood better, the multitude of problems associated with fear could be addressed by focusing public policy on improving the community dimensions that most influence fear.
The present research will examine several individual characteristics of residents and how they are associated with fear of crime in two public housing contexts. The focus of the research is to identify both individual- and community-level factors that are associated with the individual’s fear of crime/victimization in public housing in two complexes in Raleigh, North Carolina. However, the study does not assess formally the importance of community attributes per se (since there are only two communities to compare), but rather assesses how individual level factors vary in their effects across the two communities. Thus, the results should be considered suggestive as to how community attributes interact with individual person characteristics.

Investigation of the differences in characteristics between these two public housing units, may provide a better understanding of why fear of crime differs across communities that ostensibly are similar in sociologically important ways (e.g., both are almost entirely African-American, poor, and have female-headed households). Differences in fear of crime between the two sites and different effects of individual level characteristics are hypothesized based on demographic and structural variability in the residential composition.

**Statement of the Problem**

Fear of crime in communities is a fairly pervasive problem. For instance, in 12 U.S. cities about 52% of residents reported feeling fearful of criminal victimization (Smith et al. 1999). Fear of crime is an important determinant of the quality of life and can lead to various detrimental consequences. It can have individual emotional effects and can decrease the quality of communal life (Hale 1996). Hale describes these emotional effects as “feelings of isolation and vulnerability” and a “significant loss in
personal well-being” (p. 81). Additionally, personal time and money that could be spent on increasing quality of life may be spent on security. Fear can increase expensive and dangerous target hardening practices such as gun ownership and alarm installation.

At the structural level, fear influences a variety of social problems that may lead to the demise of community life, including decisions to withdraw from outdoor public activities (Skogan 1984; Hale 1996), to leave a neighborhood (Taub et al. 1984), and to stop claiming the territory near one’s home as one’s own (Taylor et al. 1995). Fear can restrict behavior and cause people to avoid certain places (Hale 1996). For example, Smith et al. (1999) reported that of the 52% of residents in 12 cities who were fearful of being victimized, 48% refrained from going out by themselves, 49% did not go out at night, and 44% refrained from using certain paths or areas. More importantly, a vicious cycle may develop in which a reciprocal pattern between fear and isolation emerges (Liska and Warner 1991). For instance, isolation may lead to weak social networks, which can foster fear of crime. Fear of crime subsequently increases isolation, which perpetuates the problem. Thus, fear can restrict the behavior of individuals to the extent that community life suffers. In addition, fear can serve to increase the crime rate in a community because fear lessens the ability of the community to maintain social bonds and control crime (Hale 1996). In the following sections, I discuss the various theoretical perspectives that have lead researchers to assess the relevance of these different individual and structural factors for understanding fear of crime.

Theories of Fear of Crime

There are a variety of theories of fear of crime. The most obvious of the theories of fear posits that victimization experiences cause fear. Victimization can be either direct
(the person is the victim) or indirect (the person hears of other victims or about crime in the community). However, indirect victimization will be discussed in the social network section. Other theories include the physical vulnerability theory, incivilities model, the social vulnerability theory, and a social network model.

Direct Victimization

The hypothesis that underlies the direct victimization argument is that a person who suffers victimization directly is likely to feel more fear. However, Hale (1996) states that the relationship between fear and direct victimization remains unresolved because some researchers find evidence that fear increases with victimization experiences (Liska et al. 1988; Skogan 1987; Skogan and Maxfield 1981), while some find no relationship (Hill et al. 1985; Wanner and Caputo 1987), and others report only a weak relationship (Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Garofalo 1979; Smith and Huff 1982). Due to the contradictory findings, some researchers claim that direct victimization or personal injury experiences are not consistent predictors in the research on fear (Smith and Torstensson 1997). Nevertheless, victimization is a sign that the potential for future danger exists. In addition, fear might be increased if the person feels unable to avoid or cope with victimization.

Physical Vulnerability Hypothesis

Whereas direct victimization focuses on objective conditions, the physical vulnerability hypothesis emphasizes subjective emotional states related to objective circumstances. Physical vulnerability is a feeling that one is likely to be attacked due to some physical limitation which may be related to membership in a certain group. For instance, groups such as women and the elderly are likely to feel more vulnerable than
men or younger persons because they feel as if they lack substantial means to protect
themselves (Hale 1996). Older people may feel vulnerable due to their lessened ability to
defend themselves or to the physical reality that recovery will be long (Hale 1996). Thus,
age and gender are indicative of physical vulnerabilities in most research. Physical
vulnerability is a person attribute, but conditions in the community such as incivilities
also may increase fear.

\textit{Incivilities Model}

The proposition that perceptions of incivilities increase crime receives consistent
empirical support in the literature (Covington and Taylor 1991; Rohe and Burby 1988;
Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Lewis and Salem 1986; Taylor and Hale 1986). Incivilities
are signs of disorder and include things such as loitering teenagers, drunken adults,
vandalism, misbehaving children, graffiti, garbage, abandoned buildings, outdoor drug
sales, fights, and disturbances. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) argue that incivilities signal
to residents that there is a breakdown in norms. Thus, it is not necessarily that the
specific incivility indicates criminal activity (i.e., loitering teens could be innocently
waiting for a ride home). Rather, incivility indicates a breakdown in community
cohesion, and may be interpreted by community residents as forewarning to increased
levels of crime (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Stinchcombe et al. 1980). In other words,
incivilities provide a signal of anticipated danger (real or perceived) that may increase
fear. Additionally, fear might be increased if one is constantly exposed to threatening
conditions. That is, they experience “social vulnerability” (Rohe and Burby 1988 p.
704).
Social Vulnerability Hypothesis

People who experience social vulnerability are those who are suffering from a constant threat of victimization because of their social location (Rohe and Burby 1988). Those who are socially vulnerable include minorities, those of lower income (Rohe and Burby 1988), and those who are less educated (Covington and Taylor 1991). These groups are considered to be socially vulnerable because they lack, for instance, access to important social resources (i.e. money, knowledge, institutional access) to protect themselves from or deal with the aftermath of victimization. The social vulnerability hypothesis states that because of this social vulnerability, these groups are likely to fear crime.

Social Network Model

A final explanation for fear of crime might emphasize social networks. While the study of fear and networks together is limited, the study of these issues independently of one another certainly is not limited. A rather large literature exists on fear of crime and another extensive literature exists on social networks and social capital. However, the relationship between networks and fear of crime is less researched. On one hand, it could be hypothesized that communities rich in network ties have more cohesion and will respond to crime collectively (Bursik and Grasmick 1993), thereby reducing fear. On the other hand, it may be that communities with more networks will spread information about crime and victimization more quickly and widely, thereby increasing fear of crime. Social networks have been hypothesized to decrease fear through informal social control (Bursik and Grasmick 1993) or, conversely, to increase fear through indirect
victimization (Hale 1996). However, it could also be that networks are psychologically empowering (Hale 1996).

Having many friends or close relatives can increase feelings of being in control or empowered. Networks can provide emotional support and instrumental support for individuals which would empower them to know that they have access to emotional and financial resources to deal with adversities such as victimization. In addition, social networks may be empowering through the increased ability to informally control community residents and subsequently to control crime in the area. Indeed, the lack of networks has been hypothesized to increase crime (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Sampson and Groves 1989).

Thus, in relation to fear, people with higher levels of empowerment should have lower levels of fear. In other words, people with high self-efficacy (Bandura 1994) which is one element of empowerment might think about being victimized, but they visualize themselves handling the attack well or warding off the attack. On the contrary, some people with high self-efficacy probably do not even think about being victimized.

Although much of the network literature and the informal social control argument emphasize the benefits of social networks, such networks arguably may have some negative consequences. For instance, the may become a burden by increasing indirect victimization information, which occurs when people hear that their friends, family, neighbors, or others have been victimized. Upon hearing about the victimization of others, an individual’s general fear and perceived risk are likely to increase.

In sum, each of the theories receives some support in the current literature (see Hale 1996 for review). Both direct victimization and incivilities increase fear but to a
lesser extent than indirect victimization. The physical and social vulnerability hypotheses are supported by the fact that women, the elderly, minorities, and the poor consistently report higher levels of fear. Social network models are studied to a lesser extent. However, existing evidence suggests that networks increase control in a community (Sampson et al. 1999) but also could allow for the spread of indirect victimization (Arnold 1991; Klecha and Bishop 1978; Box et al. 1988; Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Gates and Rohe 1987).1

While each of these theories of fear has some support, none has emerged as a “universal” way of understanding fear. One explanation for this could be that the causes of fear vary by context. Thus, similar populations in different contexts may react differently to the causes of fear based on their surroundings. For example, it could be that the effect of network ties is context dependent. Social networks in one context could increase fear through indirect victimization. In another context, they may reduce fear through indirectly controlling the population. Also, networks could have a psychologically empowering effect which decreases fear. These potential contextual effects will be discussed in Phase II of the dissertation.

**Summary**

Fear of crime has been an interest to criminologists for quite some time. Fear can result in a range of psychological and emotional consequences and can influence behavior to a great degree. Indeed, research evidence suggests that fear of crime leads community residents to restrict their behavior. These real effects of fear of crime beg the question of where this fear originates and how it is perpetuated. This is the focus of my

1 Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow for an assessment of indirect victimization in the present study.
dissertation. The dissertation seeks to understand the causes of fear and how these may differ based on context. The project compares individual-level attributes that influence fear of crime across two contexts comprised of similar populations. These individual-level attributes are derived from the theories of fear of crime discussed above.

The investigation of these theories is unique in this project for two reasons. First, the sample is comprised of public housing residents. Second, the project allows a detailed comparison of individuals across two contexts. While the sample size is limited and lacks generalizability, the small number of communities allows for more detailed analysis of life in the two communities. In addition, this focus on two contexts should underscore the important dimensions that deserve further attention in fear of crime studies. Thus, this study may be suggestive of future research for projects on the interaction between individual-level and community-level factors.

The network analyses add to a relatively small literature concerning networks and fear in public housing. The network dimensions in this study are analyzed in relation to fear of crime rather than crime itself which is the more common dependent variable explored in relation to networks (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Sampson and Groves 1989). A few studies have explored the effects of social networks on fear of crime (Baba and Austin 1991; Skogan 1986; Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Taylor and Hale 1986; Tyler and Cook 1984; Riggs and Kilpatrick 1990; Gates and Rohe 1987; Lewis and Salem 1986; Covington and Taylor 1991).

Thus, this project contributes to the literature by focusing on fear (rather than crime) among a population of public housing residents and focusing explicitly on social network behavior. In addition, this smaller sample and exploratory design may produce
suggestions for future projects that can include both individual- and community-level measures.

**Overview of the Project**

This project is intended to explore individual-level differences in fear of crime across two communities. This research project is not intended to be a test of any specific theory due to the limited sample size (two public housing contexts). Rather it is intended as an exploratory initiative in which the patterns in these findings are compared to see if they are consistent with certain theories and to suggest possibilities for future research. This project was designed around the comparison of two communities that are similar in sociological characteristics such as demographic composition and size, but differ in management and tenure limitations. I provide a brief background orienting the reader to the two contexts before describing the study.

**Research Setting**

Heritage Park and Rich Park are the two public housing settings in this study. Heritage Park had a history of problems including outdoor drug sales and prostitution. Perhaps the culmination of these problems came to head when a fire erupted killing four children in one of the apartments. Around 1993, a police substation was created and surveillance cameras were installed allowing officers to monitor the entire complex and much of the surrounding neighborhood. Heritage Park is managed directly by Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and must comply with their regulations stringently in order to ensure future funding and to avoid repercussions from violations. A highly competent staff with many years of successful experience manages Heritage Park. The enforcement of rules tends to be strict and formal in comparison to Rich Park in which...
the rules are less stringent and more informally imposed. This may be due to the fact that Rich Park is privately managed by five churches. Rich Park can be more selective in admittance and has some informal networks that express displeasure with ‘undesirable’ tenants to the extent that the ‘undesirables’ move out quickly. In addition to management, the two contexts differ in that Rich Park does not have a police substation like Heritage Park.

The study

This study was designed specifically to elicit information about social networks and the impact of networks on fear of crime among residents. Regardless of their many similarities, it is hypothesized that the complexes will differ in several ways due to the housing history and variant management policies. For instance, Heritage Park is a more disorganized environment than is Rich Park due to the higher levels of incivilities, crime, unemployment, shorter tenure, and less networking.

The analysis is conducted in two phases. In Phase I, measures of the theories of fear are tested. In Phase II, similar models are tested to assess contextual differences between the two sites. In Chapter II, the theories of crime are presented with a literature review discussing the existing research on causes of fear of crime and, specifically, social networks. In Chapter III, the data and methods are presented. In Chapter IV, the results of the Phase I analyses are presented and the Phase II results are presented in Chapter V. The last chapter provides a conclusion and directions for future research.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Fear of crime has been an increasing area of interest among researchers since 1960. Hale (1996) argued that this increasing interest is due, in part, to the recognition that fear has many ramifications beyond “personal anxiety” (p. 79). Communal life can be damaged by high levels of fear because people in the community are afraid of certain areas and people (Box et al. 1988; Hale 1996; Warr 1985; Skogan 1986). Community life can also suffer if fear causes isolation among community residents or causes them to stay indoors (Tigges et al. 1998; Wilson 1987). Schmitz (1992) discussed fear of crime as leading to the “stockade mentality” (p.42) in which families, especially women (Keane 1998) and the elderly, become so fearful of their own neighborhood that they seclude themselves (see also Belle 1982). In addition, fear has been found to decrease life satisfaction by decreasing empowerment or feelings of being in control (Adams and Serpe 2000) and to increasing psychological stress (Rohe and Burby 1988). Some are so afraid that rather than isolate themselves, they chose to leave the area (Taub et al. 1984). Lastly, fear can cause debilitating psychological effects such as, alienation (Gomme 1986), lack of self-efficacy (Normoyle and Lavrakas 1984), and dissatisfaction with community life (see Hale 1996 for review of consequences; see also Hartnagel 1979; Hindelang et al. 1978).

---

2 Researchers have delineated separate dimensions of fear and separate models of fear (Rohe and Burby 1998). For instance, fear of crime is differentiated from perceived personal risk of attack. Fear is an affective measure (Fattah and Sacco 1989) including a more general sense of safety or worry in the environment in which one lives. In other words, it may include the perception of how safe one’s immediate and surrounding neighborhoods are regardless of the potential for personal victimization (Hale 1996). Personal risk is a more cognitive measure (Fattah and Sacco 1989) that includes the perception of likelihood of being a victim and the potential consequences of victimization for the individual (Hale 1996).
Thus, the consequences of fear of crime are serious and well-documented. However, the causes of fear are more elusive and paradoxical. Research on the causes of fear has produced inconsistent results. Explanations of fear of crime and these paradoxes of fear have centered on victimization (Skogan 1987), physical vulnerability (Rohe and Burby 1988), incivilities (Skogan and Maxfield 1981), social vulnerability (Rohe and Burby 1988), and more recently social networking (Rohe and Burby 1988; Bursik and Grasmick 1993).

**Victimization Theories**

*Direct Victimization*

The effects of victimization are hypothesized to be either direct or indirect. Direct victimization theory proposes that fear is increased after being a victim of crime. This leads to the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** Recent victimization will increase fear, net of other effects.

One of the paradoxes in the explanations of fear is that direct victimization does not always increase fear. Some research shows that victims of crime have higher levels of fear (Lavrakas and Lewis 1980; Skogan 1987; Liska et al. 1988). Other studies report weak effects of direct victimization (Arnold 1991; Braungart et al. 1980; Smith and Huff 1982) or no effect at all (Newman and Franck 1982; Hill et al. 1985; Wanner and Caputo 1981; Box et al. 1988). The type of victimization may be an important consideration (see Hale 1996 for brief review). Some studies report that fear is related to violent victimization but not to property victimization (Miethe and Lee 1984). However, Smith and Hill (1991) report that property victimization is related to fear, but personal
victimization is not. While the evidence of direct victimization is mixed, the evidence of indirect victimization is more consistent.

*Indirect Victimization*

Indirect victimization is the idea that hearing of the victimization of others will increase fear (Lavrakas and Lewis 1980; Arnold 1991; Klecha and Bishop 1978; Box et al. 1988; Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Gates and Rohe 1987). Thus, knowing more people or having larger networks could increase fear. Since the mechanism of spreading information operates through network ties, the indirect victimization hypothesis will be discussed further in the social network section. Victimization probably increases one’s feeling vulnerable to future victimization. Feelings of vulnerability also might be increased by demographic characteristics.

*Physical Vulnerability Theory*

Vulnerability is a feeling of being particularly susceptible to attack or that the repercussions of attack will be relatively severe. Vulnerability may be either physical or social.

Research on physical vulnerability focuses primarily on gender and age because these characteristics are related on average to the ability of individuals to fend off offenders and/or to deal with the physical aftermath of victimization. For example, Hale (1996) states:

At a common sense level people who feel unable to protect themselves, either because they cannot run fast, or lack the physical prowess to ward off attackers, or because they cannot afford to protect their homes, or because it would take them longer than average to recover from material or physical injuries might be expected to ‘fear’ crime more than others. Three broad groups have been identified as falling into this category: women, the elderly, and the poor (p. 95).
This hypothesis helps clarify why it is that women and the elderly are more prone than men and the young to fear crime even though they are less likely to be victims. I discuss this below.

**Gender**

Women are assumed to feel vulnerable because they may sense they cannot adequately protect themselves or because the consequences of victimization may be greater compared to men (Hale 1996). Historically, women have higher levels of fear compared to men despite their lower levels of victimization (Hale 1996). Hale (1996) describes two explanations for this paradox. First, measures of crime do not accurately describe the true victimization rates of women and once these are taken into account women’s fear is more logical. Second, women have more fear due to the fact that they are more vulnerable either because they lack resources to protect themselves or because victimization includes the threat of sexual assault (see also Pain 1995). In addition, women are likely to generalize experiences of sexual harassment and past victimization as cues to their current vulnerability (Smith and Torstensson 1997). If the hidden victimization of women were taken into account, their higher levels of fear might be warranted (Sacco 1990). There is not enough variation in the present sample to test gender differences. However, it should be kept in mind that this sample is almost entirely female and levels of fear might be reflective of this fact.

**Age**

Similar to women, the elderly have fear levels that are high in proportion to their actual victimization rates (see Hale 1996 for a review of age and fear). Feelings of vulnerability and fear also increase with age. The elderly are likely to feel more
vulnerable than their younger counterparts. However, the results of the studies on fear and age produce contradictory findings (Hale 1996). In part, these contradictory findings may be due to the fact that many researchers have not controlled for the limited exposure of the elderly to crime (Fattah and Sacco 1989; Stafford and Gale 1984). In other words, when controlling for the decreased exposure to victimization of the elderly due to lifestyle routines, fear among the elderly might seem more proportionate to their actual rate of victimization. Still overall, the consensus is that the elderly have high levels of fear because of the physical vulnerability associated with age (Hale 1996; Garofalo 1982; Braungart et al. 1980). This age effect is assessed in this sample and can be formalized as follows:

Hypothesis 2: As age increases, fear will increase, net of other effects.

A more general hypothesis from the discussion of physical vulnerability that will be assessed in this study is the following:

Hypothesis 3: As the ability to defend oneself increases, fear will decrease, net of other effects.

Feeling of vulnerability also might stem from the perception of incivilities in the community.

**Incivilities Theory**

The perceived level of incivility in a community has been found to be a strong factor in predicting fear (Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Lewis and Maxfield 1980). Where the physical environment is perceived as threatening, fear levels are likely to be higher (Hale 1996).

Thus, noisy neighbours and loud parties, graffiti, teenagers loitering on street corners, drunks, tramps and beggars on the street, rubbish and litter strewn around, boarded up abandoned houses and buildings with broken windows may
all signify to some individuals that the neighbourhood is declining, disorderly, unpredictable and menacing (Hale 1996 p.115).

Fear of crime is likely to be increased where people experience symbolic cues to the threat of victimization (Hale 1996). Bursik and Grasmick (1993) state what it is about incivilities that increase fear:

The disorder model argues that fear is a response to the perception of residents that the area is becoming characterized by a growing number of signs of disorder and incivility (such as loitering groups of unsupervised teenagers, vandalism, graffiti, abandoned buildings, and public drug and alcohol use) that indicate that the social order of the neighborhood is eroding (p. 101).

The underlying theme is that incivilities signal to community residents that there is not a shared value system in existence which then, lessens the ability to informally control the behavior of youths and strangers. These signals are taken as cues to potential victimization.

These incivilities signal to community residents that the neighborhood is in decline, cohesion is eroding, and crime is a real threat (Hale 1996; Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Importantly, it is the perception of the presence of incivilities more so than the actual occurrence of incivilities that is related to fear (Hale 1996). Generally, it is assumed that incivilities signal to residents that the community has lost social control, thus they perceive victimization to be more likely (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Overall, there is some support that higher levels of incivilities are related to higher levels of fear (Lewis and Salem 1986; Covington and Taylor 1991; Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Rohe and Burby 1988). However, there may be a high correlation between the crime rate and incivilities so the relationship is confounded (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Higher perceived disorder by residents in a community may increase fear or perceived risk
(Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Scott 1999). Scott (1999) found that disorder was the main factor leading to increased fear and risk perceptions. From this discussion, I propose:

**Hypothesis 4:** As incivilities increase, fear will increase, net of other effects.

Incivilities or signs of disorder often are characterized as either physical or social incivilities. Physical incivilities can include those dealing with property such as abandoned buildings, broken windows, trash, and graffiti. Social incivilities involve a more human presence such as drunks, loitering teens, misbehaving children, and prostitutes.

Although the above stated hypothesis proposes that both social and physical incivilities lead to fear crime, some scholars propose that social and physical incivilities have different effects on fear, arguing that social incivilities have a greater influence on fear (Rohe and Burby 1988; Wilson and Kelling 1982).

The notion of social incivilities may be tied to the level of networking in a neighborhood and the ability to socially regulate residents. For instance, the notion of loitering teens has been related to the cohesion of residents. Hale (1996) states:

…the ability of a community to supervise and control teenage peer groups, is clearly connected to groups of teenagers hanging around the neighbourhood which form part of individual level perception of incivilities in the area. (p. 117).

Following this logic, it is possible that some social incivilities are more threatening than others. For instance, it stands to reason that fights and outdoor drug sales are more threatening than misbehaving children. Thus, it is hypothesized that serious incivilities will be more influential than minor incivilities.

**Hypothesis 5:** Net of other effects, serious incivilities will have a stronger effect than minor incivilities on fear of crime.
Incivilities are cues to danger or threat and often are more common in disadvantaged neighborhoods causing residents to feel socially vulnerable (Rohe and Burby 1988).

**Social Vulnerability Theory**

Earlier hypotheses 2 and 3 were discussed in which the emphasis is on vulnerability pertaining to the ability to physically avoid and/or recover from victimization. In contrast, the social vulnerability hypothesis emphasizes the ability to conjure up social resources to avoid and/or recover from victimization. Tests of these hypotheses typically focus on social location. Rohe and Burby (1988) write: “social vulnerability … arises from being frequently exposed to the threat of victimization and suffering severe social and economic consequences from victimization” (p.704). Those who are of lower social class, lack education, or are of minority status are more likely to experience feelings of social vulnerability (Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Lavrakas and Lewis 1980; Rohe and Burby 1988).

The explanation of social vulnerability takes into account the levels of risk and lack of resources to cope with victimization. Hale (1996) notes:

People in lower socio-economic groups are less able to protect themselves or their property or to avoid situations which might produce anxiety. In addition the lack of material and social resources may mean that they are less able to cope with victimisation at an individual level, and at a community level lack the contacts, organisational ability and political networks available to higher status neighbourhoods. All this will increase the sense of lack of control and, potentially, fear of crime (p.103).

Social vulnerability or ineffective coping has been shown to be related to education and employment. The social vulnerability hypothesis has empirical support in the literature with those who feel most vulnerable experiencing higher fear levels (Warr 1984; Rohe and Burby 1988). Lower socioeconomic status people have higher fear levels (Skogan
and Maxfield 1981; Baumer 1985), as do minorities (Hale 1996; Rohe and Burby 1988), and the less educated (Braungart et al. 1980; Skogan and Maxfield 1981). Based on the social vulnerability arguments discussed here, I propose to test the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 6:** Fear will decrease as employment levels increase, net of other effects.

**Hypothesis 7:** Net of other effects, fear will decrease as education increases.

In addition, I propose that shorter tenure and having dependent children also may increase social vulnerability. Tenure, in part, creates feelings of familiarity with your living environment. While tenure is not necessarily part of one’s social location, it is likely to be related to wealth and poverty. In public housing especially, tenure is likely to be short due to such policies as ‘welfare to work’. If a person stays in one place long enough, he or she will eventually become familiar with which places and people to avoid and on whom to rely for support. Conversely, lack of tenure on the individual level and at the community level (population turnover) can limit feelings of familiarity and social cohesion.

Researchers have focused on social ties among residents and the ability to provide informal social control, which may be impeded by turnover (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Crutchfield et al. 1982). Turnover may lessen the likelihood of establishing strong network bonds due to the temporary nature of the relationships and the anonymity of the residents. Conversely, longer tenure encourages network bonds and familiarity with the environment.

Where bonds are weakened the ability of the community to self-regulate is lessened; thus, high levels of population turnover decrease the ability for social control (Crutchfield et al. 1982). Communication is impeded in areas with a constant influx of
new residents mixing with longer-term residents who cannot afford to move out of deteriorating areas (Skogan 1990). Length of residence positively affects one’s social ties and identification with and attachment to the community (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974). Comparably, Crutchfield et al. (1982) report that mobility acted not only to increase temporary placement and decrease stability of the neighborhood, but also to increase the anonymous nature of the community which weakens social control. Thus, mobility increases crime through impeding the formation of social ties and weakening social control.

Shorter length of residence also is likely to increase fear indirectly, through social networks or lack thereof (Hale 1996). In other words, as stated above, turnover decreases the ability to establish bonds and attachment in the community. Thus, cohesion is minimal. Individuals may feel like they cannot recognize strangers or, cannot distinguish who belongs in the community and who does not (lack of familiarity at the individual level). Hale (1996) writes, “encounters in urban settings are encounters with strangers, in both a cultural and a personal sense” (p. 113). Some may even fear their own neighbors especially if they are living in disadvantaged areas. On the one hand, those long-term residents who are often the most disadvantaged may feel particularly suspicious of newcomers. On the other hand, the newcomers might feel more apprehensive due to unfamiliarity with their surroundings. These new residents might not know which dangerous areas to avoid (Riger and Gordon 1981). Thus, it is hypothesized that longer tenure will decrease fear. This is formalized as follows:

**Hypothesis 8:** Controlling for other effects, as tenure increases, fear will decrease.
Having dependent children is not in the literature as a characteristic of one’s social location. However, I argue here that having more dependent children at home will increase one’s feelings of social vulnerability and increase fear. Having dependent children may create altruistic fear (Warr and Ellison 2000). Altruistic fear is the notion that some mothers worry more about their children’s safety than about their own safety. These women not only worry that their children might be victimized, but also, they worry about their children becoming involved in crime. This may be especially salient for women in disadvantaged neighborhoods where crime is likely to be more common and more visible. Women might be afraid that their children will be lured into the glamour of criminal activity by the older youth in the community (Belle 1982). In other words, having dependent children in the household could increase a woman’s fear through altruistic worry. Either the mother may worry about her kids being victimized, becoming involved in crime, or having to survive on their own is she were injured by victimization. This altruistic fear is affected by social location because women in disadvantaged neighborhoods are more likely to have their children exposed to crime and victimization.

**Hypothesis 9:** As the amount of young children in the household increases, fear will increase, controlling for other effects.

**Social Network Model**

The final model of fear of crime is the social network model. Networks have been hypothesized to affect fear of crime in several ways in the literature. First, networks may increase crime through indirect victimization in which people share information about others’ victimization. Second, networks could decrease fear through an empowerment effect in which self-efficacy is increased through having many friends.
Third, much of the literature focuses on networks as increasing informal social control in communities, thereby reducing crime and fear of crime\(^3\).

**Indirect Victimization**

Indirect victimization can affect fear levels through hearing of others experiences with criminal victimization. Information spreads through networks which make victimization seem more likely because it happened to someone else in the network. Thus, hearing that a friend was victimized is taken as a cue to potential danger. Alternatively, networks may decrease fear through fostering feelings of empowerment.

**Empowerment**

The vulnerability hypothesis proposes that people who are socially or physically vulnerable tend to have more fear of victimization. On the contrary, people who are empowered are the opposite of those who feel vulnerable and rarely consider the risk of victimization. The empowerment hypothesis posits that some people have a psychological identity in which victimization is not a concern. Empowerment is a psychological construct; therefore, it is not necessarily based in physical power. Feelings of empowerment might stem from salient identity issues such as self-esteem or self-efficacy. Bandura (1994) defines self-efficacy:

> Perceived self-efficacy is defined as people’s beliefs about their capabilities to produce designated levels of performance that exercise influence over events that affect their lives. Self-efficacy beliefs determine how people feel, think motivate themselves and behave (Bandura 1994 p. 71).

People with high levels of self-efficacy then, feel as if they have control over what happens to them and act in accordance with those feelings of control. They feel a strong sense of being able to master challenges (Bandura 1994). “They approach

\(^3\) These theories are not tested directly in this study, but are used as an interpretation tool.
threatening situations with assurance that they can exercise control over them” (Bandura 1994 p. 71). Alternatively, people who have low levels of self-efficacy tend to avoid threatening tasks or situations because they do not feel capable of handling them (Bandura 1994). In addition, “they are slower to recover their sense of efficacy following failure or setbacks” (Bandura 1994 p. 71).

When people lack self-efficacy, their state of mind affects the way they judge their own abilities. “They interpret stress reactions and tension as signs of vulnerability to poor performance” (Bandura 1994 p. 72). On the other hand, those with high self-efficacy believe they are empowered to handle situations. Bandura (1994) stated:

People’s beliefs in their efficacy shape the types of anticipatory scenarios they construct and rehearse. Those who have a high sense of efficacy, visualize success scenarios that provide positive guides and supports for performance. Those who doubt their efficacy, visualize failure scenarios and dwell on the many things that can go wrong. It is difficult to achieve much while fighting self-doubt. A major function of thought is to enable people to predict events and to develop ways to control those that affect their lives (p. 72).

In relation to fear, people with higher levels of self-efficacy should have lower levels of fear. In other words, people who feel efficacious might think about being victimized, but they visualize themselves handling the attack well or warding off the attack. Conversely, these people might not even think about being victimized. Thus, people with high self-efficacy may not dwell on dangerous situations compared to those with low self-efficacy. Bandura (1994) wrote:

People who believe they can exercise control over threats do not conjure up disturbing thought patterns. But those who believe they cannot manage threats experience high anxiety arousal. They dwell on their coping deficiencies. They view many aspects of their environment as fraught with danger. They magnify the severity of possible threats and worry about things that rarely happen. Through such inefficacious thinking they distress themselves and impair their level of functioning (p. 74).
Those that lack empowerment are likely to have more anxiety concerning victimization and crime. Note that networks may be a source of empowerment on a psychological level. Those with more friends might have more self-efficacy. Thus, a competing hypothesis to the indirect victimization hypothesis is that networks decrease fear through empowerment. In addition, networks might be empowering because they can increase the ability to establish informal social control in the community.

**Social Control**

Networks also may decrease fear through establishing informal controls that reduce crime in a community. Social control may stem, in part, from the notion that network ties provide support. “Informal social control refers to the development, observance, and enforcement of norms for appropriate public behavior” (Rohe and Burby 1988 p. 705). The control model posits that social cohesion decreases fear through the ability to regulate community residents (Rohe and Burby 1988). Thus, social cohesion in a community limits fear because other residents can be relied upon for help. Cohesive neighborhoods are expected to have fewer problems in general because residents are better able to informally control the context (Rohe and Burby 1988). Some research has shown lower levels of fear with more social cohesion (Taylor et al. 1981; Baumer and Hunter 1979; Hale et al. 1994). Rohe and Burby (1988) report that the social control measures have the most predictive power in explaining fear among public housing units compared to measures of victimization and vulnerability.

Networks may be beneficial if people know and trust the people around them (familiarity), if simply having networks increases feelings of self-efficacy (empowerment), or if networks can be used as a source of support (social control). For
example, Covington and Taylor (1991) report lower levels of fear in neighborhoods where residents felt that others would beckon help if the person was in trouble. Thus, in communities where people can rely on others for help, the residents report less fear of crime. Again, this is similar to the idea that networks provide informal social control (see also Rohe and Burby 1988; Greenberg et al. 1982). Another resource for social control among networks is intergenerational closure.

Intergenerational closure is the idea that parents interact with the parents of their children’s friends (Coleman 1988). It is a measure of cohesion and control. Intergenerational closure is thought to increase supervision and safety. Intergenerational closure has not been studied explicitly in relation to fear, but there is some support for the notion that supervision of children is beneficial. For example, Weidemann et al. (1982) collected data from a 217-unit public housing development in Illinois to assess residents’ perceptions of satisfaction and safety in their housing community. The most important factor in predicting perception of safety was the concern for children playing nearby and suspicion of strangers. Other important factors included friendship ties, neighborhood networks, and surveillance or informal social control through supervision of property and noticing strangers’ behavior.

Spanier and Fishel (1973) also discuss the lack of supervisory control among community networks. Their contention is that high-rise public housing buildings make it nearly impossible for adults to supervise children closely. Because an adult may be on the 10th floor of a building while children are playing on the ground level outside, fast effective control is not possible. Thus, the lack of intergenerational closure may increase fear by limiting informal social control of children.
In much of the network literature, networks have been studied by organizing the type of social tie into three different categories. According to Hunter (1985) social networks exist at three levels: the private, the parochial, and the public. Much of the research on network ties as a control mechanism focuses on crime outcomes versus fear outcomes. However, this literature is reviewed here to illustrate the research on networks as a source of control.

*Private Network Ties*

The private level consists of primary networks or intimate friendships. The mechanism is the threat of losing support and respect from these network ties. In order to avoid sanctions, people who have established private networks will avoid criminal behavior. The literature on private ties seemingly centers on the study of poverty as limiting ties. Crime rather than fear is usually the outcome (one notable exception is Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Several researchers focus on private network ties as a means of social control because they have been shown to be the most important (Sampson and Groves 1989; Kapsis 1978; Anderson 1990). For example, Sampson and Groves (1989) used the British Crime Survey in 1982 to analyze the effects of social disorganization variables and the network approach. They found that private networks are more important than parochial networks in controlling behavior of youths and they contend that the single most productive means of social control is supervision of youngsters. Similarly, Kapsis (1978) studied three neighborhoods in Oakland, California and finds that neighborhoods that have robust networks, including associational (informal friendship) and organizational (institutional) ties, have lower rates of delinquency despite the racial and financial status of the neighborhood. Kapsis discovered that in
neighborhoods where citizen patrols were formed, the crime rate declined. Conversely, neighborhoods with shallow and temporary network ties have higher crime rates.

Anderson (1990) studied the notion of private ties as affecting the structure of gang relationships. He conducted ethnographic research in a white middle-class and a black lower-class Philadelphia neighborhood and reports that increased poverty is detrimental to the formation of familial and community networks, socialization, and control effectiveness. He demonstrated that as intergenerational networks diminish, disorganization increases and gang relationships thrive.

Similarly, Spanier and Fishel (1973) conducted participant-observation of public housing projects in Chicago over a three-year period. The private level of network control discovered in this study was the operation of the family as a protective unit. Due to the dangers of living in public housing, mothers often walked their children to school in order to protect them from robberies, shootings, and drug sales. One reason this was necessary was because the public resources were not available. For example, police could not be relied on to protect the residents of the neighborhood. Thus, institutional resources play a role in community quality of life. Whereas, private ties are the deepest, parochial ties, which are more shallow and somewhat institutional are also important. Before advancing to a discussion of parochial ties, hypotheses concerning fear and private ties are listed below:

**Hypothesis 10:** As the number of close ties increases, fear will decrease, net of other effects.

**Hypothesis 11:** As the amount of activity increases, fear will decrease, net of other effects.

**Hypothesis 12:** If intergenerational closure is present, fear will decrease, net of other effects.
Parochial Network Ties

Parochial networks consist of the larger networks of neighbors who have less attachment than that of friends, and also some local institutions (Hunter 1985). Larger networks including some institutional ties such as church, may affect quality of life and levels of fear. Neighbors can establish networks that serve as social control or networks through which they gain resources but maintain little contact. Neighbors can watch children and report suspicious behavior of residents and strangers. Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz (1986) found that participation in local organizations had an indirect effect on delinquency through attachment to schooling. Participation in organizations also had a very weak direct effect on the delinquent behavior of youths. Several measures of parochial ties are hypothesized to decrease fear through empowerment.

**Hypothesis 13:** As network size increases, fear will decrease, net of other effects.

**Hypothesis 14:** As the number of ties in the housing complex increases, fear will decrease, net of other effects.

**Hypothesis 15:** As the amount of ties in the building increases, fear will decrease, net of other effects.

**Hypothesis 16:** As the amount of neighborhood organizational participation increases, fear will decrease, net of other effects.

**Hypothesis 17:** As the amount of work organizational participation increases, fear will decrease, net of other effects.

Public Network Ties

The public level of networking is the neighborhood access to external public resources (Hunter 1985). Two possible resources are the availability of funds for crime control and the community's relationships with local law enforcement agencies (Lewis and Salem 1986). A neighborhood that has more access to funds or other resources for formal control will be in a better position to reduce crime and fear of crime.
Research on public ties has focused on access to public resources as affecting the ability of a neighborhood to adequately control behavior (Kapsis 1978). Peterson et al. (1997) studied the impact of various types of local institutions in disadvantaged areas. Most of the literature has viewed the lack of such institutions as detrimental to these neighborhoods because of the negative impact on informal and formal social control, the lack of job opportunities, and the lack of activities available. On the one hand, local institutions may serve to provide organized endeavors, role models, and also direct social control through establishing links between neighbors who can watch out for each other and oversee youth. According to Peterson et al. (1997) these institutions may include “churches, recreation centers, and libraries” (p.4). On the other hand, some institutions, such as bars, may be favorable to criminal activity because of intoxication and “defensive posturing” (Peterson et al. 1997 p.5). In their study, before controlling for the effects of local institutions, Peterson et al. (1997) found that property crime was higher in neighborhoods that included public housing dwellings; however, these effects were eliminated when the economic deprivation and instability variables were controlled. When the authors added the measure of local institutions, the effect of deprivation decreased. Thus, the authors concluded that ties to local institutions did intervene, at least partially, between disadvantage and crime.

Both Whyte (1981) and Suttles (1968) contend that problems in the neighborhood are the result of weak ties between larger societal institutions and the local community. Similarly, Dawley (1992) described the importance of maintaining ties to public resources. Dawley showed that when neighborhood programs were funded in a gang-ridden Chicago community, gang behavior diminished and fear of crime decreased.
Similarly, Sullivan’s (1989) ethnographic study of three Brooklyn-area neighborhoods supported the importance of public networks for the young males in these contexts. Of the three neighborhoods, Hamilton Park was the least disadvantaged and was comprised of mostly Caucasian residents. Hamilton Park’s residents had more accessible resources including jobs at the public level compared to the other two contexts. Sullivan linked this economic advantage in Hamilton Park to the ability to maintain ties to formal institutions that affect social control in a neighborhood. In contrast, the Projectville youths experienced relative anonymity from public institutions that allowed them to victimize their own residents more than in the other neighborhoods which probably also increased fear among those residents. La Barriada, the poorest neighborhood, lacked public resources and relied on a violent gang to provide resources. The degree the gang was linked to the community depended on the benefit the community reaped. In other words, the community benefited from the illegal resources the gangs distributed, but paid in terms of fear of violence perpetrated by the gang.

Mostly, the literature has shown positive effects of parochial and public ties. However, public and parochial networks have been found to be weak in public housing developments. Huth (1981) found that connections with police and other agencies were weak in these neighborhoods. These areas had high crime rates and relations with police received a rating of poor or fair. Other public resource networks were also limited in these public housing units. Service workers such as health care nurses and caseworkers refused to enter the housing units at night (if at all) even if a woman was in labor. Retail and grocery stores were lacking in the public housing areas. Similarly, Spanier and Fishel (1973) reported that many residents’ related stories of unanswered calls for help to
Police thought of Chicago’s public housing units as dangerous situations and balked at answering a call if it entailed entering a building. Thus, it is likely that ties to parochial and public resources are rather limited in the two contexts being studied here. Thus, when these ties to institutions and organizations do exist, they should be helpful in reducing fear. It is hypothesized that ties to public resources should reduce fear.

**Hypothesis 18:** As the quality of policing increases, fear will decrease, net of other effects.

**Hypothesis 19:** As satisfaction with management increases, fear will decrease, net of other effects.

In contrast to the literature discussed thus far which highlights the beneficial effects of networks, some researchers argue that networks can have adverse effects. This research is briefly summarized in the following section.

Social network ties do not always operate to increase social control capabilities. Sanchez-Jankowski (1991) discuss how community ties might serve to foster crime if the networks are supportive of criminal activity (see also McCarthy and Hagan 1995; Belle 1982; Stack 1974). Consistent with this, differential association studies link delinquent networks (i.e., delinquent peers who may transmit delinquent values), to crime including theft (Sutherland 1937; Letkemann 1973), juvenile delinquency (Giordano 1978; Matsueda and Heimer 1987), and sexual aggression (Adler 1985). Delinquent behavior has been predicted by association with delinquents (see also Agnew 1991; Thornberry et al. 1994). Youths that associated with serious delinquents are more likely to be delinquent depending on time spent with these ties and reported attachment to them (Elliott et al. 1985; see also Heimer and DeCoster 1999).

---

4 For a more extensive discussion of negative network effects, see Portes (1998).
Thus, unruly youth networks in an area may increase apprehension and fear among residents. As discussed earlier, this may be more of an “altruistic fear” (Warr and Ellison 2000) in that women in public housing may fear for their children’s safety or fear that their children will become involved in criminal activity more than fear for their own safety.

Networks can also serve as a mechanism to keep outsiders out (Portes 1998) which may limit ties to external resources. This social closure function of networks breeds mistrust of outsiders, thus limiting access to public resources because residents rely more on each other. For instance, mistrust of police may be common among residents in disorganized areas especially if policing leads to incarceration (Rose and Clear 1998; Skogan 1989; Marx and Archer 1971). If mistrust of police or other institutions is common, fear is likely to be higher. In addition, due to the lack of networks on which to rely, disorganized areas are more likely to reach a threshold in which the ability to self-regulate is lessened by the removal of an undetermined amount of individuals (Rose and Clear 1998). Rose and Clear (1998) discussed the negative effects of the removal of network ties through incarceration of males who provide resources. The incarceration of certain deviant individuals may have some positive effects for the community; but if neighborhood residents are relying on these deviant individuals for resources, then disruption in networks causes more disorder and more mistrust of police.

Overall, private, parochial, and public network ties are a means of socially controlling crime. Formal control may be lessened by the lack of organizational and institutional involvement of both children and parents (Bloom 1966; Kellem et al. 1982).
Informal control operates through the supervision of children by other parents in the neighborhood and the intervention (calling for help) in criminal activity (Crutchfield et al. 1982). It has been illustrated that social networks operate to socially control crime; however, those in disadvantaged neighborhoods may have difficulty establishing networks rich in conventional resources.

Most of the literature reviewed in this section suggests that the formation of networks is hindered by structural conditions in low-income communities and public housing. The lack of social networks decreases the informal and formal control mechanisms available to residents which likely increases fear. Complexes with more interactions between neighbors and institutional resources should contain less fearful residents. However, networks can deplete resources, increase criminal opportunities, or increase information about others’ victimization. Thus, in some contexts, social networks can increase fear. It could be hypothesized that networks lead to more fear either due to indirect victimization or exposure to criminal activity.

To summarize, the discussion above reviews some of the literature in the areas of fear of crime and social networks in disadvantaged neighborhoods, specifically public housing. The basic contention is that social networks differ in degree and in their effects and thus affect fear of crime differentially.

The lack of research concerning social networks and fear of crime in public housing is evident. While researchers have made a clear connection between the need to understand the mechanisms through which networks operate, this type of research is relatively deficient in comparing public housing communities. This dissertation adds to the research through comparing the structure of networks in two Raleigh area public
housing units that differ in their respective crime rates allowing for a contextual study that emphasizes women, many of whom are single mothers and in charge of the supervision of children. The contextual differences analyzed in the dissertation are of an exploratory nature. Thus, formal hypotheses are not presented. That is, while differences are expected between the two contexts, hypotheses about differences between the complexes (i.e., which slopes might be steeper or flatter) are not directly stated. However, contextual differences are expected based on several factors.

**Contextual Effects**

I hypothesize that contextual differences exist due to the specific environments in which the residents in public housing reside. Context has been found to be an influential factor related to fear. Women, who comprise the majority of public housing residents, are especially affected by their environment compared to men (Smith et al. 2001; Sparks 1982). For instance, women’s fear has been found to be influenced more so than men’s fear by ecological surroundings, and women have been reported to feel less safe than men in urban areas and public housing (Smith and Torstensson 1997).

In this dissertation, contextual effects are expected even though the complexes are similar in size as well as racial, gender, and economic composition. The differences are expected based on social disorganization factors (incivilities and turnover increases fear), relative deprivation, and familiarity effects (knowing people and places to avoid decreases fear).

**Social Disorganization Theory**

Social disorganization theory provides insight into neighborhood characteristics and crime related phenomena. Shaw and McKay’s (1942) research is cited often to show
the importance of neighborhood factors for crime rates, regardless of the individuals comprising the neighborhood. The basic premises of Shaw and McKay’s work are based on the ecological model in which three factors are found to increase crime: racial heterogeneity, socioeconomic status, and population turnover. Heterogeneous populations have difficulty communicating shared goals, which restricts the ability for implementing informal social control. Population turnover causes declines in neighborhood social control because people leave when they have the means, which impedes the establishment of ties to institutions and neighbors. This increases the likelihood of criminal activity and victimization because the anticipated repercussions from norm deviation are minimal.

Busik and Grasmick (1993) extend the social disorganization perspective into the systemic model. They attempt to resolve some of the critiques of Shaw and McKay’s work by applying Hunter’s (1985) three levels of social control. The assumption is that heterogeneity, poverty and population turnover create difficulty in the ability to establish ties at the private, parochial, and public levels. This weakens the ability of the community to self-regulate, socialize, and supervise. In terms of social disorganization, I focus on incivilities and turnover (short tenure) as the main factors that might explain differences in the effects of networks on fear. Socioeconomic status and racial heterogeneity are not discussed here because there is no variability among this sample on these characteristics.

**Incivilities**

As discussed earlier, incivilities are likely to increase fear. However, the effects of incivilities are not likely to have the same influence in all neighborhoods. Incivilities
have been used as a measure of social disorganization. In this study, Heritage Park is the more disorganized environment based on the higher levels of incivilities, crime, unemployment, family disruption, population turnover, and lower levels of networking. Thus, this higher level of perceived incivilities might create differences in the effect of incivilities. For instance, fear in Heritage Park might be more affected by incivilities. However, this probably is not only due to the high level of incivilities in Heritage Park but also to the other disorganized conditions. In other words, the level of disorganization in Heritage Park may cause incivilities to have a stronger influence on fear. Since Heritage Park has a higher crime rate, less networking and more turnover, incivilities may be more threatening and more of a cue to danger. This is also known as the “Matthew Effect” (Merton 1968) in which those who are poor on some level suffer more disadvantage from adverse conditions (i.e., the poor get poorer). On the contrary, those who are in some advantaged position suffer less from problems (i.e., the rich get richer).

Conversely, it could be that there is a diminishing return of these disorganization factors so that Heritage Park residents are not more affected by the perception of incivilities. In fact, because Rich Park residents have such high expectations of their community, it could be that their fear is more influenced by incivilities. For example, seeing a lot of teens hanging out might be more rare in Rich Park and more unexpected, thus creating a more threatening cue to danger. This is known as a relative deprivation effect in which those who have some advantage have raised expectations and any signal of threat is highly detrimental (Stouffer 1949). For instance, since conditions are not as disorganized in Rich Park, there may be raised expectations about the community and
incivilities might be especially detrimental to fear levels. Levels of victimization might have similar effects.

Victimization

Victimization is likely to increase fear but again this may differ by context. In the same way as incivilities, victimization may be more threatening in the more disorganized context (Matthew Effect). It may reinforce that this context is not a safe one. On the contrary, in the less disorganized context, victimization might be such a shock that fear is more influenced by being victimized (Relative Deprivation). Victimization differs significantly in this sample, with Heritage Park having more victimization. Tenure levels also significantly differ between the two complexes.

Tenure

Tenure is an individual-level measure of length of residence. Population turnover is the community’s rate of the influx of people moving in and out. Population turnover is a main indicator of social disorganization. Higher levels of turnover decrease the ability to establish social ties, which makes crime more likely (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). On the individual level, tenure might differentially influence fear in various communities. In line with social disorganization, shorter tenure in combination with the other disorganized conditions may increase fear at a faster rate. In addition, tenure might be one part of a larger phenomenon which is familiarity.

The familiarity effect is the idea that, in time, residents learn places and people to avoid (Riger and Gordon 1981). Thus, tenure, as well as other aspects (e.g. networks, having dependent children), might increase one’s familiarity and decrease fear. Tenure is longer in Rich Park and networking is more extensive, thus, it might be that there is a
familiarity effect in Rich Park. This could mean that networking might decrease fear to a greater degree in Rich Park because tenure and networks help the residents know which people and which places to avoid. Again, this is a Matthew Effect in which the rich get richer. In other words, those in the less disadvantaged community reap more benefits from networking.

On the contrary, it could be that in a more disorganized environment where networks are rare, what little networking does take place is extremely important. This is a “relatively beneficial” argument in which lower expectations lead to beneficial outcomes. It could be that in Heritage Park where few networks exist, these few networks create greater feelings of familiarity and empowerment in this threatening environment.

These feelings of familiarity and empowerment may serve to decrease fear to a greater extent in the more disorganized environment. In Heritage Park, tenure is shorter, so residents may not only fear strangers, but also their neighbors (who are strangers as well). Thus, when residents finally get to know each other, this may help them feel empowered and in control. In addition, this networking may provide information about the dangerous spots and people in the neighborhood and surrounding area to avoid. This makes the environment feel more familiar although they have not been there long themselves.

Conversely, this information provided by networks could create the indirect victimization effect explained earlier. If this is the case, it could be that Rich Park residents will experience more of an effect from networks. Rich Park residents might experience higher levels of fear because the expectation is that victimization is rare. If
their networks are constantly spreading information about victimization, it may be very threatening and taken as a cue that the neighborhood is breaking down. Or it could be that indirect victimization information is more threatening in Heritage Park. For instance, networking is rare in Heritage Park and if victimization information is being spread through a network that might not offer support at the same time, then networking could increase fear to a higher degree in Heritage Park.

Thus, contextual effects will be explored with the expectation that there might be a Matthew Effect in which those in the more disadvantaged context suffer more from disorganized conditions. Conversely, there could be a relative deprivation effect in which those in a less disorganized (more organized) context will suffer more from disorganization factors because of higher expectations in the more socially organized community.

On the contrary, beneficial conditions such as networking could lessen fear to a greater extent in the more disorganized environment because expectations are low (relative deprivation). Or networks could have more of a beneficial effect in the less disorganized (more organized) context due to the Matthew Effect.

These general contextual effects will be explored in Phase II of the analysis. The hypotheses stated earlier in this chapter will be tested in Phase I of the analysis (see Table 1). These hypotheses will be tested using the data collected from the two local public housing complexes. Phase I will be an analysis testing the theories of fear using the entire public housing sample. In Phase II, differences between the public housing contexts will be explored. In the next chapter, I describe the data collection, sample, and measurement of concepts.
Table 1. List of Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEORY</th>
<th>HYPOTHESES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Victimization Theory</td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 1</strong>: Recent victimization will increase fear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Vulnerability Theory</td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 2</strong>: As age increases, fear will increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 3</strong>: As the ability to defend oneself increases, fear will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incivilities Theory</td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 4</strong>: As incivilities increase, fear will increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 5</strong>: Serious incivilities will have a stronger effect than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>minor incivilities on fear of crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Vulnerability Theory</td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 6</strong>: Fear will decrease as employment levels increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 7</strong>: Fear will decrease as education increases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 8</strong>: As tenure increases, fear will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 9</strong>: As the amount of dependent children in the household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>increases, fear will increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Network Theory</td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 10</strong>: As the number of close ties increases, fear will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 11</strong>: As the amount of activity increases, fear will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 12</strong>: If intergenerational closure is present, fear will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 13</strong>: As network size increases, fear will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 14</strong>: As the number of ties in the housing complex increases,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fear will decrease, net of other effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 15</strong>: As the amount of ties in the building increases, fear will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 16</strong>: As the amount of neighborhood organizational participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>increases, fear will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 17</strong>: As the amount of work organizational participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>increases, fear will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 18</strong>: As the quality of policing increases, fear will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Hypothesis 19</strong>: As satisfaction with management increases, fear will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>decrease.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER THREE

DATA AND METHODS

The following chapter is a description of the data and methods used to test the research hypotheses stated in Chapter I. Below, I explain the data collection techniques, the sample, the measurement of the dependent and independent variables, and the analysis techniques. It is important to note that while the analyses in Phase I are tests of theories, the analyses in Phase II are exploratory. While the theories concerning contextual effects mentioned in Chapter II were used to guide analyses and interpretation, I did not intend this study to be a test of a particular existing theory but rather an exploratory analysis of the two contexts because there are only two contexts in which to test these theories.

Data Collection

This study was funded by the National Institute of Justice as part of the Locally-Initiated-Research-Partnership grant intended to build partnerships among university researchers, public housing management, and public housing residents. Two Raleigh public housing units were selected to participate in this comparative study. Each unit is similar in size and in population. This sample was originally intended to be a population study completing interviews with willing residents in all 218 units across two separate public housing complexes: Heritage Park and Rich Park. Heritage Park consists of 118 units and Rich Park has 100 units, all of which were targeted for interviews.

In-depth interviews were conducted with adult heads of households from each complex. Contact with each head of household was made initially by placing flyers on
doors and then by canvassing the complexes going door-to-door to schedule interviews. Trained interviewers conducted hour-long interviews using a structured survey instrument. Each respondent received compensation for his or her participation.

As stated earlier, adult heads of households of all 218 units were targeted to be interviewed but several units were not eligible because some apartments were used for administrative purposes or were vacant. Of the 194 (89% of 218) units that were eligible for interviewing, I conducted interviews with heads of household in 148 units, which is a 76% response rate. Due to the complexity of conducting face-to-face interviews in public housing units, I was pleased with this response rate. Some of the complexity stemmed from safety issues for interviewers, resistance to being interviewed among residents, mental health issues of some residents, and scheduling difficulties due to having part-time interviewers and having to vary the time of day and day of the week. In addition, in Rich Park, interviewers were met with some hostility among the elderly residents so only a few interviews were conducted in the part of the complex where the elderly residents were concentrated. About half of residents proved elusive to make contact with, were reluctant (“not today”), or simply difficult to schedule.

Interviewing was completed by February of 1999. By the end of this month, we had contacted all remaining households more than once and either interviewed the resident, considered the apartment a “no contact” because the resident was never home, or recorded the residents as having declined to be interviewed.
Sample

The total sample consists of 148 respondents. Of the 148 respondents, 143 were female and 5 were male heads of household. Only one respondent was Caucasian and the rest were identified as African-American. The total sample from Heritage Park is 85 and the total sample from Rich Park is 63 respondents. In Heritage Park, the median age is 36 years (27-51 Interquartile Range or IQR)\(^5\), and in Rich Park the median age is 41 years (30-55 IQR). In both complexes, the human capital attainment is low. In Heritage Park, 28.2% of respondents finished high school only, 24.7% completed some college, and 2.7% completed a college degree. In Rich Park, 27% of respondents completed high school, 25.4% completed some college courses, and 22.2% completed a college degree.

Many of the residents in both complexes were employed. In fact, only 25.9% of Heritage Park residents were unemployed and 14.3% in Rich Park were unemployed. Rich Park can be more selective in admittance because it is privately managed. Importantly, prior to 1993, Heritage Park was experiencing crime and disruption to such an extent that around this time a police substation was placed in the complex. Thus, quality of policing is one of the concepts measured here.

Measurement of Concepts: Dependent Variable\(^6\)

Perceived Risk Index

Perceived risk of victimization is assessed using a series of questions relating to residents’ concerns about victimization risk of burglary, auto theft, assault, and violent crime. Questions concerning fear of victimization are also asked in relation to contexts separate from, but nearby the housing complex. This measure is a 7-item index of

---

\(^5\) The Interquartile Range is the difference between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile.

\(^6\) Appendix C illustrates the coding and measurement of all variables.
standardized scores of variables that tap into risk of victimization. Respondents were asked how often they worry about burglary and attack in the complex. They were asked how they would judge their risk of burglary and attack in the complex. Variables asking about how safe respondents feel walking alone at night in the complex and how often they worry or think about burglary and attack by a stranger hung together in a factor analysis (see Appendix C for factor loadings).

Measurement of Concepts: Independent Variables

Direct Victimization

Respondents were asked if they or their household had been victimized recently by various types of crimes. A dichotomous variable was constructed reflecting whether a resident experienced any type of criminal victimization in the past year, coded “0” as no and “1” as yes.

Physical Vulnerability

Age

Age was assessed by asking respondents the year in which they were born. Their actual age was then calculated and used in the analysis.

Ability to defend oneself

Respondents were asked if they thought they could physically defend themselves or ward off an attack from another person. This is a dichotomous variable coded “0” if they think they could not physically defend themselves and “1” if they felt they could.
Incivilities

Serious Incivilities

The level of incivilities was assessed by two indices including a serious incivility scale and a minor incivility scale. The serious incivility scale consists of the extent to which respondents reported serious adverse conditions in the neighborhood such as prevalence of abuse of children, drunks, fights, outdoor drug sales, and harassment of women. These conditions are more criminal and deal with adults compared to the minor incivilities. Thus, the serious incivilities are expected to pose a more immediate threat than do unruly teens and children.

Minor Incivilities

Another factor indicated that there are different dimensions of incivilities indicating that loitering teens and unruly children may have a separate effect on fear. Thus, another scale was created consisting of residents' perceptions that disruptive teens, unruly children under age 12, loitering teens, and garbage were a problem.

Social Vulnerability

Education

Respondents were asked to report their highest level of education from "some grade school" to "college graduate".

Employment

Employment is measured by asking respondents what best described what they were doing last week and then listing options. These dichotomous options were then recoded into one employment variable that ranged from “full-time” to “retired”.

48
Tenure

Respondents were asked how long they lived in the complex. This variable has some outliers, thus the natural log of the variable is used in analyses.

Dependent children

Respondents reported both the number of people in their household and the number of those people under the age of 18. This variable was collapsed to five categories from zero children to four or more children.

Social Network Ties

Private Ties

The private level of network ties is assessed using questions concerning relationships with neighbors in the same public housing complex. Private ties are proxied using three different indices that assess networking at a more personal or in-depth level.

Close Ties

A measure of closeness is the extent to which people feel comfortable dropping by unannounced. Close ties are assessed by a 2-item index that includes the sum of the number of people who just drop by and the number of people you ask over to visit your home.

Visiting Activities

Visiting activities also indicate a certain amount of closeness. More interaction is usually indicative of closeness and emotional ties or at least feeling comfortable with others. This measure is a sum of several activities. Respondents were asked to report participation in several activities including whether neighbors had dined in their home and if they dined in theirs. Also, they were asked if they visited their homes in general.
Respondents were also asked if they either went out with neighbors or met them outside the complex.

*Intergenerational Closure*

I assess intergenerational closure by asking if residents interacted or socialized with the parents of their oldest child’s best friend. A dichotomous variable was constructed by coding responses as a one if they had an 11 to 15 year old child and reported knowing the parents of their child’s best friend and as a zero if they did not know the parents. If the respondent did not have a child 11 to 15 years old, then the response was coded for a child 7 to 10 years old. Then, if the respondent did not have a child 7 to 10 year old, the response was coded for the 3 to 5 year old. If the respondent had no kids, then intergenerational closure was coded as missing. Unfortunately, this variable is problematic because 72 residents did not have any children under age 15 at home and was removed from the analysis (Hypothesis 12 could not be tested).

*Parochial Ties*

Parochial ties are those that are not as close as friends, but include acquaintances and some institutional level networking.

*Network Size*

This variable is an index consisting of the number of relatives living in the complex, number of people in the complex you know, number of people in the complex that know you, number of households you borrow or lend to, number of different households you visit regularly, and the number of people in the complex you consider to be good friends. This variable has problematic outliers, thus the natural log of the variable is used in the analyses.
**Ties in Complex**

Weaker ties are assessed with a scale that taps into low level networking. This scale includes whether respondents talk with their neighbors when entering their apartments and whether they wish they had more friends.

**Ties in Building**

I constructed a measure tapping into whether respondents know their neighbors who are in closest proximity. This 2-item index of standardized scores is comprised of the amount of residents that respondents knew in their building on a first name basis and if they engaged in other activities that were not included in our original list. This variable is logged in order to make the distribution less skewed.

**Neighborhood Organizational Participation**

Respondents were also asked if they belonged to various organizations including neighborhood groups such as social, youth, church or other groups. An index was created ranging from “0” to “4”.

**Work Organizational Participation**

In addition, respondents were asked if they participated in business type groups such as business, ethnic or charity groups. An index was created ranging from “0” to “3”.

**Public Ties**

**Quality of Policing**

The public level of network ties is assessed using questions concerning the quality and visibility of local police agencies and satisfaction with housing management. Interaction with police is measured by asking questions about the frequency of both
vehicle and foot patrols. In addition, respondents were asked if police had improved conditions in the housing complex. These separate measures were standardized and combined in a 3-item index.

*Satisfaction with Management*

Satisfaction with housing is a complex issue here. Of course, most sociologists would not argue that dissatisfaction with living arrangements is a good outcome. However, public housing is meant to be temporary and is, by nature, under-funded. Thus, I would not expect residents to report a lot of satisfaction in their living arrangements. In fact, I argue that some dissatisfaction with current housing is a good thing as it may inspire upward mobility. Regardless, residents were asked how satisfied they were living in the housing complex and how satisfied they were with the management of the complex. The discussion above was intended to illustrate the measurement of the variables used in the analyses. Below I describe the statistical procedures used in this dissertation.

*Statistical Procedures*

The statistical analyses in this dissertation are conducted in two separate phases. In Phase I, perceived risk is regressed on the variables listed above using Ordinary Least Squares regression. In this phase, the entire sample will be included in order to test the theories of fear of crime. The statistical program “SPSS” will be applied in order to run the models. Ordinary Least Squares regression is used because the dependent variable is an index, which is the sum of several standardized variables. Thus, the dependent variable is continuous.  

7 In earlier analyses, ordinal regression was applied to test these effects on the dependent variable, “fear of walking alone at night” which was measured using an ordinal scale in which a rank exists (very safe to very
In Phase II, the intent is to test for differences between the two housing complexes with regard to the nature and extent of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables--that is, the slopes of the independent variables will be compared across the two complexes. In this exploratory analysis, I add cross-site interaction terms to the model with several of the independent variables as controls. Then, I compare the slopes of these independent variables using an F-test. In order to use the appropriate test, the statistical package “STATA” was used to conduct these analyses. STATA allows the entire sample to be utilized in the test. This F-test is necessary to illustrate if there is a statistical difference between the slopes in the two sites. When some of the cross-site interaction terms are added to the model, multicollinearity reaches levels that are deemed problematic by general criteria. Thus, the model used in Phase II is a scaled down model from Phase I in which as many control variables and interaction terms were included until the Variance Inflation Factor was within standard guidelines—not over four.

Before delving into the results of the regression analyses in Chapters Four and Five, some descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix A and a correlation matrix is presented in Appendix B to orient the reader to the two settings. The tables illustrate the differences between individuals in the two contexts on these important characteristics.

From these descriptive statistics, a theme emerges in that Heritage Park is a more disorganized environment with higher levels of fear, incivilities, single-headed households, unemployment, and lower levels of education. A disorganized environment

unsafe), but the interval between attributes was not defined (McClendon 1994). However, this variable turned out to be relatively useless in that in this particular environment, women are not likely to walk alone at night and if they do, there is not a lot of variation. In other words, of course these women are frightened walking alone in these relatively unsafe neighborhoods at night.
may be one in which people do not know their neighbors and only low levels of networking are taking place. Several factors contribute to this environment including those mentioned above but also the lack of trust in neighbors, lack of activities, lack of trust in police, having more children and younger children, and having less tenure.

In the next chapter, I begin with the Phase I analysis in which the entire sample is included in order to test some well-known theories of fear. In Phase II, the contextual differences will be analyzed by adding cross-site interactions to the model and comparing the slopes in the two sites. The results of these analyses are presented in Chapter V.
CHAPTER FOUR

PHASE I: TESTS OF THEORIES OF FEAR OF CRIME

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the effects of various independent variables on perceived risk of victimization in order to test some theories of fear of crime. According to the literature, there are several theories that may explain fear of crime. The theories tested here include direct victimization, physical vulnerability, incivilities, social vulnerability, and a social network theory.

The effects of independent variables derived from these theories are tested in this phase using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression. The models were constructed in a hierarchical fashion in which the theories are entered into the equation by level of importance as hypothesized by the researcher (this order is discussed further below). Thus, the final model includes all the theoretical models in addition to controlling for site (Heritage Park and Rich Park).

In general, it is hypothesized that victimization, physical and social vulnerability, and the presence of incivilities increase fear of crime while social networks should decrease fear of crime (see hypotheses listed in Chapter II). However, the effects of networks may vary by context (Sampson et al. 1999).

The measure of fear of crime (i.e., perceived risk of victimization) will be regressed on all the independent variables. Recall that perceived risk of victimization is a self-assessment of the likelihood of being victimized or the frequency of worry concerning one’s chance of victimization.
In these analyses, a non-traditional, liberal alpha level of $p < .15$ is used due to the limited sample size and the number of independent variables tested. This liberal alpha level is warranted because the degrees of freedom are limited by the number of variables compared to the sample size (Cohen and Cohen 1983).

The analysis is a two-phase plan. In Phase I, the analysis will be conducted assuming linear effects of variables across both sites. Because of the small number of cases in each site (combined $n = 148$), the risk of error increases when interaction effects are tested. As a conservative hedge against making such errors, Phase I will omit testing interaction effects. However, in Phase II of the analysis, greater risks of error will be assumed as possible and interaction tests across sites will be conducted. Further tests of product terms among independent variables are not done, again due to the limited sample size.

**Perceived Risk of Victimization**

The results of the OLS analysis of “perceived risk of victimization” are displayed in Table 2. This dimension of fear is an index with scores ranging from -6.72 to 12.34 (summed $z$ scores). The order of entry of the independent variables into the model is based on the theoretical importance of each theory as it affects fear. For instance, common sense would suggest that victimization would be highly correlated with fear. Most studies of fear control for victimization. Incivilities and social vulnerability factors, however, may also be important while controlling for victimization. Yet, because victimization is more basic to our understanding of the literature, it will be entered first in the hierarchical procedures followed here. In the next three models, variables are added to test theories that have less consistent evidence in the literature than victimization, but
more precedent in the literature than the social network model. For instance, physical vulnerability is fairly well established in that older people are usually more fearful, although some findings indicated the opposite (Hale 1996). The incivilities model has a large literature supporting the idea that incivilities increase fear (Rohe and Burby 1988; Wilson and Kelling 1982; LaGrange et al. 1992). The next model contains the social vulnerability model which includes variables that have not been explored to the same extent as the variables in the previous models. Research on fear and education (Parker et al. 1999; Evans 1995) has produced inconsistent results. There is a dearth of research concerning the effects of employment on fear, whereas more has been done on the effects of unemployment on crime (Menard and Elliott 1990; McGahey 1986; Sullivan 1989). Tenure and having dependent children are added to this model as a form of social vulnerability but have not been established in the literature as having consistent effects on fear (Skogan 1990; Hale 1996). The final model8 consists of measures of each theory with the addition of the social network variables and site variable which are least well-established connections in the literature.

*Equation 1*

As seen in Table 2, the theory of direct victimization is tested in Equation I using a variable that measures whether or not a resident had been a victim of a crime in the past year. Victimization had a strong, significant, positive effect on perceived risk when no

---

8 In this equation, all the control variables with the addition of site were forced entered into the regression equation meaning that they were entered regardless of their significance level. The network variables were then forward entered in which only the significant variables (p < .15) were included in the model. In a forward entry model, variables must meet a certain criterion to be included in the regression. All combinations are attempted in which a statistic is calculated for each variable that might be included in the model. To gain entry, the effect must have a value above that of the critical value. If there are effects that are above the critical value, then the effect with the highest standardized coefficient is entered into the model first and the procedure continues in order of the size of the effect until all steps have been exhausted. (Statsoft, Inc. 2003 from http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stgrm.html#stepwise).
other independent variables were controlled (Hypothesis 1 is supported). Experiencing direct victimization in the past year increases one’s perceived risk of victimization by 2.40 units.

Equation 2

Turning to the second equation, the theory of physical vulnerability is tested as the theory of direct victimization is controlled. As seen in Table 2, neither the ability to defend oneself nor age is a significant predictor when controlling for victimization. Thus, neither hypothesis 2 nor 3 (the physical vulnerability hypotheses) are supported. The addition of these variables to the equation does not add to the explained variance in perceived risk. In fact, the explained variance (adjusted R²) drops to four percent from five percent. In other words, victimization is the only variable in this model that significantly affects perceived risk. Direct victimization theory remains supported but physical vulnerability theory is not supported when controlling for victimization.

Equation 3

Equation 3 incorporates theories of incivilities into the model. In this equation, victimization remains significant. The variables measuring physical vulnerability are not significant. However, both serious and minor incivilities significantly and positively affect perceived risk when controlling for physical vulnerability and victimization. This supports hypothesis 4.

Adding incivilities to the equation increases the explained variance to thirteen percent. Thus, incivilities theory is supported in this sample controlling for these other factors (serious incivilities yields a 1.73 unit increase in perceived risk and minor incivilities yields a 1.25 unit increase). In this sample, serious incivilities are marginally
Table 2. Unstandardized (and Standardized) Regression Coefficients for the Perceived Risk of Victimization Equations (Interquartile Range Effects are in bold)

* p < .15; ** p < .10; *** p < .05; ****p < .01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Equation 1</th>
<th>Equation 2</th>
<th>Equation 3</th>
<th>Equation 4</th>
<th>Equation 5</th>
<th>Correlations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.039**</td>
<td>1.059</td>
<td>-2.703</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>2.879</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.229****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Interquartile Range Effects are in bold)</td>
<td>2.402**** (.229)</td>
<td>2.388**** (.228)</td>
<td>1.645*** (.157)</td>
<td>2.050*** (.196)</td>
<td>2.470**** (.236)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.024 (-.073)</td>
<td>.001 (.002)</td>
<td>-.026 (-.077)</td>
<td>-.024 (-.074)</td>
<td>-.084*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to</td>
<td>-.697 (-.094)</td>
<td>-.559 (-.075)</td>
<td>-.361 (-.049)</td>
<td>-.390 (-.053)</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend self</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incivilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious</td>
<td>1.728*** (.197)</td>
<td>1.831*** (.208)</td>
<td>1.073 (.122)</td>
<td>.331****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incivilities</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>1.246** (.183)</td>
<td>1.242** (.183)</td>
<td>.824 (.121)</td>
<td>.330****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incivilities</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>-.167 (-.037)</td>
<td>-.185 (-.041)</td>
<td>-.081</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>-.073 (-.018)</td>
<td>.380 (.095)</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>-.078 (-.019)</td>
<td>.354 (.087)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 18 years</td>
<td>-.829*** (-.216)</td>
<td>-1.032**** (-.269)</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Network Ties</strong></th>
<th><strong>Private Ties</strong></th>
<th><strong>Close Ties</strong></th>
<th><strong>Activity</strong></th>
<th><strong>Parochial Ties</strong></th>
<th><strong>Network Size</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ties in Complex</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ties in Building</strong></th>
<th><strong>Neighborhood Organizational Participation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Work Organizational Participation</strong></th>
<th><strong>Public Ties</strong></th>
<th><strong>Quality of Policing</strong></th>
<th><strong>Satisfaction with Management</strong></th>
<th><strong>Site</strong></th>
<th><strong>Adjusted R Square</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
more influential than minor incivilities (compare a standardized beta of .197 to .183). This is in support of hypothesis 5.

In looking at the interquartile range effects (IQR) for this equation (Equation 3), one can see that serious incivilities (IQR effect = 1.90) have the strongest impact or largest effect on risk of personal victimization. The interquartile range is the effect of changing the independent variable from the 25th to the 75th percentile. The interquartile range effect of victimization can not technically be calculated because the variable is a dummy variable so it is assumed here that the effect represents the change in fear for a one unit change in victimization (from zero to one). The dummy variable effect for victimization is 1.65. Minor incivilities (IQR effect = 1.50) have the lowest significant effect.

Equation 4

Similarly, in the next model (Equation 4) where social vulnerability measures are added, incivilities and victimization remain significant and positive. Only one of the measures of social vulnerability (having young children) is a significant predictor of perceived risk when controlling for direct victimization, physical vulnerability, and incivilities.

In this sample, education, employment status, and tenure did not significantly affect perceived risk of victimization. Thus, hypotheses 6 through 8 are unsubstantiated suggestive that social vulnerability theory is not supported. In addition, the direction of the effect of having dependent children was in the opposite direction than hypothesized.

---

9 Interquartile range effects are preferred by some researchers to standardized coefficients because they are considered more stable across samples than are standardized coefficients. Technically, the interquartile range effect cannot be calculated for a dichotomous variable. The number reported in bold in the table for the dichotomous variables is a “dummy variable effect”.

61
Thus, hypothesis 9 is unsubstantiated. Note, however, that adding these variables increases the explained variance to fourteen percent. In the next equation where network measures are added, the effects of serious and minor incivilities are no longer significant.

_Equation 5_

The next equation (Equation 5) includes the addition of the social network model. Note that unlike the earlier models; here the network variables were entered using a forward selection procedure\(^\text{10}\). When the model includes social vulnerability, physical vulnerability, and social networks, victimization remains a significant predictor of perceived risk. However, the serious and minor incivilities variables become insignificant when all the types of variables are included in the model. It could be that incivilities are not as important an influence on fear as network ties. It could also be that incivility measures are mediated by social networks or by site. One can imagine, for instance, the following scenario: (1) individuals who reside in neighborhoods characterized by incivilities choose to spend their time indoors because the neighborhood is unpleasant; (2) spending time indoors limits social networks; (3) limited social networks, in turn, lead to increased fear of crime. Thus, when controlling for ties, incivilities become insignificant.

Again, none of the variables measuring physical vulnerability are significant predictors of perceived risk of victimization. However, the social vulnerability measure,

\(^{10}\) In this equation, the control variables with the addition of site were entered using a force entry method. The network measures were forward entered (i.e. only the network variables that were significant at the .15 level were included in the equation). In the forward entry selection procedure, the variables with the largest semi-partial correlation with the dependent variable are entered first. Then, a new equation is calculated with the first network variable included. The remaining variable of the highest semi-partial correlation is then entered. These steps are repeated until all of the statistically significant variables are entered. This was done because the small sample size limits the number of variables that can be tested in the model. Initially, analyses were conducted with all variables force entered, but it seemed that the model was probably too inclusive.
having children under age 18, is a significant predictor of perceived risk. Surprisingly, with each additional dependent child in the household, perceived risk decreases by .83 units. Rather than adding to the support for the social vulnerability theory, this variable’s effect is in the opposite direction than expected. Recall that it was hypothesized that having dependent children would increase fear. One would expect having dependent children younger than 18 in the household would increase fear due to feelings of worry about the child being victimized or becoming involved in crime. However, it could be that women with younger children are less likely to go out at night or hang out in the scarier parts of the neighborhood, thus they view the complex and surrounding area as relatively safe. Also, remember that these complexes are in fact fairly safe compared to some other public housing complexes. It could be that women with children are outside in the complex more often during the day and over time realize that it is a generally safe environment. Conversely, it could be that they are inside at night with the young children, so they only have a sense for the complex in the daylight hours, which probably feels safer. Also, it could be that women who have small children rationalize their fear so that they feel that it is fine to let their children play outside. In other words, the children can not stay indoors all the time, so the parents must believe that the neighborhood is a safe environment for their children to play in. Lastly, perhaps these women are basing their feelings of safety on experience because their children have played outside in the complex and have not been victimized. Overall, the explained variance is highly improved with the addition of the network variables. In this model, twenty-three percent of the variance in perceived risk is explained (an absolute increase of 9% from the previous model).
Several network variables are significant predictors of perceived risk of victimization. One private level measure (close ties) significantly predicted fear. This supports hypothesis 10. Recall that close ties are those that the resident has invited over to her house or the neighbor dropped by the house unannounced. In addition, and one parochial level measure (neighborhood organizational participation) significantly decreased perceived risk. This supports hypothesis 16.

In addition to these two variables, a public level measure of the perception of policing was a significant predictor of perceived risk (fear decreases by .77 units). Thus, hypothesis 18 is supported. Alternatively, the public level measure of satisfaction with management was not found to be a significant predictor of perceived risk of victimization (hypothesis 19 is not supported). It is important to note that these measures of “public level ties” are not exactly “ties” as seen in the private and parochial measures. These public level ties are actually perceptions of the quality of service provided by these two local institutions. On some level, these may be measures of a public level of networking, in that they refer to institutional resources. However, a respondent could assess the quality of policing or management without actually having any interaction with police or management. Thus, these measures are more about the perception of quality of services provided by local institutions (i.e., public resources) rather than an assessment about ties or interactions with people involved in these institutions.

Lastly, site was a significant predictor of perceived risk. Perceived risk is 3.27 units lower for Rich Park residents. In this equation, having dependent children (IQR effect = -2.06) has the interquartile range effect that is the highest observed here. Quality of policing (IQR effect = -1.54) has the second largest effect, having close ties (IQR
effect = -1.16) the third, and neighborhood organizational participation the fourth (IQR
effect = -.970). Not only are the slopes for these network variables significant, they have
relatively large effects. Again, victimization and site are dichotomous variables so the
interquartile range effects are incalculable, but the dummy variable effects are 2.47 and
3.27 respectively.

Interestingly, in this more complete model, site is a strong, negative predictor of
perceived risk in this sample, indicating that contextual differences exist. Changing from
Site 1 (Heritage Park) to Site 2 (Rich Park) produces a 3.27 decrease in perceived risk.
Thus, it seems that controlling for other theoretically important variables, living in Rich
Park is less “scary” than living in Heritage Park11.

Two general themes emerge concerning the network effects. One the one hand, it
seems that there is some support for the empowerment hypothesis of networks in that all
of the significant network measures decrease fear. However, only three network
variables are significant and six are not significant (Hypotheses 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, and 19
are not supported). Consequently, one is inclined to say that there is only certain aspects
of networks reduce fear of victimization. Network associations, at each level (i.e.,
private, parochial, and public level) help women feel less fearful. These results are
suggestive of modest support for the empowerment hypothesis via private, parochial or

\[11\] In addition to the models shown, a model was run in which networks were added but site was not. In this
model, if all network variables are force-entered the results are the same except that serious incivilities
remain significant while minor incivilities become insignificant. However, if the network variables are
forward entered without site, both serious and minor incivilities are significant. Because incivilities
become insignificant when site is added to the model, this might be an indication that incivilities differ
between site to the extent that site is mediating the relationship between incivilities and fear rather than
networks. This might be indicative of the effect that Bursik and Grasmick (1993) referenced in which
incivilities and crime are correlated and confound the relationship between incivilities and fear. Additional
models were run with site entered as the first variable in each model. In this analysis, the only difference is
that minor incivilities became insignificant in the model that included social vulnerability. Minor
incivilities were significant in the model shown in Table 3 when site is not added until the final model.
public ties. The slope for the significant public level tie is the highest magnitude observed here (IQR effect = -1.54). However, the slope of having close ties was also large (IQR effect = -1.16). This finding is similar to Sampson and Groves (1989) finding that private ties are more important than public or parochial ties for social control of the community and supervision of youngsters. Also, the slope of neighborhood organizational participation is similar in magnitude, although slightly smaller (IQR effect = -.970). There is limited support for the importance of involvement in neighborhood organizations for the reduction in fear, as well as support for the idea that effective policing (at least as perceived) may reduce fear. It is not clear whether it is the presence of police or the perceived value of policing that is the mechanism reducing fear. Furthermore, these data do not allow for the study of the actual mechanism causing the empowering effect of networks (i.e., increased self-efficacy).

For ease of comparison, the zero-order correlations for the rest of the variables have been included in Table 2. The general theme is that the variables that were significantly correlated with fear without controlling for any other effects remain significant when the control variables are included in the model. However, some variables are correlated with risk but are not significant predictors when control variables are added. For instance, age is weakly correlated with perceived risk ($r = -.084$, $p < .15$), but it is not a significant predictor once control variables are added. On the one hand, this might be a selection effect in which those who are elderly, and have the means to do so, move out of the complex more quickly. The result is that those who are left behind are the truly disadvantaged (Wilson 1987) and probably have pessimistic world views in which their risk of victimization seems very likely.
Similar to age, activity level ($r = .092, p < .15$) is correlated with perceived risk, but is not a significant predictor when controlling for other effects. Activity level has modest correlations with some other independent variables (e.g., age, close ties, and network size). Close ties are a significant predictor of fear in the final model.

Serious incivilities is positively correlated with risk ($r = .333, p < .01$) but is not a significant predictor in the final model. When controlling for other effects including minor incivilities, serious incivilities becomes insignificant. Similarly, the minor incivilities variable is correlated with fear ($r = .330, p < .01$) and drops as a significant predictor net of other effects.

However, employment, education, ability to defend oneself, and tenure are not significantly correlated with perceived risk. It is likely that employment has a countervailing or counterbalancing effect on perceived risk. That is, employment can be empowering and increase one’s sense of control, thus decreasing perceived risk. At the same time, employment forces one to be outside the home more often leaving oneself and one’s property vulnerable to attack, thus increasing perceived risk. Perhaps these opposite effects counter each other so that there is no significant effect on perceived risk.

Similarly, education might have a countervailing effect in that higher education levels might increase risk in some cases and decrease it in others. On the one hand, education can make people aware that the likelihood of victimization is low. On the other hand, education may increase awareness and information about victimization, thus increasing fear through creating a sort of hypersensitivity to violence. In addition, employment and education are related, so the variables could be confounding the effect of the other variable.
Ability to defend oneself is not significantly correlated with perceived risk. Again, this lack of an effect could be due to countervailing factors. Some may feel empowered by being able to defend oneself. Others may have taken self-defense classes in order learn how to ward off an attack. It may be that those who feel able to defend themselves feel able because they proactively participate in self-defense courses that would increase awareness about crime, which in turn, provides more information concerning victimization or criminal activity. Thus, they feel able to defend themselves while at the same time being hyper-sensitive to criminal activity.

Tenure is not significantly related to fear. This is surprising given that tenure is likely to increase familiarity with the environment in which residents learn the dangerous people and places to avoid (Riger and Gordon 1981). One possible explanation is that whereas tenure would normally be expected to be negatively associated with fear, there could be possible selection effects at work here. Those who stay in public housing for longer periods of time may be the “chronic poor” unable to earn sufficient income to move out of public housing. Those who move out and who, by definition, cannot be studied here may be among the more “empowered”. Those “left behind”, so to speak, may be among those who find the world a frustrating and frightening one. Thus, a selection effect may be accounting for the lack of correlation between tenure and fear.

Similarly, social ties in the complex, social ties in the building, and work organizational participation are not significantly correlated with perceived risk. Ties in the complex are not moderately correlated with many other independent variables. It seems that this variable is simply not related to perceived risk. This variable is measuring whether neighbors talked while walking in and out of their apartments and whether one
rates herself as having enough friends. This measure may be one measure of a weak tie, but it is conceivable that it would have little bearing on fear and perceived risk. It may be too weak of a connection to spread victimization information, and it is not a strong enough connection to provide empowerment.

However, social ties in the building are modestly correlated with several other independent variables including neighborhood organizational participation. This could be another countervailing effect in which knowing more people in the building empowers some by fostering the feeling that much of the territory around their home is protected and ownership can be claimed. While others might have more fear with more ties to people in the building due to the spread of victimization information.

There was also no correlation between work organizational participation and fear. This is probably, in small part, due to the fact that only a few respondents were members of these types of organizations (20%). This lack of a correlation between fear and participation in work organizations could be due to the nature of these organizations, in which very little information is passed about victimization so fear is not increased, and these may not decrease fear either because the person is still away from her home and her property. Countervailing forces may be at work here. On the one hand, the work organizational participation will reduce fear through and empowerment effect. On the other hand, there is an “information effect” (e.g., hearing about victimization at work organizations).

Having dependent children is not significantly correlated with perceived risk in the zero-order correlations, but became a significant predictor when the control variables were added in the regression. Having dependent children is correlated with several other
independent variables (e.g., age, ability to defend oneself, and victimization) so there may be some multicollinearity issues although the multicollinearity was not high enough to cause problems by general standards.

Similarly, network size is not significantly correlated with risk and is not a significant predictor net of other effects. Network size is moderately correlated with tenure, ties in the building, and close ties. Network size apparently has no effect or at least less of an effect than having close ties or some other variable in the full model.

Neighborhood organizational participation (r = -.113; p < .10) and close ties (r = -.095; p < .15) are correlated with risk and remained significant predictors net of other effects. Quality of policing (r = -131, p < .057) and satisfaction with management (r = -.185, p < .01) are correlated with risk, but only quality of policing significantly predicts perceived risk when other effects are controlled. The effect of satisfaction with management is not significant because it is not a strong influence on fear once the effects of other variables are controlled. Lastly, site is significantly correlated with perceived risk (r = .305, p < .000) and is also a strong predictor of fear in the regression model net of other effects.

Discussion

Overall in these equations, direct victimization theory is supported in this analysis. Direct victimization remains a strong, positive predictor of perceived risk in all the equations. Serious and minor incivilities are important, but these variables dropped to insignificance when controlling for network tie variables. Thus, it seems there is no support for the hypothesis that serious incivilities have more influence on fear than minor incivilities when controlling for network effects because neither type of incivilities
retains significance but when these variables were significant, serious incivilities has the larger effect. Thus, these findings indicate that the more serious cues to disorder in these public housing complexes are more threatening compared to the minor, youth-oriented signals of disorder, such as unruly teens and children. It could be that the effects of networks mediate the effect of incivilities in that residents will socialize less with each other in areas with high levels of incivility.

More important theoretically, some of the network variables are significant predictors of perceived risk. In these models, moderate support is found for an empowering effect produced by network association in that close ties, participating in neighborhood organizations, and better policing decrease perceived risk. Thus, when controlling for other theoretically important variables, networking in these local public housing units has beneficial effects. That is, network empower in that they decrease fear. Empowerment stems, in part, from self-efficacy. However, the notion that networking increases individual self-efficacy cannot be tested here because it is not measured in the interviews. Thus, these findings are only suggestive of the empowerment hypothesis as increasing self-efficacy. Conversely, the mechanism causing the empowerment could be a social control mechanism (i.e., protection of neighborhood and adherence to norms) 12.

It is important to note that one measure of each level of ties is a significant predictor of perceived risk. This suggests that not only the depth of social networking is important, but also, the extensiveness of ties is important. In other words, close ties is a measure that taps into depth of ties (deeper levels of interaction). Close ties indicates a

---

12 The concept of control was operationalized in these data using a variable measuring whether a respondent had people in the complex that she would trust to watch her home if she were away. The correlation between perceived risk and this trust variable was low and insignificant (.057; p < .492). This variable had no significant influence on fear in a full regression model. Thus, support for the social control model as measured by trusting neighbors to watch one’s home is low.
level of comfort and trust that is not evident in parochial ties which are more shallow acquaintances. However, participation in neighborhood organizations, which is a parochial level tie, is also significant. This indicates that in these contexts, extensiveness of ties (even shallow ties) is almost as important as deep ties. It might be that in these contexts, quantity is just about as important as quality of ties. The empowering effect of private, parochial, and public ties may come from the “safety in numbers” effect. Perhaps in these contexts, it is important to have as many eyes on your property as possible, as well as having a few closely-knit ties.

Similarly, the public level of quality of policing is a salient network tie for this sample and had the largest effect. It seems that these residents feel much less fearful when policing is visible and responsive. This tie to a public institution probably decreases the sense of being an easy target or vulnerable to attack. Again, this may be an “eyes on the street” phenomenon. Remember, the individual interaction with police was not measured. This measure is about the presence of police. That is, this network tie might be about having people around to prevent attack. Often these ties to public institutions promote the sharing of resources. Alternatively, policing may be better in some parts of the complex and so fear is reduced for those in that part of the complex. In other words, it might be that some residents feel safer because of their proximity to the police substation or to a street where police presence is common.

Interestingly, the indirect victimization hypothesis concerning networking -- that is, the idea that fear is increased through networks spreading information concerning victimization -- was not supported. None of the network variables increased perceived risk. The reader is reminded that the indirect victimization has stronger support in
previous literature than the direct victimization argument (Box et al. 1988; Skogan and Maxfield 1981). In these data, this finding was contradicted. Perhaps this is a function of the sample consisting of public housing residents. It is conceivable that in contexts such as public housing that are likely to have more objective indicators of risk (e.g., higher incivilities, higher victimization rates), hearing about others' victimizations is not nearly as threatening as having friends is empowering. In other words, it seems that in these contexts networks are beneficial rather than adverse in that they decrease fear.

The hypotheses concerning social vulnerability theory are not supported. Having dependent children is the only significant predictor but the sign of the effect was in the wrong direction. I hypothesized that having dependent children would increase fear because it was suggested that these women would experience altruistic fear in the form of worry for their children. Instead, having dependent children decreased fear. This could be due to the fact that women feel empowered from having children or are motivated to deny the likelihood of victimization. Also, the dependent variable is perceived risk of one’s own victimization rather than general worry that could include worry about children’s victimization.

In addition to these significant predictors, there are several independent variables that were hypothesized to be significant, but were not. These variables include age, ability to defend oneself, employment, education, and tenure. Age might not be significant because the elderly in this sample may be much less likely to go out. One possibility is that elderly persons who are less able to get out due to health risks are more likely to be accepted into public housing. Perhaps those who are accepted are too fragile to go out frequently thus, they feel relatively safe in the complex. Also, it could be that
elderly people who have others around them (rather than live alone) are not as affected by their age as individual homeowners. These elderly people may have networks to rely on and if they do not, they have eyes on the street. The elderly tend to be clustered within public housing, and thus they can literally watch out for one another more easily.

The literature on education and fear yields inconsistent results (Parker et al. 1999; Evans 1995). Thus, it is conceivable that there would be no effect of education on fear in this sample. Likewise, very little research exists on the effect of employment on fear. Again, it is comprehensible that no effect was found in this sample. Perhaps education and employment are not factors that affect fear for residents in these two contexts because other factors are more salient. Recall that the dependent variable is perceived likelihood of victimization. Perhaps these women feel that their likelihood of victimization is unaffected by their employment or education status because their likelihood of victimization is probably perceived to be highest when in the complex and surrounding neighborhood. Yet another possibility is that the stigma of living in public housing negates any empowerment effect from education.

It has been hypothesized that employment could decrease fear through an empowerment effect. On the other hand, employment could increase one’s perceived lack of safety in the neighborhood because the employed may be outside at various hours and may have to leave the home unoccupied, thus exposing themselves and their property to potential victimization. Thus, there might be countervailing forces affecting the relationship between employment and fear. Employment places people outside the home more (increasing fear), but it also empowers people (increases self-efficacy and decreases
These countervailing effects might account for the lack of a significant relationship between employment and fear.

Surprisingly, tenure does not affect perceived risk. Tenure was hypothesized to promote familiarity and thus, decrease perceived risk. It might be that tenure has a countervailing effect in which long tenure might increase familiarity, or on the contrary, decrease empowerment through being left behind by the upwardly mobile. For instance, long tenure in public housing might decrease the sense of empowerment one has and contributes to a pessimistic outlook in which one rates the chances of victimization as high. In other words, it could be an effect opposite that of empowerment in which those with longer tenure become skeptical that they will become upwardly mobile and thus, their expectations concerning other factors are leveled. That is, there may be a selection mechanism in operation in which longer tenure means that the person has probably been on public assistance for a long time which might make one have a more negative world view. Thus, those who are empowered or become upwardly mobile, move away from public housing which leaves behind the poorest, least mobile, and least empowered individuals. It is likely that this creates feelings of despair and fear. Conversely, those with longer tenure should learn which places and people are dangerous and to be avoided which should decrease fear.

The ability to defend oneself may be inconsequential for the likelihood of being victimized. For example, one might feel capable of fending off attack, but that does not necessarily stop the onset of the attack. The likelihood of victimization or level of worry about it may not change, what changes is the expectation of the level of injury to be sustained from the victimization attempt because one feels capable of fighting back.
Further, it could be that types of victimization should be controlled. I was not able to separately test for the effects of property and violent victimizations, however, due to the rarity of the latter. \(^{13}\) Thus, it could be that because most of the recent victimizations were to property rather than to person, ability to defend oneself is inconsequential.

Alternatively, site is a highly influential predictor of perceived risk. This means that the Rich Park sample rates the perceived likelihood of victimization as much lower than the Heritage Park sample (Rich Park residents are less fearful). This indicates that there could be contextual effects that are not being explored in these models. In other words, these effects might vary by site. In the next chapter, I explore the findings of the Phase II analysis in which differences in slopes and intercepts of the variables are analyzed.

---

\(^{13}\) Personal or violent victimization was very rare in this sample, so it could be argued that the variable measuring victimization in this sample is actually property victimization.
CHAPTER FIVE

PHASE II: EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN SLOPES BETWEEN SITES

In Phase II of the analysis, the differences in the effects of the independent variables between Heritage Park and Rich Park are explored. The intent of Phase II is to investigate models similar to the Phase I analysis and examine the relative effects of the independent variables on fear of crime in the two sites. In addition, the differences in slopes between the two sites will be explored using F-tests, to test for whether the differences are statistically significant. If there are differences between the two contexts, this test will determine if an independent variable has more of an effect in one site compared to the other. Thus, there are two issues under investigation in Phase II: whether the intercepts significantly differ between the two sites and whether the slopes significantly differ.

Recall that Phase II is presented as an analysis premised on the idea that the probability of Type I error will be higher due to the weak statistical power of the models, itself a consequence of the low number of cases. Theoretically, contextual differences are expected based on several speculations having to do with “relative deprivation” theory (in general) – where expectations are highest for a safe environment, signs of incivilities or actual victimization may instill more fear than occur in more risky contexts. Also, a type of rational choice theory is discussed, specifically the “Matthew Effect” (Merton 1968) in which objective conditions benefit or harm one’s chance to benefit from other factors (e.g., the rich get richer, the poor get poorer). However, because this is an exploratory analysis, formal hypotheses are not presented. Instead, the general
theories are used mainly as interpretation tools. Contextual differences are expected because although the sites are very similar in composition and size, they differ in cohesion, management and social disorganization factors, such as tenure and incivilities. They also may differ in how the residents experience each environment in a “global” sense. Consequently, their collective identity differs in a way that may be important.

These differences will be explored using interaction terms between a given independent variable and site. As alluded to above, there are two general theories of interaction effects that are drawn on here as explanations of possible effects: relative deprivation and the Matthew Effect. Various combinations of these effects are illustrated in Figures 1-4.

Relative deprivation effects are comparison effects in which some individuals or groups feel unjustly deprived compared to their similar counterparts (Stouffer 1949 e.g., military troops in units with high promotion rates were more dissatisfied than troops in units with low promotion rates). This effect is based on expectations. An individual in any group expects to do as well as others in their group. If these other individuals receive more benefits, this is interpreted as unjust or unfair. Thus, an individual does not have to be among the most disadvantaged to be dissatisfied or unhappy (or here, fearful). The individual only needs to experience deprivation relative to another similar individual. For instance, relative deprivation was used to explain the increase in crime in industrialized nations even though the quality of living was relatively good (Stack 1984). Thus, as conditions improved for some, others felt unjustly deprived of similar rewards compared to their reference group, and crime is the result.
Again, it is the expectation that individuals with similar characteristics and status will be rewarded similarly. This effect is referred to as a “relative deprivation” interactive effect (following Stouffer 1949). In this study, relative deprivation is likely to be manifested in two ways. First, there could be a true relative deprivation effect in which Rich Park residents feel more threatened by an adverse condition (e.g., victimization and incivilities) because the expectations are relatively high there (i.e., they are a safe community). See Figure 1. In other words, the expectation in Rich Park is that it is a relatively “great community” and relatively “crime-free”. There is evidence that for the most part, high expectations are common in Rich Park. For instance, Rich Park residents do not consider themselves “public housing”. They feel they are “above” that type of housing and are resentful if they are categorized as such. They consider themselves to be more of a community rather than public housing. This sense of being a community is enhanced by the fact that they are privately managed (by five churches). Also, residents have longer tenure, and have extensive networking. All of these factors may be responsible for relatively high expectations as to the quality of life in Rich Park.

The effects of these general expectations on fear of crime could in principle be positive or negative. On the one hand, it may be beneficial to residents to not consider themselves public housing. They may feel more empowered and less afraid. On the other hand, there could be raised expectations (i.e., relative deprivation) operating in Rich Park in which they assume they are safe. That is, raised expectations may set one up for failure to the extent that if direct or indirect victimization occurs, it may be more traumatic in Rich Park because the expectation exists that this is a safe community. In other words, it is a more salient breach of trust in the cohesion of the community. Thus,
Figure 1. Relative Deprivation Effect (Positive Effect on Fear such as Hypothesized for Incivilities Variables)

Figure 2. Relatively Beneficial Effect (Negative Effect on Fear such as Hypothesized for Networking Variables)
news of crime, or incivilities could be such a shock that they have a greater effect in Rich Park than in Heritage Park, where these high expectations do not exist. If expectations are generally lower in Heritage Park, victimization may not come as much of a shock. It is possible that expectations are lower in Heritage Park to such an extent that victimization would not affect fear to the extent it might in Rich Park.

Whereas in the case of relative deprivation where even a minor adverse event can trigger a large increase in fear, one could also discuss a “relatively beneficial” effect when an encouraging event occurs in a context where “bad things” are the general expectation. That is, where there is a presumed constructive effect to reduce fear (e.g., networking), one might expect that those who experience many beneficial effects will not benefit much from such constructive events. In other words, those who have high expectations may not be affected much by “good” events or experiences (see Figure 2). These are “relatively beneficial” effects in which scarcity intensifies the payoff or in which expectations are low so the payoff is high (e.g., social networks alleviate more fear). So, where networking is relatively rare and the expectation levels are generally low, it has a very beneficial effect (a “little bit goes a long way”). In other words, it might be a relatively beneficial effect in which expectations are lowered to such an extent that a good condition has a relatively large effect, but where good things are expected and common, the expectations are higher, so good things are not as influential. For instance, it could be that the networking in Rich Park is not as consequential for fear of victimization as it is in Heritage Park because expectations are higher anyway and thus a “good thing” like networking has very little effect in Rich Park. In Heritage Park, it might be the case that if a resident knows just a few people in the building, they perceive
their risk as limited. It could be that knowing those few people is more empowering or increases a sense of familiarity more dramatically. It also could be that until that resident actually knows her neighbors, she fears them. Once the neighbor is no longer anonymous, the likelihood that this neighbor will burglarize the apartment is lessened.

In contrast to the “relatively beneficial” effects, there could be Matthew Effects in which a beneficial factor has even more of an effect where there is a prevalence of beneficial factors. That is, beneficial events would have more of a benefit for those who are already more privileged (e.g., the “rich get richer”).

There are two ways that Matthew Effects can manifest themselves, depending on whether the factor under consideration is hypothesized to have a reducing effect on fear (e.g., networks) or an inducing effect on fear (e.g., incivilities). If a factor is hypothesized to have an effect of increasing fear (e.g., incivilities) then that effect will be stronger where there are fewer forces at work to mitigate the fear inducing variable: the poor get poorer (see Figure 3). If a factor is hypothesized to have a reducing effect on fear then the slope will be steeper where there are already a plethora of fear reducing factors (i.e., the rich get richer). See Figure 4. Matthew Effects are premised on the idea that benefits accrue to those who are in the best position to obtain benefits, and, conversely least likely to accrue to those low in positive assets.

The basic mechanism of a fear reducing Matthew Effect is that there are numerous interaction effects operating to increase the chances for fear reduction. A person who lives in a relatively safe environment (Rich Park) and who feels safe, knows others, etc, will benefit more from each of these factors than someone who is lacking most of these potentially beneficial characteristics.
For example, if one is familiar with the people in the community, it is likely that incivilities will not be as threatening. If teens are hanging out on the street in an anonymous environment, this might be a potent cue to danger. However, if those teens are the children of your friends, this incivility will be less threatening. Even if the teens are not known, in a familiar environment there might be more people around to intervene if victimization were a threat. Lastly, just the idea of knowing more people in the community may create feelings of empowerment and thus, less fear.

On the contrary, in a disorganized, non-integrated community where incivilities are high and tenure is short, issues such as victimization and teens hanging out are likely to be more detrimental (see Figure 3). There is a possible Matthew Effect which is the idea that the “poor get poorer” (Merton 1968). In other words, in Figure 3 where the effect of the independent variable is likely to be positive or likely to increase fear (e.g., victimization and incivilities), the Matthew Effect would suggest that for those in the more disadvantaged position, fear will increase at a faster rate. In addition, in a place where people are more transient, there is more anonymity. There is less familiarity with the places to avoid so potential victimization is more of a threat (Riger and Gordon 1981). Add to that scenario actually being victimized and these characteristics are likely to be more salient. If the teens hanging out on the corner or drunks in the parking lot are unknown, you are likely to have more fear than if they are familiar to you. Thus, disorganization factors such as turnover and incivilities may be detrimental and increase the residents’ fear in Heritage Park at a faster rate than in Rich Park.

Alternatively, where the effect of the independent variable on fear is expected to be negative (e.g., networking), the “rich get richer” (see Figure 4). Thus, for those in the
more disadvantaged context, victimization should be more adverse (increase fear at a faster rate). Similarly, for those in the more privileged context, networking could be more beneficial (i.e., networks decrease fear at a faster rate).

In general, I present four possible effects based on the general theories of relative deprivation and rational choices (Matthew Effects) discussed above. Again, this phase of the analysis is exploratory and based on only two contexts (Heritage Park and Rich Park). Thus, it will be difficult to make any generalizations and explanations will be tentative at best. However, the results of this phase may lead to hypotheses for future research.

Contextual effects are analyzed by comparing some of the slopes using F-tests. In order to test the differences in slopes, interaction terms were added to the full model of control variables. However, due to multicollinearity problems with the interaction terms, the model had to be scaled down. Thus, a model is presented in which as many controls are added with as many interaction effects as possible without multicollinearity being a problem according to generally used criteria\(^\text{14}\). In other words, various models were attempted in order to test the effects of as many interaction terms as possible with as many control variables as possible. Some interaction terms (including a cross-product term in which a variable X is multiplied by a dummy variable for Heritage Park) are problematic even when only one interaction term is added such as ability to defend

\(^{14}\) Notice that the model does not include intergenerational closure. This variable was deleted from the analysis because too many of the residents did not have children. Thus, there were 72 missing values and the sample size is too small to handle this especially in Phase II. Participation in work organization was also deleted because there was a lack of variation in that almost 80% of residents did not participate in these types of organizations. Quality of policing and satisfaction with management were deleted from the model because these measures cause multicollinearity issues. Due to the limited sample size when the cross-site interactions are added, the models can withstand fewer variables. Those that seemed less important to control for or somewhat arbitrary measures were deleted. For example, it seems very important to control for education which significantly differs between the two complexes and is measured well. It seems futile to control for satisfaction with management given that it is a much more subjective assessment and might be a less valid measure.
Figure 3. Matthew Effect (Positive Effect on Fear such as Hypothesized for Incivilities Variables)—“poor get poorer”

Figure 4. Matthew Effect (Negative Effect on Fear such as Hypothesized for Networking Variables)—“rich get richer”
oneself, age, serious incivilities, employment, education, tenure, activity level, network size, ties in complex, quality of policing, and satisfaction with management.

Consequently, product terms involving these variables and housing complex (site) are not entered into the analysis. The model presented here has fifteen control variables and five interaction terms including: victimization and site, minor incivilities and site, children under 18 and site, ties in building and site, and neighborhood organization and site. Thus, these are all interaction terms with an independent variable and site, not between two independent variables\(^{15}\). In addition, all five of these slopes for which interaction terms are added significantly differ between sites (alpha levels range from .002 to .005). Table 3 illustrates the findings. Interquartile range (IQR) effects were calculated in order to better compare the magnitude of the effects of the coefficients\(^{16}\).

Overall, there are three general patterns that develop in these analyses. First, the intercept for fear differs across models, but is always higher in Heritage Park. Second, the direction of the slopes does not vary between sites (meaning that the independent variables have the same sign, either positive or negative, in both contexts although the degree of the effect may differ). Third, there are several slopes that significantly differ between the two sites.

**Discussion of Findings in Differences in Slopes**

Victimization has an interquartile range effect of 2.91 in Heritage Park compared to a 2.28 effect in Rich Park. Thus, the effect of victimization is larger (steeper slope) in

\(^{15}\) An exploratory analysis using product terms across the various independent variables was conducted in part because of the low number of cases (weak statistical power).

\(^{16}\) To calculate the interquartile range effects here the interquartile range for the entire sample is used rather than separate interquartile ranges for site. Separate site interquartile ranges were deemed more difficult to interpret because the site with the most variation would be more likely, all else being equal, to show greater effects.
Heritage Park. Stated another way, the experience of being victimized has a larger impact on fear in Heritage Park than it does in Rich Park. Thus, it seems that in a general context that could be characterized as “more disorganized”, adverse conditions are increasing fear at a faster rate. Crime is higher, incivilities are higher and networking is lower in Heritage Park. In other words, Heritage Park is a scarier environment and being victimized might intensify the feeling that the community is not a safe one and that the potential for victimization is greater than in other neighborhoods. This explanation is most consistent with the Matthew Effect (refer back to Figure 3) in which adverse effects are more detrimental to those living in a more disadvantaged context (i.e. “the poor get poorer”). It could also be that tenure is much longer in Rich Park, and residents there feel “at home” with their environment. This familiarity may foster a sense of control. For example, Merry (1981) found that public housing residents who felt they were familiar with their neighbors (and with the criminal propensity of these neighbors) were less fearful than those who thought victimization would be anonymous. Similarly, Rachman (1990) found that people living in a dangerous environment felt more in control if they were familiar with that environment. Thus, perhaps familiarity is a source of empowerment. Conversely, lack of familiarity is likely to breed a sense of a lack of control. If these residents are not as familiar with the environment, it is likely that they can not diminish cues to danger. For example, an incivility such as teens hanging out might provoke more fear in an unfamiliar place because it may be interpreted as gang activity. Whereas, in a place that is familiar, a resident may know the perpetrators and feel much less threatened. Thus, for those living in Heritage Park and who stay there for
Table 3. Five Cross-Site Interaction Effect Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>Unstandardized Beta</th>
<th>Significance Level</th>
<th>Whole Sample IQR Range</th>
<th>IQR Effect HERITAGE PARK</th>
<th>IQR Effect RICH PARK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
<td>2.91*</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>1.00 (0-1)</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.601</td>
<td>23.00 (19-87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend</td>
<td>-.425</td>
<td>.519</td>
<td>1.00 (0-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Incivilities</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>1.10 (1-3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Incivilities</td>
<td>1.39**</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>1.20 (1.07-1.14)</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.990</td>
<td>2.00 (1-4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>.417</td>
<td>2.00 (3-5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>1.73 (0-5.67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>-1.18****</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>2.00 (0-4)</td>
<td>-2.36</td>
<td>-.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Ties</td>
<td>-.573*</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>2.40 (0-3.58)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity (not dichotomous)</td>
<td>2.54*</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.55 (0-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Size</td>
<td>.354</td>
<td>.484</td>
<td>1.47 (0-4.44)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties in Complex (not dichotomous)</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>.850</td>
<td>0.0 (.00-1.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties in Building</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>.932</td>
<td>.9465 (-1-1.91)</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Organization</td>
<td>-1.39****</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>1.0 (0-4)</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td>-.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site</td>
<td>-5.30****</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.93</td>
<td>.590</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .15; ** p < .10; *** p < .05; ****p < .01

much shorter periods of time, cues to danger might be much more threatening, increasing fear at a faster rate.\(^{17}\)

These cues to danger are more prevalent in Heritage Park and as with victimization, the perception of minor incivilities has a much larger effect in Heritage

---

\(^{17}\) However, it was found here that tenure, although not significant, increased fear. Thus, it seems that familiarity is not likely.
Park (IQR effect = 1.67) than in Rich Park (IQR effect = .108). The perception of minor incivilities in Heritage Park increases fear at a much faster rate than it does in Rich Park. Descriptively, the perception of minor incivilities is higher in Heritage Park and could be an indicator that the potential for victimization is high. This is consistent with the disorder model of fear in which more deterioration and poverty (Sampson 2001; Thompson and Krause 1998) and more disorganization (Sampson and Groves 1989) breed more fear. Again, this is also consistent with the Matthew Effect. In the more disorganized environment, adverse conditions have more influence on fear (i.e. “the poor get poorer”). Teens hanging out on the corner and misbehaving youngsters might be more of a signal for trouble in light of the other conditions in the neighborhood such as a higher crime rate, lower employment rates, lower education levels, and lower networking levels than in Rich Park. Again, these incivilities are symbols of danger (Warr 1990) and might be fostering a sense of lack of control in Heritage Park to a higher degree than in Rich Park. Incivilities signal to residents that norms might not be obeyed (Lewis and Salem 1986) and cohesion in the community may be jeopardized (Skogan 1990) with the consequence of increased criminal activity (Wilson and Kelling 1982). Due to the fact that incivilities are higher in Heritage Park, residents may feel helpless and out of control, which would more than likely increase fear. Regardless of the sense of lack of control, residents in Heritage Park again might lack familiarity compared to Rich Park. If the people perpetrating the incivility are unknown or anonymous, then the potential for victimization is unknown. Thus, the cues to danger might also be more anonymous or ambiguous, and hence, more frightening. In Rich Park, the perception of incivilities may
not have the same level of anonymity. For example, teens hanging out on the corner may be the children of close friends.

According to various theorists (e.g., Merton 1968) who discuss the rational choice basis of the Matthew Effect, the “poor get poorer” because they are less able to cope with external, negative stimuli. The coping inadequacy does not stem from inadequate “character” but from inadequate “resources”, defined in the broad sense to include attitudes of the resident (not limited to physical or monetary resources). There may be greater “resignation” in the sense of hopelessness (“nothing can be done”) when confronted with incivilities.

Both incivilities and victimization increase fear at a higher rate in Heritage Park. Conversely, the results indicate that several factors are more empowering in Heritage Park than in Rich Park meaning that these factors decrease fear at a higher rate in Heritage Park than in Rich Park. This finding supports a “relatively beneficial effect” (see Figure 2). For example, having children under the age of 18 decreases fear in both sites, but much more so in Heritage Park (IQR effect = -2.36) than in Rich Park (IQR effect = -.542). It could be that people in Heritage Park with young children rationalize the risk of victimization so that they feel comfortable letting their children play outside in a somewhat less safe environment. It could also be that women with children in Heritage Park are less likely to be outside at night which may provoke less fear, and there is some evidence of this. In Heritage Park, there are more young children so this might be especially true, whereas, in Rich Park the children are older generally (on average) and probably old enough to play outside unsupervised more often. Children in Heritage Park are slightly younger. For instance, 89% of residents in Heritage Park have children and
68% of those children are under age 10. In Rich Park, 59% of women have children and only 35% of those children are under age 10. In addition, respondents were asked if they go out with their children when they are playing outside. In Rich Park, about 5% of respondents with children between age 11 and 15 reported going outside with these children while they were playing and 19% reported they did not go outside with their children of this age. In Heritage Park, none of the residents reported that they went outside with their teenage children while they were playing. This is a significant difference (t = -1.87; p < .10). Alternatively, the empowering effect of having children may not be as strong in Rich Park because they have slightly more children that are 11 to 15 years old (24% compared to 21% in Heritage Park). Thus, they have to worry about their children being outside more and unsupervised more.\footnote{Although there was no significant difference in how often residents let their 11 to 15 year old play outside, the sample in Rich Park is older, thus there may be more older children that play unsupervised whereas in Heritage Park the children are younger so even if the parent is not supervising, other women with younger children may be effectively doing so. Even if the supervision is not intentional or requested, it serves as more eyes on the street.}

More interestingly, those network measures that have significant differences between the slopes were empowering in both sites but again to a larger degree in Heritage Park. Participating in neighborhood organizations decreased fear in the two sites, but the slope in Heritage Park was steeper. Having ties in one’s building did not decrease fear, but it did differ significantly between sites. This finding might indicate that where networking is rare, it is more important. This is most consistent with the “relatively beneficial effect” (refer to Figure 2).

In the same way, participating in neighborhood organizations has a much more powerful effect in Heritage Park (IQR effect = -1.39) than in Rich Park (IQR effect = -.420). Thus, it seems again that networking is more empowering in the context that has
more crime and more incivilities. Again, a “relatively beneficial effect” may be in operation (see Figure 2) in which scarcity intensifies the payoff. These neighborhood groups consist of community programs, social groups, youth groups, and church groups. Perhaps in the context that is more disorganized, participation in these groups increases the sense of control for the individual to a greater degree. Similar to the explanations offered above, the effect of participation in local organizations might be more empowering in an environment that is less familiar because it helps to lessen the anonymity. In other words, participation in local organizations is more consequential in reducing perceived risk of victimization where adverse conditions exist such as rare networks, short tenure, high incivilities, and lack of participation in organizations.

Perhaps it is a function of getting to know those who share your neighborhood and becoming more familiar with the environment. Or perhaps it is a function of increasing the feeling of being in control and trying to solve community problems.

Overall, a couple of themes emerge in this phase of the data analysis. First, there are some general contextual differences. For instance, victimization and incivilities had steeper slopes in Heritage Park and increased perceived risk, whereas, having children under age 18, knowing people in your building, and participating in neighborhood organizations had steeper slopes in Heritage Park, but decreased perceived risk. Thus, in these two contexts of similar size and demographic composition, conditions in the environment make a difference. In other words, context matters. All slopes discussed above were in the same direction in the two sites, but the magnitude of the effect differed. The slopes either decreased or increased perceived risk at a faster rate in Heritage Park meaning that the variable of interest was more influential in Heritage Park. Thus, even in
these environments where many conditions are similar and so many factors were controlled, there are still significant differences in how these factors affect fear in the two sites.

In general, the findings suggest that in the more disorganized environment, incivilities and networking are more influential. Incivilities and victimization are more devastating and create more perceived risk. This is supportive of the Matthew Effect in which disadvantaged groups suffer more from adverse conditions (see Figure 3).

Alternatively, networks help reduce perceived risk to a greater degree in Heritage Park. Networks seem to be more empowering in the context where networking is rare. This is supportive of the “relatively beneficial” effect in which those in a more disadvantaged context have lower expectations so that any beneficial condition has relatively large beneficial effects.

It may be that where fear of victimization is more salient, fear inducing factors have greater impact; yet, in those same environments, fear reducing factors have greater fear reducing effects. The salience of fear may be a double-edged sword: fear inducing factors have a greater effect, but so do some fear reducing factors. From a “system” perspective, one might be tempted to conclude that the social system is “self-regulating” to some extent. That is, homeostasis may be the net result: harms and benefits occur with a greater impact where fear is more salient. Note, however, that the beneficial effects do not balance out the detrimental effects of the fear inducing factors. Fear of victimization is, after all, consistently higher in Heritage Park.
Discussion of Findings of Main-Effect Slopes

Thus far, I have discussed the slopes that differ significantly between contexts in Table 3. It is also important to discuss the “main effect” slopes that significantly predict perceived risk in Table 3 (victimization, children under 18, loitering teens, close ties, activity, and neighborhood organization). These slopes do not vary between sites, but can be compared to the magnitude of the effects for the slopes that differ significantly between contexts (victimization, children under 18, loitering teens, ties in the building, and neighborhood organization). A comparison will be made of the interquartile range effects of the slopes that differed significantly between site with the effects of the slopes that were the same between sites, but had a significant influence on perceived risk.

In comparing the slopes that differ significantly by context to the significant common slopes for the whole sample, victimization, having children under 18 and minor incivilities have the greatest effects. These slopes differ significantly between site and also significantly affect fear to a greater extent than the other significant slopes (e.g., IQR effect in Heritage Park = above 1.6 for all three of these variables). Thus, the more “objective” factors, being a victim, having dependent children, or perceived minor incivilities have the greatest effects on fear. Perhaps this is because these are things that are most tangible or concrete. It seems reasonable that if one had been recently victimized and believed incivilities were high, fear would be higher. Since these things are slightly higher in Heritage Park, it makes sense that these effects would be somewhat higher there. Again, this seems to be supportive of the Matthew Effect in which the presence of these factors is more consequential in an environment that has more problems (shorter tenure, fewer networks, and higher crime).
Being involved in activities with neighbors also has a relatively large effect in that activity increases fear (IQR effect = 1.40). This is a slope that is not significantly different between sites (i.e. activities increase fear). However, it is a relatively strong effect. This is the only network variable that might be indicating an “indirect victimization effect”. That is, it could be that participating in activities with neighbors (e.g., going to dinner, inviting each other over for dinner, talking on the phone) increases the amount of information you hear about victimization of others. This indirect victimization effect of activity level could be a matter of more in-depth interaction taking place. Thus, there is enough interaction that plenty of information may be exchanged, but the level of support may not be present to a sufficient level to quell fear.

Conversely, neighborhood participation and having close ties have an empowering effect with a magnitude about the same as level of activity (IQR effect = 1.39, 1.38 respectively). Thus, while not as important as the other variables, the magnitude of their effects is still large. The slope of having close ties was not significantly different between sites, whereas, the slope for participation in neighborhood organizations did differ by site. Having close ties decreases fear at the same rate in both sites. Thus, it seems that context does not matter for this variable. In other words, being close with others is just as important in a safer, lower crime neighborhood, as it is in a less safe, higher crime neighborhood. Thus, having people whom you feel close to is empowering regardless of context.

At the same time, participation in neighborhood organizations has an empowering effect that is more important in Heritage Park. The magnitude of the effect is on par with that of activity level and having close ties. Once again, this is indicative of a
relatively beneficial effect where expectations are leveled to such an extent that even a little gain has a large effect. All these variables have a noteworthy impact on fear whether or not they have significantly different slopes between contexts.

In sum, these findings indicate that contextual differences exist to some degree. Heritage Park benefits more from networking (relatively beneficial effect) but suffers more in terms of incivilities and victimization (Matthew Effect). These findings suggest that in a more disorganized environment where networks are rare, they are very consequential for reducing fear.

There was no evidence of a relative deprivation effect (see Figure 1) in which adverse conditions cause more damage in a relatively safe environment. Similarly, there is not much evidence that the Matthew Effect holds true for both beneficial and adverse conditions. In other words, the Matthew Effect holds true when the variable of interest is expected to increase fear (i.e. “the poor get poorer”), but not when the variable is expected to decrease fear (i.e. “the rich get richer”). In other words, for there to be consistent Matthew Effects, networking should have benefited those in Rich Park to a greater degree (i.e. the rich get richer), but it did not. In sum, the “poor get poorer when the effect is fear inducing, but the “rich do not get richer” when the effect is fear reducing.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented the findings of the Phase II analyses. The Phase I analysis tested the effects of various theories of fear on perceived risk of victimization. In Phase II, differences by site were explored by testing for variation in the slopes of variables between the two sites. The effect of incivilities and direct victimization were
more devastating in Heritage Park whereas the effects of networks were more
empowering in Heritage Park. A Matthew Effect was offered to explain the former
finding and a “relatively beneficial” argument was offered to explain the latter findings.
This explanation will be elaborated upon in the concluding chapter as will directions for
future research.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY

Overview of Research

Fear of crime is known to be an important determinant of quality of life (Hale 1996). Fear of crime has several possible consequences that may lower quality of life including, but not limited to, the withdrawal from community activities (Jacobs 1961), withdrawal from outdoor activities, keeping children indoors, avoiding socializing with neighbors, and flight from one’s own neighborhood (Hale 1996). Withdrawal from neighborhood activities leaves fewer people to watch and protect property which allows more crime to occur (Jacobs 1961). Thus, fear and crime may be linked to the decline of inner-city neighborhoods (Skogan 1990). Public housing is one type of neighborhood in which this decline might be taking place.

Public housing has been notoriously stereotyped as having high crime rates including a high incidence of gang activity, solicitation, and drug sales. However, most public housing communities, although perhaps relatively disorganized, are probably as safe as neighborhoods with residents of comparable socioeconomic status. These safer public housing complexes receive less attention than the few notorious examples of highly disorganized, large high-rise complexes in large cities where safety is a major concern of residents and public servants. Thus, these high crime stereotypes of the large high-rise housing units may serve to increase fear among public housing residents, in general, even if they are housed in smaller, safer complexes. Thus, fear of crime is a worthy line of query in public housing.
Fear of crime has been studied extensively and the consequences are well-documented. However, studies of the causes of fear have yielded much less consistent results and paradoxical findings. In addition, public housing residents have not been the main population of interest in the research on fear (some exceptions include: Smith and Torstensson 1997; Rohe and Burby 1988; Normoyle and Foley 1988; Newman and Franck 1982; Feagin 1974, 1972; Merry 1981). This population is largely minority, female and, by definition, poor. The causes of fear may differ among this marginalized population.

In addition, ecological studies have shown the importance of networks on reducing crime in disadvantaged communities. The effects of networks on fear have been studied to a lesser extent than the impact of community cohesion on reducing crime (notable exceptions: Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Taylor and Hale 1986; Tyler and Cook 1984; Skogan and Maxfield 1981; Gates and Rohe 1987; Merry 1981; Covington and Taylor 1991). The effect of networks on fear among public housing residents is of interest in this dissertation.

More importantly, it is likely that causes of fear may vary, depending on contextual factors. This dissertation compares two local public housing units that are similar in size and demographic composition, but differ in management, tenure limitations, incivilities and crime rates. Thus, the effects of several common causes of fear were compared across the two local contexts.

The analysis proceeded in two phases. First, several theories of fear were tested in Phase I using the entire sample (Heritage Park and Rich Park combined). In this phase, theoretical concepts were operationalized and their effects on fear were tested.
among this public housing sample. In Phase II, cross-site interactions were added to the model in order to test for contextual differences in the effects of fear predictors.

**Findings in Chapter Four: Phase I Analysis**

In Phase I of the analysis several theories of crime were tested including direct victimization theory, physical vulnerability theory, incivilities theory, social vulnerability theory, and a social network model. The findings indicated support for direct victimization theory (i.e., Hypothesis 1 was supported) and the empowerment effect of social networks whereas no support was indicated for physical or social vulnerability.

Physical vulnerability as measured by age and ability to defend oneself were not significant predictors of perceived risk when controlling for victimization (i.e., Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not supported). It was surprising that these variables did not affect fear given that there is a fairly consistent relationship between age and fear established in the literature. However, it could be that age is not as much of a factor for public housing residents. It could be that the elderly in these complexes feel relatively safe because they have others around constantly whereas they might be more isolated if they lived alone outside of public housing. Conversely, it is surmised in the literature, that age would not be as related to fear if the exposure to victimization for the elderly was taken into account (Fattah and Sacco 1989; Stafford and Gale 1984). In other words, elderly people are less likely to be outside and away from their homes. Perhaps, this is even more true in public housing compared to private, separate housing because management may help with supplying resources and people to do errands so that the elderly do not have to get out as much.
Similarly, when controlling for network ties, incivilities became insignificant (i.e., Hypothesis 8 was not supported). It could be that women in these public housing complexes are aware of these cues to danger, but the adverse effect of incivilities is not strong enough to override the beneficial effect of networks. From a policy point of view, it may be important to minimize the amount of incivilities (both serious and minor) in these contexts, but it may be more important to find ways to increase cohesion.

In addition, it was hypothesized that serious incivilities would have more influence on fear than minor incivilities. Previous literature shows that physical incivilities are not as threatening as social incivilities (Rohe and Burby 1988; Wilson and Kelling 1982). Similarly, it was hypothesized here that serious incivilities would be more influential on fear than minor incivilities. In fact, serious incivilities had a larger effect on fear when controlling for all effects except networks. This hypothesis was not supported in these data when controlling for all other effects (i.e., Hypothesis 5). It could be that women in these contexts have become somewhat accustomed to minor incivilities. For instance, it is not uncommon for teens to hang out on corners in disadvantaged neighborhoods without victimizing anyone. However, it may be that drug sales, drunks, and fights are less common but pose more of a threat because they are criminal in nature. The perception of serious incivilities as compared to minor incivilities was rated as a problem more often in both sites so serious incivilities may be more salient because they are viewed as larger problems.

Also, social vulnerability was not supported in that education, employment, and tenure were not significant predictors of perceived risk (i.e., Hypotheses 6, 7 and 8 were not supported). In addition, having dependent children was hypothesized to increase fear,
whereas it significantly decreased fear. Thus, no support for social vulnerability was found net of other effects. Education and employment possibly have countervailing effects in which the accruement of education should be empowering but might also expose the person to more crime or more information concerning crime. In the same way, employment should be empowering, while at the same time, it places the person in a more vulnerable position by exposing oneself and one’s property to victimization more frequently. According to the human capital literature, these credentials should bring rewards. The fact that education and employment do not decrease fear in this sample is perplexing and worthy of further research.

More surprising, however, was the finding that having dependent children decreased fear (i.e., Hypothesis 9 was not supported). Recent literature suggests that it is likely that women experience altruistic fear (Warr and Ellison 2000). In addition, several women expressed (informally and qualitatively) that they have concern that their children will become a victim or a perpetrator of crime. Given that these public housing contexts consist almost entirely of women, I believed this phenomenon of altruistic fear would be common. However, the dependent variable is perceived risk rather than general worry, so perhaps altruistic fear is not measured here (although it stands to reason that a woman might altruistically worry about being injured due to victimization to the extent that she could not care for her own children). Thus, it would be interesting in future research projects to measure altruistic fear.

Most importantly, several network variables significantly reduced fear net of all other effects: having close ties (private level), neighborhood organizational participation (parochial measure), and quality of policing (public measure). Thus, it seems that
networks in these data are empowering at all of Hunter’s (1985) levels – private, parochial, and public (i.e., Hypotheses 10, 16, and 18 were supported and 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, and 19 were not supported). Quality of policing had the slope of the highest magnitude but this finding should be interpreted with caution. Rather than measuring actual interaction with the police as a local institution, this measure included an individual rating the frequency of police patrols and the perception of police improving the area. This is somewhat different than a true network tie. Public ties in the literature are said to be ties to local organizations that then can be used as mediums for sharing resources between disadvantaged individuals and the local institutions. Thus, while this measure is a measure of some sort of tie with a public institution it is not clear that there is social interaction between the individual and the institution to the extent that resources are shared. Thus, the conclusion that public ties decrease fear to the greatest extent in these contexts should be made cautiously.

The findings concerning the private and parochial level measures are the more interesting side of the story. The measures of ties at the private and parochial levels were very similar in the magnitude of the effect they had on perceived risk. While the private level ties, close ties, were found to be slightly more influential, the parochial level measure, participation in neighborhood organizations was of similar magnitude. Consequently, it can be said that the private level measure, or having friends close enough that they can drop by unannounced, is more influential on fear than parochial level organizational participation. In part, this suggests that private ties are more important in reducing fear. This means that strong ties reduce fear better than weak ties, which shows the limits the advantages of the “strength of weak ties” (Granovetter 1995)
in which better occupational outcomes and mobility come to those who use weak ties. In part, this finding is not surprising because the outcomes of interest are very different than job seeking, as are the mechanisms in operation. For instance, the mechanism of gaining occupational mobility is likely to be either increased information about available jobs or using a network tie to obtain a job interview. The mechanism of networks in reducing fear is likely to be psychological empowerment, social control, or social support (i.e., issues that involve high levels of trust and mutual reliance on each other). Thus, it seems that strong ties would be more likely to provide all three of these types of fear reducing mechanisms than would weak ties. In fact, researchers have found that private ties are the most important in trying to provide social control and supervision of children (Sampson and Groves 1989; Kapsis 1978; Anderson 1990). Thus, it could be that when the outcome is fear, private ties are more effective at reducing that fear.

The results of Phase I might also indicate some support for the notion of collective efficacy (Morenoff et al. 2001). Collective efficacy is the idea that cohesion within a community in addition to the willingness to protect the neighborhood and intervene on each others behalf will reduce crime (Morenoff et al. 2001). Collective efficacy is about social control in which communities attempt to realize the common goal of living in a safe environment. For example, it was found that social ties at the private, parochial, and public levels decrease fear. While collective efficacy was not measured specifically in this study, it could be that these ties reduce fear because people feel that these social network ties will intervene in troublesome situations, thus increasing the perceived control of the community. However, part of the collective efficacy argument is that communities lower in socioeconomic status are lower in collective efficacy. In
Phase I, the contexts are combined and both are low in socioeconomic status so there is no comparison to wealthier communities. However, differences in site were explored. Lastly, perceived risk of victimization was significantly influenced by site. Heritage Park residents have much more fear. It seems then that context matters. These contexts are very similar in size, racial, gender, and age composition but vary on some important disorganization-type factors such as incivilities, unemployment, crime, and networking. Heritage Park is more socially disorganized than Rich Park. Thus, the contextual study of fear across site was warranted.

**Findings in Chapter Five: Phase II Analysis**

In Phase II of the analysis, the cross-site interaction terms were added to a model similar to, but scaled down from the Phase I model. Multicollinearity was a problem for some of the interaction terms, thus these were not included in the analysis. In this phase, contextual differences between the two sites were explored. This test determines whether there is a significant difference in the slope of a certain variable depending on the context.

The findings indicated that context is important. The slopes for several variables differ significantly in their steepness depending on site. However, the direction of the effect was the same in both sites (either a positive or negative effect on fear). For instance, the slope of incivilities and victimization were significantly steeper in Heritage Park, meaning that these effects increase fear at a faster rate in Heritage Park than in Rich Park. Conversely, network measures decrease fear at a faster rate in Heritage Park compared to Rich Park. Participation in neighborhood organizations decreased perceived risk in both sites, but had more of a beneficial influence in Heritage Park. Similarly,
having dependent children had the same effect in which the benefit of children decreases fear at a faster rate in Heritage Park than in Rich Park.

Four possible theoretical effects were offered to explain these findings: Relative Deprivation Effects (Stouffer 1949), Relatively Beneficial Effects, and two types of Matthew Effects: “the Rich get Richer, and the Poor get Poorer”. The findings lend support for the Matthew Effect (Merton 1968) in which the poor get poorer and Relatively Beneficial effects (i.e., the poor get richer), but they are not consistent with Relative Deprivation or the Matthew Effect in the form of the “rich get richer” from advantageous conditions. While these may seem contradictory, they are not because the effect is contingent upon whether the predictor is a fear inducing or fear reducing factor. For instance, incivilities and victimization in Heritage Park increase fear at a faster rate than in Rich Park (i.e., the poor get poorer). Heritage Park is the more disorganized environment with the higher crime rate, higher unemployment, and more family disruption. Thus, it is the case that in these two contexts the more disadvantaged context suffers more from factors that are fear invoking. This is consistent with the Matthew Effect in which the “poor get poorer”.

While fear inducing factors are more detrimental for those who are more disadvantaged, fear reducing factors are more beneficial for those in the more disadvantaged environment. For instance, it was found that some network ties decrease fear in both sites, but in Heritage Park, they decrease fear at a faster rate than in Rich Park. In other words, where there is more disorder and networking is more rare, networking does indeed have a larger impact in reducing fear. It was suggested that this is about expectations. In the more disadvantaged context, it is likely that expectations are
low, thus, when a good thing happens, it has a more salient impact than in a context where it is expected that things will be good. This is supportive of a “relatively beneficial effect” in which scarcity strengthens the return or in which expectations are low so the benefit is high (e.g., rare social commodities alleviate more fear).

Interestingly, when the contextual differences are explored, only parochial level measures differ across site. In other words, parochial measures seem to be the most affected by contextual differences. Perhaps this is logical to some extent. For example, it may be harder to gain parochial ties in a more disorganized environment, so when they are established their effects are more salient. In other words, where incivilities are high, crime is high, and family disruption is high, it might be more difficult to establish ties at the parochial level because they may take a certain degree of trust without the level of closeness to reinforce that trust. That is, private ties are those that a person feels closest to and most comfortable with (often very close friends and family), which are difficult to form in any context regardless of the level of disorder. Also, public level ties might be difficult to establish because the resources might not be available in either context that could link the individual to the institution in an effective manner. Thus, it could be that the more shallow ties (specifically neighborhood organizational participation) have different effects across different contexts whereas the deeper ties have similar effects. It could be that parochial ties are more empowering because they are more difficult to establish in disorganized areas. Regardless of why, only parochial level ties differ by context in that their effect is more beneficial for Heritage Park residents. This parochial level measure of network ties was participation in neighborhood organizations.
Interestingly, the manager of Heritage Park expressed the lack of participation in local programs as the most important problem in the complex.

As mentioned in the section on Phase I, these findings might support collective efficacy. In Phase II, it was found that networks decreased fear at a faster rate in Heritage Park than in Rich Park. It is feasible that because Heritage Park is more disorganized, the level of collective efficacy is lower. In fact, networking was more extensive in Rich Park. However, networks were more empowering in Heritage Park. This might suggest that small amounts of collective efficacy are more important in more disorganized communities compared to disadvantaged communities that fare better in terms of disorganization. This hypothesis could be explored in future research.

Lastly, having dependent children in Heritage Park was more empowering than it was in Rich Park. Again, this is supportive of a “relatively beneficial effect” in which those with lower expectations benefit more from an advantageous feature.

The above mentioned findings are suggestive of several implications for policy and future research. However, these policy implications that are logically derived from these results are tentative and must await replication by future studies because this study is too limited in sample size and in scope to generalize beyond the specific contexts studied here.

**Policy Implications**

The findings of these analyses lead to several tentative policy implications. These policy implications are tentative, because of the limited scope of these data in that there are only two contexts. Further research is necessary to assess if these findings are replicated before any serious suggestions for policy change are put forth.
With these cautions in mind, the results of these analyses lead to some logical implications for policies that could improve quality of life and reduce fear for those living in small public housing complexes. In Phase I, it was found that network ties at each level (private, parochial, and public) decreased perceived risk. Thus, the logical policy implications are that increasing community cohesion and increasing both the depth and extensiveness of network ties would help reduce fear. For instance, fear was decreased by having more private ties. Private ties are those ties that are deeper (e.g., close friends and family). These data suggest that increasing cohesion through increasing one’s close ties might reduce fear. However, increasing the private level ties may prove to be complicated, for it is difficult to encourage (i.e., force) residents to establish deep bonds with one another. Perhaps these ties would be easier to establish if tenure was increased. That is, if women stay in the community for longer periods (as they do in Rich Park), then they may become more familiar with and more trusting of their neighbors allowing them to establish deeper bonds. However, in these data, tenure is not correlated with close ties in the whole sample. Although, tenure is significantly and positively correlated with close ties in Heritage Park (r = .157; p < .10), but is negatively associated with close ties in Rich Park (r = -.148; p < .15). Thus, it could be that there is a tipping point in which tenure becomes a detriment to the establishment of close ties or this correlation could be a matter of an age and tenure correlation in which those with longer tenure are the oldest and thus, they get out less often and socialize less with others. Tenure in Heritage Park is much shorter and the sample is younger so this effect of age and tenure is less present. Interestingly, if these findings (having close ties decreases fear and longer tenure is related to having more ties) are replicated, then the policy suggestion might be
to abandon the common notion that public housing should be temporary. For instance, the common rule is that the housing will be available for about two years. The temporary nature of the housing increases the turnover and probably impedes the establishment of deep ties.

Another way to increase the establishment of close ties might be to allow more relatives and friends to be referred as new residents by current residents. This “nepotism” might increase the number of extended families living in the community (but in separate dwellings). Of course, this nepotism might also cause some serious issues concerning the perpetuation of poverty among disadvantaged families (e.g., those who need housing but do not have a referral from within a complex), thus, this would have to be a carefully thought out plan as to increase cohesion while also offering equal opportunity to all those in need of this type of housing. However, extended families were common in Rich Park and the chance of selection into this housing complex, in part, was based on referrals of current residents because the management was concentrated among five churches. As seen in these data, Rich Park fared better on several factors including victimization and networking. Perhaps the prevalence of extended families was, in part, responsible for these beneficial effects. In order to reduce the social closure problem (i.e., the idea that those very much in need of housing but who lack network ties within public housing may be further disadvantaged), a limit could be imposed in which only a certain percentage of new recruits could be referred by current residents.

In the same way, policies might be implemented that increase the level of parochial networking (i.e., participation in neighborhood organizations). It was found here that participation in local organizations decreases fear. Policy implications could
focus on increasing participation in local institutions and getting those in the building to become familiar with one another through participation in community programs. This could be accomplished by providing incentives for participation. Interestingly, lack of participation in programs was listed by management in Heritage Park as one of the most important and urgent problems in the operation of the housing community. The manager stated that there is not a lack of programs available, but residents seem to be apathetic so participation is poor. Participation in organizations is empowering in that it decreases fear. Thus, it could be that participation increases self-efficacy (control) perhaps better than any other level of tie. Participation could be empowering because it is involvement in an organization which is feasibly trying to change, improve, stabilize, or maintain current standards. At the least, participation may serve to help residents establish connections with others in similar situations within an organization that serves some agreed upon community goal.

How should management go about increasing participation in local neighborhood organizations and programs within the complex? It seems that lack of participation might stem, partially, from time issues, child care issues, and/or personal investment issues. First, women may not have time to participate given their work schedules. Second, they may not have a babysitter or have the money to pay for child care while they participate. Lastly, they may not be invested in the community if they think the return is not relevant to their personal situation. The time issue could be lessened by conducting a survey asking the residents which programs they would like to participate in (and the ideal times). Additionally, the meetings could be offered at convenient places to minimize the time involved in getting to the meetings. The child care issue could be avoided by
providing child care at the meetings. If cost is an issue, organizational members could rotate child care duty at each meeting. These two issues are relatively practical in nature.

The investment issue can be seen here as more abstract and more complex. Perhaps, the personal and community benefits of participation need to be made clear. In other words, people need to know that they will get something worthwhile in return for their time and energy. Perhaps pamphlets could be distributed that listed the previous accomplishments of the organization as well as stating the relevance of the organization to the resident. Awareness of the benefits is probably best improved by better communication about the mission of the organization. In a more practical manner, participation could be increased with tangible things. For instance, local participation in organizations is an investment of one’s time and energy. However, this level of investment is not likely if residents know that they are only staying temporarily (e.g., leaving in a few months or even a couple of years). That is, participation might be increased by longer tenure because people are more likely to become invested in their space (however, again, tenure was significantly correlated with organizational participation in Heritage Park ($r = .267; p < .007$), but not in Rich Park ($r = -.122; p < .170$). In addition, immediate incentives could be offered to increase participation among residents. For instance, it was mentioned by a manager in Heritage Park that participation in organizations and programs is best when they serve free food. If free food is the draw, and participation improves communal quality of life, then food appears to be an effective incentive. More importantly, incentives could be constructed around residents daily needs such as rental reductions, food discounts, coupons or discounts on necessity items, day care coupons, baby supplies, or free training classes
(e.g., computer training). Again, management could conduct a survey of residents to assess the most popular incentives.

Further, the level of investment is probably contingent on the level of return. If the organization provides a return of little or no relevance to the resident, then she is not likely to participate. Thus, it is important to offer organizations for which participation has an immediate payoff for the residents. For instance, organizations that focus on educational needs or skills may be relevant. Organizations that are centered on improving neighborhoods conditions may be important to residents. In addition, social organizations or youth organizations that serve less practical purposes might still serve the purposes of establishing network ties. Perhaps if the importance of ties is made explicit to residents, they might be more proactive in joining local organizations.

Finally, local institutions could be involved in the creation of partnerships with neighborhood organizations. These partnerships might serve two purposes at once by both increasing neighborhood organizational participation (through making the relevance explicit) and by increasing institutional ties. One such cooperative effort could be made by linking the local policing institution to the neighborhood organizations by initiating a neighborhood watch program that is trained by police and reports back to police. This might serve to empower residents as well as to increase network ties to the policing agency as well as to other residents. Recall that at the public level of networking, it was quality of policing that was significant in decreasing fear.

The public level of ties included the assessment of police presence and whether the police improved conditions. Thus, the policy implication at the public level of networking is to increase police presence. Police presence could be increased by more
frequent patrolling on foot or by car. Conversely, mobile police substations could be stationed within the complex for a determined amount of time and then return on regular intervals. The more expensive idea would be to implement a police substation in Rich Park as was done in Heritage Park. Interestingly, the residents in Heritage Park rated the quality of policing as high. They are pleased with the police substation and the frequency of patrol by police. Alternatively, it is possible that residents might view this type of policing as intrusive and harassing. Thus, it may be best to conduct focus groups with residents to determine if increased policing will be effective.

Additionally, it is possible to use policing as one measure to help reduce both victimization and incivilities. Victimization was the strongest predictor of fear in both sites, thus, it is important to minimize victimization. Victimization could be minimized through increased frequency of patrols and more proactive policing measures. Importantly, the above mentioned neighborhood watch program could help minimize property crime simply by having more people watching the area.

Similarly, incivilities were a powerful predictor of fear until networks measures were added to the model. Increased police presence and neighborhood watch programs might be used to reduce both serious and minor incivilities. Outdoor drug sales, drunks, or fights could be dispersed by more frequent policing. Loitering teens and misbehaving children could be addressed by neighborhood watch programs. Police could crack down on those who are seen littering. Broken windows and poor lighting should be a target of the resources of management.

Lastly, in Phase I, having dependent children was a strong, negative predictor of perceived risk. The policy implications here are difficult to envision. It is not logical to
suggest that women in public housing have more dependent children. It would be interesting to further explore why having dependent children reduces fear. It is probable that this is a reverse effect in which women with children must believe the neighborhood is safe because they must let their children play outside. If this is validated by future research, then the policy implications are futile because women with dependent children are likely to report lower levels of fear regardless of the actual risk in the neighborhood.

The above mentioned policy implications were developed from the findings in the Phase I analysis in which well-known theories of fear were tested. Policy suggestions were offered that might increase community cohesion and networking at all three levels. Similarly, the Phase II policy implications infer the same necessity to increase community cohesion because networking decreased fear in both sites. However, this phase of the analysis was much more exploratory and based on only two contexts. Thus, the policy implications are even more tentatively posed than in Phase I.

From the Phase II analysis, the most salient policy implication is that context matters and these effects should be explored before implementing policies. A policy that is successful in one complex may fail in another complex. Recall that contextual differences are found in that victimization and incivilities increase fear to a larger degree in Heritage Park. At the same time, having dependent children and participating in neighborhood organizations decrease fear at a faster rate in Heritage Park. It was explained that in the context where conditions are worse, adverse conditions are more detrimental, but beneficial conditions are more advantageous. Thus, policies might be designed around decreasing incivilities and increasing community cohesion more aggressively in Heritage Park. The necessity of these policies is more immediate in
Heritage Park as adverse factors are very devastating and beneficial factors actually help reduce fear. Thus, the policies suggested in the section on Phase I could be implemented more aggressively in Heritage Park\(^{19}\).

Additionally, Rich Park could serve as a model to the management of Heritage Park. It seems that Rich Park residents are less affected by both adverse conditions and by beneficial effects. As mentioned earlier, Rich Park has longer tenure, lower rental rates, and their selection processes include referrals by current residents. These are some of the policies that could be attempted in Heritage Park.

To reiterate, the policies suggested above are logical extensions of these data analyses, but cannot be put forth as general suggestions for policy change in small public housing contexts, because of several limitations in these data. This study was posed as exploratory and limited in the number of contexts to be compared, thus, it was expected that future research would be needed to replicate or elaborate on these findings before any policy changes could be suggested in a serious and ethical manner. The limitations to the data are discussed in the next section followed by suggestions for future research.

**Data Limitations**

There are limitations to any study that should be noted. The most important limitations to this dissertation are the small number of contexts that are compared and the small number of cases (n = 148) included in the study. This study is a comparison of only two contexts (n = 2) which greatly limits the generalizability of the study. Comparing only two contexts does not allow researcher the benefit of generalizing these

\(^{19}\) One might argue that the two general results (the poor are disadvantaged more by negative factors but improved more effectively by positive factors) lead to no policy consequences whatsoever. That is, the social system is self-regulating. However, this is clearly not the case as evident by the fact that fear levels were higher in Heritage Park. The fact that fear could be reduced more efficiently in Heritage Park leads to the conclusion that additional investments there would have a greater payoff.
findings to other locations. At the same time, the researchers have no reason to believe that these findings would not be generalizable to other public housing complexes of similar size and composition. However, further research would be needed to replicate these results before any major policy implications could be argued. Alternatively, while having only two contexts to compare is definitely a limitation, it is also a strength of the study. The information that was able to be obtained in these contexts is much more detailed than a larger comparison would have allowed. This level of detail allows for rich comparisons between these two sites that are very similar in size and composition.

Secondly, the actual number of individuals interviewed was limited. Again, this limits generalizability. More importantly, the small sample size limits the ability to use more advanced statistical methods. For instance, the ideal data analysis for this research project would be to investigate interactions between the contextual level and the individual level. However these data would not support an advanced statistical package such as Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) in which the effects of community-level attributes on individual-level attributes can be tested. In addition, non-recursive path models would have been interesting to explore, but again, these data would not support such an advanced method. There are simply not enough cases to support the number of variables and paths that need to be included in the analysis. However, Ordinal Regression techniques were attempted but did not offer any benefit over and above Ordinary Least Squares regression, thus the researchers chose to use the more parsimonious and more traditional method that would aid in interpretation of results. It should be noted also that while the sample size is small, the researchers were pleased
with the attained response rate (76%) given the context of public housing and interviewer schedules.

A third limitation is the questions or measures that were not included in the study. Several themes would have been explored but were omitted from the interview because of the vulnerability and potential suspiciousness of this population. This population of African-American female heads of household living in public housing is marginalized already and likely to view interviews from a large university with some suspiciousness. Further, because theoretically, this is a vulnerable population, researchers felt that sensitive questions might damage an interview. For instance, criminal activity of the interviewee was not inquired about due to the fact that these women would probably not answer honestly and the interview might be ruined at that point. Honesty is not likely here because the repercussions of disclosure may be believed to be grave. These women are living under strict rules and regulations and the consequences of violations are severe (possible eviction). Thus, sensitive questions were avoided. In addition, some questions were avoided because it was viewed that the possible costs from the information outweighed the benefit. For instance, researchers were interested in attitudes toward the camera surveillance in Heritage Park but felt that the information elicited would damage further relations with police or management and limit the possibility of future research projects in this context.

It is possible that women replied with socially acceptable answers concerning the network questions. Feasibly, some women may have exaggerated the frequency and depth of network interaction in order to avoid appearing isolationist or unfriendly. Also,
it is possible that some women embellished their network associations in order to appear more popular or to convince themselves of their own popularity.

Similarly, we asked if mothers supervised their young children while they played outside. Of course, many women said that they supervised from outside with the child. Informal observation by interviewers contradicts this in that we noticed unsupervised young children playing outside on several occasions. It is likely that these women gave a socially acceptable answer to that question for fear that if they said they did not supervise they might be stereotyped as bad mothers or worse yet, reported to management. Another problem might have been the reluctance to admit if another adult was living in the apartment. This violation is serious enough to provoke eviction and thus, I have no idea if the women were honest on this question or gave the socially acceptable answer.

Lastly, some measures were weakened just by the sheer lack of occurrence. For instance, intergenerational closure was a main networking variable of interest. It would have been interesting to see the effect of intergenerational closure on fear of crime, but 72 of the interviewees did not have children under age 15 so the variable had to be omitted from the analyses. Similarly, work organizational participation occurred so rarely for women in both contexts, that the variable did not produce robust results.

These limitations could be addressed in future research endeavors. Future research could improve on this study by strengthening the weaker measures and comparing more contexts. The results of this analysis cannot be generalized without further research due to the limited sample size. Thus, future research is warranted to replicate or contradict these findings before any generalizations are put forth.
Future Research

Future research can compensate for the limitations in this research study. Future research developed from these results should be based on the interesting findings, as well as, the unexpected findings.

First, several findings were interesting. Most interesting to the goals of this research study is the finding that networks were empowering, in that, they decreased fear of crime. Thus, future research could be conducted to either replicate or contradict the idea that networks are empowering. This is also interesting because networks in the social capital literature are almost always posed as beneficial (Portes 1998 critiques the social capital literature on this fault). Conversely, networks and fear have been less studied in relation to fear of crime, but networks can be detrimental if they are a mechanism of spreading indirect victimization information (Arnold 1991; Box et al. 1988; Gates and Rohe 1987). These data support the notion that networks help decrease fear rather than spread victimization information. Future research is needed to discern whether this finding is unique to this ample or generalizes to other similar groups.

Another interesting finding was that having dependent children decreased fear which counters the finding that women experience altruistic fear in which they have more concern that their children will either become a victim or a criminal (Warr and Ellison 2000). Since the dependent variable in this study was perceived likelihood of victimization, it is feasible that the altruistic fear argument was not supported (i.e., the dependent variable inquires about risk of personal victimization, not about risk for children’s safety). However, future research is warranted in order to discern what causes this effect that having young children decreases fear. It could be a reverse effect in which
women must believe that the neighborhood is safe so that they feel comfortable letting their children play outside. Alternatively, it could also be that younger children go to bed earlier, so mothers of youngsters are less likely to be outside at night.

An unexpected finding was that age did not increase fear. This is surprising because age has been a consistent predictor of fear of crime (Hale 1996; Garofalo 1982; Braungart et al. 1980). Future research is needed to assess whether this finding is common among women in small public housing units and if so, why. Conversely, it could be that this finding is an attribute representative of this sample only.

In addition, it was unexpected that more network measures were not significant predictors of fear. For instance, network size has been a common measure of social capital that has been linked to occupational, educational, residential mobility, and social control outcomes. Perhaps in decreasing fear, it is not the size of the network as much as it is having close ties and ties at all three levels that are important. Additionally, other network measures were not related to fear. This may be because many of them are proxies for the various levels of network ties. Future research could improve on these social tie measures while at the same time assessing content.

The above mentioned future research endeavors are based on findings deemed either interesting or unexpected. Additionally, future research should be concerned with addressing the limitations in the data. As stated throughout this dissertation, the most damaging limitation to this study is the limited number of contexts and the small number of cases.

Thus, future research projects should be concerned with studying many more public housing contexts including those similar in size and demographic composition and
also some that differ in these characteristics (to allow for more comparisons). In addition, larger sample sizes would be preferred so that the occurrence of events is common enough to gain robust results (e.g., to avoid the problem observed here with intergenerational closure). Also, with the addition of more contexts and larger sample sizes, more advanced statistical procedures could be utilized. Most importantly, multi-level studies could be conducted to discern if individual level attributes are affected by community level attributes. In other words, Hierarchical Linear Modeling procedures could be used to explore whether individual level fear is affected by community level factors such as crime rates or population turnover. In the same way, with a larger sample size, path analysis could be used to study non-recursive effects (Liska and Warner 1988) in which networks affect fear and fear, then, affects networking behavior. In addition, more interactions between all independent variables could be analyzed in more depth which was not possible here due to the small sample size and problematic multicollinearity levels so, for example, the interaction between tenure and networking could be explored. Studies that are more conclusive of various contexts and larger samples will be more generalizable and will generate less tentative policy implications than were possible with these data.

Another limitation to these data was that some of the network measures were rather weak proxies of Hunter’s (1985) levels of networks ties. For instance, the measure of the public level (e.g., quality of policing) did not actually measure frequency of interaction or resources shared between individuals and police, but rather whether the presence of police was sufficient. While this type of measure that omits actual interaction at the public level is not uncommon in the literature (e.g., Peterson et al. 1997
used number of bars and grocery stores as a public level measure), a more accurate measure of the public level would include measures of interaction and resources exchanged between institutions and individuals.

More importantly, the main problem with the measures of networks in these data (and in much of the literature) is that questions measuring the actual content of the network were omitted. In other words, network studies need to include more questions about what type of information is flowing through the network and what types of resources are actually drawn upon in the network. For example: are women in public housing are really talking about recent victimization and do they really feel that their ties help them informally regulate the community? Often, in the fear or in the social capital literature (as done here also) researchers are measuring network size and extensiveness and then theorizing about what information or resource is provided by the network. Instead of theorizing about content, researchers should measure content. Future research should include better measures of the actual information flowing through the network. Many researchers express the need for better measures of network variables. They argue that measures must extend beyond name and position generators to more in-depth operationalizations that capture content, quality, and actual use of network resources (Lin et. al. 1998; Reingold 1999; Podolny and Baron 1997; Portes 1998). Although, these researchers note these limitations, they continue to use data that contain narrow measures of networks.

In the same way, these data are limited in measures of empowerment and self-efficacy. For example, it was theorized here that networks are psychologically empowering or increase a person’s sense of being in control. However, this study did not
include measures of self-efficacy. Future research could include inquiries about the connection between one’s networks and one’s levels of self-efficacy. This will help researchers better discern whether networks decrease fear due to empowerment issues, social control issues, or some other mechanism.

In order to gain quality measures of both network information and empowerment, it may be better to begin with some qualitative data. In fact, qualitative research would have improved the interpretation of these findings but this was not a feasible task due to lack of funding. In future research, qualitative data concerning what information flows through networks, how networks are utilized, how networks are established, and how networks affect fear would provide richness to the data that was not available here. Since networks are a relatively new line of query in the fear of crime literature, qualitative research may be a reasonable starting point and from these data, quantitative measures could be constructed. In addition, it would be interesting to ask about life histories including how these women ended up in public housing, what they view as the biggest problems in the community, and how they expect to become upwardly mobile. Reingold (1999) stated that qualitative studies might be an appropriate starting point for redefining and clarifying network associations, revealing the meaning of networks, usage of network resources, and how outcomes vary for people in different social locations. Incorporating these clarified concepts gleaned from qualitative research into quantitative studies may seriously improve our understanding of the mechanics of networks. Studies combining both methods would conceivably fortify the findings and provide rich interpretation of under what conditions social networks lead to positive versus negative outcomes.
Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, fear of crime affects quality of life and causes people (especially women) to restrict their behavior. Fear may affect some populations more dramatically and differently than the general population. For instance, in a marginalized population such as public housing, certain causes of fear may be more salient than others.

This research study has contributed to the literature in several ways. For example, this dissertation focused on fear of crime in two local public housing units, allowing the exploration of causes of fear among this marginalized population. Further, this study explored the effects of social networks on fear with the conclusion that networks yield empowerment rather than indirect victimization information. Most importantly, contextual effects were explored across the two sites and the result was that the causes of fear have more influence in the more disorganized community. In the more disorganized community, adverse effects (i.e., victimization and incivilities) increased fear at a faster rate while beneficial effects (i.e., networks) decreased fear at a faster rate. Thus, context should be an important concept of study in future research. While these findings are not very generalizable due to the small sample size, the results of this dissertation could be used to inform policy within these two specific contexts and especially to inform future research.
REFERENCES


### APPENDIX A

**Appendix A. One-tailed Correlation Matrix (Means and Standard Deviations)**

* * p < .15; ** p < .10; *** p < .05; ****p < .01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Perceived Risk</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Victimization</td>
<td>.229****</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Age</td>
<td>-.084*</td>
<td>-.217****</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Defend</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.155****</td>
<td>-.408****</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. General Incivilities</td>
<td>.331****</td>
<td>.185****</td>
<td>-.136***</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Loitering Incivilities</td>
<td>.330****</td>
<td>.262****</td>
<td>-.307****</td>
<td>.107**</td>
<td>.581****</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Employment</td>
<td>-.081</td>
<td>-.164****</td>
<td>.534****</td>
<td>-.351****</td>
<td>-.061</td>
<td>-.223****</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Education</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.180****</td>
<td>-.327****</td>
<td>.304****</td>
<td>-.131**</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>-.414****</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Tenure</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.424****</td>
<td>-.255****</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>-.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Children under 18</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.299****</td>
<td>-.566****</td>
<td>.360****</td>
<td>.154**</td>
<td>.234****</td>
<td>-.278****</td>
<td>.124**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Close Ties</td>
<td>-.095*</td>
<td>.100*</td>
<td>-.136***</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.120**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Activity</td>
<td>.092*</td>
<td>.129**</td>
<td>-.314****</td>
<td>.171***</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.184****</td>
<td>-.409****</td>
<td>.302****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Network Size</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.123**</td>
<td>-.116**</td>
<td>.141***</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>-.204****</td>
<td>.141***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Ties in Complex</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.121**</td>
<td>-.161****</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.119**</td>
<td>-.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Ties in Building</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>.141***</td>
<td>-.134***</td>
<td>.096*</td>
<td>-.149***</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>-.119**</td>
<td>.114**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Neighborhood Org.</td>
<td>-.113**</td>
<td>.210****</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>-.042</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>-.112**</td>
<td>.247****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Work Organizations</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.204****</td>
<td>-.118**</td>
<td>-.087*</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.262****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Quality of Policing</td>
<td>-.131**</td>
<td>-.195****</td>
<td>.234****</td>
<td>-.087*</td>
<td>-.154****</td>
<td>-.235****</td>
<td>.161***</td>
<td>-.151***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Satisfaction w/Mgmt.</td>
<td>-.185****</td>
<td>-.149***</td>
<td>.197****</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.103*</td>
<td>-.240****</td>
<td>.347****</td>
<td>-.214****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Site</td>
<td>-.275****</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>.134****</td>
<td>.087*</td>
<td>-.319****</td>
<td>-.271****</td>
<td>-.047</td>
<td>.232****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A. One-tailed Correlation Matrix (Means and Standard Deviations)

* p < .15; ** p < .10; *** p < .05; ****p < .01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Perceived Risk</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Victimization</td>
<td>-.279****</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Age</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Defend</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.239****</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. General Incivilies</td>
<td>.374****</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>.434****</td>
<td>.300****</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Loitering Incivilities</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>-.084</td>
<td>-.093*</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Employment</td>
<td>.205****</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.379****</td>
<td>.139***</td>
<td>.490****</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Education</td>
<td>.115**</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.151****</td>
<td>.275****</td>
<td>.187****</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.103*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Tenure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Children under 18</td>
<td>.212****</td>
<td>-.257****</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.215****</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.373****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Close Ties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Network Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Ties in Complex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Ties in Building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Work Organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Quality of Policing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Satisfaction w/Mgmt.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Site</td>
<td>.303****</td>
<td>-.243****</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.110**</td>
<td>.305****</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix A. One-tailed Correlation Matrix (Means and Standard Deviations)

* p < .15; ** p < .10; *** p < .05; ****p < .01

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Risk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Incivilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loitering Incivilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Ties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties in Complex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties in Building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Org.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Policing</td>
<td>-.124**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction w/Mgmt.</td>
<td>-.093*</td>
<td>.191****</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site</td>
<td>.191****</td>
<td>-.129**</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# APPENDIX B

## Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics by Site

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>IQR by Site</th>
<th>IQR Whole Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived Risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>.798</td>
<td>-6.72</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>-6.72</td>
<td>12.34</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>-2.77</td>
<td>-6.72</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>-6.72</td>
<td>9.91</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victimization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>.447</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.496</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>40.12</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>15.27</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>87.00</td>
<td>24.50</td>
<td>23.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>44.38</td>
<td>41.93</td>
<td>67.00</td>
<td>16.25</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>81.00</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defend Oneself</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.676</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.737</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Incivilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.647</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>.732</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loitering Incivilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>.763</td>
<td>-1.07</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>-.240</td>
<td>-.265</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.706</td>
<td>-1.07</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tenure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>IQR by Site</td>
<td>IQR Whole Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Young Children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>.984</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Close Ties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>.551</td>
<td>.600</td>
<td>.800</td>
<td>.318</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>.619</td>
<td>.600</td>
<td>.800</td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network Size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>.993</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ties in Complex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>-.530</td>
<td>-.530</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>.420</td>
<td>.731</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ties in Building</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>-.530</td>
<td>-.530</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>.947</td>
<td>.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>-.420</td>
<td>.731</td>
<td>-1.00</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>.947</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neighborhood Org. Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work Organizational Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>.444</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.819</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quality of Policing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.941</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfaction with Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Park</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.893</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Park</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.889</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX C

### Appendix C. Concepts: Description and Coding (factor loadings)\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONCEPT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>CODING</th>
<th>QUESTION AND QUESTION NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Risk</td>
<td>7-item index (standardized scores)</td>
<td>-6.72 to 12.34</td>
<td>41. How often do you worry about: a. Break-ins or burglaries into your apartment? (0.692)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low to high fear</td>
<td></td>
<td>41. How often do you worry about: c. Being hit or attacked in your housing complex? (0.610)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39. How would you judge your risk of burglary in Rich Park/Heritage Park (i.e., someone breaking in your apartment)? (0.600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40. How would you judge your risk of being attacked or assaulted in your housing complex? (0.522)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42. How safe do you feel when you go out alone after dark in Rich Park/Heritage Park? (0.592)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>77. How often do you worry or think about being physically attacked by a stranger? (Seattle survey) (0.622)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>78. How often do you worry or think about someone breaking into your home and stealing your property? (Seattle survey) (0.405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General victimization</td>
<td>9-item index</td>
<td>0 = no, 1 = yes</td>
<td>In the past year, have you yourself been hit, attacked, or beaten up such that a bruise or scar resulted? (Smith survey/Seattle survey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53a. In the past year, have you yourself been threatened by a stranger? (Smith survey/Seattle survey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54a. In the past year, have you had something stolen from you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55a. In the past year have you had your pocket picked/purse snatched or something stolen from you by force (stick-up, mugging) when in a public place? (Seattle survey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56a. In the past year, have you had property -- like barbecue grills, bicycle, lawn chairs -- stolen from your yard or porch?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Scores in parentheses are factor loadings
### Appendix C. Concepts: Description and Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57a. In the past year, has anyone broken into or illegally entered your apartment? (Seattle Survey)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58a. In the past year have you found a door jimmed, a lock forced, or any other signs of an attempted break-in into your home? (Seattle survey)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59a. In the past year, have you had any property damaged by vandals or strangers? (Smith survey/Seattle survey)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60a. In the past year, have you had your car broken-in to or stolen? (Seattle survey)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age In years</td>
<td>What year were you born?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to defend self 0 = no 1 = depends 2 = yes</td>
<td>74. Do you think you could physically defend yourself or ward off an attack from another person? (Seattle survey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical (General) Incivilities 1 to 3 Not a problem to big problem</td>
<td>51. Which, if any, of the following do you think is currently a big, small, or no problem in your housing complex? Abuse of kids (.878) Illegal Drug Sales (.707) Drunks (.677) Fights or assaults (.749) Harassment of women (.773)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Incivilities -1.07 to 1.14 Not a problem to big problem</td>
<td>50. Do you have any of these problems within Rich Park/Heritage Park? (Seattle survey) a. groups of teenagers hanging around the street (.618) b. litter/garbage/trash on streets (.734)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment 1 = full-time 2 = part-time 3 = unemployed 4 = retired</td>
<td>81a. Which of the following describes best what you did last week?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C. Concepts: Description and Coding

| Education | 1 = some grade school  
2 = graduate from grade school  
3 = some high school  
4 = high school graduate or GED  
5 = some college  
6 = college graduate | 80. What is your highest year in school completed? |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>logged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short to longer tenure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Dependent Children | Collapsed to 5 categories | 0 = 0  
1 = 1  
2 = 2  
3 = 3  
4 = 4 or more |
| | Including yourself, how many people in total currently live in your household? |
| | How many of them are currently under the age of 18? |
| Close Ties | 2-item scale, windsorized, logged | .00 to 3.58 |
| | How many times during the past three months, have you **dropped in uninvited on** any of your neighbors in Heritage Park/Rich Park, or has any of these neighbors **dropped in on** you just for a casual visit? (Fischer, p. 319) (.735) |
| | How many times during the past three months, have you **invited** any (other) neighbors in Heritage Park/Rich Park over to your home, or have any of your (other) neighbors **invited** you over to their home? (Fischer, p. 319) (.769) |
| Visiting Activities | 5-item index | 0 to 1.0 |
| | 12. Which of the following, if any, activities have you done in the last three months (with anyone, not only those in Heritage Park/Rich Park)? (Fischer, p. 330) |
| | Neighbor dined at your home (.756)  
Dined at neighbor’s home (.705)  
Neighbor came to visit (.545)  
Went out with neighbor (.737)  
Met neighbor out (.562) |
### Appendix C. Concepts: Description and Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Size</th>
<th>logged</th>
<th>.00 to 4.44</th>
<th>8a Do you have relatives currently living in Rich Park/Heritage Park who do not live in this apartment? How many … (451)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10a. Are there other people besides relatives in Rich Park/Heritage Park whom you know (name and know, not just name)? (898)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10b. [If yes], about how many people do you currently know within Rich Park/Heritage Park? (863)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11b. [If yes], how many different people in Rich Park/Heritage Park do you borrow from or lend things to? (713)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14c. [If yes], about how many different households in this housing complex do you visit regularly? (963)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. How many of the residents living in Rich Park/Heritage Park would you consider to be your good friends? (912)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ties in Complex</th>
<th>2-item index (standardized)</th>
<th>.00 to 1.00</th>
<th>15. During the past three months, have you stopped and talked with any of your neighbors outside your home while you were walking to or from your apartment? (Fischer, p. 319)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. Thinking about all the people you know not just in this complex, do you sometimes wish you knew more people you could talk with about personal matters and problems, or do you feel you already know enough people to talk with right now? (Fischer, p. 336)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ties in Building</th>
<th>2-item index (standardized)</th>
<th>-1.00 to 1.91</th>
<th>19. Would you say that you know all, most, some or none of the people in your building on a first-name basis? (Seattle survey)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. Which of the following, if any, activities have you done in the last three months (with anyone, not only those in Heritage Park/Rich Park)? (Fischer, p. 330)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Organizational Participation</th>
<th>5-item index</th>
<th>.00 to 4.0</th>
<th>26. I am going to read you a list of organizations you may or may not belong to. For each, please tell me if it is or is not an organization to which you belong. church group (.433) neighborhood group (.529) social group (.434) youth group (.752) other group (.616)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

144
### Appendix C. Concepts: Description and Coding

| Work Organizational Participation | 3-item index | .00 to 3.0 | 26. I am going to read you a list of organizations you may or may not belong to. For each, please tell me if it is or is not an organization to which you belong.  
   business group  (.844)  
   charity group  (.459)  
   ethnic group  (.872) |
|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Policing                         | 3-item index (standardized) | 1.00 = poor  
   2.00 = fair  
   2.24 = missing to mean  
   3.00 = good  
   4.00 = very good | 47. How many times in the past week have you seen police on foot or on bicycle in Rich Park/Heritage Park?  
48. How many times in the past week have you seen police in a car in Rich Park/Heritage Park?  
49. Do you think the police have made things better in Rich Park/Heritage Park in the past several years? |
| Management                       | 2-item index | 1.00 = satisfied  
   2.00 = somewhat satisfied  
   2.01 = missing to mean  
   3.00 = somewhat dissatisfied  
   4.00 = very dissatisfied | 5. Currently, how satisfied are you with living in this housing complex? Would you say you are:  
6. Currently, how satisfied are you with the management of this housing complex? Are you... |
| Site                             | Dichotomous | 0 = Heritage Park  
1 = Rich Park | |