ABSTRACT

CHANG, HYEJUNG. Mapping the Web of Landscape Aesthetics: A critical Study of Theoretical Perspectives in Light of Environmental Sustainability. (Under the direction of Paul Tesar.)

The main idea of this dissertation lies in a critical study of existing theoretical positions of landscape aesthetics under the broad topic of “Environmental Sustainability.” Despite its intrinsically experiential and potentially aesthetic nature, landscape as aesthetic experience has been largely neglected as a subject matter because of its complex interdisciplinary nature and the conceptual deficiency that surrounds this topic. This recognition led to an attempt to articulate the theoretical premises, conceptual frameworks, methodological characteristics and implications of these positions as well as their relationships with one another through analysis, evaluation, and suggestion of alternatives.

The study intends to make a series of arguments to support the following propositions: 1) Aesthetic meanings and values of landscape can have a shared structure with other human beings in terms of their psychological, biological, and ecological well-being, 2) Landscape aesthetics integrates and intersects three modes of well-being: the evolutionary, the existential, and the holistic, and 3) Landscape aesthetics fosters our moral attitude toward environmental sustainability.

The strategic focus of the arguments is on underscoring the potential as well as the impediments of existing theories to contribute to an existential, holistic, and evolutionary view of aesthetics, liberated from a too narrow focus on anthropocentric values and moving toward re-discovering them in a new light that articulates human universals—a desire for eco-centric well-being in place—in our relationship to landscape as a paradigm for environmental sustainability.
The expected contribution to knowledge is 1) To establish a useful framework for conceptual thinking about landscape and its complex value system, 2) To identify criteria for sustainable cultural, ecological, and social qualities and values, and 3) To identify features and manifestations of an “aesthetic” landscape as a primary motivating force toward a “sustainable” landscape: beauty engendering duty.
Mapping the Web of Landscape Aesthetics: A critical Study of Theoretical Perspectives in Light of Environmental Sustainability

by
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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of North Carolina State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Design

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APPROVED BY:

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DEDICATION

To

Minsook Lee, my beloved mother,
Living in heaven and in my soul,
Who has nurtured me to grow in Harmony and Humanity,
For being a great inspiration for
“Life by Green Heart”

To

Paul Tesar, my teacher, friend, and parent,
Revered forever in my memory and heart,
Who has nourished me to mature in Integrity and Sincerity,
For being a great inspiration for
“Thinking through Feeling”

And To

Young, my precious cat and daughter,
Sharing and suffering here-and-now with me,
Who has healed my Body and Mind in Peace,
For being an inspiration for
“Sense of Well-Being Together”
BIOGRAPHY

Hyejung Chang was born as the third of five children and lived half of her life in a small traditional house in the city of Seoul in Korea. Her mother was a great thinker and a humble learner, yet she fully devoted her life to raising her children and to planting and caring many small lives to grow. Her father was a professor of civil engineering at the University of Seoul, the same institution from which she received her first professional degree Bachelor of Science in Landscape Architecture in 1992. After her BSLA, Hyejung started to practice with firms involved with urban and transportation planning projects and extended her expertise to include leisure, tourism, and ski-golf resort developments in a number of professional offices in Korea.

During her professional experience in Korea, which emphasized scientific, analytical, and problem-solving skills, Hyejung became conversant with rational and utilitarian approaches to landscape planning and design based on the economic efficiency of land-use, but often confronted a moral dilemma: the conflict between economic and ecological values of the land. She started to believe that both the ecological and economic values of the land become reciprocal when we think of humans as part of the environment, as one integrated “community.”

Another realization growing throughout her professional experience in Korea was that project proposals appeal greatly to clients whenever an encompassing aesthetic vision was brought to the table, rather than just a list of economic benefits. Typically, in professional practice at that time, aesthetic and ecological issues were never seen as being on a par with political, economic, or functional-scientific ones; however, if other values were evenly
competing, aesthetic issues seemed to dominate other values, and she started to believe that aesthetics is not just a matter of individual taste, but that it has an inspirational force that has moved the human mind and spirit throughout human history.

Her inquiry into the relationship between ecological and aesthetic values was a motif for her pursuit of graduate education. After obtaining the National Licensure of Professional Engineer (P.E.) in Landscape Architecture in 1999 in Korea, she decided to continue her education at the University of Minnesota at Minneapolis in the United States. During her studies the question of this relationship still remained relatively abstract until she began to work as a research assistant in both urban and rural design projects. Some of this work made her think seriously about our basic assumptions about visual qualities and their relation to urban elements and features: that urban infill is a matter of linking all elements and features together as a network both natural and cultural, and that our existing approaches to visual function, perceptual ecology, or to landscape aesthetics are important but poorly developed in both theory and practice.

After her second professional degree Master of Landscape Architecture (MLA) in 2001 Hyejung worked for companies in New York and Florida, involved in a variety of landscape projects which allowed her to experience differences and similarities in terms of the nature of projects and professional climates or demeanors. During this period she lost her loving mother. The emotional impact from her mother’s death, as well as the absence of the old house where she had lived with her mother, was so deep as to influence her serious concern with topics that occupy her until this day: our sense of home, sense of place, and sense of well-being.
Returning to Korea to support her widowed father, Hyejung also taught undergraduate students of landscape architecture in Design Seminar courses entitled “Landscape Design Methods I & II” at Myrang (now Pusan) National University as a Visiting Instructor in 2004. This experience made her realize that teaching is an integrative means as well as the ultimate end of her own long journey of learning, and the most rewarding life-long project to which she would desire to devote herself.

Hyejung came back to the US to pursue a Ph.D. in Design at North Carolina State University beginning in 2004. Working as a teaching and research assistant under the guidance of Dr. Paul Tesar, Professor of Architecture, she has been exploring theoretical as well as practical issues of landscape experience as it connects with the moral and aesthetic dimensions of environmental sustainability. At present her design approaches and research interests lie by and large in environmental design theory and criticism, focusing on landscape aesthetics as the ecological, psychological, and existential sense of well-being with-in place, and on its relations to design practice in terms of perceptual narratives, typologies, vernacular landscape, and experiential patterns of landscape.

During the fall semester of 2008 Hyejung co-taught a Graduate Design Studio, “Design Thinking, Place Making, and Representation” with Professors Arthur Rice and Gene Bressler in the Department of Landscape Architecture at North Carolina State University as an Adjunct Assistant Professor, which allowed her to develop her teaching philosophy. She has several publications to her credit and presented papers at the 37th, 38th, and 39th Annual Conferences of the Environmental Design Research Association (EDRA) as well as at the 2007 Conference of the Council of Educators in Landscape Architecture (CELA). Her dissertation “Mapping the
Web of Landscape Aesthetics” was recognized with the King Medal of the Architectural Research Centers Consortium (ARCC) as the outstanding work of environmental design research of the 2008/2009 academic year at the College of Design at North Carolina State University. Hyejung Chang has accepted a position of Assistant Professor of Landscape Architecture at the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque beginning with the fall semester of 2009.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation owes much to the writings and the scholarship of great thinkers who inspired me, and whose example encouraged me to aspire toward the synthesis of a broad and complex set of topics connecting aesthetics, environment, and a belief in humanity. I sincerely acknowledge many of my intellectual debts in the bibliography of this dissertation.

However, words alone could never express fully my gratitude to my advisor, Professor Paul Tesar, for his intellectual insights, his unwavering patience, and his risk-taking support for theoretical work of this kind, saving me from many waves of self-doubt and pushing me forward. He has spent uncountable hours in reading and polishing my manuscript, and has endured with me my emotional and intellectual sufferings during my days in Raleigh. Without his unfailing faith in me, this dissertation would have been impossible to start let alone to finish.

I further wish to express my deep gratitude to Prof. Meredith Davis, director of the Ph.D. Program at College of Design during my years of study, for her equally rigorous as open vision for the interdisciplinary and scholarly direction as well as for her special contribution to laying the groundwork for our Ph.D. program as it exists in its present form. Introducing me to John Dewey’s thinking and her financial support for my intellectual exposure to national conferences were particularly significant.

I also benefited greatly from the kind support of Prof. Art Rice and Prof. Gene Bressler, who allowed me to observe their teaching philosophy in action and to connect theory and practice during my co-teaching with them in a graduate design studio. Without the help and wisdom of these senior professors this dissertation would have lacked relevance and focus.
I also want to express my sincere appreciation to the philosopher on my committee, Prof. Katie McShane at Colorado State University, who gave me a great deal of encouragement to dare to tackle the complex philosophical issues of my work and who offered the most rigorous and cheerful feedback on my thinking and writing. As a young and passionate teacher as well as a rigorous philosopher she also inspired me to shape the reasons and beliefs for my future. Without her advice, this dissertation would have been vulnerable.

There are other important teachers to whom I like to express my gratitude. I want to thank Prof. John Tector, Associate Dean of the College of Design, for his warm-hearted support. Particularly, my field trips to Charleston and Savannah with John and Paul were unforgettable excursions that offered much appreciated relief from the burden of my prolonged study. I am also delighted to express my special thanks to Henry E. Schaffer, Professor Emeritus of Genetics and Bio-mathematics, for his profound humor, inventive wisdom, intelligent pieces of advice—as well as the stern assignment of intermediate due dates he set up for me to finish up my dissertation—all delivered during times of walking or running around the track of our gymnasium.

I would be remiss not to acknowledge my existential debt to my family. I thank my father, Seokyoon Chang, for his always helpful advice on how to make independent and rational decisions in many things of my life. I am indebted to Wonjung Chang, my eldest sister, for her affectionate support, as well as to Moonjung Chang, my older sister (who also happens to be a philosopher), for giving me insightful and sympathetic advice on difficulties and confusions I have often encountered in some questions of philosophy. I want to express my special love to Wanjung Chang, my younger sister, and to Junwon Chang, my youngest brother, for inspiring
me with his accomplishments and maturity.

I also thank my two lovely nephews, Woojae Shin and Mooyeul Yoon, who were born and became young adolescents while I was abroad, but nevertheless found ways to express their unconditional and innocent love for me. My acknowledgements would be incomplete if I did not recognize the generous support of my aunt, Kisook Lee, who witnessed my happiness and pain and who provided me with true companionship during the past five years. My special affection also goes to Young, my loving cat, for her wisdom of stepping on the keyboard whenever I was “thinking too hard,” and for sleeping on my lap whenever I was feeling cold and lonely.

Finally, my endless love and gratitude to my mother, Minsook Lee, who gave birth to me, raised me, and who is still watching me grow from heaven for helping me believe that the world is beautiful and that life is worth living.
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Theory is a matter of understanding. Theory is concerned with discovering the nature of the production of works of art and of their enjoyment in perception. How is it that the everyday making of things grows into that form of making which is genuinely artistic? How is it that our everyday enjoyment of scenes and situations develops into the peculiar satisfaction that attends the experience which is emphatically aesthetic? These are the questions theory must answer. The answers cannot be found, unless we are willing to find the germs and roots in matters of experience that we do not currently regard as aesthetic. (John Dewey, 1934, p.12)

1. INTRODUCTION

Landscape is generally defined as “all visible features that particularly have aesthetic appeal in the area of land” (Oxford American Dictionary). It is a cultural and physical product of human interactions with nature or the surface of the land. Unlike our notion of environment, which broadly covers all complex subsystems including the biosphere, many facets of nature, as well as cultural artifacts, landscape implies a fundamentally human perspective. The word “perspective” has dual meanings: it refers to a visible or spatial as well as to a mental or psychological outlook (Aiken, 1976, p.23). In other words, landscape can be only perceived by both physical and psychological actions of people, as part of the physical or perceptual environment and as phenomenal scenes and events.

Landscape is then intrinsically experiential and potentially aesthetic—the terms “landscape experience” or “landscape aesthetics” may indeed be a tautology. Despite its
intrinsically experiential and potentially aesthetic nature, the landscape as aesthetic experience—while amply addressed in art and literature—has been largely neglected as a subject matter by both scholars of landscape and landscape architects, perhaps because of the complex interdisciplinary nature of its concepts, theories, and applications. The recognition of this conceptual deficiency has led to the following series of questions, which have guided the direction of this study:

1. Why has landscape aesthetics as experience not been appropriately addressed and clarified in the field of environmental design?
2. If so, why should we regard this as a serious deficiency?
3. If, as some would argue, the aesthetic experience of landscape, like any aesthetic experience, is primarily based on subjective or personal perspectives and preferences, why should designers care about this and how could they address this issue?
4. If, on the other hand, as this study will argue, landscape aesthetics has indeed an objectively identifiable human basis and thus rises to the position of a critical factor in the decision making processes of landscape design, is it not incumbent upon us to clarify its concepts, theories, and applications?

*We sense what it is, but we have little agreement on the what, why and how*

The aesthetic experience of landscape can happen anytime and anywhere. We all have a strong sense of what it is, and this sense is reflected in ordinary words—such as attractive,
pleasing, delightful, and beautiful—that are frequently used when we express a positive feeling toward distinct features or qualities of things, places, or events. To say nothing of works of art, all cultural artifacts, in either their material visible form—such as landscapes, cities, buildings, clothing, or food—or in their immaterial and invisible modes—such as conventions, customs, and rituals—contain aesthetic potentials to evoke aesthetic feelings. However, an aesthetic feeling is seldom describable with clarity. It tends to be circumscribed with terms for certain emotional states like satisfaction, joyfulfulness, pleasure, delight, poetic inspiration, or sometimes with such values as excellence, perfection, meaningfulness, balance, and others. Because the concept of aesthetics has much to do with rather complex characteristics of humanity, such as the nature of knowledge, morality, taste, and belief systems, aesthetic issues have been among the most difficult topics addressed by philosophers, aestheticians, and critics for over two millennia, and with little progress to show other than to agree where their disagreements lie (Holgate, 1992, p.17).

*It matters because it is about the quality of ordinary life.*

However, the ambiguity or the disagreement surrounding various conceptions of aesthetics does not mean that the aesthetic dimension of the experienced world does not exist in actuality. Rather, the substantial number of disagreements among aesthetic discourses indicates that aesthetic experience is a common phenomenon that every individual can grasp and participate in, and that it therefore is an important matter in the quality of one’s life. That is to say, as every life is unique and common at the same time, so is aesthetic experience; as the
“quality of life” is generally accepted as a fundamental value of human existence, so is the essential necessity of aesthetic experience implied in it, and this notion of quality necessarily involves cultural questions and moral matters as well.

However, while moral matters compel us to seek widely shared agreements on positions that can affect environmental, social, political, and economic concerns, aesthetic matters have not been as discussed, agreed upon, and valued in the same manner. This is due in part to the general misconception that aesthetic issues are mostly a matter of taste with reference to artistic volition in the personal domain, while moral and rational decisions tackle economic or environmental necessities in the public realm. Therefore, it seems that moral matters should be given priority to aesthetic matters in public affairs in general and in the decision making of environmental design in particular. Should aesthetic concerns be less significant and less influential than moral, environmental, political, social, and economical concerns? Certainly not, particularly not in the area of environmental or landscape design, because all quality decisions related design cannot avoid confronting aesthetic matters sooner or later.

It has been not so much about experience but about a subjective view of tastes

The study of landscape or environmental aesthetics has short history because most aesthetic theories and practices have mainly focused on the work of art. In matters of the conventional arts including music, painting, sculpture, and drama, or other performing arts, many theorists and critics have attempted to determine what the objects of aesthetic experience are, and to establish what criteria are relevant to the judgment of aesthetic value. Generally
aesthetic objects of the arts are understood as what is exhibited or performed for a voluntary audience, and valued by critics.

The development of museums and galleries in a capitalistic society has isolated the arts from common life (Dewey, 1934, p.8) because individual artists, producing limited numbers of one-of-a-kind works, needed patrons who could invest their wealth into a system that maintained a view of art as an essentially private activity (Gablik, 1984, p.26). Consequently, the objects of aesthetic experience have become predominantly limited to works of art in a gallery or a theater, and people have developed a tendency to accept their aesthetic values as proclaimed by artists and critics before actually experiencing them. In addition, the concept of aesthetics, considered mostly as theory of art or theory of beauty, has remained a highly elitist and individual notion in pursuit of inexplicable, indescribable, inaccessible, extraordinary, unique, and rare qualities.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that aesthetic issues in architecture, particularly in recent times, have followed a similar course to those in the arts. Even more than the other arts, architecture is bound up with politics and money and therefore susceptible to the dynamics of the market. Some buildings often receive recognition more on reputation than on the design (Berleant, 1992, p.129), and the value of buildings often seems to be judged as significant when appealing to those with power and wealth. In modern architecture, formal aesthetic theories and criteria have developed in concert with the advances of technology, keeping them in line with geometrical orders and functional necessities. Buildings as aesthetic objects have frequently been based on personal and subjective interpretations, thus rendering aesthetic attributes of
architecture self-referential and isolated from the public at large.

For example, while abstract expressionism in art represented an “inward turn” by rejecting materialistic modernism and by denying any political or social commitments (Gablik, 1984, p.25), Avant-gardism in architecture focused on an *inward taste* by having “a love affair with the unpredictable shapes and collisions” (Campbell, 2004, p.23). Similarly, the post-modern period of architectural expression—a reaction against the simplistic functionalism of modernist architecture—claimed to emphasize cultural and historical contexts, yet is often criticized as a merely intellectual game many of its protagonists played with architectural history under the pretense of cultural intercourse (Tesar & Chang, 2006, p.11). Even in contemporary architectural projects, the building as an aesthetic object has been often regarded as merely a visual artifact, and the experience of the building has been framed from a distance, similar to paintings or sculptures in a gallery. As such, architectural theory and criticism have illustrated their formal components similar to those of the arts, and by and large the aesthetic theory of architecture has been not much more than a theory of taste, remaining essentially in the “romantic-heroic” realm.

Conventionally, aesthetic issues of landscape architecture have been even more aristocratic and paradoxical. Perhaps this is due to the difficulty in defining space as an aesthetic object. On the one hand, “landscape could be everything, everywhere, everyview, and everyplace, therefore indiscernible, nothing, nowhere” (Goodey, 1986, p.83); hence, aesthetic issues of landscape call for an eternal discussion about mind, body, and the world (Mozingo, 1997, p.54). On the other hand, and in a more limited scope, when landscape was mostly
affected by aesthetic ideas developed during the 18th century—the century of aesthetics and landscape beauty known as the Enlightenment (Lothian, 1999, p.184)—the conception of landscape implied a predominantly ‘green and natural’ environment inherited from “English landscape taste” (Lowenthal & Prince, 1965). The transfer of the formal English-type gardens with distinctive picturesque features projected a noble view and pleasing prospects with the adoption of Greek and Gothic revivals, and became a popularized style generally employing the appearance of being elite in the English manner, particularly in Northeastern American landscapes (Hugill, 1986, p.411).

In addition, the travels of the members of the Bourgeoisie to Europe and their noble search for paintings and writings made a consistent contribution to American landscape taste, which reflected the love of English rural sceneries and the admiration for indigenous native features before the English colonization. Thus, both romantic European classicism and the ideal wilderness have continuously contributed to the conception of landscape features with two distinctive types: the natural or primitive landscape, i.e. nature-like, and the picturesque landscape, i.e. picture-like. These two favorite tastes have been “successfully” incorporated in our conceptual dichotomy of landscape: the natural versus the man-made. Contemplative characteristics from the works of Eastern art, such as Chinese painting or Japanese gardens in the 20th century, have strengthened the aesthetic focus on visual features: landscape came to refer to a particular view or scenery of landscape elements like mountains, lakes, parks, gardens, and agricultural lands.

Starting in the 90s, a growing social consciousness together with environmental
concerns finally enabled environmental designers to take different aesthetic perspectives from art, because both architecture and landscape architecture as professional fields are a public service to some extent. Even artists began to incorporate a social agenda, philosophical positions, and environmental activists’ beliefs into the numerous media. They escaped from the confines of the museum for an outward turn and began to exert their creativities to visualize and to transmit social and political issues into the public realm for a token of their participation in social activity. The sphere of art was broadened to occupy public space for the exhibition of aesthetic objects. Artistic manipulation became more socially conscious, evocative, and incendiary to reinforce the effectiveness of information delivery: experiencing art was receiving social messages through artistic media.

In architecture the increasing social concern reduced human life into two realms, public and private, and into two corresponding values: collective and individual or moral and aesthetic (Tuan, 1983, p.14). Unlike such artists’ voices, the social values and the environmental agenda for architects were wedded to planning principles which aimed at functional, rational, democratic, collective, and moral values, but they regarded the aesthetic dimension of their projects as both merely private and purely aesthetic. Landscape designers also began to refuse the elitist taste of garden-making and expanded their expressive realms from private to public landscapes. At times, artistic movements like abstract expressionism in art, or the Modern or Post-Modern movements in architecture, encouraged landscape architects to look upon their design objects as a flat artistic representation by manipulating the land surface as if it were an external canvas of an artist, the so-called bird-eye-view-master plan.
On the other hand, an ecological awareness of the environment motivated designers to perform a leading role in enlightening the public to perceive the environment as a natural resource they must preserve. In many respects, aesthetic concerns in both architecture and landscape architecture are seldom free from the criticism of being individualistic, private, visual, artistic, and therefore, hard to reconcile with social, public, environmental, and scientific demands. Even today the aesthetic field in landscape has not found an appropriate position on the boundary between public and private, between artistic and scientific, between culture and nature, with the great misunderstanding that it is irrational, inexplicable, unscientific, unprovable, and inconvincible, with no general aesthetic standard as a terrain of shared, public agreement. As a consequence, we still lack any successful concepts and strategies to draw improving consequences out of this aesthetic disaster (Nohl, 2001, p.226), and the public interest for this crisis has continued to be less significant and clearly subordinate to rational, moral, and environmental values.

By contrast, most human beings regard aesthetic experience neither as insignificant nor as idiosyncratic as many designers and researchers seem to think it is. People may not know about the profound works of art as objects, but they have every sense of what is aesthetic in their experience of dusk or dawn, a sunrise or a thunderstorm, a magnificent waterfall, a calm lake, falling leaves from trees, or experiences of many other ordinary things, as a comprehensive phenomenon irrespective of whether or not it is stated to be beautiful, artistic, and aesthetic, because experiencing the environment has to do with the experience of life. If indeed all experience in life has an aesthetic dimension, then so does the experience of environment. Since
things exist for us only insofar as we experience them, the aesthetic dimension is inherent in all perceived environment (Berleant, 1992, p.10-11). Aesthetic experience then is neither a matter of what it is out there, nor a matter of what we construct, but the matter of how to discover what is out there. What then are the aesthetic dimensions of our environment? Why and how should it matter to designers if an aesthetic factor is always present in any environment?

*It needs to be identified as a shared phenomenon among different people*

If we look around our contemporary environment we soon realize that the globalized digital environment has made our communications with things, places, and events much faster, wider, and always accessible if there is a place to plug in. The visual environment that heavily depends on human eye is getting faster, wider, and instantaneously accessible, whereas the perceptual world that depends on all of our senses and on bodily movement is slower, smaller, and often inaccessible. That is, the progress of technology makes things and activities of everyday existence more comfortable, but equally makes the bodily activities, that tended to be associated with them, regress. More and more the physical environment overloads us with visual information and mechanizes and manipulates our aesthetic sensibilities to become ever more responsive to commercial stimulation. Although all of us live with the desire for aesthetic experience, the contemporary environment offers few things to be describable in aesthetic terms and concomitantly makes us have few words to describe them, and consequently the opportunities for aesthetic experience in our daily existence remain largely barren and unrecognized.
Aesthetic matters in the field of environmental design are particularly concerned with the quality of life. A sustainable environment should be literally a habitat to sustain all organisms to properly function and interact with one another. Environment is where all life happens, where all living creatures learn to survive. The desire for well-being we all inherit and harbor motivates our aesthetic sensibility toward the understanding of a good quality of life across many cultures. Aesthetic sensibilities evolve with humanity and are sustained by culture, embedded in the interaction between the physical environment and physical activities. Seeing the physical environment as the object of aesthetic concern is not new, but seeing it as aesthetic experience is a more recent approach adopted from phenomenology. “The aesthetic aspect is descriptive rather than prescriptive” (Berleant, 1992, p.11), and it should be anywhere and possible to explain. For this reason I believe that environmental designers and researchers should be able to articulate an aesthetic theory of environmental experience rather than theory of art applied to environmental design.

Environmental design, however, is an integrated endeavor, needing a practical incorporation among architecture, landscape architecture, urban design and planning, and a theoretical marriage among studies in social science, philosophy, psychology, natural science, the humanities, and ecology. Theoretical perspectives of landscape aesthetics have often employed a random mixture of static art theories, architectural formal theories, and psychological, phenomenological, or social science theories, without substantial foundations and distinctions; thus, the aesthetic field of landscape research has lost its self-explanatory power. Such a theoretical void also gave rise to methodological deficiencies by relying primarily
on long-standing academic traditions that saw methods dichotomously as either quantitative or qualitative or as empirical or speculative.

Landscape research that has adopted a single theoretical foundation from either psychology, phenomenology, social science, or the literature of the arts has revealed its methodological deficiencies: on the one hand, a psychological social science approach on a quantitative, empirical basis has been legitimately criticized for its sometimes naïve and too linear evaluations among variables of stimuli-response; on the other hand, the qualitative, interpretive approach from phenomenology, hermeneutics, or the literature of the arts often confronts an equally legitimate criticism for its dependence on too subjective personal statements.

“Why should we want to make a landscape a focal interest? Why study it, why does it seem worthy of our close attention?” continues Tuan (1979, p.100), “Here is a tentative answer: yearning for an ideal and humane habitat is perhaps universal. Such a habitat must be able to support a livelihood and yet cater to our moral and aesthetic nature.” Even if our aesthetic appreciation can exhibit individual peculiarities or differ from culture to culture in its degree and its kind, and even if a diversity of theories intend to interpret the different experiences of art and landscape, it does not necessarily mean different things to different people. Tuan’s tentative answer above is the question of my study and the proposition I argue for: if we believe that landscape as a humane habitat supports a livelihood, and thus our moral and aesthetic nature, it is worthwhile to try to clarify what landscape experience is or is about, to explain why it supports the aesthetic and moral nature of humanity, and to suggest how we go about
achieving it in our environmental practice.

Therefore, my study attempts to critically examine existing theoretical positions on the broad topic of “environmental aesthetics” or “landscape aesthetics”—with all the multi-dimensional confusion that surrounds this topic—and to articulate and compare their assumptions, premises, methods, and implications, as well as their relationships with one another, through similarity and contrasts. By doing so, I expect to envision a framework for an alternative paradigm, or conceptual framework, and to suggest related methodological possibilities for our understanding of the aesthetic value of landscape experience as a widely shared human phenomenon arising from our shared roots as biological, ecological, and cultural beings. Finally I will argue that environmental and landscape aesthetics, if approached from this vantage point, will emerge as intimately intertwined with questions of environmental ethics and become a fundamental factor in our thinking about issues of environmental sustainability.

2. STRATEGY

Landscape allows and even encourages us to dream. It does function as a point of departure. Yet it can anchor our attention because it has components that we can see and touch. As we first let our thoughts wander and then refocus them on the landscape, we learn to see not only how complex and various are the ways of human living but also how difficult it is to achieve anywhere a habitat consonant with the full potential of our being. (Tuan, 1979, p.100)

My study attempts to make a series of arguments to support the following three hypothetical statements:
Propositions

- Aesthetic meanings and values of landscape can have a shared structure with other human beings in terms of their psychological, biological, phenomenological, and ecological well-being.
- Landscape aesthetics integrates and intersects three modes of well-being: the evolutionary, the existential, and the holistic.
- Landscape aesthetics fosters our moral attitude toward environmental sustainability.

In order to make a supporting series of arguments, the study attempts to critically evaluate existing ideas and perspectives that have been believed, accepted, and used—both appropriately and inappropriately—in the area of landscape aesthetics, and as they relate to my propositions.

Systemic (discursive) argumentation

“Critical approach to reasoning necessarily involves the activity of philosophizing, and philosophical thinking helps us to clarify issues and stances, asking questions and seeking answers” (Stramel, 1995, p.6). Critical thinking involves a systemic (discursive) argumentation, which “attempts to situate a well-defined thing or issue in a systemic framework that can have explanatory or utilitarian power over all instances of that thing or issue” (Groat & Wang, 2002, p.93). Therefore, the entire mission of this study is “to frame a logical conceptual system that interconnects previously unknown and unappreciated factors in relevant ways” (p.302). In this
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regard discursive argumentation “is very useful in providing theoretical foundations for a wide range of empirical manifestations. It tends to culminate in the theoretical system itself as an outcome, rather than have the logical framework be a means to other outcomes” (p.334).

Figure 1: A system of argumentation of the study

As seen in Figure 1, the study uses mainly a heuristic\(^1\) approach as a critical and creative method. The heuristic approach aims to understand, to systemize, to organize, to analyze, to look for relations and meanings, and to construct a system of values. Such a philosophical approach to aesthetic theory or criticism for landscape or art cannot “rest simply in the role of neutral, quasi-scientific commentators,” but it requires us to re-work our material, as we select, 

\(^1\) It is a method—often called the trial-and-error method that is not certain to arrive at an optimal solution, yet it relates to general strategies for solving problems, in turn leading to learning and discovery.
sift through and organize it (Hepburn, 2002, p.28). Hence, the basic structure of the argumentation entails a critical as well as a creative process (or holistic as well as heuristic process) along with comparison, analysis, evaluation, and synthesis.

Chapter 1 re-examines and questions the existing web of inquiries, and compare, analyze, and evaluate the existing answers. The findings of Chapter 1 lead to the need for an evaluation and re-conceptualization of divergent paradigms that have separated interrelated problems, which I discuss in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is a convergent and synthetic process that integrates fundamental premises of the existing paradigms and delineates an alternative conceptual direction of approaching the problems. This conceptual framework and possible theoretical position then serve as a lens through which to explore further questions, by re-visiting, re-connecting, and re-discovering issues, implications, and applications from existing theories and their relations to one another in a new light: “aesthetics from below,” “aesthetics from above,” and “aesthetics from the center,” all of which are conceptually independent, yet experientially interdependent, as discussed in Chapter 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Chapter 7 finally evaluates my own arguments on the issues of the previous chapters, and also suggests some possible practical upshots for the future study.
I still believe that a concept such as landscape offers a wonderful potential for reuniting our fragmented experience and understanding. Such a device is necessary to help free us from three millennia of the de-spiritualizing of a world ultimately whole and sacred, and the splintering of ideas conferred on modern thought by three centuries of materialist greed and waste. (Paul Shepard, 1967, p.xxvi)

1. TRENDS OF LANDSCAPE RESEARCH AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Starting from the 1960s, when there was a rising interest and commitment to environmental quality that peaked through the 1970s, and fluctuated and decelerated in the 1980-90s, the studies of landscape aesthetics have tended to become a relatively less popular issue to most productive landscape researchers (see Figure 1.1). It may be not only due to the misconception that aesthetic matters are neither researchable nor significant to environmental sustainability, but also to a philosophical challenge to substantiate the nature of landscape and its value considerations. A substantial part of contemporary landscape research has shown a strong inclination toward issues relevant to land use policies and legislations, and many studies of landscape aesthetics have aimed to develop effective empirical criteria for decision-making in planning and management.

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2 Especially on the idea of visual resource since the 1960s, see Litton (1990), Ch.9, and Cousins’ (2003, Oct.) chronological summary of a brief history of environmental policy.
**CHAPTER 1**  Critical Inquiries of Landscape Aesthetics

**Figure 1.1:** Rends of landscape research and legislative intentions
Thus, it is useful to first ponder upon how landscape aesthetics has been addressed in a spectrum of contemporary research, second to re-view the inquiries and arguments perpetuating some of the core issues in landscape architecture, and finally to examine the research questions that have been raised yet not answered, or those that need to be further raised or explored in landscape architecture. This should not only help to highlight the importance of landscape aesthetics as well as to justify a philosophical approach to it, but also to guide us to a further step as a future challenge, which I propose to call a sustainable paradigm for landscape aesthetics.

As seen in Figure 1.1, in the 1960s many legislations, such as the Wilderness Act of 1964, The Highway Beautification Act of 1965, the US Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, and The National Trail System Act of 1968, were passed with the intent to establish effective land management policies. As a consequence of these legislations a substantial amount of research was conducted for practical applications to environmental planning policy and useful to landscape evaluation and scenic quality management of both the urban and the natural landscape. The quantitative and the comparative assessments of landscape resources were the most popular approaches to the policies for scenic management.

In the late 1960s The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 triggered many attempts to “assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings” (NEPA of 1969, section 101, (2)) and there was significant theoretical support for this practice. Lynch’s (1960) “The Image of the City,” Appleyard’s (1965) “The View from the Road,” and Thiel’s (1961) “A Sequence-Experience Notation”
Critical Inquiries of Landscape Aesthetics

proposed concepts and principles that were the most influential in the field of landscape architecture and urban design for the improvement of the city image, for the refinement of the views from urban streets, and for human experience, respectively. Besides, there were significant endeavors for empirical inventories for designers and planners, such as Litton’s (1968) “Forest Landscape Description and Inventories” and Steinitz’s (1969) “A Comparative Study of Resource Analysis Methods.”

As a result a considerable number of research endeavors in the 1970s were heavily weighted toward landscape quality assessment on an empirical basis, under the assumption that the safe, the healthful, and the productive quality of landscape is a significant determinant for environmental qualities. There also was a momentum of public concern and of legislative appropriations, such as US Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, the US Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, the US National Forest Management Act of 1976, the US Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act of 1977, and the Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1978, which were intended to support the operation of such agencies as the Forest Service, the Social Conservation, and the National Park Service (Litton, 1990, p.114). Studies for the identification and the classification of landscape features were intended to serve as a significant indicator for a healthy, productive, and aesthetically pleasing environment, with the underlying notion that landscape is considered as a natural resource continuum as well as a commodity (Zube, 1976, p.92).

In addition, during this period the public scenic preference or consensus on particular landscape qualities were regarded as aesthetically and culturally significant variables, heavily
influenced from environmental psychology and the methods of social science. In this manner, both the quantification of public preferences and the classification of landscapes with aesthetic qualities became a natural trend in empirical research of landscape. However, on the other side of landscape research, historic and cultural meanings as landscape quality were not entirely neglected. Appleton (1975a) pointed out the theoretical vacuum in the studies of landscape evaluation, and published his famous book (1975b) “The Experience of Landscape” in which he proposed a powerful theory based on aesthetic, cultural and biological symbolism in landscape perception.

Along with Appleton, Tuan’s (1974, 1977) “Topophilia” and “Space and Place” emphasized environmental narratives and aesthetics influenced by the phenomenological perception of the cultural and symbolic landscape, and Wohlwill’s (1976, p.77, p.81) writings on environmental psychology, the arts, or landscape painting were also a remarkable attempt in humanities-based empirical research. However, there also was a criticism of these cultural studies as being based on a too personal, subjective, arbitrary, and slippery interpretation of ephemeral landscapes: the approaches from cultural and historic perspectives were undoubtedly regarded as meaningful, but at the same time considered as insufficiently objective to qualify as rigorous research. Daniel and Boster’s (1976) proposal for a “Scenic Beauty Estimation Method” exemplifies this classic belief that aesthetic quality in landscape can be measured objectively. In opposition, Carlson (1977) criticized the ambition of a quantification of scenic beauty with philosophical rigor in his article “On the Possibility of Quantifying Scenic Beauty,” and brought the issue more into the critical and empirical realm of environmental aesthetics by
The intentions of legislations from the 1980s to the 1990s saliently dealt with global principles and comprehensive strategies, such as the International Tropical Timber Agreement of 1983 and the World Conservation Strategy in 1984. During these two decades fewer legislations were passed, but environmental perception and aesthetics became more prevalent keywords for landscape researchers. The general assumption still was that landscape aesthetics is a social and public phenomenon, and that it should be possible for a series of scientific explanations for environmental perception to concomitantly explain the subject matter of aesthetic phenomena.

Landscape was regarded as the social, the public, and the environmental realm of aesthetics, and contributions to seeking empirical relationships between human behavior and environmental qualities were made primarily by the approaches of cognitive psychologists, physiologists, and social scientists to human needs. Many scholars and researchers (Carlson & Sadler, 1982; Zube, 1984; Zube, Sell, & Talyor, 1982) tried to bridge the gap between environmental aesthetics and planning, between theory and practice, and between the subjective and the objective perspectives. Kaplan and Kaplan (1982, 1989) made remarkable theoretical contributions to the study of landscape aesthetics in terms of public preference from a psychological perspective of the natural environment.

Starting from the late 1980s to the present, along with the growing consciousness of landscape as ecological resource, there were some scholarly efforts on bridging the gap between the beautiful and the ecological in the area of landscape design and planning as a part of
bridging conflicts between human perception and the ecological nature of the environment. Koh (1988) and Spirn (1990) suggested a unified vision of an ecological aesthetic as a theoretical basis for landscape perception. For designers and planners, Steinitz (1990a) empirically examined the characteristics of a sustainable landscape with both high visual preference and high ecological integrity in the case study of Acadia National Park, and Thorne and Huang (1991) attempted to establish methodologies appropriate toward ecological landscape aesthetics. Aesthetic values sought in most empirical studies, however, seldom appeared to be ecologically relevant. If studies had addressed aesthetic quality at an empirical level, they would have been concerned either with public preferences regarding the physical attributes of particular types of natural landscapes, or with the correlation among variables in either visual perception or psychological and economic dimensions of well-being in environmentally sensitive areas.

Since The Rio Declaration of United Nations in 1992, a new environmental agenda, “Sustainable Environment,” which concerns equally the development and the preservation of the environment, has driven the academic atmosphere of the fields of environmental design. Research efforts looking for the most significant determining factors of landscape and environmental quality tend to bend toward ecological and cultural diversity as well as social and political democracy. Even today, issues of quality of life or of quality of landscape, i.e. environmental sustainability on which the vast amount of research focuses, tend to be rampantly replaced by other relevant quality issues with little distinct definition, such as sense of place, ecological or environmental quality, environmental satisfaction, visual preference, and sense of attachment, and the like. In the field of the aesthetic evaluation of landscape, Daniel
produced great deal of empirical research based on scenic preferences and visual assessment of different types of landscapes, and at the same time, Nassauer (1995, 2007), Mozingo (1997), and Gobster (1999, 2001) made particular efforts in seeking practical criteria to reconcile the conflict between ecological sustainability and environmental aesthetics for landscape management and planning.

The growing concern about human well-being and the quality of life in the environment have liberated and expanded our views of aesthetics from a predominantly elitist pursuit at the service of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie into the public, social, and environmental realms of today. Aesthetic quality of the environment is now generally recognized as an inevitably significant environmental value on the one hand, yet at the same time is widely regarded as too complex and intangible to articulate on the other. Many philosophers such as Berleant (1992, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2005), Carlson (1985, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2006) and others are dedicated to the development of arguments, of both a formal and an experiential nature, as a theoretical basis of aesthetic appreciation of the nature or the natural environment, independent of the classic vision of aesthetics of the arts. Even for environmental experts “landscape aesthetics may still remain as an uncertain challenge in environmental studies,” states Ribe (1999). Nevertheless, “even if it may be a more difficult part of its task, theory must deal with the aesthetic aspect of cities” (Lynch, 1981, p.104).

Since the late 1980s, aesthetic matters in the field of environmental design have been downgraded as a basis for sustainable design by the conventional, and often misunderstood,
view that “Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder.”

Much criticism of landscape evaluation through visual resource assessment also made a negative contribution to the aesthetic study of landscape, shifting scholarly attention from aesthetics to ecology under the premise that visual aesthetics is a mask that deceives our eyes to see the true nature of the real land-ecosystem.

Some exceptional studies have been done by such landscape scholars as Bourassa (1988, 1990, 1991), Daniel and Vining (1983), Litton (1982, 1990), Sancar (1985, 1993), Porteous (1996), Zube, Sell, and Talyor (1982), and Zube (1984), who have made extensive efforts to integrate the issues and problems in landscape aesthetics, and who have argued for the necessity of a reliable paradigmatic basis and a conceptual model on which many empirical research and design and planning principles could be built. Rarely have these voluminous studies suggested a single plausible model in which the controversial problems in both theory and practice of landscape aesthetics can be resolved, but rather have offered “A range of possibilities for interdisciplinary collaboration to yield holistic perspectives on the kinds of environments which can enrich our lives” (Carlson & Sadler, 1982, p.165), which may guide us toward a future direction.

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3 Most recently Lothian (1999) claimed that the view of landscape in the eye of the beholder is right, in his historical review of the philosophy of aesthetics based on an epistemological dichotomy: quality inherent either in the landscape or in the eye of the beholder.
2. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Critical questions, by their very nature, have often not been asked because they may raise fundamental questions about the credibility and the validity of existing conventions of the discipline, and thereby aim to construct a new vision as a catalyst of change. Educators and professionals in landscape architecture had not started to seriously deal with critical questions in a scholarly manner until the early 1990s, such as “what are critical inquiries” (McAvin, Meyer, Corner, Shirvani, Helphand, Riley, & Scarfo, 1991) and “what are the most important questions” (Riley & Brown, 1992). It may be efficient at this point to examine the questions and issues that have been regarded as both critical and important, and to assess their relevance to aesthetic discourses in landscape architecture as a discipline as well as a profession.

2.1 CRITICAL INQUIRIES ON LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE

Thoughts and comments among landscape professionals and educators on critical inquiry and landscape architecture (McAvin et al., 1991) are diverse and divergent, yet some shared groups of ideas can be identified. The first is to clarify what critical inquiry is about. Many believe that it is about criticism and theory, which are mutually informing. “Theory can be a synthesis or explanation of particular critical observations, and it also can be tested and refined or transformed through specific applications in criticism (McAvin).” Similarly, criticism

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4 “Critical inquiry” is here used as a general term different from “critical theory” as literary criticism or as a social theory that came from the Frankfurt School of social science.
in landscape architectural design is defined as “a body of thought and school of knowledge (Meyer),” and it is “paramount to the success and sophistication of our design theory and practice (Corner).” Thus, the development of a critical framework in landscape architectural design must be “essential and inclusive rather than esoteric or peripheral (McAvin),” and must require “a broad knowledge of original literacy, historical and philosophical texts, and an awareness of culture, ways of life (Shirvani).”

The second is about the characteristics of critical inquiry. Critical inquiry in design that necessarily involves theory and criticism has to be “interpretive, evaluative, and creative (McAvin; Helphand; Riley).” It means to be “neither positive nor prescriptive, but rather therapeutic or normative (Corner; Shirvani).” Critical inquiry should serve as “the explication of content and context (Meyer),” which leads to thoughtful analysis of value, namely evaluation in design as both process and product. In other words, critical inquiry—i.e. theory and criticism—involves the interpretive, analytical, and creative development of “value judgment (Helphand)” on a good design, not a matter of opinion. By doing so, a design process itself becomes both “self-critical and self-renewing (Meyer)” to produce the new ways to think. Landscape architectural design as critical inquiry “focuses not only on asking or explaining how and what but on keeping why questions alive (Shirvani)” ; thus it is both “conservative and revolutionary (Corner).”

The third is about tools and methods of critical inquiry. If criticism is not a matter of opinion, then the critic must be explicit in stating the framework of analysis and standards of evaluation. “There must be different models and methods grounded in both art and science
Critical Inquiries of Landscape Aesthetics

(Scarfo)” provided for research and scholarship of critical inquiry. “The scientific model seeks objective truth by rigorous accountability and methodologies, and the humanities and the liberal arts appear to be softer, yet no less rigorous, as they probe questions of meaning, causation, relationships, and values (Helphand).” Landscape architecture as a design seeks objective truth as well as meanings and values; thus, any method based in the “dichotomy is a false one (Helphand).” In addition, “in any pure discipline, application does not dictate the form”; rather, “the creative concepts within each discipline may condition the appropriate application (Shirvani)” because criticism is neither “merely a reflection of the prevalent mode of production (Shirvani)” nor “doctrines of absolute authority and certainty (Corner).” Such creative concepts from landscape’s own object of knowledge, and through the medium of landscape, can generate a “codification and regulation of practice: norms or codes embodied in theory (Meyer).” “Landscapes pose questions through their character, qualities, actions, elements, and processes (Helphand),” which should be “capable of geographical, typological transformation (Meyer)” with the precision of formal language achieved by critical practice. In order make space distinct, we need to state the precise nature of space. Likewise, to make landscape architecture a distinct scholarship and profession, we must have our own language to state its precise nature.

The fourth group of ideas entails the orientation and the role of critical inquiry in landscape architecture, which has been controversial and is reflected in our understanding of the nature of landscape and of landscape studies. It is a general consensus that the object of critical inquiry covers a vast territory from humanistic through social, cultural, and ecological inquiries, to those with a natural science character, and that they are not convergent to any
single direction. However, there may be three conventional positions in seeing this. One is that landscape can be understood to be “a living geography, a social, public sphere, or a cultural schema (Corner),” which is “firmly grounded in humanistic inquiry (Helphand).”

On the one hand, there is the position that critical inquiry of landscape must “explore connections to the encompassing the realms of nature and culture (McAvin)” because “the essence of the profession is in the service of the public and the land (Scarfo),” and thus landscape architecture “is clearly superior to architecture in its respect for and use of the ecological and social sciences (Riley).” The third is a neutral position in terms of encompassing the realms of nature and culture: landscape architecture should not be solely involved in either artistic or ecological debates because it is neither art nor science. Rather, it “predicates on a systems aesthetic” with “its own object of knowledge (Meyer),” and it must “bridge between design and experiences, between art and sciences (Riley).”

Finally, critical inquiry goes to the very beginning, as a criticism of our contemporary trends of critical inquiry in landscape architectural design. It is about the lack of “what constitutes critical inquiry and the lack of application of critical inquiry (Scarfo),” which refers to the above four interrelated norms: theory and criticism, characteristics, roles and orientations, and tools and methods. The fundamental problem is that landscape architecture lacks a “theoretical foundation as well as habits of criticism (McAvin).” Our theory is still too derivative of both art and science (Meyer) and ignores “a distinctive aspect of what we are about (Shirvani).” Theory and criticism became “secondary compared to the magnitude and severity of today’s global problems” because they appear to “lack any substantive social
function.” “So much of today’s criticism is sadly about books of theories of texts of critiques of landscapes, removed from real life (Corner).” It is “the trap and seduction of academic institutions as well as of our critical journals and professional glossy magazines (Corner).” Consequently, “what’s happened to research in landscape architectural programs is hermetically isolated from the group worrying about why we can’t bring hermeneutics into our studios (Riley).”

The lack of a theoretical foundation and the isolation of criticism from real life situations not only creates the need to clarify the social function as well as the fundamental roles and orientations as a solid discipline between social and ecological roles, between art and science, and between culture and nature; but it also accounts for the lack of identifying interpretive, analytical, evaluative, and creative forms and standards embodied in theory. There is a criticism that critics discuss the issues with “the superficiality of fashionable intellectual jargons (Riley),” “striving to keep up appearances through an illusory discourse of legitimation, used primarily by an elite and hermetic group in academic circles (Corner).” The trouble is that “some of the concepts and styles of discourse presented have come from architecture, which are not native to architecture in the first place: they are borrowed from other fields, largely literary criticism (Riley).” This recognizes the lack of the fourth norm in our critical inquiry: tools and methods that support landscape architecture’s own interpretive, analytical, evaluative, and creative forms and standards. Therefore it is ironic, yet true, that the lack of critical inquiry on the discipline is the most critical inquiry of landscape architecture.

How critical then is the role of landscape aesthetics in the critical inquiries on landscape
architecture? Helphand (McAvin, et al., 1991, p.165) states that landscape architecture may be neglecting what is intrinsic to the field and neglecting a more profound understanding of what is the designer’s scholarship. Landscape aesthetics, I believe, is posed at the very center of this notion. Just as criticism, theory, design, and research of landscape architecture must integrate both nature and culture, both art and science, and must develop their own object of knowledge, as must landscape aesthetics. Just as landscape architecture as a discipline needs to establish a theoretical foundation and develop its own language, so must landscape aesthetics. This is because landscape aesthetics is by nature an interdisciplinary, hybrid, and holistic domain, and necessarily involves, and mutually contribute to, criticism and theory. It therefore can compensate for the lack of both social and ecological roles with its own knowledge grounded in both culture and nature, and can connect both artistic and scientific tools and methods to produce its own interpretive, analytical, evaluative, and creative conceptual framework and discourse. Therefore, it is reasonable to postulate that landscape aesthetics should take a critical and a crucial part in the critical questions of design, theory and criticism. As Meyer (McAvin, et al., 1991, p.157) stated, critical inquiry in landscape architecture should be “a systems aesthetics.”

2.2 IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN LANDSCAPE RESEARCH

Critical inquiries guide many directions of research, although theory and criticism are often mistaken as a softer area, remote from “true” research. Yet in a continuum of critical inquiry the most important questions were presented by the most influential scholars and professionals in the discipline, such as Litton, R. Burton; Hester, T. Randolph; Kaplan S. &
Kaplan R.; Corner, James; Steinitz, Carl; Scarfo, Robert; Hunt, John D.; Wolschke-Bulmahn, Joachim; Alanen, Arnold & Howell, Evelyn; Chenoweth, Richard; Olin, Laurie; Low, Setha M.; McAvin, Margaret; Marcus, Clare Cooper; Palmer, James F. & Smardon, Richard C.; Sancar, Fahriye; Spirn, Anne Whiston; Riley, Robert B. at Landscape Journal (Riley & Brown, 1992).

This outpouring of a formidable academic effort implicitly indicates that the conventional approaches of our contemporary research for the past three decades have not sufficiently dealt with the important questions. It is interesting to note that the most important empirical questions demanding future investigation share similar arguments presented in theory and in criticism-critical inquiry: that is, critical inquiry and research questions should be mutually informing, and that the aesthetic, ecological, and social roles and values of landscapes are highlighted. The questions addressed can be divided into three overlapping categories: conceptual and theoretical frameworks, characteristics for a good landscape and its design, and their empirical dimensions and relationships.

First, the unique conceptual and theoretical questions such as “what is landscape architecture and conceptual thinking about its work? (Hunt),” “how can we achieve and selectively integrate our knowledge and experience? (Steinitz; Olin),” “what is the value of disciplinary definition? (McAvin),” and “how to integrate natural science and environmental psychology into landscape design theory? (Hester)” were addressed to develop the unique research tradition, not for “a singular paradigm what all investigators must follow, but for our genuine research (Arnold Alanen & Evelyn Howell).” A unique research tradition means to build “distinctive theory or compelling philosophy by which we can form our research needs
(Palmer & Smardon)” rather than simply borrow from many disciplines.

Chenoweth (p.170) describes our current landscape research as a “Baconian fallacy-gathering facts like so many nuts and berries in the vague hope that in the end it will all add up to something,” arguing that “not knowing one’s purpose is likely to result in empirical trivia and theoretical bullshit.” It may be true that theory has become a “Procrustean bed on which all ideas are stretched and chopped to fit (Hunt).” This is not “because of a lack of data or sophistication in technical means, but rather it is inherent in the nature of the landscape phenomena (Sancar).” Such research questions are raised in the hope that more explicit theories, conceptual frameworks, and models can be formulated to define the nature of landscape, the role of landscape architecture, and their own specific modes of scholarship and related empirical methods.

The second are questions about the qualities and characteristics of landscape or “good design,” addressing cultural, social, aesthetic, and ecological contexts and values as well as issues surrounding the notion of “quality of life.” Such questions as “what is ecological design, and can we do it?” and “what are the aesthetic values that may reside within ecological design? (Litton),” “what are the dimensions of sustainability?” and “what is good design and how is it formed and informed by everyday life? (Scarfo),” “how do we develop ecological aesthetics that provides for true stewardship and regeneration of the land for professional strivings for good design?” and “how can landscape communicate meaningfully and enhance their everyday lives? (Low),” “what is the functioning nature of metaphor and poesis in the making of contemporary landscape?” and “what is a poetic landscape and how might it embody a richer metaphoricity of
dwelling? (Corner),” “what is more beautiful and why, and how do we know? (Olin),” and “what are creative principles common to nature and to art? (McAvin)” are included in this group.

Value considerations are usually within the interdisciplinary roles of landscape architecture, and social, ecological, and aesthetic (poetic or spiritual) values are most significantly mentioned, particularly correlations of aesthetic and ecological values in terms of their usefulness or applications to economic and political decision-making. Professionals address a need for a more informed, consistent, and multidisciplinary methodologies and approaches to represent the process of evaluating aesthetics, particularly economic evaluation of aesthetics (Cats-Baril & Gibson, 1986). Sustainability was too a most popular issue even fifteen years ago and Hester (Riley & Brown, 1992, p.162) cynically mentioned then, “How can it still be as superficially founded as the day it was first uttered?” The important point is that the question essentially still remains unexplored and unanswered.

The last ones worth mentioning are some empirical and methodological questions about the detailed nature and types of landscape experience, such as how, why, and in what ways which aspects of landscape are related human experience. “How and what do we perceive, use, know, and value in common? (McAvin),” “what kind of environmental experiences lower the stress?” and “what is the deep source of the attraction to nature? (Marcus),” “what is the impact of human influenced nature on the human experience? (Kaplan & Kaplan),” “what is the language that fuses form, function, feeling, and meaning to articulate space and to satisfy our fundamental physical, social and spiritual needs? (Spinn),” “what is the nature of human
attachment to the landscape?‖ and “what are the roles of experience in our emotional relationship to landscape? (Riley),” “How do we create a landscape where the individual or groups can find a sense of well-being and purpose? (Helphand) (Riley & Brown, 1992, p.165)” are those questions. Such questions are generally based on various assumptions, conditions, and variables of human experience of the landscape from biological, psychological, physiological universals to cultural, social, and individual traits. It is noteworthy, however, that few are based on any aesthetic assumptions, probably because of the lack of conceptual clarity in their related contexts.

**Figure 1.2:** A summary of the most critical inquiries and questions in landscape architecture

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Figure 1.2 summarizes the relationships of critical inquiry and important questions. Scarfo said, “Everyday life holds the answers to sustainability and carrying capacity, what I term the aesthetics of everyday life” (p.166). Questions and issues raised are very much talking about aesthetics and ethics of the landscape of everyday life and about what is critical and rudimentary in terms of qualities and values of good design. If the aesthetic dimension of landscape is indeed a form of value then it should be based not just on self-referential rhetoric but claim the power of justification. That is why we need both scientific and philosophical approaches in getting after the complexities of landscape experience.

3. SOME AMBIGUITIES IN STUDIES OF LANDSCAPE AESTHETICS

Aesthetic theory by and large deals with interpretive, analytical, evaluative, and creative issues in design, and landscape values cannot be separated from aesthetic values or the quality of experience. The lack of a theoretical infrastructure to articulate the logical link between theory, criticism, and research questions of landscape architecture is therefore necessarily related to a theoretical deficiency of landscape aesthetics, which makes aesthetic issues most critical.

The first ambiguity lies in a conceptual deficiency in design theory, and much of the viability and social influence of landscape architecture will depend upon how well we move toward a more integrative theoretical base (Steinitz, 1990b, p.143). Steinitz (1995) suggested a dual theoretical framework in landscape design: “Design as a verb—the asking of questions; design as a noun—choosing an answer.” The asking of questions involves six question models,
such as representation, process, evaluation, change, impact, and decision, and will have answers that can be characterized as nouns, whereas choosing answers means a focus on the design product, “how it came into being: the materiality and the organization of experience, which are ecological and perceptual, and integrated into the verb frame” (p.190). To suggest the dimensions of materiality and the organization of experience for design as a noun, he also proposes a framework inspired by four basic social concepts of Martin Buber (Buber, 1970) as shown in Table 1.1.

**Table 1.1: A theoretical framework for “Design as a Noun”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World view</th>
<th>Strategic concept</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Materiality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Me</td>
<td>one-ness</td>
<td>singularity</td>
<td>ordering</td>
<td>unifying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Us-them</td>
<td>two-ness</td>
<td>dialectic</td>
<td>juxtaposition</td>
<td>contrasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We</td>
<td>many-ness</td>
<td>pluralism</td>
<td>adaptation</td>
<td>diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendent</td>
<td>infinite-ness</td>
<td>spiritual</td>
<td>revelation</td>
<td>symbolic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Steinitz’s theoretical framework, the four dimensions of both the experience and the materiality are correspondent to four ways of viewing the world. They are particularly worth mentioning because the eight dimensions are mutually informing and share their ecological and perceptual nature in a consistent continuum from the individual to social relations. These dimensions may look like simplistic substitutes for a formal design language, and the experiential dimensions may seem not to show a “humanistic” experience. They
indicate ecological characteristics on the one hand and the material dimensions seem to appear as formal aesthetic attributes on the other. However, this framework does show the possibility of having intersecting dimensions across ecological, perceptual, and social perspectives in landscape experience, which supports my initial argument on the nature of landscape aesthetics as a world view-paradigm. While aesthetic concepts are seldom included in his building of a theoretical framework for landscape design, it is nevertheless undeniable that in reality much of his work has dealt with aesthetic issues in landscape, with a primary focus on landscape experience.

A second ambiguity may have more to do with a certain philosophical deficiency in our understanding of the aesthetics of nature. With the aim to establish a theoretical infrastructure for landscape aesthetics or environmental aesthetics, there have been philosophical attempts to develop our knowledge of the beauty of nature in terms of the beauty of the arts, because in the arts “we have various bodies of criticism to guide our responses; we have knowledge of developing genres and evolving forms, but not so with nature” (Hepburn, 2002, p.29). Connecting the aesthetic appreciation of art with the appreciation of nature could, at first sight, be a misguided ambition, yet Carlson (1979a, 1979b, 1993a, 2004) makes an impressive attempt to generate a theoretical basis grounded in both science and art in terms of the aesthetic appreciation and evaluation of the environment. The basic premise is that works of art are made for the purpose of aesthetic appreciation, and that we have knowledge of what and how to aesthetically appreciate in works of art; likewise, the subject of environmental aesthetics is “an
aesthetic appreciation of nature (1979, p.268),” based on our knowledge of what and how to “aesthetically appreciate an object that reveals what aesthetic qualities and values it has” (2000, p.88).

Carlson (1984a) argues “the aesthetics of nature is essentially positive in that all virgin nature is beautiful” (p.10). While art allows for negative aesthetic criticism because it “depends on viewing the aesthetic object as an intentional object, as an artifact, as something that is shaped by the purposes and designs of its author” (p.13), there is no such thing as aesthetic evaluation in nature, namely a negative or a critical aesthetic appreciation of nature, because nature is boundless, unlimited, and not created by a designer. In other words, only for the environment which is affected and altered by man, is aesthetic appreciation possible: the landscape or the built environment can evoke an aesthetically negative appreciation, a criticism.

Carlson treats evaluation primarily as a judgment about what is good or bad, or what is true or false. He does not make a distinction between appreciation and evaluation, and in his thought appreciation and evaluation don’t seem to represent independent aesthetic attitudes, although it

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6 For environmental philosophers including Carlson, there is little conceptual difference among nature, the natural environment, the environment, and the landscape, but mostly here nature is meant to be the natural environment, i.e., a traditional concept of landscape.

7 In this view, Carlson proposes that “the positive aesthetic appeal of the natural world is a function of the astonishing nature of something that is beyond the limits of human control (Carlson, 1984, p.15),” like a feeling of amazement, wonder, woe, and sublimity.
would appear that the former is like tasting the sweetness of milk and the latter is like saying milk is a good beverage (see Figure 1.3).

![Diagram of Carlson's philosophical argument on aesthetic appreciation of nature]

Figure 1.3: The diagram of Carlson's philosophical argument on aesthetic appreciation of nature

Thus, to the extent that our environment no longer remains as a primitive or virgin nature, we are capable of making value judgments on it. If a particular built environment has more natural and intrinsic qualities, ones that we believe nature itself has, then the aesthetic evaluation for that environment must be positive. However, in order to be able to make an aesthetically positive or negative judgment on the environment, we need to have objective, or at
least objectified, standards regarding what we believe to be the natural or intrinsic qualities of nature.

To find the applicability of aesthetic judgment about nature within our knowledge of art for an effective and objectified standard for aesthetic justification, Carlson (1979a, p.273) explains: just as we do have such knowledge of art as artistic traditions and genres, and styles within those traditions to present a persuasive account of the truth and falsity of aesthetic judgment about art, to aesthetically appreciate natural or intrinsic qualities of nature we must have knowledge of the different environments of nature and of the systems and elements within those environments. Using Kendall Walton’s essay, “Categories of Art,” Carlson (2000, p.54-56) argues that value judgments about art are based on two aspects: the perceptual properties of a work, and the perceived status of those when a work is seen in the context of its appropriate category of art. For instance, Picasso’s Guernica is a work of art that has certain perceptual properties—lines, colors, textures, etc.—that don’t make sense when perceived in the category of impressionist art; they do, however, in the category of cubism. Therefore, an aesthetic judgment on nature or the environment is similarly a function of the perceived status of its properties, with the stipulation that the environment is perceived in the contexts of its correct categories.

Many critical objections could be raised against this position, such as: nature is not an object of art; genres and categories in art are relative and subjective and thus not applicable to objective categories for nature; there is no category of right or wrong, or true or false in nature, and most fundamentally, a value judgment on a work of art is not necessarily an aesthetic
judgment (it could be about commercial value), and so on. However, what I think is reasonable in Carlson’s argument is his analogy of genre and “correct category” regarding the objectified standard for value judgment, not the direct transfer of aesthetic value judgment from art to the environment.

What he meant by “correct category” may be controversial, but not unlike a cubist perspective for Guernica, Carlson thinks that natural science, e.g. Darwin’s evolutionary theory, makes nature less fearful and opens our eyes to an appreciation for nature, and that our scientific knowledge, such as in the fields of ecology, geography, biology, forestry, geology, and others, informs us of “correct categories” for perceiving. Perceptual properties are neutral, and Carlson believes that perceiving is “not a matter of inferring, but rather a matter of simply seeing the expanse in the relevant categories” (p.61). Like genres in art, functional and perceptual categories, such as natural, coastal, or artificial environments, guide us to perceive a number of perceptual properties and characteristics combined into a Gestalt, and help us determine whether it is appropriate to perceive them as natural things or as artifacts.

4. A THEORETICAL VACCUM IN LANDSCAPE EVALUATION

The recognition of the theoretical void and the call for a new approach to landscape aesthetics was raised in the middle of the 1970s. Appleton (1975a) criticized that the aesthetic evaluation of landscape, evaluating landscape aesthetically, has been blindly dependent on an empirical methodology, and that its theoretical bases are not convincing enough to legitimate the research findings. He explained what we can expect of a theory in what context, how the
weakness of theory affects our methodology, and what to do about it, using cases from the professional relationship between a medical doctor and his or her patients. That is, we know and learn the sensation and the pain of a certain disease from the perception of the condition by the patient. He concludes that a doctor, a professional who seeks to discover a disease from which patient suffers, or examines whether there is any significant correlation between the distribution of patients suffering from an epidemic disease and some environmental variables, should not select the variables for examination on a purely random basis.

In addition, to make a further assertion that the patient is suffering from a particular disease, the doctor needs a measure of theory, which involves models and formulas, and enables us to identify a condition, to prescribe a procedural intervention for remedying or ameliorating that condition, and to predict the consequences of this or some other intervention (p.120). Appleton argues that most empirical research in landscape evaluation has not empirically demonstrated a theoretical framework for the identification of problems, a methodological procedure for prescription, and a decent level of predictability in its findings, as there should always be. Most studies concerned with the study of beauty in the arts neglected nature, and a non-spatial theory of landscape aesthetics is largely missing; he calls it a “theoretical vacuum.” Through this analogy, he identifies the problems resulting from the theoretical void with three concerns: Where to attach values, who does evaluation, and how to evaluate, and emphasizes the importance of role the professionals in the task of the landscape evaluation (i.e., Figure 1.4).
According to Appleton, a landscape aesthetic theory first would need to establish necessary categories or components of landscape features to which we attach values for aesthetic evaluation. In other words, the theory should explain why we should assume that beauty resides in a mountain, in a stream, or in skylines, rather than relying on brief and simplified accounts. For example, the notion of the edge phenomenon that refers to the boundary zone between contrasting landscape features should not be regarded as the theory for why a skyline is beautiful, but instead the theory should make us believe why these edge phenomena and skylines are significant in landscape aesthetics.

Appleton poses an important question for the second concern: “Do we have to go down to the same plane as the man in the street” (p.122), the so-called landscape users, to avoid criticism that the evaluation is biased by a professional viewpoint? He argues that the data acquired from a questionnaire “asking people to prefer one landscape to another do not lead us into a body of theoretical knowledge.” Without an adequate theoretical ground it may be hard to avoid fallacies in the decision-making areas of landscape evaluation. A surgeon cannot make a diagnosis and prediction based on a consensus of opinions from the patients, nor can the
quality of a fine wine be simply judged by “consumer groups” without an underlying theory, principles, or evaluative categories. In some professional arts, at least, we have some faith in the ability of the expert to recognize excellence. Thus, the absence of theory and general principles in studies of landscape evaluation makes professionals become incompetent, and makes their value judgments based on taste rather than knowledge.

Can theory then help professionals in their ability to make judgments to recognize excellence? Appleton emphasizes that the theoretical vacuum leads to a validity problem in methodological issues of landscape evaluation. When evaluating landscape quality, we attempt to measure such aspects as “artistic sensitivity” and “feeling” with all kinds of methodological equipments borrowed from the sister sciences, such as graphs, computer simulations, and questionnaires, but we do not have any theoretical rationale to make us believe that the holistic quality of landscapes can be evaluated by breaking the landscape down into parts.

Finally, Appleton concludes that studies of landscape aesthetics should focus on the interdisciplinary, elementary, and empirical task of theory generation, particularly for an evaluative theory of landscape features, which4s to examine the nature of values and qualities in landscapes with an experiential perspective: the experienced quality of landscape features. To that end he suggests the following three strategies as future guides for evaluation studies: 1) The improvement and refinement of empirical techniques for the study of the subjective quality of landscape experience, 2) Making appropriate assumptions about the fundamental nature of aesthetic experience and its relationship to the enjoyment of landscape, and 3) The establishment of theoretical bases for these empirical techniques.
The task of environmental aesthetics in a meta-critical sense is the theoretical control of the description, interpretation, and evaluation of the environment and the creation of a frame of reference. It constructs a model of how the environment is received, and in what ways it operates as an aesthetic object. (Yrjö Sepänmaa, 1986, p.79)

1. LANDSCAPE AESTHETICS AS A PARADIGM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

The nature of landscape necessarily involves philosophical reasoning about human beliefs and values regarding the relationship between life and nature. Preliminary to dealing with landscape as an object of aesthetic experience, I will briefly discuss the hybrid, interdisciplinary, and the holistic nature of landscape in the current systems of knowledge, which belong neither to the humanities nor to the sciences. Then, I will argue for a view of landscape aesthetics that could mediate between conflicting ideas derived from its nature. Furthermore, I will reaffirm the nature of landscape as intrinsically experiential and potentially aesthetic, and claim that, because of the experiential as well as aesthetic nature of landscape, studies of landscape aesthetics could provide a great opportunity to bridge traditional dilemmas between subjectivity and objectivity, between culture and nature, and between personal and social or individual and collective meanings.

Not only have these dilemmas frequently become the cause of controversy in environmental design studies, but more importantly they have proven that without a resolution
these existing frameworks are too unbalanced and therefore incompatible for successfully addressing issues of environmental sustainability that have relied heavily on the conceptual foundations of the natural and social sciences. This discussion should help set up the critical angles from which to delineate a range of problems and possibilities of the role that landscape aesthetics could play in terms of the fundamentals of environmental sustainability. Figure 2.1 represents the relationship of these fundamentals.

**Figure 2.1**: Conceptual diagram of the nature of landscape aesthetics
1.1 BETWEEN ART AND SCIENCE: BRIDGING SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY

Whether landscape ought to be understood from an artistic or scientific point of view is one of the frequently asked questions in landscape studies, yet it is philosophically difficult to answer because each of the arts and the sciences, as independent disciplines, aim to pursue their own goals with their own systems of knowledge generation: they represent a paradigm. Art has its own body of thoughts, ideas, genres, media, and trends, just as each branch of science develops its own systems of inquiry, methods, solutions, and notions of truth. On the one hand landscape could be regarded as a kind of “work of art” if it is created by and for human sensibility; on the other hand it could be seen as a product of scientific thinking because it necessarily involves a myriad of natural laws in the physical environment.

The same could be said of most works of design in general. Some aestheticians or art theorists have argued that the arts involve an activity of originality or creativity and that the production of artifacts does not, and that “artifacts are physical objects or tools, whereas works of design are types” (Dilworth, 2001, p.170). Whether we agree or not with the characterization of design objects as types, the act of design is clearly as different from a pure artistic activity as it is from a mere act of making physical tools, since it typically involves the social and cultural production systems that connect artistic and scientific underpinnings. Thus, it is reasonable to say that landscape studies, as a sub-discipline of environmental design, necessarily be accessible though both, studies of the arts and studies of the sciences. In other words, landscape studies in the very nature are an interdisciplinary field that connects the classical separation of human
knowledge: art and science.

However, despite the fact that both professional practice and scientific investigation must be reciprocally and necessarily connected in the act and the study of design in general, this traditional boundary between art and science has had the effect of deepening the gap between the two. One the one hand many design professionals often are guided by artistic or aesthetic ambitions, gleaned from art history and the aesthetic theories of the arts, in their projects; landscape researchers, on the other hand, are more encouraged to adopt scientific and analytic methodologies in their investigations. As a consequence of this split design languages become as individual, subjective, and esoteric, as designers and artists desire to make an extraordinary, creative, innovative, and original piece of work. By contrast, research tends to follow a habit to guarantee the objective validity of outcomes that are communicable within a particular research group, based on well-established scientific methods or statistical techniques. As a result, design products in many cases face the criticisms of the lack of objective criteria, such as site specific or universal principles, whereas research products often turn out to be either too specific for the particular landscape settings, or far beyond the real world conditions for design performance.

Landscape architecture is also regarded as an applied art or as an applied science, and has struggled to seek its artistic and its scientific identities in both research and practice, although recent landscape studies have tended to place more emphasis on scientific and physical rather than on artistic or spiritual aspects. It may be due to the misunderstanding that aesthetics is a theory of art or a philosophy of art criticism, and that landscape is not the a
“work of art” created by human beings, but simply “nature” created by God. Thus even 18th and 19th Century works on aesthetics, which substantially treated the beautiful, the sublime, and the picturesque in nature, still essentially stressed artists’ beliefs on nature, very rarely natural beauty in its own right (Hepburn, 2004a, p. 43). To the extent that general contemporary writings on aesthetics have neglected natural beauty, so has the more specific field of landscape aesthetics. Moreover, there has been a view that landscapes are not designers’ objects of expression, but rather that they are “the natural environment” where plants, animals, humans, and other organisms and resources live together; thus landscape professionals should take naturalistic and environmental responsibilities for the transformation of landform, habitats, and the ecosystem. Consequently our contemporary scientific studies on landscape seem to be rather reluctant to discuss the notion of beauty or landscape aesthetics, and our contemporary works of art, until recently, have hesitated to involve environmental concerns or even the notion of landscape as an aesthetic object.

The fact that landscape and design by their very nature represent bridges between art and science may explain why aesthetic matters in landscapes have become intractable. In fact, many studies in landscape aesthetics have been relying on either the aesthetics of the arts or the aesthetics of nature. In art appreciation, we have various bodies of criticism to guide our responses. Carlson (2000) argues, “The evolution of aesthetic appreciation of nature has been intertwined with both the objectification of nature achieved by science and the subjectification of it rendered by art” (p. 3). That is, our aesthetic appreciation of nature as the picturesque is to appreciate the subjective romantic image, whereas the aesthetic appreciation of nature as the
sublime requires disinterestedness to objectify the nature. The 18th Century picturesque mode of natural beauty, and the 19th Century sublimity mode of natural beauty, such as the wilderness preservation idea—wild nature is beautiful and nature with human intrusion is ugly—have remained as two ways of appreciating nature in the late 20th Century: the former seems to influence landscape aesthetics as subjective and picturesque phenomenon, and the other becomes associated with contemporary environmentalism. Landscape aesthetics becomes “A messy, subjective business of little philosophical significance” (p.5).

If landscape aesthetics is indeed just a messy, subjective business, then there is little scholarly value in it. By the same token, there is no such thing as aesthetic judgment in landscape if the nature of landscape depends just on a scientific account for what environmentalists deem important. The objectivity of beauty matters in this respect. It is an aesthetically fundamental, yet philosophically controversial subject in landscape. Admittedly, scientific evidences and techniques do not always secure the certainty and the regularity of the phenomenal patterns occurring from the interaction between the human and the environment; it is a matter of defining an acceptable degree of objectivity. On the other hand, the subjectivity of beauty may be more than simply a matter of accepting that individuals differ about their predilection of landscapes. For instance, in the area of aesthetic perception, the artistic intention designers or artists may want to express in their projects could indeed successfully evoke the desired aesthetic feelings of people who experience these works of design or art. Sometimes, in spite of our individual differences, we do experience a similar state of feelings and have similar responses with others—for instance to magnificent natural landscapes or to some ugly urban
scenes—regardless of how our individual verbal expressions might differ. Thus, it is presumable that aesthetic perception in landscape or in a work of art and design is not only an objective phenomenon, but also a subjective phenomenon at the same time: landscape aesthetics could be objectified by the partnership between the arts and the sciences.

However, by whichever path landscape aesthetics is approached, it is unlikely to explain both the objective and the subjective nature of landscape, both in empirical and conceptual studies of landscape aesthetics. Landscape aesthetics has been theorized by formal and objective criteria for the criticism of the arts, or specified by a collection of subjective emotions in the empirical sciences. There has been the misconception that art deals with private business, while science contributes to a public consensus on landscape quality and value. Thus, the appropriate groundwork for landscape research will have to be able to articulate its own position between the subjectivity and objectivity of landscape aesthetics, and also will look for an integrated methodology for the partnership between the arts and the sciences, because landscape is essentially experiential, and potentially aesthetic, and landscape architecture deals equally with the arts of landscape and the sciences of landscape.

For an integrated methodology, Appleton (1986, p.28) advises landscape architects to commit to the encouragement of interdisciplinary cooperation to broaden investigative efforts that embrace all kinds of sources of information. He sees the methodological difference of science and art as the difference between evidence and clue. Admitting that scientifically based methodologies are more acceptable and less controversial in the mixed approach to the arts and the sciences, he suggests evidence, both circumstantial and conclusive, as the most appropriate
alternative methodology to handle the subject matter of landscape research. Evidence supports a belief. It is “to refute, support, to change or modify the hypothesis by which we seek to explain the perceived environment, landscape” (p.32-35). Evidence can be “conclusive” from a scientific analysis as well as “circumstantial” from surviving works of art, such as paintings, photographs, and other literary accounts. Appleton also points to creativity, fashion, and symbolism as commonalities between art and science: for instance, the scientific fashion to pursue quantitative techniques, and artistic fashion to put a higher value on works influenced by a specific genre.

Finally it should be underscored that the interdisciplinary nature of landscape aesthetics is somewhat different from other design disciplines, such as architecture or industrial design products, because the landscape as the perceived environment is composed of both living and non-living aesthetic objects, which is changeable by time and space and far harder to delineate with a physical boundary, whereas buildings and products deal with definite non-living substances with physical and spatial boundaries. Therefore, it is indeed necessary to first articulate independently the hybrid nature of landscape aesthetics, both contextually and independently, in terms of a broader perspective. Along with this, developing an integrated methodology, applying both art and science, and mediating the subjective and objective nature of landscape, is also an important and unexplored task with limitless opportunities for further work.
1.2 BETWEEN CULTURAL AND NATURAL ENVIRONMENT: BRIDGING HUMANS AND ENVIRONMENTS

Landscapes studies are often approached by two basic types: cultural and natural landscapes. Under these dual categories, the cultural landscape also tends to connote the human-made, artificial environment, whereas the natural landscape is typically recognized as the wild, untouched environment. Of course, neither of these literally exists, and neither genuinely represents the nature of landscape. First, there is no such natural environment as a purely untouched wilderness. If certain environmental features are perceived as landscape, it logically means there was at least a human being who perceived or affected them. In addition, it seems not to be practically right that all landscapes are human made or artificial, because landscape generally involves the outdoor surroundings more than just human artifacts, such as the sky, trees, creeks, rocks, birds, and others. It is unquestionable that landscapes practically embrace both the human made and the natural features of the environment, and landscape studies theoretically concern the interaction between the humans and the environment. Such dual aspects of landscape as cultural vis-à-vis natural, urban vis-à-vis rural, and human vis-à-vis environment have become somewhat inseparable approaches to current landscape studies and practices, a separation serving mostly the purpose of the conceptual clarity and functional usefulness of the results.

The dichotomy between the cultural and the natural landscape is in part derived from the separation of humans from their environment as well as the art from the science thereof. “The Cartesian separation between self and surroundings is a recent phenomenon and powerful
in western culture as that of Europe and North America” (Bell, 1999, p.65), which is also fundamentally associated with the separation of the mind from the body, or of spirit from matter. As Berleant (1992) points out, there may not be the environment “as if it were outside and independent of ourselves” (p.4), because the human perceiver (mind) is an aspect of the perceived environment and the physical landscape (body). He argues that our conventional view of landscape as picturesque, which is “visual, bounded, and distant” (p.5), reflects our objectifying and distancing of the environment.

Slightly different from Carlson (2000), who has been trying to investigate landscape aesthetics by objectifying and synthesizing the aesthetic quality of both the work of art and the natural environment, Berleant’s thought on an integrative view of landscape focuses more on the “cultural landscape shaped by objects and changes by which people have imprinted their practices on the land through distinctive field patterns, farming practices, architectural styles, and settlements” (p.6). If the environment changed by humans and their products and processes of settlements is a cultural landscape, then it may be true that our conception of the natural landscape is indeed already cultural, because it is composed of, and evolves with, the changes of humans and other objects.

In this respect there is no clear boundary of landscape types between the cultural and the natural landscape: e.g. the picturesque or the sublime landscape, which is often regarded as a reflection of the natural landscape, contains many cultural meanings at the same time. Hence, the dichotomy of landscape types seems to be a matter of the visual dominance of either human, artificial features or non-human, or natural features, which reflects the separation of
human products from natural environment as well as the isolation of cultural meaning from the natural order.

The central issue in the nature of landscape and the nature of aesthetics, as both a cultural and a natural process, can be raised in the discussion about its meanings and values. Meanings and values are pivotal and inseparable in design decisions, not only because they “facilitate the asking of questions as a function of social, economic, and cultural factors, but because they make the answering of such questions appear to be an obligation on the part of anyone who would make such decisions within a pluralistic, democratic society” (Carlson, 1990, p.158). In design landscape meanings are the interpretive questions about the environment, and landscape values are the normative answers for the environment.

That is to say, landscape is a meaningful and a valued environment, and landscape aesthetics is a search for meanings and values in the landscape. Meanings do not exist, only the objects (broadly, the environment, not a mere object but a whole Buberian “Thou”) that denote something as well as the subjects (the humans, the “I”s), who mediate the process of meaning generation; whereas values come to pass only if the subjects (the humans) attach meanings to the objects (the environment). Landscape itself is an interpretive as well as a normative system that links the subjects and the objects, humans and their surroundings, and likewise, culture and nature. The interaction of nature and culture gives birth to an aesthetic experience of landscape that entails meanings and values, and connects the human mind with its surroundings. It is an intellectual, moral, and aesthetic statement of people as a human and a humane being (Berleant, 1992, p.6).
However, many contemporary studies of landscape have concentrated either on cultural meanings, detached from the natural landscape, or on natural values, isolated from the cultural landscape. The division between natural landscapes and human-altered or cultural ones has affected the disregard of aesthetic values in the landscape as well (Bell, 1999, p.70). It is not only because our conventional thoughts still resist considering nature as a part of the interpretative, cultural meaning system, and culture as a part of a normative, natural value system, but also because, as I discussed earlier, landscapes have generally been investigated from natural and scientific perspectives, while aesthetics has been considered as a matter of cultural and artistic studies, even though the natural environment in our actual experience has been widely acknowledged within our culture as a source of powerful aesthetic experience (Foster, 1998, p.134). Thus, landscape aesthetics fundamentally directs us to see the environment within both natural and cultural contexts.

Many scholars prompted a new vision of landscape aesthetics in search of an interactive quality linking nature and culture, and linking humans and the environment. Ecological aesthetics was introduced as an alternative concept to connect culture and nature, “seeing science as culture” (Mozingo, 1997). Its practical principles are to enhance visibility (or “observability”) of ecological phenomena, and to make ecological functions apparent (Nassauer, 1995); in this respect, ecological aesthetics is rather a visual ecology. Furthermore, a new aesthetics of landscape starts to account for the dynamic processes of motion and change in terms of continuity and evolution that are applied to both culture and nature. The physical environment is not merely a text, but a transformed form by the concept of dialogue between the humans and the
environment (Spirn, 1988b, 1990). Spirn states it well when she writes, “Dialogues are means of knowing oneself, and one’s place in the world...We express what we value through the transformations...Whether their origins are metaphysical or mundane, these dialogues are ultimately aesthetic” (1988b, p.109). Meanings and values are cultural as well as natural systems not only in landscape or in aesthetics but in design general. That is why I think landscape aesthetics indeed can play a central role in diffusing the edge between meanings and values, culture and nature, and the human and the environment.

Another conceptual issue connecting the nature of landscape and the nature of the aesthetic, and one that embraces both culture and nature, is the notion of naturalness. Naturalness primarily concerns a kind of quality in a non-human or an unaffected environment, but also it could mean some qualities that are unpretentious, genuinely open, or vernacular: the former refers to qualities that are nature-like, and the latter has cultural and social implications. Being natural is the way we see things for what they are (Moore, 2004, p.220) and some philosophers view nature as natural. Being natural has always something to do with both meaning and value, two dimensions that have frequently been substantial issues in design and research. What makes things and events natural? (What makes us think of things and events as natural?)

On the one hand we tend to believe natural objects to be superior to human-made objects in a value domain of naturalness; on the other hand we are likely to feel a certain landscape as being natural when it has familiar, friendly, and features and properties similar to things and events that happened in our experience. The former is a value of nature as having a
quality of naturalness in its own right; the latter is a cultural value of human production that appeals to our human sense of naturalness. That is, both natural and cultural values are embodied in the notion of naturalness. “Similarities and our familiarities with the particularities of natural objects is a useful preparation for our enjoyment of art,” says Moore (2004, p.215) and continues, “Nature prepares us for art and art prepares us for nature.” In other words we could say that nature prepares us for culture and culture prepares us for nature, and since qualities, meanings, and values lie at the center of the aesthetic, naturalness can be a statement of aesthetic values that intersects human nature with the nature of our physical environment. While this may sound all too obvious, this issue has nevertheless generated a substantial amount of philosophical controversy in judging qualities and values of the naturalness of aesthetic objects or landscapes.

Then, what does it mean to be natural? Why and how do we value it? Seemingly, we could value a particular landscape as natural based on its ecological quality or a streetscape as natural based on its cultural “fit” and significance. However, an independent approach implicitly derived from the dichotomy of culture and nature does not seem to properly represent such an integrative value as naturalness; it would rather make sense if is a single but integrated one, such as ecological aesthetics or cultural ecology, would be used. The notion of naturalness as a value statement lies at the center of an epistemological debate as well. The issue has been whether the aesthetic value of naturalness of a particular landscape is a universal sense of human beings or peculiar to specific groups and cultures. Normally natural landscapes, such as wild forests or natural parks that reflect an ideal image of primitive nature, are believed to be natural in a
universal sense, but urban landscapes within a certain cultural boundary can look familiar and natural to persons who came from a completely different culture. Does to be natural then mean to be familiar? Does it depend on personal taste? Or does it entail rationality or morality?

If “physical ordering of space must express and influence people’s ideas, their beliefs and values” (Tuan, 1983, p.14), then it cannot be independent of social demands or public customs. Tuan draws a metaphoric analogy to stress the morality of architecture. “Costume is one of society’s most important customs for sustaining proper senses of the self and for guaranteeing appropriate behaviors”(p.13). Costumes conform to the constant demands of the human body, and at the same time are transformed into social tastes, values, and a sense of naturalness. Likewise, landscapes are the “environmental costumes” that respond to biological or ecological necessity (i.e. the bio-ecosystem), yet at the same time evolve with notions of social appropriateness, such as morality, rules, and customs. As costumes are able to present bodily beauty as well as personality, so does the landscape reveal nature as well as culture as aesthetic potentials. Thus the notion of naturalness helps us to realize that understanding the nature of landscape requires our simultaneous attention to cultural meanings together with values of nature, as well as to meanings of nature along with the values of culture, and thus may reveal cultural aesthetics through nature, and natural aesthetics through culture.

1.3 BETWEEN EGO AND ECO: BRIDGING I (SELF) AND IT (THE WORLD)

As discussed, the idea of keeping humans from being a part of the environment relates on the one hand to the separation of culture from nature, but concomitantly also tends to
undervalue the cultural landscape and ultimately to idealize the value of natural environment on the other. The opposing dualism at the heart of western patriarchy has in fact a deeper root: “From Plato’s prioritization of abstract thought to Descartes’ distinction between mind and body, from Aristotle’s sphere of freedom in the life of the polis as against the sphere of necessity in the world of the oikos, to the Western liberal distinction between the public and the private, the hu(man) world has been constructed over and against the world of nature, and the world of woman” (Mellor, 1997, p.180). In addition, the concerns over the environmental and ecological crises started to stress the dominant and destructive role humans have played against nature. Humans are the ugly species in opposition to nature that is meant to be beautiful. Whatever humans do against nature is not as right as whatever nature should be in its own right. That is, radical environmentalism, implicitly reflecting a dichotomous attitude toward humans vis-à-vis the environment as well as culture vis-à-vis nature, has a tendency to treat humans as environmental criminals and asks them to take moral responsibilities for ecosystem.

Such an environmental consciousness naturally has had a somewhat muting influence on our consideration of the value of landscape as a bridge between culture and nature. It is notable that a disproportional part of contemporary empirical research, focusing on various aspects of environmental sustainability, has concentrated on the role and the values of the natural landscape. Presumably, it is because natural values seem to be easier for environmental researchers to measure than cultural values, implicitly indicating that culture as a non-scientific human value system is subjective or relative, whereas nature, approached by scientific methods, has objective or absolute values. Furthermore, the value consideration of landscapes seems to
take dichotomous moral attitudes unwittingly: anthropocentrism (human-centeredness) vis-à-vis eco-centrism (nature-centeredness). Landscape as embodying an anthropocentric value is relevant not only to our conception of the cultural landscape, which is Western, modern, masculine, and dominant over other ambient features, and has brought a great deal of havoc to many traditional cultures, but also to our conception of the natural landscape as a materialistic resource only for the purpose of economic and psychological benefits for human interests and well-being.

Meanwhile, landscape as an eco-centric value predominantly sees the natural environment as a prior concern of value, which is an “intrinsically dynamic, interconnected web of relations,” an ecosystem which all organisms inhabit. Humans are not singled out for special treatment or seen as distinct from the rest of the natural world (Mellor, 1997, p.182). Also, the cultural landscape to eco-centrists appears to be in contrast to anthropocentric notion: it is seen as Eastern, feminine, and conforming to ambiences (Warren, 1987). Thus, the growing environmental awareness of ecological values as a moral imperative has directed the contemporary sustainable practice of our interactions with landscape to focus heavily on the natural value from a human-centered point of view—landscapes as resources—rather than from a nature-centered point of view—landscapes as a whole system.

Landscape values have been and will be a significant concern for many researchers and designers, regardless of their moral or aesthetic, or ecological or economic concerns. Yet, the studies in search of landscape values have focused predominantly on economic or ecological, or the intersection of the two in the natural landscapes. This over-emphasis on natural landscapes
is not only associated with the abundance of supporting evidence provided by the natural sciences for both the anthropocentric and eco-centric values of landscape, but is also associated with a fair degree of neglect of the underlying philosophical issues in academic circles. As it were, most empirical studies have had a tendency to look upon landscape values as rational or economic, not as moral or aesthetic.

In addition, the social sciences and psychological studies have contributed to the anthropocentric understanding of cultural landscapes, while the eco-centric understandings of cultural landscapes seem to have been dealt with only through the voices of eco-philosophers and of environmental activists. As a result, from anthropocentric point of view, the value of the natural landscape is often identified with economic values, and the cultural landscape represents rational, social, and culturally-relative values. By contrast, in the view of eco-centrism, the value of the natural landscape refers to ecological values; yet there have been few attempts to see the value of the cultural landscape from an eco-centric perspective, which would be based on moral, aesthetic, and cross-cultural values.

All values are associated with humans’ knowledge and beliefs; they can be therefore “deeply and profoundly embedded in our anthropocentrism whether we care to recognize them or not” (Skolimowski, 1984, p.284), even if they are claimed to be an eco-centric perspective of landscape. Similarly, the eco-centric perspective could become morally sterile if it becomes anti-human or inhuman, a criticism frequently leveled against radical environmentalism. In other words, it seems likely that if the nature of landscape value is approached by a single extreme perspective, either anthropocentric or eco-centric, then the notion of landscape value would not
be able to negotiate the conflict between humans and the environment or the tension between culture and nature. All value considerations, both anthropocentric and eco-centric, are essentially and necessarily human, and thus they reflect not only human rationality but also human morality.

Anthropocentrism as a moral attitude toward the landscape can be either altruistic or egoistic. An altruistic anthropocentrism cares about public or egalitarian values, rather than private or utilitarian ones, as a moral justification. Even in simple interactions between individuals, altruistically motivated human beings seek a balance between self-interests and others’ interests, while egoistically motivated human beings look primarily for self-interests in the conflicts of interests with others. By the same token, eco-centrism as a moral attitude toward the landscape can be either humane (spiritual) or inhumane (materialistic). That is, in exchanges between human beings and the environment, individuals who are eco-centric as well as humane agents are will tend to seek a balance between self-interests for humans and ecological sustainability, while inhumane individuals might see the environment and its biocosystem primarily as a set of scientific data to be utilized to support their interests.

The world, according to Martin Buber (1970), is “twofold in accordance with twofold attitudes: the basic word I-You and the basic word I-It” (p.53). “The world as experience belongs to the basic word I-It, and the basic word I-You establishes the world of relations” (p.56). Whatever we perceive lies in the sphere of a goal-directed verb or in the relation of the subject and the object, I-It. When we perceive a thing (It) as an ongoing process, however, it establishes the relation of “I with You.” This implies that in order to value something or
someone means not only to establish the relation of I with You, but also to express the rational and moral attitudes toward something or someone (It) or to the relations of those, which could be social, economic, cultural, and ecological or environmental.

As the nature of landscape, in the terms of Buber, can be fundamentally identified as an “I and Thou” relationship, so could the conceptual location of aesthetic qualities and values of landscapes lie between the cultural and the natural, between the psychological and the ecological, between the rational and the moral, and between the anthropocentric and the ecocentric attitudes. The relationship of humans and the environment is embedded in the cultural landscapes that are shaped by various natural conditions. The problem may not be to connect these two, humans and their environment, but to recognize them together as a whole. “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community,” said Aldo Leopold (1949, p.224-225). To identify the nature and the characteristics of landscape aesthetics as the beauty of the bio-eco community, a rather holistic vision would be necessary to integrate humans, societies, and nature.

2. REVIEW OF EXISTING PARADIGMS FOR LANDSCAPE AESTHETICS

The recognition of the general lack of philosophical and theoretical foundations in landscape or environmental aesthetics leads to the need to examine the existing and most influential approaches to landscape aesthetics, as well as their underlying philosophical and conceptual premises and paradigms about the relationship between humans, the environment, and landscapes. Several scholars have tried to identify paradigms from different ontological,
epistemological, and methodological positions, and have called for a general theory that encompasses these shared grounds. The existing paradigms identified have three different standpoints, such as landscape perception and evaluation, environmental aesthetics, and aesthetic appreciation of the environment, and their examination may guide us to a direction for a new transactional paradigm that integrates them by being centered on an experiential and humanistic paradigm based on the transactional view: to see human beings as part of the environment.

2.1 LANDSCAPE PERCEPTION AND EVALUATION

A decade after Appleton’s criticism of landscape evaluation studies, there was another attempt to sketch out the categorical edge of the theoretical vacuum through extensive analyses of existing journal articles that dealt with landscape perception in interdisciplinary areas, such as architecture, environmental and behavioral studies, geography, forestry, and outdoor recreation, and identified the existing paradigms of “landscape perception research” (Zube, Sell, & Taylor, 1982; Sell, Taylor, & Zube, 1984; Zube, 1984). They categorize the existing body of landscape perception research into two dichotomous approaches: application and understanding.

The application approach concerns practical tools and methods for landscape resource managers and empirical tests and evaluations of public groups, whereas the understanding approach searches for the meaning of landscape perception. Then, using their rigorous classification of extensive literature, they identify the theoretical origins of this dichotomous research with four distinct theoretical bases, respectively: the expert, the psychophysical, the
cognitive, and the experiential, which they call the four paradigms. The first two paradigms within the “applying” approach include landscape evaluation by experts and psychophysical tests of the public, and the other two paradigms within the “understanding” approach concern meanings of the interaction between humans and the landscape.

First, the expert paradigm assumes that trained professionals are capable of objectively analyzing landscape characteristics and features into a descriptive assessment of scenic beauty, which in part supports Appleton and Carlson’s expert argument on “objective criteria.” The aesthetic premise of the expert paradigm is aesthetic evaluation is an emotional or subjective response, thus the research can only rely on a skillful expert’s opinions.

Second, the psycho-physical paradigm assumes that a landscape serves as the source of stimuli to which individuals respond. That is, the objective assessment of landscape quality is determined by the selected population’s evaluation of specific landscape features or properties. The theoretical basis of this paradigm is primarily grounded in stimulus-response assumptions in psychology, and on the premise that landscape has physical properties that afford specific ways of responding. Both the expert and the psycho-physical approaches deal predominantly with the physical characteristics of landscape for practical applications, but their methods of examining landscape quality entail completely different social agenda.

Third, the cognitive paradigm assumes that landscape quality is a human construction built up usually from visual modes of information processing. This paradigm also addresses our biological origin of aesthetic preference. This approach hypothesizes that the selected respondent group’s preference of a certain landscape feature over another is the objective
evidence to show the one is “more beautiful” than the other, thus landscape quality is essentially
determined by public preference. Both the cognitive and the psychophysical paradigms depend
on public opinions, yet they have different epistemological positions about whether the
objective value resides in the mind or in the landscape.

Finally, the experiential paradigm orients its research focus on the experience or the
phenomena of human-environmental interaction: both humans and the environment are being
shaped in the interactive process. It often employs phenomenological explorations of the
landscape, but this approach has own difficulty in employing techniques for analysis and in
addressing distinct premises for objective values: whether experts evaluate landscape better than
the public and whether landscape quality resides in the physical features or is constructed by
the individual mind.

After the comparative review of these existing four paradigms based on their theoretical
premises, Sell, Talyor, and Zube (Zube, et al.,1982; Sell, et al., 1984; Zube, 1984) classify them
further into three elements of a framework for examination of current landscape perception
research: the humans, the landscape properties, and the interaction outcomes. They conclude
that each paradigm has shortcomings because landscape perception under the individual
paradigm deals with only one of the elements or components, either the concept of human
beings or the landscape properties, rather than the interaction of those two.

The concept of the human beings includes observers or merely respondent groups, or
active participants in a particular interaction with landscape. The concept of landscape
properties includes tangible or intangible elements of landscapes that contribute to the
perceptual interaction process, and the concept of the interaction itself encompasses relationships between human and human, group and landscape, and its outcome in turn affects both the humans and the landscape.

The expert and psychophysical paradigms find their theoretical basis in the landscape, the cognitive paradigm seeks its theory on the human side, and the experiential paradigm is most concerned with the interaction and its outcomes. In other words, most landscape perception research has concentrated on the “what” of landscape perception by whom, rather than the “how” and the “why” (Sell et al, 1984, p68). They argue for a new integrative paradigm that should be able to unify the human and the landscape components, seeking to identify the “how” the and “why” of human-landscape interaction, and one that would integrate all four existing approaches into one conceptual system of landscape perception, the experiential paradigm.

In order to support their argument on the importance of the concept of interaction and its relation to the experiential paradigm and in order to develop a theoretical framework for landscape aesthetics, they suggest a “transactional” model to build on the work of William Ittleson (1973) in environmental psychology (Zube, et al.,1982, p.22; Sell, et al., 1984, p.71; Zube, 1984, p.108), which emphasizes the importance of experience in defining the identity of the entities. For further guidance of a theory of landscape perception they first identify the seven perceptual properties of landscape, or properties of transaction, in the contributions of the transactional model, and then categorize them into the four existing paradigms. As seen in Table 2.1, the experiential and cognitive paradigms promise to be the most relevant approaches to the
The Paradigms of Landscape Aesthetics Reconsidered

transactional-interactive perspective and to the continuity between person and landscape, which they think is of most significance.

Table 2.1: Paradigm Contributions to a Transactional Approach to Landscape Perception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptual Properties of Landscapes by Ittelson (1973)</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Considerable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Psycho-physical</td>
<td>*Cognitive</td>
<td>*Experiential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Landscapes surround</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Landscapes are multimodal</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Landscapes provide Peripheral as well as central Information</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Landscapes provide more information than can be used</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Landscape perception always involves action</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Landscapes call forth actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Landscapes always have an ambiance</td>
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</table>


Zube (1984) argues that the theoretical problem in landscape research lies in the slippery and ambiguous usage and definitions of landscape in theory, model, concept, and hypothesis, and attempts to suggest a general theory for landscape evaluation with three conceptual themes,
The Paradigms of Landscape Aesthetics Reconsidered

namely paradigms of theoretical orientation: the behavioral, the humanistic, and the professional (see Figure 2.2).

The behavioral paradigm is about landscape aesthetic perception mostly focusing on landscape preference rooted in biological heritage, the humanistic theme is to seek cultural influences on different aesthetic preferences, and the professional paradigm is a normative
The Paradigms of Landscape Aesthetics Reconsidered

aesthetic value to build visual landscape models such as elements of visual quality—cover pattern, water, vegetation pattern and the like. The behavioral and the professional paradigms have suggested visual assessment models from an aesthetic viewpoint, focusing on form, line, color, texture as compositional qualities on the one hand, whereas cultural studies have focused on comparative analyses of differences and similarities between perceived meanings of landscape. Furthermore, the behavioral paradigm defines theory in an explanatory context (understanding why and what), while the professional paradigm does this in a normative and deterministic context (defining what ought to be). In other words, the behavioral paradigm basically includes most empirical studies of social and behavioral scientists who construct hypotheses and theory so as to explain and predict phenomena, whereas the professional paradigm also includes empirical works, but descriptive rather than explanatory, as well as normative rather than predictive.

In addition, methodologically social behavioral scientists predominantly tend to adopt quantitative tools, whereas professionals use both quantitative and qualitative tools, yet tend to become more quantitative when institutionalized: they are mutually informing each other. By contrast, the humanistic paradigm is a rich source of qualitative information, having great potential for expanding knowledge about the value and the meaning of landscapes (Zube, 1984, p.108). This paradigm adopts qualitative and descriptive tools from such concepts as sense of place, transactionalism, historicism, and phenomenology, and informs its findings to both the behavioral and the professional paradigm, but not necessarily receiving information from these two.
In order to help conceptually to bridge these differences between professions and disciplines in terms of the nature of a general theory, Zube explains a four level structure of theory (p.105) suggested by Moore, Tuttle, & Howell (1982) as follows: 1) “A general theory” that represents broad concepts and identifies lines of research, 2) “Conceptual frameworks” that represent relationships among existing findings and provide their systematic organizations, 3) “Conceptual models” that provide descriptions of variables or of relationships among variables, but not necessarily explanations of phenomena, and 4) “Explanatory theories” that represent testable hypotheses based on assumptions and concepts about relationships among variables, leading to the explanation and understanding of phenomena.

Most research under the professional and social behavioral paradigms, he points out, tends to focus on the third and the fourth level of theory without a general theory and its conceptual frameworks. These overlapping attributes of the three paradigms should define what a general theory for landscape evaluation should encompass. A general theory must be a transactional and interactive linkage among the three paradigms, and must recognize the need for, and the relationships between quantitative and qualitative information and at the same time encompass diverse geographic scales and types from the site to the regional and from urban to natural landscapes. Moreover, a general theory should be neither an explanatory theory nor a single theoretical framework, but rather a heuristic one that seeks a systemic quality that transacts among normative aesthetic values, cultural influences, and our biological heritage (Zube, 1984, p.109).
2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

Porteous (1982, 1996) expands the concept of landscape perception and of evaluation to the realm of environmental aesthetics. He identifies the four approaches to environmental aesthetics by adding one more dimension, the “activist,” to Zube’s (1984) three interactive paradigms and calls them humanists, activists, experimentalists, and planners.

The humanists’ approach to environmental aesthetics stresses a non-positivist and phenomenological perspective based on personal reasoning or intuition. The activists attempt to draw the attention of the public and of policy makers by portraying environmental aesthetics as the basis of moral needs. Quite unlike the humanists’ tone, this group of people, including environmentalists, conservationists, and eco-activists, have immediate practical aims in mind when speaking with sometimes emotional voices to the public (1982, p.77).

The experimentalist approach is largely composed of social scientists and environmental psychologists whose aim is to tease out landscape qualities or variables that affect the observer or the user. This approach is apt to treat the environment as a source of perceptual stimuli, and usually involves some testable forms of simulation. Lastly, the planners’ approach is less concerned with theory building and empirical research than the social science oriented experimentalists are, but seeks rather to create a harmonious blend of theory and application, and some real-world feedback to the other three, the activists, the humanists, and the experimentalists.
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the four paradigms are informing one another. Environmental activists learn from both humanists and planners, and also inform them. Environmental and social scientists share their findings with humanists as well as planners, and at the same time, receive qualitative and practical information from them. By comparison, humanists and planners exchange information and knowledge extensively with all of the other three approaches: both play integrative roles as the richest source of information.

In addition, these four paradigms are interactively arrayed in terms of philosophical criteria: rigor and relevance (1996, p.14). According to Porteous, rigor refers to a strong scientific orientation, to theory building, and to testing in pursuit of positivism, whereas relevance refers to the immediacy of the approach to current environmental problems. Both

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activists and humanists are relatively less interested in seeking scientific or positivist views on aesthetics, whereas both planners and experimentalists are more interested in empirical tests or actions in theory and practice. Likewise, both activists and planners tend to take immediate actions, while humanists and experimentalist seem to be more conceptual or theoretical.

Although his analysis of the approaches to the environmental aesthetics appears rather schematic, it implies several remarks in support for the scheme of an integrative theory argued for by Zube and others. First, the role of professionals—planners or designers—is recognized to be the most integrative, and significant for moral justifications in the realm of environmental aesthetics. Second, the humanists’ approach is considered to be most interactive with other fields, and thus, if equipped with scientific or philosophical rigor, it would be an important source of theoretical underpinnings for environmental aesthetics. Third, and most importantly, except for activist approach there is no substantial difference between the approaches to environmental aesthetics and to landscape perception or evaluation: a paradigm for landscape aesthetics is a paradigm for environmental aesthetics.

2.3 THE AESTHETIC APPRECIATION OF NATURE

Carlson’s primary interest in the aesthetic appreciation of nature is in knowing what and how to appreciate. He has sought to establish a conceptual framework of aesthetic appreciation, and the criteria for aesthetic judgment of the environment, from different approaches to the work of art, despite the criticism that existing approaches to the work of art do not fit the appreciation of nature or of the environment. Departing from the analogy with approaches to
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art he admits that a paradigm for the aesthetic appreciation of nature should be different from that of art, yet ironically the recognition of the difference makes us also see that the aesthetic appreciation of both the work of art and the environment would share some common characteristics under the categories of “aesthetic object” and of “aesthetic experience.”

Carlson (1979, 1993, 2000, 2004) first identifies two traditional models, the object model and the landscape model, for the aesthetic appreciation of art, and examines how and why they might be inappropriate to the understanding of the natural environment. He then introduces five different models of aesthetic appreciation, each of which seems to be based on an appropriate paradigm for the environment. These models identified by Carlson are the followings: 1) Object model, 2) Landscape model, 9) 3) Natural environment model, 4) Engaging model, 5) Arousal model, 6) Post-modern model, and 7) Metaphysical imagination model.

The first, the object model, is an obvious artistic view: artists create a work of art, like a sculpture or a painting, as a self-contained aesthetic unit (2000, p.42). From this view nature or the environment may be simply viewed as a sculptural piece like a mountain, a rock, trees, or other natural objects, that seem to have formal properties to allow us to identify what it is. The supporting reason for this model, as one of the possible paradigms, is that the environment has its own natural or artificial objects, and consequently we appreciate things and features of the environment, not actually the environment itself. However, Carlson argues (2000, p.43), there

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9 Since I am arguing that landscape is not merely a scene from a distance, I would rather call it the “scenery or prospect paradigm” instead of the “landscape model.”
are aspects that the object model is inappropriate and questionable to the environment: it has limited qualities that are removed from their relational surroundings. If the attention is directed specifically and separately to a certain object, like a waterfall, rocks, houses, or trees, then it is no longer the appreciation of nature.

The second is the landscape or scenery model, which refers to picturesque qualities or to a prospect as a two-dimensional view on the environment. The landscape model requires an observer from a due distance or from a specific standpoint and regards the environment as scenery or as an illustration from landscape painting, a postcard, or camera’s viewfinder. This model probably owes its existence to landscape painting as an art form and has been historically significant in our aesthetic appreciation of the environment or of nature (1979a, p.270). However, Carlson articulates this model is inappropriate as well. First, it also requires dividing the environment into scenes and blocks of scenery by the appropriate emotional and spatial distance, like a walk through a gallery of landscape paintings, although the environment is neither a static painting nor consisting of two-dimensional views. In addition, this model requires the appreciation of the environment not as what it is and with the quality it has, i.e. the immediate and holistic environmental or landscape quality, but rather a pattern of visual and compositional qualities that are significant in landscape painting.

It may be similar to appreciating the beauty of a person in a picture manipulated by a computer technique, rather than to appreciate the beauty of a person as he or she is in the lived moment. Thus, although viewing the environment as a prospect, inspired by landscape painting, was partially responsible for stimulating the moral movement for the protection of nature,
Carlson argues that the scenery model is neither aesthetic nor moral (1979a, p.271) because it is entirely anthropocentric and has nothing to do with the beauty of nature. While the scenery model may seem inappropriate, it cannot be easily rejected because much of our scientific research in landscape aesthetics depends on this kind of paradigm: the contemporary scientific and empirical tradition of landscape requires chopping the environment into blocks and units by spatial and emotional distance to make it accessible to the methods we presently have at our disposal.

Carlson argues that neither of these traditional models fully realize the nature of landscape and of the environment, and suggests a third, the environmental model, which recognizes that everything is to be appreciated in all the ways in which we normally are aware of and experience our surroundings by sight, smell, touch, etc. (2000, p.48). The environment model is predicated on the notion that we must appreciate nature as what it is in fact, as natural and as an environment, as well as in light of our knowledge of what it is, provided by natural science. In other words, he seems to claim that if we appreciate the environment also as informed by scientific knowledge, then our experience would become aesthetic. Thus, Carlson affirms, “by initiating more universal and object centered environmental aesthetics, the environment model successfully aids in the alignment of aesthetics with other areas of philosophy, ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind” (p.13).

While the environment model emphasizes scientific knowledge, the fourth, the engaging model, realizes the contextual dimension of nature and our multi-sensory experience of it. Viewing nature as a seamless unity of organisms, perceptions, and places makes the human
being become a part of such an infinite relationship. The engaging model attempts to obliterate the traditional dichotomy of subject and object, and to reduce the distance humans and nature (2000, p.7). However, Carlson argues that this model may lose the reason by reason of which the resultant experience is aesthetic, and thus may also lose the possibility of distinguishing between a trivial and superficial appreciation and the appropriate and serious one. This is simply to say that not every experience is aesthetic and that there is no clear evidence to say whether or not one’s experience is aesthetic or whether it is in some way “better” than another one.

The fifth, the arousal model, proposes that we may appreciate nature simply by being emotionally aroused by it. Unlike the environment model, that holds that we appreciate the environment to the extent that we know it, the arousal model premises that a less intellectual, more visceral experience of the environment is the way of aesthetic appreciation: we appreciate in feeling. Carlson seems to be interested more in the relationship between the natural environment model and arousal model, like many of those who are curious about whether aesthetic experience is due to instinctive or intellectual force. An emotional response to the natural environment can be also cognitively and intellectually aroused and thus the contrast with both the natural environmental and the engaging model may not be clear.

The sixth, the post-modern model of appreciation, views nature as a text, contending that in “reading” a text we appreciate. The environment is seen as many layers of human cultural deposits that overlay pure nature. Whatever culture is, nature is found in it. In other words, the aesthetic appreciation of the environment is to appreciate the proper dimensions of it, such as the rich and varied deposits of art, literature, folklore, religion, myths of it. As
Carlson states, this is the idea that “nature is what it is for us, not in itself” (2000, p.xx). The postmodern model essentially attempts to obliterate the traditional gap between culture and nature, but heavily emphasizes our cultural deposits: we do not appreciate solely nature, but culture in it. Carlson is unlikely to accept this because, like the engaging model, human cultural deposits are too pluralistic and are endorsing diversity, and are therefore questionable for an appropriate aesthetic appreciation.

The last, the metaphysical imagination model, views nature as a metaphysical insight about the whole of our experience. Hepburn explains, “We see the landscape as cosmically ominous, or as revealing-concealing a still greater beauty than its own, then, the many leveled structure of aesthetic experience of nature can include great diversity of constituents: from the most particular—rocks, stones, leaves, clouds, shadows—to the most abstract and general ways we apprehend the world, the world as a whole (Hepburn, 2004b, p.127).” We appreciate the environment for a deep meditation or wild speculation, such as the meaning of life and spirituality of nature.

The seven models identified by Carlson give us plausible ways of seeing nature and the environment. They also invite us to think about several points that can be noted in these models in search for the fundamental metaphysical issues about the true character of landscape and about their proper place in design in terms of the relationship between the work of art and nature.

First, both the object and the scenery or landscape models are deeply grounded in the dichotomous view that the environment and human beings are separate entities, which can be
called the object-scenery paradigm. Much of current research in relation to landscape evaluation is rooted in this perspective taken over from art criticism and focusing on formal properties. Humans are the ones eligible to make aesthetic judgments, and the environment is the object, the framed scenery, or the environment, which is not ontologically pertinent to the nature of nature, the environment, or landscape. There is no objection to his argument that the environment is not “a sculpture,” removed from its surroundings, but I may disagree that the environment is endlessly indeterminate and therefore not an aesthetic object; yet he claims at the same time, to appreciate something is to enter the subject-object relation (Carlson, 1979a, p.268).

If we appreciate something as an aesthetic object we discover and explore not a mere thing, but some limited qualities through its own medium within human experience, which is necessarily involving its physical and material surroundings or other experiential qualities. Even if experiencing a sculpture as an object, we experience qualities in it, not an object itself. Therefore, I would say, the object model cannot be fully denied because, while the environment may not be a mere static object like a sculpture, it is nevertheless a living object that has features, qualities, and contexts to be experienced together; therefore the fundamental nature of

10 Carlson’s basic interest in environmental aesthetics is how to appreciate the natural environment, or nature. If he meant the environment as virgin nature, with no human intervention or experience, then he is right, because nature itself is indeterminate, but then there is really no need for aesthetic debate because the appreciation of nature must be always positive.
the aesthetic experience of nature still needs to be clarified.

Second, the environment model as Carlson’s most favorite, not only recognizes both humans and the environment as one interactive entity emphasizing the importance of contexts and surrounding, but it also recognizes the epistemological dualism of both knowledge and sensation in the aesthetic appreciation of the environment. However, it is still too broad in terms of experiences by all senses, and too narrow in terms of knowledge. The engaging and the arousal models also deal with human sensation in a significant way, and his notion of knowledge about “nature” is not necessarily approached only by the natural sciences but also by the social and cultural knowledge, particularly if we deal with the human environment. All of this essentially means that the third model, the environment model, is the most inclusive of the engaging and arousal model with respect to human sensation on the one side and the post-modern and the metaphysical model in terms of human knowledge on the other side. Hence, each of the four models, the engaging, the arousal, the post-modern, and the metaphysical imagination models, can be integrated into the environment model in Carlson’s definition, as well as to a broad notion of human experience.

As Carlson himself points out about the engaging model, the environment model still does not seem to suggest clear reasons why one’s specific experience of a particular environment is aesthetic or why one experience is “more aesthetic” than the other, implicitly admitting that not all human knowledge of the environment is derived from the natural sciences. Nevertheless, in spite of these lingering questions, Carlson’s seven models clearly address issues on what needs to be further examined for a general theory or for a new paradigm.
for environmental aesthetics. Figure 2.4 shows an analytical diagram summarizing Carlson’s seven models in their approach to environmental aesthetics under the scenery-object (anthropocentric) paradigm and the environment-experience (ecocentric) paradigm.

![Figure 2.4: An analytical diagram of Carlson’s seven models for aesthetic appreciation of the environment](image)

### 2.4 SOME REMARKS ON EXISTING PARADIGMS

From the integrative analyses, such as Zube and others’ paradigms of landscape evaluation and perception, Porteous’ paradigm of environmental aesthetics, and Carlson’s analyses of the existing approaches to aesthetic appreciation of the environment, some
important lessons can be found. First, the existing paradigms for landscape perception and evaluation cover three disciplines: psychology for cognitive and behavioral aspects, phenomenology for the humanistic and experiential approach, and social science for practical applications, but most of the approaches to aesthetic evaluation relied on psychological responses from the public, based on the view that the environment or the landscape is a static or a scenic object.

Second, Zube and his colleagues, Porteous, and Carlson agree that the experiential and the humanistic approach, which may have little scientific or evaluative rigor, or practical relevance, best recognize humans as a part of the environment, and that they show great potential to integrate all the other paradigms as a transactional or heuristic center, capable to suggest explanatory, descriptive, and normative qualities of aesthetic perception. For instance, Ittleson’s property of landscape perception can transact between the cognitive and experiential approaches, and Carlson’s environment model integrates the other models, such as the engagement of senses, our varieties and kinds of knowledge, and intuitive imaginations in terms of experience and knowledge for aesthetic appreciation.

Third, therefore, a new paradigm and a general theory should be organized in a holistic, interdisciplinary, transactional, and heuristic conception of aesthetic experience, which exactly permeates the common ground among design theory, landscape, and aesthetic experience. At the same time, a general theory should be able to address a single unified entity that intersects the components and the factors of the landscape we seek to synthesize, and thus inform professionals more explicitly of aesthetic criteria for value judgment not only in terms of what
are qualities and features that can be aesthetically appreciated, but also why these and not others, and how the aesthetic value of those could be enhanced.

Finally, it is noteworthy that the existing paradigms regarding landscape perception and evaluation are congruent with those of the aesthetic appreciation of the environment; thus, a general theory and a new paradigm of landscape aesthetics from experiential point of view could spell out such issues as perception, appreciation, and evaluation of the environment from the aesthetic, the ecological, and the ethical point of view.

Based on the analytical review on the existing approaches and their inherent shortcomings, the direction of a new paradigm for landscape aesthetics and of a general theory of aesthetic experience emerges as one that needs to be more holistic, interdisciplinary, transactional, and heuristic than the ones we have. It should therefore prove to be valuable to scrutinize the visions of several scholars who have tried to propose such a more comprehensive and a more integrative paradigm. The three to be discussed below envisage the possibilities of a transactional, developmental or evolutionary, and holistic paradigm for the aesthetic experience of landscape—i.e. the experiential nature of landscape aesthetics from phenomenological, psychological, and ecological perspectives respectively.
3. THREE APPROACHES TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY: A NEW EXPERIENTIAL PARADIGM

3.1 THE TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH TO LANDSCAPE EXPERIENCE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

There is no such thing as a natural landscape unaffected by human and every environment is a human environment. The notion of environment is fundamentally problematic: environment is not the environment as if it were outside and independent of ourselves, and our experience of environment is not “the” experience as well. The experience of our environment has an identity, but as a phase or mode in which experience may occur, not as a separate kind of experience. The perceiver is an aspect of the perceived and persons and their environment are continuous. The notion of the aesthetic experience of the environment has somewhat rested on supernatural and transcendental grounds because aesthetic and moral interests tend to be isolated from rational inquiry (Berleant, 2000, p.15). The environment has long been approached by sheer rational inquiry from the natural sciences, rarely defined by cultural geographers and cultural ecologists (Berleant, 1992, p.4), while the aesthetic appreciation of the environment is affected by traditional accounts of the theory of art and somewhat misguided by a formal and visual focus, and the work of art has been treated primarily as a cognitive, contemplative, and disinterested phenomenon.

Berleant emphasizes philosophical assumptions that are open to the challenge of developing a unifying theme in our approach to environmental aesthetics on empirical as well as conceptual grounds, and postulates that a unified theory should offer an analytic account of
what occurs in the experiential unity of the aesthetic situation by describing the types and characteristics of aesthetic experience in everyday life. According to him, the experiential unity of the aesthetic situation is “the aesthetic field” (2000) that has functional and dynamic relationships among four constituents: artists, perceivers, aesthetic objects, and critics. Aesthetic experience occurs in the transactional mode of experience of the four in which a united analysis of aesthetic experience as well as a genuine logic of aesthetic judgment—what critics do—can be made.

To explain, designers or artists intend to imbue their work of design or art with certain features and qualities, which renders it potentially aesthetic. The art or design object then provides the “aesthetic situation” with its intrinsic features and qualities, and at the same time the perceivers bring their own experience into the situation. To the extent that perceivers appreciate the features and qualities of the work as created by the designers, the aesthetic transaction has occurred: the perceiver and the designer or artist becomes connected with each other through their medium of expression—the work of design or art. The role of critics is composed of a circular phase of the four functions: valuation, description, interpretation, and instruction about the creation of the work of art, the qualitative and structural features of the art object, and the perceptual responses to it. In opening a conversation for “attaining a fuller perceptual experience by increasing the scope and intensity of aesthetic awareness” (p.147), criticism can make a substantial contribution to this transaction (see Figure 2.5).
Berleant’s account of a transactional mode in fact outlines the aesthetic field as a communicative relationship among the artist, the work of art, and the perceiver. If the aesthetic experience is to be a kind of common, situational denominator in an aesthetic field among them, it means that the artist or designer provides features and qualities through his or her work, the perceiver can take aesthetic qualities from it, and the work can become a medium for communication similar to language. This communication model then can be applied to the aesthetic appreciation of the natural or man-made environment as well.

Assuming the environment we all perceive as a kind of work of design or art, we

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11 From “The aesthetic field: Phenomenology of aesthetic experience” by A. Berleant, 2000, New Zealand: Cybereditions.
perceive it by discovering certain characteristics or qualities embodied in the environment or by bringing those to the environment ourselves. When we appreciate a particular landscape as aesthetically pleasing or positive, such as a deer running through snow on the hillside of a mountain, we discover some appreciative qualities of what is perceived, and at the same time we attach some qualitative meanings to what is perceived: perceiving is a simultaneous transaction between humans and the environment and between the objective act of discovering and the subjective act of attaching, and aesthetic experience is neither subjective nor objective—it is existential (see Figure 2.6).

**Figure 2.6:** The aesthetic transaction among designer, perceiver, the environment, and human artifacts

Although Berleant speaks little about the difference of the perceptual fields between the work of art and the environment, the perceiving of landscape characteristics and qualities is
definitely different from the perceiving of the work of art or architecture. The natural environment has most diverse and complex qualities that may have been less explored than any other human environment. Perhaps, “our experience may be more intensely realized and pervasive in nature, for we are in nature and a part of nature; we do not stand over against it as over against a painting on a wall” (Hepburn, 2004a, p.45).

In brief, nature seems to easily attract more appreciative spectators than the work of art, and to easily engage ordinary people rather than only some elites who have received traditional art education and claim to have special aesthetic taste. Then, how do we know the qualitative characteristics of aesthetic experience in the environment? Berleant answers this question with no hesitation. Works of the art such as sculpture, painting, poetry, music, performing arts, architecture, and landscape architecture already have these experiential characteristics, all of which are part of the environment. A theory of aesthetic experience then could be empirically attempted with identifying, describing, defining, clarifying and ordering such qualitative characteristics.

In a first empirical attempt to identify qualitative characteristics that are common to both works of art and the environment, he identifies inclusive factors that condition qualitative characteristics in the modes of aesthetic experience (i.e., Table 2.2). As factors for the aesthetic condition he first defines the aesthetic field as a perceptual field, and invokes the full range of sensory responses, such as visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, and kinesthetic perceptions involved in our normal experiences, and thus defines them essentially as biological factors.
The second factor he takes into significant consideration is a psychological factor, which involves our analysis of identifying characteristic patterns of perceptual experience, based on our insights from such disciplines as the behavioral sciences, Gestalt psychology, cognitive science, and others. Thus, the aesthetic experience as a perceptual field can be described primarily by the contextual relationship between biological and psychological factors, and by other supporting factors such as technical, material, cultural, social, and historical. The description of aesthetic perception includes characteristics and qualities that are essentially pre-cognitive or pre-logical—active, immediate, sensuous, sensible, qualitative, intuitive or integrative and intrinsic.

The other empirical mode of aesthetic experience is appreciation. The psychology of appreciation as an empirical investigation is “in a less developed stage than the psychology of perception,” as interviews and questionnaires “are apt to be influenced by the respondents’
priori ideas rather than actual appreciative experience” (Berleant, 2000, p.74).

Thus, before attempting an aesthetic appraisal, he argues, we must first determine the types and characters of responses that are relevant by reference to each mode of aesthetic experience. The mode of appreciation is apt to be conditioned by historical, cultural and social factors, and is more likely to have cognitive, analytic, and rational characteristics on a knowledge basis. The conditioning factors, from biological and psychological to cultural, social, and historical, tend to be integrated in the process of an aesthetic experience: perception and appreciation do not occur separately, and each has different experiential characteristics and its predominant conditioning factors.

As such, maintaining a wide spectrum of aesthetic experience absorbing the interactive relationships among works of art, the environment, perceivers, and critics, Berleant calls for a new perspective of environmental aesthetics as an experiential quality, and describes its basic functions and characteristics by employing Dewey’s philosophy of art and experience. In his integrative approach to aesthetic experience Berleant emphasizes more the pre-cognitive quality of perception and the transactional function of aesthetic field. His analytic scheme of aesthetic experience may synthesize Carlson’s four models, such as the engaging, the arousal, the post-modern, and the metaphysical imagination: the engaging, the arousal, and the metaphysical imagination can be seen as the conditioning factors for the mode of perception, and the post-modern model can be included as the conditioning factor for the mode of appreciation. Yet, the distinction between a psychology of perception and a psychology of appreciation still remains somewhat ambiguous in regard to aesthetic experience.
3.2 THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO LANDSCAPE EXPERIENCE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

Bourassa (1988, 1990, 1991) agrees with the majority of already discussed problems in developing a theory of landscape aesthetics, and argues that it is because many philosophers of aesthetics have not given attention to landscapes as aesthetic objects (1988, p.241). He assumes that landscapes as aesthetic objects are active rather than static, and that a model for an aesthetic analysis of landscape will have something to do with the human mental structure. In particular he explores the possible association with the idea of archetype and Bachelard’s (1969) “poetic image of space” as a key conceptual basis for an aesthetic theory of landscapes. Using Langer’s (1953) and Dewey’s (1934) treatment of aesthetic perception as a part of ordinary human experience, as opposed to the “visual beauty” of aesthetic formalism, he argues that the theory of landscape aesthetics is a meta-aesthetic theory that embraces art and nature (Bourassa, 1988, p.251).

In his later works (1990, 1991) Bourassa proposes two possibilities for the identification of aesthetic principles: one is based on biological, and the other on cultural assumptions. As an approach to a general theory he suggests tripartite modes of aesthetic experience. First he applies the notions of the Russian cultural-historic psychologist Vygosky (1986), who emphasized inter-personal culture and historic evolutionary processes in an existential and developmental account of human mental structure and behavior, to the biological and the cultural account of aesthetic experience. He then reviews MacLean (1959, 1973) and Zajonc’s (1980, 1984) research on feeling and thinking to relate the separate modes of biological and of
cultural of experience to each other, employs Meyer’s (1979) general theory of style to these modes, and finally proposes “Modes of aesthetic experience and their manifestation as aesthetic constraint and opportunities” (Bourassa, 1990, p. 803).

Bourassa’s modes of aesthetic experience (1990, 1991) structurally maintain a similarity with Vygotsky’s account of three developmental and evolutionary modes of human intellectual activity: phylogenesis, sociogenesis, and ontogenesis. These developmental processes become a tripartite paradigm with three modes of aesthetic experience: the biological (Vygosky’s natural), the cultural, and the personal. Vygotsky sees biological (phylogenesis) and cultural (sociogenesis) constraints as underlying factors that an individual can transcend on the personal level (ontogenesis) through intellectual activity, whereas Bourassa sees these cultural and biological constraints as two dialectical components that constitute an aesthetic experience. As it were, an aesthetic experience happens as an intellectual, personal experience, as in Vygotsky’s ontogenesis, but it is constrained, evolved, and transcended by biological and cultural modes.

The notable point in his approach is that the biological and cultural components of an experience are regarded as having a distinct and as separate status, such as the dual physio-psychological system of emotion and cognition. Our mental structure has two independent systems, the cognitive and the affective, in correspondence to environmental stimuli as in Zajonc’s findings. These dual systems of human mind are related to MacLean’s notion of the dual systems in human perception, emotion (feeling) and cognition (thinking). In addition to the synthesis of the psychological evidences, such as those by Vygostky, Zajonc, and MacLean’s dual or tripartite approach to human perception and cognition, Bourassa finally employs
Meyer’s general theory of style, which refers to a series of choices to systemize the biological, cultural, and personal modes as three levels of constraints and opportunities for aesthetic choices: laws, rules, and strategies. Laws are defined as trans-cultural constraints whereas rules are trans-personal but intra-cultural, and lastly strategies are compositional choices made within the possibilities established by laws and rules (see Figure 2.7).

Figure 2.7: Bourassa’s paradigm of landscape aesthetics: Evolutionary modes of aesthetic experience

Bourassa’s approach to a paradigm of landscape aesthetics appears rather as a systemic organization of the relevant psychological theories. The interesting points to underscore are that first, he regards the developmental states of aesthetic experience from biological, cultural, and personal modes as being connected in a distinct, but interactively evolving process, but sees the personal mode of experience as an accumulated state and as a bridge between the natural and cultural development of human mind, which relates well to Berleant’s analytic framework of
aesthetic experience. Second, Bourassa connects feeling and thinking, as the dual functions of the human mind, with the biological and cultural modes of human perception: this again confirms Berleant’s conditioning factors, which are psychological as well as biological. Third, Bourassa’s account of aesthetic judgment may be still be a personal choice as part of aesthetic experience; however, the aesthetic choice we make personally is no longer purely personal, separated from social, cultural, and biological contexts and necessities, it is rather a rational choice crystallized by trans-cultural and transpersonal constraints and opportunities: a personal aesthetic choice may indeed be a shared phenomenon.

The tripartite framework for a general theory is based on the basic premise that an aesthetic experience is ultimately a mental activity identified by a system of constraints and opportunities, such as biological law, cultural strategy, and individual choice. This framework integrates the perspectives of behavioral, cognitive, and developmental psychology, and supports the biological and cultural substrate for the individual personality. While the tripartite phases of aesthetic development are independent, they are also hierarchically inter-dependent (i.e., Figure 2.8).

![Figure 2.8: The relationship of biological, cultural, and personal factors in Bourassa’s tripartite framework](image)
These characteristics make Bourassa’s general theory acquire an explanatory power in terms of why the natural environment is most favorable, and why individual persons have their own personal aesthetic preference. However, individual style and taste, a form of repetitive patterns in both human behavior and artifacts, seem to be reduced to a parameter to explain the mere fact of an occurrence of aesthetic experience. In addition, the combined application of Vygotsky’s “intellectual activity” and Zajonc and Maclean’s physiological “perception” to his “aesthetic experience” does not really explain why an experience is aesthetic: without further conceptual distinction, an individual choice could also be rational or moral.

Bourassa also linearly equates feeling with biological factors and thinking with cultural factors of experience, and the psychological mechanism mediating between feeling and thinking is still conceptually separated and not yet empirically clear. Nevertheless, his approach to aesthetic experience makes great sense in that it first defines aesthetic experience as a personal phenomenon that arises from the distinct yet interactive relationship between biological and cultural or social contexts. Second, it proposes that the aesthetic experience eventually leads to aesthetic preferences as an evaluative process in everyday events.

3.3 THE HOLISTIC APPROACH TO LANDSCAPE EXPERIENCE: AN ECOLOGICAL ACCOUNT

By the very nature of their discipline designers always have to deal with aesthetics, if only indirectly, but often in terms too vague to be useful. Koh (1982, 1988) argues that any aesthetic theory must be applied and tested for its specific usefulness in design, insofar as aesthetic issues are central to environmental design, and works of design can be empirically
evaluated to advance the rationalization of the designer’s decisions and thus contribute to making them more relevant to social issues in ordinary life. A synthetic theory, he argues, should be able to fill the deficiencies left open by both formal and phenomenological approaches to aesthetics.

Formal aesthetics deals with the static concept of aesthetics by taking artwork as an object of observation from a distance, and tends to be scientific, objective, and positivistic, whereas phenomenological aesthetics aims to be holistic and humanistic, but tends to encourage designers to be too experience-centered and subjective. Thus, in order to help designers deal with aesthetic values and judgments objectively, we need a theoretical synthesis, an ecological paradigm as a general theory. He calls it a “theory of creativity,” able to bridge the gaps between art and environmental design.

Koh argues that a theory of creativity could offer a useful framework for aesthetics on a firm empirical foundation, because the concept of creativity can be explained by current thought derived from biology, psychology, neurophysiology, and artificial intelligence, and can link “aesthetics with design, art with science, product with process, perception with cognition, and the aesthetics of art with the aesthetics of natural beauty” (1988, p.179). As long as aesthetic theory is generally expected to explain both artistic and natural beauty, the general aesthetic theory of creativity can account inclusively for many kinds of creativity, such as cognitive and perceptual development, biological and physiological development, organic evolution, and a theory of ecosystems. Both design and aesthetic experience are a creative process of ordering in the both the cognitive as well as the perceptual realm.
Based on a variety of literature, Koh specifies the empirical premises for his theory as follows:

- Both perception and cognition are complementary, creative, and adaptive processes.
- Design as a creative problem-solving process (artistic as well as scientific creativity) involves visual thinking and aesthetic judgment: they are searching not only for original but also elegant solutions.
- The sense of beauty involves playfulness, humor, and hedonism, which are related to four psychological aspects of creativity: process, product, person, and environment.
- Creative scientists, artists, and designers tend to place a higher value on aesthetic and theoretical matters than on pragmatic and ethical matters.
- Both aesthetics and design are a creative process as well as a creative product, because a creative process is always manifested in a creative product: process and product are two aspects of one.
- Both art and science deal with the works of art and nature: both are creative products that provoke aesthetic response.

Koh’s approach starts from a basic premise that aesthetics is a theory of art, utility is a part of the scientific realm, and “creativity” is a common character to both; thus, by probing the general features common in artistic as well as scientific creativity, we could delineate a general theory for design aesthetics. Koh calls a theory of creativity an ecological paradigm, and argues it must be based on “ordering principles in nature as well as on human perception and
cognition” (p.180) (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3: An approach to an ecological paradigm and a theory of creativity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ecological Aesthetics</th>
<th>Theory of Creativity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A general Theory</strong></td>
<td>Theory of Creativity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode</strong></td>
<td>Phenomenological, evolutionary, participatory, and adaptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interdependent Principles</strong></td>
<td>Inclusive Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity of form</td>
<td>Dynamic qualitative balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-organizing system of mind and body</td>
<td>Balance between opposing qualities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolving system open to the environment</td>
<td>Dualistic notion of process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open minded person</td>
<td>Indoor vs. outdoor continuity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitive to awareness and to cognitive integrity</td>
<td>Archetypical symbols with unconscious natural features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aesthetic Principles</strong></td>
<td>Contradiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity with people and place</td>
<td>Natural-cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of place</td>
<td>Symmetry vs. asymmetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of harmony</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure and ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
He formulates three interdependent principles of a theory of creativity—theory across organic, biological, psychological, ecological, and aesthetic realms: 1) Inclusive unity, 2) Dynamic balance, and 3) Complementarity, all of which contribute to traditional aesthetic theories of art as well as to scientific theories of nature. Corresponding to these principles, Koh furthermore identifies aesthetic principles that project concepts and meanings useful for the creative design process. Olmsted’s words, “Designers should discover the law of harmonious relations between multitudinous details” confirm a classic definition of aesthetics. The term harmony is one of the supreme principles of both ecology and aesthetics, referring to unity in variety and dynamic balance in complexity. Finally, the dynamic relationships based on the interrelatedness of the real world with the world of the mind entail the components of symbolism and meaning, such as complexity, multi-dimensionality, open-endedness, exchange, and transaction (Rosenberg, 1986, p.81).

Spirn (1988b, 1990, 1998) also proposes a poetic norm for a new aesthetics, what she calls “a dynamic dialogue” with the natural world. While Koh maintains ecological aesthetics within an empirical, biological, and metaphysical perspective, her voice is rather ethical, normative, speculative, and narrative. She postulates that landscape should be seen as a culturally harmonious process or dialogue of human beings and culture with the natural environment. Landscape design should be able to embody ecological aesthetics as a poetic dialogue by highlighting the relationship between nature’s order and human order for our contemplation, and by intensifying the experience of a sense of unity and sense of identity with a larger whole; thereby they eventually merge into a sense of place. Both nature’s order and
human order harbor poetic contents, such as time, change, pattern, and rhythm, capable to evoke powerful aesthetic potentials and to prompt the contemplation of what these orders mean to us as individuals, to societies, and to our values.

Hence, when design fosters and intensifies the experience of the temporal and spatial scales of landscape by an interpretive language such as process, pattern, and rhythm, space becomes a particular place, which contributes to the experience of being connected to the past and to the future. Spirn’s notion of aesthetic experience is therefore an experience that occurs in places where the natural and cultural process of feeling, meaning, and function appear as patterns, rhythms, space, and time. What designers should do is to amplify such dimensions, from invisible to visible, by making, caring, and thinking.
Whenever the bond that binds the living creatures to his environment is broken, there is noting that holds together the various factors and phases of the self. Thought, emotion, sense, purpose, impulsion fall apart, and are assigned to different compartments of our being. For their unity is found in the cooperative roles they play in active and receptive relations to the environment. (John Dewey, 1934, p.252)

1. A THEORETICAL SCHEMA: FOUR-PART STRUCTURE OF EXISTING APPROACHES

Although the existing paradigms and conceptual models in the studies of landscape aesthetics discussed in Chapter 2 tend to present different theoretical premises and methodologies, the subject matter of these approaches is same: the aesthetic experience of landscape, the single most important category that integrates them all. In order to further investigate reasonable theoretical positions and their overarching paradigms, it is useful to simplify the existing paradigms into some more general common categories of experience. For example, it can be said that Zube and his colleagues’ four paradigms for landscape evaluation—the expert, the psychophysical, the cognitive, and the experiential—and the three conceptual models for a general theory of landscape aesthetics—the behavioral, the humanistic, and the professional—basically present three theoretical approaches to the human mind in terms psychological, phenomenological, and pragmatic experience. Similarly, Porteous’ four paradigms for environmental aesthetics—experimentalists, activists, humanists, and planners—can be
simplified into the empirical, the humanistic, and the pragmatic.

Daniel & Vining’s (1983) five conceptual models in landscape quality-assessment studies, such as the ecological, the formal aesthetic, the psychophysical, the psychological, and the phenomenological, seem to fit the methodological categories of assessment that reflect the criteria on which to make aesthetic choices, and thus may be either quantitative and qualitative, or empirical and humanistic. Furthermore, Carlson’s seven models—the object, the scenery, the natural environment, the engaging, the arousal, the post-modern, and the metaphysical imagination—tend to fit the dual attitudes of the human perception of the environment: the environment as object-scenery and the environment as experience. Whether scientific or humanistic, pragmatic or theoretical, or quantitative or qualitative, there is a need for more general categories that underlie human experience and are able to integrate the different existing paradigms and models.

Hudson (1966) classifies two simple types of scientists, the convergers and the divergers: the former refers to those who seek an impersonal analysis of facts, while the latter refers to holistic generalists. Maslow (1968a) spoke of healthy and creative scientists as opposed to compulsive and unhealthy scientists, who are characterized by neurotic levels of precision, control, quantification, and proof. Mitroff & Kilmann (1978) further suggested a fourfold typology of scientists such as the analytic scientists, the conceptual theorists, the conceptual humanists, and the particular humanists, based on the interactive types from Jungian theory: sensation,

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12 Maslow will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
As illustrated in Table 3.1, a fourfold structure of scientists’ attitudes seems to be an appropriate conceptual scheme to simplify as well as integrate existing theoretical approaches.

**Table 3.1: A typology of scientists and its correspondence with existing approaches to landscape**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interactive types</th>
<th>Sense-Thinking</th>
<th>Thinking-Intuition</th>
<th>Intuition-Feeling</th>
<th>Feeling-Sense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A typology of Scientists</strong>&lt;br&gt;(Mitroff &amp; Kilmann, 1978)</td>
<td>Analytical Scientists</td>
<td>Conceptual Theorists</td>
<td>Conceptual Humanists</td>
<td>Humanists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impersonal Specialist</td>
<td>Impersonal Generalist</td>
<td>Personal Generalist</td>
<td>Localist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Methodical Methodical</td>
<td>Speculative Speculative</td>
<td>Speculative Biased</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logical Logical</td>
<td>Imaginative Imaginative</td>
<td>Imaginative Focused</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specific Specific</td>
<td>Holistic Holistic</td>
<td>Holistic Specific</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary attitude</strong></td>
<td>Appreciative</td>
<td>Evaluative</td>
<td>Justificatory</td>
<td>Explanatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engaging Post-modern Metaphysical Arousal</td>
<td>Imagination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Jung’s theory of archetypes will be further discussed in Chapter 7.
Carlson’s environmental paradigm, in opposition to the object and the scenery paradigm, corresponds reasonably with the four types, as well as with the four modes of experiential values: the appreciative is engaging; the evaluative reflects post-modern attitudes in the way Carlson defined them; the justificatory is an attitude that involves holistic imagination, and the explanatory model is relevant to the arousal model. Zube’s (1984) proposal for a heuristic approach for the future, as a transactional paradigm, also underlines the utility of this conceptual schema of landscape experience.

Also, Porteous’ paradigms can be arranged more inclusively in accordance with these interactive types. He has argued figuratively that experimentalists’ and activists’ approaches are opposed to each other in terms of two interlocking aspects of rigor and relevance, that the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigms for Landscape Perception and Evaluation (Daniel &amp; Vining, 1983)</th>
<th>Psycho-physical</th>
<th>Formal aesthetic</th>
<th>Phenomenological</th>
<th>Psychological</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradigms for Landscape Perception and Evaluation (Zube et al., 1982)</td>
<td>Psycho-physical</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Experiential</td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradigms for Landscape Perception and Evaluation (Sell et al., 1984)</td>
<td>Heuristic approach (Explanatory + Descriptive + Normative)</td>
<td>Behavioral</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Humanistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradigms for Environmental Aesthetics (Porteous, 1982a, b, 1996)</td>
<td>Experimentalists</td>
<td>Planners</td>
<td>Humanists</td>
<td>Experimentalists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 Continued
experimental approach has much to do with sensation as mediating between the pair of opposites of feeling-thinking, while the activist approach, along with planners as well as humanists on the other side, tends to correspond with intuition as mediating between the same pair of feeling-thinking (see also Figure 2.3). Thus, both planners and humanists play more interactive roles between experimenters’ favor of rigor and activists’ favor of relevance.

![Figure 3.1: A typology of scientists and its relationships among professionals, humanists, and experimentalists](image)

This meta-theoretical scheme is neither dogmatic nor conclusive but rather intended to serve as a systemic tool for an analysis of existing perspectives in looking at the whole quality of
experience and of landscape features. As shown in Figure 3.1, this circular four-part schema makes apparent how lopsided our scientific research of landscape aesthetics has been rendered by the dominance of analytical scientists, focusing sense-thinking, the most conscious part of human nature.

The so-called analytical scientists and the particular humanists are likely to have a variety of theoretical positions, reflected in their experimental, behavioral, cognitive, and psychophysical kinds of research, which have been the most common approaches to landscape aesthetics, often adjusted to inquiries that are personal, localist, methodical, biased, focused, and specific. It may be true that much of existing research has focused on the explanatory appreciation of aesthetic objects, while the aesthetic issues addressed by psychologists, despite their substantial contributions to the understanding of human mentality and the quality of life and the environment, for the most part centered on the causal relationship between environmental stimuli and human behaviors, based on the correlated mechanisms between brain and pleasure.

On the other hand, conceptual theorists and humanists tend to maintain the more general, speculative, imaginative, and holistic nature of aesthetic experience, with one exception: the former tend to be impersonal, while the latter tend to favor a more personal tone. Both generally deal with evaluative justifications for landscapes. The conceptual theorists deal with the aesthetic evaluation of the object or the experience of the object. Professionals or experts typically have tended to treat aesthetic issues as ethical values of landscapes. By comparison, the conceptual humanists seem to rely more upon intuitive feeling, which is often critical to our
aesthetic judgments. Qualitative matters of landscape tend to become explanatory and justificatory when dealt with by humanists, who have primarily affective and moral motivations.

Research is a serious and independent act that cannot be literally restricted and defined by any category. This implies, however, that scientists, just as any individual in society, can also have personal dispositions or intellectual preferences to a particular type of research, and that these personal discrepancies may affect individual scientists’ beliefs and values in pursuit of their questions and the ways in which those questions are to be answered, and vice versa. Rarely have research attempts been made aiming to tackle the whole nature of landscape aesthetics; perhaps this could be the reason why the studies of aesthetics have been and still are an ongoing and a never-ending project.

It also is apparent that there has been a counterproductive dichotomy between the empirical and the conceptual approaches. Based on the fourfold typology of scientists, empirical studies in general refer to the approaches of the analytical scientists as well as the particular humanists. Equally apparent and notable is the general lack of research of the conceptual humanists’ kind, which can explain 1) why the existing approaches have insufficiently discussed the unconscious, personal, deep-ecological, and phenomenological aspects of human experience; 2) why the moral and affective values of aesthetic experience have been underestimated; and 3) why aesthetic experience has been neither explained nor sufficiently justified in theory and practice. In order for a transactional approach toward reconciling the dichotomy to succeed, I suggest that the empirical approach move more toward an analytical humanism and the conceptual approach more toward a conceptual humanism. If that happens,
aesthetic theory of landscape experience may begin to explain our empirical understanding as well as act a guide toward normative concepts or conceptual norms.

In conclusion, the four part meta-theoretical schema reveals that the existing paradigms and theoretical perspectives of landscape aesthetics have allowed us to narrowly and partially examine the subject under the guise of scientific investigation. This means that while each theoretical approach still remains effective and admissible in part within its own disciplinary limitations, it may be insufficient as a whole. The fourfold circumference of theoretical perspectives is a Gestalt (holistic) approach, useful for our whole understanding of the nature of landscape aesthetics, just as we experience landscape as a whole, rather than separating parts of it under the name of analysis and of science. Some possible experiential (both analytical and conceptual) parameters that subsume an understanding of the whole experience should be explored, and in order to do so it should be worth our while to revisit some of the theories and their underlying perspectives.

2. ANALYTICAL HUMANISM

2.1 ANALYTICAL SCIENTISTS

The analytical scientists’ approach tends to be a dominant type of research that involves inclusive studies of scenic assessment of the physical attributes of landscape. The so-called sense-thinking type envisages landscape as a visual, aesthetic, and scenic resource to which the public has a right, and that therefore planners, landscape architects, and land managers or policy makers must attend to it in their projects or development proposals. Usually, the quality of
landscape can denote various meanings such as visual, scenic, or aesthetic and other qualities; yet researchers and professionals have used it as the same lexicon in predicting the visual impact on the physical landscape, or on surrounding features, or for the codification of visual controls for landscape planning and design (Litton, 1982, p.97-98).

This type of research typically hypothesizes that the visual aesthetic quality of landscape, or observations of behaviors, have to be identified and predicted by professionals, and thus its methods and processes seek to quantify, rate, or objectify the visual quality as an important indicator of environmental quality. Sense in this sense may refer only to the psychological sense of seeing through eyes; thinking may refer to a realistic evaluation of what is physically perceived by experts. As specified in Table 3.1, the existing paradigms including formal aesthetic, ecological, psycho-physical, behavioral, and experimentalist may belong to the analytical scientist’s approach.

The formal aesthetic approach literally involves formal principles as the basis of assessment. That is, a given landscape can be categorized by the experts, typically landscape architects, into abstract physical properties, based on formal and compositional qualities such as form, line, color, texture, harmony, axis, dominance, and then the relationships among these elements are examined to classify each landscape area or scene into aesthetic or scenic values, such as variety, contrast, integrity, sensitivity, susceptibility, intactness, vividness, and so forth. Litton (1968) in particular established visual models of the Visual Management System (VMS) for the management of the forest aesthetics.

The formal aesthetic approach typically relies on judge groups, both experienced
professionals’ judgments and public preferences, to identify aesthetic qualities of a landscape area or scene, and its typical methods of evaluation use photography, maps of topography, vegetation, and water features, or direct visual inspection. These techniques are rather simplistic and therefore frequently lack on their reliability and sensitivity. Validity is also a problematic concern because the aesthetic quality is utterly determined by the limited categories of the assessment. For instance, what is unity? Does unity refer to a consistency of features that may also produce monotony? Otherwise, what then? This question, and other similar ones one could ask, concerns “whether the analysis of the landscape into a set of abstract formal elements captures all of the aesthetically relevant aspects of the landscape” (Daniel & Vining, 1983, p.53).

The ecological approach begins with an explicit assumption that scenic quality is determined by ecological formal criteria: that is, aesthetic components of landscape have often been identified with an intrinsic quality of landscape ecology (Schauman, 1988), based on the philosophical proposition that nature is intrinsically beautiful; therefore a landscape with ecological quality is essentially beautiful. In other words, the uniqueness of a given landscape is more significant than any common landscape because it is defined by physical, biological, and human use dimensions, and it implicitly reflects aesthetic value as a primary ecological function of ecological criteria (Daniel & Vining, 1983, p.45). If a landscape has unique characteristics, then it will have a positive aesthetic value; if it is a common landscape, then it will have a negative or “lesser aesthetic” value. Leopold (1968, 1969) has developed “a uniqueness index of landscape quality” based on which aesthetic or scenic aspect has been evaluated differently across variable sites.
The ecological approach typically relies on experts’ judgments on the quality of biological, physical, and human use dimensions. This raises the issue of reliability, because a study would completely depend on the categorical judgments of different groups of judges, whether university students or landscape professionals, on how they assess the uniqueness of a landscape: some judges would give higher scores to a managed forest than to wilderness, and other judges would do it the other way around. More critically, other than Leopold’s index, there is no philosophical clarity in defining the relationship between ecological functions and scenic quality, as well as no conceptual clarity in the sub-categories, i.e. physical, biological, and human use, regarding their the uniqueness attributes, which also undermines its validity.

As such, both the formal aesthetic approach and the ecological approach are basically alike in terms of their formal emphases, but their bases hold a polarized perspective on beauty of landscapes: landscape as art or landscape as nature. This reminds us of an important issue on the conflict between ecological and human values, which remains intact both philosophically and empirically. In any event, the relationship of these formal elements to aesthetic value or scenic quality must be more precisely specified and tested (Daniel & Vining, 1983, p.53), because it leaves some doubt about the reliability, sensitivity, and validity of both approaches.

The psycho-physical approach, on the other hand, assumes that landscape has physical attributes that can be recognized by people as scenic qualities. As reviewed in Chapter 2, its

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14 The issue of objectivity in regard to the aesthetic appreciation of nature was challenged by Carlson. Philosophical discussion in comparison with aesthetic appreciation of art is in section 2-2, Chapter 2.
theoretical base is primarily grounded on the stimulus-response assumption in psychology, and Gibson’s theory of affordance\textsuperscript{15} has been often used for it as well: the physical features of landscape as stimuli afford specific behaviors or aesthetic responses, thus if the landscape attributes or physical features categorized by experts’ judgments appeal aesthetically to general public, then it these physical attributes would have aesthetic qualities.

The stimulus-response relationship experimentally pursued through the use of mathematical formulae, which emphasize simple stimuli such as light, sound, and objects varied on a single dimension such as brightness, loudness, or weight. Based on the perception of the relevant properties of stimuli presented, the responses are also expected to be simple, like yes or no, rating on a scale, or numerical estimates. Statistical methods such as q-sort, rank order, magnitude estimate, and others are used for sorting and analyses to finally establish physical and predictive categories of landscape types and zones.

A great number of studies have been made to generate standardized measures of scenic beauty, primarily in natural or forest landscapes, based on respondents’ judgments. A considerable body of research seeks to define aesthetic variables in landscape scenery based on the establishment of a relationship between visual physical elements and emotional judgment or aesthetic response (Litton, 1982), to analyze the cross-cultural perception of scenic beauty

\textsuperscript{15}Gibson’s theory of affordance is against the conventional view of stimulus-response psychology. Further will be discussed in Chapter 7.
A Comparative Analysis of Theoretical Perspectives

(Zube & Pitt, 1981), and to identify perceptual properties from an assessment of scenic qualities that contribute to ecological sustainability (Ribe, 1989, 1990). Litton (1979) examined visual preferences to identify the aesthetic quality of landscape, such as form, space, scale, color, and pattern of natural landscapes, as well as selected perceptive values, such as vividness, unity and variety etc.

In recent years this kind of approach has also found increased application in varied practical settings of urban areas. The goal of this approach is to develop models that provide accurate and reliable predictions of a person’s perception of landscape quality based on objective measures of the physical features of the landscape. Unlike the previous formal approaches, the psycho-physical approach relies on the averaged aesthetic judgment from groups of public observers; thus, in order to increase predictability of scenic quality in research findings, both landscape samples and respondent groups selected for these studies had to be specifically categorical. For instance, the general classification of landscape types included forest, agricultural, farmland, natural-open space, wetland, and the like; the physical variables varied from natural topographical elements, such as land, water, stream, waterfall, and lake, to immediate, intermediate, and distant area of vegetation, or to the various forest or bush types with a variety of developmental impacts; likewise, the respondents were categorized by socio-cultural-ethnic characteristics (Zube, 1976; Schauman, 1988; Amedeo, Pitt, & Zube, 1989; Ribe, 1990).

The analytical scientist approach therefore can be said to be analogous to Carlson’s term
A Comparative Analysis of Theoretical Perspectives

scenic-object approach, in pursuit of scenic quality of landscape, which is primarily interested in “objective classification and quantification” (Fenton & Reser, 1988, p.111). However, the over-emphasis on objectivity has tended to squeeze prediction from unlikely but reliable variables, and thus has been often criticized for its “instrumentalist” view: that nature’s objects and events have inherent aesthetic value as causes of the aesthetic experience of people.

More complete applications were required for rating responses to standardized internal scale values and for specifications of a multidimensional relationship between perceptual scale and specified physical features of the landscape (Daniel & Vining, 1983, p.57). Besides, public preference should not be the sole criterion for landscape quality assessment, and how well these landscape assessments reflect the “true” values of the landscape, as well as how well they make a meaningful and working relationship between theory and method, have been important issues to date (Carlson, 1977; Wohlwill, 1976; Zube, Sell, and Taylor, 1982; Fenton & Reser, 1988, p.108).

2.2 SCIENTIFIC HUMANISTS

The scientific humanist approach involves existing paradigms, the so-called cognitive, behavioral, or psychological approaches, all of which are different labels for essentially the same. It assumes that judgments of expert panels on scenic qualities are not an objective but rather an instrumentally biased measurement because objective scenic qualities can stimulate

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16 See Carlson’s paradigm of aesthetic appreciation for nature in section 2.2 in Chapter 2.
subjective human perceptions and feelings. The emphasis is on the cognitive and affective (behavioral) reactions evoked by various feelings such as security, warmth, freedom, cheerfulness, happiness, and etc., and the conceptual and methodological basis for this approach is derived from personality theory and attitude measurement developed in humanistic psychology (Daniel & Vining, 1983, p.66). That is, the research premises that subjective psychological preferences for a landscape with various environmental variables would help find objective physical references to aesthetic qualities.

The approach often employs and tests some explanatory theories, such as Berlyne’s *Arousal* theory, Wohlwill and Ulrich’s *Affective* qualities, Kaplans’ *Information Processing* theory, and others. The underpinning idea is that the public perception on liking and disliking certain patterns is part of a biologically inherited aesthetic taste toward the environment, developed during a functional or evolutionary process for survival, which therefore could be common across cultures. Some abstract qualities elicited from these theories are surprisingness, ambiguity, familiarity, complexity, legibility, coherence, mystery, contrast, etc., with complexity, familiarity, and legibility being the most popular dimensions researchers have been interested in for further clarifications in various environmental conditions.

There has been a great surge in empirical research investigating public perception of landscape scenery since 1970 (Ribe, 1989, p.56). Although the scientific humanist approach starts with a different epistemological ground, and also differs in seeking quantitative measurement of perceptual, cognitive, affective scales instead of physical attributes, it is to some extent similar to the psychophysical approach in terms of its stimulus-response orientation.
physical variables, such as ground textures, depth, and complexity, etc., have to be controlled and limited, thus the studies tended to use quasi-experimental approaches, adopting a “substantive division between urban and natural or between industrial and agricultural, or open and closed, barren and verdant, etc. in order only to serve for the practical specification for land use control, which is totally illogical” (Porteous, 1982) in respect to the subject matter of aesthetic quality.

Moreover, since the studies were overly dependent on questionnaires, it has become a significant issue for the validity and reliability of the studies whether the perceptions of the broader and more general landscape users are the right way to approach this and whether the aesthetic sensitivities of the general public should be the basis for landscape quality appraisals. Social scientific and psychological methods have also promoted numerous studies focusing on cross-cultural research: for instance, the differences and the similarities among Balinese, Japanese, Australian preferences, or among typical North American farmers, landowners, students, and urban residents vs. rural visitors’ perceptions of landscapes. Some of this research found, for instance, that landscape types such as a landscape with large trees, open savannah types of landscape and flat grassy areas are inter-culturally preferred.

While the analytical scientist’s approach concerns predominantly scenic quality, the scientific humanist’s approach cares more about public preference as an important criterion to measure psychological properties of landscape, raising typical methodological questions: whether the method is measuring consistent dimensions between the verbal labels of such psychological properties and the semantic scaling of landscape patterns, or how closely the
dimensional ratings reflect “natural” human reactions to the landscape (Seamon, 1979). However, the most important problem is that the rampant reproduction of such scientific studies have merely replicated what everyone already knew, rarely informing us of why particular landscapes are preferred to the others and with “little attempt to delve deeply into the emotions” (Porteous, 1996, p.139). Consequently, these approaches by themselves are not likely to produce new knowledge of empirical or aesthetic significance to our understanding of the quality of life in everyday landscapes as well as for practical applications to landscape design practice.

3. CONCEPTUAL HUMANISM

3.1 CONCEPTUAL THEORISTS

The emphasis of the conceptual theorists’ approach is not on the explanation of aesthetic experience or of landscape quality, but on the valuation of design and planning actions for what ought to be done: it is normative and may include both Zube’s expert paradigm and Porteous’ notion of the activist-planner linkage. It regards design as a form of action, and the relevant studies therefore mostly attempt to provide direct and practical information for professionals and for policy makers for action, based on an evaluative and intuitive understanding of landscape quality and of landscape experience. Such studies do not rely upon public preferences, but on various professionals’ experiences and knowledge from many provinces, such as geography, engineering, forestry, history, and ecology. Thus, the generated concepts and theories do not focus literally on the aesthetics of the natural landscape, but rather
widely address the full range of social, political, ethical, economic, and spiritual aspects of landscape experience (and perhaps management).

Despite their tendency to adopt an expert point of view, the studies of the conceptual theorists are distinguished from the scenic studies, i.e. the psycho-physical approach, not only in the aspect of an abandonment of scientific methodologies, but also in their strong tendency toward integrative (holistic or intuitive) considerations. They embrace both qualitative and quantitative dimensions, informed by both experimentalists and humanists, but their theories cover more conceptual parts of aesthetic problems: some deal with ecological management principles for landscape assessment; others deal with design methodologies for the process or for the product.

Porteous (1996, p.191) pointed out that aesthetic issues dealt with by environmental planners often tend to fall into dichotomous divisions between the urban and the non-urban (or rural) type, conflicts between expert and public judgment, and between visual and ecological values. Lang (1991, p.77) argued that architectural theorists acted as “moral absolutists” who relied heavily on their individual “intuition and common sense as well as on political agendas in establishing ideas about what is good environment,” and that their models of the relationship of people and their environment often were “not only too simple but also largely erroneous.” It was a common tendency in both architecture and landscape architecture that aesthetic treatises, based on the professed insights of heroic designers, became guidebooks for the particular group of professionals in terms of both process and product.

It may be true that the conceptual theorist’s approach often speaks of the nature of
aesthetic principles used by artists, rather than the nature of aesthetic experience itself. Frank Lloyd Wright’s organic approach to site and Lawrence Halprin’s environmental score in the tradition of Frederick Law Olmsted are examples of individuals that addressed the nature of aesthetic experience in their work. The conceptual theorists in urban planning and design, however, began to concern themselves more with human use and experience in relation to social and economic contexts, beyond the narrow view of aesthetics confined to particular artists or architects. While aesthetics still may be a largely impenetrable discourse to many urban planning professionals, the ideas proposed in “The Image of the City” (Lynch, 1960), “The Concise Townscape” (Cullen, 1971), “The View from the Road” (Appleyard, Lynch, and Meyer, 1967), “Livable Streets” (Appleyard, 1981), and “Good City Form” (Lynch, 1981) are significant classic theories that made great contributions to our understanding of the urban landscape by introducing experiential qualities into practical vocabularies, and by addressing the visual, physical, and material dimensions of design action.

Sancar (1985, p.119) argued that aesthetic perspectives for constructing viable theories for professionals belong to three major approaches: 1) Universalistic, 2) Situational, and 3) Integrative. The universalistic approach gives priority to the abstraction, formalization, and generalization of relationships, using a hypothetical-deductive strategy. The situational approach

17 In a sense the universalistic approach has a shared vision with the sense-thinking approach in terms of its expert judgment in a global context; the situational approach is close to the sense-feeling approach in terms of its reliance upon public preferences in a local context.
emphasizes contextually relevant information on specific sites, using inductive reasoning. The integrative approach, most required for professionals is to connect these two, uses both deductive and inductive reasoning with all kinds of knowledge inputs. It may be also fair to say that the integrative approach needs both intuitive and perceptive sense developed from personal as well as shared experience.

Along similar lines, Zube et al., argued (1982) that the humanist approach has shown two trends: 1) Phenomenological and transactional and 2) Historical and cultural. The transactional and phenomenological approach attempts to probe the fundamental meanings of our common experiences, and to provide universal vocabularies for planning and design practice. The cultural and historical approach, on the other hand, concerns itself with interpretive and cultural peculiarities relying on diverse and rich resources. The former may be more theoretical than humanistic, while the latter may be more humanistic than theoretical, yet both approaches are conceptual as well as integrative. The conceptual approach needs to recapture and to revisit environmental meaning as the process of presenting a conceptual understanding that is discovered latent in individual experience and the shared experience of others.

3.2 CONCEPTUAL HUMANISTS

The boundary between the approaches of the conceptual humanists and the conceptual theorists vanishes when the conceptual theorists take on a humanistic and experiential voice. In general the conceptual humanists are interested in the cultural roots of aesthetic behaviors and
in historical trends in landscape tastes and meanings and their interpretations in literature, poetry, diary accounts, and painting, etc., extensively approached by contemporary geographers, historians, and writers of art literature (Porteous, 1982, p.54). Historians and writers of art literature display a tendency toward working from a diversity of historic materials and documents of both, common persons and intellectuals, and emphasize the cultural and historical trends of landscape tastes that contributed to our current tastes and the appreciation of the importance of mountains and wilderness (p.46). The contributions of the humanist geographers to landscape aesthetics also go beyond an intellectual conception of aesthetics as a response to scenic stimuli or internal mental processes alone (Zube et al., 1982, p.25). They use a wide range of cultural components of literature, such as local history, legends, myths, travel writings, cults, essays, and diaries to inspire their interpretations and descriptions of landscape beauty.

The conceptual humanists have a cultural, historical, and phenomenological emphasis that has often been criticized for its subjectivity and often regarded as a-theoretical and as uncritical: everyone has a different and unique experience, so the experience could be no more than a “self-professed subjective experience” (Crotty, 1998, p.83). However, the theoretical contribution of the conceptual humanists is of remarkable significance in that they introduced a phenomenology of space and time as a solid meaning-probing methodology for universals of an experience of place. It cuts across the social and cultural contexts of vernacular, ordinary, and everyday landscape with an underlying philosophical emphasis on a more holistic and ecological view of landscape (Kennedy, Sell, & Zube, 1988, p.33). Moreover, the phenomenological
perception of place helps one to penetrate the very meaning of nature, of living beings, and of the human body, in the context of the everyday world of “taken-for-grantedness,” which makes it critical, universal, and integrative.

The conceptual humanists are critical observers of human nature, of landscapes, and of the interaction of the two, with attentiveness and intuitive insights, and often provide cultural assumptions and useful concepts to the experimentalist’ approach. A number of aesthetic theories have been proposed by eighteenth century writers, including Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant, who suggested that the wild, chaotic aspect of nature could be aesthetically pleasing, but the aesthetic emphasis often tended to be visual and ideological (p.32). A more recent development of this approach has turned more toward identifying the elementary nature of the human experience of landscape, i.e. the notion of “sense of place.” Approaches to place theory, and to the term “sense of place,” have come from a number of directions with historical, cultural, sensory, feminist, psychological, and philosophical underpinnings. Despite an array of rich and suggestive definitions, a sense of place, not unlike aesthetics, is still difficult to articulate, which may point to the parallel nature of place theory and an aesthetic theory of landscape.

The geographer Lowenthal (1975, 1978) argued that traveller’s writings about scenery that celebrate the cult of the past and nostalgia represent landscape tastes that have developed in a cultural and historical context. Relph (1976, 1979, 1984, 1993) asserted that an authentic sense of place consists of a complete awareness of, and acceptance of responsibility for, the relationship between place and people and for the identification of people with place. The American writers
Jacobs (1961) and Jackson (1984, 1994) argued that *ordinary, common sense*, and *vernacular landscapes* should emerge as important components of the urban landscape, and called for the rediscovery of the notion of ordinariness by a critical observation of American urbanity through laymen’s eyes. Cultural and historical humanists tend to have common interests in connecting the personal with the public, the local with the regional, and the ordinary with the extraordinary experience of landscape.

On the other side, a biologist, Shepard (1967) emphasized that our innate affection for our motherland is a “biological basis of intuition” towards nature, as opposed to a picturesque perception of it; Appleton (1975b), a geographer, used existing landscape paintings to argue for the aesthetic experience of landscape as an evolved experience of environmental cues for survival: *prospect and refuge*. Tuan (1974, 1977, 1993, 1998), a cultural geographer, speculated that the human longing for landscape is deeply rooted in our love for place, our affective attitude, “*Topophilia,*” as a biological basis of human behavior, and argued that the experiential values in landscape are related to animality, body, imagination, meanings, symbols, and are reflected in our myths. Their aesthetic theories on the nature of landscape experience seem to be grounded not only in the evolutionary universals of human experience as the extended reality of self, body, life, and nature, but also in the integrative perception of landscape: an experience of natural habitats as well as cultural habits.

All of these studies of conceptual humanists appeal to us to recover a generic sense of human habitation: i.e. life, self, and place as a bridge between culture and nature, between humans and animals, between the self and the world. The conceptual humanists emphasize our
heart and soul as vehicles to carry aesthetic and moral actions toward landscapes. They have the richest resources and the broadest perspectives to explain a sense of place, ranging from a biological and psychological, to a social, cultural, and ecological understanding of the relationship of human experience, culture, and nature.

4. INTEGRATION: ANALYTICAL-CONCEPTUAL HUMANISM

The existing perspectives of various studies in relation to landscape experience can be re-organized in a unified structure based on Mitroff and Kilmann’s typology of scientists derived from Jungian Theory. Their examination of aesthetic experience can be by large divided into two categories: analytical humanism and conceptual humanism. The analytical humanist approach interrelating feeling-sense-thinking helps us primarily to understand perceptual components (sense) in the relationship between people and place by explaining and evaluating our appreciation. The conceptual humanist approach, intersecting feeling-intuition-thinking, helps us to understand the underlying spiritual component (intuition). The polarized aspects of sense and intuition indicate the dichotomous direction of studies: scientific (the conscious) and humanistic (the unconscious).

The function of feeling between sense and intuition is noteworthy. When feeling is animated by sense in scientific studies, its judgmental nature becomes explanatory, explicitly expressed and measurable, whereas when feeling is mingled with intuition in humanistic studies, it can be sharply sensed, but it is inexpressible and its judgmental nature is more implicit, requiring an evaluation by thinking, i.e. justification. By contrast, the function of thinking is the
key element of any study of aesthetics. It helps not only analysis in scientific studies, but also conceptualizing in humanistic studies: thinking rationalizes, evaluates, and justifies the interrelationship of sense-feeling-intuition as well as the interrelationship between people and place (See Table 3.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual Schema</th>
<th>Analytical Humanism</th>
<th>Integration: Heuristic Approach</th>
<th>Conceptual Humanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing Approaches</td>
<td>Psycho-physical, Formal, Scenic, Cognitive, Experimental, Either Personal or impersonal</td>
<td>Experiential, Humanistic, Interpersonal</td>
<td>Professional, Either personal or impersonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Approaches</td>
<td>Experiential: Analytical humanism</td>
<td>Experiential: Analytical-conceptual humanism</td>
<td>Experiential: Conceptual humanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Character</td>
<td>Explanatory Descriptive</td>
<td>Explanatory Normative Descriptive</td>
<td>Normative Descriptive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional relationship between People and Place</th>
<th>Biological</th>
<th>Causal-mathematical</th>
<th>Holistic</th>
<th>Resources - manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Stimuli-respondent</td>
<td>Evolutionary</td>
<td>Ecosystem-caretaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behavioral</td>
<td>Objects-human subjects</td>
<td>Transcendent</td>
<td>Ambiance-participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Culture-nature-human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic contexts</td>
<td>Biological</td>
<td>Ecological</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ecological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Phenomenological</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural, social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behavioral</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td></td>
<td>Historical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phenomenological</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The four part scheme of theoretical perspectives may also help to explain the loss of the *heart* in many design professionals. The ineffable part of the totality of aesthetic experience dwells in our heart and soul, both of which meet at the hybrid boundary of our existence as a biological and as an ecological being. At the very primitive and spiritual part of human life and experience, the intuition-feeling dimension will connect aesthetic desire to moral duty as experienced through love, compassion, and reverence for nature and landscape.

Maslow (1966), himself a “Taoistic thinker” (p.95-101),\(^{18}\) advises young scientists to avoid the trap of dichotomizing experiential knowledge from and against conceptual

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\(^{18}\) The Taoistic approach Maslow (1966, p.95) suggested refers to the other approach to knowledge, learning about the nature of things, not as an extrusive method or as a panacea.
knowledge, and stressed a “holistic approach” (p.46). “Experiential knowledge is prior to verbal-conceptual knowledge but they are hierarchically integrated and need each other” he argues (p.46). The term analytical humanism used here can refer to Maslow’s definition of experiential knowledge, and science can be shown to be more powerful if it includes experiential data. For an approach to experiential and conceptual knowledge, Maslow (p.47) emphasizes as a normal and usual path that “most psychological problems must begin with phenomenology,” and then traditional psychological methods, such as objective, experimental, and behavioral, must follow it later, “from a less reliable beginning toward a more reliable level of knowledge.”

It is not a new observation to state that contemporary studies of landscape aesthetics have been dissected into the two realms, the sciences and the humanities, as much literature has argued, but apparently few attempts have been made to achieve conceptual clarity and an articulation of what underlies, and what constitutes, an integrated whole. Such an approach will have to re-collect the separated parts, primarily from the sciences and the humanities, of the body of existing approaches into a unity toward an analytical-conceptual humanism, i.e. a merger of experiential and conceptual knowledge by which aesthetic values and ethical values of landscapes can be intersected (see Figure 3.2). As Maslow (1966) argues, “the construction of theories and laws is often rather like a discovery of them”(p.99): it is a heuristic investigation of re-discovering and re-connecting the segmented theoretical focuses of the explanatory, the descriptive, and the normative in order to achieve both analytical rigor and conceptual relevance.
Figure 3.2: A diagram of future approach to landscape aesthetics
AESTHETICS FROM “BELOW”: DESIRE FOR LIFE AND LIFELIKE PROCESS

The nature of experience is determined by the essential conditions of life. While man is other than bird and beast, he shares basic vital functions with them and has to make the same basal adjustments if he is to continue the process of living. Having the same vital needs, man derives the means by which he breathes, moves, looks, and listens, the very brain with which he coordinates his senses and his movements, from his animal forbears. The organs with which he maintains himself in being are not of himself alone, but by the grace of struggles and achievements of a long line of animal ancestry. (Dewey, 1934, p.13)

INTRODUCTION

As previously discussed, the theoretical perspectives of empirical studies about landscape evaluation and perception tend to diverge into various spectrums, such as psycho-physical, behavioral, or cognitive, all heavily dependent on psychological experiments on the physical aspect of landscape, which I believe makes the general conception of landscape aesthetics slippery. Analytical humanism, as I suggested, aims to seek experiential universality through empirical evidences about the interrelation of feeling, sense, and thinking, an approach which shows promise to function as a synthetic theoretical orientation as well as a guide to methodological alternatives. For further development, there is a need to examine possible theoretical parameters that can integrate and intersect these divergent spectrums. Hence, it seems to be necessary to delineate the common denominators of some empirical aesthetic theories that have been principally adapted to such the existing psychological spectrums. I
would call such common ground *aesthetic theory from below*, which generally refers to experimental aesthetics launched by a German psychologist, Gustav Theodor Fechner\(^\text{19}\), in contrast with the traditional aesthetics of the philosophers’ *aesthetics from above*.

The first part of the discussion of aesthetic theories will involve those developed by behavioral psychologists that approach aesthetic experience through the relationship between stimuli and responses. Arousal Theory and Adaptive Affects Theory will be comparatively analyzed first in terms of the dialectic between feeling and thinking in aesthetic experience with regard to common physical attributes, and then in terms of an evaluative discussion of their relevance and application to landscape aesthetics. The second part of discussion will involve some other aesthetic theories, explaining aesthetic phenomena as the evolutionary remnant of cognitive and behavioral functions. The discussions will aim to extend the notion of aesthetic experience from a subjective personal phenomenon to the collective and unconscious preferences and the basic instinctive desire for survival and habitat. The third part of discussion will entail the exploration of a most influential theory in the discipline of landscape architecture, the so-called Prospect-Refuge Theory, in terms of its analytical as well as humanistic approach, as well as in terms of its explanatory descriptive power as a heuristic theory. Lastly, I will identify universal themes and important aesthetic implications, which I believe outline the

\(^{19}\) Gustav Fechner (1801-1887) is one of the founders of modern experimental psychology, who had had a vast influence on psychophysics, in opposition to theorists such as Immanuel Kant, and tried to establish the mathematical formulae on human sensations: e.g. \(S(\text{sensation}) = c \log R(\text{Stimuli})\).
future direction of landscape aesthetics from below: biophilia\textsuperscript{20}, the love for life and life-like processes.

Aesthetic theories “from below” consequently use theoretical formulations evolved from inter- and trans-disciplinary approaches: i.e. from physiological response, to biological-cognitive interaction (functional evolution), toward biological-cognitive-symbolic interaction (symbolic evolution). The aesthetic theories from below (perhaps, below the conscious) have tried to understand the function of sense-feeling-thinking and to test, prove, and explain it: this justifies why I call them explanatory theory of aesthetics. Even until now aesthetics still has been regarded as the most complex and difficult subject in the field of psychology. The biophilia hypothesis could have cogent relevance to the future study of landscape aesthetics, i.e. the analytical account of the sense of self-growing, self-becoming, self-realization with-in place.

1. AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE: THE DIALECTIC BETWEEN FEELING AND THINKING, BETWEEN STIMULUS AND RESPONSE

Most analytical theories discussed have been grounded in, and at the same time projected onto, experimental psychology, including behaviorist, cognitive, and psychophysiological approaches. The analytical theorists (both the scientific humanists and the analytical scientists) have investigated the reasons why some works of art are preferred to others, foremost in terms of their formal and structural compositions. Respondents’ preferences

\textsuperscript{20} Edward O. Wilson in 1984 defined Biophilia as our innate tendency to focus on life and life-like process.
for a particular environment in environmental perception studies have been regarded as resulting from an aesthetic function of cognitive or behavioral mechanisms through which an individual can detect, ignore, or intend to participate in a given situation (Craik, 1986, p.51). Following are the most influential theories that have been adopted to landscape aesthetics and perception studies.

1. AESTHETIC PLEASURE AS HEDONIC VALUE

1.1 AROUSAL THEORY: FEELING IN UNCERTAINTY AND CONFLICT

Experimental research in environmental aesthetics has an underlying assumption that aesthetics is concerned with the mechanisms by which emotion and cognition arise. Arousal is a motivational drive for behavior on a sort of neuro-psycho-physiological basis. Berlyne (1960) hypothesizes that the individuals engage in explorative behavior for the selection of stimuli to reduce the amount of conflicts or uncertainty of the environment. Environmental arousal stimulates an organism’s behaviors to be alert, excited, awakened, and ready to act. The lower level of arousal occurs when sleeping, being tired, resting, and being relaxed, while the higher level of arousal happens when alerted, hungry, in an emotional state. Arousal triggers emotional or motivational energy that makes us ready for action. Needless to say, extreme levels of arousal occur in the states of violence, passion, or fury.

Berlyne believes environmental perception is a process of an explorative behavior and of information transmission. Perception occurs when two or more responses are evoked as mediating responses. The mediating responses occur in implicit forms of attention, abstraction, grouping,
comparison, and collation, and determine an overt response: for human beings this is a process of thinking, of cognition. He calls these mediating responses arousal increasing devices or *arousal potentials*. Berlyne (1971) identifies the interrelated factors that determine the levels of arousal into three types of arousal potential: psychophysical, ecological, and collative. Psychophysical variables refer to sound, light, colors, musical pitch, and passage that *intensify* arousal. Ecological factors indicate inherent properties one acquires in everyday life, learned associations with events or activities of biological importance. The collative stimulus properties basically elicit comparative responses “to degree and nature of *similarity and difference* between stimulus elements” (p.141). The collative stimulus properties can facilitate and organize the perceptual process in the information transmission, called *curiosity conditioning*, which is believed to be most relevant to aesthetics.

Through a wide collection of literature and experimental results, Berlyne (1971, 1974) tried to specify such collative stimuli variables, potentially aesthetic stimuli, of the environment. They are such characteristics of *uncertainty* and of *conflict* as novelty, expectation, incongruity, uncertainty, “surprisingness,” complexity, conflict, incompatibility, “puzzlingness,” ambiguity, multiple meaning, instability, incompleteness, and so forth. Thus, to summarize Berlyne’ aesthetic perception of environment: 1) it is a part of explorative behavior, and occurs through information transmission, i.e. a cognitive process; 2) aesthetic responses can arise from the process of curiosity conditioning against the collative stimulus variables (arousal potentials), and 3) aesthetic responses can move toward an optimal level of arousal potentials with uncertain and conflicting properties (see Figure 4.1).
Berlyne argues that there are four types of stimulus responses to environmental properties: 1) Emotional responses: synaesthesia, 2) Motor responses: bodily movement, 3) Imitative responses and empathy: feeling into or inner doing, and 4) Verbal and imaginal responses. It may be significant to remark that two of these four types of stimulus responses are carried by large emotional components: synaesthetics (feeling together) and imitative empathy (feeling into). Feeling or emotion has been a prominent part in studies of aesthetic perception and response. Including Plato and St. Thomas Aquinas’ notion of *pleasure*, and Langer’s (1942, 21) 

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1953) emphasis on the role and power of feeling in both art and aesthetics, it is a believable claim to say that “all art should give pleasure” Berlyne believes similarly that environmental perception activated by arousal potentials elicits emotional accompaniments, which seem to be associated with pleasure, but independent of the limitations of verbal expression. With accounts of the brain system, beyond relevance for the present discussion, Berlyne defines this kind of pleasure as the aesthetic value, and named it “hedonic value” (1971, p.79).

Hedonic values are by his definition the behavioral phenomena associated with reward value (as a result of exploration and comparative responses through cognitive process), positive feedback, and positive incentive value. Perhaps it may be similar to a marathon runner’s relaxation after the completion of a race; it may be a kind of pleasure when one has reached a solution for a challenging mathematical question; it may taste like a sip of wine after hard work. These values can be either verbally reported by the word ‘pleasant’, or ‘elicited’ or bodily revealed by postural or facial expression. The interesting point of Berlyne’s theory I think is that aesthetic potentials, namely arousal potentials, are the collative properties (together-ness) of environment sufficient to arouse one’s curiosity. Curiosity makes a person explore the world and optimize the information from the world for survival action. Conflicting and uncertain things together often attract one’s curiosity as arousal potentials, as observed children’s behaviors in comparing the similarity and difference between things.

The relationship between arousal potentials and hedonic values (pleasure) has been further explored with a number of hypotheses and measurements, particularly regarding the kind and the degree of complexity. As Figure 4.2 illustrates, research typically has found that as
arousal potentials increase hedonic values also increase until an optimum point is reached.

![Diagram](image.png)

**Figure 4.2: A comparison of findings in the relationships among hedonic value, complexity, and aesthetic pleasantness**

Birkhoff (1933) first argued that aesthetic pleasantness increases as the level of complexity increases; it decreases as the level of order increases. Eysenck (1942) later suggested an inverted U-formula that represents the optimal level of aesthetic pleasure in terms of both order and complexity: pleasantness increases as both order and complexity increase to a certain point, from which on pleasantness starts to decrease. Berlyne (1960, 1971) further investigated the mathematical relationship between hedonic values and arousal potentials, between

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complexity and arousal potentials, and between complexity and hedonic values. The findings are as follows:

1. Hedonic values are positive, neutral, and negative. In general, as arousal potentials increase, hedonic values increase also. Yet, after reaching the optimum point, the hedonic values go down to the zero toward the negative as arousal potentials increase.

2. Arousal potentials increase as complexity increases.

3. Hedonic values first increase as complexity increases to the optimum point, but if complexity increases after that, then the values gradually decrease.

1.1.2 FURTHER ACCOUNTS OF AESTHETIC RESPONSES: NOT SPECIFIC BUT DIVERSIVE EXPLORATION

Years later, Wohlwill (1976) asserted that voluntary exploration activities and choices led by arousal stimuli with “collative property” hardly could represent a direct expression of the perceived aesthetic value of stimuli (p.43). He observed that a person avoids not only too familiar but also too uncertain stimuli, and argued that the nature of stimulation most often selected would require some intermediary value with regard to the uncertainty within it. According to Wohlwill, the explorative responses to uncertainty and conflicts in the environment would entail two attitudes, specific and diversive (p.41): the specific exploration is an effort to investigate or explore particular stimuli that generate uncertainty and conflicts (i.e. arousal potentials), while the diversive exploration is an activity to seek the optimal level of stimulation aiming to be satisfied by some intermediary level, i.e. an uncertainty-optimal level of arousal potentials (see
By further development of Berlyne’s (1974) findings, Wohlwill argues specific exploration increases as arousal-uncertainty potentials increase, e.g. “surprisingness,” ambiguity, complexity, etc., but that the emotional state arising from the specific exploration is more likely to be “interestingness” than hedonic value or the aesthetic judgment. That is, when perceiving uncertain stimuli, we find them interesting and explore them specifically. However, if those stimuli are either too familiar or too uncertain to keep us interested by an intermediary value, then further exploration will not take place. Thus, this specific response is not yet an aesthetic response. On the other hand, he argues again, the diversive exploration can be an aesthetic response that involves a joint action of two mechanisms: arousal reducing and arousal increasing mechanisms, until an optimal level of arousal reached. Therefore, depending on an
intermediary value judgment on the degree of uncertainty of arousal stimuli, the diverersive exploration may either reduce or increase the level of uncertainty until the hedonic values emerge from the top of inverted U-shaped curves.

Both Berlyne and Wohlwill agreed that arousal potentials of environmental stimuli have to do with explorative responses, i.e. aesthetic responses, although Wohlwill’s studies intended to provide a more precise accountability for the nature of aesthetic responses. Also, both agreed that the aesthetic responses involve a cognitive process of comparative as well as evaluative analyses for further diverersive exploration toward the optimal level of uncertainty. For an easy example, a place with both familiar and strange characteristics, or with new and old buildings together, or things with a certain degree of similarity and of difference, tends to attract us. The same applies to any experience with a person or a thing. If the given information of a thing is too specific it would not raise our curiosity to help us to get interested in it, perhaps because it may be too obvious or vulgar, but if the information of the thing maintains the appropriate level of ambiguity or uncertainty, then it would engage us further and longer.

In order to identify the structural aspects of an aesthetically significant environment, the focus of aesthetic studies of the environment has been on the examination of the relationship of aesthetic preference in comparisons of rural and urban settings. Wohlwill added “diversity” into a category of arousal potentials, and found that diversity tends to be perceived as positive in the natural environment, but as neutral in the mixed environment, and as negative in the urban environment. An important task for many experimentalists is to identify the patterns of environmental configurations that induce exploratory behavior and to relate those to intrinsic
features of the environment that contribute to fitness (Orian, 1986, p.8).

Nevertheless, there are still some unresolved research tasks: to identify the functional and characteristic distinctions among the stimulus properties (Berlyne’s collative variables) as well as to articulate the semantic or non-semantic expressions of aesthetic preference from numerous studies of environmental aesthetics. In this context the arousal theory is indeed of great significance in that it addresses the fact that aesthetic experience can start with a tiny curiosity grabbing us and creating a sense of uncertainty. Following are some implications elicited from the extensive experimental findings related to Berlyne’s arousal theory:

- Complexity is a very clear property in environmental aesthetics. However, its role is in the aesthetic response is uncertain.
- Unlike diversity, complexity is related to aesthetic preference to the same degree regardless of whether we experience it in a natural, mixed, or urban environment.
- Complexity constructs imageability.
- An orderly chaotic environment is complex but uncomplicated.
- Novelty with complexity increases explorative action.
- The relationship among the hedonic dimension, affect, aesthetic evaluation, and preference is much more complex than generally assumed.

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23 This reminds me of words from Alberto-Perez-Gomez’s lecture on architecture, “Life is beautiful because it is so uncertain,” Dept. of Architecture, North Carolina State University (February, 2008).
• The Gestalt theorists’ favored variables, such as harmony, balance, unity, coherence, and fittingness are all correlational to the optimal arousal properties.

1.2 AESTHETIC PLEASURE AS A SERIES OF ADAPTIVE AFFECTS

1.2.1 AFFECTS THEORY: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN AFFECTS AND COGNITIVE EVALUATIONS

In the rise of cognitive psychology in the 1960s, feeling was viewed as a product of thought (Ulrich, 1983, p.88); in a word, aesthetic pleasure is a result of some form of “information transmission.” This means that information transmission (perception) is an explorative selection of stimuli that can occur without conceptual compartmentalization. Similarly to, yet slightly different from both Berlyne and Wohlwill, who argued for the source of stimuli and of hedonic values, cognitive psychologists have believed that environmental stimuli are the source of information, i.e. the information of objects, and aesthetic experience is directly relevant to emotion, feeling, and mood. They tried to control variables of environmental stimuli and to measure emotional responses, treating environmental stimuli as an object of art or as information stacks.

Ittleson (1973) declares environmental perception cannot be understood “by reference to the complete control of stimulus alone” (p.8) (see also Table 2.2) because the environment has “no fixed boundaries in either space or in time; therefore, it has to be understood “as a total active, continuous process involving the participation of all aspects” (p.18). A large body of works has also found that cognitive functioning is an inseparable part of perceiving, and environmental psychologists began to discuss perceptual experience in a variety of ways,
including phenomenology. Some started to argue that aesthetic responses (feeling, emotion, and mood) are pre-cognitive rather than post-cognitive experiences.

“\textit{Affect}” is a term construed by psychologists (Izard, 1977, 1984; Zajonc, 1980) as a synonym of emotion, feeling, and mood that encompass drive states, such as thirst and hunger. Affects are essentially pre-cognitive phenomena that constitute the initial level of aesthetic response to the environment. Zajonc (1980, 1984, 2000) argued that the initial level of aesthetic response consists of global or generalized affects related to \textit{preference} or \textit{like-dislike affect}. It occurs without a precise recognition of environment, yet in response to a class of features and characteristics of the environment, \textit{preferenda}. The initial like-dislike affect then facilitates recognitions, and heightens the efficiency of information processing. For example, children have a strong like-dislike affect toward something before learning what it is and about; love at the first sight may be too a similar case of it. As such, the aesthetic preference is to like or dislike something by perceiving general or global features of the environment before knowing what exactly it is: aesthetic preference, the initial affect, is prior to cognition.

The initial affect animated by preferenda (gross environmental features) also motivates behavioral choices whether to avoid or to approach something in an “ambiance” (Ittelson, 1973). The ambiance has little cognitive information, yet influences an ensuing process of cognitive evaluation of the environment. If a liking or disliking or an interest-fear feeling is strong, then it not only makes behavioral choices immediate and distinct, but makes the ensuing cognitive process quick and efficient; the environmental experience becomes salient to the perceiver. That is, if we like the ambiance, then we approach and evaluate it; if we dislike it,
then we avoid it. The process of cognitive evaluation again modifies and refines the initial affect. This adaptive process from the cognitive evaluation back to the affects is called “post-cognitive affective” by Zajonc. Once knowing more about what it is, or evaluating it, we may not longer have an affective feeling toward the ambiance; or exploring it more and farther, we may like it more: the degree and the intensity of affects changes (see Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4: A diagram showing adaptive interaction between affect and cognition

In this way the initial affective feeling becomes a post-cognitive affect, and again
modified and refined by the second ensuing cognitive evaluation. As the cognitive evaluation continues, perception, namely the interaction between affect and cognition, becomes more comprehensive. Thus, environmental perception, according to Zajonc and his colleagues, is the adaptive behavior, initiated by the first affect and constituted through the dialectical mechanisms between affect and cognition, i.e. the ongoing activities between feeling and thinking. The aesthetic responses, on the other hand, include a sequence of affective feelings, starting from the initial affect, the like-or-dislike affect, and move through the adaptive process of post-cognitive affective and modified affects as on-going adaptive behaviors; yet it excludes the cognitive evaluation, thinking. Therefore, an aesthetic experience emerges as a series of dialectical events that involve such states as feeling, emotion, and mood, and evolves from immediate to symbolic feelings through cognitive modification extended from the personal to the cultural realms.

1.2.2 FURTHER ACCOUNTS OF AESTHETIC (AFFECTIVE) REACTION: SENSE OF WELL-BEING

Many environmental researchers attempted to understand the functions and consequences of affects toward the natural environment by a behavioral or preference approach (Ulrich, 1983, p.93). Related studies also proposed that adaptive functions of strongly positive affects can sustain ongoing activity (p.94); in other words, strongly liked environmental features can engage behavioral exploration as ongoing cognitive comprehension and evaluation. Aesthetic (affective) reactions to the natural environment are assumed to motivate behaviors that are not necessarily expressed as observable actions, but nonetheless qualify as adaptive
functioning (p.95).

Ulrich particularly concluded that an attractive natural view may elicit aesthetic feelings of pleasantness and hold our interest, and therefore reduce stress: it fosters psycho-physiological restoration, a sense of well-being (Ulrich, 1979, 1981). “Aesthetically spectacular vista would likely elicit an initial affective reaction of strong preference and interest that could sustain a lengthy and elaborated cognitive process, involving detailed perception and processing of the visual information and thoughts as diverse as memories from a childhood vacation or an idea recalled from a poem” said Ulrich (1983, p.93). A sense of well-being gives birth to a sense of competence in terms of our mental power contributing to a sense of identity (White, 1959).

Complexity is a distinctive dimension in the adaptive, affective aesthetic response in related studies. Preferenda, the influence of structural and configurational properties on the aesthetic response, such as harmony and composition have turned out to be consistently prominent in Gestalt theory. Focality, ground-surface texture, and depth-openness of spaces were identified by many investigators (Ulrich, 1973; Wohlwill, 1976, 1980) as additions to the gross structure-preferenda that can evoke the aesthetic attraction (the initial affects). The interaction between feeling and thought has become a significant theoretical subject for researchers, focusing naturally on specific variables rather than general preferenda, such as past experiences of the individual, cultural differences, or the different physical settings. Studies found that the quality and intensity of the affects (aesthetic reactions) can be influenced by internal states of an individual’s previous experiences.

Nasar (1994, p.383) identified two kinds of aesthetic variables for aesthetic responses in
the urban environment, by examining architectural styles: the formal and the symbolic. The formal variables become active immediately as *denotative* meanings, including such aspects as shape, proportion, rhythm, color, complexity, shadowing, novelty, and others, and the symbolic variables are the outcomes, from an adaptive cognitive process in which an individual infers *connotative* meaning. Thus, the architectural styles are a connotative variable of the environment.

The intensity of aesthetic responses can vary from person to person according to their internal states of mind, but the fact that gross, configural, and vague aspects of the environment are able to elicit our affective reactions is significant, because these primitive or pre-cognitive properties, or *preferenda*, are what matters most to designers as universals. This also is consistent with Berlyne’s notion of *arousal potential*, i.e. collative properties. Both arousal and affect theories agree that the gross configural environment, with such qualities as ambiguity and uncertainty, can motivate further explorations in seeking the basic information on which to make cognitive judgments. Research related to Berlyne’s arousal theory tended to concentrate on the physical and objective measurement of environmental stimuli as determinants of the aesthetic quality of the environment, but by comparison, there has been less research related to Zajonc’s affect primacy theory.

Arousals as aesthetic responses involve post-cognitive evaluation, hypothesizing that cognition determines emotions, because aesthetic behavior is viewed as the process and the resulting values from optimizing arousal potentials. On the other hand, Zajonc thought of affective reactions as aesthetic responses more or less independent of cognitive functions, starting with an immediate reaction and involving adaptive activities between pre-cognitive and
post-cognitive affects. His argument on the primacy of affect was sensational to most cognitive psychologists who have focused on a positivistic approach with a belief that emotion is a result from the participation of cognition (Lazarus, 1982, 1984, 1991). However, no matter which is prior to the other between affects and cognition, it may be a circular argument (Zajonc, 1984, p.117).

Zajonc’s affects constitute an extensive realm of emotion, feeling, or mood, including unconscious appraisals, which are instigated by often “global or spherical [elements] rather than built sequentially from structural elements” (Lazarus, 1982, p.1021). Lazarus’ (1982) cognition also is inclusive not only of “deliberate reflection, rationality, or awareness” (p.1022), but of the integral feature of all emotional states, i.e. integrative perception. For contemporary psychologists it is true that perception is regarded as the adaptive and integrative interplay between feeling and thinking, which are never totally independent of each other. Considering the holistic nature of aesthetic experience, the separation between feeling and thinking seems meaningless.

There are some empirical implications I would like to emphasize about aesthetic experience. First, aesthetic appraisal can emerge from the positive cognitive process, and that aesthetic pleasure is closely tied to liking or interest (positive) affects. Second, a plausible explanation for aesthetic preference is based on the adaptive affects between emotional and cognitive functions. If the initial affective reaction is strong, aesthetic experience as a series of explorative activities will last longer and be richer: this indicates the influential power of preferenda. Third, the adaptive dialectic between affects and cognition as aesthetic responses
obviously involves conscious and unconscious exploration, which is congruent with a schema of being-with-in-place (see also Chapter 7).

Fourth, affects are universal aesthetic responses not only because of their affective immediacy, but also because of their extensions to symbolic meanings; similarly, thoughts or cognitive evaluations occur as part of aesthetic responses that involve personal past history as well as cultural contexts. “We have taken it for granted that it is the passions (affects) that make similar, whereas reason or intellect (cognition) is the source of individual differences” (Zajonc, 1997, 2000, p.32). Lastly, affects as aesthetic reactions are proven to have a parallel in our sense of well-being, and particularly affective responses to nature have to date been found to have a powerful impact on our emotional health (Ulrich, 1993). This means essentially that a sense of well-being has much to do with having an affective reaction toward or with-in something, although many studies of aesthetic evaluation seem to reduce affects simply to addressing the static or visual image of the landscape, heavily relying on respondents’ verbal expression of liking or disliking, whereas affect theory experientially connects beauty and heart.

2. AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE: THE EVOLUTION OF COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR

2.1 AESTHETIC PREFERENCE AS A COGNITIVE PROCESS

Kaplan and Kaplan (1982, 1989) argued that “preference is not simply a liking of one environmental setting over another”; it is related to the individual ability to acquire information for survival. In other words, aesthetic preference is a behavioral choice occurring in the development of cognitive information processing skills that originated from the long-term
survival of the human species, and that actively guide behavior to environmental learning in order to make sense of their whereabouts.

According to the Kaplans, aesthetic preference is a direct, immediate, and holistic feeling as well as an expression of underlying human needs and behavioral functioning. Preference is an extension of the “perceptual process—information processing”—as well as an “expression of the prediction—evaluation of one’s possibilities for further information (1982, p.80)” about the environment before going through a complex, analytic process.

**Table 4.1: Kaplan and Kaplans’ preference framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibilities</th>
<th>The Basic Needs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Making Sense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate (Present)</td>
<td>Coherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promised (Future)</td>
<td>Legibility</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


As seen in Table 4.1, the Kaplans constructed a preference framework with two basic informational needs: making sense and involvement. These basic needs have time dimensions that focus on immediate and long-term possibilities. From the combination of basic informational needs and possibilities, they suggest four distinct patterns of perceptual properties, all of which are strongly correlated: coherence, complexity, legibility, and mystery. Coherence permits a quick
Aesthetics from "Below": Desire for Life and Lifelike Process

understanding of the environment, while complexity offers enough information to promote interest. Legibility reduces a feeling of ambiguity, while mystery encourages further exploration.

It is interesting to note that the Kaplans’ two informational needs entail the dialectical relationship between cognitive clarity (making sense) and explorative uncertainty (involvement). Making sense is a cognitive evaluation of environmental properties and a comparative response to optimize the uncertainty and ambiguity of those properties, e.g. Berlyne’s arousal potentials. Similarly, making sense simultaneously and necessarily involves a long-term evaluation as an adaptive process between feelings for explorative behavior and thoughts as post-cognitive evaluation, e.g. Zajonc’s notion of aesthetic response. Accordingly, the Kaplan’s notion of aesthetic preference inclusively involves both making short-term immediate sense as well as a long-term involvement for information availability. Again, complexity is recognized as the most agreed on property for aesthetic preference.

The important point in the Kaplans’ theory is that aesthetic preference is a sheer function of information processing that integrates both biological and cognitive needs for living. Aesthetic preference is to seek environmental possibilities through the development of basic needs for explicit and immediate survival as well as for the implicit and long-term process of cognitive learning. There is no distinct empirical and conceptual boundary between feeling and thought in the Kaplans’ information processing theory, but it experientially connects the immediate need for survival with a long term desire for learning.

Many researchers have attempted to identify detailed variables of aesthetic preference out of these correlations between environmental possibilities and basic informational needs.
Ulrich (1979) asserts that legibility has four components: complexity, focality (coherence, unity), ground texture, and depth. The Kaplans considered familiarity significantly as an important component in cognitive affordance. Familiarity affords us to make sense out of the environment, yet at the same time, it does not determine one’s aesthetic preference; thus, familiar and unfamiliar environments are capable of generating strong involvement, which is analogous to Berlyne’s arousal theory. Regarding the correlation between familiarity and complexity, research found that within complexity aesthetic judgment is an evident trade-off between the excitement of a new environment and the comfort generated by a familiar environment.

*Mystery* has been an interesting quality among the Kaplans’ four dimensions of their preference framework. It is at the intersection between a future promise of information and a basic need for involvement. By rating photographs of forests, Gimblett, Itami, and Fitzibbon (1985) attempted to specify physical landscape attributes that are perceived as mystery scenes. Following Kaplan’s definition of mystery as the intersecting quality between future promise of information and the opportunity of involvement, they specified physical attributes of mystery into five types: distance of view, screening, physical accessibility, radiant forest, spatial definition.

The results show that the combination of screening and physical accessibility is identified for the physical components of mystery; this supports the proposition that aesthetic judgment is a trade-off between conflicting functions, meanings, and characteristics. In addition, the combination of radiant forest and well-defined space tells us that a sense of
mystery is suggestive of something positive and bright rather than creepy or dark. The distance of view is identified as the most important feature in the definition of mystery, for it promises a sense of security and provides for behavioral opportunities to acquire more information. These five attributes could be sufficient for descriptive physical definitions of mystery, but may not be necessary for normative definitions (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Physical Attributes that define the Kaplan and Kaplans’ concept “Mystery”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mystery</th>
<th>Future promise of information</th>
<th>Opportunity of involvement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distance of View (not define, but affect)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Screening</td>
<td>Physical Accessibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radiant Forest</td>
<td>Spatial Definition</td>
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A vast number of studies in relation to “preference” have covered the widest range of scenic contexts, including the natural, the man-made environment, and demonstrate the conditions of and inferences from the environment. Some studies realized that the aesthetic judgment made by experimental subjects is not initiated by physical attributes alone; therefore, they started to look for variables—especially legibility and familiarity, influenced and modified by knowledge, behavior patterns, inter-cultural or inter-generational factors, and personality differences. Related studies support the Kaplans’ preference framework, by speculating that our
innate preference, namely a genotype of landscape preferences, is the “parkland with views” (Savannah Theory) (Porteous, 1996, p.125), by arguing that the flat and grassy Savannah landscape with a distance of view has an optimal level of complexity, focality, texture, and mystery.

**2.2 AESTHETIC PREFERENCE: LOOKING FOR A HABITAT**

Orian and Heerwagen (Orian, 1986; Orian & Heerwagen, 1992; Heerwagen & Orian, 1993) argued that the human aesthetic preference for landscapes has evolved in cultures from all organisms’ need for habitat selection (“habitat selection theory”), for finding desirable places for survival and reproduction. For all organisms, good habitats should evoke strong positive responses, while poorer habitats should evoke weaker or negative responses to key features of the environment. Basic responses to habitat features and qualities are likely to be modified by the presence of other individuals of the same species, because they provide information about choices made by previous arrivals. These ideas can be related “to more general notions about the evolution of a sense of beauty among people” (Orian, 1986, p.4).

The process of developing an aesthetic preference for a landscape is neither merely based on initial affects nor on information processing, but rather involves several inclusive phases of evolution: 1) the initial evaluation of key environmental cues, such as a patch of land and its prospect and refuge characteristics; 2) the exploration of the potential to gather future information that helps to determine the qualitative and quantitative aspects of an unfamiliar and complex environment; and 3) after accomplishing the environmental assessment, the decision
to remain and to unfold the set of activities appropriate for that time of year or part of life-cycle. They suggested a functional-evolutionary aesthetic theory of habitat selection with two complementary frameworks: one is the exploration of an unfamiliar landscape, and the other is a long-term evaluation in the time frame over which information is relevant (i.e., Figure 4.5).

![Figure 4.5: Functional-evolutionary framework for esthetic preference to landscape](image)

These two serial frameworks posit that the human aesthetic preference for landscape has evolved by a process of the organism’s habitat selection, looking for environmental cues for survival and reproduction—what we call habitability. This view also suggests that Appleton’s
theory of prospect and refuge, Berlyne’s arousal potentials, and Zajone and Wohlwill’s affective reaction theory can be consistent with the notion of the initial encounter with, and emotional responses to unfamiliar and complex environmental cues, and also that the Kaplans’ information processing theory for cognitive learning is relevant to the evolutionary account of survival and reproduction.

The frameworks integrate the ideas of aesthetic experience that involve emotional responses and preferential choices. The emotional reaction to the initial environmental features is immediate and affects the individual evaluation of the future preferred habitat or patch in which to settle. Habitat selection theory posits that our individual aesthetic preference is based on our search for habitability as perceptual property, from which an immediate aesthetic pleasure derives, and which affords an aesthetic evaluation in the process of searching for better and familiar conditions for settlement; thus, preferred landscapes are a manifestation of their relevance to “a good place for living.”

The frameworks involve three stages of exploration. Stage one is an initial encounter with a landscape and is the decision to explore the landscape further or to ignore it and move on. The emotional responses at the first stage are highly affective and instantaneous to some direct sources of information, such as plants, foods, and water, as well as to indirect information available in the form of topographic cues, such as a cliff, a cave, signs of human occupation, or other life supporting resources. If the emotional response is positive, then the stage two, the information gathering process, will follow. More cognitive features and future information are detected for habitat selection during exploration: e.g. signals of the availability of fruits in the
future, greening grass, and leafing of trees. Finally, stage three concerns the decision to stay in the environment to carry out a certain set of activities, depending on the relevant activities, the length of stay may be terminated or last a lifetime (Heerwagen & Orian 1993, p.143).

Habitat selection theory confirms some experientially common senses of landscape aesthetics. For instance, good visibility combined with a hidden space is a highly motivating scene to gain information and to protect. The evaluation of the landscape is the process of finding an unfamiliar landscape to become familiar, and of an uncertain and complex landscape to become legible, meaning it is a process of environmental learning. In addition, a long-term site selection is not a direct response but rather an evolutionary response to the environment, influenced by an individual’s past experiences, time constraints, and psychological preferences. Therefore, habitat selection theory presents aesthetic experience as one that integrates emotional responses with cognitive evaluations of personal, social, and cultural meanings for habitat.

Habitat selection theory represents both, a functional and aesthetic teleology, implying that intrinsic features of an environment that contribute to its perceived fitness would induce exploratory behavior to determine the best selection of living conditions (Orian, 1986, p.8). Whether or not aesthetic responses are determined by behavioral mechanisms responding to intrinsic features of an environment, the theory seems to attempt to stress the need for a general accountability for the problems of aesthetic diversity and of aesthetic universality. Darwin’s principle of natural selection postulates a general mechanism that is applicable to the evolution of diverse properties of millions of species of living organism; likewise, human beings
display a great diversity of aesthetic reactions to landscape, yet at the same time we may be able to detect an evolutionary root of beauty as generalizable response pattern (p.17). Then, the ultimate aesthetic goal of landscape lies in its ability to simply guide environmental decisions in ways that enhance survival and fitness (Heerwagen & Orian, 1993, p.146) for all organisms.

Orian (1986) argues that our general feeling of beauty aroused by an object is what we can always understand or can think of as functionally good as a resource (p.18), and that the reasoning about the existence of resources and their patterns by collecting and classifying information is associated with a prime source of pleasure (p.19). In other words, a sense of beauty indispensably involves our concept of value, because the beautiful attracts repeated attention, and the sense of value—why something would be deemed more beautiful than something else—is associated with this repetition, length, and intensity of attention. This implies that humans have a more advanced and more complicated cognitive capacity for this process, and that their aesthetic preferences and responses are richer, longer, and more sophisticated. It is an evolved sense of beauty for humans, but it may be a crude sense of life for all other organism.

This poses a question which experimentalists may find hard to answer: whether the sense of beauty as value can be morally justifiable and aesthetically generalizable. First, it seems to suggest that the habitats of more knowledgeable, more experienced, and more complex species would have higher aesthetic values than those of other organisms: which addresses e.g. why adults have a better understanding of living than children and why experts’ opinions on environmental quality are valued higher than laymen’s, and so forth. In addition, if aesthetic
feeling is primarily about an evaluation of what is good as resource, then it would reduce aesthetic value to a materialistic value from an anthropocentric and utilitarian perspective, against what is good for other creatures. Third, if the ultimate aesthetic goal of landscape is no more than a matter of survival and of fitness, then there would be no substantial difference between aesthetic and ecological value. Therefore, finally, if the aesthetic value is indeed a matter of survival and fitness, it would be more plausible to say that certain and familiar, rather than uncertain and unfamiliar environmental stimuli must evoke an aesthetic response, even at the initial stage.

Orian further argues that the pleasure of collecting and classifying information is not simply a matter accumulating objects, but a matter of assembly into some systems that establish and clarify their interrelationships, the discovery of patterns. Pattern is an outcome of an evolutionary process, of knowledge and values we share and feel familiar with, and at the same time it is an ecological and aesthetic property. The initial positive response occurs to unfamiliar landscapes as a whole, and the positive emotional response in collecting and classifying information (process of knowing and understanding) occurs to minor variations within a familiar stimulus pattern; by contrast, negative feelings occur toward major deviations from the same familiar pattern. In short, a positive aesthetic response occurs in recognizing patterns (familiarity) that contain subtle variations and deviations (diversity and differences).

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24 For instance, great humor is often based on subtle deviation a familiar story (Orian, 1986, p.19).
3. AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE: FINDING A DEFENSIBLE PLACE

3.1 TO SEE AND NOT TO BE SEEN AS HEURISTIC THEORY

Appleton (1975b, 1984, 1990) has consistently argued that existing studies of landscape aesthetics, used to measure the merits of particular landscapes, rely heavily on photographs as sources for empirical research, and are not aiming directly at the central problem, the essential nature of the experiential landscape and of experiential aesthetics (Appleton, 1984, p.101). The essential element they ignored, or were unable to capture, is “inspiration” (1975b, p.44). By the same token he expressed skepticism that such aspects of aesthetic theories as concord, harmony, and order, or “the intrinsic value of all nature,” by both art historians and critics, as well as some of the Greek philosophers, frustrate laymen’s aesthetic experience that is occurring in our common experience of landscape. In an analogy to studies of visual art he felt that they are rather paying too much attention to such aspects as the “techniques of painting, uses of material styles of brushwork, the structure of composition on the two-dimensional plane of the canvas” (p.18), rather than the subject matter of the painting.

Appleton contends that landscape aesthetics ought to be explained from “below” for laymen and for everyday landscapes because landscape is an inclusive realm appreciated by all of us, not an exclusive realm for scientists, art historians, or philosophers. He argues that we need a “holistic theory” (1984, p.91) as the groundwork by which to connect empirical findings tested by scientists with the broader humanistic understanding pursued by phenomenologists, historians, and art theorists. In connecting these two different realms, he suggested a heuristic
method: 1) looking at the phenomenon of pleasure and 2) enquiring further into the relationship between the pleasurable feelings we experience in the contemplation of landscape and those which we derive from other kinds of activity or involvement (1982, p.28). Appleton cast the empirical question first, “What do you enjoy about landscape and why?” and the philosophical question next, “What is the source of the pleasure which we derive from the contemplation of landscape?” (1975b, p.15).

In response to these questions he postulates that 1) the source of laymen’s aesthetic satisfaction arises from a search for an understanding of landscape, and hypothesized that 2) human aesthetic responses to landscapes are *in part inborn* and derive from the spontaneous biological requirement for survival, “Prospect-refuge: seeing without being seen” (p.viii), and proposes a synthetic theory of landscape aesthetics in his milestone book, “The experience of landscape” (1975b). As a biological inheritance humans have a general tendency of behavior to investigate and to explore their environment, and to select a certain place that affords the opportunity for hiding and simultaneously for seeing as a vantage point for hunting (defense and attack). This primitive activity of seeing without being seen has evolved into aesthetic satisfaction because it is followed by the reduction of anxiety and restlessness due to potential danger (p.71).

Seeing without being seen as aesthetic theory appears to rely on sight in landscape experience. He admits the importance of seeing in experience by stating, “Perhaps, the most important contribution of perception study to landscape aesthetics so far is the momentum which has been generated towards an understanding of landscape in terms of the way in which
people look at it, what they see in it, and how its components combine to stimulate responses of an emotive as well as of a cognitive kind” (p.54). At the same time, employing Dewey’s notion of *experience*, Appleton stresses that the prospect-refuge notion is about total experience in terms of a locomotive attitude toward an optimal opportunity for the exploration of the environment. A particular theoretical base should provide us with a frame of reference for examining the aesthetic properties of landscape form (p.79). Prospect-refuge theory can explain such emotional responses as ease, satisfaction, or unease and disturbance to environmental objects, and can work as a framework for an infinite account of aesthetic symbolism in different ways: i.e. hazards, shelters, hiding places, a sense of being enclosed, openness, ridges, mountains, valleys, high-rise buildings, open space, convex and concave spaces, etc.

### 3.2 PROSPECT-REFUGE AS SYMBOLISM OF HABITAT

Prospect-refuge is a behavioral as well as a symbolic hypothesis of human experience through evolutionary history (1990). It is a strategic value for survival that had resided in all animals, and has ceased to reside in human beings; instead, it continues to remain as a symbol for aesthetic apprehension. All landscape has the potential of these two kinds of opportunities. “The eye makes a spontaneous appraisal of the environment as a strategic theater for survival; this must include some assessment of the opportunity for movement between the various key-positions in the prospect-refuge complex” (1975b, p.119). The spontaneous appraisal of the environment in search of a good place for survival is not just a conscious and a rational appraisal of what is good for survival, but a symbolic and unconscious understanding of
opportunity for movement.

In addition, the prospect-refuge theory can make a successful theoretical application to both the cultural and the natural landscapes, and it can also make a spontaneous and simultaneous linkage between emotional response (refuge: hiding safely) and cognitive evaluation (prospect: exploring-further) as in a reciprocal framework. It is probably fair to conclude that our aesthetic response to the natural landscape is more directly associated to biological-behavioral-functional accounts of human experience, whereas our aesthetic response to the cultural landscape involves more reflective and symbolic inferences.

Appleton made interpretive accounts for his arguments about prospect-refuge, providing a vast amount of evidence and clues including paintings, writings, and poetry that have primarily exhibited the English romanticism of the “picturesque” of the 18th Century, as well as the American landscape ideal of “wilderness” in the 19th Century. He argued that framing is an application of prospect and refuge, as it frames landscape experience like the view from a room through the frame of a window (p.129). Scale, a middle distance of landscape, locomotion, and visual totality in the balance between seeing (revealing) and hiding (concealing) were significant components of prospect and refuge in landscape paintings.

The symbolic, the behavioral, and the evolutionary perspectives of landscape aesthetics can generate an inferential power for the application to the environmental design practices. The manifestation of a prospect-refuge value in a larger urban context would include natural features such as shelters, caves, rocks, hollows, vegetations, and surfaces or the inter-relationship of mass-void, figure-ground, and solid-fluid. Potentially, all kinds of vistas and views, such as
panoramic, closed, open, deflected, offset, as well as a wide range of visual serial experience (Cullen, 1971) can be explained in the conceptual frame of prospect-refuge.

For architecture prospect-refuge becomes more intimate, spatial, and bodily in nature. Hilderbrand (1999) explores the notion of finding a “good home” as our innate predilection for shelter and our explorative perception of spaces. He does this through a detailed examination and careful interpretation of Frank Lloyd Wright’s houses and a variety of other architectural spaces and elements of buildings, such as courtyards, cloisters, columns, windows, roofs, walls, ceiling planes, floors, doors, hallways, arcades, overhanging eaves, alcoves, balconies, and recesses. Prospect and refuge are perceptual symbols of opposites: prospect is expansive, bright, cool, masculine, Yang, outside, convex, and open; refuge is small, dark, warm, feminine, Yin, inside, concave, and, enclosed. The symbolism of habitat as an archetypal projection or abstraction seems to be infinite, and the contrast, complexity, juxtaposition, and balance between prospect and refuge as a whole seem to be universal and are experienced across cultures.

Appleton argues that the origin of taste is a form of biological symbolism. “Taste is derived indirectly and incomprehensively, from some sensitivity in human nature which is communicated innately from generation to generation” (Appleton, 1975b, p.234), “It is one’s acquired, learned preference for particular methods of satisfying inborn desires” (p.239). Aesthetics has been always regarded as a matter of taste in food, clothing, selecting mates, etc. So in summary it could be said that landscape aesthetics is rooted in our acquired, learned preference for particular landscapes, capable of satisfying our inborn desires for prospect-refuge, which is
derived indirectly from some sensitivity in human nature, which is communicated innately from generation to generation. Individual inspiration for a particular landscape is ultimately a personal response, but it is not just a subjective, personal opinion, but rather a manifestation of our innate and learned desire for prospect-refuge qualities in our environment.

3.3 AN ANALYTICAL-HUMANISTIC ACCOUNT OF BEING IN PLACE

Experimentalists tend to believe that the prospect-refuge theory postulates that a safe place from which to explore is a key feature in evoking an initial positive response to an unfamiliar environment. They pose questions and subject them to the assessment of judges: some confirmed and others failed to find experimental support (Appleton, 1984, p.98), e.g. that an open view is judged safer than a closed one (in contrast to Appleton), but that vegetative open spaces are all judged positive (Nasar, Julian, Buchman, Humphreys & Mrohaly, 1983). Kaplan and Kaplan hypothesize correlations between preferred landscapes and symbolic features of a safe place, and argue (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989, p.92) that the theory of refuge and prospect can be better explained by informational accounts, because it is about finding a place to hide and to look into the distance, where one can gain information about what is going on and at the same time be able to prevent others from obtaining that information.

Heerwagen and Orians (1993) argue that prospect-refuge, behavior, and hazard theories are all integrated in the habitat selection theory in terms of its evolutionary-functional accounts of landscape experience. Appleton, on the other hand, distinguishes prospect and refuge from habitat selection in that the former is a universal behavioral theory, based on an innate desire to
reduce the danger of premature extinction, whereas the latter is not universally behavioral “but much simpler, more logical, and more effective in providing an explanation of familiar experience” (Appleton, 1975b, p.84).

To explain further, habitat selection theory can differ from prospect-refuge in the following two reasons: 1) habitat selection is a universal theory applicable to all animal behaviors; prospect-refuge is a logical, simple, and plausible explanation for shared experience, and 2) habitat selection theory reduces the evolutionary account of landscape experience to an instrumental functionalism; prospect-refuge theory extends the evolutionary account to an experiential symbolism. To make an analogy, habitat selection theory is Darwinism through the Freudian eyes (behavioral functionalism); prospect-refuge theory is Darwinism through Jungian eyes (behavioral symbolism).

There is a danger of over-simplification in the fact that any theory tends to isolate common characteristics, which is useful for explanatory purposes, but at the same time ignores other characteristics and inevitably distorts the total image of each individual circumstance (Appleton, 1984, p.92). Appleton refutes that the problems in the prospect and refuge theory (p.96-97) arise from the multi-disciplinary nature of the argument, which he said is a common criticism many other theories suffered. First, only a minority of readers is interested in a broad concept, and almost all others are experts in a much more restricted field. Second, even highly reputable scholars tend to read into innovative ideas what they expect to find there and what fits into their own established habits of thoughts. Lastly, he argues, explaining aesthetic values in biological terms is still anathema to the romantic mind.
Appleton continues to argue that theory is not a problem solving tool for all explanations of the truth; it is a simple formula that presents a framework of explanation for morphological phenomena in terms of their probable solution. Theory can be inadequate, but that does not necessarily make it wrong. Appleton (p.93) articulates the objectives of the prospect-refuge theory as follows:

- The prospect-refuge theory attempts to set the aesthetics of landscape within the context of a biological interpretation.
- The prospect-refuge theory supports both art and science, and even circumstantial evidence afforded by everyday experience of the man and the women in the street.
- The prospect-refuge theory attempts to reduce a complex reality to a relatively simple formula by simplification, but without simplification or reduction there is no explanation.
- The prospect-refuge theory can be applied in any particular area of investigation or in any particular method or technique.

In this sense, all aesthetic phenomena that occur as various personal experiences cannot be reduced to one single theory, i.e. prospect-refuge; but the theory can explain the shared phenomena, our familiar experience with minor variations in a simpler way based on “evidence and clues rather than conclusive proof” (1986, p.33). This is the main reason I would like to call it an analytical-humanistic theory, which can attempt to identify primitive patterns of behavior, make aesthetic value susceptible to examination by the methodology of the sciences, and
therefore bridge the dilemma of landscape aesthetics between subjectivity and objectivity, and between art and science (see also section 1.1, Chapter 2).

In response to some criticism that the theory of prospect and refuge “alludes to the 18th Century’s treatment of the sublime and the picturesque but does not offer an explanation for the aesthetic pleasure we can find in any landscapes and landscape painting” (1984, p.96), Appleton admits that there is no misconception there, because the explanatory power of prospect and refuge has mainly to do with the symbolism of hazard and peril. However, Burke’s (1757) dichotomous hypothesis of the sublime and the beautiful arises from two kinds of impression on the mind and sprang from two different origins: the sublime is connected with a desire for self-preservation and the beautiful is a desire for engaged and harmonious life in society.

A powerful vicarious excitement and sense of awe elicited by imagined pain or terror for the sake of survival leads to the feeling of sublime, whereas the beautiful is the feeling of continuing life and health that have a capacity to be affected by pleasure and passion (1975b, p.28). Prospect and refuge is neither the simple replication of the sublime, i.e. a desire of survival, nor the Gestalt interpretation of the picturesque, but the archetypal symbolism of life and life-like processes embedded in our biological needs and our mentality, i.e. a form of biophilia. The notion of prospect and refuge actually seems to suggest a bond between Burke’s two concepts of the beautiful and the sublime.

25 In many passages of his book Appleton uses Dewey’s (1934) notion of “emotion” in aesthetic experience for his emphasis on aesthetic satisfaction as an empirical and intrinsic aesthetic quality of landscape experience.
Regarding his second objective of the theory, that it can support art and science, as well as circumstantial evidence afforded by everyday and ordinary experience, it may be questionable whether aesthetic pleasure expressed in landscape paintings could reflect everyday common experiences of landscape for both laymen and artists. Gombrich (1994) states that we may learn to appreciate as beautiful or sublime what we have experienced in paintings, that art indeed may help to focus our aesthetic sensibilities towards nature: “If an Alpine peak is inspiring, it is because the tradition of their art had provided them with ready visual symbols for steep isolated rocks, which made it possible for them to single out and appreciate these forms in nature (p.117).”

Gombrich’s argument of aesthetic experience of nature through art locates it on one side of the everlasting debate whether aesthetic feeling is shaped by either nature or nurture, whether it is genotypic or phenotypic in kind. In this sort of argument we always seem to be of two minds: on the one hand, we all do believe in children’s, and perhaps even animals’, innate empathy for and affective feeling for nature; on the other hand, we do not believe their experiences can be the same as those affected by an awareness of art history and landscape paintings. However, there is plenty of empirical evidence that animals do have natural instincts and feelings for nature and for life. We may simply resist calling it “aesthetic.”

4. COMMON THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS

The analytical theories discussed above—Arousal, Affects, Information Processing, Habitat Selection, and Prospect-Refuge—show some discrepancies as well as overlaps in terms
of how they understand the nature of aesthetic experience. The discrepancies arise from the manner in which they tackle the conceptual relationships among feeling, cognition, perception, and experience, such as causality, co-relation, inter-relations, and the overall Gestalt, and they also arise from discrepant views on the relationship between humans and the environment: linear, dialectical, and evolutionary. Despite such differences, all of these theories present significant overlaps in terms of the analytical structure and mechanisms in experience. There are common themes that the theories of the analytical humanists’ share and from which important aesthetic implications can be generated. They can be subsumed under the notion of biophilia, an innate love—“love from the heart”—for life, which creates a biological link with other species, other living systems, society, and ultimately nature, and which I believe provides the most fundamental and intrinsic dimension in the aesthetic experience of landscapes.

4.1 AESTHETIC RESPONSES: FEELING

4.1.1 AESTHETIC FEELING AS AN INTEGRATED PROCESS AND PRODUCT

The most compelling evidences supporting the analytical humanists’ theories are the emotional outcomes, because our emotional response, particularly in terms of liking or disliking, is usually discriminating. As discussed, most environmental preference studies have been interested in emotional responses with the underlying assumption that aesthetic experience has much to do with feeling, and that the landscapes preferred by the average public would have some significant aesthetic attributes. While there are no empirical studies that distinguish feeling from pleasure or from other emotions, it is plausible to assume that aesthetic feeling arises from
some kind of integrative mechanism. Aesthetic feeling is an act of transcending oneself (aesthetic subject) to the other (aesthetic object); it is an emotional engagement in the process of understanding—classifying and differentiating uncertain things; it is a desire to fill a gap and to look for a balance between collative properties. Dewey said, “experience denotes characteristic emotions: emotions qualify the experience as a unity” (1934, p.43). “If unity is described in any experience, it has an aesthetic character even if it is not dominantly an aesthetic experience” (p.42).

Berlyne’s Arousal Theory proposes that stimuli-choices in response to environmental properties are four: emotional, motor response, imitative empathy, and verbal-imaginal responses, and argues that aesthetic responses are related to a particular property—collative potential—and to the hedonic pleasure arising from those four stimuli-choices. Although Berlyne distinguishes aesthetic pleasure from other emotional responses, and emotion from imitative empathy, feeling is of particular importance for him in aesthetic experience as process. For instance, empathy is a “feeling into;” synesthesia is a cross-sensory feeling arising from the interaction of all of Berlyne’s four response choices, including the verbal-imaginal. Although arousal theory tends to focus on the relationship between hedonic pleasure and collative stimuli potentials primarily as empirical values, it seems to be apparent that aesthetic feeling arises from the integration of these four as process and product.
4.1.2 AESTHETIC FEELING AS A TWO-FOLD EXPERIENCE: MOTIVATION AND FULFILLMENT

Another aspect of aesthetic response discussed by scientists is affection. The initial affects are presented as initial feelings that move into, with, and toward an aesthetic object, and hedonic pleasure is a sense of relief resulting from explorative efforts to collect, classify, and to compare environmental stimuli until optimizing the proportional relationships among complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty. It is kind of both, a conscious and an unconscious pleasure derived from filling the void, finishing the incomplete, comprehending the uncertain, and clarifying the ambiguous. On the other hand, affects are an aesthetic feeling driven by curiosity at the beginning, and evolve by the successive and explorative process of knowing and understanding. Thus, like hedonic pleasure, affects by nature are both pre-cognitive and post-cognitive emotive forces directed toward aesthetic stimuli, which motivate cognitive processes. Affects as aesthetic feeling are circumstantial and directional: they are not static but moving.

Many environmental studies interested in aesthetic preference have employed Zajonc's Affect Theory and the Kaplans’ Information Processing Theory as their theoretical ground. Environmental preferences for a particular landscape, as judged by the public, may not be sufficient to distinguish affective feeling from rational thinking, because feeling and thinking are both judgmental and mutually dependent. However, environmental perception studies further proposed that aesthetic preference—whether it is affective or rational or hedonic feeling—includes a distinct emotional quality that can stimulate, motivate, and activate our behavioral choices, the aesthetic evaluation of physical characteristics in landscapes.
Aesthetic feeling is therefore a twofold experience: it is a *unity* that has a beginning and an end; it is a *balance* between motivating and fulfilling. The two-fold experience can exist in any learning experience. “Emotion is the moving and cementing force” (Dewey, 1934, p.42). “The experience has a satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement” (p.38). Dewey (p.41) continues that such emotions as joy, sorrow, hope, fear, anger, and curiosity are significant aesthetic qualities of a complex experience, which move and change into completeness and unity. The aesthetic feeling is to motivate passion and love toward things, persons, environments, and the world (I toward It), and to bridge the distance between those: the perceiver and the perceived (I and Thou) (see also section 1.3, Chapter 2).

### 4.1.3 AESTHETIC FEELING AS TRANSCENDENT: TRANS-PERSON, TRANS-SPECIES

Aesthetic feeling can also be understood as growing out of biological and behavioral universals, as products of the rudimentary mechanism of the brain system. There is empirical evidence that the brain system that animals, such as reptilian and mammalian, and humans share provides a neural template that makes emotion in many species similar in some fundamental ways (Lazarus, 1982). In other words, we can assume that feeling, such as hedonic pleasure and affects, are functional and evolutionary products that are deeply rooted and broadly shared species. Thus, the gross environmental information (preferenda or arousal potentials) can cause similar emotional reactions in human as well as other organisms, particularly in relation to their survival.
Animals have developed such an affective feeling into fellow creatures: a maternal instinct can be cross-species (see Figure 4.6). Cats, for instance, seem to share our prospect-refuge instincts in showing a pronounced tendency to take advantage of a place from where to see without being seen. If we admit that aesthetic experience is initiated by a special sort of feeling arising from a biological need for life and habitat, we do have sufficient reason to believe all species capable of emotion can be pregnant with aesthetic feeling. Aesthetic feeling is an innate feeling of love, passion, empathy, and sympathy for life. Humans can then be distinguished from other species only in terms of their advanced capacity to project affection and meaning not only toward a thing, but also to surroundings, other organism, and living systems in general. In this vein aesthetic feeling can be also understood as a symbolic expression of reverence for life—it is capable of awakening the fundamental animality and childlikeness dormant within us.

Figure 4.6: Affects based on biological needs: Cross-species maternity

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4.2 AESTHETIC STIMULI: ARCHETYPAL CHARACTERISTICS—“PATTERNS”

The theories of the analytical humanists have attempted to construct scientific bases from which we could begin to understand how physical characteristics and regularities, as environmental stimuli, arouse aesthetic responses in us, and they identified gross environmental features as the primary sources of attraction. Berlyne called them arousal potentials in collative pairs, and Wohlwill called them preferenda. The source of attraction always seems to contain subtle ambiguity, uncertainty, conflict, novelty, incongruity, and unfamiliarity as a whole, and evokes interest and curiosity to explore more and further. These arousal potentials and preferenda seem to captivate our attention immediately and before knowing where they come from and what they are about.

The Kaplans, on the other hand, regarded familiarity as a significant environmental preferendum, and also recognized coherence, complexity, legibility, and mystery as generally preferred environmental features. Nasar (1994) tried to find the answer to why most people do not like the designs architects seem to like (p.378) in regard to urban design aesthetics. By further developing variables of both affective and cognitive aesthetic responses, he argued for the existence of two connected aesthetic variables: the denotative (formal) and the connotative (symbolic) that are merged into typicality in ordinary human experience. Typicality seems to entail some desirable environmental characteristics for most humans: repetitive ordering elements, familiar historical elements, moderate levels of complexity, moderate discrepancy from prototypical elements, and popular over high styles (p.397). He concluded that most
human beings—apparently in distinction to architects—find familiarity in typicality attractive (p.382).

Thus we are left with the apparent contradiction that both unfamiliar and familiar environmental stimuli have been found as a principal condition for aesthetic preference, but arguing for the primacy of one over the other by further empirical research may be meaningless in terms of aesthetic experience as a whole. Things that are cognitively unfamiliar but emotionally intimate seem to entice us to explore and make sense of them, more so than things that are cognitively familiar but emotionally strange. As reviewed in the discussion of the prospect-refuge theory, the act of trying to find a balance between opposite pairs, such as familiarity and unfamiliarity of aesthetic stimuli, can lead to various ways of exploration, both formal and symbolic. Many studies seem to suggest that moderate and optimal levels of complexity and diversity are important as aesthetic stimuli, because they create a greater potential for collative properties, as Berlyne argued, and because they embody environmental characteristics with subtle deviations and variations within familiarity, as Orian (1986) argued. Moderate uncertainty in regularity, and moderate novelty in familiarity, bring about aesthetic motivation to explore further, until an environment is perceived to be good for living.

Both nature and culture are the shared physical and formal structure as well as symbolic structure of life. The natural environment has both familiar and unfamiliar, and both formal and symbolic characteristics, and ultimately affords familiar experiences for all. Both nature and culture display a multitude of repetitive characteristics and regularities, in other words patterns. Natural patterns are broadly shared and are capable of initiating an immediate aesthetic
response, whereas cultural patterns are locally and socially shared and involve more aesthetic exploration. Patterns are based on similarities and differences that are absorbed into our shared, familiar experience and therefore have great potential to evoke similar aesthetic responses. The notion of universal and experiential patterns as cultural overlaps, however, has been largely neglected in contemporary experimental theories, mainly because of the use of quantitative measurements that mainly concern the visual evaluation of the physical composition of natural landscapes.

Patterns are visible and invisible, tangible and intangible, pre-cognitive ("primitive") and cognitive, unconscious and conscious structures shared among living beings. Patterns are archetypal, are formal as well as symbolic. Patterns are perceptual (visual, spatial) and temporal: space and time have patterns. Patterns are experiential characteristics recognized not only by sight alone but also by all senses as a whole. Pattern is a collectively recognized form and meaning of complexity and diversity within a category: a habitat would be an example of a pattern of a living system. A way of life is a pattern (see Figure 4.7): the individual way of living has daily and seasonal patterns that can become the collective and shared living patterns of a community. Trees have growing pattern and animals have behavioral patterns. Days are both similar and different: they pass and come again in repetition. The sun rises and sets in a similar ways every day, yet at the same time affords the opportunity for an infinite variety of different aesthetic experiences. Bodily movement is perhaps more of a natural pattern, while language is a more cultural one, but both are habitual patterns all humans share explicitly and implicitly.
4.3 AESTHETIC EXPLORATION: DESIRE FOR HABITABILITY

The “habitat selection” and “hazard” theories proposed a functional and evolutionary vision of landscape aesthetics: that aesthetic experience is an explorative journey in search of environmental cues for survival. Many may find this line of argument instrumentally reduced, but the evolutionary view that human aesthetic desire is an evolved form of a biological need and instinct for survival intends to explain not so much the entire nature of aesthetic experience as the origin of aesthetic desire. That is, aesthetic experience may begin with the biological need for survival, but then develops into an on-going process of exploration of the landscape for potentials for a “good life” with-in it. When a wild natural landscape, e.g. the Grand Canyon, makes a thrilling emotional impact on the perceiver, the experience rather immediately evokes a deep sense of humility in the face of the absolute power of nature. Such an experience of awe

27 From internet open sources: Yann Arthus-Bertrand, http://www.yannarthusbertrand.com (left); http://www.gopion.com (center); photo by author (right).
originates from an imagined potential danger and a concomitant desire of survival, as discussed in Burke’s notion of the *sublime*, requiring a psychological distance from a source of a threat for life.

By contrast, aesthetic exploration arising from initial affects or a vague feeling of attraction may not always directly bring about a strong sense of survival pleasure, but rather is indicative of a sense of life and of living being associated with landscape. Berlyne’s identification of uncertainty and conflict among the collative environmental stimuli indicates a further need for information, and therefore exploration, to achieve relief as a hedonic pleasure derived from the expectation of something good for life. As Wohlwill argued, such an exploration is not instrumentally and specifically directed toward the source of the stimuli of uncertainty themselves, but rather tends to pursue an array of diverse directions aiming to achieve an equilibrium among conflicting conditions. The Kaplans’ theory may explain the act of aesthetic exploration even better: the aesthetic experience of landscape is the intrinsically satisfying process of exploring—with the hope of discovering—cognitive affordances for survival. While environmental stimuli of uncertainty contain possibilities of complexity and mystery as motivating circumstances, the ultimate goal of aesthetic exploration is the search for coherence and legibility. In terms of habitability these notions appear to be largely consistent with the habitat theory by Orian and Heerwagen as well as with the prospect-refuge theory by Appleton.

To make sense of something is the act of discovering its relevance to our situation: it is not just about knowing what it is, but understanding it and relating it to our life. Finding
information from the natural environment strengthens our affinity with other living beings and helps us to understand and appreciate the diverse habitats of other living organism. It seems fairly well established that a natural environment with water and with vegetation always evokes more positive emotions than an urban environment (Ulrich, 1981), and that rich habitats, such as river systems and lakes, are always human preferences.

However, as human beings have removed themselves from the natural environment, and have replaced it with modern artifacts and a machine-dominated world, they keep in touch with other species and with nature mainly vicariously, by visiting museums, zoos, and parks, or by buying a suburban house with a water-front or with a garden, for the sake of a “healthy” life with nature. In this situation aesthetic exploration is limited in time and space, passively given, and forcefully specific rather than diversive. Being separated from the natural environment tends to sterilize human knowledge in terms of relating other living beings to us, and thwarts our opportunities to learn by direct experience from nature and life—and perhaps even culture.

The aesthetic exploration of landscape enhances our understanding of cultural history within natural processes, and of natural history in the cultural context. Landscape does not simply afford instrumental behavioral functions for humans; it affords symbolic and metaphorical imagination. Finding habitability through landscape involves not only multisensory engagements within a situation—the perception of the self and of the body—but also the cognitive process of recognition, recollection, comparison, and evaluation of its relevance to human well-being. As culture and language expanded, humans “naturally” used living organisms and various aspects of nature as a source of metaphor and myth (Wilson, 1993, p.32) which
enabled them to engage in deeper, longer, and richer aesthetic exploration. To the extent that an environment affords biological, behavioral, and ecological functions for all organisms, it also affords us psychological, perceptual, cognitive, and spiritual symbols and metaphors that enable us to adore and revere life and life-like processes. The aesthetic exploration of landscape is indeed the discovery of environmental affordance for all lives.

4.4 AESTHETIC VALUE: TOWARD A BIOCENTRIC HUMANITY

Value, in general, is a dimension assigned by humans to persons or things, as well as to work, society, culture, and nature in expressing views of what is considered to be good from economical, psychological, sociological, and ethical spectra. In the conventional and scientific mind, a feeling of affection, or of perceived aesthetic quality, has not been valued for its own sake, but is seen as having value for someone for the sake of subjective experience. However, the notion of aesthetic quality suggested so far is meant to be the more general humanistic value assigned to objects, or the specific course of the experience occurring between subjects and objects and the aesthetic theories analyzed above therefore expressed an indication of quality and value of aesthetic experience primarily from a psychological and biological basis. In contrast to many empirical studies that show a propensity to assign value based on the results, the aesthetic qualities and values examined by analytical humanistic theories here are both intrinsic (valued for its own sake) and instrumental (valued for an interests), and always exist in the relationship between objects and observers.

The principal concept to explain aesthetic value is the notion of pleasure. Positive
feelings, such as affects, are taken as initial signals for aesthetic value, and hedonic value is resulting from the human search for a coherent and fulfilling existence. Such an instrumental value of aesthetics is suggests a strong connection to the experience of the natural landscape and its potential for a positive impact on human psychological well-being. Aesthetic value in terms of psychological well-being points equally strongly to an evolutionary view of aesthetic value, from biological needs for survival to the fundamental value placed life and life-processes. Thus, aesthetic value becomes a transactional link between human psychological well-being and biological well-being of other species by exploring the meaning of, and learning rules for, selfhood. The aesthetic implications derived from theories suggested by the analytical humanists are ultimately directed to our innate love for the self—our own as well as that of others—as a biological being: a conception of value embodied in the notion of biophilia.

Morality grounded in feeling or emotion can provide a good explanation of the intrinsic value of other species. Callicott (1993, p.67-68) calls it the “Humean-Darwinian natural history of morals,” which does not regard egoism as the only genuine and self-explanatory value because, according to Hume, we may have a strong emotional attachment to our own interests, but it is also possible to have strong feelings for the interests of other beings. Similarly, Darwin's implied moral proposition suggests that parental care is the capacity evolving from natural selection necessary for many species, especially mammals, to ensure reproductive success. It is motivated by a certain strong emotion which adult mammals experience toward their offspring and therefore would affect a species' psychological profile of “parental love”. This suggests that humans would be capable of extending this capacity toward the living beings
of other species as if they were their own offspring.

Kellert (1993, p.43) noted that the biophilia-tendency becomes apparent as possibly a universal expression of the human dependence on nature. He suggested a typology of nine fundamental aspects of human valuing of, and affiliating with, the natural world: 1) Utilitarian, 2) Naturalistic, 3) Ecological-scientific, 4) Aesthetic, 5) Symbolic, 6) Humanistic, 7) Moralistic, 8) Dominionistic, and 9) Negativistic. Kellert’s typology of valuing nature shows some overlaps with value considerations of landscape in terms of aesthetics from below. I would suggest five aspects of value consideration that the existing theories of landscape aesthetics of analytical humanists have presented, as follows: 1) Utilitarian-instrumental value, 2) Natural-empirical value, 3) Symbolic-existential value, 4) Ecological-intrinsic value, and 5) Moral-altruistic value.

First, utilitarian value is, in its conventional sense, restricted to material and physical benefits. This view presumes that aesthetics of landscape is indeed a consequence of the experience of physical and material things. In other words, the utilitarian value of landscape aesthetics arises from the view that humans and other species take evolutionary advantages of their environment. However, this aesthetic view of utilitarian value is bio-centric rather than anthropocentric. That means, for instance, that trees as physical and material elements of landscape are universally accepted to be beautiful not because of their potential use as a building material for a house, but rather because of a number of different functional life-benefits, such as fruits, place, nest, shelter, bridge, and playground, provided for diverse forms of living organisms. The utilitarian value of landscape aesthetics is therefore not to see landscape beauty as driven by human selfishness, but rather to see it as an evolutionary benefit arising from a
teleological function.

Second, natural value of aesthetics is simply meant to suggest that a direct contact with nature gives a greater satisfaction than contacts with other aesthetic objects. The naturalistic value affirms the presumption that the natural landscape is universally better liked by average people than the urban, industrial landscape, because nature is an infinite source of our sense of wonder, fascination, and woe, and the source of deeper sense of mystery that grows exponentially: “The greater the knowledge of nature, the deeper the mystery and the more we seek knowledge to create new knowledge” (Wilson, 1984, p.76). The creation of new knowledge is intrinsically valuable and this view of landscape aesthetics encompasses such a value of learning: our empirical curiosity for the exploration of the mysteries of the natural world.

Third, the symbolic and existential value of landscape aesthetics recognizes human existence in the landscape as symbol, which is “reflected in the development of human language and the complexity and communication of ideas fostered by this symbolic methodology” (Kellert, 1993, p.50). Natural and cultural phenomena reflected in landscape indicate a long term of human existence and the history of many lives. Landscape reminds us of some memories from the past, and beckons us to associate them with the present meaning of our existence. Not all symbols are intrinsically valuable, but symbolism of landscape is valuable because it is a communicative form and a connection between the past and the future of human existence, similar to a shared inherited language. Prospect-refuge is not just a functional expression, but more importantly a symbolic expression of humans in search of habitability. Many cultures worship mountains as a spiritual and ritual guide for a profane life. Symbolic
expression is the well-known aesthetic methodology that entails both symbolic abstraction as well as projections of meanings, because it binds two different worlds together as a creative force: i.e. a symbiosis between nature and culture, between humans and animals, between the young and the old, and between the self and the universe. Symbolic existential values recognize landscape as an extremely rich and textured system, and its aesthetic dimension as significant for human knowledge, art, and religion.

Four, ecological-intrinsic values in landscape aesthetics are directly related to the nature of landscape. From the humanistic perspective, the notion of landscape by its very nature encompasses experiential and holistic dimensions, and aesthetics by nature can be characterized as experiential and holistic perception. “Ecological value” is a modern scientific formulation that recognizes the intrinsic value of nature as a complex of life-systems for all organisms, but as the conventional and narrow expression of scientific inquiry ecological value often encompasses mainly a systemic inquiry for “organizational structure and complexity, barely discernible to the average person” (Kellert, 1993, p.47). The conflict between the ecological value and the aesthetic value of landscape is mainly due to this narrow definition of ecology, as means of controlling nature, which is a reductionist and atomic outlook on landscape. By contrast, a holistic vision of landscape prevents us from seeing landscape as a picture in the postcard, or as a thing isolated from its surroundings; rather it makes us make both intuitive and empirical sense of the reality of the world as a process and a system of nature, and of culture as a form of functional and structural interconnectedness.

The last value in landscape aesthetics, the moral-altruistic, integrates the other four
values suggested. The aesthetic and moral transaction of landscape experience becomes possible when aesthetic theories are able to explain a view of valuing landscapes as moral justification. The “biophilia-hypothesis” may indeed provide a moralistic-altruistic account of landscape aesthetics. The utilitarian-instrumental value is morally good for the survival of bio-community; the naturalistic-empirical value is morally good for the vital human knowledge of our vital community: nature; the symbolic or existential value is morally good for our spiritual well-being; the ecological-holistic value is morally good for the realization of the interconnectedness of life as a systemic whole.

Biophilia is powerful aesthetic hypothesis not only because it explains the nature of the human experience of landscape, but also because it allows us to justify the human role, right, and duty to the environment as a synthesis of the self, nature, and culture. As such, both moral value and aesthetic value cannot include each other as a part; they are parallel values facing each other as two sides of the same coin. A synthesis of ethics and aesthetics is, I believe, the intellectual product of our most refined humanity, because both ethics and aesthetics aim to explain and to guide our relation to “life around us that exceeds in complexity and beauty anything else humanity is ever likely encounter” (Wilson, 1993, p.40).
AESTHETICS FROM “ABOVE”: REVERENCE FOR LIFE IN NATURE

The status of life in nature is the modern problem of philosophy and of science. Indeed it is the central meeting point of all the strains of systemic thought, humanistic, naturalistic, and philosophic. The very meaning of life...is not very different from our conclusion respecting nature, considered in abstraction from the notion of life. (Alfred North Whitehead, 1938, p.202)

1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE ON THE AESTHETIC APPRECIATION OF NATURE

As I discussed in Chapter 1, some of the problems in the study of landscape are due to the lack of a specific philosophy of the aesthetic appreciation of nature, even if many philosophers have been interested in the topic of beauty since Plato. It may also be “because aesthetics is usually regarded as an even less rigorous and certainly less important subject than ethics” and because intellectuals like to talk about right or wrong and “ignore wow or ah thing, i.e. aesthetics” (Callicott, 1993c, p.148). “The most important unanswered question concerning natural beauty is to explain what is now to ground our interest in it or how such interest, if self-justifying, requires no ground or foundation” (Diffey, 1993, p.61). In the recent decades, however, environmental philosophers have started to work on the beauty of nature and the value of nature as a serious philosophical problem. Some have developed the ground of landscape aesthetics in the traditional frames of aesthetic discourses on the arts; others have developed it for the purpose of providing the best reasons for environmental sustainability or to provoke our accountability for the environment.
Such contemporary philosophical trends encourage environmental designers to be able to find justifications for their projects in terms of the good and the beautiful. As I elaborated in the beginning of this work, the notions of “landscape aesthetics” or of “landscape experience” are tautologies because landscape itself is essentially aesthetic as well as experiential. As Clark (1976) wrote in his book, ‘Landscape into Art’, almost every person would begin to describe a landscape or a natural phenomenon if asked to give an example of something beautiful. The beauty of nature has been a most agreed upon premise supporting an environmental ethic, both practically and theoretically. Simply put, almost every person, if they are asked why we should save the Grand Canyon, would answer “Because it is beautiful” (Rolston, 2008, p.325). As represented in many types of landscape paintings, our notion of landscape and our sense of beauty are seem to be connected in an inextricable relationship.

A landscape usually has found its aesthetic justification either in the beauty of nature or in the beauty of art as an appearance or an image of nature, and landscape design, intentionally or by default, always expresses our conception of nature and beauty. Hence, many serious epistemological and metaphysical arguments have started with the question whether landscape is seen as nature or as “art.” A number of philosophical questions about the aesthetic appreciation of nature have recently been raised with divergent focuses and have developed into more appropriate and persuasive frameworks to establish the conceptual legitimacy of landscape aesthetics. In my best understanding, Allen Carlson (1979a, 1979b, 1981, 1984a, 1993b, 1993c, 1995, 2002, 2006) and Arnold Berleant (1992, 1997, 2000, 2005) are two of the most influential figures who have framed the issues and pursued aesthetic inquiries of landscape
and the environment in terms of the polar opposites deeply rooted in the dichotomous positions in our mind: nature and culture, science and art, and cognition and emotion.

In Chapter 1 I introduced Carlson’s thinking on what he perceives as a deficiency in the philosophical foundation of the aesthetics of nature, and his identification of a need for conceptual work on the nature of our aesthetic appreciation of the environment. In response to this call I argued briefly in Chapter 2 for a position that would locate our understanding of the nature of landscape and of the nature of aesthetic experience in an interdisciplinary, hybrid, and holistic sphere between culture, nature, art, science, and the self in the world. In addition, I argued for a new experiential paradigm for landscape aesthetics through an analytical examination of three plausible approaches, one of which was Berleant’s phenomenological account of aesthetic experience. The common position held by both Carlson and Berleant is that the aesthetics of nature is an important subject matter in the debate surrounding contemporary environmental issues, and that it must be developed conceptually and theoretically from an experiential point of view, helping us to escape from much misguided thought on the aesthetics of art as well as on the subject of landscape evaluation.

Carlson’s arguments have started mainly from a criticism of empirical efforts to quantify scenic beauty (Carlson, 1977, 1984b), and Berleant’s arguments have criticized the idea of the framed landscape, i.e. the notion of the picturesque focusing heavily on sight. Despite these similar points of departure which both hold against a merely scenic, superficial, idiosyncratic, and anthropocentric view of the beauty of nature, it is notable that these two philosophers still have different origins of their reasoning and pursue divergent routes to their destinations. The
divergent sides of this common theme are distinguished into the cognitive model and the imaginative model (Eaton, 1998, p.149), or into conceptualists and non-conceptualists, i.e. experientialists (Moore, 1999, p.215-216), or into two opposing positions: the science-based and the non-science based approach (Brady, 2004, p156). Moreover, it is also interesting to note that recently emerging issues surrounding landscape aesthetics in planning and design show a tendency to support both sides of arguments for their own conceptual basis.

1.1 THE CONCEPTUAL-COGNITIVE MODEL

The cognitive (or conceptual, science-based) model by Carlson and his colleagues suggests that aesthetic experience consists of the scrutiny of an object and a response based upon it; in the case of the aesthetic appreciation of nature, the scrutiny is based on, and enriched by, a scientific understanding of nature and of ecosystems, provided by ecology, geology, or other natural sciences. The key to the appropriate appreciation of nature lies in appreciating it for what it in fact is, and to achieve a legitimacy of aesthetic judgments regarding natural objects, they argue, we need categories, types, and genres, similar to the way aesthetic judgment in art history and art criticism uses them.

The cognitive model has several ramifications. First, it helps planners who are attempting to evaluate the quality and value of landscapes based on objective criteria of

judgment. Second, it helps to support the assumption that pristine nature has only positive, intrinsic aesthetic value. Third, it thus helps to constitute a reliable tie between ecology and aesthetics under the legacy of Aldo Leopold, so that it naturally relates to concerns about environmental ethics. Finally, it helps to liberate our perception of nature from an artistic obsession to a scientific worldview.

There are varied perspectives on the link with Carlson’s thinking. Rolston (1995, 2002) stresses the role of cognitive understanding of nature through the harmony between culture and nature, and defends not only the importance of scientific knowledge in appreciation but also endorses the importance of engaged participation. He argues that the misguided interpretive framework of “landscape as scenery” has the effect of blinding us, so that we cannot see what is really there, and that science can greatly educate us to recognize what is actually taking place (1995, p.383). However, what Rolston talks about is the deeper and warmer science concerning human perceptual participation. He maintains that humans in every culture enjoy aesthetic features in their landscapes and rebuild their environment to suit their preferences, for “we cannot appropriately appreciate what we do not understand, and science understands how landscapes came to be and how they now function as communities of life” (p.377). Thus, science plays a crucial role in our engaged participation, in our actions upon and preferences for landscapes.

The justification for Carlson’s and his colleagues’ defense of the role of science or ecology lies in making a rational transition from beauty to duty, from culture to nature, and from subjective to objective appreciation. Saito (1998) argues in favor of appreciating nature on
its own terms—as a moral obligation to treat things for what they are. She suggests, however, that Carlson’s cognitive emphasis on scientific knowledge must be concentrated in scale and scope to include anthromorphic narratives of telling nature’s story, such as folklore, indigenous traditions, and myths. Landscape is like “a suit of clothes, empty without value apart from its wearer” (Rolston, 2002, p.131); in other words, it is meaningless without a human presence. Fashion changes and varies according to age, gender, or socio-cultural group, and so do people’s preferences for landscape features. When we as humans are valuing clothes aesthetically we are connecting them with experiential universals of the human body and with moral attitude towards human well-being. Likewise, if we are valuing landscape aesthetically, we are participating in a creative, moral dialectic with nature.

With regard to an analysis of aesthetic experience, Rolston (2002) raises a fundamental question: what is it an aesthetic experience of? He argues when we value landscape aesthetically we value the products of its creative and evolutionary ecosystemic nature, such as “form, structure, integrity, order, competence, muscular strength, endurance, dynamic movement, symmetry, diversity, unity, spontaneity, interdependence, lives defended, coded in genomes, regenerative power, speciation, and so on” (p.132). He proposes that there are two sorts of aesthetic qualities: 1) Aesthetic capacities: capacities for experience that are only in the beholder subjectively, and 2) Aesthetic properties: features which lie objectively in natural things. Aesthetic experience is being superposed on natural properties as our “aesthetic capacities track their aesthetic properties” (p.133). That is to say, the attributes of landscapes are objective, but the attribution of the value is subjective. Rolston’s position can be summarized like this: aesthetic
capacity exists in the human mind subjectively while aesthetic property exists in nature objectively; when we experience landscape, we experience aesthetic quality, which includes these two; however, when we value landscape, our appreciation and our judgment has to be objective; therefore we value properties, not capacities.

Affirming Carlson’s cognitive model of the aesthetic appreciation of nature, Eaton (1997b) also emphasizes the role of knowledge in terms of the goal of sustainable landscapes that are both beautiful and healthy. That is, when we learn something that directs our perception to an aesthetic property of a landscape, such knowledge redirects our attentions to more and deeper aspects, and in turn the enriched experience motivates a desire for more knowledge, and so on and so on. She claims knowledge not only sharpens aesthetic experience in both art and nature, but also contributes to sustainability, for beauty sustains our attention. Thus, the “aesthetic value of landscape is a matter of that which sustains attention” (p.89). When having an aesthetic experience, we must look and see at least some of these intrinsic properties of landscapes “identified in many cultural traditions as worthy of attentions” (p.92), for landscapes involve “non-perceivable properties that cannot be immediately seen, smelled, tasted, or felt” (p.93).

Then, what is an aesthetic property? Eaton notes it is *aesthetic relevance*. If any landscape feature draws attention (perception and reflection), it has properties that are aesthetically relevant. That is, both visible and invisible aesthetically relevant properties of landscape can be discovered, regenerated, and enriched in aesthetic experience with ecological knowledge. Like Carlson, regarding properties that are aesthetically relevant as well as ecologically intrinsic,
Eaton emphasizes the importance of category, scale, types, vernacular patterns, and many other kinds of site-specific information, and also that these ecologically intrinsic as well as aesthetic properties are culture-bound both temporally and spatially (p.98). Eaton’s claim for the dialectical reciprocity between aesthetic attention and ecological knowledge presents an idea that is essentially congruent with Rolston’s notion of aesthetic capacity and aesthetic property in that the cognitive function of perception and reflection opens and broadens aesthetic sensitivity to ecological knowledge of landscapes; our deepened knowledge in turn can re-charge aesthetic sensibilities and extend our aesthetic attention to non-perceptible properties which are aesthetically relevant and ecologically informative.

Ultimately, the cognitive-conceptual model for the aesthetic appreciation of nature can effectively couple aesthetics and ecology, and therefore concomitantly provide a powerful justification for environmental ethics: aesthetics engenders ethics. In Western philosophy since Kant—probably the most influential philosopher in this respect—many philosophical and practical discourses have separated the aesthetic attitude from ethical and cognitive functions, and have treated aesthetic values as less important than other values, such as economic and moral values. However, “there have been theories that present there is a causal connection between aesthetics and ethics” (Eaton, 1997a, p.356). Moreover, “logically, we do not destroy beauty; psychologically, we do not wish to destroy beauty” (Rolston, 2002, p.140). There are several views on the relationship between aesthetics and ethics. One is that our appreciation of nature moves from beauty to duty, because duty is what we feel we owe others in our community, whereas beauty arises at least in part from a feeling of gratitude to other beings in our
community. Further, it is said that aesthetics can be seen as “the mother of ethics” (Eaton, 1997a) in that aesthetic and ethical sensitivity are interdependent in making judgments. Chang and Tesar (2008) confirm the notion of aesthetics as the mother of ethics by arguing that the aesthetic attitude toward the environment can nurture, or be pregnant with, an ethical attitude to the environment in that emotional as well as spiritual mode of aesthetic experience can give birth to moral actions.

The cognitive model also contributes to connecting the value of making (aesthetics) with the value of doing (ethics). “We might think of aesthetics as being primarily about value claims—i.e., claims about which things have what kind and how much aesthetic value, whereas we might think of ethics as being primarily about how one ought to respond to the presence of value in the world—i.e., once we know which things are good and in what ways, ethics tells us how to behave toward them” (K. McShane, personal communication, February 17, 2009). The cognitive model provides not only a logical and psychological reason for Leopold’s vision, namely the beauty of the biotic community as a matter of biotic right, but also a practical reason for environmental designers in the pursuit of qualities and values of the good and the beautiful.

Aesthetic capacity that tracks aesthetic property is the same as “human emotion that tracks the motions of nature” (Rolston, 2002, p.133). This emotional capacity that subjectively seeks aesthetic properties helps us discover the objective and intrinsic value of nature—of plants, of animals, and of places—for what it is in itself as a habitat in the ecosystem, not for the instrumental value of nature. An aesthetic property is not a single object or event, but a motion-map of beings with form, symmetry, harmony, structural patterns, dynamic processes,
and ecological interdependence. Aesthetic experience construes aesthetic relevance toward an appreciation for an intrinsic value—ecological health—not simply instrumentally for the pleasure it brings us.

One of the most serious criticisms of environmental designers’, and particularly landscape architects, that has been leveled against their conventional approach to the value of making, is that they “have too often acted as beauticians, as if their task were to prettify by covering up, not really altering, underlying flaws” (Eaton, 1997b, p.95). While landscape architects’ disproportional emphasis on scenery has been often criticized to be too anthropocentric (centered on humans), the cognitive model of the appreciation for nature still offers aesthetic value to be anthropogenic (generated by humans) but at the same time propels our moral attitudes—the value of doing—toward a more ecocentric and biocentric direction. Furthermore, such an aesthetic attitude can no longer be solely characterized by the traditional notion of disinterest, as it arises from a sense of care that clearly implies some kind of interest (Eaton, 1997b). Thus, it advises landscape architects to take advantage of aesthetic values as they design ecologically sound landscapes by making aesthetic properties accessible and perceivable (p.101): making ecological functions perceivable.

1.2 THE NONCONCEPTUAL-IMAGINATIVE MODEL

By contrast, the imaginative (or non-conceptual, experiential, non-science based) model, for which Berleant and his colleagues seem to argue, criticizes Carlson’s approach as over-intellectualized, and suggests that our aesthetic experience is enriched by the engagement of
nature or art through imagination, emotion, mystery, bodily engagement, and the role of myths experienced in our lives. According to them, neither nature nor art has aesthetic qualities without human presence and experience; thus, the aesthetics of engagement is not limited to nature and art, but constitutes a model for the appreciation of any environment. Berleant’s emphasis on the immediate involvement with the environment means to aim at a total, multisensory engagement, as in the appreciation of the arts. Carroll (1993, 2002, 2004) argues that we appreciate aesthetically because we are moved or emotionally aroused by nature without dependence on scientific knowledge, but he contends that nature, more than any of the arts, elicits our direct and immediate emotional response.

The problem of the aesthetic identity of nature and of art has been raised with the paradox of a philosophically rigorous search for what it is, rather than with an experiential sketch of the ambient dimension. That is, philosophical efforts to define or to confine what the aesthetic experience of nature is are prone to rationalize and intellectualize it in non-aesthetic terms, because the aesthetic value of nature does not arise from any reliance on scientific knowledge, but rather in relation to the ambient dimension of aesthetic experience. We could not judge the aesthetic quality or impact of nature until perceiving it for ourselves (Foster, 2004, p.198), and an aesthetic experience is “a feeling of being surrounded by or infused with an enveloping, engaging tactility” (1998, p.132). That is, “beauty does not depend for its existence on our having to speak of or think of it; rather it is to be beheld, enjoyed, and cherished” (Diffey, 1993, p.46) as “powerful and enduring kinds of aesthetic experience resist direct or clear expression of discursive prose” (Foster, 1998, p.128).
If we agree that aesthetic experience is beyond description, then would it still be considered as a legitimate philosophical subject matter? Foster proposes that the narrative dimension of the value of nature is to describe “the perceptual properties of nature’s surface through a frame of reference that functions as narrative in character” (p.131). Godlovitch (2008) describes that ineffable emotional qualities of the aesthetic experience of nature, such as respect, regard, reverence, affection, and love, are at the root of our “heart for the earth,” and that such qualities are exactly what is lacking in the scientific regard for nature. The heart for the earth is “the unconditional regard (that) flows from an inner attachment to the earth” (p.143). This affection is a transcendent force, as blood ties broaden into cultural ties, and as cultural ties should broaden out further into global environmental ties.

The notion of the heart for the earth is neither cognitive nor emotional. In addition, it neither asserts that the beauty of nature resides only in the eye of the beholder, agreeing with a popular opinion of intellectuals, nor does it see beauty as nothing but a matter of taste or a matter of appearance; rather it recognizes a feeling of awe and a sense of mystery as an affective motive that can “extend to provide a ground for protecting the environment as an object of love, reverence, and respect.” He continues, “Love is blind, love is archetypally selfless, and universal” and thus, of “an object with appreciation or with love, we say it has intrinsic value”, just as works of art have been preserved because they are cherished and loved, and thus needed, not just “because they have intrinsically interesting extant characteristics” (p.144). Godlovitch’s expansion of the aesthetics of nature to the “heart for the earth” seems to move us to a more
purposive ethical meaning: our love for nature as a great mother earth\textsuperscript{29} transcends human interest and thus further promotes our well-being. Because “raising children, preserving nature, cherishing art, and practicing the virtues of civil life are all costs, the costs of being the people we are” (Carlson & Arnold, 2004, p.18).

Similarly, Brady (2002, 2004, 2008) and Hepburn (1996, 2004) contend that our aesthetic appreciation of nature involves many levels, but the role of the \textit{metaphysical imagination} is particularly significant because it finds deep and transcendent meaning in the experience of nature. Our imagination about the natural world tends to reveal universal metaphysical truths, such as insights about the meaning of life, the human relationship with other beings, and the place of humanity in cosmos, and so forth. Despite his criticism of a merely passive appreciation of art, stressing instead the role of the active imagination, Hepburn (2002) defends the conception of the disinterested and the contemplative, clearly distinguished from Berleant’s aesthetics of engagement, and argues that aesthetic experience involves disengagement and disinterestedness from the practical, acquisitive, utilitarian concerns of life (Hepburn, 2002, p.26) as a deeper metaphysical value.

The role of imagination is elaborated in more detail by Brady (2004). She argues that Carlson’s cognitive model is too sympathetic to the notion of disinterestedness, which lacks an

\textsuperscript{29} I am aware that some eco-feminists may not agree with the gender implications of the “mother earth” metaphor. My emphasis here is only on the love for nature, which gave birth to us in a symbolic sense.
emphasis on distinctive features of the aesthetic response: *perception and imagination*. That is, our aesthetic experience is not directed by what an artist has depicted or what natural scientists have explained, but rather is directed by the recognition and enjoyment of perceptual qualities *through imagination* (p.160). Brady distinguishes four specific modes of imaginative activities in relation to natural objects, which are *exploratory, projective, ampliative, and revelatory*. These four modes can explain not only how imagination guides the aesthetic appreciation of nature, but also bring perception and imagination together in place of the cognitive function of appreciation. As such, the non-conceptual or imaginative model is intended to reveal the different and integrative nature of human experience of nature and the environment.

### 1.3 REVERENCE FOR BEINGS IN NATURE

In the philosophical debate, Carlson’s conceptual and Berleant’s non-conceptual models hold opposite positions against each other, but at the same time it seems that both are similarly right in their understanding of the appreciative nature of human experience. Nevertheless, their focuses of arguments are significantly based on the dichotomous line of thoughts that have been traditionally separated, such as art-science, human-environment, emotion-cognition, feeling-reason, mind-body, the subjective-the objective, naturalistic-phenomenological, judgmental- experiential; experts’ decision-public perception, and so on. The cognitive-conceptual model assigns a dominant role to scientific, rational, cognitive, objective, and judgmental parts of human experience; whereas the non-conceptual model, which I want to call the experiential, has a primary focus on the opposite side. A comparative analysis between the
cognitive-conceptual model and the imaginative-experiential model is summarized in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: *Comparison of the philosophical debates on the aesthetic appreciation of nature*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lines of Thought</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Experiential</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Imaginative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual</td>
<td>Non-Conceptuel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Science based</td>
<td>Non-science based</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophers</th>
<th>“Carlson”</th>
<th>“Berleant”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rolston, Saito, Callicott, Eaton</td>
<td>Brady, Carroll, Foster, Godlovitch, Sagoff, Hepburn</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Naturalists and empiricists</th>
<th>Phenomenologists and humanists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>Quality of ecosystem</td>
<td>Quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus</td>
<td>Aesthetic judgment and cognition</td>
<td>Aesthetic experience and emotion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influential figure</th>
<th>Leopold’s “Land Ethic and Aesthetic” (1949)</th>
<th>Dewey’s “Art as Experience (1934)”</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Appreciation</th>
<th>Cognitive engagement</th>
<th>Bodily and Emotional engagement</th>
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<tr>
<th>Value concern</th>
<th>Normative (ethical)</th>
<th>Descriptive (aesthetic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landscape</td>
<td>Aesthetic appreciation of nature</td>
<td>Aesthetics of engagement in art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons from art</td>
<td>Conceptual, categorical property</td>
<td>Experiential, qualitative properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic properties</td>
<td>Objective, formal, and intrinsic but aesthetically relevant.</td>
<td>Ambient, narrative feeling of being surrounded by animated life, infused with an enveloping, engaging tactility.</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Aesthetic subject: human</td>
<td>Aesthetic subject: the perceiver</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aesthetic object: the environment</td>
<td>Aesthetic object: the perceived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape quality</td>
<td>Subjective capacity and objective property</td>
<td>Human perception and interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic transition</td>
<td>From art to nature</td>
<td>From shallow to deep experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Cold experience (mind)</td>
<td>Warm experience (body)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation with ethics</td>
<td>Causal, influential:</td>
<td>Transcendental:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aesthetic experience foster ethical attitude because it enriches our natural and cultural knowledge about ecosystem, and our obligation to nature.</td>
<td>Aesthetic experience transcends to moral appreciation of the environment like raising children, preserving nature, cherishing art.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conceptual model implicitly etches the role of naturalistic scientists, planners, environmental activists into a surface, by emphasizing that all of our knowledge of natural sciences, and some cultural knowledge about natural history, such as myths or folklores, can contribute to seeking and preserving the objective, intrinsic aesthetic values in nature and the
ecosystem. Thus, we could say that the aesthetic valuation of intrinsic properties of nature is to “give a right” to the ecosystem, i.e. the biotic community, and that decision based on aesthetic considerations can be a legitimate part of environmental democracy.

By contrast, the experiential-imaginative model seems to resist over-estimating the role of science; rather, it emphasizes emotion and perception in human experience, and recognizes the importance of imagination in aesthetic experience as part of our cognitive capacity. It regards human respect for nature as an innate desire and an intimate emotion of a self—human life in nature—developed without the assistance of any scientific knowledge, just as we naturally have a warm heart toward our children without knowledge of child psychology or pediatrics. Our emotional and bodily engagement with nature can deepen and enrich the aesthetic appreciation of nature, and transcend it toward a moral feeling, our love for nature. The former model juxtaposes aesthetics and ethics in the distinct causal relation, while the latter treats aesthetics as transcending into ethics.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that both philosophical positions on the aesthetic appreciation for nature attempt to make a logical connection between the value of nature and the value of art. The cognitive model suggests some of the concepts of art theory and art history as useful and compatible templates for a reasonably objective base for aesthetic judgment on nature, whereas the imaginative model attempts to examine the experiential universals in both nature and art. Thus, the cognitive model operates within a relatively normative view of aesthetics with its emphasis on conceptual, categorical, and formal properties in nature, whereas the imaginative model undertakes to better describe ambient, narrative, and
qualitative properties of aesthetic experience.

However, “the issue of nature is fundamental to landscape design theory” (Spirn, 1988a, p.ii), more so than the issue of art and beauty, because landscape is a boundlessly perceptual world, whereas art has boundaries. Landscape represents peoples’ minds and cultures, rather than a private ideal and desire of the minority of cognoscenti, as in the work of art. Thus, any form of landscape design ultimately and necessarily is asked “to do right” to nature and the environment, while art does not have any such moral obligation.

Despite their differences in philosophical rigor, these two positions tend to argue for the direction toward complementary overlaps that are conceptually as well as experientially humanistic. Clearly fuller account of aesthetic experience and value in the natural environment will emerge when natural and cultural knowledge are furnished by imagination, cognition, and emotion with both narrative and ambient dimensions (Foster, 1998, p.132): the boundary between both models is dissolved and moves them toward a symbolic relation for a fuller account of aesthetic experience. This should remind us of the validity and the need for a new experiential paradigm of landscape aesthetics, and three plausible experiential approaches, as discussed in Chapter 2: holistic (ecological account), transactional (phenomenological account), and evolutionary (psychological account). In a context similar to these three approaches the contemporary philosophical debates discussed above also seem to be on a search for the best reasons and answers for the human significance of aesthetic experience and moving toward the four-part structure of “being with-in place” proposed earlier.
1.4 FROM COGNITION TO IMAGINATION

The philosophical debates on the aesthetic appreciation of nature seem to leave us with a significant aesthetic implication we can recast: how it makes sense to think about the value of nature as inseparable from that of our experience in landscape. This also implies that the value of a thing in general is inseparable from two seemingly opposing aspects—the conceptual-cognitive and the non-conceptual imaginative—for both aspects merge in all human experience. Since experience arises from the interaction between humans and the environment, aesthetic qualities and properties of nature are always seen to be subjective as well as objective. In appreciating nature the objective value of aesthetic objects (nature) contains formal and physical characteristics that are aesthetically relevant; at the same time, humans as the aesthetic subjects play an active and imaginative role in that experience.

Dewey (1934) argues that aesthetic form emerges when raw materials are selectively arranged in reference to rendering an aesthetic experience—the experience unified in its movement to its intrinsic fulfillment—and that the controlling forces that can engender an aesthetic experience are surely objective conditions in the production of a work of art. He states, “for an object to be the content of aesthetic appreciation, it must satisfy those objective conditions… the general conditions of aesthetic form are objective in the sense of belonging to the world of physical materials and energies” (p.147), and these objective conditions can only be identified in the course of the lived aesthetic experience. “The reproduction of the order of natural changes and the perception of that order were at first close together, so close that no
distinction existed between art and science” (p.149). That is, the boundary between the natural order and the perception of that order ceases to exist in the reproduction of the aesthetic experience of nature.

The cognitive dimension of landscape experience will have more to do with our rational judgment on the value of landscape, whereas the imaginative dimension will extend its descriptive feelings to deeper layers of human realization, those that integrate emotional, rational, and spiritual states of the human mind and of our bodily participation in the environment. The cognitive aspect of landscape experience will foster our ethical attitude toward the value and the preservation of the environment and the ecosystem, for our natural and cultural knowledge will enrich the opportunities and the meaning and significance of these experiences. The imaginative aspect of landscape experience, on the other hand, encompasses the ethical feeling toward the environment, for the aesthetic appreciation of nature transcends the love of the self to the love of all lives in nature. The cognitive approach will integrate the realms of science and art, and the objective value of nature with the subjective value of human experience; the imaginative approach will synthesize the depth and intensity of human engagement.

The common ground of landscape experience from cognition to imagination thus can be communicated through three modes of aesthetic appreciation: Revelation, Relevance, and Reverence. Revelation means that aesthetic appreciation starts to discover what captures aesthetic attention and excitement within human cognitive and imaginative capacities. What attracts and fascinates us comes first, recognized by aesthetic attention that is constantly activated and
modified by further explorations. Aesthetic exploration challenges us to further discover the relevance of visible or invisible landscape properties, and the experience of aesthetic relevance is evolved and organized through our cognitive and imaginitive processes. “The roots of every experience are found in the interaction of a live creature with its environment, that experience becomes conscious, a matter of perception, only when meanings enter it that are derived from prior experiences.” \textit{Imagination}, says Dewey (1934), “is the only gateway through which these meanings can find their way into a present interaction” and “is the conscious adjustment of the new and the old” (p.272).

Aesthetically appreciating landscapes is a constant process of the revelation of aesthetically relevant properties, and imagination inspires a rational, emotional, and spiritual state, a reverence for life in nature. “Philosophy like art moves in the medium of imaginative mind.” Quoting Goethe’s notion of nature as having neither kernel nor shell, Dewey said, “Only in aesthetic experience is this statement completely true. Of art as experience, it is also true that nature has neither subjective nor objective being; is neither individual nor universal; neither sensuous nor rational” (p.297). The combination of cognitive and imaginitive aspects of aesthetic appreciation could represent a significant advancement in the moral state of the human mind, but at the same time still contain substantial philosophical challenges both to our understanding of art and nature and of moral and aesthetic experience, and thus to the notion of a sustainable practice for landscape.
CHAPTER 5  Aesthetics from “Above”: Reverence for Life in Nature

2. LANDSCAPE AESTHETICS AS SUSTAINABILITY: THE SEARCH FOR THE VALUE OF NATURE

Compared with philosophers’ complex treatment of the aesthetics of nature, landscape architects’ views on the aesthetics of nature tend to be somewhat simplistic at times: that is, nature is beautiful, and therefore landscapes inspired by pastoral images of nature can be claimed to be natural and therefore beautiful. While clearly an oversimplification, landscape architects’ over emphasis on scenery has been often rightly criticized of being anthropocentric in its origins and thus in an essential conflict with our concern for the ecological soundness of the environment. The aesthetic value of nature tends to be seen as having less justification than the ecological value of nature in terms of sustainability; yet still there is a belief that the value of landscape can be “ethically and aesthetically right” (Leopold, 1949, p.224) when the designed landscapes tend to “preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community” (p.225).

As our perception of the nature of nature changes, so does our conception of the nature of sustainable landscapes. However, sustainable landscapes have generally been defined as those that contribute positively to the existence of human beings and at the same time are in harmony with the natural environment. Landscape sustainability, as the link between aesthetics and ecology, is not a new issue for landscape architects and theorists, yet it seems to be a complex concept “which is philosophically cohesive yet operationally challenging” (Thayer, 1989, p.109). As argued previously, for landscape architects or planners the domain of aesthetics generally has not been a serious concern in their conception of “sustainable landscapes,” yet it is generally agreed that “aesthetics must come to be seen coextensive with the exosphere, rather than
narrowed to its traditional applications in art criticism, so that aesthetic values may no longer be isolated from ecological ones” (Howett, 1987, p.7).

In the context of our recent and current understanding of the meaning of an “ecological emphasis,” many empirical studies of landscape architecture have dealt with the functional relationship between formal, visual, and perceptible attributes of landscapes and ecological indicators of healthy landscapes, because an ecological approach to sustainability, rather than aesthetic approach to it, has appeared to have a stronger moral and scientific appeal to the public and to policy makers. However, today such conceptual, theoretical, and technical perspectives and methodologies of ecology are evolving with a greater reliance upon a more philosophical definition of ecological health and of sustainable landscapes, because there clearly has been a lack of, and there is a strong need for, theoretical as well as practical attempts to redefine our inherited notions and to advance our conception of aesthetics to become integral with our understanding of sustainable landscapes.

2.1 SUSTAINABILITY AS ECOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

A popular approach to assess landscape sustainability has been based on the relationship between visual preference and ecological integrity, but Steinitz (1990a) correctly reminds us of the inconvenient fact that sometimes there is little correlation between visually likable and ecologically healthy landscapes. While a congruence of visual preference and ecological integrity has been found to exist to some degree, incongruent combinations were identified as well: high visual preference with low ecological integrity; low visual preference with high ecological
integrity. Steinitz therefore emphasizes a need for more thorough and delicate assessment models, because visual preference variables and ecological integrity variables operate within different value systems: one is based on an extensive survey of photographs and literature, the other is based on landscape elements that contribute to a high diversity of wildlife habitats. Moreover, following Carlson’s cognitive model of aesthetic appreciation, one can assume that the respondents’ varying degrees of ecological knowledge would have influenced positive or negative aesthetic appreciation.

There is another study that identified landscape ecological integrity with ecological aesthetics. According to Thorne & Huang (1991), landscape ecological integrity must be based on the integration of three dimensions: quality of physical environment, biological diversity, and cultural diversity, and here ecological aesthetics is defined as a quality that integrates physical, biological, and cultural qualities and diversities. They recognize contextualism as an important quality of an ecological aesthetic of landscape, and try to develop land use methodologies and aesthetic principles serving bio-cultural diversity, i.e. ecological integrity. Several aesthetic principles are suggested, such as regenerating a mature native ecosystem, disturbing successional conditions, and supporting a dynamic and viable representation of biological and cultural diversity in an ecosystem. In general, however, their notion of ecological aesthetics seems to be leaning rather heavily toward an ecological rather than a cultural notion of integrity.

For professionals, the conflict and the discrepancy between ecological and aesthetic qualities tends to become an insoluble issue mostly because of a too narrowly defined epistemological framework, and consequently methodological units and strategies regarding
ecological integrity have not sufficiently addressed cultural diversities. The aesthetic quality of landscape generally is believed to be relevant to both the ecological and the cultural integrity of the environment, yet the current wave of sustainability clearly offers more integrative concepts for ecological integrity rather than cultural integrity. Not surprisingly, cultural integrity has become a growing issue in the management of sustainable landscapes, and even though an identification of cognitive categories for cultural resources has been attempted (Toupal, 2001) in terms of public perceptions led by a particular cultural or an ethnic group, much more work need to be done in this area.

Gobster (1999) proposes some explanations for the reason why the values of aesthetics and the values of ecological sustainability often tend to be in conflict with one another in landscape research. He argues that it is due to our limited range and depth of aesthetic opportunities, such as our narrow attention to a scenic aesthetic, or due our asking people about what they must perceive as static and formal compositions. In other words, the visual and scenic value of landscape is incompatible with its ecological value, because the one is static and visual and the other is dynamic and non-visual—the value of nature itself, and comparing two incomparable entities can end up with the assessment of rather superficial qualities of landscape. Gobster continues by arguing that what is necessary for an appropriate assessment is a conceptual marriage between ecological and aesthetic landscape qualities into a single integrated notion, *ecological aesthetics*.

Gobster's ecological aesthetics as a single value is similar to Eaton's (1997a) notion of *ecological fit* in the aesthetic experience of nature. He contests that “in ecological aesthetics,
pleasure is derived from knowing how the parts of the landscape relate to the whole” and suggests that “the study of people’s aesthetic response to landscape move from one that is purely descriptive toward one that is more prescriptive or normative in nature” (Gobster, 1999, p.58). His ethical focus in relation to aesthetic principles of planning apparently lies in the possibility of communicating sustainability values through design and he proposes some ideas for future directions in policy and planning programs, on-the-ground management, as well as research and theory development.

First, for policy and planning he argues that aesthetic value should be built into a sustainable landscape along with moving its visual management toward an ecological approach, particularly to include contextual considerations into aesthetic management. Second, for on-the-ground management he argues that there is a need in design to show a conspicuous experiential quality that reveals ecological beauty. Doing so, he goes on, will help the public to gain a deeper understanding and experience of ecological beauty. Lastly, for theory development, Gobster challenges researchers to investigate sustainable attributes in relation to aesthetic quality as well as to economic, recreational, symbolic values, as we know so little about the totality of landscape perception and experience and about the broader nature of aesthetic responses. Thus, he argues, it is an important task for researchers to integrate ecological aesthetics into landscape perception theory as well as to examine a variety of experiential approaches, including the multiplicity of environmental values and the repertoire of methods, both qualitative and quantitative.

Building a conceptual model of ecological aesthetics is an on-going issue for
environmental sustainability, and both the experiential as well as the contextual approaches are suggested to be desirable to date (Gobster, Nassauer, Daniel, & Fry, 2007). The underlying logic seems to be that ecological aesthetics constitutes a perceptible realm for human engagement with environmental phenomena at particular scale; that the interactions within this perceptual realm give rise to aesthetic experience, but also that contexts affect the aesthetic experience of landscapes, which can lead to changes affecting humans and the landscape-ecosystem; therefore, the aesthetic experience of landscape poses a positive challenge to our thinking about issues of environmental sustainability.

2.2 SUSTAINABILITY AS VISIBLE (PERCEPTIBLE) ECOLOGY

Landscape sustainability challenges the conventional ideas of both aesthetics and ecology. Ecological aesthetics is conceptualized in various terms from ecological diversity, to biological integrity, to cultural integrity, and presumes a contextual and perceptual experience of a part within a whole. Landscape professionals and environmental designers have begun to agree that landscape is nature seen through culture; likewise, that sustainability is ecology through a cultural lens.

If ecological aesthetics is an important value of environmental sustainability, how could we practice this value as an environmental product? Humans have inhabited and operated in landscape as an ecological system, but they also have operated in it as a communication system: it has both ecological as well as expressive functions. Thus, “rather than simply designing to enhance ecological quality, we must design to frame ecological function within a recognizable
system of form” (Nassauer, 1995, p.163). Rooted in part in invisible ecological functions, the ecological quality of landscape must be actively communicated and represented for human experience. The expressive, communicative form of ecological quality in North American landscapes can be typically characterized by “neatness and order” (Nassauer, 1995) or a strong “sense of caring” (Thorn & Huang, 1991).

Such a visual impression of caring may be the aesthetic perception of landscape embedded in people’s mind. “Care is an expression of human intention; care is shown by cultural expectations of neatness, stewardship, and naturalness” (Nassauer, 1995, p.165, 1997, p.68). In other words, natural appearance or naturalness is not an expression of too-much nature, but just a cultural expression of invisible ecological functions. In summary, sustainable landscapes are landscapes that are based on an expressive system of ecological functions “sustained by human care over the long term” (1997, p.69) and represented by cultural languages: therefore, the task given to landscape professionals must be to critically analyze these cultural languages and to use them to intentionally communicate ecological functions (1995, p.163).

About three decades ago, Thayer (1976) used the term visual ecology to challenge the development of a new aesthetic theory of landscape architecture, one that can bridge the gap between the ecological ideal and the real in perceivable landscape form. Modern landscape designers generally have been trained in formal composition and functional problem-solving, but their notion of aesthetics is still too often referring too narrowly to a pastoral image of a garden or a park; at the same time the notion of the sustainable landscape is still in an evolving
A process of unfolding its complexity and not yet convincingly incorporated in modern technology and culture. The gap between the aesthetics and the sustainability of landscapes is particularly conspicuous in the process of design: many designers seem to employ quite rigorous and objective methods of landscape analysis, but then end up with final design decisions making a “leap to form” that still relies heavily upon their subjective intuition. Therefore, along with the increasing ecological awareness, the development of a new “intuitive approach to developing a more environmentally appropriate landscape imagery” is a vital challenge for defining a new environmental aesthetics (p.40).

The term visual ecology, implying a (perhaps unintended) emphasis on vision, would sound better if replaced with communicative ecology or perceivable ecology, for Thayer calls for new aesthetic principles to make a rich spectrum of cultural and experiential aspects sustainable in terms of landscape ecology. He suggests five levels of landscape aesthetics as a framework of visual ecology from which to make environmental communication possible (p.43). They are: 1) The concrete or presentational level, 2) The associative or representational level, 3) The emotive or affective level, 4) The rational or symbolic level, and 5) The behavioral or activating level. To explain further: the first level of significance refers to direct perceptual dimensions of landscape experience such as color, line, form, scale, rhythm, balance, texture, etc; the second refers to aesthetic significance related to functional origins or uses of landscape objects or spaces; the third is the level that affects or arouses emotional response; the fourth is the significance of some abstract or symbolic expression of environmental value, and the last is the combinations of all previous levels, ultimately provoking us to behave or to act in a certain
Thayer’s five levels of landscape aesthetics have parallels with perceptual, rational (both functional and symbolic), emotional, and moral qualities and values, which are congruent with the ethical and aesthetic modes of landscape experience I suggested in Chapter 3. However, he regards the affective or emotive part of visual ecology, or its related aesthetic principles, as more important by stating: “Aesthetics is one possible component of affect,” and continues, “The psychological term affect may be more appropriate to describe a broader range of emotions or feelings attached to ideas, places, or objects.”

Thayer sees affect as an important dimension of human-well-being, which “might include feelings of community belonging, pride, health, safety, security, sense of self, oneness with nature, and emotional stability over time” (1989, p.103). At the same time, he holds that “the congruency of positive and affective dimensions is an essential attribute of a sustainable landscape.” Thus, sustainable landscape is redefined: it “implicitly affects us by not only functioning to preserve our resources and ecosystems, but by simultaneously symbolizing that aspect through visual, spatial, and sensory means to induce a positive affective response” (p.104). This is an important comment that distinguishes Thayer’s notion from Nassauer’s and others’ more formal approach to visual (perceivable) ecology.

From this a significant need for an important role of designers, and perhaps even engaged artists, seems to become clear. It is to assign visible, observable, and perceivable characteristics to sustainable landscapes so that the members of the public may come to know them more readily and are encouraged create them more frequently: making sustainable
landscapes more conspicuous and comprehensible. Furthermore, he adds, “future research and theoretical development will continue to address the issue of cultural sustainability in the context of biological and ecological stewardship” (p.108), because “humans are symbolic animals that can make the relationship of form, structure, process, and information content so that sustainable landscapes will acquire cultural meaning and provide depth of experience” (p.109).

Thayer calls for a recognition that “the aesthetics of landscape design is more vital, the profession of landscape architecture more useful, and the management of dwindling resources and fragile ecosystems more publicly important” (1998, p.118). As such, the term visible (perceivable) ecology as the landscape aesthetics of sustainability is presented to serve as a powerful tool of our aesthetic vocabulary to represent, reflect, and affect positive environmental change toward sustainability. In other words, landscape aesthetics is seen as a strategic means towards an environmental or ethical end: sustainability.

2.3 SUSTAINABILITY AS DEEP, TRANSCENDENTAL, AND TRANSPERSONAL ECOLOGY

The discussion surrounding the notion of a “landscape aesthetics of sustainability” is still on-going and has evolved with various terms from ecological aesthetics to visible or perceivable ecology. As discussed previously, ecological aesthetics may appear as a slippery term composed of two concepts that are abruptly married at different conceptual and empirical platforms and intended to serve an imperative environmental value. By the same token, the notion of visual ecology as sustainable aesthetics may sound naïve and too simplistic in terms of
the multidimensional qualities of human well-being as well as the complex nature of ecosystemic health. These views regard ecological qualities primarily as determinants for aesthetic quality: that is, making things good for sustainability is an ultimate aesthetic value, whereas making things good for the eyes is but an aesthetic means to that end.

The prevailing focus of landscape architects and environmental planners on the need for objective value criteria has been based on a scientific notion of ecology and its related technological means to support it. Practically, we do need objective criteria to measure correctly qualities and features of environmental sustainability, including the qualities of human culture and of well-being. But we need to ask: should the objective criteria for sustainability and ecological quality be the only science-based? Can pure science alone help landscape architects and planners identify normative values? When the very nature of the healthy ecosystem is in doubt, the traditional notion of ecology must come in doubt too. An ecosystem is the inclusive system of interconnected structures of life, yet ecology that emerged within the context of so-called pure science tends to deal with issues in isolation and individual analysis rather than through inclusion and connection. This deeper understanding of the ecological paradigm shares a similar context with other attempts to bring about a new aesthetic paradigm. Koh’s holistic approach to ecological aesthetics, previously discussed in Chapter 2, is an example.

Deep ecology is a term first coined by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in 1974 to describe an ecology guided by a philosophical sense of normative values. Deep ecology is not merely an institutionalized set of ideas as found in philosophy or ideology, but “a movement designed to encourage people to question more deeply the judgmental presuppositions in terms
of value priorities, philosophy, and religion” (Naess, 1993, p.411). Deep ecology proclaims that other living beings have intrinsic value for their own sake, independent of their practical utility to humans. Thus, the (deep-) ecological value is a normative system for a sense of self or self-realization that “embraces all life forms on the planet together with individual selves” (Naess, 1993, p.418) as indistinguishable from, and united with, the natural world, a notion that goes beyond the typical Western idea of the self independent from the environment (Thayer, 1994, p.183). Naess (1993) presents a deep-ecology perspective, as distinguished from that of a shallow ecology, as follows.

First, the well-being of human and nonhuman life on earth has value in itself (intrinsic value, inherent value), independent of its usefulness for human purposes, and independent of any awareness of or interest in it by any conscious being. The term life refers not only to a single living or non-living entity, but also to a river, a mountain, and to the ecosystem as a whole. Second, a deep sense of self is engendered through the realization of values of the richness and diversity of life forms. Third, thus, humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. Fourth, to increase richness and diversity of non-human life, a smaller human population is required. Fifth, policies must therefore be changed to affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. Sixth, appreciating life quality is the ideology we need: a higher standard of living lies in greatness rather than in bigness. Lastly, all of these points must be seen as an obligation to implement the necessary changes.

Deep ecology is conceived to present an ultimate norm that leads us to the realization of a more and more expansive sense of self, one which concerns the goodness, balance, truth,
and beauty of the natural world, and of a human being’s biological and psychological need to be fully integrated within it. This view of environmental ethics serves neither utilitarian nor even a purely rational end, but serves the development of personal values as aesthetic and philosophical convictions. This sense of the Self is based on a gestalt or systems thinking that leads us to ultimate norms: to altruism, ecocentrism, and biocentrism. Naess argues that maximum self-realization not only implies maximizing the manifestations of all life and of long range universal diversity, but also of an increased self-identity that involves an increased identification with others. “As a result, we increasingly see ourselves in other beings, and others see themselves in us. In this way, the Self is extended and deepened as a natural process of the realization of its potentialities in others” (1993, p.420).

Naess’ work manifests several practical areas of thinking and behaving in terms of an ultimate norm of self-realization: 1) Appreciation of diversity (both cultural and natural), 2) Appreciation of what Kant called ‘beautiful actions’—good actions based on inclination, in contrast with actions performed out of a sense of duty or obligation, and 3) Multifaceted high-level of self-realization, which is simple in means but rich in ends, and easily reached through a lifestyle, rather than the material standard of living of the average citizens of industrial states. Appreciating diversity based on inclination, not on obligation, implies an aesthetic appreciation of the environment as a volitional, emotional engagement in the world and with living and non-living beings.

Naess continues: “Self-realization is in part motivated by the belief that maturity in humans can be measured along a scale from selfishness to an increased realization of Self, that
is, by broadening and deepening the Self, rather than being measured by degrees of dutiful altruism. I see joyful sharing and caring as a natural process of growth in humans” (p.420). Thayer (1994, p.184) advises that deep ecology’s normative moral values serve its transcendent function, in that “a picturesque nature composed of water, trees, rocks, and soil could readily absorb spiritual meaning and easily refer to or stand for a set of higher spiritual and moral values.” A sense of self is also described in Fox’s (1995, p.198) term transpersonal ecology, in terms of its meaning to “extend beyond one’s egocic, biographical or personal sense of self,” and “discovering transpersonal identity,” borrowing the concept of Beyond Ego from the transpersonal dimension in psychology.

This confirms that a sense of Self in deep ecology, as a new ethic, is congruent with “being with-in place” in aesthetic experience, in that both seem to seek the same holistic-ecological, transcendent-existential, and evolutionary-developmental modes. The Self in Naess’ deep ecology has psychological parallels with Jung’s idea of the Self as well as Maslow’s theory of self-actualization as a general outline of the modes of aesthetic experience I will discuss in Chapter 7.

Thayer (1994) states that deep ecology may appear to be ecology with a conscience, which so much requires a strong act of faith by the participating public and an act of making the ecological nature of nature perceivable. Then, what does it mean to make deep ecology perceptible? I would argue that what would guide landscape architects’ design attitude in favor of deep ecology is an emphasis on the symbols and meanings of ecological nature, rather than focusing on images and visualization of it. This attitude may be characterized as the difference
between making things visible and making relationships meaningful, perceptible, and communicable. Because, as I discussed previously in terms of four-value structure of aesthetic experience in Chapter 3, what deep ecology and landscape aesthetics share in common are the moral and spiritual values in their experiential modes, often found in our mystical and symbolic experiences and representations of nature.

There is a call for an increased emphasis on the appreciation of aesthetic values in our approach to deep ecology as a new ecological ethic. Lynch (1996) re-conceptualizes Naess’ notion of deep ecology more radically by urging us to view it as an aesthetic movement, rather than an ethical movement toward the environment, to some extent questioning the appropriateness of humanistic ethics in this context. For his argument Lynch utilizes the Platonic Trilogy of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, and argues, “Without an aesthetic delight in discovering the nature of reality, the True becomes an uninteresting and lifeless body of propositions, useful, if at all, in a merely strategic or utilitarian sense, while morality, the Good uninformed by aesthetic imagination is an equally lifeless matter of upholding the determination of rigid Duty” (p.148). He proclaims, if ecology is meant to be based on a moral ethic, then deep ecology fails; if deep ecology is interpreted as an aesthetic movement, then it is both philosophically coherent and practically adequate.

The problem with the deep-ecological vantage-point is, he recognizes, that it takes us away from our particular circumstances and lives; it requires us to have a non-anthropocentric (bio-or eco-centric) attitude of respect for the integrity of natural objects; therefore it may be hard to take direct moral action on the natural objects of the environment, for moral experience
substantially involves a sense of empathetic or sympathetic identification with the object by putting ourselves in the shoes of another (p.153). Our moral action then cannot extend beyond the realm of sentient beings, “those which have a capacity for suffering and enjoyment” (Singer, 1990), and our empathetic respect for the objects of the environment will be underpinned mainly in terms of behavioral similarities or psychological states of need, desire, and interest similar to our own: in other words, they become anthropocentric. Thus, moral action is difficult to sustain through a deep ecological movement.

By contrast, he argues that aesthetic experience involves perception on a human scale, which is substantially non-anthropocentric as well as non-instrumental, and “effectively motivates human beings in a way that expresses an original respect for the integrity of natural objects” (p.151). A crucial point of distinction of aesthetic experience from moral experience is in the fact that there is no direct demand for action on the spectator in the former, and there is also no need for sympathy to identify instrumental and utilitarian values as a response to the implied demands of the object to respect its needs, desires, and interests. Hence, Lynch criticizes Fox’s (1995) ethical method—the transpersonal sense of ecological self—as empty in its practical application to real life, arguing “that there is no way to think like mountain, like bear or like everything else” (Lynch, 1996, p.150).

Lynch’s argument for deep ecology as an aesthetic movement, rather than as a moral movement, makes sense in the context of Naess’ (1993) notion that our realms of thinking and behaving toward the appreciation of nature are based on inclination, not on a sense of obligation. Whichever may be morally more effective, the important message from Lynch’s argument is
that there are many philosophical reasons to support the view that to address deep ecology as a new environmental ethic can also serve as a new aesthetic movement. However, Lynch’s notion of aesthetic experience with no sympathetic or affective attitude, with no will, and no interest, can be still controversial, because without having such an intention, need, will, or interest, we could have an affection to anything and everything else. “We do not judge comparatively those to whom we are fully dedicated in love, affection, and concern” (Godlovitch, 1998a, p.120), nor can we be fully dedicated equally to everything, of course. Moreover, in our spiritual and mystical experience we experience an affective sympathy or empathy, such as thinking like a mountain, like a cat, and like anything else, and in some cultures it is apparent that the spiritual and mystical respect and love for the “mountain spirits” or a particular animal can foster effectively a generative power for moral action toward the preservation of the environment.

The traditional notion of ecology or of nature has expanded its scope and has shifted its emphasis from a narrowly defined science dealing mainly with perceivable objects of nature to a holistic and integrative science that offers the promise of a strong paradigm for explaining and ordering human life, both within imperceptible systems of relationships and within the contexts of living beings and non-beings. Thus, deep ecology as a new paradigm also has become a threat to the dominance of a reductionist technological determinism, and a challenge to landscape architects who may have demonstrated their primarily formal and visible notions of the designed landscape with an insufficient moral or aesthetic basis for its existence.

The deep-ecological perspective generally seems to be regarded as practically intangible and therefore burdened with too much inertia to be espoused into today’s designed landscape,
partially because of the difficulties in employing a value system that seeks parity between humans and other species, partially because of the frozen view of the formal aesthetics of disinterestedness. In this sense, whether it is called visible, perceptible, transcendent, or transpersonal ecology, re-conceptualizing a new aesthetics, based on new approaches to ecology that are both morally effective and aesthetically sustainable, should be regarded as a fruitful pursuit in the interest of landscape sustainability.

2.4 “GLOBAL” ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

To be legitimate and effective, our notion of environmental sustainability needs to be able to accommodate both, the cultural environment as well as the natural environment. Godlovitch (1998b, p.18) proposes a “global environmental aesthetics” as a new and more appropriate theoretical alternative to a deep-ecological point of view, because 1) it adopts both naturalist (in the natural environment) and intuitionist (in cultural environments) approaches to aesthetic experience and to the object of that experience; 2) it supports “an integrative holistic outlook” in order to generate the aesthetics of everything, a model of the fully aesthetic life, and 3) thus it has thematic links to deep ecology. To restate his main point, landscape sustainability can be more readily accessed though a global environmental aesthetics than through deep ecology because it can generate an integrative model of aesthetic experience, of the object of experience, and of life, including the little things of one’s life.

Global environmental aesthetics maintains (p.18-19) that aesthetic experience is grounded upon our spontaneous native tendencies to be attracted and repelled by things and
events around us,” available to everyone by species birthright. It is “an elemental mode of awareness, a special way we make contact with experiential content,” and “a primary primitive perspective involving those qualities of sensation and affect that draw us to and repel us from the world of experience by way not of survival and benefit, but of fascination.” “Fascination is not directive, not a goal-oriented state.” It “stands proxy for a cluster of terms all of which accent a powerfully personal bond (analogous to affection) that develops in aesthetic experience between the subject and object of experience.”

Global environmental aesthetics does not consider aesthetic experience to be “detached, dispassionate, cool, aloof, impersonal, distanced, analytical, and clinical, in charge” (1998b, p.19), but it also considers “the nature of the proper objects of aesthetic experience,” not only as “a native spontaneous capacity for aesthetic experience to everyone capable of experience,” but also as “potentially a fitting source or object of aesthetic attention.” In other words, “the environment provides us with whatever activates and captures our native aesthetic response. But it is also our “experiential field that includes both internal and external objects of awareness—the real and the imaginary, the private and the public,” and thus it is paradoxically a subjective notion.

If “everything in and about everyday life and our lives themselves becomes a center of aesthetic attention” (p.20), then what matters indeed is the fact that these experiences “somehow captivate us, and that we respond aesthetically.” “The more things captivate us, the longer they hold us, the better. The aesthetic imperative enjoins us to experience fascination, where it is possible.” If we accept this view it raises an obvious question: if aesthetic experience is possible anywhere and at all times, what value lies in it? A global environmental aesthetics
would support that both universal aesthetic and moral sensitivities are built on our native inclination for affection and sympathy, and therefore the development of universal aesthetic sensitivity contributes to a life richest in experience as “a prime ingredient in any life most worth living.” To re-state it in a simpler way, the environment activates us to respond to whatever captivates our aesthetic attention, and this experience cultivates our universal aesthetic as well as moral sensitivities. Here may the second question arise: then, is there no difference in the value of landscape?

Godlovitch argues that a fuller aesthetic experience of the environment requires a non-judgmental (non-evaluative) appreciation, which means to “take and accept things as they are and for what they are” (1998a, p.120), just as we do not judge comparatively those to whom we are fully dedicated in love, affection, and concern. On the other hand, appreciation of cultural things calls forth preferences and therefore differences in evaluation (p.119), just as we cannot love all beings and all things at the same time and to the same degree. If aesthetic appreciation is a comprehensive form of positive judgment, it does allow for the possibility of differential judgment through comparisons, which we therefore need a synthesis of the objective and the subjective perspectives.

“The subjectivist view of environmental aesthetics appeals to the role the subject has in constituting and ‘constructing’ the very environment itself” (1998b, p.23); that is, “environment is the confined to whatever is outer for the subject as presented to experience” (p.22). When aesthetic experience takes places, some of the objects will lose their external characteristics as they are manifested within our experience. The subjective view concerns the objects of aesthetic
appreciation in the process of *absorptive assimilation* (taking-into the self) and of *objectification* (distancing it from the self). “The objective versions of environmental aesthetics, on the other hand, adopt a realist notion of the environment as comprising the separate, independently existing external world around us” (p.23), and yet does not involve the process of objectification to construct the objects of aesthetic experience. Besides, the identification of even available objects of aesthetic experience compatible with objectivism is too broad: it may comprise of all things that experientially accessible, cultural, and natural as presented by human knowledge. Therefore, none of the two is fully universal or offers a general analysis of the aesthetic experience. It may be possible if there is a *synthesis* beyond this traditional boundary.

As Godlovitch suggests, the aesthetic experience of the environment rather be approached “by affirming [and differentiating] the special goodness we attach to the uniqueness of the object” (1998a, p.120), because it “is best conceived descriptively as determining a field of study and not as prescribing a kind of general aesthetic response or personality” (1998b, p.24). For a synthesis of future studies, he proposes two promising alternatives. The first is a *unification approach* that conceives of environmental aesthetics as an umbrella that synthesizes notions of *art and of nature* appreciation and experience into a unified aesthetic theory. The second is *green or ecological aesthetics* that synthesizes notions of the *natural and cultural* environments and works to dissolve the boundaries between environmental *ethics and aesthetics*. The future study of global or universal environmental aesthetics therefore holds the promise to generate a unified theory of experience and appreciation of all aesthetic objects, including art and nature; to build upon the common core of aesthetic and ethical values in appreciation and
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action; and by doing so to connect theory with practice in design.

2.5 LANDSCAPE AESTHETICS AS A PARADIGM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

2.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AS A SYNTHETIC ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

Godlovitch’s thematic guideline for global environmental aesthetics affirms the position for which I have argued: that environmental aesthetics (landscape aesthetics) can, or ought to be, regarded as experientially, ecologically, and morally sustainable. Our current primary conception of environmental sustainability—seeing it from a naturalistic, ecological, and moral perspective—is shifted to an aesthetic movement, because environmental sustainability seen only through an ecologically colored lens has kept both ecology and aesthetics limited and isolated from actual human experience. By contrast, environmental sustainability approached as an aesthetic movement will broaden both “shallow” ecology and elitist aesthetics to tap into a deeper common level, and will make an effective bridge between aesthetics and ecology, culture and nature, art and science, and aesthetics and ethics; it therefore will contribute to making landscape sustainable as it enhances the value (i.e. diversity and richness) of the aesthetic experience of landscape.

I would argue that even a synthetic view of Godlovitch’s two alternatives can indeed be seen as a valid framework for a general theory of landscape (or environmental) experience toward a sense of beings with-in place or a sense of the self within other beings in nature, which ultimately tends to connect individual preferences with social and cultural values, as well as biological and psychological needs with aesthetic and moral values. The aesthetic and moral
value of landscape experience, and design dedicated to it, is apt to receive little attention from the general public, from environmental professionals, and from politicians, because environmental values generally have been better acknowledged and valued when directly connected to monetary or economic values and to scientific scoring systems aiming at a quantification of qualities. Together with establishing a unified theory of aesthetic experience, our future direction toward sustainability therefore will have to focus on a search for the common source and context of aesthetic and moral values, including economic, recreational, ecological, religious, cultural, and heritage values, etc., in other words on seeking connections to other generally acknowledged values that can be interpreted as relevant to and supportive of aesthetic values.

As manifested by the Rio Declaration, sustainability originally used to be used primarily as a legal, political, and environmental term, which mostly addressed healthy ecosystems and the social, economic, and cultural soundness of environmental development. Like aesthetic value, the value of sustainability is primarily seen as the embodiment of other relevant intangible values, but with no value in its own right. Connecting such intangible values with tangible features and qualities may help to make this value transferable. Sustainability entails many other complex issues, such as social, cultural, and ecological diversity and integrity, yet in the present the notion it is mainly regarded as a moral and as an economic value (“Green is Green”).

If sustainability is seen as an aesthetic movement, the value of the environment becomes more sustainable in light of its parallels with economic, social, psychological, cultural, and moral values. Environmental aesthetics therefore is a much more inclusive, universal, and
influential domain than any traditional area of aesthetics, and thus becomes not only philosophically and practically coherent, but also psychologically and logically plausible when liberated from the objects of the arts and expanded to the experiential scope of life: to non-beings and to the ecosystem. This is in essence why I am arguing for landscape aesthetics as a paradigm for sustainability.

2.5.2 APPRECIATING AESTHETIC VALUE VS. VALUING THE AESTHETIC APPRECIATION

Approaches to the aesthetic appreciation of nature and the aesthetic approach to sustainability ultimately concern the value of landscape. The conceptual-cognitive approach to the aesthetic appreciation conceives of nature as having intrinsic values, and we appreciate aesthetically if these values are recognized, identified, and classified by ecology and other natural sciences. On the other hand, the non-conceptual-imaginative approach to the value of landscape focuses on valuing the aesthetic appreciation of the relationship between humans and nature. The former is the appreciation of the (intrinsic) value of what it is; the latter is the appreciation of the (perceptual) value of what is experienced. Each seems to have its own ontological difference, yet from an experiential point of view, both are almost same, because we only know what it is by experience. Similarly we may say about music that we have an aesthetic experience of music by listening to it, and through that aesthetic experience music has its aesthetic value, and because of this the music also will be preserved to be able to move more people’s hearts as a precious cultural, moral, and aesthetic asset.

Humans will never fully discover the values of nature—if the values of nature are
claimed to be infinite or intrinsic, but its experiential values can be identified by human capacities, including our cognitive and imaginative capacities. If any landscape is claimed to have aesthetic or ecological values, then it should be accessible and experienced not only through our ecological knowledge, but emotion and imagination. By the same token, if any designed landscape offers a variety of experiential opportunities, stirring our symbolic or spiritual imagination and our emotional response to it, it would certainly harbor the possibility of aesthetic value. That is, a landscape has an aesthetic value through an act of valuing, i.e. appreciation. Then, the question about landscape evaluation is simpler to ask: what make us appreciate more one than another? Specifically, what features of landscape are more identifiable by our experience than others?

Like anything else, any decision on valuing a landscape over another needs its appropriate categorical system or condition for evaluation. Any pair of things can be aesthetically evaluated if categories or standards such as hierarchy, order, context, and relevance are properly provided for comparative analysis. If the judgmental categories and standards for aesthetic values are too general or less relevant, or has little to do with contextual information, then it would be insufficient for a full appreciation. For example, love is a universal aesthetic experience that helps the (perceptual) self to fully extend itself to the other beings and the world. Love can make us blind, but at the same time it makes our eye open to the diverse and intense qualities and values of the loved. A love of landscape and a reverence for nature is at the root of our aesthetic as well as our moral experience, which helps us identify deeper and richer qualities of landscape, and makes our common environment sustainable.
below”—our desire for life and life-like processes—and “aesthetics from above”—the reverence for life in nature.
We live in a world in which there is an immense amount of organization, but it is an
eternal organization, not one of the ordering of a growing experience, one that
involves the whole of the live creature, toward a fulfilling conclusion. Works of art
that are not remote from common life, that are widely enjoyed in a community, are
signs of a unified collective life. But they are also marvelous aids in the creation of
such a life. The remaking of the material of experience in the act of expression is
not an isolated event confined to the artists and to a person here and there who
happens to enjoy the work...it is also a remaking of the experience of the
community in the direction of greater order and unity. (John Dewey, 1934, p.81)

1. LANDSCAPE AESTHETICS AS QUALITIES AND IDENTITIES OF SELF AND OF PLACE

1.1 FROM IMAGEABILITY (NON-AESTHETIC) TO DURABILITY (AESTHETIC)

Landscapes are indeed cultural artifacts embodying human struggles with-in nature as
they accumulated throughout history. The fact that landscape is not only a matter of scenes we
see at present, but also of places in which we have lived in the past and will live in future, does
not always seem to be fully recognized even by people who work in the area of environmental
design. Place is cultural space with a specific character. In general what we consider to be the
character of a thing or a place takes either a visual or verbal form and is assigned to it through
human perception and conception. Likewise, the character of space is visual because it contains
objects with certain perceivable characteristics and the distances between them; it is spatial and
temporal because it carries and frames events and activities.

Conventionally the primary focus of our attempts to deal with the aesthetic perception
of landscape and of place has been on sight and a secondary one on verbal expression. The form, shape, and color of a scene have always been regarded as objective; by contrast, the meanings and interpretations of a place were largely seen as subjective. Therefore, as previously argued, formal and compositional aspects of landscapes have been the primary considerations in our conventional notions of aesthetic quality. This is, however, a reduction that is neither realistic nor objective, because the quality of landscape is never determined by a mere image—a mental representation of a scene or picture—but rather by a much more complex cultural manifestation of a place.

The visual image may indeed be a quality inseparable from any cultural representation of place and landscape. Lynch’s (1960 seminal book The Image of City initiates the discussion that image is not a static visual impression but a perceived quality through a two-way process: the observer and the observed (p.11). Applying visual and cognitive psychology to observations of existing cities, such as Boston, Jersey City, and Los Angeles, Lynch contends that a city is a perceptually complex structure that we experience in our everyday life, and that the image of the city is constructed through an essentially experiential and interactive quality called its imageability. A city’s imageability can be regarded as an aesthetic potential and an essential criterion that enhances good city form through four interrelated components: structure, identity, visibility, and legibility (see Figure 6.1).

It is worthwhile to note that Lynch’s systemic formulation of the qualitative components of urban form and their five empirical categories demonstrates how visual Gestalt psychology can be applied to the physical structure of the existing cities. The “empirical
categories” (p.109), such as paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks, are perceptual as well as physical elements that reside prominently in our memories of cities. The qualities of urban form derived from Gestalt principles are figure-ground, clarity, simplicity, continuity, dominance, clarity of joint, directional differentiation, visual scope, motion awareness, temporal sequences, as well as names and their associated meanings. In other words, the city is assumed to be a complex system and its imageability tends to be regarded as a special quality of place that facilitates our sense of visual orientation and ease of movement in the city.

Figure 6.1: Qualitative components and empirical criteria of Lynch’s imageability

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Here I would like to argue that imageability is a qualitative concern that may be a necessary yet not a sufficient condition for a true (or full) quality of place that is aesthetic, mainly because of its passivity. Imageability can be “a mere recognition or a perception arrested before it has a chance to develop freely” (Dewey, 1934, p.52) for a full perception—i.e. an aesthetic experience. Dewey differentiates recognition from perception in the notion of having an experience as the difference between passivity and receptivity, or between mere consciousness and a more comprehensive taking in:

In recognition, we fall back, as upon a stereotype, upon some previously formed scheme. Some detail or arrangement of details serves as cue for bare identification…Sometimes, in contact with a human being we are struck with traits, perhaps of only physical characteristics, of which we were not previously aware. We realize that we never knew the person before….We now begin to study and “take in”…Recognition is too easy to arouse vivid consciousness. There is not enough resistance between new and old to secure consciousness of the experience that is had. Even a dog that barks and wags his tail joyously on seeing his master return is more fully alive in his reception of his friend than is a human being who is content with mere recognition. (Dewey, 1934, p.52-53)

“Postcards tell us something about imageability” (Tuan, 1974, p.205), for they depict aspects of cities that are believed to do them credit, but are remote from life and from the experience of pedestrians, and are more about “the view from the road for legible, safe, educative, and pleasant experience to drive along” (Porteous, 1982b, p.79). Imageability of the city is thus a cognitive faculty of the observer out of the window, lacking people's quality of life in the street: it is not that fully alive in receptivity as in Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience. It is also largely based on abstract and conceptual knowledge within a social class, rather than
on the detailed and perceptual qualities across genders or social classes. As Tuan (1974, p.207) points out, the city perceived by the well-to-do is different from that known by the poor, varying according to their social status or ethnic territories and their use of motilities. In general, the poor and females seem to perceive their environment richly and intimately, aware of the identity of their own neighborhood, whereas the well-to-do males are isolated by their wealth, yet with a broader visual scope.

“Richness of place has invisible and marginal meanings,” notes Lynch himself (1960, p.139), and introduces a new holistic quality, durability, in his book Good City Form (1981, p.112). There he maintains that a good city form is no longer built for its imageability, but it is achieved by making a good place. “Good settlement that enhances the continuity of a culture and the survival of its people, increases a sense of connection in time and space, and permits or spurs individual growth: development, within continuity, via openness and connection” (p.16), said Lynch. Durability is a spatial and temporal quality for city performance, and may be a similar to today’s more general concept of Sustainability. Five qualitative characteristics are specified as meta-criteria for making a good place: 1) Vitality, 2) Sense, 3) Fit, 4) Access, and 5) Control, Efficiency, and Justice.

Although imageability has been more often used for the visual assessment of urban aesthetics, Lynch deliberately avoids the notion of an aesthetic dimension in the establishment of planning principles. However, I would argue that the term durability conveys a definite aesthetic quality due to these five qualities, perhaps more in line with Dewey’s notion and parallel to the practice of sustainability in urban planning. In other words, if the city is perceived
as a visual object, the quality for a good city—whether it is called imageability or sustainability—would not connote social, cultural, and ecological or biological meanings, and thus become of limited value. By contrast, if the city is projected as a living organism, then the quality of a good city, i.e. durability, would become aesthetically sustainable, because its qualitative constituents, such as vitality, sense, fit, access, and efficiency, are fundamentally aesthetic and contain biological, social, cultural, and ecological meanings and values of life.

First, according to Lynch, vitality refers to the health and biological well-functioning of the individual and the survival of living species. The vital city is energetic and full of life. The city is not necessarily activated merely by the flow of economic or social interests, but by the self-functioning force for healthy communities to maintain their biological and ecological system of life. Livable cities that literally exhibit a variety of life forms and living patterns for human beings, animals, and plants tend to be fascinating.

Second, sense depends on spatial form and quality as well as culture and experience, and clearly is a well-established aesthetic dimension. Being in a special place means sensing the characteristics of the place: the play of light, the feel and smell of wind, touch, sound, color, and form. A good place is accessible to all the senses, makes visible the currents of the air, and engages the perceptions of its inhabitants and reinforces them as a special event. The most interesting in Lynch’s discussion of sense is that a Sense of Place or Event is necessary for making a good place, and is a narrower meaning of a Sense of Identity. The identity of the self is often realized with the identity of places, because identifiable places are convenient pegs on which to hang the personal memories, feelings, and values of its inhabitants. A sense of place is
therefore an aesthetic experience of place and can be analyzed by simple tests of recognition, recall, and descriptions of people who live in the place.

Third, Lynch explains *fit* as a personal ability or a sense of competence to be adequate or sufficient in terms of “how well a spatial and temporal pattern matches the customary behavior of its inhabitants” (p.151). This means that good city form follows the daily routines and lifestyles of inhabitants, namely culture. In addition, the word *fit* generally implies the contextual and mutual relationship between things, such as inhabitants and habitats, to be a vital whole from bodily, psychological, social, cultural, and ecological perspectives. *Fit* is a reference to a healthy and necessary relation between all things for their own existence, like flesh and bones, figure and ground, and clothes and body. Things and people are fitting well to one another or into a larger system (i.e. habitat, society, and culture) depending on their nature, competence, or personality. Aesthetic feeling always occurs along these contexts and *fit* is a quality and condition necessary in aesthetic experience, making a place vital and sensible, and thus making a good place.

Fourth, *access*, in Lynch’s terms, is a qualitative matter and serves for a sense of well-being. Good city form should make people, activities, resources, places, and information accessible and available. While this dimension is discussed mainly from a social and political view of planning, it also can be seen as an aesthetic value. To have access to a place means to engage with qualities of place and to participate in activities it provides, and the aesthetic experience of place is inseparable from the continuing exploration and discovery of what that place used to be, what it has to offer now, and what it will be about: Connectivity and efficiency
are therefore rational as well as aesthetic issues that serve our sense of well-being in environmental planning.

I have argued previously for some essential perspectives of aesthetic experience in terms of our biological-evolutionary desire for well-being, a perceptual-transcendent sense of identity and place, and a holistic-ecological realization of belongingness or being-togetherness. Lynch’s four planning dimensions—vitality, sense, fit, and access—seem to be similarly based on divergent biological, ecological, social, and cultural aspects, yet converge into a full experience of a good place (see Figure 6.2).

**Figure 6.2: Relationship of qualitative components in Lynch’s two theories of good city form**

Vitality is a metaphor for the biological and emotional energy in a living organism. Sense is all about memory, feeling, and value. Fit is the relationship between the living things and beings and the city as living organism. Access enhances relations and connections to be broader.

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and stronger. Durability is indeed a metaphor for the power of persistence as a source to sustain a life as community. The quality of place is sustained by the durability of such aesthetic qualities, and the more general aesthetics of landscape can be truly understood through a discussion of the value of place. It is therefore my conclusion that Lynch’s later theory of good city form is a place theory dealing implicitly with aesthetic perception as an ecological Gestalt (sustainability), which transcends his earlier theory that deals with aesthetic perception essentially as a visual Gestalt (imageability).

1.2 SERIAL REVELATIONS OF HERE-AND-THERE RELATIONS

Another approach worth noting in terms of landscape aesthetics from an intimate cultural as well as communal point of view is Cullen’s place theory in his seminal book Townscape (1971). He argues that “city is not a static image but a dramatic event in the environment,” and that a city is experienced through serial vision providing a series of revelations in continuously emerging views, and that it is full of visual sequences of events.

Cullen’s entire book stresses three experiential aspects as gateways to the experience of a city’s liveliness: motion, position, and content. A place has its own contents like a well-woven fabric or drama. When moving through a town we are experiencing the urban landscape in serial vision, and the collective pattern of the series of scenes becomes its contents. The contents of place are constituted by the evidence of differing periods that display a mixture of architectural styles, materials, and scales, as well as patterns of various orderly scenes and accidents, and are rendered through an examination of color, texture, character, and
personalities (see Figure 6.3).

![Figure 6.3: Deviation and variation of "Serial Vision" in movement](image)

Cullen argues the content of place is not residing in the formal properties such as symmetry, balance, perfection, and conformity, but in “the interplay of this and that” (or here and there) (p.12). Having a sense of place means that we discover ourselves constantly aware of

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32 Edited by author from the illustrations of “The concise townscape,” by G. Cullen, 1972 (the original version was published in 1961), London: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
our “position” in the city: in other words, a sense of identity is a sympathetic feeling of the self in position. Cullen advises town planners who have tended to draw the lifeless lines of buildings on their desk on the basis of abstract statistics that “the main endeavor is for the environmental makers [designer] to reach their public, not democratically but emotionally” (p.16). Throughout a vast collection of many urban scenes Cullen suggests first five experiential constituents of a place: possession, position (here-ness), here-and-there, anticipation, and the floor (linking and joining) (see Table 6.1). The content of place, according to Cullen, includes so-called categorical landscapes based on characteristics, styles, and materials, which marks the physical, emotional, and behavioral qualities and features in place making. Place and its contents, according to his book, are indeed composed of nothing but traditional, ordinary landscape elements such as the floor, paving, railings, fences, steps, textures, lettering, trimming, roads, bridges, and squares.

Table 6.1: Cullen’s approach to qualitative identification of place (position) and of content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characters</th>
<th>Qualitative identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Possession</strong></td>
<td>Occupied territory, Furniture, Advantage, Enclaves, Viscosity, Enclosure, Focal point, Precincts, Indoor landscape/outdoor room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position</strong> (Here-ness)</td>
<td>Multiple enclosure, Block house, Insubstantial space, Defining space, Looking out of enclosure, Thereness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Table 6.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content Landscape</th>
<th>Here-and-There</th>
<th>Anticipation</th>
<th>Liking and joining: The floor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pinpointing, Truncation, Change of level, Netting, Silhouette, Grandiose vista, Division of Space, Screened vista, Handsome gesture, Closed vista, Deflection, Projection/recession, Incident, Punctuation, Narrows, Fluctuation, Undulation, Closure, Recession</td>
<td>Infinity, Mystery, The maw</td>
<td>Pedestrian ways, Continuity, Hazards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Juxtaposition</th>
<th>Nostalgia</th>
<th>Multiple use</th>
<th>Immediacy</th>
<th>Exposure</th>
<th>Foils</th>
<th>This-ness</th>
<th>Intimacy</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seeing in detail</td>
<td>Illusion</td>
<td>Scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret town</td>
<td>Metaphor The tell-tale</td>
<td>Scale on plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanity</td>
<td>Animism</td>
<td>Distortion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intricacy</td>
<td>Noticeable absence</td>
<td>Trees incorporated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propriety</td>
<td>Significant objects</td>
<td>Calligraphy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bluntness/Vigor</td>
<td>Building as sculpture</td>
<td>Publicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entanglement</td>
<td>Geometry</td>
<td>Taming with tact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Organized by author from “The concise townscape,” by G. Cullen, 1972 (the original version was published in 1961), London: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
Similarly to Lynch, Cullen talks little about aesthetics; yet his attempt to describe qualitative serial dimensions points in many ways to the aesthetic experience of ordinary landscapes and, in his case, townscapes. We may have some fragmented, static scenes and images in our mind and memories, but what we experience is not these fragmented images, but serial motions, positions, possessions, anticipations—the linking and joining of landscape elements—and these changing motions and positions of the self in the landscape then evoke what we call the sense of place. Lynch defines the meaning of sense of place as a narrower sense of identity, while Cullen defines it as essentially synonymous with a sense of identity. For Lynch the identity of a place is primarily concerned with identifiable characteristics through recognition, recall, and descriptions, and is therefore a priori-condition for aesthetic experience intertwined with personal memories, feelings, and values. Cullen’s identity of place, on other hand, arises not only from the identification of relations and qualitative characteristics of the city here and there, but also from a kind of self-sympathy with-in a particular situation.

Cullen’s categorical landscape includes such aspects as intricacy, intimacy, juxtaposition, scale, illusion, and exposure, etc. These kinds of contents of place may be referring more to a manner in which the place is experienced, rather than to substances—material and physical properties—of a cityscape or an ordinary landscape. The everyday landscape acquires a richer and newer meaning when experienced with these contents and when re-phrased by aesthetic hindsight, just as “a work of art is recreated every time it is aesthetically experienced” (Dewey, 1934, p.108).
Motions and dynamic changes of one’s position are the serial units of felt space, and the quality of place unfolds through the way we feel our body move (here-and-now) and simultaneously through the way we identify changing characteristics of the perceived space (here-and-there). As Dewey says, the present experience of here-and-now takes place as well in any aesthetic experience (p.123), “The scope of a work of art is measured by the number and variety of elements coming from past experiences that are organically absorbed into the perception had here and now.” Apparently Cullen suggests as an important aesthetic principle of place that landscape remains meaningless and outside the realms of the aesthetics unless and until it is experienced and felt through bodily movement.

1.3 THE IDENTITY OF SELF IN CONTEXT, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE

Relph comments in his book “Place and Placeless” (1976, p.20) that Lynch’s theoretical approach to a place is biased by his use of abstract, cognitive, and two-dimensional maps, and thinks Cullen’s approach is too visual, by stating, “In our everyday lives places are not experienced as independent, clearly defined entities that can be described simply in terms of their location or appearance” (p.29). Relph contends that a sense of being is to identify the self in context, is self-identity, and that context is different from serial visions. Contexts in which we are may refer to this and that, here and there, to position or situation, and the like, but knowing a particular place means to know about the context of that place, i.e. the landscape and culture in which it is embedded. Relph attempts to explain what it means to have a place through the following contexts: location, landscape, time, community, private life, rootedness or caring for,
home, and drudgery.

**1.3.1 EIGHT TYPES OF CONTEXTS OF PLACE**

First, place is not so much in a fixed location in the strict cartographic sense, as Susanne Langer (1953, p.95) states, “Literally, we say a camp is in a place, but culturally it is a place. A gypsy camp is a different place from an Indian camp.” The homeless can sense a place; a chair or bench can be a place. That is to say that place is not geographical or geometric, but cultural and existential.

Second, place is “substantial and capable of being described” because it “has a physical, visual form—a landscape” (Relph, 1976, p.30). It is also “the visible expression of a feeling sometimes called an atmosphere,” Susanne Langer describes similarly (1953, p.99). Relph (1976, p.30) continues, “The spirit of a place lies in its landscape,” which is “one of the most obvious attributes of place.” Place thus becomes a synonym of landscape, for it has its features and appearances to be described, and it offers its spirit and feeling. Place as landscape is therefore existential as well as perceptual, namely experiential.

Third, time provides a significant context for place. Time is not only measured mechanically, but it is also perceived through continuous changes. Time modifies, as well as persists in, characters of places and our sense of attachment is growing with both the persistence and the change of characters of places. “Any form of repetitive ritual and tradition re-establishes places and expresses its stability and continuity” (p.32); it “strengthens attachment to place by re-affirming not only the sanctity and unchanging significance of it, but also the
enduring relation between people and their places” (p.33). Ritual, custom, tradition, and myth in general, last longer than the physical places they are attached to. Place is indeed culture recognized through our sense of time, our sense of attachment to place, and a sense of continuity in place. Our sense of place is strongly culture-bound, as is the aesthetics of place.

Fourth, place is community-bound in all cultures, for one reinforces the identity of the other. Likewise, as discussed previously, “landscape is very much an expression of communally held beliefs and values and of interpersonal involvements” (p.34). In experience, “a place is its people and people are their place. In this context places are public—they are created and known through common experiences and involvement in common symbols and meanings” (p.34).

Fifth, place is at the same time experienced individually. In essence all experiences of our physical environment are individual as well as public to varying degrees. In a public place there may be some secret and sacred places existing in our memory of childhood, whether they still exist as they were or not. That is to say, landscape is a public and individual place for shared experiences.

Sixth, our attachment to places can be identified with our need for roots. Relph argues (p.38) that our need for roots is a kind of preconditioned need of the soul, which is a spiritual and psychological attachment to somewhere in particular. Particularly, he writes, a personal sense of place is close to the attachment to that place, and this sense is not only familiarity but a deep sense of care for places. The psychological and spiritual attachment to places is, in other words, a sense of belonging to that community and an affective feeling toward life in community. Places emotionally attached to us become a field of care. Caring for a place takes “a
responsibility and respect for that place both for itself and for what it is to the selves (ourselves) and to others” (p.38). The need for roots ultimately engenders a respect for life in community.

Seventh, perhaps the most authentic sense of place, is home, the heart of all places. It is here where I know and I am known. Home is the most profound and fundamental sense of place, distinguished from a mere physical term house. It is the place of existential feeling toward being where we came from and return to. Thinking of home brings about nostalgia or homesickness, which “accompanies a feeling of oppressiveness as well as of imprisonment” (p.42). Therefore, eighth, people also have a need to escape from the drudgery of their routine life and concomitantly long to return to home after an absence. Leaving-and-longing for home is indeed an existential necessity and an essential meaning of place, common in all life in all cultures.

Ultimately, I would say that Relph’s place theory can be seen as framework for our understanding of the aesthetics of landscape. The eight contexts for a place are akin to the conditioning factors for aesthetic experience—biological, psychological, social, and cultural—and Relph literally defines a place as a landscape and a landscape as a place. His notion of home provides not only for functional and physical comfort, but also is a biological and psychological symbol of our mysterious longing for roots and for freedom, and community develops through a shared and collective experience of home. When communal life becomes a repetitive ritual and tradition through time, places express their cultural stability and continuity. The contexts influencing the quality of place are therefore largely synonymous with those relevant to the aesthetics of landscape.
1.3.2 THE TRIPARATITE COMPONENTS OF PLACE AND OF A WORK OF ART

The underlying assumption of the notion of place, common among urban theorists such as Lynch, Cullen, and Relph, is that a good place has essential characters and distinctive qualities that are communicable as adequate concepts and approaches to place-making. Particularly, Relph notes, “Identity of place is important and is as much a function of inter-subjective intentions and experiences as of the appearances of buildings and scenery, and it refers not only to distinctiveness of individual places but also to the sameness between different places” (p.44).

Dewey (1934, p.109) says that any “work of art is universal” not because it has a fixed and repetitive identity, but “because it can continuously inspire new personal realizations in experience.” One person may feel a primitive sense of comfort when looking at a cat sleeping on a couch; another may feel the same from seeing a baby calmly nestled in its mother’s arms. This personalized sense, in this case of comfort, is “universal” due to our experience of it, not due to any shared physical appearances and that is why any experience, whether it is of place or of a work of art, can be unique as well as universal. The difference between the cat and the baby may be a difference in substance from each other; the sense of comfort is the subject common in both. The following Dewey’s (1934) passages seem to affirm Relph’s notion of “sameness in different places”:

If one will take a multitude of art products of all kinds and sorts and keep them in mind long enough to assign a subject to each, one will see that the substance of works of art dealing with the same “subject” is infinitely varied. How many poems are there in all languages having flowers, or even the rose, for their subject?...They are inevitable as the common things of the world are
experienced in different cultures and different personalities. (p.110)

The common subject in works of art, or places is thus their meanings, feelings, and symbols. Relph articulates three interrelated components that primarily comprise the identity of place: 1) Physical features and appearances, 2) Observable activities and functions, and 3) Meanings or symbols. These tripartite components for the identity of place are largely congruent with Dewey’s (1934) account for a work of art as the integrated relationship between substance, form, and subject:

The enduring art-product may have been called forth by something having its own date and place, but what was evoked is a substance so formed that it can enter into the experiences of others and enable them to have more intense and more fully rounded out experiences of their own. This is what it is to have form...Hence there can be no distinction drawn, save in reflection, between form and substance. The work itself is [subject] matter formed into aesthetic substance. (p.109)...The subject is outside the poem; the substance is within it; rather it is the poem...Its subject-matter is all the experiences a reader brings with him of cruelty and pity in connection with a living creature. The artist himself can hardly begin with a subject alone. If he did, his world would almost surely suffer from artificiality. (p.111)

From this we can conclude that the identity of place is structurally akin to the aesthetic components of a work of art. The identity of place and the aesthetic components of a work of art are rather a subject-matter of experience, and neither is a work of art a mere object, nor is a place mere a name of location. Physical features alone cannot constitute a landscape any more than a mere collection of words could constitute a poem.
1.3.3 TAKING ONE’S PLACE IN EXISTENCE: A DIALECTIC OF INSIDE AND OUTSIDE

Compared to Cullen’s notion of here-and-there, identifying place with a moving body, Relph (1976, p.49) rather emphasizes “being inside” in experience. We need to be inside so as to identify with a place or to belong to it. The longer and the deeper we are inside, the stronger the identification with the place. “Inside-outside” bears a meaning when described as a movement, or as an activity, in the context, in, around, and out of the physical environment. The inside-outside dualism of place thus is not simply a conceptual division as a geometric term, but carries a philosophical significance, as Relph seems to suggest. Bachelard (1969), in the following passages from his The Poetics of Space, writes about the dialectics of inside and outside as a metaphor for metaphysical meanings of everything or nothing, of being and non-being, of within and without, of open and closed in the activities, contexts, and other situations:

Outside and inside form a dialect of division, the obvious geometry of which blinds us as soon as we bring it into play in metaphorical domains. It has the sharpness of the dialects of yes and no, which decides everything. Unless one is careful, it is made into a basis of images that govern all thoughts of positive and negative. Logicians draw circles that overlap or extrude each other (p.211)…Philosophers, when confronted with outside and inside, think in terms of being and non-being. Thus, profound metaphysics is rooted in an implicit geometry, which confers spatiality upon thought…They are metaphors that he [philosopher] attaches to everything, even to his systems. (p.212)

What is more important is that the metaphorical domain of inside-and-outside connotes the existential as well as spatial significance of human nature as a half-open being to the world. The identities and characters of place or object become an expression of the inter-subjective
nature of human experience in this respect. For example, doors are not only a functional and physical element of architecture, but express a rich symbolism of entering into the depth of being in place and extending the surface of being toward the world. From the following, it can be drawn that any physical objects and places in the environment are a particular carrier of human characters and identities; therefore it may be meaningful to us and that is why they are indeed the metaphors of all relations in human experiences. Bachelard (1969) continues:

Doors! For the door is an entire cosmos of the Half-open... The door schematizes two strong possibilities, which sharply classify two types of daydream. At times, it is closed, bolted, padlocked. At others, it is open, that is to say, wide open...[We can define] the being of man, for instance, as the being of an ambiguity... Then, on the surface of being, in that region where being wants to be both visible and hidden, the movements of opening and closing are so numerous, so frequently inverted, and so charged with hesitation, that we could conclude on the following formula: man is half-open being. (p.222)33

This suggests that identities of place can be transferred to the identity of being, but the identity of something is not yet a value statement. Relph introduces the term authentic place, and asserts that the authentic sense of place is due to two types of relations: I-Thou and I-You relation.

What I want to suggest here is that the authenticity of place be seen as the very aesthetic statement of place, whereas the identity of place be seen as value-neutral. According to Relph, the I-Thou relation is “above all that of being inside and belonging to your place both as an

33 Italic marks in block quotation are mine.
individual and as a member of a community, and to know this without reflecting upon it” (p.65). This knowing without reflection is the sense of place that occurs at the moment the self is unselfconsciously identified with the place, which tends to appeal immediately and seems to fit primarily to us. Unselfconscious authenticity arises from tradition, custom, habit, and being lived-in. Many a traditionally grown city has been built unselfconsciously, with unknown architects or without architects, but with authenticity.

On the other hand, the I-You relation brings about a self-conscious sense of place for “outsiders who seek to experience places as openly as possible and attend knowledgeably” (p.66) through an act of judgment. Self-conscious authenticity is, for instance, characteristic of master architects’ or other authority powers’ distinctive and intentional attempts to build places for specific symbolic purposes, such as a Gothic cathedral or other historically significance architecture and landscapes. The former is a complete unselfconscious sense of the self in place; the latter is a conscious reflection of the self in relation to place.

As such, the authenticity of place has a genuine quality that involves feeling unselfconsciously and intimately inside it, i.e. being in an I-Thou relationship, and the self-conscious meanings, qualities, and values being identified outside from it, i.e. from an I-You relationship. In other words, the former sense of the I-Thou relation in place may be a resident’s perception of place; the latter I-You relation may be a visitor's sense of place. It is significant and interesting that Relph defines the authenticity of place as having a quality constituted by these indiscreete values. Dewey (1934) reminds us that an authentic quality is the intrinsic nature of aesthetic experience:
Even a crude experience, if authentically an experience, is more fit to give a clue to the intrinsic nature of aesthetic experience than is an object already set apart from any other mode of experience. Following this clue, we can discover how the work of art develops and accentuates what is characteristically valuable in things of everyday enjoyment. (p.11)

When the experience of place achieves its single whole quality, it makes the individual realize the conscious and unconscious self with-in the world. Such a two-fold integration of the self with the world also implies that the authenticity of place is the inter-subjective embodiment of cultural and personal contents and, phenomenologically, that it creates a genuine sense of being and that an authentic quality of place is an aesthetic quality (see Figure 6.4).

![Figure 6.4: Relph's idea of the authenticity of place](image-url)

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1.3.4 SEVEN TYPES OF IDENTITIES OF PLACE

Relph categorizes the identities of place into seven types as I summarize in Table 6.2. Particularly, the existential, the empathetic, and the behavioral types are most relevant and significant to observe because the types of identities of place implicitly indicate the essence of human perception and suggest reasonable approaches to the understanding of aesthetic qualities of place.

Table 6.2: Relph’s typology of identities of places

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Characteristics of Identities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Existential Insideness</td>
<td>Places are lived and full with meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unselfconscious (I-Thou)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Existential Outsideness</td>
<td>Places represent a lost and no unattainable involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfconscious (I-You)</td>
<td>Self-conscious alienation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Empathetic</td>
<td>Places are records and expressions of the cultural values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Behavioral</td>
<td>Places are ambient environment, possessing quality of landscapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Incidental</td>
<td>Places are the selected functions of a place that are important.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Objective</td>
<td>Places are reduced to the single dimension of location or to a space of located objects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Superficial</td>
<td>Places are remote from direct experience, ready-made by mass media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It undermines individual experience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The underlying reasons are first, the existential approach to the self in place, as previously discussed, indicates the authentic quality of place, grounded in such contexts of place as time, community, private life, rootedness or caring for, and a sense of home, etc. The existential approach to human perception deals with immediate, primary, and intimate sense of the self as reflected in meanings and symbols of human experience.

Second, the empathetic approach, points to the inter-subjective understanding of individual experience as an extension as well as the expression of collective life patterns and culture. Empathy is an emotional term in general, yet in Relph’s case it is used as an integral qualitative force that connects parts to the whole and individuals to society in community and culture. Third, the behavioral approach to human perception does not suggest a conventional environment-behavior approach, but might be better characterized as an I-They relation; it refers to a holistic and ecological approach to the environment or landscape as a dialect of inside and outside, of humans and the environment, of I-Thou and I-You.

I previously discussed three plausible approaches to a new aesthetic paradigm for landscape experience, such as a transactional, evolutionary, and holistic approach to aesthetics. Quality of place equally implies reciprocally the quality of being in place, and authenticity is another word for aesthetics in place, in experience, and in being. Design is by definition a self-conscious act, yet, a place created self-consciously can be experienced unselfconsciously when collective values of life in community are manifested in a self-conscious act of making. Landscape as a good place is therefore a unique as well as a universal experience in that new qualitative meanings can be created and discovered by those who live in the existing social,
cultural, and environmental contexts, and good designers of places are those who make them pregnant with new meanings out of the existing contexts.

2. LANDSCAPE AESTHETICS AS THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN COMMUNITY

2.1 QUALITY OF LIFE: PATTERNS OF LIFE TOGETHER

The categories, characters, identities, and types of landscape or place discussed previously are intended to provide a practical tool for communication among designers and others and they establish a kind of language in which to understand each other and to communicate with one another about qualities of place or landscape. They may be useful as norms and criteria based on which the quality of place can judged and design decisions can be made. These terms also suggest that landscape and place are not just things that only designers can understand and express, like the work of an artist; rather they must become “a work of art” built in a timeless way.

Christopher Alexander (1979, p.7) defines the timeless way of building as a powerful and fundamental way of making any building in the world as beautiful as any place. This making a building and a place beautiful is “a process through which the order of a town grows out from the inner nature of people, the animals, the plants, and matter which are in it,” and “a process which allows the life inside a person, a family, and a town to flourish so that it gives birth to the natural order which is needed to sustain this life.” That is to say, ordering the inner nature of people, animals, and plants in a place can bring life into place and thus sustain its natural order.

The timeless way of building is very important not only in its methodology to suggest
pattern languages for place making, but also regarding landscape aesthetics as paradigm for environmental sustainability, which I discussed in the previous chapters. The inner nature of people, animals, and plants is embedded in all parts and members of the same class of physical structures, and Alexander calls this “pattern.” In order to bring life into the system as a pattern in which to sustain its own life and its natural order, there is a need for a deeper generative process, and Alexander calls this “language.” He continues, “In terms of these pattern languages, all the different ways of building, although different in detail, become similar in general outline” (1979, p.12). The term pattern language thus has a profound implication: it is a common language for a whole with different parts, i.e. patterns. Pattern language is a timeless process, method, and system of learning and therefore it is a way of making a place beautiful: “The power to make buildings beautiful is so firmly rooted and coherent in every one of us” (p.14).

### 2.1.1 QUALITY OF LIFE IN PLACE: THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE OF BEING ALIVE

Alexander emphasizes that we must first know the “quality without name,” a quality that is most fundamental, objective, and precise. It is “a central quality which is the root criterion of life and spirit in a man, a town, a building, or a wilderness” (p.19). This central, fundamental, objective, precise, yet nameless quality seems indeed to be synonymous with the aesthetic quality of place for which I have argued, and akin to the intrinsic value of nature for which environmental philosophers have argued. Thus, only by circling around it through other words can this aesthetic quality of all living system—the quality that cannot be named—be
described:

A system has this quality when it is at one with itself….You already know this quality. This feeling for it is the most primitive feeling which an animal or a man can have. The feeling for it is as primitive as the feeling for our own well-being, for our own health, as primitive as the intuition which tells us when something is false or true (p.26)… It is not only simple beauty of form and color… It is not only fitness to purpose… It is not only the spiritual quality of beautiful music or of a quiet mosque that comes from faith… The quality which has no name includes these simpler sweeter qualities. But it is so ordinary as well, that it somehow reminds us of the passing of our life. It is a slightly bitter quality. (Alexander, 1979, p.39-40)

This quality in feeling and in character is the most precious thing we can ever have in our lives: a sense of being alive. Alexander describes being alive as the feeling we know from experience. It is wild freedom and passion, which comes into our lives in the instant we let go; it is the special moment when we smile unexpectedly and when all our troubles seem resolved. Places therefore “have this quality or invite this quality to come to life in us. When we have this quality in us, we tend to make it come to life in towns and buildings which we can help to build… It is a quality of life” (p.53-54). The quality with no name, an objective and primitive feeling, is a quality of life, a precious feeling, and a sense of being alive, attainable within places.

Similarly, Dewey (1934, 1958) writes about this primitive feeling of being in terms of quality as well as experience in living organism interacting with the environment:

The nature of experience is determined by the essential conditions of life… not externally but in the most intimate way (1934, p.13). In a world like ours, every living creature that attains sensibility welcomes order with a response of harmonious feeling whenever it finds a congruous order about it. Each part of an organism is itself organized, and so of the parts of the part. This pervasive
operative presence of the whole in the part and of the part in the whole constitutes susceptibility—the capacity of feeling (1958, p.256). For only when an organism shares in the ordered relations of its environment does it secure the stability essential to living. And when the participation comes after a phase of disruption and conflict, it bears within itself the germs of a consummation akin to the aesthetic (1934, p.15). [Therefore] the experience of a living creature is capable of aesthetic quality. (p.17)

Dewey (1934) uses the term “inner harmony” as quality, attained “on an objective basis” in many ways in the environment. That is to say, the inner harmony encompasses such different feelings as pleasure, happiness, or delight, all of which have an objective basis because of their interaction with the environment. Dewey states, “Pleasures may come about through chance contact and stimulation,” whereas happiness and delight “come to be through a fulfillment that reaches to the depths of our being—one that is an adjustment of our whole being with the conditions of existence” (p.17). This shows that to both Alexander and Dewey the notion of quality of life is identified with a deep sense of being alive, achieved only through the interaction with the surroundings in a town or community or the environment. This quality with no name may reside in the depth of our being but can be felt in delight and happiness. If we agree with Dewey and Alexander, and accept aesthetic experience as an existential and ecological sense of well-being in community, then the aesthetic quality of place would provide a moral justification to environmental sustainability.
2.1.2 QUALITY OF PLACE AS PATTERNS OF EVENTS AND OF SPACES

We need to be cognizant of this essential quality of place and of life in order to be able to create it. Like other theorists mentioned previously, Alexander maintains that every place is given its character by certain patterns of events and of space that are alive. The life of every creature—persons, animals, and plants—is full of events made of similar episodes. The character of a place is thus given to it by the episodes that keep happening there and that are different in one place from another. What matters is that the life of a town is not its outward shape or its physical geometry, but the quality of the events and situations we encounter there (Alexander, 1979, p.65), namely patterns.

What is happening in a place as the quality of the events and situations are repetitive patterns, closely related to our sense of well-being. Let us imagine having a good life. It is an aesthetic life, full of events comprised of memorable and meaningful relationships with people, animals, nature, and many things, and the life stories passing through such emotions as delight, sadness, joy, anger, and love. We cannot imagine a life without places, nor can imagine a place without thinking of certain events or activities, nor can think of an event without reference to spatial characteristics. I as a person am not given my character by my height or color, but by my many relations and situations with people, different from one culture to the other. Similarly, a building is not given its character by the mere appearance from its material or form, but by functions and activities, such as working, chatting, sleeping, and eating. Likewise, a garden is given its character by many events, like the flowering of the grass, the growing of the plants, the
flying of the insects, and the playing of the cats and children. The quality of place and the patterns of life that are woven with different events and spaces are therefore fundamentally community-bound. All animals have nature-bound patterns, i.e. habitats, whereas human beings additionally have culture-bound patterns. Patterns of events and of spaces define a place, the quality of life, and the depth of being and feeling alive in place, something that is common to both culture and nature.

Patterns are an organic and morphological term. Things are the parts of a whole, which itself is a part of another larger system, “the relationships among other smaller patterns, which themselves have other patterns hooking them together” (p.91). A town is made of something, which may be called its basic elements. Church, market, street, school, house are the elements of a town, which keep repeating and varying and in the town. However, there are also certain repetitive or different patterns of relationships between these elements, and a structure that in turn connects these patterns of relationships. Thus, in order to build a town that is alive, such relationships between elements, patterns, and structures must be organically interlocked enough to carry multiple events into the town community as a system. Dewey (1934) writes:

*In great art, there is no limit set to the individualization of parts within parts...The universe is infinitely organic because every organic thing is constituted ad infinitum of other organisms...as a measure of artistic achievement, it is true that every part of a work of art is potentially at least so constituted, since it is susceptible of indefinite perceptual differentiation. We see buildings in which there is little or nothing in the parts to arrest attention...they do not hold us as parts...there is nothing to dwell upon unless there is an individualized object or event...The more definition of parts contributes to the whole, the more it is important in itself.* (p.205)
The Pattern Language coined by Alexander is a metaphorical analogy. The act of making or building may be akin to writing a composition. Language is a system of symbols, letters. There are structural components in a composition, such as words, phrases, idioms, sentences, paragraphs, chapters, and others. Following the rules of grammar, words are combined with other words to become a sentence and thus to attain a meaning. The word itself means nothing; it has to be situated in the contexts and will have different meanings in different contexts. Alexander (1979) states: “A pattern language gives each person who uses it, the power to create an infinite variety of new and unique buildings, just as his ordinary language gives him the power to create an infinite variety of sentences” (p.167). Just as we communicate with people through words in patterns, so do environmental designers communicate through these pattern languages of relationships. Just as words can become a great poem, so can patterns become a place with a quality of life. Pattern languages are a timeless generative system of reference to place. In this way the quality without a name becomes recognizable through patterns that are repeated in regularity and variation, capable of generating meaning that is fundamental to shared experience and relationships, and thus becomes self-sustaining.

### 2.1.3 PATTERNS AS ARCHETYPE OF LANDSCAPE

Patterns as aesthetic qualities are significant not as a visual Gestalt but as an expression of symbolic meanings with rich existential and ecological roots. Alexander points out that a porch, a traditional architectural element, is a deep archetypal pattern of linking event and space by saying, “We may call it watching the world go by” (p.70). A porch in designer's vocabulary
thus is no longer a single physical element, but is understood in its capability of multiple variations of characters and of timelessly shared meanings of life. Alexander (1979) describes the essential quality and variation existent in a porch in the following:

We sit, perhaps slightly raised, on the front porch, or some steps in a park, or on a café terrace, with a more or less protected, sheltered, partly private place behind us, looking out into a more public place, slightly raised above it, watching the world go by. (p.70) It is essential that the porch should be a little raised above the level of the street; it is essential that the porch be deep enough to let a group of people sit there comfortably; and it is essential that the front of the porch is open, pierced with openings, and that the roof is therefore supported on columns... By contrast, the length of the porch, its height, its color, the material of which it is made, the height of the side walls, the way the porch connects up with the inside of the house, are less essential—so they can vary, without altering the fundamental and essential nature of the porch. (p.90)

Such essential qualities in architecture, in places, or in a town may be what we call an aesthetic quality and the porch thus becomes an aesthetic object. It is also an exemplar of a traditional architectural element as well as an important part of townscape. Because of the many variations in less essential qualities of the porch, it tends to be experienced anew and timelessly. As Mugerauer (1993) describes, it is a mediating place between house and exterior, offering to ameliorate the contrast between inside and outside the dwelling; it provides a refuge from frequent showers and a relief from overheated interior rooms in summer; it establishes a distinctive built place in the landscape; its design, frames, styles, and materials in relation to the columns, the roof, and the floor become more elaborate in time; it allows to watch the children play; it provides a vulnerable yet relaxed place to sleep; it gives an effective access to birds, the sky, and other animals. This phenomenological approach to an archetypal element, such as a
door or a porch, reveals its contribution to an existential, functional, material, social, and ecological sense of being alive toward the world.

“Many of the patterns are archetypal—so deeply rooted in the nature of things, that it seems likely that they will be a part of human nature, and human action, as much in five hundred years, as they are today” (Alexander, 1977, p.xvii). In other words, patterns embedded in human nature and action, which generate essential and shared meanings of being in a place, are archetypes. An archetypal pattern has its own aesthetic quality. It is a universal quality by nature but can afford a great variety of variation from individual to individual and from culture to culture. This may explain the reasons why the aesthetic experience of landscape is an essential or even universal aspect of psychological and ecological well-being, and at the same time is able to accommodate a variety of specific cultural expressions in terms of physical and cultural characters. It also may explain why aesthetic experience is universal in nature as well as unique in culture. The aesthetic quality of landscape is indeed both archetypal and at the same time diversely patterned in traditions, customs, and myths.

There are lessons for environmental designers to be drawn from Alexander’s timeless patterns of living. Designers should be trained to see intuitively what are the things that fit together to bring a place to life. Ranging from a smaller detail to a bigger pattern, from concept to construction, and from a holistic to an experiential and practical view, we may need to develop and modify more or newer patterns than the 253 developed by Alexander, summarized in Figure 6.5. Patterns as languages help us to discover the hidden or forgotten morphological meanings of places, i.e. the aesthetic qualities of the world we may not perceive because we take
them for granted.

**Figure 6.5:** A system of pattern languages

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2.2 QUALITY OF CITY: THE SYNTAX OF MIND

2.2.1 THREE MODELS OF MENTAL STRUCTURE

While Alexander’s pattern language stresses symbolic meanings from phenomenological and ecological perspective on life in a community, there is another perspective that emphasizes visual patterns of the city from a physiological approach to the human mind. Smith (1977), in his book “The Syntax of Cities,” envisions a city as a giant syntax of cognitive dynamics of the human mind, full of the capacity of transmitting messages, symbols, and images. He says, “A syntax of place is a metaphor which may serve to extract verbal meanings from the matrix of visual patterns cutting cross towns and cities” (p.17).

This implicitly premises that all meaning in the urban environment is conferred by the mind; thus if we know the structure of the mind, we could know and create a better syntax of cities as if we made a sentence in order to verbally express meanings based on grammar and syntax. This psychological scenario from a brain metaphor aims to describe the urban milieu and make recommendations about its design. Thus, an account must be “taken of its capacity to meet intellectual and emotional needs” to be “liberated from the shackles of subjectivity and the stigma of intuition” (p.31) as well as understood from an a priori standpoint.

The syntax of city constitutes three ways of describing the anatomy of the brain: the phylogenetic, the attitudinal, and the functional-hierarchical models. First, the phylogenetic model suggests that the human brain consists of the three layers—a triune brain: Reptilian, Palaeo-mammalian, and Neo-mammalian brains. The reptilian brain commands behavioral
patterns for the survival of the species, which is automatic and invariable. The Palaeo-
mammalian brain is the seat of motives and emotions, capable of responding to present
information in light of memories of past information. The Neo-mammalian refers to the
neocortex as the highly evolved brain capable of anticipation and choosing a response to a
stimulus according to what the result will be (see Figure 6.6).

Figure 6.6: MacLean’s triune brain

These three layers are functionally interconnected, yet capable of operating
independently of the other two. The neo-cortex deals with rational activity such as verbal ability,
logical thoughts, and evaluation; whereas in the other two, the limbic system exercises a decisive
influence on responses to stimuli, plays a fundamental role in emotional behavior, and has
strong impact on the matter of perception and evaluation via the neo-cortex. That is to say, the

phylogenetic model suggests that our basic reactions to the environment are limbic-intensive, both visceral and emotional.

Second, the attitudinal model proposes that the neo-cortex is composed of bipolar systems of consciousness: two cerebral hemispheres, which have contrasting attitudes to sensory stimuli, and cross over in connection to our eyes. The left hemisphere is responsible for speech, writing, calculation, and logical thought or verbal acquisition; whereas the right-hand hemisphere has a more spatial, global, and intuitive apprehension of the world, such as recognizing shapes, faces, textures, forms, and colors. The two cerebral hemispheres are related to two types of consciousness: rational and intuitive, and the interaction between the two capacities increases creativity. Creative thinking, which both artists and scientist are capable of, involves the dialectic between reason and intuition. Hence, the attitudinal model suggests that “creative perception, which is perhaps another way of describing the aesthetic response, may very well reply on the same dialect principle” (Smith, 1977, p.37). However, the imbalance between the right and left seems to be inevitable in human experience because of a general over-emphasis on verbal and language ability. That is why the right hemisphere, where a primordial attitude to sensory experiences is strongly linked with the limbic system, seems to be more relevant to aesthetic experience than the left in general.

Lastly, the functional-hierarchical model finds that the human brain has three information processing units: the left and the right of the neocortex as well as the limbic system. The neocortex as the cerebral part tends to be concerned with the intrinsic quality of information; the limbic system is primarily interested in biological significance. This model may
be a synthetic combination of the other two. Out of all three models Smith (1977) assumes that perception would be a “wholistic” process that frequently involves multiple frames of reference, not just obeying the rules of cerebral logics. According to him, perception involves the massive and independent “schema of symbolism,” occurring not only in the cerebral dialectics of “partness to wholeness” via two hemispheres, but also in the vertical interaction between cerebral and visceral stimuli via the three brains: the left, the right, and the limbic (see Figure 6.7).

Figure 6.7: A comprehensive diagram of the three models of the brain system

All three models stress that aesthetic experience occurs in the dialects of the high (cerebral) and low (visceral) brains, i.e. the structural mechanism of symbolism, but at the same

time stress the power of the limbic system. For instance, the left hemisphere could help recognize and identify functions, features, names, and styles of buildings, roads, shops, streets, and signage systems, for these are connected with memory and the logic of language. The right hemisphere, on the other hand, could discriminate or favor shapes, locations, textures, colors, tones, and rhythms of such landscapes. The limbic brain can recognize viscerally, emotionally, and immediately some invariant features and structures of landscapes with a great degree of intensity. The limbic system has “the capacity to participate in a non-verbal type of symbolism” (Smith, 1977, p.51), which is common to all humans and possibly other species.

The significance of Smith’s symbolic accounts of the mental structure lies not only in providing structural clues to the understanding of aesthetic experience in general, but of cultural experience of cities because of the emphases on the limbic system: that is, the schema of symbolism prevents aesthetics from being purely individual and subjective. The first model leads to a fundamental recognition that in human experience immediate emotional and behavioral patterns play a primary role, implicitly for their survival, just like in other species. Indeed, emotion in experience is the powerful common denominator through which almost all animals are attached to their places, and helps us understand other animals or other cultures.

The second model leaves draws out attention to the fact that a creative perception that occurs in the dialects between reason and intuition is an aesthetic experience, and explains why aesthetic experience is understood to be more concerned with the intuitive and spatial perception in the right brain that has much to do with the primitive emotion from the limbic brain. The last model proves that both aesthetic and cultural experience can occur from a
wholistic process both in the horizontal dialect between science and art, and verbal and spatial perception, and in the vertical dialects between the cerebral and the visceral, and the conscious and the unconscious.

2.2.2 AESTHETIC QUALITY FROM ARCHETYPAL SYMBOLISM

Smith thinks the mid-lower-limbic brain is of fundamental significance in terms of its capacity not only to mediate between the two hemispheres, between reason and intuition, but also to detect deep-seated cultural symbols and inheritances from the environment. In the experience of the city an objective awareness of the urban environment occurs via the neo-cortex, whereas its subjective perception is mediated by the primitive mid-brain (p.52). In almost all cultures “fundamental symbols represent primordial man’s attempt to reconcile the conflicting demands of intelligence and emotion.” Smith calls it the “archetypal symbolism” of human experience. In any built environment there has taken place a fundamental and collective encoding of a million years of cultural communication, with a sentimental link to human habituation “to facilitate a deeper emotional attachment to place” (p.58). In short, the limbic brain deals with archetypal symbolism, which is concerned with aesthetic quality as the emotional attachment to place and to collective life in culture.

Archetypal symbolism is concerned with ordinary people’s “vulgar tastes” rather than with designers’ “good” or sophisticated tastes that often fluctuate according to ebb and flow of fashion. Smith calls this emotional quality a limbic value, and establishes its four characteristics and components. As seen in Table 6.3, the limbic components of cultural qualities are the very
perceptual properties also found in a work of art, i.e. a painting. This seems to indicate the power of archetypal symbolism.

**Table 6.3: Components and characteristics of limbic value**

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<tr>
<th>Limbic Value</th>
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<td><strong>Components</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Characteristics</strong></td>
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Line symbolizes stability and continuity within movement as well as creates rhythm and pattern. Shape, a dominant part of architecture, is subordinated to three-dimensional elements, and has such characteristics as angle, corner, convex, and concave that have emotional links to the feminine, masculine, assertive, protective, and the like. Texture perhaps has the most psychological importance on symbolic levels. It symbolizes natural roots and cultural sophistication and dexterity through materials, for it has profound influence on haptic and sensory-motor perception that defines scale and distance in space.

Color, on the other hand, has a great physiological significance in its most powerful aesthetic impact on visual perception. It affects not only emotional recognition but also
intellectual awareness. Combinations of colors, rather than a single color, tend to bring about a positive hedonic effect (see Chapter 4), because of their potential for a dialectic relationship (p.79). Symbolic meanings of color are associated with temperature, mood, climate, sound, and so on. The limbic components—line, shape, texture, and color—are primary constituents of aesthetic characters, but more importantly, they combine in cultural qualities, which tend to offer unlimited emotional and symbolic nourishment.

2.2.3 AESTHETIC QUALITY AS A VALUE OF URBANISM

Since the limbic value also subsumes emotional, symbolic, and cultural meanings, it is fair to assume that it is relevant to our notion of aesthetic quality. Typically, aesthetic awareness has been thought to be connected with the right hemisphere, because the right is largely the locus of what we think of as our aesthetic sensibilities. However, “the right hemisphere has a strong connection with its left counterpart and with the limbic system” (p.87). It should be intuitively agreeable that aesthetic appreciation involves a particular kind of dialectics among the three brain systems: between the rational and the emotional, or between thinking and feeling, strongly influenced and related to one another by the archetypal symbolism contributed by the limbic brain. Smith therefore concludes that aesthetic capacity induced from the brain metaphor could begin to explain qualitative matters in urban experience: “The real value of urbanism lies in its capacity to excite all three units” (p.191).

Several points on the nature of aesthetic experience can be elicited from Smith’s physiological account of urban aesthetics. First, aesthetic experience is dependent upon the
principle of *holistic*-holistic dialectics. Nothing is beautiful in itself if it exists as a single isolated element, as a single line or a single musical note, in any form of art. Second, such an aesthetics of relationships—also called a Gestalt experience—changes things that are perceived in gross. That is, a *symbolic transaction* happens in experience. Lastly, aesthetic experience in reality occurs in the dialogue between mind and matter in specific situations, bound together by a community, yet it *transcends* the infinity of instances of individual uniqueness. In short, it is “rhythms and relationships that establish a kind of psychological resonance producing infinitely variable levels of satisfaction” (p. 89).

Above all, there must be an aesthetic impact recognized as gross or archetypal, but constituted by immediate, intimate, and haptic characteristics. It is composed of numerous combinations of color, texture, pattern, rhythms, and conflicts. In the *state of appeal*, a strong visceral reaction occurs in response to the stimuli that interacts simultaneously with cerebral experience. In the next state, I would propose to call it *aesthetic discovery*, emotion and perception come about in a state of continuous linkage. Aesthetic emotion arises from the vertical dialectic between the right hemisphere and the limbic system—a visceral-cerebral relationship.

Through this dialectic biological and gross characters merge with perception from sensory organs and allow us to derive hedonic satisfaction or pleasure resulting from a form of tension-reduction: balance, elegance, coherence, and equilibrium are the properties detected for this kind of aesthetic pleasure. In the process of discovery, the left hemisphere—logical and intellectual capacity—interacts less and more indirectly with the limbic system and more directly with the right hemisphere. Thus, harmony, unity, hierarchy, and complexity become cognizant
to discover “how patterns and rhythms weave their way across a seemingly random array of lines, shapes, colors, and textures” (p.103). My attempt at a synthetic summary of this dialectical mechanism of a physiological account of aesthetic experience is shown in Figure 6.8.

“Urban aesthetics is resonated with symbolism,” says Smith (p.145). Patterns and rhythms weave limbic components together intelligently and symbolically to become a cultural experience. Places display distinctive characters of spatial patterns and rhythms because they are the manifestation and evidence of the lived life, of historic events, and of cultural richness, and

together form a great variety of aesthetic appeals. Patterns and rhythms also connote a particularly close connection between culture and biological needs in urban aesthetics: the beautiful city must have limbic potentials accounting for the richness of life in culture: “Cultural development is an aesthetic exploration into a new harmonic relationship” (p.92), which “strongly asserts their autonomy, and the whole ensemble held together by various overall rhythms at different frequency” (p.145).

Then, where are the patterns and rhythms as aesthetic qualities in urban experience? What are the spatial and physical characteristics that are culturally and aesthetically significant in the city? These are the practical issues useful for urban designers Smith addresses in his book and attempts throughout it, like Alexander (1977) in his pattern language, to identify symbolic patterns and rhythms from old European cities. Table 6.4 summarizes his vast and somewhat random descriptions of urban aesthetics.

Table 6.4: Spatial characteristics as the dialect of rhythms and patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spatial Characters</th>
<th>Archetypal Symbolism</th>
<th>Physical manifestation</th>
<th>Aesthetic Properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The idealized Distance</td>
<td>Unconscious drive to a center</td>
<td>Various town squares, vistas, facades, nodal places</td>
<td>Contrast, tension, style, scale, tone, proportion, color, texture, shape, and line</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I would say the unique part of Smith’s descriptions would be in the archetypal symbolism and relevant characters. Aesthetic properties alone are rather formal aesthetic elements that are constant and repetitive, but when manifested with functions and materials, they achieve their own characters and symbolic meanings. The idealized distance as an archetypal character is not just a distance between things, it signifies that human beings have a kind of teleological drive to a clear route toward a center or a dominant object that pervades whole city. An urban square is a most distinctive pattern in a sequence comprised of spectacular vistas and existing façades along the streets, and creates a recognition of a fragment of a distant goal.
Inductive place means that aesthetic satisfaction gained from the experience of serial rhythm and of a curving passage of movement, which generate directional dynamics toward the hidden beyond. Curving sequences, corners, the art of intersection and tangent areas of ascending or descending roads and hills, open up the poetry of urban space.

*Gate and arch* are a deep symbolic expression toward a more elaborated civic image. Gates articulate linear spatial experience, and arches may frame views as a fine grading of space in the social domain. Arches together with steps can articulate social characters, mingled with small rich places. The combination of *maze and accent* in the urban landscape are to capture attention. Smith particularly emphasizes the roles urban accents perform in urban aesthetics regarding urban mnemonics, rhythms and hierarchies, differentiation, and a touch of the exotic.

Accentuation creates rhythms and hierarchy as symbolic modulations. Rhythms and hierarchy are recognized by differentiating the characters of things, or by balancing the tension between old and new buildings, casual and the special events, and parts and wholes. They weave a serial rhythm of the city as the relationship between aesthetic appeal and fulfillment.

“The intensity of urban events, the enlargement of scale, speaks of a place of ultimate self-realization” (p.180). Several points of Smith’s approach to urban aesthetics are worthy of our attention. First, it seems to successfully connect the Gestalt aesthetic theory evolved from psychology with the practice of urban design. Second, the so-called “wholistic” Gestalt is concerned with bodily experience rather than visual perception, tackling sequential relationships of patterns and rhythms and of spatial dialectics so that aesthetic experience can account for its
tangency to biological, physio-psychological,\textsuperscript{39} phenomenological, and ecological symbolism. Third, the archetypal approach to urban aesthetics achieves a systemic transaction from a thing to a place and from an individual experience to collective, social, and cultural and historic meanings and identities.

Fourth, as for urban aesthetic values, his emphasis on a limbic value is particularly noteworthy. The limbic value may be the most influential and initiatory in one’s aesthetic consciousness, for it has symbolic as well as emotional parts of the whole experience. Fifth, patterns and rhythms are for him not only a formal manifestation of place, but also have an extended symbolic existence of life in community. They can be “the minutiae of the moment, all the clutter of life at short focus…the here-ness of everyday life, and the same satisfaction with this earthy existence” (p.200). Lastly, it should be said that Smith’s urban experiment on aesthetic properties such as color, texture, line, and shape due to archetypal symbolism has its limits. It seems to focus too much on visual and architectural properties and reminiscences of the old European cities, rather than on the qualitative relations of urban events and spaces in sequence and motion, and therefore leaves us with question on how to examine and to articulate new urban archetypes with universal and inter-cultural dimensions, applicable to

\textsuperscript{39} Smith’s physiological account for aesthetic experience is consistent with Berlyne’s arousal theory and Zajonc’s adaptive affect theory, discussed in Chapter 4. Smith argues similarly that aesthetic satisfaction as hedonic pleasure, results from the reconciling two conflicting components between complexity and order, between ambiguity and legibility, between novelty and familiarity, and between continuity and differentiation.
contemporary young cities.

2.3 LANDSCAPE QUALITY: THE STRUCTURE OF ORDINARY LIFE

2.3.1 ORDINARY LANDSCAPE AS CULTURAL LANGUAGE

Aesthetics is a serious subject matter in all cultures and, as Smith argues, culture may indeed be a history of aesthetic exploration. Understanding and interpreting the cultural landscape is a huge and difficult task to articulate because no single paradigm has controlled cultural studies, which seems to be equally true for the studies of landscape aesthetics. Every landscape has its own code, and its study may be undertaken as a deciphering of the meaning of the cultural and social significance of ordinary, but at the same time diagnostic features. Ordinary everyday landscapes are crucibles of cultural meaning and environmental experience, for they indicate our primary interest in unconscious processes of daily life, the continuous creation and alterations all around us. They are an unwitting autobiography, reflecting our taste, our values, and our aspirations and even our fears (Meining, 1979; Groth, 1997).

The cultural landscape is nearly everything we can see when we go outdoors, the common workaday landscape that has very little to do with the skilled work of landscape architects. However, reading it requires the shrewd perception of landscape architects, geographers, and cultural anthropologists, for it is disorganized and messy like reading an old book, different from a study undertaken as formal history, and methodically defining the making of the landscape from the past to the present. Ordinary landscape “deserves the broad attention that only ordinary language allows” (Meining, 1979, p.34), concerned with not
elements, but with the essence, with the organizing ideas we use to make sense out of what we see.

Lewis (1979) has the following to say about the axioms of the ordinary landscape. First, the ordinary landscape is a clue to culture. Different cultures exhibit different “tastes” in their cultural landscapes. Not only famous historic buildings or gardens, but houses, roads, cities, farms, and all ordinary landscapes represent a corollary of tastes: if we could understand the roots of taste, we could understand culture itself. Second, the ordinary landscape shows cultural unity and landscape equality. Culture is whole, a unity, and no matter how ordinary, all landscapes reflect culture in unified ways. “There is no such thing as a culturally uninteresting landscape” (p.19), nor a morally insignificant one. Third, ordinary landscape is common thing. This is an important axiom by nature, but one that has been frequently overlooked by academics or approached with aesthetic or moral prejudice.

Fourth is the historic significance of the common landscape. The common landscape is a corollary of historic lumpiness, sometimes of sudden historic leaps, built by people in the past, whose tastes, habits, wealth, and ambitions as well as technology and the mechanics of communication were different from ours today. Fifth, the ordinary landscape has geographic or ecological significance. The term ordinariness is context-bound. It tells us about the geographic and ecological surroundings in which it was built. Sixth, it is strongly environmentally controlled, for it is intimately related to the physical environment. Lastly, the ordinary landscape is obscure. That is, landscape messages are not obvious, and convey all kinds of meanings, as obscurity exists in any language. Each axiom of the ordinary landscape makes sense along with
the other six and implicitly displays cultural axioms and lexicons. It is what we live with and take for granted, yet uncertain about how to see. It is also “something that most Americans have not done and should do” (p.27). 40

The word landscape is not identical with, but related to the word place. Ordinary landscapes, which are culture- and context-bound, unified, common, intimately physical, ecological, and historically significant, are an authentic place. It is an extraordinary place in which aesthetic experience takes place, and from which the concept landscape aesthetics stems. “Ordinary landscape is also understood as the context of latent selfhood” (Samuels, 1979, p.53).

In order to defend its own brand of humanism in the ordinary landscape, the self arises not from the mind of anyone in particular, but rather from a universal mind in the context of science and the self, or the self and responsibility, getting rid of any anthropocentric taint (p.56). The missing self in our ordinary landscape is the ethical issue at stake, as much addressed in the realms of landscape aesthetics as in those of place-making.

2.3.2 AESTHETIC LEXICONS OF VERNACULAR LANDSCAPE AS CULTURAL SUSTAINABILITY

The nature of vernacular culture has been examined with increasing interest among architects in vernacular architecture as well as landscape architects and geographers in the vernacular landscape, and has led to a growing public awareness of a rich vernacular heritage (Jackson, 1984, p.85). The usual scholarly approach to the vernacular runs the risk of being

40 In the present era, this is an issue for all cultures and countries.
antiquarian because it tends to concentrate on the anatomical aspects of old buildings, such as construction materials and techniques, and on the geographical origins of structural features, relatively neglecting function and the relationship to work and community (1994, p.64).

The original notion of vernacular is the language spoken by ordinary people in a region, referring to the fact that all languages have geographical as well as cultural boundaries. The vernacular landscape is the ordinary landscape with its own locality. If ordinary landscape can be seen as a language, then the vernacular landscape could be said to be a dialect of that language. In its present usage the word vernacular covers many diverse aspects of contemporary popular culture. “It does not pretend to stylistic sophistication, is not subject to fashion, but loyal to local forms and rarely accepts innovations from outside the region” (1984, p.86). It is timeless because it has a history of its own, has undergone a long and complicated evolution, and has been determined by ancient archetypes. The vernacular landscape reveals the evolution of a culture and of many life patterns in community.

Human relationships to the environment tend to evolve towards more impersonal, abstract, and legalistic forms, for land has been owned and exploited not by merely physical means but also by contract. Spatial reorganization and transition is typical for any period of history, including the relationships and contradictions and experiments of juxtaposition of the old and the new (Jackson, 1979, p.155). “The professional [in his or her approach to vernacular landscape] searches for differences, and is partial to what might be called a kind of academic romanticism; the establishing of distinct categories” (p.153). However, “history repeats itself, establishes the patterns and reveals universal laws of human conduct” (p.154). Jackson
continues, “The amateur, on the other hand, is more concerned with finding similarities, with perceiving the universal which presumably lies behind diversity” (p.153). I believe this to be one of the most important notions in a cultural approach to ordinary landscape, to ordinary life, and ultimately to landscape aesthetics.

“The beauty that we see in the vernacular landscape is the image of our common humanity: hard work, stubborn hope, and mutual forbearance striving to be loved” (Groth, 1997, p.18). For this reason certain studies of vernacular landscapes can be seen a means to an end, undertaken for the purpose of understanding our common humanity in landscape experience: our sense of well-being or our aesthetic awareness of the self in place. The common subjects and themes in the existing historical approaches to studying the vernacular landscape may well present tangible clues to the aesthetic qualities of place and of the ordinary landscape. These particular components, dimensions, and aspects of our relationship with the landscape—that may come to stand for a place—constitute a kind of aesthetic lexicon of vernacular landscapes, and are as follows: 1) Attachment, 2) Accessibility, 3) Spirituality, 4) Familiarity, 5) Symbolism, 6) Presence of other life, 7) Work and live, 8) Locality, 9) Sense of time, and 10) Sense of place.

The first of these, and perhaps the most important one, is our attachment to home, and the study of vernacular buildings has been greatly influenced by speculations on the psychology and mythology of traditional man-made spaces for living (Jackson, 1984, p.85). Home is, in Relph’s view, the most authentic place, the heart of all places. It deeply involves the history of family and a legacy for future generation to honor and preserve a place. The sense and
characters of home harbors many affective associations that sustain and integrate people as a group. Jackson (1997) observes:

Once we have a home and had closed the front door, we had the happy feeling of being where we belonged. Home was where each room, each passage, had its own unique character and where every space, every hour of the day, imposed its own appropriate behavior; the important part of the joy of being home was that we could control who had access to it and who could be excluded. (p.145-146)

Home refers to house, land, village, city, district, country, or indeed the world (Sopher, 1979, p.136) and is often identified with the self. Home is the territorial, existential identity of being: it provides the existential tension between inside and outside, private and public, leaving home and longing to return home, or explorative freedom and restrictive rules and customs. Its biological attachment is to people and its cultural attachment is to places (p.133). It gradually becomes a symbol of stability, and the attachment to the land affects our manners and codes of conduct and morality (Jackson, 1997, p.147). The landscape of home is our affective and moral being.

The second is accessibility, essential to the survival in a spatial system, “those meandering, unpredictable roads, paths, alleys, and trails which had proliferated since the beginning of history and which are like a web of roots” (1994, p.5). The roads are “the real consequence of the rebuilding of our cities,” because they destroy “the distinction between the life of the street and the life lived behind the façade” (p.9). What brings and holds us together in our landscape and a community is not the sharing of space but the sharing of the routines and the identity achieved by the short private road that everyone uses in daily life. “The archetypal
road is one which not only serves the daily needs of the small community but helps preserve its ethical values” because it calls for a rite which “makes virtuous behavior possible and it preserves the territorial integrity of the village” (p.7).

The third component of the aesthetic lexicon is spirituality. Spirit is the obvious attribute of a place, like the mentality rather than the materiality of an object. Spirituality is concerned with political, social, and religious ideals of community, which “enables us to debate such matters as good and evil, justice and injustice, an how to act to achieve a good life” (Jackson, 1984, p.11). Whether it is religious, political, or ethnic in character, landscapes tend to display a variety of spiritual transformations such as “symbols, inscriptions, images, monuments, not as works of art but to remind people of their civic privileges and duties, and tactics to exclude the outsider” (p.18).

There is one more characteristic in the spiritual landscape: a transcendentental dimension. The wilderness experience, which is believed to be spiritual, reveals to us that we along with all living things are inseparable parts of the cosmic order: the transcendence of self to the mystery of unspoiled nature. Similarly, perceiving the spirit of an ordinary landscape is to humanize it by transcending the self into other things, people, and the community culture beyond its physical and material boundary. Every traditional public space, including a garden, a civic square, a forum, and a market place, is potentially spiritual. The spirituality of the vernacular landscape cherishes its aesthetic quality as a cultural artifact as well as its ethical quality as civic duty, both of which imbue the spirit of place with a transcendentental dimension.

The fourth component of the aesthetic lexicon of the vernacular landscape is familiarity.
Familiarity makes us feel at home wherever it exists. Home is the most familiar place of habit and custom: “A place becomes a dwelling when it is part of our customary or habitual behavior, a way of life” (Jackson, 1984, p.91). Familiarity of any landscape is inseparable from the lived geography of the childhood and from the social and psychological experience of home (Sopher, 1979, p.138). It is the inhabited landscape, not deliberately created, but “merely evolves in the course of our trying to live on harmonious terms with the natural world surrounding us” (Jackson, 1984, p.42) and “tells us about a way of life that was simpler and more intimate” (p.43). The family garden, for an example, is the focal point of family life: it is where many small lives—vegetable, animals, and humans—create an autonomous community with its own customs (1994, p.124). The notion of the prototypical garden is therefore not a thing to be designed but a type to be identified with house and family. Landscapes are strongly identified with ways of life: home, family, habit, and custom exist in continuity and eventually take their place in landscape history.

The fifth part of the aesthetic lexicon is symbolism. The spiritual and inhabited landscapes are the rich source of symbolic and mythical experiences. Culture is a rich symbolic system of life and community, and so is landscape. Symbols are in many ways a product of imagination, fantasy, and myth, and abound in landscape paintings and poetry. The vernacular landscape is full of ambiguous and complex ad hoc spaces, those to which designers should give form and meaning in society “because of their everyday importance, eventually acquired symbolic values” (p.96). Symbols and myths are derived from geographical, psychological, mythological, or unconscious origins and universals, “merged into the consciousness—the
creative power to call something into being, to render the invisible visible, and to impart certain characters to things” (Tuan, 1991, p.690). Ordinary features that are visible, tangible, and therefore experiential can be powerful symbols—like trees, for example—because their associations with ordinary life make them richer and further narratives and descriptions possible. Home, road, garden, square, park, landmarks, and the presence of trees are such vernacular features that sustain and enhance the meaning of place, because they are capable of multiplying the power of symbols.

The sixth component of the aesthetic lexicon of vernacular landscape is the presence of other life. There is no beauty in a lifeless thing, event, or place. The notion of life here is not strictly literal but symbolic as well as social: it may be symbiotic, or biological and ecological symbolism. Any landscape has social meanings: it should attract and support many lives. Just as the primary content of home is not the material landscape but people, place acquires its spirit primarily because of the presence of human and other beings. A sense of beauty in any lived environment comes from sense of other lives, including insects, squirrels, birds, trees, cats and dogs, and many other familiar animals and their activities. It is the sense of place that comes not just from seeing a collection of a number of other forms of life, but from engaging with many and diverse lives gathered and interconnected in a place. William Whyte (1980) has demonstrated that the presence of other life is the main source of pleasure and stimulation in the urban landscape: market place, urban plaza, and streets are aesthetically stimulating and essentially social, symbolic, and symbiotic, ordinary landscapes, for they deal with life in
The seventh component is work-and-live, especially important in the notion of the vernacular. As addressed previously, the average house is a most prominent feature in vernacular landscapes, not merely as an individual residence, but as part of a community or town of work and live. It is about access to ways of a socially and existentially healthy life. In the traditional houses of the agricultural villages working and living are combined in their social role and achieve a healthy balance between public and private activities. Jackson (1994) emphasizes social meaning of the work-live house by describing it as a metaphor of “the extension of the hand.”

It is the hand we raise to indicate our presence; it is the hand that protects and holds what it its own; the house or hand create its own small world; it is the visible expression of our identity and our intentions. It is the hand which reaches out to establish and confirm relationships. Without it, we are never complete social beings. (p.145)

“The real alternative to homelessness is not shelter but solidarity,” as Jackson says (1994, p.138), and the real problem of placelessness may not be the absence of green open space but of aesthetic communal space.

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41 In this sense it is illogical to equally compare the intensity of the beauty of vernacular with wilderness landscape because of different ways of dealing with life. However, the kind of beauty, on the other hand, may be disputable between inhabited and virgin landscape. The former stresses more social aspect of aesthetics with emotional and intimate stimulus; the latter stresses more ecological aspect of aesthetics with its rational and contemplative emphasis.
The eighth locality, is perhaps the closest to a general notion of an authentic or aesthetic quality. Localities are hard to define with precision, other than as some unique qualities associated with a place or location. “One way of defining such localities would be to say that they are cherished because they are embedded in the everyday world around us and easily accessible, but at the same time are distinct from that world” (Jackson 1994, p.158). Like an aesthetic experience of a work of art, locality is a unified single unique quality of a place, acquired only through the experience of a small and significant event, or by a visit, or by being there. Just as we recognize a historical object or locale, and celebrate its setting, locality is the appreciation—recognition and celebration—of something that stems from the past, something that is up to us to protect, restore, recreate, and enhance (Lowenthal, 1979, p.109). Some unique, historical, and specific characteristics of place may be typical of locality. However, locality is not something precisely definable in its own right, but only as distinguishable from the others or identifiable within its surroundings each time when we are refreshed and elated by being there. It is therefore the quality that has been there and then and is identified by being here and now. This is an important aspect of the vernacular as distinguished from the merely historical.

The ninth component is sense of time. Experience of space and time is simultaneous and largely subconscious (Tuan, 1977, p.118). Time is sensible only with event in space; an event is a happening in time and in space as an irreversible sequence. The experience of landscape “presupposes a major reordering of time as well as space” (p.123). Landscape paintings or photographs captured by the camera or by human eyes can give us an experience
under which we see time melded into space and learn to organize visual elements into a dramatic spatiotemporal structure. Every activity generates a particular spatiotemporal structure, which is apparent in body movement and in language. Moving toward a destination from an origin creates a path, and repetitive occurrences and rhythmic sequences exist in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of such traditional elements as steps, streets, walls, trees, columns, and many others.

A sense of time is an important notion in the vernacular landscape with respect to our desire to recover the past, memory, life, and history—the evidence of past events. Locality is a characteristic of time and space; familiarity is a characteristic of the past. “Events such as going to office, planning a visit, looking at the scenery, hearing news of friends in another town, are too much the accepted pattern of daily living to warrant reflective thought” (p.131). Reflection continually requires new interpretations of what has taken place for the changing present. “Awareness of the past is essential to the maintenance of purpose in life. Without it, we would lack all sense of continuity, all appreciation of causality, all knowledge of our own identity” (Lowenthal, 1979, p.103). “I believe that this has always been the common or vernacular way of recognizing the unique quality of the community we live in” (Jackson, 1994, p.159).

The last part of aesthetic lexicon available in the vernacular landscape is a sense of place, as I have argued throughout this chapter for landscape aesthetics in everyday experience in general. In the vernacular landscape, sense of place is inevitably associated with our routine, rite, habit, and custom, as Jackson (1994, p.160) emphasizes. A cyclical sense of time is rooted in the daily, weekly, seasonal occurrences which we look forward to or remember and share.
The regular recurrence of events and their celebrations create our sense of ritual, a sense that makes us more aware of time and of the rhythms of the community because it brings us together with people in a community. Sharing the same time table—-the same work hours and the same habits and customs-- is what gives us reassurance and a sense of unity and continuity, and in the long run creates our sense of place, and of community. Below is I think one of the best descriptions of what we may now call cultural sustainability:

We attach too much importance to art and architecture in producing an awareness of our belonging to a city or a country, when what we actually share is a sense of time. What we commemorate is its passing; and we thus establish a more universal historical bond and develop a deeper understanding of our society. (Jackson, 1994, p.162)

Sense of place is in fact an “awkward and ambiguous modern translation of a Latin term, genius loci— protective spirit of a place,” yet “a much used expression, chiefly by architects but taken over by urban planners and interior decorators and the promoters of condominiums, so that now it means very little” (p.157). It is irony to say on the one hand that the ordinary landscape means a lot in our protective spirit of community; at the same time, and on the other hand, the landscape used in our ordinary expression does not. However, it is true that in many contemporary cities and cultures there is little ordinariness of life in our ordinary landscape. Sense of place must be a spirit of inhabited cultural landscapes, not a forcefully given image created and consumed for commercial and industrial purposes.

Whatever its definition, the term sense of place is a total quality of all aesthetic components and aspects of the vernacular landscape, and therefore an expression closest to our
aesthetic experience of landscape. It makes social, psychological, symbolic, phenomenological, and ecological sense out of being in place. All landscapes are a symbolic expression of cultural values, social behavior, and individual actions worked upon particular localities over a span of time (Meining, 1979, p.6). Certain localities have an attraction which gives us a certain identifiable sense of well-being and which we recognize, and want to return to, time and again. “It is believed a locality—a space or structure or a whole community—derived much of its unique quality from the presence or guardianship of a supernatural spirit” (Jackson, 1994, p.157). All of the vernacular qualities I associate with the aesthetic lexicon are therefore what guards a spirit of place and what sustains a culture.

3. LANDSCAPE AESTHETICS AS THE LOVE OF PLACE

3.1 LOVE OF LIFE FROM “BIOPHILIA” TO “TOPOPHILIA”: ESCAPING FROM AND BACK TO “NATURE”

Ordinary landscapes are the real to our everyday living. The real place is different from the reality. In short, house is the reality; home is the real. Perhaps the conventional approach of city planners or environmental scientists to landscape may be the reality, indifferent to the needs and desires of particular individuals or groups, to local patterns of orders that have been created and inhabited, whereas landscape for environmental designers and artists must be the real one, the landscape that is familiar and nurturing and all-enveloping. Home is the real place to which one is attached to by myriad habits of thoughts and behaviors as the essence of our being (Tuan, 1998, p.7). A sense of the real is an experience of the sleeping cat, the smiling
infant, the sunset in the dusk, the delicious dish, the well-defined architectural space, the well-told story, the scared ritual, all of which give us a heightened sense of self—a feeling of *aliveness*.

The real is the thus can be said to be authentic as well as aesthetic. I have discussed previously why an authentic sense of place is aesthetic: it is mainly because “the direct perceptual force of aesthetic experience carries its own authenticity” (Berleant, 1997, p.129). There is no such feeling of the real self or of aliveness in empty, weightless, and lifeless space and time. Rather, it occurs in a place with the presence of other lives. Sometimes “memory highlights selected scenes, making them so real and vivid we can scarcely believe they do not actually survive.” However, “such total recall is rare. Most of us can no longer retrieve past scenes after we have outgrown the way we originally experienced them” (Lowenthal, 1979, p.104). This original experience of space and time is the real, authentic, and aesthetic experience of landscape; it is the real sense of aliveness with people and other lives in the lived place. “For most people, the lived and living landscape is the commonplace setting of everyday life. How we engage with prosaic landscapes of home, work, local travel, and recreation is an important measure of the quality of our lives” (Berleant, 1997, p16).

Such qualities of life, all interrelated with a sense of the self, a sense of aliveness, a sense of place, and a sense of the real or the authentic, are therefore the aesthetic quality of the lived landscape. The quality of life is the felt quality derived from a place that many lives inhabit. A daydream, for instance, is a non-aesthetic experience, because it is not really felt through all senses and thus lacks resonance in a multi-layered experience and context. Fantasy would be non-aesthetic as well, for if “the imagination reaches toward the excesses and incoherence of
fantasy, it can delude, enchain, and isolate” (Tuan, 1990, p.43) us from life, inhabited place, and the earth.

Let me say that imagination can be a catalyst of aesthetic experience, but does not assure its occurrence. Thus, dream or fantasy is simply an innate ability to the human condition in order to escape from nature and simultaneously return back to nature, even though escaping from and returning to nature is a well-known cultural and aesthetic theme. Nature is the essential and intrinsic quality from which all life starts, and the ultimate place in which all life ends. Dewey (1934) writes:

‘We’ have desires that are rooted in longing for an increase of experienced vitality through delightful intercourse with the forms and movements of “nature.” (p.332)

Yearning for escaping from and simultaneously returning to life, home, community, and the earth is a fundamental aesthetic impulse. Tuan (1998, p.19) writes that our desire and ability to escape nature is a consequence of culture, i.e. human civilization, and our yearning to go back to nature is a relic of our sentiment for the natural and the wild. “Culture, through habitude, easily becomes second nature—like the graceful gesture that feels natural, always there, rather than chosen or constructed” (Tuan, 1993, p.8). Culture is the system of humanized nature, and its production occurs through the four areas of art, science, religion, and myth. All cultural

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42 The production of culture by Peterson and others (1976) is manifested as three symbol-creating domains: art, science, and religion. “Myth” is my addition to these cultural institutions; it includes non-institutional living system such as habit,
products such as art, science, religion, and myth are born from imagination as well as with the aesthetic desire and ability of escaping from and returning to life and nature. That is why culture and nature are interdependent in the lived landscape: all natural landscapes are cultural, and all cultural landscapes are natural. This is also why I have argued that landscape aesthetics is a hybrid, interdisciplinary field in which culture and nature, art and science, and the self (ego) and the world (ecosystem) successfully transcend each other (see also Chapter 2).

“Escaping from nature” and “back-to-nature” may be concerned with biophilia—the biological need for survival, primitive desire for life and life-like process—which I talked about as the “aesthetics from below” in Chapter 4, as well as the human longing for being concerned with topophilia, the spiritual need for being in nature, which I discussed as the “aesthetics from above” in Chapter 5. Topophilia is a term coined by Tuan (1974) to describe the human love of place as a human being’s affective tie with the environment. He argues that human responses to the environment may be primarily aesthetic, and differ greatly in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression, and defines “Topophilia” as the human love of place that is primarily related to health, familiarity, and awareness of the past (p.92). I would say our love of place is circling around from biophilia as desire for life—escape from nature, to topophilia as longing for being in nature—longing to return to nature. The love of place is the appreciation of the flow of life, and routines of culture, and the embeddedness of nature. It is the aesthetic experience of the lived landscape.

custom, rituals, and traditions.
Love has been always our trans-cultural quest for beauty, which will never be reduced to a mere pursuit of pleasure. Love is “as open-ended as life itself and remains the ground of meaning even in times of obsessive materialism” (Pérez-Gómez, 2006, p.5). There are three modalities of love designated by three Greek words, all of which are interrelated in human experience: eros, agape, and philia. In general, as used in the Christian New Testament, eros is a form of human love that is acquisitive, an egocentric love that perceives the value of its object, while agape is essentially God’s unqualified love for his creatures that creates value in an object by loving it, regardless of its virtues (p.120). Western culture somehow fails to understand love and beauty as experience, by “polarizing it between eros and agape, selfish pleasure and abstract charity” (p.121), profane and profound love, matter and spirit, and irrational aesthetics and rational ethics.

In difference from the Christian convention of love, both eros and agape can be regarded as a pair of inseparable concepts in relation to the nature of environmental aesthetics. Agape is about the absolute, unconditional value of all creatures in nature and their symbiotic coexistence in an ecosystem. Eros, on the other hand, is the relative, conditional value of certain characters and appearances of the object by human selection. Agape is a conceptual ideal of beauty focusing more on the altruistic eco-centric value of the environment; eros is experiential desire—usually sensual—for beauty stressing more the egoistic bio-centric predilection for it. As the core of my aesthetic investigation, what I am trying to emphasize here is philia as a link between these two conventional concepts of love, eros and agape. Pérez-Gómez (2006) describes it as social sympathy or compassion as in the following
Philia is at its best the *fullest expression* of human love…With the help of time, erotic love invites friendship; philia celebrates the *communicative capacity* of oral speech as the vehicle for assent and communion. Indeed, philia partakes of eros and agape… philia seeks ideal friendship to preserve the *common good*. Philia can thus be defined as ‘*social sympathy*’…Philia is more about loving than being loved, but philia implies *reciprocity* and thus has limitation. Like exponents of Eastern philosophy of *compassion*, Aristotle affirms the imperative of self-love. This is a principle of ethical and poetic action: *the logos of love*. (p.121-122)\(^43\)

Unlike other classic forms of love—eros or agape—philia depends on a perception of the other’s virtue that joins friends and citizens. This confirms why philia may be the best explanation of our love of place. In the aesthetic experience our love of place is constituted in the reciprocal friendship among many lives, neither a blind or radical love of the environmental good nor simply a response to a stimulus for mere hedonic pleasure. Our love of life entails the innate desire for existential safety by escaping from nature, learning environment to become familiar and to be a good citizen in a community, and an ultimate and infinite longing for returning back to what we used to be and where we are from, such as home, family, and nature. The aesthetic perception of landscape involves the love of life with others as a compassion for the environment, solidarity with a community, and sympathy for other living creatures. It is a process of the self growing and knowing other lives together within community. It is the social and cultural expansion of our humanity and friendship, as qualities of life, to the environment.

\(^43\) Italic marks are mine, and single quotation marks are Pérez-Gómez’s.
3.2 LOVE OF PLACE: THE MOODS AND THE MODES THE LIVING BODY “FEELS”

3.2.1 THE LANDSCAPE AS MOOD—A GOOD FEELING

No one will deny that love is an authentic and aesthetic experience. Love—whether it is called philia, eros, or other incarnations—is a universal experience that we all feel, know, want, and express as beauty. Love of place is a genuine individual experience as well as part of our social intercourse in community. It embodies culture embedded in nature: it is the transcendence from biophilia to topophilia. However, like our sense of beauty—despite the many psychologists and philosophers that have tackled it—it is hard to explain what love is or where it comes from, and it may be possible to describe only from our common sense of how it feels with references to other things. Thus, it would be a wiser attempt to further clarify the nature of both together, or to probe aesthetic qualities, identities, and features of place.

One of the common and classical misconceptions of the relationship between eros and beauty may be to see eros as a sensory phenomenon and beauty as visual appeal. It is in part true that both eros and our sense of beauty are interrelated in a strong connection with sensory organs and emotions. As I introduced in chapter 4, the biophilia hypothesis—biological origin of aesthetic pleasure—basically suggests that our aesthetic impulse (or perception, experience) is a universal desire in us for life and life-like processes. What I mean by desire is an emotional state, which is related to but not identical with eros, and rather a partial incarnation of love.

Desire, according to Solomon (1990, 1993), is a fundamental species of passion together with emotions and moods. Moods are defined as the “metaphysical generalizations” or as the
“indiscriminate universality” of the emotions, which may be closely related to our sense of communal feeling or emotional landscapes, because the landscape is the ambiance and in a way the atmosphere. Desire is built upon an emotional infrastructure and gives rise to appropriate emotions. Desire concerns not only the most primitive kind of hunger and thirst, but also “personal reputations and standing among one’s fellow men, desires for friendship and success, need for self-esteem, and the ultimate desire for happiness” (p.72). Without desire, “the very conceptions of happiness, love, and wisdom and joy become unintelligible” (p.71).

Let me clarify first the interchangeable quality of the environment and people: the difference between the place of love and the love of place is that between the aesthetic landscape and the aesthetic experience of landscape. Then, now it is clear that the aesthetic landscape can be restated as the place of desire, love, happiness, and thus, the environment of well-being. Happiness (or well-being) may be a teleological goal of all organisms, and at the same time, it is truly the spiritual, rational, emotional, and practical goal of human animals. To be a place of happiness (or well-being), landscape should be able to satisfy the primitive desire and necessity for survival, as well as the sophisticated desires like ambitions, wishes, and hopes. The

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44 Mood is the universal nature of religious passion, says Solomon (1993), this can explain why all religions have their particular ideals of gardens or architectural styles.

45 The relationship between desires and emotions is extremely complex and distinguishing them is not easy even in the fields of psychology and neurophysiology (Solomon, 1993, p.72).

46 I will not attempt further clarifications of the psychological and philosophical meanings among these desire, love, happiness, and well-being, other than relating them to aesthetic landscape and experience as I have tackled so far.
most primitive sense of well-being may come from our ordinary use of language—“feeling good.”

It is the whole bodily perception, arising from the resolution of the basic desires for bodily comfort, safety, food, or relaxation. Even in the most rarefied aesthetics it is agreed that our experiences of the arts feel good in simple-to-profound ways (Dissanayake, 1995, p.24). The word feeling, here in relation to aesthetics, is meant to be the total body perception and judgment that integrate both emotions and sensory perceptions, such as hedonic pleasure, affective feelings, or affects, as a mode of behavior discussed in Chapter 4.

Love built upon bodily desire is typically called eroticism and is experientially inseparable from biophilia. Eroticism is one of the primitive as well as one of the more sophisticated passions for well-being. Pérez-Gómez (2006) maintains that the concept of Eros as desire calls for three structural components: the lover, the beloved, and the space-time that comes in between (p.32). Erotic space is not an objective geometric entity but the electrified void between two entities that are brought together and kept apart. It is the space of both spatial and temporal embodiment that separates, connects, reveals, conceals, harmonizes, unites, adjusts, and bears dramatic events. Such an electrified void in-between that attracts and makes

47 James-Lange Theory” in the 1930 has initially termed the word “Emotion felt” or “feeling” or “the effects of the various emotions on behavior.” With Dewey’s “Theory of emotion,” These non-psychologists have focused rather on the experiential component of emotion, and have held to the traditional interpretation of an emotion as a species of feeling or affects. They also treated feelings identifiable from sensations. See Solomon’s book, “What is an Emotion?” (2003).
people *feel good* is important in the landscape. Landscape is essentially erotic because “the positions and movements of our bodies produce its kinesthesia of the basic dimensions of space” (Tuan, 1993, p.35) between the moving (loving) body and the beloved landscapes.

### 3.2.2 THE LANDSCAPE AS THE MODE OF THE MOVING BODY

The loving experience of landscape is strongly connected with multi-sensory pleasures—the original, intimate, and individual part of the bodily experience. It is useful to be reminded that all basic five senses such as sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch are proximately concentrated on the face. The face is by far the most expressive part, yet at the same time, a vulnerable and subtle part of the body. “The face is the index of the whole person” (Tuan, 1998, p.57). In any culture the face impresses us at the first sight, becomes a critical object of beauty, and therefore easily commands love.

The face has both general characteristics shared by people everywhere and distinctive identities of socio-cultural groups and individuals. The facial expression of an infant is easy to understand and we readily appreciate the genuine nature of such emotional states as happiness, hunger, pain, warmth, anger, sadness, etc., not only because we all had been infants before, but also because we share the structure of our body and the basic senses as human beings. Things having faces create a *natural* domain for the expression of emotional characteristics and qualities, projecting moods of place that seem familiar to us. Rubbing the skin of our face against a beloved animal is an almost universal expression of love; the symmetrical front door of architectural façades greets people in the public realm and projects a kind spirit into the
Consequently, places composed of these elements and characteristics—places that have social faces facing us, have genuine expressive qualities, seem accessible and arouse multisensory responses—make us feel good and are easy to love. In general feeling as a total body perception is apt to be much concerned with the sense of touch. Aristotle identified five sensations constituting the sense of touch: pressure, warmth, cold, pain, and kinesthesia. James Gibson (1966) proposed alternate basic five senses of perceptual system by adding the two—the basic-orienting and the haptic systems, instead of the touch—to the visual, the auditory, and the taste-smell, capable of obtaining information about objects in the world without the intervention of an intellectual process (Bloomer & Moore, 1977, p.33).

All senses have spatial and temporal dimensions of how the body feels—or what we

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have called an erotic dimension. In narrow sense aesthetics often tended to be reduced to an aspect of sensory experience. What gives Aristotle’s notion of kinesthesia or Gibson’s basic-orienting and haptic systems greater significance in the aesthetics of place making is that they harbor the potential of “making love” with place, for the loving experience in space and time is felt through the moving and therefore living body—the self with-in the world.

Sight immediately gives us a visual world, *out there.* “Self without a world is reduced to mere body” (Tuan, 1993, p.96). The visual world has the greatest definition and scope. “Sight for humans is our distance sensor as smell is for many other animals” (p.98) because “distant objects can only be seen” (1974, p.12). The visual world is both spatial and temporal and both sensual and intellectual. The sensual qualities provide a visual delight with color, light, shape, and tactile quality we almost both see and *feel.* On the other hand, the world perceived through the eyes is more abstract than through the other senses, because it is the consequence of both abstracting and extracting things (detached) from the environment. Some words—insight, vision, perspective, and the soul as the eyes of the mind—tell us that our eyes are perceived as a vehicle to the mind.

The visual world is both practical and aesthetic. Objects in the visual world, for humans, are things that can be picked up by eyes, and examined for practical (e.g. avoiding a car) or inherent (or aesthetic) interests (e.g. watching a sleeping cat). The shape or size of objects located in various distances in space then can be felt through actions. In other words, seeing is *feeling* as well as *behaving*—kinesthesia. Color is so fundamental an aesthetic property that we take it for granted and seem to feel, not merely see, in the landscape. Colors in patterns evoke a
“vital sense of life—\textit{aesthesia}” (1993, p.102); without them the world becomes gray, dull, boring, depressing, and lifeless—a form of anaesthesia. For these reason the visual world, for humans or other mammals who can feel and behave, is the world of “pattern rather than of composition” (p.97).

Sound is a sign of life. When living things move they make sounds. Through sounds we feel our whole being as connected with the world. A singing bird, playing children, a cooking mother, an alarm clock, or a postman stepping up, even the traffic noise from the street, announce the existence of habitual life in the world. “Infants in the womb can hear their mother’s breathing and heart-beating, digestive processes, and muscle and joint movement. They register messages from the external world even before the birth, and become accustomed to their parents’ voices” (p.71-72). The steady sound of organic life, of heart beats and rhythms, provides comfort as a sign of health. Our biological fondness for beats and rhythms gives music the power to immediately grips our heart. Human voices are the most familiar, and thereby we tend to have the greater sensitivity to, as well as the capacity to make judgments on, the volume or the quality of another’s voice.

The auditory world makes time intelligible in space and space haptic in time. Sounds flow as repetitive patterns with their tone, beat, pitch, pause, intervals, and waves. We can feel the wind as a form of sound when breathing, sleeping, walking, running, or swimming in our daily activities. A particular sound can carry bodily emotions, a haptic-sensuality such as feeling husky, cold, thrilling, sweet, nervous, sharp, heavy, sticky, or relaxing, etc., which evokes most aesthetic as well as most discriminative sensations. Auditory perception “seeks to build up total
musical experience as an emotional response to complex tonal stimuli, reinforced by sensations of contrast, surprise, familiarity, and personal association” (Langer, 1953, p.106).

“Music makes time audible, and its form and continuity sensible” (p.110). It is a universal feeling that musical instruments somehow engender intimate emotional relations with the organs and the flesh of the body. The piano is a keyed instrument for fingers moving around in a linear space with high and low pitches and stepping rhythms up and down the black and white keys. The position of the fingers, the force of their touch, carries the mass and the volume of music. The violin, a stringed instrument, on the other hand, makes a sensuous, direct connection with the ears, creating the sound and beat of the heart, and the flows and vibrations of blood and the internal organs together. The human invention of music and of musical instruments are indeed proof of our aesthetic passions (love) for the felt body in space and time. Dewey (1934) writes:

Music, for example, gives us the very essence of the dropping down and the exalted rising, the surging and retreating, the acceleration and retardation, and tightening and loosening, the sudden thrust and the gradual insinuation of things. The expression is _abstract_ in that it is freed from attachment to this and that, while at the same time it is intensely direct and _concrete_. (p.208)

A musical sequence is “an image of lived or experienced time—the passage of life that we feel as expectations become now” (Langer, 1953, p.109). Music describes our universal sense of love and joins us spiritual communication. Music is called the sound of nature. Music describes or orchestrates the passage of life, composed with tone, harmony, melody, accents, and rhythms. Beethoven’s Symphony No. 6 in F major, op. 68, “The Pastoral” represents the
feelings and sensations of the awakening joy, gratitude, and love of all living creatures in the midst of landscape. Music represents the mood as well as the mode of experience—lived time, life, and landscapes. Landscape as experience can be composed as the music of our habitual life.

Smell-taste is most intimate and immediate to a haptic and tactile quality. Many animals collect environmental information by the primacy of smell-taste and tactility. Eating is an essential mode of touching the external world as a means of survival and infants explore their environment with their mouth that adjusts to the contour of the mother’s breast (Tuan, 1977, p.21). For the infant sucking requires the participation of the different senses of touch, smell, and taste. Sucking the breast and feeding milk is one of the most rewarding activities for both mother and her baby, for it gives them a mutual sense of contentment. The memory associated with the sense of smell-taste is extremely strong, never forgotten, reminding us of various types of environments in the past, such as things, persons, events, time, and places. Homesickness is likely to languish for mother-made-food. Eating is a biological imperative, yet it is also transformed to a daily ritual, a genuine social event and celebration, tied to cultural manners and traditions, and even a spiritual exercise in its own right with a long history. Smell-taste and its relation to tactile elements constitute the most intimate visceral environment, immediately sticking to a deep feeling from the bottom of our heart.

Ironically, this deep intimate feeling from the heart is at the same time connected to the fact that we are also animals. Like animals, we too have to eat. Eating may give us bitter-sweet taste, for it is morally ambiguous. Like other animals, we eat and sustain life by destroying and eviscerating other organisms. At the same time, in this activity, our biological imperatives as
animals are joined to sensual delights, to art, and to “the claims of cultural taste, refined achievement known as good taste” (Tuan, 1993, p.46). Tuan says (1998, p.32-33) wanting to be more natural and animal-like, and at the same time, attempting to cover and to transcend our animality is a universal human trait as a cultural attainment. Religion, as one of our cultural institutions, makes an important contribution to this transcendence, in terms of its habitual and spiritual practice of eating and fasting. Buddhism, for example, encourages meditation to be one with the spirit of the universe, and prohibits the killing of animals and the eating of meat. Christianity, on the other hand, emphasizes “the very power of the shared meal to cement friendship provides the opportunity for its betrayal,“(p.47) as embedded in the most sacred rite, the Lord’s Supper (Holy Communion)—Christ’s last supper with his disciples.

The visual, the auditory, and the smell-taste senses create strong feelings—from the biological to the cultural—for place, combined with our given ability to move—kinesthesia, the basic-orienting and haptic system. Basic orientation refers to our postural sense of up and down, depending on gravity, and our total body, based on our frontal sensory systems, balances this postural orientation—back and front, or left and right. It is true for most mammals including humans that a fundamental sense of orientation is derived from taking a few steps after their mother, and with the participation of the entire body it becomes a strong feeling for place. The ability to transcend this basic condition, the limitations of our body and our senses, is fundamental to humans.

Our upright body posture and kinesthetic system, together with our use of tools, machines, and other technological devices, enlarge our sense of space and our experiential
boundary—in its synesthetic, kinesthetic, and associational dimension—of the environment. Sight or sound can be extended telescopically or electronically; our ability to touch objects is extended with a cane, with chopsticks, or with a knife beyond our the reach of our hands; the body as the *felt qualities of space* gains in size from our mother’s womb, to the reach of our arms, to a personal room, a house, a town, a city, and ultimately the earth; the body as the *felt qualities of time* gains in speed from our mother’s pace, to a bicycle, a car, a bus, a train, a plane, or a space craft.

An engaging environment exemplifies the potential for such (aesthetic) experience more clearly and forcefully than in our encounter with the arts, for our environment exhibits many of the qualities and features for our total bodily perception more explicitly and empathetically than those in the arts. It is “a true synaesthesia, perceptually continuous union of sensory modalities” (Berleant, 1992, p.28): it is sensed through our feet, kinesthetic sensation of our movement, in the feel of sun, and wind on our skin, and also includes what lies before my eye, what is behind our back, beneath my feet, above our head (p.27). “We cannot grasp any idea, any organ of mediation, we cannot possess it in its full force, until we have felt and sensed it… Different ideas have their different ‘feels,’ their immediate qualitative aspects” (Dewey, 1934, p.119).

Synaesthesia is a symbolic fusion of the senses, and also becomes even more intense when it is interfused with some visceral, instinctive responses (see also Table 6.3). “Qualities of sense, those of touch, taste as well as of sight and hearing, have aesthetic quality…only in their connections; as interacting, not as simple and separate entities” (p.120). The unity of senses and
impulses are not so much direct feelings on a human existential basis, i.e. our animal-likeness, as they are a “ground-plan” of meanings in human experience. Dewey (1934) writes:

Full recognition is therefore, of the continuity of the organs, needs and basic impulses of the human creature with his animal forbears, implies no necessary reduction of man to the level of the brutes. On the contrary, it makes possible the drawing of a ground-plan of human experience upon which is erected the superstructure of man’s marvelous and distinguishing experience. What is distinctive in man makes it possible for him to carry to new and unprecedented heights that unity of sense and impulse, of brain and eye and ear, that is exemplified in animal life, saturating it with the conscious meanings derived from communication and deliberate expression. (p.22-23)

3.2.3 LANDSCAPE AS THE PLACE FOR CHILD-LIKENESS

As discussed, engaging the environment means to extend our body boundary to the environment, and feelings (or our sense of well-being) typically are conjoined with specific identifiable sensations. Love is a universal experience of what feels good and right. It is said that Aristotle identified the sources of our emotions were our hearts, not brains (Solomon, 1993). This is non-sense in today’s scientific sense, but makes a great sense in our individual experience of love, because it is the way our body and mind feel together as one. Despite the fact that contemporary culture seems to overly emphasize the destructive and possessive desire for material things in the world, a deep rooted love is born in the heart at birth and is profoundly extended to the world as the soul learns to grow.

It is often said that children have a lot to teach to adults. Children’s perceptual categories of environment are by far more sharp, empathetic, discriminative, and highly
expressive than those of adults. According to Tuan (1977), at birth an infant’s cerebral cortex has only about 10-20 percent of the normal complement of nerve cells of a mature brain, which means that children are more visceral and closer to our animal nature. The infant cannot distinguish between self and an external environment, and evidently experiences a world in which the body and environment tend to fuse. Then infants slowly learn to distinguish themselves from their mother and begin to understand physical properties of the environment through grasping, sucking, and moving around.

Children’s frames of reference are rather restricted. They begin to divide things into two categories: the familiar and the strange, and the inside and the outside world, long before they acquire their ability for verbal or visual expression (Bloomer & Moore, 1977, p.38; Tuan, 1977, p.24). The inside and the outside world are discovered simultaneously through transactions between the body and the environment, and the accumulation and the repetition of these transactions register in the children’s world into familiar or strange categories. Children are caught up in the excitement of people, things, and events: they “learn quickly about spatial relationship through imaginative play” (Tuan, 1977, p.27), but “going from one place to another—way finding—is not their responsibility” (p.26). That is to say, children know how to explore their environment aesthetically better than adults.

Therefore, if we want to understand the aesthetic exploration of place, it might make sense to examine the characteristics of children’s emotional ties to place, simply because we all

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49 Children’s “knowing the environment” in this sense is not a purely intellectual act, but a bodily knowledge.
used to be a child in the past. First, children have a strong sense of attachment to particular places. As I said before, the world of children does not separate the environment from the self—body and mind, and places are vividly recorded in children’s body memory. This sense of belonging originates from an infants’ feeling toward its mother as an essential shelter and as a physical and psychological source of comfort. A sense of feeling homeless or placeless is an extended loss of solidarity, of socio-cultural communion, as a feeling of being at home is the result of our deep-seated connection to our mother and an emotional extension from the first social contact with our mother.

Second, love seeks a promise of stability. Children love familiar places that stand for stability and permanence as the mother who is always around when needed. Children hate being lost, and feel most comfortable with the presence of parents: parents are their most familiar environment. The absence of familiar and intimate features of the habitual environment leaves children emotionally adrift. The places to which we feel strongly attached always exhibit many familiar dimensions associated with our habit, or with particular events from our memories of childhood. However, “much of the child’s combative possessiveness is not evidence of genuine attachment” (Tuan, 1977, p.32), for belonging is opposite to possessing: e.g. I love my cat because I belong to her, not because she “belongs to me” in the sense of possessing her.

Third, some places seem to easily attract and immediately capture our attention. Like kittens, children are full of curiosity and can “fall in love” with a place at the first sight. Love is often described as a magnetic, magical, or mysterious force as well as a dynamic interaction of two entities. Children instinctively desire to discover secret, adventurous, and mystical places
here and there—branching out from the comfort of the familiar—and develop steady friendships by playing with one another in these places. It may be reasonable to say that in our ordinary experience what attracts children is aesthetically more significant than what may attract adults, because they blindly fall in love with a place for the simple and genuine experience it offers—as an end in itself—immune to practical, economic, or political concerns, which renders things merely as instruments, as means to ends that lie outside themselves.

Lastly, children have a great empathy with many living and non-living things in their environment. “Empathy is a translation of the German word Einfühlung—feeling into—coined for the first time in 1873 by the philosopher Robert Vischer” (Dissanayake, 1995, p.142), who spoke of a person forming an emotional union with objects by projecting our personal emotions into them. The world of children is filled fantasies and dreams. They get to know physical things by assigning special names and characters to them or by projecting their own personalities into them—for them empathy is also a process of familiarizing an environment and of making friends. Children are fond of toys and dolls, for they are an imitation of the self, of their engaging world, and of their embodied personality. Children project personality into objects, animals, and natural features, such as sun, moon, wind, and trees, to create and to live in an imaginative world of anthropomorphic animals or physiognomic, animated objects—probably all reasons why they Disney World is a big success with children.

Philia is often described as a form of social sympathy and empathy as an important incarnation of love. Dissanayake (1995, p.142) says, “Empathy is a kind of super sympathy,” because it “has been appropriated by psychoanalysis to refer to the capacity of an individual to
feel the needs, the aspirations, the frustrations, the joy, the sorrow, the hurt, the hunger of others as if they were his own.” Vischer’s empathy was an extraordinary thought to explain the way the feelings of the artist, while making a work of art, could become the content of the work. Later Theodor Lipps further developed *Einfühlung* as not only the way of making a work of art but also “the appreciation of a work of art depended upon the capacity of the spectator to project his personality into the object of contemplation” (p.143). For Lipps, empathy has become the feeling of the inner self or “the objective environment of self,” which might be embodied in and “projected to the walls, doorways, and domes of a building” (Bloomer & Moore, 1977, p.27).

Empathy is a form of aesthetic affection. Although the term is not widely used by art theorists today, it may explain why children are in general highly imaginative, imitative, and expressive. To develop empathy as well as sympathy, quite natural to children, may take some effort for adults. Without any further and more detailed definitions form psychology or philosophy, a simple distinction and connect can be made between the two: sympathy is a social term, as receiving from, sharing with, and supporting someone’s feelings; empathy is one’s active attitude or behavior to feel others’ feelings as if they were our own. It is very much a bodily capacity, because “through it, one can experience something akin to ‘getting out of our bodies’ ” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p.565). We tend to be sympathetic (or empathetic) with the feelings of people and with objects we possess, know, or are familiar with, but these feelings of

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sympathy or empathy may not happen as easily with those who we feel are far from our daily life, e.g. wild animals, non-living organism.

Like the world of children and of artists—who seem to share some of their sensibilities—the environment should be able to re-create empathetically the objective projection of the self by imagination and symbolism. The capacity for imaginative projection is “experientially, a form of transcendence,” “a form of being in the other,” and “a major part of what has always been called spiritual experience” (p.565).

![Figure 6.10](image-url)

**Figure 6.10**: The heart of a child and the soul of a poet (Mark Twain)  

Empathetic feeling is the emotional and cognitive faculty developed from childhood that we do not want to lose as we grow up—as, unfortunately, many of us seem to do—because

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it attaches ourselves to place as the transcendence of the self to the environment, and thus may help us conceive and create relevant and engaging landscapes for all. Empathy arises from our ethical as well as aesthetic imagination and is a form of love that fuses them into an inseparable whole. It is the heart of a child as well as the soul of a poet (e.g. Figure 6.10).

3.3 LOVE OF PLACE: SYMBOLIC MEANINGS THE MIND “SEEKS”

3.3.1 PLACE AS A SYMBOLIC SYSTEM OF LIVED LIFE

Culture, as we know, is by nature a meaning (or a belief) system, and a system of knowledge. The concept of landscape has replaced the notion of place, and its “aesthetic appreciation” has replaced the love of place. This replacement probably occurred out of a perceived difficulty in the conventional use of the terms landscape and beauty: the one has been misinterpreted in a too narrow view; the other has become extremely isolated from our ordinary awareness. Regardless of conventional landscape types—whether vernacular, historical, urban, or rural, scholars such as Lynch, Alexander, Smith, Jackson, Tuan, and many others’ aesthetic notions about cultural landscape are very much based upon the two distinct, yet interdependent dimensions: the ordinary and the symbolic.

Seemingly, the ordinary is perceived as an opposition to the symbolic. It may be due to “some inherent antagonism between the process of normal living and creating and enjoyment of works of aesthetic art” (Dewey, 1934, p.27). The problematic nature of this opposition becomes more clear if we think about our special experience of love. Love has the capacity to turn ordinary daily routines into extra-ordinary events because of its symbolic power. Since love
can arise anytime in anybody, it harbors the broadest and deepest potential for feelings we share. The ordinary-and-symbolic (or both material and spiritual) dimension is present in any aesthetic experience, but the cultural landscape, as I already discussed in the aesthetic lexicon of vernacular landscapes, reinforces these aesthetic dimensions even more explicitly, because the environment offers everything we constantly interact with, and thus constitutes the materialization of how we feel, act, and think as our meaning system. The aesthetic landscape makes us feel good and think right and well: it makes our experience meaningful.

Mark Johnson (1987) proposes that the emergence of meaning is very much based on an embodied structure, called schema, which may simply refer to a softer name for a qualitative reasoning system, i.e. a symbolic system. Meanings never occur from nowhere and from nothing; they are always based on something and tend to generate more meanings by thinking of or referring to something else. As much as our ordinary language describes cultural and natural properties systemically as the ways we feel, act, and think, so does our ordinary landscape constitute a system of meaningful relationships among things, people, animals, architecture, or all living and non-living creatures.

Trees may be the single best example. We are interacting with trees in a variety of ways: they give us shade and privacy and coolness in the summer, and are a simple source of pleasure. Each domesticated tree calls for an individual sense of responsibility and sometimes even a kind of parental pride. That is, we care about trees and trees care for us. Our responses to trees are “far richer, than a strictly passive-aesthetic or ecological response to forest” (Jackson, 1994, p.95). “Trees because of their everyday importance, eventually acquired symbolic values” (p.96).
Almost all cultures depicted trees as mystical creatures, as the habitat of elves in familiar fairy tales, and even individual trees have been given names and their own symbolic significance based on specific local cultures. Furthermore, trees are experienced as the symbolized human body, and metaphorically refer to abstract or logical concepts in our reasoning with such components as roots, branches, fruits, seeds, trunks, and, in their multitude, as forests. Trees are indeed one of the richest sources of meanings in our existence, and our love of trees is a search for the beauty and the truth of life. Jackson (1994) writes:

Our true seeking for trees derives from an ancient source—from centuries of domesticating, improving, protecting, and loving those other forms of life which are part of our daily existence…in order to express a variety of basic emotions; the need to celebrate the home, the need for beauty, the need for some living thing to protect and transform, the need to pass on to the future some sign of our existence. (p.102)

It would be tragic indeed if environmental planners and dwellers would think of trees merely as a visual element for decoration or as an evidence of the presence of oxygen, of wood for our use, and as providing fruits and foods, things we consume or exploit, and not paying attention to their symbolic significance. If we do not think of objects in the environment as being more than what they are used for, we will be unable to discover values beyond their economic benefits, but when our ordinary landscapes support many living creatures associated with our own life story they also able provide us with profound symbolic sources to conceptualize as well as to beautify our world. Simply imagine a world without trees: no birds nesting and singing, no fairy tales and myths, no love stories, and no paintings and poems.
exalting the beauty and significance of trees—just by the absence of trees alone the human mind would be sterilized, lacking a significant source of emotion and knowledge and a fundamental ingredient to our sense of well-being.

Like trees, important things in life, as signs of many lives, tend to develop into cultural symbols. Our utilitarian or biological desire for something may be the beginning of love as a necessary condition, but is not a sufficient condition for such important life-values as love and beauty. Langer (1942) argues that symbolism makes the human world distinctive above the level of sheer animality: animals merely use signs as biological stimulus-response patterns, but “man, unlike all other animals, uses ‘signs’ not only to indicate things, but also to represent them.” Symbols serve to “let us thinking of or referring to what is not here” (p.37), to discover meanings, and symbolism is therefore an imaginative faculty in search of what is more above and beyond signs—a form of aesthetic transcendence.

Through symbolic transformation and identification physical objects and landscape features are able to represent abstract and implicit concepts as they are embodied or incarnated in ordinary experience or in common and explicit notions. Thus they can become the source of aesthetic pleasure, not just because they abound everywhere, but because they are bound up with our common experience and our lived lives. Love is alike: to explain what love is, we need to identify from where it comes, what it is related to, and what is about—in other words we need experiential references which allow us to generate further symbolic inferences. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) emphasize the power of conventional, primary metaphors for a proposition of a general theory of meaning:
Our experience of love is basic—as basic as our experience of motion or physical force or objects. But as an experience, it is not highly structured on its own terms. There is some literal inherent structure to love in itself: a lover, a beloved, feelings of love, and a relationship, which has an onset and often an end point. But that is not very much inherent structure. The metaphor system gives us much, more. When we comprehend the experience of love, when we think and talk about love, we have no choice but to conceptualize mostly in terms of our conventional metaphors—to conceptualize it not on its own terms, but in terms of other concepts. (p.70)

The conventional metaphors quoted below are, in short, felt body metaphors.\(^\text{52}\) Synaesthesia is an example of a conventional, primary metaphor. It is a universal felt-body metaphor, for it is the symbolic fusion of the senses with kinesthesia, normally inferred from our immediate and direct experience. Johnson (1987) calls this metaphor system as “experiential Gestalt\(^\text{53}\) as a constraining schema” of the meaning. The word “constraining” indicates that there is an identifiable structure (or schema) from which our experience is embodied, and our concepts, logics, and imagery are abstracted. For example, “The Life (Love)-Is-A-Journey”

\(^{52}\) Lakoff and Johnson (1999.p.46) term the symbolic inference through the felt body metaphor as “theory of primary metaphors.” This seems to be congruent with Dewey’s notion of emotion as quality of an aesthetic experience.

\(^{53}\) “Experiential Gestalt” (Johnson, 1987, p.41) is used as the expression of the wholeness of both the bodily perception and embodied mind. Simply speaking, it is to say “feeling” involves reciprocally a generative system of conceptual meaning. I have referred to Dewey’s notion of “an experience” as the unified (aesthetic) experience that does not separate body from mind in experience. It is also distinguished from traditional Koffka’s Gestalt psychology in the sense that bodily-spatial experience is different from visual composition.
metaphor\textsuperscript{a} is a conceptual structure that facilitates the reasoning for its occurrence and relations in an embodiment of journey. Similarly, Langer (1942) talks about the power of symbols lies in an “unconscious, spontaneous process of abstraction” as well as “a process of recognizing the concept in any configuration given to experience, and forming a conception accordingly” (p.70). This is also the reason why both artists and scientists are interested in using symbolic representation: it makes it efficient to recognize as well as express the characteristics of relationships both logically and perceptually.

This also justifies the need of symbolic representation in the interpretation of landscapes. We make patterns of symbols, words, images, etc. that represent the very different yet analogous relationships among things, events, and characters in our landscape experience, similar to a sentence in language. In the interpretation of landscape, “aesthetic explanation can never be direct and straightforward...Its occurrence and identification are our standpoints” (Berleant, 1992, p.15). Dewey (1934) similarly stresses beauty as a theoretical rather than an analytical term:

\begin{quote}
Beauty, conventionally assumed to be the especial theme of aesthetics, has hardly been mentioned in what precedes. It is properly an emotional term, though one \textit{denoting a characteristic} emotion. In the presence of a landscape, a poem or a picture that lays hold of us with immediate poignancy, we are moved to murmur or to exclaim ‘how beautiful.’ The ejaculation is a just \textit{tribute to the capacity} of the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{a} The Love-Is-A-Journey metaphor is a conceptual system with metaphoric components: Journey—A love, The lovers—Travelers, Their common goals—Destinations, The love relationship—A vehicle, Love difficulties—Impediments to motion, etc. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
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object to arouse admiration that approaches worship. Beauty is at the furthest removed from an analytic term, and hence forms a conception that can figure in theory as a means of explanation or classification. (p.129)

In this respect, signs serve for mere recognition, but symbols serve for the development of a full perception. “In recognition, we fall back, as upon a stereotype, upon some previously formed scheme. Some arrangement of details serves as cue for bare identification, only physical characteristics, of which we were not previously aware” (Dewey, 1934, p.52). “Symbols function aesthetically, not as an intellectual object that facilitate the analysis of meaning but as a vehicle for the direct perception of an identity between it and the object symbolized” (Berleant, 2000, p.114). From this it should be clear that symbols are an apt vehicle for the experience of felt meanings.

3.3.2 LOVE OF PLACE: SEARCH FOR THE MYTHICAL AND POETIC LANDSCAPE

Cultural symbols must communicate successfully with our inhabited life patterns. If they do not fit to long accepted formulae of behaviors and habits, they would not last, for culture is a resilient structure, resistant to dramatic change. We now live in a time of materialistic abundance and technological advancement that constantly propels the literal production and reproduction of new symbols such as icons, images, codes, and styles. It is a very false idea to assume that any massive production, because of its accessibility and abundance, constitutes and generates cultural and symbolic meaning. The material products may use some symbols for the self-referential expression and may not be representative and therefore meaningless. “The relevance a
symbol has is experiential rather than referential” (Berleant, 2000, p.115).

The same applies to a work of art and our environment. The surrounding environments we experience must *represent* things that are meaningful to our life and to our love of community, instead of literally *presenting* social classes, functional zones, commercial boundaries, intended to control, conceal, and to color our collective, unconscious experience of the world. We have had a tendency to see landscape as an environmental product, not as “a work of art” that contributes to aesthetic, meaningful experience. Even if we thought of the environment as a work of art, we still tend to have the wrong idea that symbols contribute to identifying art, and not to the identification of the aesthetic function of objects (p.116). Of course, artists tend to import symbols all the time, but their works may not be meaningful without such an important aesthetic function, i.e. a form of communication. Dewey (1934) states:

> To say in general that a work of art is or is not representative is meaningless. For the word has many meanings...If literal reproduction is signified by ‘representative’ then the work of art...ignores the uniqueness of the work... *Representation* may also mean that the works of art tells something to those who enjoy it about the nature of their own experience of the world: that it *presents the world in a new experience* which they undergo. (p.83)

Dewey’s notion of “a new experience” does not mean a new creation of a thing or a message artists create for their own sake, but rather consisting of common messages and symbols out of which we can create and infer new meanings to learn more about the self, the

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55 Single quotation marks are Dewey’s, italics are mine.
community, and the world.

Here I would like to remind ourselves that such notions as the identities and qualities of place, sense of place, patterns of community, structures of ordinary life, love of place, and others discussed in this chapter, have emphasized our deep-rooted symbolic values and meanings of life to some extent: we could call it forms of universal symbolism. As I have highlighted so far, various theoretical perspectives of place theory, of the urban landscape, of vernacular landscapes, and of our love of place seem to illuminate three modes of universal symbolism, all of which are distinct but at the same time overlapping and inseparable: Phenomenological (existential) symbolism, Behavioral (archetypal) symbolism, and Ecological (holistic and organic) symbolism. Because of their communicative as well as aesthetic function that contributes to the cultural formation of landscape, I strongly believe that these three types of symbolism are of great practical significance in environmental design as aesthetic fundamentals.

In addition, these three areas are strongly associated with our empathetic, or synaesthetic, or supernatural feeling of the self in our surroundings, which consequently also involves relevant meanings of life, love, and place. This sympathetic vibration of feeling, thought, and body together with imagination “merges with the universal depths of our common human natural being” (Berleant, 2000, p.118). Such an integral experience, following Dewey (1934), has an aesthetic quality:

It is not possible to divide in a vital experience the practical, emotional, and intellectual from one another, and to set the properties of one over against the characteristics of the others. The emotional phase binds parts together into a single whole; the ‘intellectual’ simply names the fact that the experience has
meaning; ‘practical’ indicates that the organism is interacting with events and objects which surround it. The most elaborate philosophic or scientific inquiry and the most ambitious industrial or political enterprise has, when its different ingredients constitute an integral experience, aesthetic quality. (p.55)

The symbolic nature of aesthetic experience has the emotional phase—feeling—which integrates these three—phenomenological, psychological, and ecological—aspects of the self, transcendent to the world. The “intellectual” in Dewey’s passage means simply to conceptualize the experience; the term “practical” presents the reality—the organic relationships we perceive between the self and the world. Consequently, my point is that the identification of aesthetic landscapes should include symbolic structures as experiential universality, which can associate simultaneously all existential, ecological, and psychological meanings of the self and the world.

Since almost all art forms have symbols aiming for aesthetic representation and communication, all the arts—at least in theory—have the potential to contribute to arousing our sympathetic vibration in relation to our everyday experience. The arts in general abstract the substantial aesthetic properties from landscape and nature and express such emotions through their own medium of representation. Landscape is a rich source of our imagination, but at the same time it is also a work of art: that is, it has its own medium of representation. However, unfortunately many landscape artists and designers do not seem to realize the very meaning of abstraction and representation in the lived environment. Environmental designers, if they believe nature is the source of imagination and the habitat of the human being, must first abstract symbolic patterns and dimensions that compose sympathetic and synaesthetic vibration of time, space, and body, i.e. the felt body in the lived landscape, and then represent them again
differently, in much more sensible and sensuous ways into the medium of our present living landscape, not into a static scene, a blue print full of visual symbols.

The arts are the great source from which to learn the process of abstraction and representation, because as discussed, they all have empathetic and sensuous ingredients fused into spatial and temporal experience. I suggest that poetry and myth could be the most helpful aesthetic sources for the symbolic representation of landscape, because mythical or poetic components of art better portray the universal symbolism of human existence than other forms of art.

![Figure 6.11: Interrelated characteristics of mythical and poetic space](image)

There are interlocking characteristics in mythical and poetic space in light of universal symbolism, each of which is defined by the others, as identified in the following links:
Aesthetics from “The Center”: Sense of Life in Culture

Archetype is a deeper structure that underlies the similarities of human spatial and temporal perception and the basic geometry in the mental process. The basic binary conception is configured in human perception, and symbolizes the harmony of the opposite and dynamic pairs: earth-sky, woman-man, profane-sacred, evil-good, lunar-solar, left-right, down-up, dark-light, soft-hard, yin-yang, and close-open, and even inside-outside, this-that, to-fro, front-back. The circle, as Jungian psychoanalysts see it, is a symbol of wholeness and harmony as an archetypal image of the reconciliation of opposites. It also is a common geometric and cosmological schema embedded in “the arts of ancient Eastern civilizations, in the thinking of ancient Greece, and in Christian art, in the alchemical practices of the Middle ages” (Tuan, 1974, p.17). Bipolar, tripartite, four-folds, five-folds, the seven and twelve elements are the basic abstract as well as concrete symbolic schemata in the structuring of the universe and of human life. The tripartite is an important epistemological structure in the knowledge and imagination of the universe, the self, and the in-between: the left-center-right, the below-center-above, the back-center-front, or the in-center (boundary)-out.  

The square is associated with four cardinal points, four-body postures—up-down-left-

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56 A most influential philosophical theory tends to maintain a conceptual unity and archetypal simplicity. Both Eastern and Western philosophy maintain the tripartite conceptual structure: heaven (yang)-people (mediator)-earth (yin); Plato’s beauty-truth-the good; Aristotle’s pathos-logos-ethos; Hegel’s thesis-anti-thesis-synthesis; Christian trinity, and so forth.
right (vertical and horizontal space), four cardinal points and seasons, along with geometric symmetry, and mathematical simplicity as well as profundity. The square is a mythical schema, associated with human psychology. “The Greek idea of four elements—earth, fire, water, and air—appeared during the 5th Century B.C., at roughly the time when the idea of five elements—earth (center), water, fire, wood, and metal—surfaced in China” (Tuan, 1974, p.20).

In the Western cosmology, the four elements and the seven planets such as Sun, Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn are symbols that represent the basic energies or impulses in the human psyche and temperaments. On the other hand, in the Eastern (Chinese) cosmology, the five-fold schema represents four cardinals and the center. The balance of the bipolar idea of Yin and Yang and the five elements comprise significant meaning systems, linked to the seven visible planets as well as the basic units of time—the seven day week (see Table 6.5).

The epistemological and cosmological similarity in Eastern and Western culture may explain why human beings have a tendency to structure their worlds in a limited number of such basic categories such as substances, the basic body-orienting system, the cardinal points, the four seasons, personality types, colors, and different kinds of life forces—the emotions. Particularly in the Eastern culture, as manifested in the Feng-shui \(^{57}\) geomancy, the aspect, the

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\(^{57}\) “Feng-Shui” literally refers to wind (air or force) and water in Chinese character. In many respects, Feng-Shui theory can be understood as a science-based poetry, with great aesthetic potentials, for it theorized archetypal patterns of both natural and cultural living.
direction, the center facing the south-east, and the dynamics of all related natural settings have greatly influenced the Eastern perception of dwelling. On the other hand, “the detailed ordering of the components varies greatly from culture to culture” (p.23). The Chinese five elements and yin-yang philosophy are modifiers and affect the characteristics of each of the *twelve animal* signs, the traditional Eastern medicine, music, and other various forms of folk art. Similarly, the Greek four elements are broken down into *the twelve animal* signs, combined with three qualities—personal (fixed), social (mutable), and universal (cardinal)—and represent highly sophisticated descriptions of human emotion, the personality traits, and sensible and rational qualities of the world.

**Table 6.5: A Comparison of the archetypal elements of Ancient Greek and Chinese Philosophy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Chinese Five-fold Schema</th>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Spring</th>
<th>Summer (Late)</th>
<th>Fall</th>
<th>Winter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>Earth</td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taste</td>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>Bitter</td>
<td>Sweet</td>
<td>Spicy</td>
<td>Salty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smell</td>
<td>Goatish</td>
<td>Burning</td>
<td>Fragrant</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Rotten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Joy/Love</td>
<td>Obsession</td>
<td>Sorrow</td>
<td>Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate</td>
<td>Windy</td>
<td>Hot</td>
<td>Damp</td>
<td>Dry</td>
<td>Cold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planets</td>
<td>Jupiter</td>
<td>Mars</td>
<td>Saturn</td>
<td>Venus</td>
<td>Mercury</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.5 Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Viscera</th>
<th>Liver</th>
<th>Heart</th>
<th>Spleen</th>
<th>Lung</th>
<th>Kidney</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Yin-Yang)</td>
<td>Gall</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Stomach</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Bladder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intestine</td>
<td>Intestine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Greek Four-fold Schema

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Spring</th>
<th>Summer</th>
<th>Fall</th>
<th>Winter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Fire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Earth</td>
<td>Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choleric</td>
<td>Melan-</td>
<td>Phleg-</td>
<td>phle-</td>
<td>Cold</td>
<td>Wet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choleric</td>
<td>Sanguine</td>
<td>Choleric</td>
<td>Melan-</td>
<td>Cold</td>
<td>Wet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spleen</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liver</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Black bile</td>
<td>Phlegm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since such mythical structures serve as a broader and deeper natural account for human universality and cultures, they have great potentials for aesthetic expressions. As Thiss-Evensen (1989) argues, archetypes need to be classified in a concentrated overview, because they are the “common language of form we can immediately understand, regardless of individual or culture” (p.17). Immediacy and spontaneity are what makes the making as well as the acting of art both sensuous and empathetic—such as the spontaneous intimacy of space. “Works of art often present to us an air of spontaneity, a lyric quality, as if they were the unpremeditated song of a bird” (Dewey, 1934, p.70) or “the old poets invoking the muse of Memory,” or dancing and singing children “wholly on the basis of unlearned and unformed responses.” Spontaneity,
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according to Dewey, is “the inevitable self-movement of a poem or drama…in complete fusion with an emotion that is fresh.” It is clearly “something in the present to evoke happiness,” (p.71) “on a deeper level and with a fuller content of meaning” (p.72). This spontaneous intimacy projected into objects constitutes poetic images of space—it may be called “the phenomenology of imagination,” as Bachelard (1969) describes:

Poetry gives not so much a nostalgia for youth as a nostalgia for the expressions of youth. It offers us images as we should have imagined them during the ‘original impulse’ of youth. Primal images, simple engravings are but so many invitations to start imagining again. They give us back areas of being, houses in which the human beings’ certainty of being is concentrated, and …by living in such images …that are so stabilizing as these are, we could start a new life, a life that would be our own, that would belong to us in our very depths. When we look at images of this kind, when we read the images…we ‘start musing on primitiveness.’ Because of this very primitiveness, resorted, desired and experienced through simple images, an album of pictures of hut would constitute a text book of simple exercises for the phenomenology of the imagination. (p.33)

The archeology of images creates an intimate place for children and poets, who have once belonged to, and arise from a desire for, the mother-home, and reflect our empathetic and sensuous affinity to many living forms of the mother-earth. Mythical and poetic space shows the most primitive images of all we inhabit in order to relate the self to the world. Bachelard’s identification of the poetic space—the space written by great poets—is interwoven with the organic and cosmic symbolism of shells, doorknobs, closets, attics, drawers, and corners in the rooms of the house, with their transcendental geometry extended to the dynamics of the universe. Poetic spaces are all common places as a living nest which to inhabit. “Nature is the mother and the habitat of man” (Dewey, 1934, p.28) as home is the mother and the habitat of
youth. The poetic space is what is seen through the eyes of a child and what is read or written through the soul of a poet. Poets take the world as their next-door-neighbors. Poets do not perceive a space as a reference to mere objects, but as the place of spirit that refreshes and polishes concrete details with images of hesitation, temptation, curiosity, desire, security, welcome, and respect, as a sign of wonder, and as the symbolic dialectic between inside-outside, center-corner, and open-close. Bachelard (1969) writes:

Is he who opens a door and he who close it the same being? The gestures that make us conscious of security or freedom are rooted in a profound depth of being. It is because of this ‘depth’ that they become so normally symbolical…A legend…treated by a poet, is naturally not a mere reference, it helps the poet sensitize the world at hand, and refine the symbols of everyday life. The old legend becomes quite new when the poet makes it his own. (p.224)

Now the role of environmental designers seems to become clear: they should be poets who understand and refine the symbols of everyday life. Body spatiality organizes three categories of the building—the floor, the walls, and the roof—as well as the archetypal or cosmic categories of landscape—the earth, the person (center), and the heavens that surround us. These basic categories “recapitulate, re-create, and continue to expand our actual identity” to a wealth of sensuous, empathetic details (Bloomer & Moore, 1977, p.44) in archetypal modes of relations—adding, penetrating, dividing, connecting, directing, delimiting, and supporting—or modes of organization—centrality, axiality, and networks (Thiis-Evensen, 1989). Through these modes of relations detail elements, such as doors, windows, stairs, rooms, fireplaces, columns, beams, arches, arcades, colonnades, domes, vaults, towers, or open spaces, squares, landmarks,
ponds, edges, patches, bridges, corridors, fences, paths, roads, parks, gateways, or even smaller elements (flowers, benches, lights, and individual trees) would serve as rich sources of meanings that stir deeper poetic feelings.

Thus, when we do no more than simply explore here and there, we alter the qualities of objects, and the qualitative change is due to the felt relationships in poetic space. In other words, the felt relationships are the archetypal, organic relations of our actions and reactions. When these relationships achieve rhythms, balance, unity, and harmony as a whole, they acquire an aesthetic quality. Dewey’s (1934) notion of aesthetic quality exactly implies the organic relations of poetic space I have spoken of:

Movement in direct experience is alteration in the qualities of objects and space as experienced is an aspect of this qualitative change. Up and down, back-and-front, to and fro, this side and that—or right and left—here and there ‘feel’ differently. The reason they do is that they are not static points in something itself static, but are objects in movement, qualitative changes of value... Near and far, close and distant, are qualities of pregnant import—that is, as they are experienced, not just stated by measurement in science. They signify loosening and tightening, expanding and contracting, separating and compacting, soaring and drooping, rising and falling; the dispersive, scattering, and the hovering and brooding, unsubstantial lightness and massive blow. Such actions and reaction are the very stuff out of which the objects and events we experience are made. (p.207) (e.g. see Figure 6.12)

It is obvious that mythical and poetic space is also spiritual. Myth is a theology of imagination. It is “much more an affair of the psychology that generates works of art than of effort at scientific and philosophical explanation. It intensifies emotional thrill and punctuates the interest that belongs to all break in familiar routine... Theologies and cosmologies have laid hold of imagination... with solemn processions, incense, embroidered robes, music, the radiance
of colored lights, and stories that stir wonder and induce hypnotic admiration” (Dewey, 1934, p.30). As a matter of fact, the arts have always been handmaidens of religion. “The rites, ceremonies of the church were arts enacted under conditions that gave maximum possible emotional and imaginative appeal” to eternal glory and bliss, because “one moral or spiritual sentiment had a hundred sensuous images” (p.31).

The Gothic cathedral is, for example, a powerful expression of archetypal symbolism in this respect. It is “frequently related to nature and interpreted as a stylized forest in which the columns are tree trunks with the ribs representing branches and foliage.” The floor unites “the nave and aisles while continuing yet further out to nature’s floor itself...The stone floor plays

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its part in joining town and landscape to the interior of the church, a spatial manifestation of the symbolic unity between God and the world” (Thiis-Evensen, 1989, p.57). The church is an architectural theme that employs its compositional elements of columns, ribs, the floor, the corridors, and the ceiling, and together they represent a timeless panorama of moral and spiritual experiences: up to the divine, through the pains, beyond (hidden behind) the world, and forward toward infinite bliss and divinity.

Poets always seem to be able to capture the spirit of everything, varying from natural features such as water, rocks, trees, or flowers to man-made gardens, roads, bridges, stairs, or windows, all pregnant with farther and deeper meanings of life. A road has always been a spiritual symbol that represents a way of life—an uncertain journey to a goal—as well as a landmark of life. For example, the spiritual qualities experienced along a Gothic corridor may be similar to those depicted in Cézanne’s painting, Road at Chantilly (1888) as well as Van Gogh’s sketch, Lane with Poplar Trees (1884) (see Figure 6.13).

The straight road arched with trees and branches is perhaps welcoming and framing a joyful or painful path and of life; dense foliages may depict existential depth, while the vertical array of tall poplars and their thin foliages may humble us and emphasize the long suffering of human life. The foliage, branches, trunk, and roots of trees, or even their falling leaves, are often subject matters for one artists’ perennial themes: spirituality. Branches and foliages often frame the ceiling of the heaven, and also animate mystic scenes with ritual images, indicating something beyond, as depicted in Cezanne’ painting, Chateau Noir (see also Figure 6.13).
Figure 6.13: Spiritual qualities depicted in the works of art such as a Gothic architecture (left); Cézanne’s painting, Road at Chantilly (center) Van Gogh's sketch, Lane with Poplar Trees (right) 59

Figure 6.14: John Marin’s works on “Approach the Bridge,” 1931 (left), “Brooklyn Bridge,” 1912 (right) 60

59 “View of Chateau Noir” (1894-1896), Oil on canvas, (73 X 92 cm), National Gallery of Art, Washington, Venturi 667). Paul Cézanne depicts the Black Castle, popularly believed to be a place where Santanic rituals were held, as a mysteriously growing building hidden behind dense foliage (Becks-Malorny, 2001).

A bridge, another popular subject matter and a theme for artists, connects two different worlds, reconciles conflicts, and leads to the spiritual world by overcoming the troubled life, and at the same time it has also been a heroic figure of industrial prosperity. John Marin’s sketch and water color painting may show such ideals and admirations embedded in a bridge (i.e., Figure 6.14).

To artists, curving lanes and winding roads tend to bring back to us memories inhabited from childhood, or lead us back to the vital breaths, rhythms, and melodies of lived places. Two of the Beatles’ lovely songs, *Penny Lane* and *The Long and Winding Road*, portray such a spiritual sense of place that evokes sensuous and sympathetic feelings, encounters with existential meanings of the self, and a rediscovery of the rich memories of lived home and loved life. Besides, opening and closing doors, entering the center place, landing in between, and sharing rooms are all ordinary personal as well as social activities, often ritualized as mystic memories. Dewey (1934) writes:

> There is no limit to the capacity of immediate sensuous experience to absorb into itself meanings and values that in and of themselves—that is in the abstract—would be designated ‘ideal’ and ‘spiritual.’ The animistic strain of religious experience, embodied in… memory of childhood… is an instance on one level of experience. And the poetical, in whatever medium, is always a close kin of the animistic. (p.29)

I have already argued for the important role of myths and poetry play in the making of the aesthetic landscape. The landscape we experience reveals itself through symbols and meanings, and through the relational links I have identified earlier, as it is experienced.
Landscapes are first symbolized (or realized) through the artists’ body and mind as a full perception, and then represented into the limited space and time of the work of art with specialized tools and means—each art’s own medium of expression. Environmental designers, similar to like other artists, read the landscape as they see it, not what they think they see, and represent symbols in their relations to the real world that are not necessarily limited, but still defined by, their full engagements. Environmental designers do not need to present visual images derived from various works of art; rather, they may abstract the symbolized relationships—identified aesthetic functions, expressed in different languages and media—and rearrange universal meanings and values in our living landscapes. Dewey (1934) writes about this as follows:

In seeing a picture, it is not true that visual qualities are as such, or consciously, central…Seeing a picture can be same with reading a poem, or treatise on philosophy…These are stimuli to which we respond with emotional, imaginative, and intellectual values drawn from ourselves, which then are ordered by interaction with those presented through the medium of words. (p.123)

Lastly, I believe Paul Cézanne’s description of his way of perceiving landscape is an exemplary description of a full experience, an aesthetic experience, and the interrelated characteristics of mythical and poetic space I have discussed above: archetypal-temporal-spatial-spontaneous-sensuous-intimate-empathetic-imaginative-organic-spiritual-animistic:

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This is what one must achieve. If I reach too high or too low, everything is a mess. There must not be a single loose strand, a single gap through which the tension, the light, the truth can escape. I have all the parts of my canvas under control simultaneously. If things are tending to diverge, I use my instincts and beliefs to bring them back together again...Nature is always the same, even though its visible manifestations eventually cease to exist. Our art must shock nature into permanence, together with all the components and manifestations of change. Art must make nature eternal in our imagination. What lies behind nature?...Perhaps everything. Everything, you understand...So, I close this errant hand. I take the tones of color I see to my right and my left, here, there, everywhere, and I fix these gradations, I bring them together...They form lines, and become objects, rocks, trees, without my thinking about it. They acquire volume, they have an effect. When these masses and weights on my canvas correspond to the planes, and spots which I see in my mind and which we see with our eyes, then my canvas closes its fingers. It does not waver. It does not reach too high or too low. It is true, it is dense, it is full.
The verb ‘to civilize’ is defined as ‘to instruct in the arts of life and thus to raise in the scale of civilization.’ Instruction in the arts of life is something other than conveying information about them. It is a matter of communication and participation in values of life by means of the imagination, and works of art are the most intimate and energetic means of abiding individuals to share in the arts of living. Civilization is uncivil because human beings are divided into non-communicating sects, races, nations, classes, and cliques.

(John Dewey, 1934, p.336)

1. A HEURISTIC SCHEMA OF LANDSCAPE AESTHETICS: (WELL) BEING WITH-IN PLACE

Previously, in Chapter 2, I endorsed Zube’s point that a future approach to a general theory of landscape aesthetics should be a heuristic approach that integrates current themes and paradigms from an experiential point of view. In addition, I introduced three experiential approaches that could present a plausible direction for this heuristic integration: Berleant’s transactional approach as a phenomenological account, Bourassa’s evolutionary approach as a psychological account, and Koh’s holistic approach as an ecological account.

Then, in the following Chapter 3, I tried to conceptualize a general scheme for a heuristic theory, and suggested a category—analytical and conceptual humanism—that has the potential to delineate the layout and the characteristics of a heuristic framework that would confirm the three experiential approaches (See Table 6). What I termed landscape aesthetics from Below, from Above, and from The Center in the consecutive chapters (4, 5, and 6) were conceptual
constructions derived from the heuristic process of re-visiting, re-examining, and re-discovering ideas and meanings from existing literature, and I did this under three symbolic angles from which to view the unified relationship between humans and the environment, between mind and body, and between self and place as a whole experience of life, nature, and culture.

Such a large expansion of the project of landscape aesthetics to a general concept of experience—the relationship between humans and the environment—involves “a single all-embracing kind of experience, which requires a comprehensive theory to accommodate it” (Berleant, 1992, p.161). What “we share with others can often serve as a useful guide but not a definitive standard, since differences in perceptual sensitivity, knowledge, and experience give individual form to common principles and values” (1997, p.24). It can also explain the critical process is to discern the distinctive forms of those dimensions in individual experience. “We cannot rank landscapes,” but “we must, then, develop qualitative guidelines and procedures for evaluating landscape” (p.24). This may be “a naturalizing of aesthetics, as it were, its association and continuity with other regions of experience, and toward identifying the aesthetic as a critical dimension of the value that binds together the many domains of the human world” (Berleant, 1992, p.161).

“What is perceived is charged with value,” says Dewey (1934, p.256). “Perception that occurs for its own sake is full realization of all the elements of our psychological being” (p.256). For a general and comprehensive theory for such a heuristic aesthetics—a full aesthetic realization or a synthesis of all the elements of our psychological being—I suggest a schema of being (self) with-in place derived from three areas of psychology: existential, evolutionary, and
ecological psychology. The proposed schema outlines the range of an aesthetic experience as it serves both for our enduring self (the felt body) extended to our sustainable environment.

To say nothing of Dewey, I am indebted to the following psychologists: Carl G. Jung (1933, 1940, 1964), Abraham H. Maslow (1954, 1968b), and James J. Gibson (1966, 1986), respectively, for their interdisciplinary and philosophical contributions to the investigation of the nature of the human mind with-in the world, and to a general theory of heuristic aesthetics I would like to propose here. It is “happiness and delight” that spring from the fulfillment of the depth of our whole being. Dewey’s (1934) describes:

Happiness and delight...come to be through a fulfillment that reaches to the depths of our being—one that is an adjustment of our whole being with the conditions of existence. In the process of living, attainment of a period of equilibrium is at the same time the initiation of a new relation to the environment, one that brings with it potency of new adjustments to be made through struggle. The time of consummation is also one of beginning anew. Any attempt to perpetuate beyond its term the enjoyment attending the time of fulfillment and harmony constitutes withdrawal from the world...But, through the phases of perturbation and conflict, there abides the deep-seated memory of an underlying harmony, the sense of which haunts life like the sense of being founded on a rock. (p.17)

1.1 JUNG’S FOUR MODES OF THE WHOLE BEING: EXISTENTIAL BEING WITH-IN THE WORLD

Jung (1933) attempted to develop a general concept and universal structure of the human psyche, realizing that his contemporary psychology was in a chaos of arbitrary and dogmatic opinions. The human psyche is viewed by Jung as “the borderland where biology and spirit, knowledge and experience, body and mind, the conscious and the unconscious, the individual and the collective all came crowding together” (Stevens, 1983, p.34). It is also “a
portion of nature itself, a hidden connection between human nature and the nature of the cosmos” (p.35).

In Jung’s theory of the human psyche, the complex psyche is composed of the two psyches: the personal, ontogenetic, the flesh psyche and the collective, phylogenetic, the skeleton psyche (p.66). The goal of the core of the complex psyche is directed to the basic archetypal structure, “the Self,” which pursues its ontological development, and leads a growing child to maturity. That is, the self is an unfulfilled core of the psyche needing to be realized by the product of individuation—the process of integrating one's personality and the “life experience of the individual” (Jung, 1964, p.40).

Thus, in Jung’s theory, “The Self” signifies the coherent whole, the unified consciousness and the unconscious being of a person, (see Figure 7.1), and has an inner “tendency to form various representations of a motif without losing their basic pattern,” i.e. an Archetype (Jung, 1964, p.58). Jung conceives of the archetype as a basic pattern of the self and the wholeness of mind and body, which is “common to the whole of humanity” (1940, p.50) and “accessible to human consciousness by way of symbolic projection” (p.55). He (1933, p.80) argues that the four-structure of archetype corresponds to the four types of human temperaments identified by ancient Greek medicine, as well as to the four elements from the ancient cosmological scheme, and natural phenomena (i.e., Figure 7.1, see also Table 6.5).
Jung (1933, 1964) also suggests a theory of “four functional types of the self”—feeling, thinking, sensation, and intuition (see Figure 7.2)—all of which can be grouped into two pairs of opposites, the conscious (sensation and thinking) and the unconscious (feeling and intuition). “Sensation tells you that something exists; thinking tells you what it is; feeling tells you whether it is agreeable or not; and intuition tells you where it comes from and where it is going” (1964, p.49). In other words, sensation establishes what is essentially given; thinking enables us to recognize its meaning; feeling tells us its value, and finally intuition points to the possibilities of origins and destinations within the immediate facts (Stevens, 1983, p.68).

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Figure 7.1: Jung’s idea of the four-part structure of the archetype, humanity, and cosmos.\textsuperscript{62}

Jung (1933, p.91) explains, “When we think, it is in order to judge or to reach a conclusion, and when we feel, it is in order to attach a proper value to something.” Thinking and feeling, Jung argues, as one pair of opposites (and dialectical too) are definite psychic facts and so obtrusive that every habitual language carries unmistakable expressions for them—we are consciously rational and unconsciously evaluative. Sensation and intuition, on the other hand, are perceptive: “They are making aware of what is happening, but do not evaluate or interpret it.” Jung defines “sensation as perception through conscious sensory processes, and intuition as perception by way of unconscious contents and connections” (p.91). Sensation is antagonistic to intuition as an opposite pair as thinking is to feeling. These four modes of the

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whole being (the self) are, he argues, not regarded as dogmatic but as “suitable criteria for a classification” (1964, p.50).

Jung argues that each individual tends to make his or her primary adaptations to reality through one of the four modes, and this constructs an individual’s psychological type superior to the rest. By contrast, if those four functions of the individual are not developed by exercise and are not consciously brought into daily use, then they remain in a more or less primitive and infantile state, often only half-conscious, or quite unconscious. These relatively undeveloped functions constitute a specific inferiority, which is characteristic of each type. For instance, a modern human being with “one-sided emphasis on thinking has inferiority in feeling, which makes sensation and intuition mutually injurious” (1964, p.93). Here Jung’s concept of feeling is worth a remark. Feeling usually acknowledges its rationality, but it is more primitive, less developed, and therefore, contaminated with other functions—sensation and intuition that are irrational, illogical, and not evaluative. This means that the awareness of these four modes of the whole being is the process of self-individuation to achieve a rounded personality, and therefore, one’s psychological health depends upon the development of the neglected functions, not upon one superior function of the four modes of being.

It is important to note that Jung’s analytical as well as conceptual approach to the self has been developed against dogmatic psychology, and that his emphasis on what he calls psychic or mental energy covers the unconscious and primitive part of the four modes of personality, i.e. the whole being. It is also significant to note that Jung’s notion of psychic energy flows outwards or inwards in order to communicate with the world, including other
people, animals, and society, as the extension of the self to the nature of the cosmos. As Jung states, modern people’s life and experience have excessively emphasized the rational, conscious function of thinking, relatively neglecting the function of feeling of the self; therefore it may have undermined other modes of our experience—sensation and intuition. Finally it is useful to remember Jung’s belief that the fulfillment of an individual’s healthy experience and life can be achieved through a balance between the four modes of the self and the psychic energy that flows to the environment and landscapes.

1.2 MASLOW’S MODES OF SELF-BECOMING: EVOLUTIONARY BEING WITH-IN THE WORLD

Maslow (1954, 1968b)’s existential psychology (sometimes called personality psychology) attempts an empirical understanding of the self and of identity. Like Jung, he (1968b, p.10) also argues that logical positivism in psychology, particularly dealing with personality, has been a failure, for its treatments of human motivation are more about techniques to get rid of our discomfort, such as motivated behavior, goal seeking, and stimulus-responses, most of which have been more appropriate to deterministic animal behaviorism. In order to better define the essence of man’s life-span personality as an inner nature of all human beings, Maslow borrows an existentialist view of the human mind from phenomenology.

Unlike the behaviorists’ theory of motivation that resorts to deficiency motivation for behavior, the Growth Motivation or the Self-Motivation Theory 64 considers such impulses as

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64 Maslow’s theory of basic needs calls for a reconsideration of instinct theory that has been described as powerful,
wanting, desiring, and yearning for pleasure as basic needs. These basic needs interact with other social and personal needs in a hierarchical order, and thus the gratification of one need brings about the emergence into consciousness of another higher need or pleasure (Maslow, 1968b, p.30). In this way personality grows from childhood to maturity in the form of progressive gratification—so-called, self-motivations—from immediate and basic needs to ultimate and sophisticated states: a process of self-actualization.

Self-actualization is defined by Maslow as an “ongoing actualization of potentials, capacities, and talents, as fulfillment of mission, as a fuller knowledge of, and acceptance of, the person’s own intrinsic nature, as an unceasing trend toward unity, integration or synergy with person” (p.25). Unlike instinct or behaviorist theorists, Maslow’s notion of self-actualization is a state of finding self-fulfillment and of realizing one’s creativity by an awareness and exposure to the experience that develops from the basic needs, including physiological needs, and such feelings as safety, love, belongingness, respect, and self-esteem, those which I have discussed as being aesthetic in nature.

In addition, as opposed to deficit-needs like hunger, appetite, thirst, etc., Maslow argues that such growth needs are not disappearing by satisfaction, but rather growing by gratification, and uncontrollable, unsuppressible animal instincts in specific stimulus-response terms. His new hypothesis suggests that there be intrinsic and hereditary impulses in human whole quality, which is non-deterministic, and easily controllable or repressible by habits or by suggestion. See Chapter 6, “Motivation and Personality,” 1954, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
even are intensified and heightened by education. He maintains that growth itself is an exciting and rewarding motivation that makes life-time experience a mature and pleasurable quality, and that it ultimately is what distinguishes “human being” from “animal becoming,” and “adult maturity” from “infant becoming.” Thus, healthy people, he writes, “have sufficiently gratified their basic needs so that they are motivated primarily by trends to self-actualization” (p.25), and the basic needs are therefore the prerequisite condition for achieving a peak-experience of psychological being and becoming. “Self-transcendence,” on the other hand, according to Maslow, is a moral state of mind to connect to something beyond the ego or the self, or to help others find self-fulfillment and realize their basic needs and self-actualization (see Figure 7.3).

**Figure 7.3:** The aesthetic level as a need for self-fulfillment suggested in Maslow’s theory

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According to Maslow’s pyramid of human needs—or Maslow’s theory of motivation and its relation to an aesthetic need in a hierarchy—the satisfaction of basic needs from physiological to self-esteem involves bodily interaction with the physical environment in a quest for safe survival, and social satisfaction and love involves interaction with other human beings in society and culture. Then there are “two significant types of needs of the self-actualized person: these are the cognitive and aesthetic needs” (Dennis, 1974, p.58).

The cognitive needs, to know, to understand, and to explain, are the _adjustive tools_ to satisfy our basic needs and the expression of self-actualization. Our cognitive capacities (perceptual, intellectual, learning) are activated to seek truth, wisdom, and a solution for the cosmic mystery, all of which, if not satisfied, may become problems that threaten basic needs (Maslow, 1954, p.47). Our need for acquiring knowledge and systemizing the universe is thus more intensified in adults than in infants. Similarly, the aesthetic need, according to Maslow, is also a _truly basic need_ that can be identified almost _universally in healthy people_ in every culture and in every age as far back as the cavemen (p.51).

The aesthetic need shows substantial overlaps with _conative_ and _cognitive_ needs, and has an intermediate function as a tool to gratify basic needs and as a _catalyst to activate_ the center of the self toward self-transcendence. Maslow (1954) describes both, life’s “the peak experiences” and the daily experiences of self-actualizing people, and argues that the peak or the mystic experience of healthy people is natural, aesthetic, and even ethical. This confirms the nature and characters of _an aesthetic_ experience that I—in building on Dewey’s foundations—have discussed in this dissertation. Maslow (1954) writes:
There were the same feelings of a limitless horizon opening up to the vision, the feeling of being simultaneously more powerful and also more helpless than one ever was before, the feeling of great ecstasy and wonder and awe, the lost of placing in time and space with, finally the conviction that something extremely important and valuable had happened, so that the man is to some extent transformed and strengthened even in his daily life by such experiences…Apparently, the acute mystic or peak experience is a tremendous intensification of any of the experiences, e.g. intense concentration, intense enjoyment of art or music, self-forgetful intense, sensuous experience, etc. …Peakers seem also to live in the realm of Being, of poetry, aesthetics, symbols, transcendence, and of end-experiences. (p.164-165)

Moreover, what is notable is that Maslow defines some of our aesthetic terms, such as the experience of appreciation, of wonder, of zest, of connoisseurship, of mystery, and of admiration, as “end-experience,” which means “the ultimate biological pleasure (zestful experiencing) that is an automatic, non-instrumental, unsought-for, unmotivated by-product of being alive and healthy” (1954, p.236). In other words, our appreciation, wonder, and mystery are the ultimate and universal biological need. Maslow makes it clear that the process of self-fulfillment of a person toward a state of self-actualization relies essentially upon the inseparable contexts of physiological and environmental conditions, social and cultural understanding and learning, and personal or transpersonal relationships. His view confirms that an aesthetic experience as the peak-experience occurs in the course of transforming and of transcending biological, social, and personal meanings of the growing being (the self) toward the environment. Dewey (1934) says similarly:

Esthetic experience is always more than esthetic. In it a body of matters and meanings, not in themselves aesthetic, ‘become’ aesthetic as they enter into an ordered rhythmic movement toward consummation. The material itself is widely...
human...The material of esthetic experience in being human—human in connection with the nature of which it is a part—is social. (p.326)

However, Maslow’s hierarchical pyramid of basic needs is often mistakenly understood as being merely a pre-requisite for personality growth—of satisfying lower needs first and, the ones above them later—yet they are really simultaneous and overlapping in many ways. In addition, the cognitive and the aesthetic needs are likely to be recognized as less significant than what they are meant to be: the cognitive need is directed toward the gratification of the basic needs; the aesthetic need is the ultimate step toward self-transcendence, i.e. to the emergence of our moral being. Therefore it may be useful to re-view the universal characteristics of self-actualizing persons, identified throughout Maslow’s (1968b) clinical and empirical observations:

• They accept self, others, and nature. They respect and esteem themselves and others.
• They are not externally motivated or even goal-directed—rather their motivation is an internal one of growth and development.
• They have a sense of responsibility. They are mission-oriented, often on the basis of duty, or obligation rather than personal choice.
• They are capable of a continued freshness of appreciation. They repeatedly experience awe, pleasure, and wonder in their everyday world.
• They have mystic experiences, an oceanic feeling. They have experiences of ecstasy, awe, and wonder with feelings of limitless horizons opening up, followed by the conviction that the experience was important and had a carry-over into everyday life.
• They have a deep feeling of empathy, sympathy, or compassion for human beings and other forms of life in general.
• They have deep interpersonal relations with others.
• They are philosophical and creative.

Lastly and most importantly, the following passages from Dewey (1934) and Maslow (1968b) on self-actualization (or self-transcendence) demonstrate a marriage between aesthetic and moral experience in the realm between nature and culture. The environment as soil provides the embryonic potentials, the seed for our self-growing, and society and culture act as sun and water to foster (actualize) our aesthetic need for a fuller Being—our own quality of life and life experience:

As the developing growth of an individual from embryo to maturity is the result of interaction of organism with surroundings, so culture is the product not of efforts of men put forth in a void or just upon themselves, but of prolonged and cumulative interaction with environment. The depth of the responses stirred by works of art shows THEIR continuity with the operations of this enduring experience. The works and the responses they evoke are continuous with the very processes of living as these are carried to unexpected happy fulfillment. (Dewey, 1934, p.28)⁶⁶

Man demonstrates in his own nature a pressure toward fuller and fuller Being, more and more perfect actualization of his humanness in exactly the same naturalistic, scientific sense that an acorn may be said to be ‘pressing toward’ being an oak tree…The role of environment is ultimately to permit him or help him to actualize ‘his own’ potentialities, not ‘its’ potentialities. The environment does

⁶⁶ Capital letters from Dewey’s and only italic marks are mine.
not give him potentialities and capacities; he has them in inchoate or embryonic form, just exactly as he has embryonic arms and legs, and creativeness, spontaneity, selfhood, authenticity, caring for others, being able to love, yearning for truth are *embryonic potentialities* belonging to his *species-membership*. Culture and society does not create a human being, rather it permits, fosters, or encourages what exists in embryo to become real and actual. The culture is sun and food and water; it is not the seed. (Maslow, 1968b, p.160-161)

**1.3 GIBSON’S ENVIRONMENTAL PERCEPTION: ECOLOGICAL BEING WITH-IN THE WORLD**

**1.3.1 AFFORDANCE AS DETECTING ECOLOGICAL NICHES**

The ecological psychology founded by Gibson (1966) started from a demand for “the reasonable commonsense position” that what we perceive is not an exact reflection of the physical world as seen in any physics textbook, but the phenomenal world. The question was “how the surroundings of a single animal can also be the surroundings of all animals?” (p.43) Gibson hypothesizes that the layout of surrounding surfaces does not exist with reference to a stationary point, but “to a *moving point* of observation along a path that any individual can travel” (p.43). The surroundings are the animate environment that affords organisms “even more than the physical environment does since animals have more characteristics than things and are more changeable” (p.23). Hence, “the environment of each observer is ‘private,’ that is, unique,” and at the same time, “all its habitants have an equal opportunity to explore it” (p.43). Gibson (1966) writes:

Light, sound, odor and a mechanical encounter (touch) may all carry the *same information*, in a sense, but, *the kind* of light it reflects, the kind of sound it makes, and the kind of chemical it diffuses will all *specify the sort* of animal it is. (p.22)
Aesthetics Connecting Beauty and Duty

Affordance is, as he admits, a radical hypothesis in both psychology and philosophy in a sense that it “is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both” (1986, p129), but “it implies that the ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ of things in the environment can be directly perceived” (p.127). An affordance is “neither the quality of object” (p.134) nor “quite the same as the habitat of the species” (p.128). Rather, it is “a niche [that] refers more to how an animal lives than to where it lives” (p.128). That is, we do not perceive things in the environment; we perceive a niche, a set of affordances. Gibson’s theory of affordance tells us that the environment has a set of objective characteristics, the so-called invariant ecological characteristics (or functionally significant structures), which afford every individual to perceive or detect the structured ecological niches for living. Gibson (1986) says this about an ecological niche:

In architecture a niche is a place that is suitable for a piece of statuary, a place into which the object fits. In ecology a niche is a setting of environmental features that are suitable for an animal, into which it fits metaphorically. (p.129)

It is important to recognize that assumptions and terminologies of ecological perception, according to Gibson (1966, 1986), are different from those of traditional theories of perception. First, ecological perception rejects the old idea of a stimulus-response formula employed in experimentalistic theories of perception. The idea of experimental psychology, that sensory inputs are subject to cognitive processing—such as recognition, interpretation, inference, concepts, ideas, and storage and retrieval of ideas—is a mistaken theory of visual perception,67

67 Gibson calls this “the orthodox theory of the rental image” which is not necessarily for vision (1986, p.58-64).
for it supports the notion that the observer stands at the center of his or her private world, and that each environment is therefore different and unique to each observer. Gibson defines stimuli as “patterns and transformation of energy at the receptor” (1966, p.28), and asks “how can they [experimenters] hope to isolate and control an invariant of optical structure so as to apply it to an observer if they cannot quantify it?” (1986, p.141). Gibson (1986) suggests neither to quantify it nor to apply it to an observer:

The answer comes in two parts, I think. First, they should not hope to apply an invariant to an observer, only to make it available, for it is not a stimulus. And second, they do not have to quantify an invariant, to apply numbers to it, but only to give it an exact mathematical description so that other experimenters can make it available to their observers. The virtue of the psychophysical experiment is simply that it is disciplined, not that it relates the psychical to the physical by a metric formula. (p.141)

Second, there is a crucial difference between Koffka’s Gestalt perception and ecological perception. Gibson argues the Gestalt psychologists’ notion of a demand character is different from an affordance because “the affordance of something does not change as the need of the observer changes” (p.139), while in the Gestalt perception, for instance, a postbox has meaning and value only when a man has a letter to post or expecting a letter from a girl. Gibson (1986) writes that perception is not a subjective but an ecological phenomenon:

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68 “Each thing says what it is... A fruit says, ‘Eat me,’ water says, ‘Drink me,’ thunder says, ‘Fear me,’ and woman says, ‘Love me’” (Koffka, 1935, p.7) quoted by Gibson (1986, p.138).
The behavior of the observers depends on their perception of the environment, surely enough, but it does not mean that their behavior depends on a so-called private or subjective or conscious environment. The organism depends on its environment for its life, but the environment does not depend on the organism for its existence. (p.129)

1.3.2 AFFORDANCE AS MEANINGFUL ENVIRONMENT: NOT MEASURABLE BUT SPECIFIABLE

Affordance is “one’s complementary relations to the world” (p.141). It is “not a process of perceiving a value-free physical object but a process of perceiving a value-rich ecological object” (p.140). “Insomuch as affordance is properties taken with reference to the observer,” the value of affordance can be “specified in the structure of ambient light without an excessive amount of learning” (p.143). Gibson attempts some basic identification of such a value-rich environment. First, the terrestrial environment has three basic kinds of matters: the earth, an air, and water. Second, these matters constitute three kinds of characters: a surface, a medium, and the substance.

“The surface” is the ground of living as well as important terrestrial information for animals where perception and behavior take place. “The medium” such as air or water affords locomotion to an animate body, movement, smell, sound, and vision by transmitting, absorbing, and reflecting light. “The substance” of the environment differs in chemical composition. Rock, soil, sand, clay, oil, tar, wood, minerals, metal, water, various tissues of plants and animals are examples of substances of the environment. Water is, according to Gibson, a significant (both ecologically and perceptually) property in that it is one basic matter of the environment, and its character serves for the surface for aquatic animals, for a medium, and for substance.
Gibson emphasizes that light and sight (the optic) is predominant because the optic flow and array fundamentally affords locomotion—the medium, which affords meanings of the environment. Because of the optic array, animals sometimes misperceive, and thus lead to inappropriate actions (p.142): for example, birds hit the window; in the complete darkness one can hardly move around; children attempt to walk through a sheet of glass by misperceiving the affordance of it. An affordance is all about relational and yet invariant properties or features, existing independently of a perceiver (Heft, 2001, p.124), but it can also be altered and expanded by the use of tools of the human animal: e.g. a fork affords the human animal pick-ability or pierce-ability. That is, the affordance is a process of one’s (environmental) learning.

Thus, a meaningful environment fosters meaningful behaviors afforded by the relations of substances, surfaces, and their layouts, enclosure, distance, objects, places, events, and other animals (1986, p.33-43). However, we can never fully know what the ecological invariants are. In most his writing Gibson tries to specify the relational characteristics of surface features with ecological laws of surfaces because he feels they are particularly important for the terrestrial animals, including human animals, throughout his book, although specifying the necessary and sufficient features of the (perceptual) environment is almost impossible (see Figure 7.4). Gibson (1986) writes about it:

To perceive an affordance is not to classify an object…As Ludwig Wittgenstein knew, you can not specify the necessary and sufficient features of the class of things to which a name is given. They have only a “family resemblance.” But this does not mean you cannot learn how to use things and perceive their uses. You do not have to classify and label things in order to perceive what they afford. (p.134)
To specify all relational and yet invariant properties is to classify all meaning systems possibly generated from the affordance of the basic properties. I propose to call the affordance of the basic properties *archetypal properties*.

**Figure 7.4:** A diagram of Gibson’s ideas about environmental affordance for animals

### 1.3.3 AFFORDANCE AS PERCEPTION OF THE SELF, EVENTS, PLACES

Gibson’s three concepts of self, event, and place need our attention in terms of affordance as aesthetic perception. We perceive *the self* at anytime with-in the environment. To put it simply, when we see the world we see our nose at the same time. When looking down,

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up, to the left or right, front or back, our hands, legs, feet, shoulders, our hair and all other portions of the body come into a direct field of our experience. “The continuous act of perceiving involves the co-perceiving of the self” (p. 240). “To specify the self including head, body, arms, and hands accompanies the optical information” (p.116). The self is the perception of a living body, conjointly within the environment; therefore, the (perceptual) environment is an extended body: our body bridges the self and the environment. In this sense Gibson’s notion of body is neither merely a biological unit nor a psychological vehicle, but rather becomes a phenomenological medium: it serves as our frame of references for the perception of the environment and the self: the world (Heft, 2001, p.136). Therefore, self-perception is defined as the I, a sense of identity or of being.

Perceiving the self ultimately controls behavior (Gibson, 1986, p.227), because the living body is the moving body. Gibson says when one moves through the environment, a flow of optical arrays reveals an invariant structure that specifies the meaningful environmental features and layouts. Thus, the different perspectives of an animal do not mean different environmental variables, but different meaningful behaviors. For instance, he found from an experiment that two children perceived a toy with the identical affordance. Gibson argues that the body is a source

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70 Heft (2001, p.135) argues that William James, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and James Gibson share the claim that the self (body) as the felt body is a directly experienced facet of everyday activity.

71 In light of self-perception with-in place, William James’ notion of “the I” as our frame of references to the perceptual environment. For related discussion, see also Buber’s (1970) notion of the “I and Thou-world” as a unified one in Chapter 2.
of stimulus information in the integrated perceptual systems—the stimulus here does no longer refer to sensory “in-put,” but to “patterns and transformation of energy.”

Therefore, the perception of the self is the perception of environmental stimuli—the moving body, the invariant structures and patterns. This is the primary difference between self-perception in the two-dimensional virtual world—a secondhand experience such as film, or a retinal picture image, or visual Gestalt perception—and self-perception in the three-dimensional real world—a firsthand experience, or a sense of place. Furthermore, self-perception—the perception of affordance—is primarily registered by the optic system and picked up by the haptic system in supplementary fashion, and is synthesized, systemized, and intensified through and into the moving body—the integrated perceptual system with all senses.72

Gibson contends that the perception of affordance is “a foresight”—seeing a distance necessary for the preservation of an animal, as well as “an encounter” with tools, food, shelter, mates, and amiable animals, fires, weapons, etc. by their shapes, colors, texture, and deformations (p.232).73 The explorative behavior of foresight-and-encounter such as standing, starting, stopping, going back, steering, approaching, entering enclosure, and keeping a safe

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72 In Gibson’s ecological psychology, perception cannot be explained based on the traditional studies of perception and of cognition. To Gibson perception is no longer separated from cognition. It is a way of knowing that is based on the detection of environmental information, and it is an awareness of existing places, objects, persons, animals, and ongoing events (Gibson, 1986, p253-263).

73 Similarly, Kaplan and Kaplan’s (1982, 1989) theory of aesthetic preference specified two basic needs: “making sense” and “involvement” as immediate and promised possibilities for behavioral choices. See Table 4.2.
distance, constantly involve vertical and horizontal contours within which and on which to reveal or to conceal the facets in the ambient array during locomotion (p.121, p.228-p.234). Consequently, he argues, that figure and ground, regarded as prototype of perception, is a misleading percept (p.231) in our everyday perceptual world, i.e. our landscape.

Second, the notion of event is also a significant concept in Gibson’s ecological perception. It means changes in the environment: changes in the layout of surface, changes in the color and texture of surface, and changes in the existence of surface (p.94). Events are a perceivable dimension of time, whereas surfaces are a perceivable dimension of space—contrary the concept of time and space in Cartesian-Newtonian thought as being not perceivable. Time consists of events filling it and that space consists of the surface of objects filling it. For example, the stepping motions of the escapement of a clock and the rotation of its hands are perceived as events, yet a clock is an object to measure time like a ruler is to measure space. Sunrise is another example for an event: a way of perceiving a day. Each new sunrise is like the previous one and yet at the same time unlike it, and so is both repetitive and anew at the same time (as discussed in the previous chapters). Gibson states, “An organism similarity is never quite the same as it was before, although it has a rhythm” (p.101). That is, the rhythm is a constant repetition as well as a renewal of an ecological event, which makes one organism similar to or different from the other.

Gibson says that events are “a flow that consists of natural units, nested within one another: episodes within episodes, subordinate ones, and super-ordinate ones” (p.101). Episodes, like surfaces, are structured at various levels. Every day a number of episodes constitute a unity
episode that is a matter of choices that have the sequential order from beginning to end. Events therefore, are a series of rhythms and episodes, and the embodiment of time. As the self is perceived by the movement of body together-with-in the environment, so is an event by the movement of time—by changes of sequential orders and units—together-with-in the environment (as discussed in Chapter 6). A fuller affordance is therefore a deeper and longer perception of bodily locomotion as well as unity episode: it is a unity of the present events, rhythms, and the present self. Dewey (1934) writes this about aesthetic rhythm:

Esthetic rhythm is a matter of perception and therefore includes whatever is contributed by the self in the active process of perceiving...The notion I refer to identifies rhythm with regularity of recurrence amid changing elements...In fact denial of rhythm to pictures and buildings obstructs perception of qualities that are absolutely indispensable in their aesthetic effect. (p.163)

Gibson’s concept place is similar to the concept of habitat—ultimately, the whole environment. He says that smaller places are nested in the larger places with no boundary (p.240). Terrestrial surfaces encompass meaningful places for animals. Trees may be a good place for birds, but for humans it may not be a place but an object or an obstacle. To be a place, the environment must offer an affordance, not an object. Places nest ecological characteristics and ecological invariants make a place persist. Places incubate events. Gibson says that the most ecologically important place is a hiding place (p.136). Hiding places vary and include nests, caves, shelters, refuges, dens, burrows, holes, etc. They provide animals fundamental affordances such as safety, belonging, comfort, warmth, protection, mating, and reproduction. Gibson’s notion
of a hiding place can be compared with Appleton’s theory of prospect-refuge 74 (as discussed in Chapter 4) in that an ecologically significant place can provide fundamental aesthetic pleasure for animals and human animals alike.

In conclusion, Gibson’s theory of affordance in ecological psychology offers several universal implications on landscape aesthetics. First, it rejects the traditional perception developed by experimental psychology because of its too narrow conception of environmental variables as mere stimuli. As Gibson says, an affordance is not measurable, but it may be specifiable in parts. Second, the theory of affordance implies aesthetic potentials of the environment, for it recognizes importantly: 1) The environment as perceptual properties as well as ecological niches, 2) The reciprocal evolution of animals and their environments, 3) The self-perception (moving body) together-with-in-the environment, 4) The total engagement in the surroundings as a source of a meaning-generation system, and 5) The basic ecological invariants as archetypal (or symbolic) properties for a fuller exploration of landscape.

1.4 THE AESTHETIC VALUE OF THE LANDSCAPE: TRANSCENDENCE OF EXISTENTIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND ECOLOGICAL WELL-BEING WITH-IN PLACE

The above three psychologists—Jung’s four modes of the self, Maslow’s hierarchy of self-becoming, and Gibson’s ecological perception of the self—have a shared treatment of the self and its transcendence to the world. All three are opposed to a deterministic, stereotyped,

74 This may be the reason that Appleton’s aesthetic theory is often criticized of being too behaviorist.
and dogmatic positivism as well as to subjective opinions and values on one’s personality and experience; thus, all three tried to empirically examine the nature of human being as growing from experiential universals (the broadly shared nature of human beings) in the realm of psychology. I believe that a synthesis (or a tangent) of these three theories reinforces many of the important propositions of landscape aesthetics as experience that I have discussed throughout this study.

First, the three theories—the theory of types, the theory of growth motivation, and the theory of affordance—provide a useful framework for a heuristic aesthetics that is suggested to be both conceptual as well as analytical, and aim to specify its empirical criteria, such as characteristics, patterns, and typologies, as a synthesis of the two—the so-called analytical-conceptual humanism—as an explanatory, descriptive, and normative schema (discussed in Chapter 3). In addition, such a tangent of Jung’s, Maslow’s, and Gibson’s theories seems to open a possibility for a single paradigm connecting many isolated paradigms and conceptual underpinnings (see also Chapter 1 and 2). In a similar approach I have proposed a symbolic perspective, implied in the notion of Aesthetics from the Center (see Chapter 6), that springs from “our heart of the felt body” (the self), and transcends or integrates our ordinary (or cultural) perception of the environment with both biological and ecological meanings of life and nature: the heuristic aesthetics from below (the visceral, unconscious part of the self, or “analytical humanism” as discussed in Chapter 4) and from above (the cerebral, moral consciousness of the self, or “conceptual humanism” as discussed in Chapter 5).

Second, all three theories have in common that they treat the concept the self
importantly as the center of the human mind-and-body, although there is a distinction in Jung’s and Maslow’s treatment of the concepts of ego and self. To Jung the ego is the center of the human psyche, the inner flow of psychic energy and one of the four archetypal figures, but not yet completed to the whole being—the self. Thus, the ego tries to fulfill our synergic, dynamic, and integrative sense of being connected to the world. To Maslow, on the other hand, there is no distinction between the self and the ego, but the self becomes actualized, and realizes its own identity, through the whole process of growth: self-actualization. Therefore, the self is both, the felt, moving body as well as more a balanced, mature, and spiritual goal that an individual mind (ego) aims to achieve by practice and education. Maslow’s sense of the self arises from an experience of its own healthy and balanced personality.

Third, they tend to propose the whole relationship in-between the self and the environment (nature or cosmos) from “a” transactional, evolutionary, and holistic insight. By defining human nature toward the self (the center or the goal of the human psyche) as an extended spirit to the world, they conceive of the subjective and the objective being (interacting) with-in the environment as a whole. The perception of the self, of events, and of places, conceived as the perception of ecological niches, confirms the need for an experiential paradigm for the aesthetic experience of landscape, rather than a scientific and physical paradigm, for perception extends the sense of the self toward persons, animals, the environment, nature, and cosmos. Dewey (1934) writes about this holistic extension:

75 Jungian concept of the Self is similar to Freudian concept of Superego in this respect.
The word “nature” has a special meaning in esthetic literature, indicated especially by the use of the adjective “naturalistic.” But “nature” also has a meaning in which it includes the whole scheme of things—in which it has the force of the imaginative and emotional word “universe.” In experience, human relations, institutions, and traditions are as much a part of the nature in which and by which we live as is the physical world. (p.333)

Fourth, in congruence with Vygosky’s (1986) account of three developmental modes of human intellectual activity—phylogenesis, sociogenesis, and ontogenesis (see Figure 2.7),—these theories of the self propose tripartite layers of personal-development that connect biological, trans-cultural, and primitive feeling with socio-cultural, trans-personal, and conscious thinking. They confirm that our ultimate sense of self-transcendence to the world is the integration of the biological, the socio-cultural, and the personal mode of being—the aesthetic experience.

Fifth, Jung, Maslow, and Gibson share a common interest not necessarily in a religious, but a spiritual attitude toward other organisms, animals, habitats, and nature in general. Particularly, both Jung and Maslow argue that the healthy person is a spiritual person. Critical of dogmatic Christianity that counts on the definite dichotomy of good and evil, both attempt to interpret the essential nature of the human mind as the connected spirit with the cosmos, derived from Eastern philosophy such as Taoism and the yin-yang theory. Both believe that the dual aspects of the universe have a teleological intention toward a balance and unity, and that human beings are growing more mature and healthier as they connect themselves to the

76 Quotation marks are Dewey’s.

77 In Jung’s theory “the introvert” refers to Yin and “the extrovert” refers to Yang.
nature of the cosmos—moving toward self-actualization, or the whole being (the Self).\footnote{This attitude is often regarded as the idea of transcendental phenomenology.} Besides, from spiritual point of view, Gibson does not distinguish human animals from the other organisms in the environment.

As such, all of them seem to believe in a kind of moral force that flows from the connection between healthier human personalities and spirits and society and the environment. Similarly, Dewey (1934) argues that the ideal factors of morality must be indifferent to the dichotomous judgment of the good and bad:

The idea and the practice of morality are saturated with conceptions that stem from praise and blame, reward and punishment. Mankind is divided into sheep and goats, the vicious and virtuous, the law-abiding and criminal, the good and bad. To be beyond good and evil is an impossibility for man, and yet as long as the good signified only that which is lauded and rewarded, and the evil that which is currently condemned or outlawed, the ideal factors of morality are always and everywhere beyond good and evil. (p.348-349)

Sixth, all of them emphasize feeling as a primitive, trans-culturally inherited, and symbolic aspect of the self beyond a biological need for survival. Jung calls it the unconscious and evaluative “Feeling,” while Maslow terms it “Basic needs.” Jung argues that if feeling is neglected, it is easily contaminated by sensory organs and intuition. Maslow also explains that such impulses as safety, security, belongingness, love, respect, and self-esteem are a kind of feeling. Gibson’s theorizes feeling as an “Affordance” that gets wider, finer, longer, richer, and fuller as a perceiver explores and learns the environment (Heft, 1997, p.101). In addition, both
Jung and Maslow contend that the integrative *feelings* move upward the conscious if the realization of the ego is unsatisfactory. The lack or the loss of the satisfaction of Maslow’s basic need—or Gibson’s environmental stimuli—can cause an individual to activate other functions, such as sensation, intuition, and thinking (Jung), to activate cognitive and aesthetic needs (Maslow), and to explore further and more affordances (self-perception), in order to overcome any inferior functions of the human psyche (Jung), to gratify the unsatisfied needs for the ultimate goal of healthy personalities (Maslow), and to perceive fuller ecological invariants of the environment (Gibson).

Last, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that the integrative view of the three psychologists’ theories provides both an aesthetic and an ethical vision on the relationship of humans and their environment. Jung’s archetypal states of feeling, thinking, sensation, and intuition are the four interactive modes of an aesthetic experience, and at the same time he conceives of them as a pre-requisite mode for the well-being of a whole being. Similarly, Maslow recognizes the aesthetic need as a basic need for self-actualization to be a morally healthy state. Likewise, Gibson’s position is definitely moral, for he emphasizes the commonalities between human animals and other animals, whose behavior choices are dependent on the environment. The only difference is that human animals have a creative ability to transform their affordances—ecological invariants—by tools, including language.

The theories of Jung, Maslow and Gibson all seem to have strong moral implications, but their notions are more strongly present in aesthetic experience—the self-and-environment perception. A spiritual or symbolic power (imagination) in our perception of the self-and-
environment enables us to realize the universal, invariant structure of the self, and to extend the self far beyond ourselves through inspiration, resonance, and gratification. That is, imagination is a catalytic instrument for both aesthetic and moral experience because of its empathetic and sympathetic drive (see also Chapter 6). Dewey’s (1934) notion that “art is more moral than moralities” best describes “the primacy of the imagination” for the good as follows:

Imagination is the chief instrument of the good. It is more or less a commonplace to say that a person’s ideal and treatment of his fellows are dependent upon his power to put himself imaginatively in their place. But, the primacy of the imagination extends far beyond the scope of direct personal relationships. Except where “ideal” is used in conventional deference or as a name for a sentimental reverie, the ideal factors in everyday moral outlook and human loyalty are imaginative. The historic alliance of religion and art has its roots in this common quality. Hence, it is that art is more moral than moralities. (p.348)

2. LANDSCAPE AESTHETICS AS A PRIMARY FORCE TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

From the above studies of various theoretical perspectives, landscape aesthetics emerges as playing a primary role in the cluster of values we connect with issues of environmental sustainability. An experience of landscape engenders a “sense” of place and the aesthetic experience of place yields a “peak-experience,” a fuller sense of the self within place. It contains four aspects of the self-perception—feeling, sensation, thinking, and intuition—which evolve, transcend, and integrate the experience toward a unity. Such a full experience is a spiritual and imaginative encounter with the environment, and therefore it can be stated that aesthetic sensibility is prior to moral responsibility for our environment. That is to say, discovering beauty of a place fosters a way of recovering duty for the place as an ecological community.
2.1 AESTHETIC QUALITIES: THE INTERCHANGEABLE QUALITIES BETWEEN PERSON AND ENVIRONMENT

The transcendence of the self toward the environment, and the transactional relationship among designers, critics, and the environment (see also Figure 2.5, 2.6) suggests that there be interchangeable qualities between the self and the environment, those that we perceive and the environment affords.

![Diagram of Interchangeable Qualities between Persons and Their Environments](image)

**Figure 7.5**: A conceptual diagram of Interchangeable qualities between persons and their environments

As depicted in Figure 7.5, the four-structure of the self is the other side of environmental affordability. That is to say, when we feel affection for a place, the place contains
particular characteristics that motivate, attract, and appeal to the “primitive” part of our being—our “hearts,” perhaps. When we perceive a place with our sensory organs it means that the place has qualities and features—perceptibility and sensibility. Likewise, as we become aware of a place and find it comprehensible, it means that the environment is imbued with qualities to make it legible, intelligible, and accessible to reason. Our love of a place eventually rises even to a spiritual level, transcending or fulfilling our sense of identity with a place through our imaginative extensions and insights.

However, this dynamic circularity of the quadrant of sense, mind, soul, and heart is not dividable, as we cannot divide a person into the four different persons. It is also true that knowing the four aspects of being does not mean to propose to divide the qualities of environment into the four different perspectives. The circle rather attempts to represent an archetypal unity that connects aesthetic meanings and the values of human needs and behaviors with those of other things, organisms, and the universe, and that transfer the layers of aesthetic meanings tangents of phenomenological, ecological, and existential meanings. The dynamic nature of experience is the common ground for both perceiver’s experiences and those of the artist or designer— we could call it an interchangeable quality. Dewey (1934) writes about it like this:

> What is called the magic of the artist resides in his ability to transfer these values from one field of experience to another, to attach them to the objects of our common life, and by his imaginative insight make these objects poignant and momentous. (p118)
2.2 AESTHETIC “MOODS” AS A CATALYST FOR ETHICAL “MODES”

The interchangeable qualities in-between the self and the environment come to be fully perceived or gratified by an on-going process of exploration and evaluation. This aesthetic process is a cause of motion that evolves from its free, direct, spontaneous, and un-systemic force (Russell, 1988, p.128), and produces an integrative feeling, a total engagement of sensuous, rational, intuitive, and imaginative action. At the beginning of a total perceptual process, a certain integrative feeling can be aroused: it may be rather ambiguous, sufficient to evoke primitive aesthetic responses, and involves the dynamic interaction in-between the four modes of the self with-in place. The whole process thus enacts the perceptual qualities and attaches them to the environment as the source of our appreciation (non-judgmental perception) and of our evaluation (judgmental perception). Dewey (1934) says:

More important is the fact that primitive need is the source of attachment to objects. Perception is born when solicitude for objects and their qualities brings the organic demand for attachment to consciousness. (p.256)

The qualitative notions of aesthetic experience vary from affective and rational, to sensuous and spiritual attitudes, and ultimately are associated with our moral attitudes toward the environment. As illustrated in Figure 7.6, the ambient aesthetic feeling—the affective mood—of the object (or the environment) can be circumscribed with some psychological concepts such as a sense of comfort, liking, attachment, belongingness, security, or preference that are discriminating, judgmental, sympathetic, and explorative.
Figure 7.6: The structure of aesthetic moods prior to moral modes residing in sense of place

An affect is “an attitude results from combining a belief about something with a value premise about it” (Lang, 1988, p.19). Because of its strong emotional impact, the ambient aesthetic feeling is often infused with moral feeling—affective feeling—and therefore can become a crucial cause of moral action. When the gross aesthetic feeling most influences what we call sensation or synaesthesia—a full multi-sensory engagement with an aesthetic object, i.e. our environment—it tends to be an integrated non-judgmental sensation that brings about or intensifies our sense of joy, delight, and appreciative attitudes to the environment.

Our moral imagination is often activated by sensational and synaesthetic images and events, and because of the psychological as well as emotional power of our imagination, sensation interacting with feeling not only deepens our aesthetic perception, but also tends to
feed back moral attitudes and judgments to it. We therefore can conclude that our moral attitudes and judgments will tend influence our non-judgmental aesthetic appreciation or aesthetic evaluation of the environment, whereas our aesthetic attitudes and judgments will influence our moral attitude toward or our judgment on the environment by necessity.

To aesthetically evaluate things, we need to rationalize perceptual qualities in a larger context and reasoning system. The act of self-gratification and aesthetic contentment derived from the object (or the environment) thus entails a complex process of reasonable or logical choices and a process of evaluating environmental meanings and values in a social and cultural context. This is a conscious and rational process of thinking, required for environmental criticism and design evaluation, which expresses our experience verbally through the medium of language. Thus these evaluative moods of the aesthetic attitude tend to transfer our environmental choices and behaviors from an aesthetic justification to the moral modes (actions) for the environment.

Lastly there is mystical experience, an unconscious but nevertheless sharp perception, i.e. intuition. Berleant (2000) describes an aesthetic intuition as the seizing or grasping of something—the qualities of experience (p.103)—which differ sharply from intellectual intuition. It is “an organic intuition,” “not confined to cerebral activity,” but engages in the aesthetic relation “all the dimensions of the human organism—the imaginative, rational, sensuous, and impulsive” (p.104). However, this does not mean anti-intellectualism in aesthetics; it rather means contextually and organically situated intellectualism. Berleant (2000) describes it further:
[Aesthetic intuition is] the process by which we attain a unity of existence, however, [it] is not an act of intellectual synthesis, just as the experience of art is not an analytic one. It is, to put it literally, pre-analytic and pre-synthetic. While the activities of analysis and synthesis are largely reflective in character, it takes place on a pre-reflective level, contextual rather than fragmented, and therefore undifferentiated by any conceptual distinctions. (p.103-104)

Mystical experience is therefore non-judgmental, but may involve some unconscious process of contemplation or reflection on a complex environment. This experience can arouse a deep aesthetic and moral sense, such as respect, sublimity, dignity, woe, which together create a sense of responsibility for the environment in us. Aesthetic intuition is “the immediate, personal apprehension of truth—the feel of what is true—about a thing, a person, or a situation” (p.102). Perhaps, it is largely a sense of what is right or wrong in a given situation, not necessarily whether an object in itself is good or bad. In case of the work of art, this sense of what is right may be the feel of what is appropriate for the unity of its existence; however, in the case of the environment, this sense of what is true in its natural and cultural aspects can arouse a truly moral sense of what is good for the environment and eco-system.

As such, the conceptual schema of being with-in place can explain the intense interactive quality, namely the aesthetic quality of landscape experience. However, the schema must not serve as a dogmatic or deterministic mould in which to mount our experiences of landscapes, but as an analytical as well as conceptual system of the characteristics of the transactional relationship between humans and the environment (see also Figure 3.2). The conceptual schema of aesthetic experience provides the most sustainable account for the intersections and overlaps between the aesthetic and the moral realms, ranging from emotional,
perceptual, and rational to spiritual qualities and values, and fosters both realms (of aesthetics and ethics). This serves as an explanatory, descriptive or appreciative, evaluative, and justificatory framework, and also is a procedural and substantive structure for both aesthetic and moral experiences. The conceptual framework may help us explain why a certain landscape makes us feel good, and also teaches us to appreciate it better and richer, and finally may tell us what ought to be in the future.

In conclusion, the aesthetic moods become ethical modes for action toward environmental sustainability—psychological, socio-cultural, and ecological health. The conventional approaches to aesthetic experience were directed toward the conscious, of the senses and the mind, both of which influence individual tastes and socio-cultural preferences, respectively. The schema of the self as a conceptual schema for landscape aesthetics not only encompasses an individual’s whole experience, integrating body and mind as well as the conscious and the unconscious, but also it explains how an individual’s aesthetic experiences are shaped by biological, physiological, socio-economic, cultural, ecological, and environmental associations and connections.

Aesthetic and moral values in the transactional qualities and meanings between humans and the environment are only attached to the transcendent, evolutionary, and holistic relation of the environment and its habitants, not to one or the other. This relation is neither subjective nor objective; it is heuristic and contextual, yet possible to explain, describe, and evaluate. That is why “the critique of an environment is at the same time the critique of a civilization” (Berleant, 1997, p.24): the aesthetic and the moral value of the environment has evolved with
Aesthetics Connecting Beauty and Duty

culture. Dewey (1934) says:

Esthetic experience is a manifestation, a record and celebration of the life of a civilization, a means of promoting its development, and is also the ultimate judgment upon the quality of a civilization. (p.326)

2.3 BIOPHILIA, ECOPHILIA, AND LOVE OF PLACE, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE

Sustainability as a value is neither subjective nor objective; rather it is aesthetic and moral. In Chapter 4 I argued that our desire for life and lifelike-processes within the environment can be seen as “aesthetics from below,” and I attempted to characterize its heuristic meanings as arising from primitive feelings connected with a search for habitat—being in place. Biophilia is a hypothetical concept I used to describe this primitive and explanatory—not deterministic—feeling that is both aesthetic and moral. In Chapter 5 I argued that our deep reverence for life in nature, beings within the environment, can be seen as “aesthetics from above,” and that environmental sustainability should be a transcendental, and normative feeling that is grounded in our cognitive understanding as well as in our imaginative appreciation of nature and ecosystem. I would hypothetically call it ecophilia as a concept that is both aesthetic and moral.

Like our sense of beauty, our typical concept of love can be misunderstood or distorted as being merely a matter of personal taste or choice, but philia has been argued to be a transcendent, evolutionary, and holistic form of love, a form of longing for being-together-with-in place. The notion of place encompasses habitat, home, community, and the
environment—i.e. both culture and nature.

![Figure 7.7: A conceptual map of landscape aesthetics as a primary force of environmental sustainability](image)

In Chapter 6 I have argued that the aesthetic perception and appreciation of landscape or the environment—feeling good or well—starts with a kind of self-realization of being, or of life, with-in place, community, and the cultural and natural context—environment. This realization, what I called “aesthetics from the center,” originates from our ordinary landscape experience—captivating our attention and activating our full appreciation—and encourages us to extend its meanings to the larger contexts and systems, and thus cultivates our reason to do morally good to the environment. As depicted in Figure 7.7, aesthetics from the center is indeed the center of our aesthetic perception, connecting our primitive desire for well-being with-in
habitat (below) to our transcendental reverence for healthy beings within the ecosystem (above).

Aesthetics from the center, ranging from below to above, or from above to below, can be seen as the heart of our understanding of and application to environmental sustainability. This heuristic aesthetics of landscape thus promises to integrate the analytical with the conceptual approach of humanism to environmental sustainability (see also Chapter 3). Our full appreciation of the environment would be aesthetic, if it impregnates the transcendent, evolutionary, and holistic self within place. It may be true that our love of place can be a moral force to do right to our community if it transcends, evolves, and integrates the self within place.

3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

3.1 RESPONSES TO THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

At the very beginning of Chapter 1 I asserted that aesthetic theory and criticism in landscape architecture is one of the most critical inquiries in both design and research, yet that it lacks a sustainable theoretical and philosophical foundation. Here may it be helpful to think whether my proposed theoretical framework could provide an answer to the important questions that have been most frequently asked, yet have remained unanswered (see also Figure 1.2).

In response to the first question—*What is landscape architecture and what is conceptual thinking about it, and how do we achieve it?*—I find myself essentially in agreement with Scarfo’s
(Riley & Brown, 1992, p.166) statement, “Everyday life holds the answers to sustainability and carrying capacity of the aesthetics of everyday life,” and Steinitz’s observation “I believe that the viability and influence of landscape architecture as an area of professional education and practice will depend in large measure upon how well we move toward a firmer and more integratable theoretical base” (Steinitz, 1990b, p.143). Thus I have argued that due to the essentially aesthetic nature of “landscape” the critical role of landscape architecture should be identified with the nature of landscape aesthetics, because landscape aesthetics as a synthesis of theory and criticism can create a bridge between art and science, ego and eco, culture and nature, humans and the environment, subjectivity and objectivity, and egocentric and ecocentric value systems (see also Figure 2.1).

Then, to answer to the second part of the first question—how do we achieve this conceptual thinking—I endorsed Zube’s claim (see Chapter 2) that a heuristic approach to landscape evaluation and perception would be the most appropriate methodology of a new landscape aesthetics, and I have further asserted that landscape aesthetics should be the aesthetics of everyday life, that its nature is hybrid, interdisciplinary, and holistic, that it has neither a sufficient conceptual or theoretical foundation, nor even an appropriate name. Thus, it is reasonable to propose that a new aesthetic theory be grounded in existing interdisciplinary literature, and serve as a paradigm in terms of environmental sustainability.

With regard to the heuristic approach to landscape aesthetics, it is important to ask whether it can be the answer to the second question: What are social, ecological, aesthetic, sustainable
qualities and values and how are those formed and informed, and why are they good? I would say that my dissertation has tried to answer them by developing the groundwork for a paradigmatic landscape aesthetics in light of environmental sustainability. I have argued that aesthetics integrates and intersects these personal, social, cultural, and sustainable qualities and values, and that these interchangeable values can be specified and identified through our aesthetic experience from below, from above, and from the center as an on-going process of aesthetic appreciation, participation, and communication. Dewey (1958) writes about the qualities of the organism in the environment:

The qualities never were in the organism; they always were qualities of interactions in which both extra-organic things and organism partake. When named, they enable identification and discrimination of things to take place as means in a further course of inclusive interactions. Hence they are as many qualities of the things engaged as of the organism. (p.259)

In terms of value judgment, I explained if aesthetic experience is considered as rooted in ecological, psychological, and phenomenological meanings of human well-being, then it could impregnate our moral reason to do right to the environment—feeling good fosters doing good. The feeling good and the doing good are neither subjective nor individual states of mind, but they have in common a procedural as well as substantial structure—just as our experience is both temporal and spatial—as I have argued and suggested for landscape aesthetics as a paradigm and a heuristic theory. Because they are identifiable and specifiable in the interactions, the way the aesthetic qualities and values are informed, can be the way they are formed through our moral acts of making—environmental design.
However, the identification of interactive values needs hierarchical or systemic orders and layers: bio-ecological well-being—*phylogenesis*—is the lower, broader, and deeper root, including the well-being of all animals and organisms; socio-cultural well-being—*sociogenesis*—is a branch of aesthetic experience as a shared value and health in community and society; the individual psychological well-being—*ontogenesis*—is based on individual choices and comparable to individually different shapes and forms evolved from shared structures in both nature and culture. Using a tree metaphor, Smith (1977, p.91) similarly explains that at the top of the tree aesthetic response is infinitely variable as the branches reach maximum differentiation. Further down, larger areas of aesthetic reaction become common to the group and then the culture, and the root reflects biological needs. Perhaps, as Dewey (1934) suggests, the lower value is the more valuable:

> These *biological commonplaces* are something more than that; they reach to the *roots* of the aesthetics in experience. The world is full of things that are indifferent and even hostile to life; the very processes by which life is maintained tend to throw it out of gear with its surroundings. Nevertheless, if life continues and if in continuing it expands, there is an overcoming of factors of opposition and conflict; there is a transformation of them into differentiated aspects of a higher powered and more significant life. (p.14)

These layers and orders constitute the unified aesthetic whole with holistic, transcendent, and evolutionary values. In this respect, these values and qualities of aesthetic experience I have argued for may be ultimately instrumental. Dewey (1958) writes about such layers of qualities and values of objects, and emphasizes the interactive nature of empirical aesthetics as follows:
The hierarchy is explicit in Greek thought: first and lowest are vegetative ends, normal growth and reproduction; second in rank come animal ends, locomotion and sensibility; third in rank, are ideal and rational ends, of which the highest is blissful contemplative possession in thought of all the forms of nature. In this gradation, each lower rank while an ‘end’ is also means or preformed condition of higher ends. Empirical things, things of useful arts, belonging to the second class but, affected by an adventitious mixture of thought, are ultimately instrumentalities potential for the life of pure rational possession of ideal objects. (p.105)

The last set of questions is: How and what do we experience in landscape in common? And how do we create a landscape where people can find a sense of well-being? I believe that findings and implications throughout the consecutive Chapters 4, 5, and 6 have provided sufficient evidences and clues to answer these questions. The bottom line is that my propositions and suggestions have argued for an experiential universality all human beings share: aesthetics as the experiential universality. Dewey (1934) says about this:

The “common” is that which is found in the experience of a number of persons; anything in which a number of persons participate is by that very fact common. The more deep-seated it is in the doings and undergoing that form experience, the more general or common it is. We live in the same world; that aspect of nature is common to all. There are impulsions and needs that are common to humanity. The “universal” is not something metaphysically anterior to all experience but is ‘a way in which things function’ in experience as a bond of union among particular events and scenes. (p.286)79

Following Dewey, I would argue that we also could call such experiential universality as “a way in which things function” sustainability. This is also an important value statement for

79 Quotation marks are Dewey’s.
our acts of making, i.e. environmental design. Thus, what environmental designers should keep in their mind is that “the more a work of art embodies what belongs to experiences common to many individuals, the more expressive it is (Dewey, 1934, p.285), because this act of making has ultimately the purpose to create a landscape where people can find a sense of well-being.

I believe that the suggested conceptual schema can provide a frame of reference of landscape aesthetics open to conventional approaches from experimentalists, planners, humanists, and activists (see Figure 2.3). A single approach will be inappropriate and insufficient; thus a selective adoption of existing theoretical positions and methods may be needed.

For example, it is conceivable that based on the schema—the suggested theory of aesthetics, well-being-with-in place—experimentalists can generate more explicit specifications of interrelated and invariant perceptual dimensions in aesthetic experience. Humanists may be able to describe further the immediate, integrative perceptions (in-sight), such as a sense of being, a sense of belonging, a sense of place, a sense of identity, a sense of interdependence, and a poetic sense of space, etc., as they are in general holistic thinkers. “The phenomenological situation with regard to psychoanalytical investigation will perhaps be more precisely stated in connection with poetic images” (Bachelard, 1969, p. xxix). Then, designers—planners and activists in Porteous’ terms—ultimately create, by making and doing, the best communication between things and between beings and places through their representation of the relationship.

In terms of a dialogue the designers’ task may be a challenge and often even harder: they have to develop intermediate languages (e.g. pattern languages) to arbitrate the dialogue between
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laymen and themselves.

As Fenton (1988, p.110) states, a review of the landscape preference or evaluation literature has suggested three principal approaches: 1) The objective measurement of physical setting variables, 2) The use of judges’ ratings to define landscape variables with a clear environmental referent, and 3) The description of landscape variables in phenomenological terms. I would argue that without an identification of “the systems aesthetic”—the description or identification of physical characteristics interrelated with landscape quality—may fail. Thus, going back to the question, how to create a landscape where people can find a sense of well-being, I believe that my conceptual and theoretical suggestions and propositions confirm a necessary assumption that aesthetic invariants—rather than variables—are salient to the perception of landscape quality.

Throughout Chapter 4, 5, and 6, I have discussed the gross structure of aesthetic stimuli and their essential characteristics, archetypal and symbolic patterns and features, types of aesthetic contexts, limbic qualities and physical features of cities, identities and qualities of place, and others. Together these could be very useful guidelines for further identification and for typologies of common experiential dimensions and cultural identities in light of environmental sustainability. Physical dimensions and characteristics help to define the unique identity of persons and places, because physical characteristics are also sustained by those identities (Heatth, 1988, p.9). Such identities and qualities are conditioned and sustained by biological, psychological, ecological, and socio-cultural contexts. Therefore, my attempts to identify qualitative characteristics should ultimately help to define the contexts of place and
environment.

3.2 FUTURE QUESTIONS IN LANDSCAPE RESEARCH

Aldo Leopold (1949) proposed that land use decisions be based on three criteria: ethical (ecological), aesthetic, and economic. It is my proposal that these three criteria be seen as an inseparable systemic whole, fused in the aesthetic. The ethical value and the economic values of the environment are often in conflict when they are narrowly defined—ecocentrism vs. anthropocentrism—just as we frequently witness the conflicting values between “green and growth,” and as we separate existential meanings of the self from the world: human well-being with-in place as irrelevant to, and disconnected from, doing good to the environment. If the moral state is the ultimate end of being, and the process of growing and becoming is aesthetic, then aesthetics can be a means for the combination of ethical and economic values in the practice of environmental sustainability.

Apart from a further critical study of moral and aesthetic values based on philosophical rigor, my future work would be primarily to expand the integrative whole of aesthetic meanings of well-being to other related bodies of inquiries and questions, to bring them “down” to a level of tangible applicability to the practical or empirical relationship of landscape qualities and features informing the area of theory and criticism of environmental design. The following would be the sub-areas or topics I would like to further investigate as the extension of this dissertation:
• Categorize landscape qualities as experiential universals

• Identify landscape features as embedded in body and language

• Identify characteristics of ecological aesthetics or cultural ecology in terms of a sense of nature and a sensibility of the natural

• Identify physical or formal indexes on ecological and psychological well-being

• Identify qualities of the vernacular landscape in terms of habituation, habit, and habitat

• Re-think “sense of place” as a system of moral and aesthetic values and meanings

• Further attempt to specify typological and morphological characteristics of landscape.

• Examine cross-cultural perception in the aesthetic landscape

There are also a number of interesting state court cases on planning policies and zoning regulations that are related to conventional visual beauty and landscape preservation. Perhaps, possible research issues could include the development of justificatory value criteria of sustainability as aesthetic as well as moral decisions for the community. The following are some of the conventional issues that can be re-approached:

• Prevention of harm or regulating visual (aesthetic) misfits.

• Shared human values for community protection

• Well-being more than only economic protection of property values and tourism

• Re-assessment of visual access for public use or profit

• Environmental harmony needs to be re-defined as an identifiable composite system of aesthetic value.
Lastly, Dewey's (1934) ending passage in his book “Art as Experience” would also be the best way to end my long journey:

What is true of the individual is true of the whole system of morals in thought and action. While perception of the union of the possible with the actual in a work of art is itself a great good, the good does not terminate with the immediate and particular occasion in which it is had. The union that is presented in perception persists in the remaking of impulsion and thought. The first intimations of wide and large redirections of desire and purpose are of necessity imaginative. Art is a mode of prediction not found in charts and statistics, and it insinuates possibilities of human relations not to be found in rule and precepts, admonition and administration. (p.349)
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