ABSTRACT


The purpose of this research is to examine married women’s perceptions of the division of household labor. Distributive justice theory has suggested the mechanisms through which individuals determine their situations are fair. However, the majority of applications of the distributive justice theory have been focused on Western nations. This research extends these previous applications in two ways. First, the self-evaluation theory is integrated with distributive justice theory and elaborated into a new theory, called Contextual Distributive Justice Theory. Second, part of this new theory is tested using a sample of 4581 married women from the International Social Justice Project data. Using multi-level analysis, this research suggests that context does matter in predicting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. There are statistically significant differences in women’s average perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor based upon their nation of residence. Context indirectly affects women’s perceptions of fairness through national ideology and women’s overall empowerment. Further, women’s individual measures of empowerment affect their perceptions of fairness differently based upon the overall empowerment of women in their nation of residence. Implications for further theoretical elaboration and empirical examination are discussed.
IS JUSTICE CONTEXTUAL? A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF MARRIED WOMEN’S PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS OF THE DIVISION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR

by

SHANNON NICOLE DAVIS

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APPROVED BY:

Theodore N. Greenstein
Chair of Advisory Committee

Maxine P. Atkinson

Stacy M. DeCoster

Richard Della Fave
BIOGRAPHY

Shannon Nicole Davis was born on November 28, 1974 in Charlotte, North Carolina. After graduating from high school in Charlotte, she attended the University of North Carolina at Asheville where she received her Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology in 1997. She received her Master of Science degree in Sociology at North Carolina State University in 2000 and immediately began work on completing her Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology. She accepted a position as a Post-Doctoral Scholar working with Dr. Lisa Pearce at the Carolina Population Center for 2004-2006, and plans to pursue an academic position after completing her post-doctoral training.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Prologue

Since the publication of Oakley’s (1974) pivotal work on the sociology of housework, sociologists and social psychologists have focused much attention on the division of household labor. Household labor is viewed at the macro-level as reproductive labor necessary for the continuation of society. At the micro-level, the division of this labor is viewed as relevant in the reproduction of family, gender, and other relationships. A major focus has been on the perceptions of fairness in the division of household labor even in the face of unequal distributions. While much research uses society-wide predictors of fairness like employment status and income, some researchers continue to emphasize the household itself as the focus for perceptions of fairness, emphasizing the importance of negotiated meanings of domestic work. Sociologists rarely consider the nation-level cultural and structural context.

This research project places the sociological research on individual perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor into a nation-level cultural context. Specifically, this research does three things. First, it uses cross-national data to examine the effects of national belief structures or ideologies on individual women’s perceptions of fairness. Second, it determines whether individual predictors of married women’s perceptions of injustice in the United States are the same for married women living in post-socialist nations. Finally, this research examines the effects of women’s overall
empowerment in a nation on individual married women’s perceptions of fairness of the
division of labor in their homes. By including characteristics of the national context
within which people live, I intend to fill the gap in knowledge of how national context
influences married women’s constructions of justice regarding their family life and work.

This research has significant implications for researchers interested in
understanding gender inequality and the ways in which it is supported by cultural
ideologies and social structures. By exploring these relationships across nations, this
research uncovers important similarities and differences in how women in various types
of societies formulate their perceptions of inequity. To the extent to which perceptions of
inequity serve as a catalyst for positive changes in the well-being of women and families,
this research has important implications for social policy.

While some cross-national research has examined the factors that predict the
division of household labor using local and contextual predictors, this is the first
empirical research specifically examining individual- and structural-level predictors of
married women’s perceptions of fairness using cross-national data. Further, this research
employs multilevel analysis to assess the social processes and mechanisms through which
inequalities are perceived as inequities without ignoring context. To my knowledge, the
only cross-national research focusing on family processes that employs multilevel
analyses has focused on predicting the division of household labor, rather than
perceptions of fairness of that division (Batalova and Cohen 2002; Davis and Greenstein
2003; Fuwa 2003).

Further, I argue that what researchers refer to as gender ideology in much recent
sociological research is better conceptualized as a form of justice ideology. I have argued elsewhere (Davis and Greenstein, forthcoming) that researchers must understand ideology as a vehicle through which individuals construct meanings for their personal experiences. To the extent that the processes assessed in this research do differ by ideology, we will learn more about how context moderates the association between ideology and behavior. This may aid in understanding how this relationship perpetuates inequalities across societies.

1.2 Contextual Framework

Distributive justice perspectives explaining perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor include individual justifications for the division of labor and information about individuals’ comparison referents. As I argue in Chapter Three, the justifications individuals use for their division of labor may be contextually-based, or normative in their nation. Additionally, the neoclassical and social exchange perspectives suggest that the perception of fairness of the division of household labor likely would be based on perception of input into the household reproduction, either via income or reproductive labor. In patriarchal capitalist society, this inevitably would lead to greater credit being given to the person who earns the higher proportion of income in the family, allowing them to “buy out” of doing household labor. This would occur while both partners continue to see the division of labor as fair. Further, most previous research has been performed only in capitalist nations (primarily the United States). There may be contextual effects on the individual perception of fairness, although as little research has
been performed on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor outside of the United States, we do not know if this is the case. Those related projects performed in former socialist states have had little bearing on Western research and theory.

Thus, we need research that takes into account this capitalist social structure by looking at women in contexts. If we were to perform comparative research on married women’s perceptions of the fairness of the division of household labor in several different economic contexts (e.g., the United States, Japan, and post-socialist nations such as Slovenia and Estonia), we may find important differences that inform understanding of perceptions of inequity. We may further find that women’s perceptions of fairness are based out of some combination of their personal experience in their homes and the larger ideological or economic structure in their nations.

Previous research has examined the effects of the division of labor on perceptions of fairness, moderated by one or both partners’ gender ideologies, or beliefs about the roles women and men should have in the public and private spheres. Some studies find a correlation between gender ideology and women’s perceptions of fairness. Further, this relationship is moderated by employment status. This interactive relationship is indicative of the kind of relationship that may differ based upon the national ideology governing individuals’ relationships with one another and the government. It may be that gender ideology is a kind of justice ideology that differs cross-culturally as a result of national history and current context. However, scant research has examined whether these kinds of relationships are the same in differing national contexts (e.g., Batalova and Cohen 2002; Fuwa 2003; Wunderink and Niehoff 1997). Does the relationship between
employment status and perception of fairness, for example, look the same in former socialist states as it does in continuous capitalist states? Once we take into consideration measures of national ideology, will we see the same kinds of individual-level relationships or predictors of individual perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor?

### 1.3 Project Description

This research attempts to bridge the gap between the micro-level and macro-level predictors of family relationships. In this research, I replicate previous work on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. However, rather than simply including only predictors within the household, I place perceptions of fairness into a larger context, in this case, nation within which the respondents live. Researchers have demonstrated that other social processes differ greatly across nations (e.g., divorce, Trent and South 1989; the extent to which a person’s sex affects their likelihood of holding a supervisory job, Rosenfeld, Van Buren, and Kalleberg 1998; division of household labor, Batalova and Cohen 2002). By analyzing married women’s perceptions as a product of their own household characteristics and their social/physical location, I argue: (1) that we are able to construct a more accurate picture of how married women perceive inequality in their own relationships, and (2) that we are able to determine that the previously documented processes are not ubiquitous social processes, but are the result of the historical changes of the family as an institution within the confines of national borders.

In much cross-national research, multiple models are estimated with the same
predictor variables for each nation and comparisons of the effects of those predictors are limited either to descriptions of the coefficients or to many multiple comparisons tests (e.g., Calasanti and Bailey 1991; Kamo 1994; Sanchez 1993; Sanchez and Kane 1996). Another method is simply to include a dummy variable for each nation included in the analysis. Where the outcome is at the individual level, having the individual components and national components simultaneously regressed on the outcome variable masks the variation within and between nations. Additionally, this kind of analysis does not allow for assessment of whether the processes constructing perceptions of fairness are similar or different based on the context of the nation. Further, as individuals are nested within nations, performing some statistical correction for the clustering of the data is necessary. Failure to do so violates one of the basic regression assumptions, as the error terms for responses by individuals within the same nation will be correlated. The standard errors for the estimates of the parameters would be biased, potentially allowing for a Type I error. Recent statistical innovations allow for multilevel models with nested data, that is, when data are naturally nested within groups (in this case, nations), the predictors of the outcome variable, perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor, can be at both the individual- and the national-level. This naturally occurring nesting fits well with the multilevel modeling technique employed in this analysis.

1.4 Outline of Subsequent Chapters

In the next chapter, I present the empirical findings and theoretical perspectives currently prevalent in studying perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.
Although most previous research focuses on American couples, I include relevant literatures of cross-national research on similar topics. Specifically, I discuss some research that suggests this particular project should be undertaken because national culture and structure are important for understanding individual and family behaviors and beliefs. Further, I provide evidence that the nation as social/physical context is a crucial point missed in previous research and suggest that my research fills in that empirical gap. At the conclusion of Chapter Two, I provide a summary of the theoretical mechanisms proposed by previous research and the general hypotheses I test in this project.

Chapter Three develops a contextual theory of distributive justice based partially on the review of the literature presented in Chapter Two. I place the distributive justice theory into context by arguing that the notion of what is considered just is contextually specific based upon the ideology and/or structure of the context. I explain how distributive justice theory may operate differently based upon contextual ideology and structure in explaining people’s perceptions of justice. Specifically, I integrate self-evaluation theory with distributive justice theory and elaborate on how the self-evaluation process creates personal ideologies. I conclude by describing the application of the contextual theory of distributive justice to married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.

Chapter Four presents the analytic technique used to answer the primary research question regarding variation in predictors of the perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor cross-nationally at both the individual and nation levels. The measurement of all variables is specified in this chapter and the formal hypotheses
regarding expected relationships are included. In addition, the types of methods used to
analyze the 1991 International Social Justice Project data and nation-specific social
indicators are discussed.

Chapter Five discusses the descriptive and summary statistics for the individual-
and the national-level predictors. This chapter provides descriptive analyses of the data
using both within- and between-nation comparisons.

Chapter Six presents the findings of the empirical tests of my hypotheses. I
describe the direct effects of the individual level predictors on married women’s
perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. I also examine the extent to
which married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor are
predicted by their own individual (and/or their partner’s) characteristics as compared to
characteristics of the nation in which they reside. Finally, I describe the effects of
national-level characteristics on married women’s perceptions of fairness both directly
and as they moderate the effects of individual-level characteristics.

Chapter Seven summarizes all findings and determines whether the hypotheses
derived in Chapter Four are supported. Each hypothesis is revisited and the empirical
evidence evaluated to determine the extent to which the hypotheses are supported by the
data. I also discuss how the findings from this research inform theoretical understanding
of how married women construct their sense of fairness and justice surrounding the
division of household labor.

In Chapter Eight I describe what I see the implications of my research to be,
focusing on how I see my research informing other scholarship on the family and
perceptions of inequity. Specifically, I comment on how I see the individual-level findings in this study inform research on family well-being. I argue that my research provides evidence that individual-level processes differ by context. I describe methodological implementations that can be used to examine these differences. I end by calling for greater theoretical development similar to the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice where individual behavior is explained as a product both of personal experiences and of context.
CHAPTER TWO
INDIVIDUAL AND CONTEXTUAL PREDICTORS OF PERCEPTIONS OF
FAIRNESS OF THE DIVISION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR

2.1 Introduction

Much research on predictors of perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor focuses on micro-level factors that affect married American women’s perceptions of fairness. However, far less is known about whether the processes previously identified in the United States are general or context-specific social processes. There is some evidence that these processes may be context-specific, given that research in other aspects of family life demonstrates that family behaviors and individual perceptions differ by national context.

In this chapter, I summarize previous research and theoretical perspectives on the perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor, highlighting the concentration of this research and theorizing at the micro-level. I include in this section research on married American women’s perceptions of the division of household labor as well as some cross-national, country-specific information. Additionally, I summarize research suggesting there may be nation-specific contextual effects based upon nation of residence on women’s perceptions of fairness. This section specifically addresses the notion of a national ideology but does not focus on individual nations. Finally, I summarize the literature suggesting the ways in which the micro-level predictors and macro-level predictors may interact in their effects on individual women’s perceptions of fairness of
the division of household labor.

2.2 Individual-Level Theories Predicting Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness

Several theories have been espoused to explain individuals, particularly wives, perceptions of equity in the division of household labor. These theories include classic equity theory, distributive justice, and social exchange. I discuss each of these perspectives and then detail the empirical findings regarding perceptions of fairness and predictors of perceptions of fairness in both American and non-American women.

Theoretical explanations of perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor can be categorized generally under either classic equity, distributive justice, or the social exchange models. Classic equity theories offer two main propositions: (1) fairness is obtained when the reward-to-contribution ratio is constant between individuals; and (2) perceived equity in rewards is satisfying, but over-reward leads to guilt and under-reward, to anger (Homans 1974; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Equity theory legitimates inequalities by focusing on differential resources and ability to contribute (Kahn and Gaeddert 1985). According to this theory, the unequal divisions of household labor in the family is an example of male privilege in capitalist patriarchal society (Thompson and Walker 1989; VanYpern and Buunk 1991). Specifically, individuals do not regard married women’s greater contributions to housework as unfair because they perceive husbands contributing to the household through income, which may be in their minds a more important contribution than actual household labor (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978).

The distributive justice model posits that there are three factors that contribute to a
sense of fairness: outcome values, justifications, and comparison referents (Major 1987; Thompson 1991). Outcome values refer to what people want from a relationship. It is generally assumed that married women want an equal division of household labor. However, there may be other desirable outcomes, such as relationship stability. A desired outcome also could be help with certain tasks (as opposed to objective equity), which explains why men’s time spent on female-typed tasks may be seen as an important predictor of married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor (Baxter 2000; Baxter and Western 1998; Blair and Johnson 1992; Sanchez and Kane 1996).

Justifications are based on the perceived appropriateness of the current arrangements. If the outcome cannot be seen as rewarding in and of itself, or if justifications for this outcome are not satisfactory, there is a greater likelihood of perceived injustice. Research has shown that for married women in particular, the more negative the outcome, the harder it is to provide justifications for the outcome (Dempsey 1997, 1999; Gager 1998).

Comparison referents answer the question of “What are the standards by which we judge our situation?” If married women make same-sex comparisons or compare their situation to a perceived statistical average (Dempsey 1999; Gager 1998), they are much less likely to perceive their own division of household labor as unfair than if they compare their housework time to their husbands’. Given that the majority of married women value being relieved of some of the housework and rarely compare their own situation to men’s and/or an equal division of labor (for couples), the distributive justice
perspective also suggests that few wives with an unequal division of household labor feel entitled to an equal division of labor, while most husbands may feel entitled to resist an equal division of labor (Gager 1998).

Exchange theorists and those who espouse theories of interdependence suggest that the fairness perceptions of the division of household labor are influenced by the person’s dependency on and power within their relationships, which is dependent upon the relative size of their own resource contribution (Blau 1964; Blood and Wolfe 1960; Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Rusbult and van Lange 1996). Other theorists have incorporated a gender stratification slant to exchange models which provide modified explanations. For example, Chafetz (1988) argues that when married women gain access to macro-level resources (i.e., higher status jobs), their husbands’ micro-level power (household and family influence) decreases. This theory predicts higher levels of dissatisfaction and conflict for women with macro-level power when household labor is inequitably divided. In other words, married women with fewer alternatives to marriage and fewer economic resources will be more likely to say that an unequal distribution of labor is fair (Lennon and Rosenfield 1994).

2.3 Individual-Level Research Findings for Predictors of Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor

General Findings

General empirical research into perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor focuses on women, either as individuals or as a part of a heterosexual
couple. Perceptions of fairness of division of household labor have not changed over time in two marriage cohorts (Rogers and Amato 2000). Most married women and men feel that their current division of household labor is fair, even with women doing 2/3 of the work (Blair and Johnson 1992; DeMaris and Longmore 1996; Gager 1998; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Robinson and Spitze 1992; Sanchez 1994). This may be because most couples do not use a 50/50 split as a comparison referent (Gager 1998). In general, husbands are more likely than wives to be overbenefited and feel satisfaction with an inequitable relationship that favors them (Schafer and Keith 1981). Further, married women feel less entitled to receiving help than do men. Women are also less likely than are men to see inequality as inequity. This difference is a result of the types of comparisons married women make and the justifications made for the division of labor (Major 1993; Gager 1998). Entitlement differences could be a result of marital power inequality (Lennon and Rosenfield 1994). As an example, married women are less likely than men to feel entitled to avoid hated chores (Gager 1998). Also, men’s contributions to housework tend to be noticed and negotiated whereas women’s are taken for granted (Robinson and Spitze 1992). Married women’s sense of fairness rests on the distribution of valued outcomes instead of time spent and tasks done to achieving the outcome (Thompson 1991).

Thompson (1991) suggests that four points contribute to women’s sense of unfairness. First, married women making between-sex comparisons on the amount of housework leads to a greater sense of unfairness (Hawkins, Marshall, and Meiners 1995), while making same sex comparisons leads to an evaluation of greater fairness (Coltrane
Second, if married women recognize household work as work, they are more likely to feel they are entitled to their husbands’ contributions. A third component likely to increase perceptions of unfairness is a woman not accepting her husband’s justifications for not doing family work (Thompson 1991). If the outcome of the division of labor is negative, the woman is less likely to believe the man’s justification for not doing it, particularly if the justification is that he cannot multitask when he does at his paid employment (Gager 1998). This is also related to invoking high housework standards as a justification for nonperformance (Allen and Hawkins 1999; Coltrane 1996; Ferree 1990; Hawkins, Marshall, and Meiners 1995). The fourth contribution to married women’s perceptions of unfairness under Thompson’s (1991) model is when a woman does not accept the traditional way that household labor has been divided. This will be discussed below under gender ideologies.

Findings Based on Couples in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia

A majority of research into perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor has examined female and male perceptions of fairness separately (e.g., Baxter 2000; Benin and Agnostinelli 1988; Calasanti and Bailey 1991; John, Shelton, and Luschen 1995; Sanchez and Kane 1996; Wilkie, Ferree, and Ratcliff 1998). This is because researchers are cognizant that perceptions of fairness in all aspects of marital labor for wives and husbands differ within the same marriage (Blair 1998). Below I summarize the empirical findings on demographic and relationship-specific predictors of perceptions of
Wives’ satisfaction with the division of household labor is highest in the pre-parental and post-parental stages and lowest when children are present, which corresponds to the time when women do the most domestic work (Sanchez 1994; Suitor 1991). Married women who perceive themselves as breadwinners are more likely to see inequities (Thompson 1991), as are women who are employed full time (Piña and Bengtson 1993). Stohs (1995) finds that white women working full time are likely to see the unequal division of household labor as inequitable while those who work part-time or are not employed do not. Alternatively, non-white women are likely to see inequities in the division of household labor, regardless of their work status (Stohs 2000). Increases in women’s employment hours increase their perceptions of unfairness (Baxter 2000; Demo and Acock 1993; Greenstein 1996; Sanchez 1994; Sanchez and Kane 1996). Other research finds that the more married women contribute to family income, the less household labor they are perceived to contribute relative to their spouses (Kiger and Riley 1996). However, some studies failed to find any relationship between work hours and perceptions of fairness (Blair and Johnson 1992; John, Shelton, and Luschen 1995; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994). Further, other studies find no association between earnings and perceptions of fairness (Baxter 2000; DeMaris and Longmore 1996; John, Shelton and Luschen 1995; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994). Higher levels of education for both spouses are associated with seeing less fairness in the division of labor (DeMaris and Longmore 1996; John, Shelton and Luschen 1995; Robinson and Spitze 1992). Women with less education than their husbands are less likely to see unfairness (Lennon and
Rosenfield 1994; Wilkie, Ferree, and Ratcliff 1998). Married women who feel they are appreciated are more likely to see the division of labor as fair (Blair and Johnson 1992; Thompson 1991). These women are also more likely than other women to value their own contribution to the household (Pittman et al 1999).

Another important factor in married women’s perceptions of fairness in the division of household labor is an increased amount of time of husband’s contributions to “female” tasks (Blair and Johnson 1992; DeMaris and Longmore 1996; John, Shelton and Luschen 1995; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Perry-Jenkins and Folk 1994). Men’s lower levels of participation in household labor are associated with women perceiving more unfairness in the division of household labor (Blair and Johnson 1992; Dancer and Gilbert 1993; Greenstein 1996; Sanchez 1994). This is especially true when men contribute little to the routine tasks of cooking, cleaning and washing (Baxter 2000; Baxter and Western 1998; DeMaris and Longmore 1996; John, Shelton, and Luschen 1995; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Perry-Jenkins and Folk 1994; Robinson and Spitze 1992). The more housework women perceive they do relative to their husbands the more likely they are to see the situation as unfair (Mederer 1993; Sanchez 1994). Women who have fewer alternatives to marriage and who would be in poverty if divorced are most likely to see unequal division of household labor as fair (Lennon and Rosenfield 1994). Women with low marital quality tend to perceive the division of household labor as unfair (Gager 1998). Remarriage status has also been found to influence women’s perceptions of the fairness of the division of household labor, as second marriages are perceived to be more fair than first marriages (Sanchez 1994).
Research into ideological predictors of perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor focuses on gender ideologies, or beliefs about the division of power and labor in heterosexual relationships. Some studies show that women, and sometimes men, with more egalitarian gender attitudes see more unfairness for the wife in household labor allocations (Blair and Johnson 1992; DeMaris and Longmore 1996; John, Shelton and Luschen 1995; Sanchez and Kane 1996). Egalitarian women whose husbands contribute feel they are supportive, and the women’s psychological well-being increases. Egalitarian women are more likely to be dissatisfied when the division of household labor is unequal, while traditional women make justifications based on their beliefs (Piña and Bengtson 1993). Greenstein (1996) notes a statistically significant interaction between gender ideology and housework, with the actual division of labor having a smaller effect on fairness evaluations when wives hold more traditional views on gender.

Greenstein (1996) suggests that gender ideology serves to provide married women with a comparison referent by which they determine the relative fairness of their situation. Further, gender ideology may be used as a justification for the current division of labor. In this research, I argue that gender ideology is a form of justice ideology, both at the individual and at the national level. By extension, individuals, especially women, with more egalitarian justice ideologies will be more likely to be influenced by the overall distribution of labor/power within a nation, as their comparison referent would more likely be prominent women in their country as well as their own spouses. Additionally, those with individualistic or ascriptive ideologies may be more likely to justify an unequal division of labor as fair based upon their belief that equality is not the best
distribution of resources. Chapter Three proposes a model for the construction of personal ideologies in general and describes how to apply this new model to married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.

**Findings Based on Couples in Nations other than the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia**

Research in nations other than the United States have found conflicting results in modeling individual-level effects on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Iwama’s (1997) research on Japanese couples parallels research on United States wives/couples in that wives are more likely to perceive the division of household labor as unfair when they hold egalitarian beliefs. They also are less likely to perceive the division of household labor as unfair when the husband’s actual housework hours increases, when they hold less power in relation to their husbands, and when husbands have higher levels of socioeconomic status (Iwama 1997). Japanese research on marital satisfaction also mirrors American research, reporting that in couples where the wife earns more than 30% of the household income, men’s increased contribution to the household work increases wives’ marital satisfaction (Yamato 2001).

Alternatively, German women and men hold different notions of equality and fairness regarding the division of household labor, as the meanings behind doing housework continue to be tied to self-concept, as well as to beliefs about women and men in the society as a whole (Beck-Gernsheim 1992; Kirchler and Venus 2000).

Dutch researchers find support for the social exchange theoretical perspective in
how Dutch couples perceive their division of household labor. Specifically, power, dependency and ideology all affect the perceptions of fairness among Dutch couples (Arts and Hermkens 1994; Van Berkel and de Graaf 1999). The Dutch also show a relatively well-defined separation of equality and equity ideologies (Matějů 1993).

Some research has examined household labor and fairness in post-socialist nations as well. There is great variation among Russian households in the division of household labor and the justifications for that division, based mainly on cultural and ethnic differences in beliefs about women and men (Bozhkov and Golofast 1986). Both women and men in Estonia believe personal efficacy in a relationship is important rather than passively adapting to others’ demands (Haavio-Mannila and Rannik 1988). Prior to the end of socialism in Yugoslavia, structural changes were found to statistically significantly influence attitudes toward gender inequality overall, but the culturally embedded features of agency as noted by traditional religious beliefs were still extremely influential (Massey, Hahn and Sekulić 1995).

Czech citizens are likely to mix typically egalitarian principles with clearly meritocratic rules of distributive justice regarding economic distribution. However, the egalitarian ideology seems to hold a stronger position overall as compared to the meritocratic belief system (Matějů 1993). This is not the case inside the household regarding the division of labor, as the belief structures among Czech women and men seem to be patterned after western separate spheres beliefs, even though the majority of families are and have historically been dual-earner (Křízková 1999).

Previous research suggests that perceptions of what is fair regarding the division
of household labor are likely to be influenced by being in a post-socialist nation but may be moderated by cultural traditions. Further, it seems clear that all capitalist nations will not follow a monolithic pattern in the construction of perceptions of fairness. The next section examines previous research on structural factors affecting individual-level perceptions of fairness.

2.4 Structural (National) Level Predictors of Perceptions of Fairness

Existing research does not examine explicit connections between structural- and individual-level predictors of perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor; however, some early research has noted explicitly that contextual differences not only are present but are crucial to understanding local-level household processes (Calasanti and Bailey 1991; Kamo 1994; Sanchez 1993). One project examines perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor in four nations (Japan, Russia, the Netherlands, and the United States), and the authors propose that differences across nations shown in the data are the result of economic and cultural differences, as well as historical relationships between women and men in these nations (Wunderink and Niehoff 1997). Below I describe relevant literature which, taken together, implies the importance of taking into consideration national context when doing research on the division of household labor.

Castles and Flood (1991) report that contextual factors within a country affect both the divorce rate and changes over time in divorce rates. Additionally, they find that the contextual factors differ by the legal/cultural/historical/religious family from which the nation’s laws were drawn (Castles and Flood 1991).
Chafetz and Hagan (1996) document the uniformity of change across industrialized nations regarding women’s post-secondary education, labor force participation, fertility rates, first marriage and first birth rates, and divorce rates. They argue that industrialization as a macro-structural change “affects individual decision making and the gendered division of labor, resulting, at the aggregate level, in cross-nationally similar changes in the structure and functioning of the family as a social institution (Chafetz and Hagan 1996: 187).” They also comment on the similar contexts within industrialized nations and develop a theory of how women make decisions based upon their location in the national (economic) context. They suggest that contemporary women in industrialized nations try to meet a set of goals for family life based on a traditional gender order while also taking advantage of increased educational and employment opportunities (Chafetz and Hagan 1996). Their rational choice model can be extended to all types of nations as an interaction between the socio-historical context of women’s work/industries/labor force participation and women’s perceptions of their options. However, the national-level power and prestige of women in general must be included as a potential referent group to whom individual women compare themselves.

Some research attempts to examine the influence of culture on families. However, culture in these studies has not been defined or measured consistently, rendering the results ambiguous. Handwerker (1986) defines culture as the ideas by which individuals order material experience and assign value to its elements. Culture is regarded as a mental phenomenon that is created and changed by people in their attempt to make comprehensible a material reality. Hoult (1974) identifies culture as a people’s
way of life or social heritage that includes values, norms, institutions, and artifacts that are passed from generation to generation. Culture provides a “world-taken-for-granted” that most people accept most of the time. These definitions would be difficult to measure as a concept at the individual level. Fu and Heaton (1995) argue that religion may be one of the most useful cultural indicators, as religion is an important source of ideology that governs family pattern variations. Culture may be bound by national borders, or it may overlay those borders based upon the religious and political heritage of a people. Thus, examining the effects of religion both within and across nations will measure one facet of culture, but political ideology must be included as well.

Examining cross-national divorce rates, Fu (1992) describes the importance of assessing cultural influences within a country in conjunction with demographic factors when predicting a country’s divorce rate, as cultural influences within a country shape individual citizens’ lived experiences just as much, if not more than, the political, legal, and economic systems. Although Fu (1992) does not examine empirically the cultural effects on cross-national divorce rates, the comparative analyses by cultural grouping suggest that cultural traditions likely mediate the relationship between codified legal and political systems and the decisions women and men make in their daily lives.

It is possible that the level of gender stratification in a nation affects individual-level perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Below I describe several mechanisms through which this relationship can take hold. First, national gender stratification may have an indirect effect on the perceptions of fairness through the effect on the actual division of household labor. This suggests that women’s increased material
resources gained through low levels of gender stratification in employment are the key catalyst in the local division of household labor. Theorists argue that women’s access to and control of potential resources can result in leveraging power to induce others to perform devalued activities, namely household work (Mason 1986; Safilios-Rothschild 1982). Young (1993) specifically hypothesizes that women’s material resources can be used to promote men’s greater housework participation. Thus, the national level of gender stratification may have a measurable effect on the division of household labor. This perspective is an extension of one used connecting individual characteristics to explain the local division of household labor, as it suggests that any material resources the wife has are the result of a national level effort to reduce gender inequality.

A second view of women’s access to material resources focuses on the relative number of women and men in a society (the sex ratio) and the effect the sex ratio has on the distribution of dyadic and structural power. Guttentag and Secord (1983) argue that high sex ratios, which indicate a relative under-supply of women, are associated with women having dyadic power. In societies where men hold structural power but women hold dyadic power, men cannot maximize their outcomes wholly at the expense of women but must compromise since women can use their dyadic power to place men in competition with one another. As a result of women’s power to choose among men, a man is forced to make a commitment to a woman in order to have a relationship with her, and he must treat her well or run the risk of losing her to another man. However, men’s structural power is sufficient to allow them to place constraints on women’s freedoms and to impose a sexual morality on them. South and Trent (1988) report support for the
majority of the postulates resulting from the sex ratio theory, noting that the effect of sex ratio seems more pronounced in economically developed nations than in those less-developed nations. Further research has found mixed results of the effects of the sex ratio on power-sharing outcomes (Fu 1992; Fu and Heaton 1995).

Further extending this notion of structural power via demographic comparisons as leading to dyadic power connects national-level justice ideologies to the local-level. Family labor allocations and related perceptions of fairness likely are structured not simply by gender differences in resources or power but by differences in ideological valuations of labor (Curtis 1986; Katz 1991). Thus, when allocating labor and interpreting the performance of labor, families not only advance “rational” economic strategies, but also fulfill cultural, moral, ideological, and historical imperatives (Curtis 1986; Folbre 1982, 1988; Sanchez 1994; Young 1993). National ideologies are intended to support the state’s reproduction as a whole (Peterson 1996), so their prevalence and wide-spread acceptance is necessary for the state’s survival. These ideologies are not simply personal ideologies based upon what individuals believe is right or fair; instead these are the ideologies professed by the state through formal and informal means that individuals act upon. Cultural distinctions can lead to a common set of beliefs within nations, whether it be on religious, social justice or nationalistic grounds. While nationally supported egalitarian ideological valuations of labor can reduce gender inequality on the local level, the opposite is true as well. If a nation espouses a non-egalitarian (more individualistic or fatalistic) belief in the valuation of labor, gender inequality is expected to be prevalent, formally regulated, and seen as fair on the local-
Kentworthy and Malami (1999) suggest that political, socioeconomic, and cultural factors each play a role in accounting for cross-national variation in the degree of gender inequality in political representation. A relatively common view holds that reduction of gender inequality in the socioeconomic sphere, from education to the labor force, is critical to women’s success in obtaining political power (Blumberg 1984; Chafetz 1984, 1988; Randall 1987). Kentworthy and Malami’s (1999) analyses suggest that women’s movement into professional occupations advances their opportunities in the political sphere, but this is tempered by cultural factors.

Women in post-socialist nations have less political access than they did under socialist rule (Liczek 1996; Marsh 1995; Wolchik 1996). Party politics, religious, and cultural traditions have prevented women from moving into top leadership positions (Marikova 1997; Wolchik 1996). During the transition period, the sheer numbers and power of women in politics declined dramatically, although women began to be involved in non-governmental organizations as a way to continue political work, albeit without power at the societal level (Liczek 1996; Marikova 1997; Wolchik 1996). Women had greater power to address issues of rape and domestic violence, poverty and unemployment before the economic and political change (Liczek 1996; Marsh 1995; Wolchik 1996). This description suggests that women may have continued difficulty in gaining power at all levels, especially in the post-socialist states. Perhaps in nations where women gain power, powerful women are seen as referents for average women in their lived experiences. It could be that average women see the few powerful women not
actively working toward gender equality. When the powerful women attempt to do so, they are faced with many obstacles such that little political action on “women’s issues” takes place (Marikova 1997). This suggests that women in their own homes may not perceive unfairness in their own gendered relationships. However, women who gain power can leverage their female status to gain support for their continued power and can use their own stories to create local support for their policy initiatives (Adler 1996).

Some research on housework in other nations shows the importance of including national-level ideologies and context in research on household labor. Niemi (1984) finds that Finnish women with less personal power are more likely to underestimate the time on household labor they perform to reduce their own cognitive dissonance with what is seen as an acceptable fair share for women. Niemi (1984) suggests that this is a result of internalized beliefs about women’s work derived from national ideology. A comparison of college graduates in the United States and Japan finds support for bargaining power theories of the division of household tasks in both nations, but the authors suggest that societal ideology is crucial to defining the scope for bargaining at the couple-level (Strober and Chan 1998). In her research comparing the United States and several southeast Asian nations in their individual-level predictors of the division of household labor, Sanchez (1994) notes that individual women’s power does not always lead to greater equality in the division of household labor. Research must consider the ideological systems guiding the division of household labor. I argue that these ideological systems, both internalized and distinct at the national level, are crucial to understanding cross-national differences in the division of household labor and
perceptions/interpretations of that division.

2.5 Multilevel Analysis Predicting Individual-Level Perceptions

There is little precedent for performing multilevel analysis on cross-national division of household labor and/or perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor data. However, early research indicates that cross-national research must account for both within- and between-nation variation in individual perceptions of their experiences. One concern is that the analyses be truly comparative in nature and that the importance of the socio-cultural, economic and political contexts in which social phenomena develop is understood (Hantrais 1999). Context-bounded research is one of the central types of research in sociology; however, quantitative analyses often neglect to capture the subtleties of context. However, the more recent movement toward multilevel analyses allows researchers to include important contextual effects, which may be lost if we focus solely on the individual level, as well as compare the effect of those contextual factors across social units. Using the nation as the social unit in cross-cultural/national research is important when the phenomenon under examination is affected by legal regulations dispatched at the national level (Hantrais 1999).

There may be an effect of the intersection of cultural ideologies and economic development specifically related to understanding the division of household labor. Blumberg (1984) suggests that macro-level power dynamics and resources serve as “discount factors” to mitigate women’s micro-level power. She suggests that we nest levels of power resources. Capitalism may have effects on macro-level stratification and
on individual women’s power and perceptions of the appropriate division of labor.

In their cross-national study examining the effects of structural factors on the divorce rate, Trent and South (1989) argue that examining individual-level survey data could uncover relationship among attitudes toward modernization, women’s status and divorce that comparative macro-level analyses cannot capture. It could be that placing individual-level data into cultural context will provide insight into how women make decisions about divorce. It will also provide insight into whether the decisions that look the same comparatively across cultures using macro-level data really are the same once cultural context is considered.

Rosenfeld, Van Buren, and Kalleberg (1998) used multilevel analysis to examine the factors explaining cross-national differences in the impact of a person’s sex on holding a supervisory job. Most of their findings suggest that nation-level factors are essential to understanding cross-national differences. Differences in laws, especially typically gender-specific laws like parental (maternity) leave, as well as structure of economy (e.g., industrial segregation and earnings structure) are better predictors than political organization and influence. While this research was predicting the degree of gender equality, not perceptions of fairness or equity, it is important to note that they included a national-level predictor described as institutional gender ideology. This study measures institutional gender ideology as the extent to which women and men are seen as equal by laws, especially with guaranteed maternity leave, and the reach of collective bargaining units, especially unions. This ideology is one of the most important predictors of access to supervisory jobs (Rosenfeld, Van Buren, and Kalleberg 1998).
Batalova and Cohen (2002) find that the nation-level predictors in their model predicting the effect of cohabitation on the division of household labor cross-nationally explain more of the variance in the outcome variable than do individual-level predictors. It may be that women in nations where the Gender Empowerment Index is higher (meaning there are more women in parliament, administration and the professions) have more bargaining power within marriages, which leads them to be likely to perceive inequality as inequity. Norms about the division of labor also may be affected by women’s visibility in positions of public authority and prestige. They propose that their findings regarding women’s empowerment at the national level suggest that the meaning and implication of cohabitation is conditioned by the social context of gender inequality (Batalova and Cohen 2002). As an extension, it follows that the meaning of women’s personal power and perceptions of fairness may be conditioned by the social context of gender inequality.

It is possible that through a “split consciousness” (Kluegel and Smith 1986) that a dominant ideology as context and potentially challenging beliefs (derived from lived experiences) may coexist such that a person may not be willing or able to challenge inequality (Matějů 1993). Empirically, this has been found in post-socialist nations (Matějů 1993).

Davidson, Steinmann, and Wegener’s (1993) project is especially relevant for the present study. Davidson et al (1993) use data from the International Social Justice Project to examine sex differences in justice perceptions of distribution of societal resources. Comparing two Western and two post-socialist nations, they found that “women’s
socialization into patriarchal culture causes women to spurn distributive measures based on competitive or achievement-oriented values. Western women’s exposure to the values of capitalism appears to lead them away from favoring need as a distribution norm. At the same time, Eastern European women appear to internalize the socialist ideals of ‘to each according to his/her need’ (Davidson, Steinmann and Wegener 1995: 317).” Further, Western women’s sense of justice in hypothetical situations change once their own interests are considered. “Western women are able to seek a rational, ‘justifiable alternative’ (Döbert and Nunner-Winkler 1986) to the individualistic conceptions of justice in capitalist societies when faced with the discrimination of their gender (Davidson, Steinmann and Wegener 1995: 318).” However, women and men in the post-socialist nations have similar justice preferences, suggesting the socialist ideology is internalized and is to a greater extent important than their own personal considerations (Davidson, Steinmann and Wegener 1995).

2.6 Summary

There is extensive evidence that social researchers understand individual-level predictors of the perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor, particularly in the United States. Mikula (1998) suggests that previous research examining predictors of perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor has been too simplistic, because researchers have not taken into full consideration the social processes and interactions. There is little knowledge regarding whether and how context and social level factors affect perceptions of fairness. Nonetheless, the literature suggests we need to take these
factors into consideration. Do national belief structures or ideologies affect an individual’s perceptions of their own household division of labor? Do women use as their comparison referents a generalized woman as embodied by women in power or with prestige within their nation to determine whether their division of labor is fair? Previous research has noted the lack of answers to these questions. This research project bridges this empirical gap by placing individual experiences and perceptions into national context.

Based on the literature reviewed above, I argue that we have sufficient evidence to suggest that there will be statistically significant differences in women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor based upon the nation in which the woman lives. Research based in the United States reports an interaction between gender ideology and employment status on married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of labor. Assuming that gender ideologies are a form of justice ideology, we can expect that there will be a statistically significant interaction between a woman’s justice ideology and her employment status on her perception of fairness of the division of labor.

The context within which married women live affects their perception of reality. As such, if a woman lives in a context where the overall belief system is that everyone is equal and should be given equal access to work, her having high levels of human capital would not necessarily lead to her being more likely to report inequality in the division of household labor as unfair. This would be particularly true when compared to a counterpart in a context where individuality and personal characteristics, such as hard work and high amounts of human capital, give one more bargaining power leading to a
greater likelihood of reporting an unequal division of labor as unfair.

As argued above, the level of gender stratification in a nation affects the local household arrangements, such that nations where women have higher levels of power and prestige nationally also tend to have less gender stratification at the local level. The gains in power and prestige that women on average achieve in a country tends to facilitate the mobilization of resources to enable a more equitable division of household labor. In the absence of this equal distribution of labor, married women in nations where women have increased levels of power and prestige will be more likely to report that the division of labor is unfair.

The above research notes that women who compare themselves to their husbands are more likely to report unequal divisions of household labor as unfair than if they compare themselves to other women. This is because when wives compare themselves to their husbands and realize that they are pulling more weight around the house than their husbands, all else equal, they are likely to see the arrangement as unfair. If they compare themselves to women who also perform more household labor than their husbands, the situation appears equitable. The mechanism here is that the wives are comparing themselves to someone to whom they consider themselves comparable. In some places and times, this someone will be their husband. In others, it will be their girlfriends, sisters, and/or mothers. We can extend this argument and suggest that where women overall have higher levels of power and prestige, women with higher levels of power and prestige will see themselves as comparable to women in power. Therefore, they will be more likely to report an unequal division of household labor as unfair, under the notion
that there is greater equality for women overall and should be in their own household.

The historical intersection of capitalism and patriarchy has led women in capitalist nations to be less likely to report unfairness in their division of household labor as compared to women in previously socialist nations where social justice was a national priority. As noted above, women who have higher levels of power and prestige within a nation are potential comparison referents for the average woman in a nation. Participation in a capitalist system resulting in increased levels of human capital (and higher levels of power and prestige in that capitalist system) should affect whether a woman is likely to report an unfair division of labor differently when women do not have power and prestige in the nation overall.

Chapter Three connects the theoretical propositions regarding perceptions of fairness by constructing a theory of distributive justice that incorporates social context. This theory is described and then applied to married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.
3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter described the theoretical explanations and empirical findings regarding married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor and how these perceptions may vary across national context. The issue of married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor is a specific example of a broader question. Specifically, this issue taps into the larger question of why some people in similar circumstances are more likely to believe their circumstances are fair as compared to others in their same circumstances. It also taps into questions relating to what types of factors lead people to perceive that situations are fair or just and to how context affects these perceptions.

Distributive justice theory is helpful for explaining how people determine whether their situation is fair to them in general. In this chapter I place the distributive justice theory into context. That is, I argue that the notion of what is considered just is contextually specific, based upon the ideology of the context. I explain how distributive justice theory may operate differently based upon contextual ideology in explaining people’s perceptions of justice. I first describe distributive justice theory, a theory constructed by integrating social exchange and symbolic interactionist theories. My discussion traces the evolution of this theory, and then draws on it to derive theoretical propositions regarding construction of ideologies. Specifically, I integrate self-
evaluation theory with distributive justice theory and elaborate on how the self-evaluation process creates personal ideologies.

Next I present what I call a Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice. I describe how the theory explains perceptions of justice involving valued outcomes, distribution rules, and comparison referents. I conclude by describing an empirical test of the contextual theory of distributive justice, specifically using the theory to predict married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.

3.2 Distributive Justice Theory

Distributive justice theory explains how people determine whether their portion of distributed social goods is a fair amount for them to receive. Distribution rules are the formalized ways through which valued outcomes and social goods are distributed within a social context. The evaluation of how much of a valued outcome or social good someone should receive is based upon some predetermined measure, dependent upon the social context (Cook 1975). For example, in a capitalist society, workers are paid for their labor based upon the market value of their labor in performing the specific task they are hired to perform. The market value of their labor is determined based upon their human capital as well as the current conditions of the local labor market. Individuals compare their portion of the valued outcome or social good to what they expect to receive based upon the distribution rule in that social context. If the allocation is less than what the individual expects to receive, the individual is likely to perceive unfairness.

An alternative conceptualization of the process through which individuals
determine whether they are treated fairly employs a comparison to others rather than a formalized distribution rule (Adams 1965; Anderson 1976; Blalock and Wilken 1979; Harris 1976; Walster, Walster and Berscheid 1978). Individuals compare their investment to and rewards/valued outcomes from a social interaction with those investments and rewards of another social actor. Injustice is perceived if there is not an equal ratio of investments and rewards for each actor.

Cook (1975) argues that the distributive justice theory can explain individual perceptions only when the following three criteria are met. First, one or more socially valued outcomes are allocated to individuals in the situation. Second, there is a distribution rule describing the relationship between the criteria upon which individual contributions will be evaluated and the amounts of the valued outcome to be distributed in the situation. Third, the distribution rule applied in this context is perceived to be legitimate. Is the rule supported normatively in the social system? Therefore, any version of the distributive justice theory may or may not include actors comparing themselves to others, but must include a generalized distribution rule. The requirement of the distribution rule is derived directly from status-value theory, which argues that justice evaluations are made in reference to a referential structure that describes the connection between rewards and investments for a generalized set of individuals (Berger et al 1972).

Cook (1975) also argues that derivations of distributive justice theory have not specified adequately the conditions that lead to perceptions of inequity. Specifically, she notes that structural conditions (emphasis added) have not been included in existing studies. In her extension of the theory, she adds to the concept of the distribution rule by
noting that the rule must specify the evaluation criteria so that individuals can determine
the amount of the valued outcome they should expect in a given situation. “If the rule is
perceived to be legitimate and if an individual knows their position (or that of any other
member of the system) on the dimension of evaluation, then they can determine whether
or not they have been treated fairly. If this individual’s reward expectations based upon
the legitimate distribution rule are violated, it is predicted that he [sic] will define the
situation as unjust (Cook 1975: 386).”

Cook (1975) reports that the respondents in her study describe a situation as unfair
depending upon the information they have on their comparison referents regarding rank
or status. Social comparison theory would explain this as people tending to compare
themselves with someone similar to rather than different from themselves on important
characteristics, like rank and status (Festinger 1954). Therefore, the distribution rule
must specify explicitly how rewards and other valued outcomes should be allocated
within the situation. Further, the distribution rule must include information allowing
individuals to determine their status on the evaluation criteria in order to determine the
level of reward to expect. If the distribution rule is unclear, individuals may create their
own distribution rule for the situation based upon their own experiences (Cook 1975).

Situations where the distribution rule is unclear may be the result of a social
disruption, such as in the aftermath of a natural disaster or during a spontaneous protest.
Through these unstructured situations, new distribution rules (and beliefs about justice)
may form. The social movements literature categorizes individuals’ shared
interpretations of an unexpected situation as the first step in organized collective behavior
(Turner and Killian 1987). While Turner and Killian (1987) argue that these emergent norms, these new distribution rules, are connected to the creation and continuation of social movements, this is not the focus of the current theoretical development.

Later elaborations on distributive justice theory move either toward a more formal or a more discursive approach. Markovsky’s (1985) multilevel distributive justice theory builds on equity and status-value approaches, Jasso’s (1980, 1988) individual- and group-level approaches, and relative deprivation theory. In Jasso’s individual-level approach, an individual experiences justice when they perceive their actual share of rewards equals the amount they believe they should have received (just share is defined as the mean reward level across their reference group). More specifically, Jasso (1988) formally constructs what she calls the Theory of the Distributive-Justice Force. Justice becomes a continuum and represents the human experience that over-reward is less problematic than is under-reward (Jasso 1980, 1988). Further, she provides a measurement rule through which non-material goods can be included in the comparison process, based upon relative rank of the individual within a comparison group. Comparison holdings are not theorized to be equal for all groups. Instead, comparison holdings are hypothesized to take the average value of the reward and an individual-specific parameter that takes into consideration everything unknown about that person’s actual reward.

The relative deprivation approach begins moving the theoretical understanding to the group level. The fraternalistic interpretation of the relative deprivation approach suggests that individuals gather reward information about themselves and others in their referent group and determine they are deprived as a result of their group membership
(Martin 1981). Jasso’s (1980) aggregate-level theory suggests that by using probability theory, we can determine aggregate phenomena by the distribution of justice evaluations across the aggregate once we understood how individuals determine justice.

Markovsky (1985) constructs a mathematical theory that combines all of these components but only tests the individual-level component. His derivations, however, can inform our understanding of the connection between justice evaluations at the individual- and aggregate-levels, as long as we take into consideration the notion that the distribution rule used to determine the just share is based on the dominant ideology. A specific example of this connection is described below.

Hochschild (1981) provides a clear example of the discursive mode of distributive justice theory. In Hochschild’s framework, distributive justice has two principles: the principle of equality and the principle of differentiation. The principle of equality has four norms: (1) strict equality, (2) need, (3) investment, and (4) procedure (random rules, majority rule, etc). The principle of differentiation also has four norms: (1) investment, (2) results, (3) ascription, and (4) procedure (free consent, social Darwinism, etc). Hochschild (1981) argues that the norms of distributive justice fall along a continuum, moving from the principle of equality to the principle of differentiation (see Figure 1). She argues that Americans usually start from a principle of equality when addressing socializing (everyday life) and political domains (citizenship) and from a principle of differentiation when addressing economic domains (earning a living and knowing one’s place in the larger society) (Hochschild 1981). Therefore, if an interaction is perceived to be one located in the economic domain, or if the larger ideological context suggests the
interaction should be viewed vis-à-vis an economic perspective (the application of an economic perspective may only be an understanding of knowing where one stands in the framework of the larger society), then the greater the likelihood of applying the principle of differentiation.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

These justice norms are directives toward promoting or preventing certain behaviors and exist both at the societal and individual levels. “The norm itself is a widely held social value but the use of a particular norm in a specific decision is an individual choice (Hochschild 1981: 46).” People’s internalized justice norms reflect, to a greater or lesser extent, the predominant way in which their social context describes the general nature of the social world. In this regard, justice norms are no different than other societal norms. How do these justice norms become internalized? Further, how do we explain individual deviations in the internalization of the societal justice norms?

Stolte (1987) proposes that the justice norms used to determine equity are constructed using a version of structural-exchange theory where the scope is broadened to include cognition. He creates a link between structural-exchange theory and symbolic interaction theory, such that norm formation as a power-balancing mechanism happens in the context of the creation of meaning agreements regarding the social exchange where power was imbalanced. ‘What ought to be’ is created as a norm that is not in an individual’s immediate self interest, but in the collective interest of others with whom that individual exchanges such that the power in the social exchange is balanced more equitably (Stolte 1987). Bargaining within the exchange will end when the individuals
feel, based on their justice norms, their own profit has been maximized (Kelley and 
Thibaut 1978). The meaning attributed to those exchanges by the powerful individuals 
within a social context will lead to differential justice norms, such as equal opportunity, 
status/rank inequality and consummatory need, depending on what the collective goal of 
social exchanges are (Stolte 1987). This collective goal of exchanges within a social 
context is subsumed under the dominant ideology.

At the macro-level, notions of distributive justice may be two-fold: a dominant 
ideology and an alternative, or challenging, one (see, e.g., Della Fave 1980, 1986a, 
1986b; Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey 1992), although the content of these ideologies 
necessarily will be context or culturally specific (Della Fave 1986a). The two ideologies 
are predicted to be supported more or less based upon class or strata, in that those who 
occupy higher positions in the stratification system will be likely to support ascriptive or 
individualistic norms of justice (depending on the country’s dominant ideology) and those 
in lower positions likely to support egalitarian norms (Della Fave 1986a; Ritzman and 
Tomaskovic-Devey 1992). There is empirical evidence suggesting this is true in the 
United States (Ritzman and Tomaskovic-Devey 1992) and in other Western countries as 
well (Matějů 1993). In post-socialist countries, this differentiation seems to be less clear 
(Matějů 1993). Lack of clarity in post-socialist countries probably is because of 
transition regarding economic and political systems, with some individuals holding on to 
egalitarian ideals underlying socialist regimes.

There is empirical evidence of national-level differences in beliefs about justice 
and the resulting moderating effects on individual justice beliefs regarding appropriate
outcomes in a variety of settings (Burgoyne, Routh, and Sidorenko-Stephenson 1999; Jasso 2000; Jasso and Wegener 1999; Wegener and Liebig 2000). Burgoyne and colleagues (1999) argue persuasively that national ideologies regarding justice are affected by differing historical and cultural changes within nations, and that individual justice beliefs vary from national ideologies because of personal experiences. People interpret exchange situations through a combination of the dominant ideology and a “layered on” personal ideology. Personal ideologies may reflect social liberalism (Kluegel and Smith 1986), but not always depending on social/cultural context.

Early work focused on distribution rules in specified exchanges and under certain conditions only in micro-level contexts. A distribution rule for all interactions could be spatially contextual, such as for a country, and constant across all interactions within that context. A country’s overall ideology and notions of legitimation of allocations may be the distribution rule for subcontexts. One’s belief in a just world, or how one sees the world as just, may be modified by experiences in the context in which justice is determined (Lerner 1980). People learn how to define “people getting what they deserve” based upon the dominant ideology and legitimation strategies within their own socialization context. Lerner (1980) specifically argues that the norms of the United States culture determine how United States citizens define what is just and fair. Shepelak and Alwin’s (1986) research seems to indicate that people interpret their own situations in ways that protect their sense of self while simultaneously maintaining and protecting the larger ideology (or belief system) which legitimates the unequal distribution of resources (Shepelak and Alwin 1986). This may be especially true for the historically
disadvantaged, like racial/ethnic minorities and women in the United States (Shepalak 1987).

Why do people expect equity (or inequity) in their relationships? The above discussion highlights the construction of justice norms. That discussion does not, however, explain why people expect equity or inequity. I contend (Davis and Greenstein, forthcoming) that ideology is a vehicle through which individuals can construct meanings for their personal experiences. Individual ideology leads people to expect certain outcomes in their relationships and helps them determine first, whether inequality exists and second, whether to articulate perceived inequality as unfair. Assuming that this is true, the key question centers on how one’s ideology is constructed.

3.3 Ideologies and Legitimation

The formation of ideologies is a combination of the self-evaluation process as described by Della Fave (1980), exposure to alternative ideologies, and exposure to experiences inexplicable by the dominant ideology.

In his theory on the legitimation process, Della Fave (1980; 1986b) asks how ideologies justifying structured inequality in resource distribution become part of individuals’ social consciousness. There are two propositions in this theory. The first proposition is: “The level of primary resources that an individual sees as just for him/herself, relative to others, is directly proportional to his/her level of self-evaluation (Della Fave 1980: 962).” Through the status attribution process, those with more resources are seen as better than those with fewer resources. By the equity principle,
those who are better are seen as more deserving of more resources. Individuals compare how much they have to others, and based upon this comparison, their self-evaluation emerges. “A given distribution of resources tends to reproduce itself in a congruent distribution of self-evaluations, which, in turn, reinforces the very status quo that it generated in the first place (Della Fave 1980: 963).” Interactions with specific others lead to a self-evaluation relative to others and creates generalized expectations for people similar to those with whom we have interacted. These generalized expectations are created within a cultural context. The shared context is important, as people within the same context are likely to share resource knowledge, expectations for social interactions, and meanings for resulting resource distributions (Della Fave 1986b).

The second proposition in Della Fave’s theory on legitimation is: “The strength of legitimacy of stratification in any society is directly proportional to the degree of congruence between the distribution of primary resources and the distribution of self-evaluations (1980: 962).” The distribution of resources in a stratified manner leads (via the status attribution and equity processes noted above) to routinized relationships between those with many resources and those without. Those routinized relationships lead to internalized expectations of the self and others, but particularly a self-evaluation relative to one’s position in their society. When there is congruence between self-evaluations and the distribution of resources, as the proposition notes, the ideology is seen as legitimate.

Similarly, “[T]he more incongruent the distribution of resources and self-evaluations, the more likely is the delegitimation of stratification (Della Fave 1980:
This incongruence can occur when the distribution of resources is highly stratified but individuals have not developed, or no longer have, self-evaluations that accept their command of resources within the society. How does one not internalize the routinized relationships which should lead them to see those with more resources as better and therefore deserving of more resources? There are two ways this can occur. First, the individual can be exposed to situations that are clearly inexplicable by the dominant ideology. Second, the individual can be exposed to alternative ideologies, or justifications/explanations for distributions of resources. Della Fave (1980) notes that the legitimation process, including the extent to which a self-evaluation is congruent with the distribution of resources, does not occur haphazardly. Instead, the legitimation process is incorporated into social institutions (such as families, schools and workplaces) that may lead individuals to be more or less likely to develop a congruent self-evaluation. Specifically, differential access to and mobility within social institutions may either reinforce or provide evidence against the dominant ideology, thereby affecting the extent to which the individual constructs a congruent self-evaluation.

Much of the self-evaluation theory is based upon comparisons individuals make between their resources and those of either a specific or the generalized other. This has found some support in experimental research (Stolle 1983). If individuals have internalized the dominant ideology, they are not likely to experience relative deprivation if they compare themselves to someone who has more resources but who they perceive to be “better” than they are. This proposition will be supported if the dominant ideology suggests that, like in Animal Farm (Orwell 1945), everyone may be equal, but some are
more equal than others. If the dominant ideology is such that resources are to be
distributed as equally as possible, individuals develop self-evaluations based upon both
their internalization of routinized relationships surrounding them and their relative
position in society. They may develop incongruent self-evaluations based upon their
exposure to alternative ideologies and inexplicable circumstances within the dominant
ideology. Alternatively, they could experience relative deprivation if they internalize the
dominant ideology (believing all should have equal resources) and do not see themselves
as having equal resources as compared to similar others. Notably, individuals who
develop an incongruent self-evaluation may not experience relative deprivation if they
believe there is some reason for the inequality in resource distribution.

Della Fave (1986b) argues that individuals’ self-evaluations are built on the
principle of equity (meaning that individuals come to believe that they are receiving their
fair share based upon what they perceive to be their contributions to the situation). This
means that individuals, via socialization, internalization, and interaction with social
institutions, determine that sometimes they do not receive the same amount of rewards as
do other people in social exchanges. In order for social exchanges to continue people
must accept that there are reasons for this observed inequality. The equity principle
suggests that individuals come to see what they receive as appropriate compensation and
believe they deserve what they receive as a result of routinized interactions. Those
interactions and the resulting compensation become normative.

Additionally, the self and the identity are the primary locations where norms are
effectual, such that the stronger the belief in an institution’s importance for defining self
and identity, the more influence the everyday exchanges and goals in that institution will have on creating and reaffirming norms for social behavior (Della Fave 1986a). This can be explained as the internalization of ideologies explaining behavioral exchanges in that institution. For example, individuals internalize beliefs about the importance of family and corresponding roles, and these beliefs affect identity construction. These ideologies ultimately lead people to consider the family as more or less important in defining who they are, leading them to create equity norms based on both the importance of the family as an institution to them and how they have seen exchanges work in the family in the past. Therefore, individuals may construct equity-norms in their intimate relationships based on how primary their role in the family is to their identity construction as well as how much they are rewarded for their contributions within that specified role.

Individuals who do receive less than an equal share have an “investment in subordination (Della Fave 1986b: 484).”

“It is an investment because self-esteem rests on the ability to perform subordinate roles well and to participate successfully in the lifestyles that accompany them. This is no less than a commitment of one’s identity that also entails a commitment to these roles. Ironically then, any attempt to shake the sense of inferiority is likely to set off defensive resistance since it would threaten what has become a quite livable adjustment. The disadvantaged derive real gratification from this adjustment, hence the term “investment in subordination’ (Della Fave 1986b: 484).”

This suggests that in order for individuals to change their self-evaluation and as a result
their personal ideology, challenging their self-evaluation directly will not result in change but in reinforcement. Situations where individuals are treated in ways inexplicable by their self-evaluations and ideologies may change their self-evaluation (over time). How do we explain who is more likely to change their ideology as compared to others? This is a variant of the question asking how we explain the extent to which individuals internalize the dominant ideology. I contend that the process would be approximately the same.

In summary, micro-level theorizing has constructed a distributive justice theory that is composed of three cognitive processes: determination of a valued outcome, justifications for that outcome (distribution rule), and comparison referents. The determination of whether a situation is fair is based upon the person’s ideology. Personal ideology will provide for people the distribution rule they use to determine fairness, the valued outcome in an interaction or exchange, and the others with whom they should compare themselves. Individuals engage in these social interactions not in a void but in a specific historically based social context. That context has a natural history which can be described contemporarily by its dominant ideology and the extent to which that ideology is reflected in social institutions. Further, people’s ideologies are derived from their self-evaluations, which are in turn, derived from their perceived position in the larger stratification system and from the dominant ideology within that social context. Two general social processes have been described above. I have described the distributive justice process and the process through which individual identities are constructed within social contexts. Integration of these two social processes can be accomplished through a
common concept, personal ideology. I call this theoretical integration a Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice.

### 3.4 Concepts in the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice

All of the concepts in the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice have been assimilated from the theories described above. In this section I remind the reader of the meaning of all concepts before moving into the description of how the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice explains individual perceptions of fairness. For simplicity, and to be consistent with the theoretical bases from which this theory grows, I specify the relevant social context as a nation/society. This is not a fundamental assumption, but an assumption of convenience, because the theory should apply in any context.

**National-level**

There are three concepts at the national-level: social history, dominant ideology and institutional structure. The history of a nation’s political and economic systems are exogenous to the theory, but are crucial to understanding the two other macro-level concepts, the nation’s dominant ideology and the corresponding institutional structure. The dominant ideology is a product of the social history of the nation and consists of the nation’s distribution rule for all resources and the meanings to be attributed to all resource allocations. Institutional structure refers to the extent to which all social institutions within the nation reflect the dominant ideology. The social institutions include, but are not limited to, laws, religious norms, political systems, and educational systems.
**Individual-level**

There are seven concepts at the individual-level. The first five concepts describe experiences prior to the circumstance being evaluated. Frequency of contact with alternative ideologies refers to how often individuals have come into contact with alternative distribution rules for resources. A related concept is the extent of alternative ideology contact. The contact may be minimal, such as a media report providing multiple explanations within a particular news story, or it may be extensive, such as a required course in a training program including multiple explanations for the distribution of resources. The third concept, social network acceptance of the dominant ideology, is correlated with the first. Social network acceptance of the dominant ideology refers to the extent to which individuals in one’s social networks accept the dominant ideology of their social context.

The fourth concept is proportion of experiences not easily explained by the dominant ideology. The experiences could be those of the individuals themselves or they could be situations, interactions, or experiences of others they have heard about (i.e., vicarious experiences). A related concept is the extent of the justification required to make sense of the experiences not easily explained by the dominant ideology. At times, the experiences may be ambiguous enough that they can be explained by the dominant ideology without much trouble. Other times, they may not be. An example of this ambiguity is a situation where an African-American male is passed over for a promotion. He could simply have been less qualified than the person who received the promotion, or it could have been racism. Indeed, such ambiguity has resulted in much
court debate about the standards – process vs. outcome – used to prove racial
discrimination in hiring practices. It may also be the case that experiences require such
extensive justification that the underlying premises of the dominant ideology are no
longer recognizable. Examples of such clarity include quid pro quo exchanges such as
bribery, or explicit behavior (such as fascist graffiti) exhibited toward someone else in the
form of a hate crime.

Personal ideology is defined as the extent to which individuals have internalized
the dominant ideology. The extent to which individuals have internalized the dominant
ideology is a function of the strength of the routinized relationships through which prior
socialization occurred, the frequency of contact with alternative ideologies, the extent of
the alternative ideology contact, the frequency of contact with situations not easily
explained by the dominant ideology, and the extent of the justification required in those
experiences. Personal ideology leads individuals to expect certain rewards in certain
circumstances, based upon previous socialization via routinized relationships and their
understanding of their contributions to the social exchange at hand. Personal ideology
also leads individuals to determine the justice of a new interaction by specifying
appropriate comparison referents, valued outcomes, and how they should justify their
contribution to the situation.

The final concept, perceptions of fairness, is defined as the extent to which
individuals perceive they have received the expected amount of the valued outcome in a
social interaction relative to others.
3.5 Causal Mechanisms and Process in the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice

The above description of the key concepts in the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice provides some insight into how the concepts are related to one another. Figure 2 provides a diagram for the proposed relationships.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Dominant ideologies have developed in a social history such that the stratification system includes institutional arrangements and corresponding roles that make alternative ideologies and systems of resource distribution seem nearly impossible (Della Fave 1986b). For example, Blumberg (1984) and Chafetz (1990) have noted in their theories on the development of gender ideologies and gendered social systems, gender inequalities are embedded in our social institutions. These inequalities affect the roles people are expected to inhabit in those institutions such that the evaluation standards in those institutions are gendered as well. At the intersection of the dominant ideology and the institutional reflection and reinforcement of the dominant ideology individuals engage in the self-evaluation process described above.

Individuals may come to believe that those in power deserve more rewards because they must have contributed more to get into power (Della Fave 1980). This process seems to work for societal legitimations of income distributions and within micro-level interactions (Homans 1974; Leventhal et al. 1972; Ofshe and Ofshe 1970). However, whether it applies to the evaluation of power and valued outcomes in intimate heterosexual relationships is more problematic, especially if patriarchal concepts of
power and valued outcomes are taken into account. Indeed, the embedded nature of evaluation standards makes creating a self-evaluation which is incongruent to the dominant ideology difficult, as the standards by which we are evaluated to be “good” humans in our social roles have been derived from the historical connection between the dominant ideology and its corresponding stratification system.

Individuals construct their personal ideology via the self-evaluation process. Their personal ideology is likely to be congruent with the dominant ideology unless they have encountered alternative ideologies and situations which call the dominant ideology into question. This suggests that individuals who are young are likely to develop personal ideologies congruent with the dominant ideology to the extent that they have experienced the routinized relationships in institutions that reinforce the dominant ideology. It would be difficult to create a personal ideology incongruent with the dominant ideology without being exposed to alternative options and incongruent experiences. Frequency of contact with alternative ideologies will affect the creation of personal ideology such that individuals who have had greater contact with alternative ideologies have a greater likelihood of creating a personal ideology incongruent with the dominant ideology. Further, the extent of the alternative ideology contact will moderate the effect of the frequency of contact such that more powerful contact will cause the frequency to have a greater effect on creating a personal ideology incongruent with the dominant ideology. This could explain, for example, the “liberalizing” effect of a liberal arts education, especially if the student goes to college away from home.

Frequency of contact with alternative ideologies will be greater if individuals’
social networks are not accepting of the dominant ideology. Individuals whose social networks are not accepting of the dominant ideology are also likely to create a personal ideology incongruent with the dominant ideology because they want to be accepted by those in their social networks. Conversely, individuals whose social networks are accepting of the dominant ideology will have lower frequencies of contact with alternative ideologies. Further, they will be likely to create a personal ideology congruent with the dominant ideology in order to fit in with their peers.¹

The greater the proportion of situations individuals have encountered that are difficult to explain using the dominant ideology, the less likely they will develop personal ideologies that are completely congruent with the dominant ideology. The self-evaluation process provides for individuals to justify situations using the dominant ideology (either because it benefits them or because they have an investment in subordination). However, the mental strain of justification will eventually become too great when many situations are presented that are not easily explained by the dominant ideology. Further, the extent of the justifications required will moderate the effect of the proportion of difficult to explain situations such that the greater the justifications required overall, the greater the effect of the proportion of difficult to explain situations will have on the creation of personal ideology.

The more people have internalized the dominant ideology’s specification of status

¹ This invokes a question of which came first: do individuals choose social networks because of their ideologies, or do individuals change their ideologies to fit in with their social networks? It may be that these are simultaneously occurring processes. Further theoretical development will need to address this possibility.
for someone like themselves, the less likely they are to perceive inequalities in social interactions as inequities. The process through which the personal ideology is constructed and the resulting expectations of rewards and determinations of fairness should be the same regardless of the social context. This means that we should be able to determine people’s personal ideologies and their reaction to social exchanges and interactions whether they live in the United States or Japan or Russia, three countries which have differing natural histories, dominant ideologies and corresponding social institutions. Whether the process works regardless of social context is an empirical question.

3.6 Application of Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice

Examining perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor in multiple contexts is one possible empirical test of the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice. As noted in Chapter Two, much of the empirical research on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor has tried to determine factors that predict married women’s perceptions of fairness. I am proposing a test of the theory to determine married women’s perceptions of fairness, although there is no assumption that the theory would not also predict men’s perceptions of fairness.

As specified above, the dominant ideology of a nation is the nation’s distribution rule for all resources and the meanings to be attributed to all resource allocations. Institutional structure refers to the extent to which all social institutions within the nation reflect the dominant ideology. Chapter Two summarizes the empirical literature on
general differences in dominant ideology across nations. Chapter Two also describes how and why level of gender stratification can be used as a measure of institutional structure.

Therborn (1980) asserts that the relationship between ideology and the state determines which particular strain of ideology will be dominant within a country. The state has the power to influence individual beliefs, and thus, the particular form of ideology that is endorsed by the state will become the dominant ideology. The state will endorse ideologies that maintain the status quo. Additionally, individuals in power and who control the state will favor ideologies which preserve their power and prestige. Therborn (1980) notes that ideologies construct the hegemonic definitions of what is, what is good, and what is possible within the context of that ideology’s influence. He traces the history of historical materialism and connects class consciousness, sense of political power by the people and likelihood of social change to the hegemonic position of historical materialism and capitalism as it is manifested. This connection implies that the national level definition of what is good will be different in a continuously capitalist country versus that in a post-socialist country. Specifically, it will take more time than has elapsed for capitalist influences on those with political power to change the hegemonic ideology for standards of individuals relating to one another and being subjects of the state. Nationalist movements, or movements to create a national identity consistently use gendered images to get people to buy into the ideology (Nagel 1998).

It is important to examine the relationship between state politics and the constitution of families and households (Peterson 1996). Gendered policies are the norm
within global capitalism. Examinations of families and households in their national context should include more of the history and background of the nation, which will allow a better understanding of that nation’s particular relationship between gendered state policies and families (Peterson 1996). Capitalist economic development in a nation does not inevitably lead to increasing egalitarianism between women and men in families (Beneria 1985). Therefore, examining post-socialist countries and continuously capitalist countries and comparing them in their own context will help determine the extent to which perceptions of fairness are the results of pervasive social processes as well as the extent to which they are the result of the national/economic context within which the individuals live. The ideological backlash against state socialism’s failure to reduce some gender inequalities (Lobodzinska 1995) is one example of how political context might condition the effect of a predictor on the gender division of household labor and perceptions of fairness thereof.

The history of housework “has been shaped by interconnections and tensions between patriarchal and capitalist relations and in particular by men’s defense of patriarchal privileges under the changing socioeconomic conditions created by the rise of capitalism (Jackson 1992: 168).” Perceptions of fairness of the division of housework cannot be expected to be the same in countries where the historical relationship between patriarchy and capitalism has been tightly intertwined as they are in countries where capitalism is a newly introduced economic system. Gender identity and citizenship status may be tied to individuals’ relationship to the market, but may be interpreted in a different way based on the economic system (Calasanti and Bailey 1991). Additionally,
the relationship between patriarchy and capitalism may differ based upon the religious norms within a nation. For example, there is great variation across fundamentalist Muslim nations regarding the position of women. Women may be prevented from participating in the labor market or women may excel professionally but remain subordinate within marriage and family contexts (e.g., Ahmed 1992; Chatty and Rabo 1997; Kadiyoti 1991; Yamani 1996).

The process through which individuals construct their personal ideologies is proposed to be the same regardless of context. Personal ideology is defined as the extent to which individuals have internalized the dominant ideology. Individuals’ ideologies may reflect completely the dominant ideology of their nation or may not reflect that ideology at all. As noted above, the extent to which individuals have internalized the dominant ideology is a function of the strength of the routinized relationships through which prior socialization occurred, the frequency of contact with alternative ideologies, the extent of the alternative ideology contact, the frequency of contact with situations not easily explained by the dominant ideology, and the extent of the justification required in those experiences.

Women perceive their division of labor as fair or unfair based upon the extent to which they have internalized the dominant ideology. Their personal ideology tells them how much household work they should be performing and why, to whom they should compare their distribution of household labor, and the meanings which should be attributed to the distribution of household labor. If a woman lives in a nation where the dominant ideology suggests that everyone should have equal access to all resources,
including leisure time, she is predicted to have internalized this dominant ideology. She will have internalized the dominant ideology unless she has had frequent contact with alternative ideologies (particularly if those contact situations have been extensive) and/or she has had high proportions of experiences not easily explained by the dominant ideology (that may have required a great deal of justification). Therefore, if she has internalized the dominant ideology, she is more likely to say an unequal division of labor is unfair than someone who has not internalized the dominant ideology.

Alternatively, if a woman lives in a nation where the dominant ideology suggests that individuals receive rewards in proportion to their individual effort, plus women are expected to handle domestic work, she is predicted to have internalized this dominant ideology. She will be less likely to have internalized this dominant ideology if she has had frequent contact with alternative ideologies (particularly if those contact situations have been extensive), and/or she has had high proportions of experiences not easily explained by the dominant ideology (that may have required a great deal of justification). Therefore, if she has internalized the dominant ideology she is more likely to say an unequal division of labor is fair than someone who has not internalized the dominant ideology.

Note that the second scenario considers the interaction between political/economic system and patriarchy via the separate spheres ideology. What kinds of circumstances would lead to individuals not completely internalizing the dominant ideology? Alternative ideologies reside frequently in the highest level of educational institutions and related publications, as there should be open dialogue about and criticism
of the status quo in educational settings. Experiences not explained by the dominant ideology may be something the individual personally encounters or encounters via others. For example, reflecting upon political positions and the distribution of jobs in the nation in general may lead individuals to determine that not everyone has access (or does have access depending on the situation) to valued resources. Thus women in nations where women are expected to have equal access to jobs and political positions but do not are going to be less likely to internalize the dominant ideology if they consider the justification to be too extensive for the lack of equality.

However, women with an investment in subordination cannot perceive situations as inexplicable by the dominant ideology. This investment will be magnified if people in their social networks have ideologies congruent with the dominant ideology. As a result, these women will have few if any situations where their experiences cannot be explained by the dominant ideology. They will have personal ideologies congruent with the dominant ideology and perceive their situation as fair.

3.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have integrated distributive justice theory and self-evaluation theory. In addition, I have elaborated on the self-evaluation process by further specifying

2 Bowles and Gintis (1976) contend that education is stratified such that only those with a strong interest in preserving the status quo are exposed to discussions of critiques. It is ironic that those with an interest in maintaining the status quo are the ones exposed to the mechanisms used to challenge the status quo. Those exposed, for example, to a liberal arts education may not have actively sought to do more than get a good education and preserve or acquire privilege. However, instead they are exposed to alternative ideologies, which, based on the rest of the theory's propositions, could change their personal ideologies, regardless of the intent of the initial exposure.
the conditions under which personal ideology will develop to be less congruent with the
dominant ideology. I contend that the self-evaluation process as modified in the
Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice better predicts personal ideology, and as a
result, perceptions of fairness. Empirical tests are the best ways to examine specific
derivations from this new theory in predicting perceptions of fairness.

I have provided an example of an empirical test of this new theory, focusing on
women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor and have suggested
possible measures for the concepts in the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice. In
the next chapter, I provide details on the measures in the empirical test using the
International Social Justice Project data. I also describe the analytic technique used for
determining the accuracy of the theory’s predictions.
4.1 Introduction

Much cross-national research is descriptive in its comparisons, rather than examining the contextual factors using multilevel analyses. Further, relatively little research has examined fairness issues cross-nationally; those cross-national projects tend simply to describe the division of labor (e.g., Batalova and Cohen 2002; Baxter 1997). Those projects which have used the ISJP examining perceptions of fairness have examined perceptions of economic fairness (e.g., Burgoyne, Routh, and Sidorenko-Stephenson 1999; Jasso 2000; Jasso and Wegener 1999; Kreidl 2000, 2001; Orkeny and Szekelyi 2000; Stephenson 2000; Verwiebe and Wegener 2000). One notable exception is Wunderink and Niehoff (1997) who performed rudimentary analyses on factors that affect perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor using the ISJP, although the analyses were descriptive in their comparisons and used data from only four nations.

In this chapter, I describe the International Social Justice Project, the data used to estimate the individual level models in this research project. I also describe and explain the measurement of all variables included in my analyses, focusing on the individual- and national-level predictors separately. Following the explication of formal hypotheses, I describe the analytical technique employed, multilevel modeling. I conclude this chapter with a detailed description of all models used in testing each of the hypotheses.
4.2 International Social Justice Project

The International Social Justice Project (ISJP) is a survey design where similar data were collected in 12 nations (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, United Kingdom, and United States). The goals of the International Social Justice Project were two-fold. First, the researchers “sought to generate a comparative picture of popular perceptions of economic and political justice in advanced industrialized nations (Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995: 2).” Second, they provided the context for the testing of both empirical justice theory (“what is”) and normative theories (“what ought to be”). The researchers included measures of macrojustice (criteria used to evaluate the aggregate or societal level fairness of the reward distribution) and microjustice (criteria used in the evaluation of justice or rewards received by individuals and small groups) (Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995).

The data from this project were collected in 1991, except in Estonia, where the data collection occurred in 1992. The data were collected using a stratified probability sample of adults aged 18 and older in all 12 nations through face-to-face interviews. Funding considerations led to using a computer-aided self-administered interview procedure in the Netherlands, and to telephone interviews in the United States. The sampling and interviewing were carried out by leading academic or commercial survey research organizations in all nations but Japan, where university students carried out the interviews (Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995). Table 1 includes the technical features of the survey as it was implemented in each nation.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
To ensure high standards throughout data collection, each national participant was to “adhere to the following methodological standards:

1. Field a common questionnaire, replicated exactly in each nation, except for translations, using identical questionnaires with questions in identical order; nation-specific questions were to be allowed only if they were placed at the very end of the interview.

2. Use an agreed-upon national probability sample design, with known probabilities of selection, yielding a minimum of 1,000 respondents.

3. Use a questionnaire, translated from an agreed-upon English-language questionnaire, with nonliteral translations - that is, culturally equivalent questions rather than literal questions - to be the exception and indicated in the documentation. (Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995: 322-323).”

Completion rates were computed for each nation. The completion rate is defined as the final analyzable sample size divided by the net sample (the latter defined as the total number of issued addresses/households/telephone numbers minus the cases out of the sample because of ineligibility). This is different from the response rate, which sometimes takes into account only contacted households. With the exception of Japan (at 52%) the response rates were above 70% in each nation. The researchers verified that their samples were in fact representative of the populations from which they were drawn based upon several socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (age, education, occupation, income, etc.). The only nation in which the sample seemed less than representative was Japan, where respondents had slightly higher incomes on average and
were slightly more likely to be self-employed than the average Japanese citizen (Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener 1995).

Implementation of a cross-national survey design must address issues of comparability of the data and other issues of data quality (Harkness 1999). As the questionnaire used to collect these data was written in each nation’s native language, translation issues were not as problematic as in other cross-national studies. Additionally, the survey design and sampling design were the same in all nations, thereby completing the need for comparability of the data at it affects the ability to examine adequately the cross-national similarities and differences. Although the study is not without criticism (see, for example, Della Fave 1997), the International Social Justice Project does provide insight into more general knowledge on justice beliefs through the creation of comparable international data.

4.3 Measurement

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable, perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor, is measured using the following question: “How fair do you think this arrangement is (referring to the division of household labor)? Is it very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair or very unfair?” In the analysis, the response “very unfair” was the reference group to which all other groups are compared when the cumulative logits are created. There is a known critique of the measure of the dependent variable, in that this particular measure, which is exactly like the measure used in the National Survey of Families and
Households (NSFH), lacks unidimensionality and is difficult to interpret (Smith, Gager and Morgan 1998). This difficulty lies in the fact that researchers do not know what the respondent understands the word “fair” to mean. However, I attempt to address this difficulty by considering the individual’s justice ideology, or belief about fairness issues (Wegener and Liebig 1993, 2000).

**Individual Level Predictor Variables**

In this research, justice ideology is used as a predictor variable, rather than a justice index score (Jasso 2000). An individual’s justice ideology is included in my models similarly to the way in which gender ideology has been used in perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor research in the United States. Each respondent is characterized as one of the four following justice ideologies: egalitarian, fatalistic, individualistic, and ascriptive. The method through which each person’s justice ideology is determined is complex. Wegener and Liebig (1993, 2000) note through factor analysis that each ideology is comprised of German respondents’ answers to specific questions in the survey instrument. Additionally, Davidson, Steinmann, and Wegener (1995) performed factor analysis to comprise similar ideologies in their work comparing two former socialist and two Western capitalist nations. I use the notation (W&L) to denote the questions used to comprise Wegener and Liebig’s ideologies and the notation (DS&W) to denote the questions used to comprise Davidson, Steinmann and Wegener’s ideologies.

The egalitarianism ideology is comprised of respondents’ answers to the
following three questions, each with a five point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree:

1. The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living. (W&L) (DS&W)

2. The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one. (W&L) (DS&W)

3. The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money any one person can make. (DS&W)

The fatalistic ideology is comprised of respondents’ answers to the following two questions, each with a five point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree:

1. The way things are these days, it is hard to know what is just anymore. (W&L)

2. There is no point arguing about social justice since it is impossible to change things. (W&L)

The individualistic ideology is comprised of respondents’ answers to the following three questions, each with a five point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree:

1. There is an incentive for individual effort only if differences in income are large enough. (W&L) (DS&W)

2. It is all right if businessmen make good profits because everyone benefits in the end. (W&L) (DS&W)

3. People would not want to take extra responsibility at work unless they
were paid extra for it. (DS&W)

The ascriptive ideology is comprised of respondents’ answers to the following two questions:

1. Please tell me how much influence each of these factors should have in determining the level of pay for an employee: Being a man and not a woman (5-point scale)? (W&L)

2. Three patients are admitted to a hospital at the same time, all suffering from a form of heart disease requiring surgery. However, the limited resources of the hospital allow only one heart operation each month. All three cases are equally urgent. The patient who is treated first will have a better chance of survival. The patient who can afford to pay most is treated first (4-point scale). (W&L)

As both the number of factors contributing to each ideology and the number of potential response categories within each ideology are not equal, I standardize the responses to all ten questions. Then I create a summary score for each justice ideology. A person’s justice ideology is the category in which their score is the greater number of standard deviations from the mean of that ideology category. Ideology is included as a set of dummy variables, with individualistic ideology as the reference category.

I attempt to determine whether the perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor differs based upon individuals’ experiences of discrimination (Davidson, Steinmann, and Wegener 1995) by including a measure of the respondent’s experiences with injustice based upon their sex. This is included as the respondent’s answer to the
following question: “Sometimes people experience injustice in their lives. How often have you personally experienced injustice because of your sex? Was it very often, often, sometimes, rarely, or never?” I combine very often and often into one category, sometimes and rarely into one category and left never as its own category. I also created two dummy variables with never as the reference category. However, I have no way of knowing whether a respondent’s answer to this question includes their thinking about the division of household labor.

The actual division of household labor is measured by asking each respondent who usually does the housework (such as the cooking, cleaning and laundry). Respondents were given the choices of “always self,” “usually self,” “self and partner about equal,” “usually partner,” and “always partner.” Even though all respondents were female, responses to this question were recoded to “generally or always wife,” “equal,” and “generally or always husband,” with “generally or always wife” as the reference category in the analyses. Individuals who have someone else do the household labor, either another family member or a paid employee were excluded from the analysis.

The employment status measures ask whether the person was employed for pay outside of the home either full-time or part-time. These measures are included as dummy variables for each spouse, with not being employed outside of the home for pay as the reference category.

For international comparisons, the authors of the ISJP recoded education of both respondent and spouse using CASMIN levels (Konig, Luttinger, and Muller 1988). There are three levels of education using this educational scale. Level 1 has three sublevels.
Level 1a is less than general (primary) formal education. Level 1b is having received general (primary) formal education. Level 1c is having received general (primary) formal education and basic vocational training. Level 2 has two sublevels, combined together in the ISJP as medium vocational training and medium formal education. Level 3 has three sublevels. Level 3a is having received secondary formal education. Level 3b is having received lower tertiary (vocational) training, while Level 3c is having received higher tertiary (vocational) training. I recode this into four educational categories, combining Levels 1a and 1b into a category called “Primary Education or Less;” Levels 1c and all of Level 2 into “Mid-Range Formal and/or Vocational Education;” Level 3a into “Secondary Formal Education;” and Levels 3b and 3c into “Post-Secondary Education.” In the analyses, Primary Education or Less is the reference category for both spouses, unless otherwise noted.

The age of each spouse at interview in years is included, both as continuous variables.

An increased number of people living in a home increases the amount of household work to be completed. As such, I include a measure of the presence of children and other adults living in the home. The number of individuals in the household is included as a continuous variable and includes the respondent and her spouse as household members.

Respondents were asked their individual and their household income in their interviews. However, the question differed by nation, as some asked income per month and some, income per year. Further, the ISJP includes the amount given in each nation’s
currency. For example, the income figures for Germany are in German Marks per month, while the income figures for Japan are in Yen per year. To take into consideration the relative nature of income across nations, I create relative income measures within nations for the respondents’ incomes and total household incomes. Within each nation, I calculate the median incomes for women and households. Then I calculate a ratio of respondents’ and households’ income to that median (so that individual earnings at the median within a nation received a score of 1.0).

**Nation Level Predictor Variables**

At the nation level, I have three nation-specific measures. I include a dummy variable measuring whether the nation has continually been a capitalist state during the lifetimes of the respondents or if it is a previously socialist state. This is an attempt to measure national-level justice ideologies based upon expectations of state influence in the economic sphere. Being a continually capitalist nation is the reference category.

I include a composite measure of women’s empowerment in a nation, the Gender Empowerment Measure (United Nations Development Program 2000). This composite includes four indicators of women’s power and prestige within each nation. These nation-level indicators are the proportion of each nation’s parliament’s seats held by women, women’s share of the nation’s earned income, the proportion of administrators and managers who are women, and the proportion of professional and technical jobs held by women.

The sex ratio measure is the ratio of females to males in the nation’s population in

4.4 Hypotheses

From the measures presented in this chapter, I derive several hypotheses. First, I replicate research determining the predictors of perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor that have been performed almost exclusively in the United States using a cross-national data set. This replication attempts to determine whether married women’s perceptions of fairness differ based upon context, or in this case, based upon the nation within which respondents live. If it is, the process is better modeled by multilevel modeling rather than single-level regression models. I hypothesize that there will be statistically significant differences in the perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor based on context alone.

Hypothesis 1: There will be a statistically significant portion of the variation in perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor explained by nesting respondents within nations (that is, $\tau_0^2$ will be statistically significant).

As noted in Chapter Two, previous research finds that individuals who hold egalitarian gender ideologies are more likely to perceive unequal divisions of household labor as unfair. Additionally, married women who work outside the home for pay are more likely to perceive unequal divisions of household labor as unfair. Further, previous research reports a statistically significant interaction between gender ideology and employment status, such that married women who work outside the home for pay and
have egalitarian gender ideologies are more likely to perceive unequal divisions of household labor as unfair when compared to those who have similar working statuses but are more traditional in their attitudes. As the structures of ideologies are similar in nature, I attempt to model the above relationship under the assumption that gender ideologies are a form of justice ideologies. Therefore, I hypothesize that the effect of married women’s employment status on their perceptions of fairness in the division of household labor will be moderated by their own justice ideology.

*Hypothesis 2: There will be a statistically significant interaction between married women’s justice ideologies and employment status as they affect their perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.*

Following previous research on effects of gender stratification in a nation on local household arrangements, I anticipate that there is an effect of women’s empowerment in a nation on married women’s perceptions of fairness. Nations where women have greater levels of empowerment are expected to have greater levels of perceptions of unfairness overall.

*Hypothesis 3: Increased power and prestige of women in a nation will increase the likelihood of married women saying the division of household labor in their home is unfair.*

Utilizing multilevel analyses, I determine whether there are certain factors in a nation beyond national identity that predict individual-level perceptions of fairness. I suggest that national level ideology, measured in this study as whether the nation has been continuously capitalist, will have an effect on the married women’s perceptions of
fairness of the division of household labor. I also hypothesize that factors important to perceptions of fairness in capitalist nations (e.g., working full-time outside the home for pay and income) may not be statistically significant predictors of perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor in some post-socialist nations as a result of differing national ideologies regarding social justice. I suggest that living in a post-socialist nation will decrease the effects of the individual-level predictors of perceptions of fairness.

*Hypothesis 4: There will be a statistically significant interaction between whether a nation as been continuously capitalist and the individual level predictors of working outside the home full-time for pay, having achieved secondary or post-secondary education levels, and wife’s relative income, such that these factors will affect perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor more in capitalist nations.*

In addition to national-level ideology interacting with individual-level measures of empowerment within the household to predict perceptions of fairness, I suggest that these individual measures of empowerment affect perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor differentially based upon the level of women’s power and prestige in a nation. I hypothesize that individual-level factors related to an individual woman’s greater level of power and prestige (e.g., working full-time for pay outside the home, having achieved secondary or post-secondary education levels and relative income in a household) will have stronger effects on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor in nations where women have higher levels of power and prestige.
Hypothesis 5: Married women with higher levels of power and prestige will be more likely to respond that the division of household labor is unfair if they live in a nation where women overall have higher levels of power and prestige.

Finally, the above theoretical considerations and empirical research suggest the historical intersection of capitalism and patriarchy leads women to be less likely to report unfairness than women who have experience with state-sanctioned social justice as a priority. Women who have lived in a previously-socialist state will be more likely to report what they perceive to be an unfair division of labor. However, this relationship may be less pronounced for women who have achieved individual power and prestige in a capitalist nation. I hypothesize that the differential effect of women’s power and prestige based upon women’s overall empowerment in a nation will differ based upon whether the nation has been continually capitalist or if they are a former socialist state.

Hypothesis 6: Married women with higher levels of power and prestige will be more likely to respond that the division of household labor is unfair if they live in a capitalist nation where women overall have higher levels of power and prestige.

3.5 Multilevel Ordinal Regression Analysis

Given that the response categories to the dependent variable are ordinal in nature, ordinal logistic regression is certainly an appropriate method for analyzing these data. However, because the data were collected in naturally occurring groups (i.e., respondents
were nested within nations), I have chosen to analyze the data using multilevel modeling, using the individual as the level-1 unit of analysis and the nation as the level-2 unit of analysis. While controlling for the nation within which the respondent lives is a similar method of addressing this nesting issue, multilevel modeling provides analytic power that having “nation” as a control in a standard logistic regression model cannot approximate. This research follows in the tradition of other cross-national comparative studies which attempt to take into consideration the nesting of individuals within nations (e.g., Batalova and Cohen 2002).

Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), a generalization of multiple regression for nested data, was developed by Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) and other researchers. HLM is one of several methods developed in recent years for analyzing data nested within groups. Recent innovations in statistical analyses have allowed HLM to model non-linear outcome variables as well as linear outcomes. I use hierarchical generalized linear modeling (HGLM) for my analysis. I chose Bryk and Raudenbush’s HLM because it is flexible and is described well in available publications. Additionally, a computer program for implementing the hierarchical analyses for non-linear outcomes is commercially available (Raudenbush et al., 2000).

The distinguishing feature of multilevel models is the inclusion of a complex error structure, in that the error structure allows for variation in outcomes across individuals and across contexts, as well as for variation in the effects of individual-level covariates across contexts. Additionally, multilevel models allow for a decomposition of variance in the outcome variable into two components: one part resulting from differences across the
contexts and one part based on differences between individuals within the same context. This decomposition of variance into between and within components allows researchers to determine the relative importance of the variables included at each level in the model in predicting the outcome.

In my explanation of multilevel modeling, I rely heavily on the descriptions in Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), Snijders and Bosker (1999) and Teachman and Crowder (2002). Unless otherwise noted, all descriptions of specifics regarding the statistical understanding of multilevel modeling are drawn from these sources.

**Within-nation Model**

Multilevel modeling distinguishes between within-nation and between-nation models. In a multilevel analysis, the within-nation model must be considered first because it determines the meaning of the between-nation model. The outcome variable, perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor, is an ordinal level variable. The measurement model (the within-nation model) looks very similar to an ordinal logistic regression threshold model.

In my analysis, Y is the observed variable, responses to the question regarding perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Ŷ denotes the assumed unobserved underlying continuous variable of real perceptions of fairness. Respondents who see their household labor as unfairly divided (a low value of Ŷ) have a very high probability of choosing *very unfair*. This means that $\Pr(\text{somewhat unfair})$, $\Pr(\text{somewhat fair})$, and $\Pr(\text{very fair})$ are small. However as the value of Ŷ increases, $\Pr(\text{very unfair})$
decreases and \( \text{Pr(somewhat unfair)} \), \( \text{Pr(somewhat fair)} \), and \( \text{Pr(very fair)} \) begin to increase. As \( \hat{Y} \) reaches very high values, \( \text{Pr(very unfair)} \) becomes very small, as do \( \text{Pr(somewhat unfair)} \) and \( \text{Pr(somewhat fair)} \). Therefore, where \( R \) is the response variable of perceptions of fairness

\[
\phi_1 = \text{Pr}(R = 1) = \text{Pr(very fair)}, \\
\phi_2 = \text{Pr}(R = 2) = \text{Pr(somewhat fair)}, \\
\phi_3 = \text{Pr}(R = 3) = \text{Pr(somewhat unfair)}, \\
\phi_4 = \text{Pr}(R = 4) = \text{Pr(very unfair)}.
\]

The cumulative probabilities would be characterized as

\[
\phi_4^* = \text{Pr}(R \leq 1) = \phi_1^* = \phi_1, \\
\text{Pr}(R \leq 2) = \phi_2^* = \phi_1 + \phi_2, \\
\text{Pr}(R \leq 3) = \phi_3^* = \phi_1 + \phi_2 + \phi_3, \\
\text{Pr}(R \leq 4) = \phi_4^* = \phi_1 + \phi_2 + \phi_3 + \phi_4 = 1.
\]

Note that \( \phi_4^* = 1 \) is redundant. Therefore, only three cumulative probabilities are of interest in this project.

This idea of cumulative probabilities leads to the cumulative logit

\[
\eta_3 = \log \left( \frac{\phi_3^*}{1 - \phi_3^*} \right) = \log \left( \frac{\text{Pr}(R \leq 3)}{\text{Pr}(R > 3)} \right)
\]

This leads to the simple logistic regression model (meaning one level) of

\[
\eta_m = \theta_m + \beta X_r
\]

where \( m \) = the possible ordered categories \((1,2,3)\). The model has an intercept, \( \theta_m \), for
each category \( m \), called a “threshold,” and a common slope \( \beta \). In this model, there will be three thresholds, as there are four ordered response categories. Formally, Equation 4.3 is called a proportional odds model. If we compare the expected log-odds for two cases, one with \( X = X_1 \) and the second with \( X = X_2 \). The expected difference in log-odds between these two cases will be

\[ \eta_{m1} - \eta_{m2} = \beta(X_1 - X_2), \tag{4.4} \]

which does not depend on \( m \). Thus, expected differences in log-odds between cases differing on \( X \) does not depend on a particular category. The relative odds for these two cases will be

\[ \frac{Odds_{m1}}{Odds_{m2}} = \exp\{\beta(X_1 - X_2)\}. \tag{4.5} \]

Thus, the proportional-odds model makes a key assumption that \( X \) affects the odds ratio in the same way for every category \( m \). The model also assumes that, for any \( X \), the difference in log-odds between any two cumulative logits, say \( \eta_1 \) and \( \eta_2 \), for categories \( m=1 \) and \( m=2 \), depends only on the respective intercepts, that is,

\[ \eta_1 - \eta_2 = \theta_1 - \theta_2. \tag{4.6} \]

In my analysis, respondents are nested within nations and I have 22 level-1 predictors and three level-2 predictors. The full level-1 model will be shown below. However to explain the derivation of the level-1 equation, I will be using a shorthand notation. For \( k \) predictor variables, where \( k=1,...,22 \), where respondent \( i \) is nested in nation \( j \), the level-1 model will be
The problem that arises in Equation 4.7 is that there are 25 potentially random coefficients: the slope for each \( X \), and the three thresholds. A better approach is to work with the differences,
\[
\delta_1 = \theta_1 - \theta_2,
\]
\[
\delta_2 = \theta_2 - \theta_3,
\]
and to add a common intercept, \( \beta_0 \). The level-1 model then becomes
\[
\eta_{1ij} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{ij}X_{kij},
\]
\[
\eta_{2ij} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{ij}X_{kij} + \delta_1,
\]
\[
\eta_{3ij} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{ij}X_{kij} + \delta_2.
\]
include level-2 predictor variables. This should become more clear as I present the
specific equations tested for each hypothesis.

The shorthand form of the level-2 model is

$$\beta_q = \gamma_{0q} + \sum_{j=1}^{k} \gamma_{j} + Q_{ij} + u_{iq},$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.10)

where the $k$ is the number of level-1 predictor variables included in the model, $j$ is the
number of nations included in the analysis and $s$ is the number of level-2 predictors
included in the model.

**Error Terms**

In generalized linear multilevel models, there is no explicit level-1 variance term
estimated since variation at that level is governed by conditional expectations in the form
of the conditional probabilities. This makes it more difficult to assess the relative sizes of
residual variance components within models and changes in these variances as I move
from one model to a more complex one. As this is one of the key strengths of multilevel
models, this lack of easy explanation of variance is problematic. However, as noted
above, one interpretation of the logit model is that it characterizes the conditional
probabilities of responses falling in certain groups of values on a latent variable
underlying the ordered categories. If this latent variable follows a linear multilevel model
but with a standard logistic distribution for the level-1 variance, then we can treat this
model as we would a logit model. As noted above, the $\theta$ parameters are viewed as cut-
points for the categories on the latent variable scale. For identification reasons the latent variable is standardized and the implicit latent variable, whatever the model specification, always has the logistic variance $\pi^2/3$, or approximately 3.29, at level-1 (Fielding and Yang 2000).

The usual assumption is that the $\delta_{0j}$ have an expected value of zero and variance $\tau_0^2$. Thus $\tau_0^2$ represents the between-nation variance. In some of the equations, the error terms (e.g., $\delta_{0j}$) mean that the between-nation model treats the $\beta_{0j}$ as random effects (i.e., as having meaningful variance across nations).

The potential to decompose variance of the perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor into between and within nations is important as it allows me to assess the relative importance of context, or nation within which an individual lives, in determining a respondent’s perceptions of fairness. If the nation where the respondent lives does not matter, then $\tau_0^2 = 0$. That is, there is no variation in perceptions of fairness across nations. If nation in which the respondent lives explains all of the variation in their perceptions of fairness, then $\sigma^2 = 0$. That is, there is no variation in respondents’ perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor between all respondents within a country. The intraclass correlation, $\tau_0^2 / (\tau_0^2 + \delta_0)$, can be used as an indicator of the relative importance of context, with larger values indicating a greater relative importance of nation in which the respondent lives.

### 4.6 Model Estimates

A multilevel analysis yields estimates of all parameters, their standard errors, and
In the analyses, employment status will be measured by two dummy variables: employed full-time and employed part-time, with the reference category as not in the labor force. As this is an example of how to interpret a centered categorical variable, I am simplifying the employment status variable to include only two categories: employed full-time or employed less than full-time. 

The results also include estimates of the magnitude and reliability of the variance components of random effects. In order to make sense of the maximum number of calculated parameter estimates of the cumulative log-odds, I centered each variable around the grand mean for that variable. Centering around the grand mean allows for each variable to be understood as expected changes in that variable relative to the overall mean score. For example, for age, each calculated coefficient will be explained as holding constant the variability of ages across all respondents, and the intercept is the expected value when all variables are at their mean. If the variable is a dummy variable, I also grand mean centered it (\( \bar{x} \)). For example, the indicator variable for being employed full-time (where the reference category is employed less than full-time\(^3\)) will be centered around the grand mean, \( \bar{x} \). This centered predictor can take on two values. If the respondent is employed full-time, \( X_{ij} - \bar{x} \) will equal the proportion of respondents who are employed less than full-time in the sample. If the respondent reports not being employed full-time, \( X_{ij} - \bar{x} \) will be equal to minus the proportion of respondents who reported they worked full-time. As in the case of continuous level-1 predictors centered around the respective grand mean, the intercept, \( \beta_{0j} \), is the adjusted mean outcome in unit \( j \). In this case, it is adjusted for differences among units in the percentage of respondents who reported full-time employment.

The unconditional model is the model used to assess the magnitude of variation.

\(^3\) In the analyses, employment status will be measured by two dummy variables: employed full-time and employed part-time, with the reference category as not in the labor force. As this is an example of how to interpret a centered categorical variable, I am simplifying the employment status variable to include only two categories: employed full-time or employed less than full-time.
among nations in the absence of covariates. This is the model used to test Hypothesis 1.

The level-1 model is specified as

$$
\eta_{mj} = \beta_{oij} + D_{2ij}\delta_{2j} + D_{3ij}\delta_{3j},
$$

(4.11)

where $D_{2ij}$ is a dummy variable indicating whether $m = 2$ and $D_{3ij}$ is a dummy variable indicating whether $m = 3$. This formulation summarizes the three equations

$$
\eta_{1ij} = \beta_{oij},
$$

$$
\eta_{2ij} = \beta_{oij} + \delta_{2j},
$$

$$
\eta_{3ij} = \beta_{oij} + \delta_{3j}.
$$

(4.12)

At level 2, the model is standard:

$$
\beta_{oij} = \gamma_{o0} + u_{oij}, \quad u_{oij} \sim N(0, \tau_{o0}),
$$

$$
\delta_{2j} = \delta_{2},
$$

$$
\delta_{3j} = \delta_{3}.
$$

(4.13)

The full level-1 model is specified as

$$
\eta_{mij} = \beta_{oij} + \beta_{1j} (\text{FATAL})_{ij} + \beta_{2j} (\text{ASCRP})_{ij} + \beta_{3j} (\text{EGAL})_{ij} + \\
\beta_{4j} (\text{OFTSXINJ})_{ij} + \beta_{5j} (\text{SOMSXINJ})_{ij} + \beta_{6j} (\text{EQLHW})_{ij} + \\
\beta_{7j} (\text{GENHHW})_{ij} + \beta_{8j} (\text{WFTEMP})_{ij} + \beta_{9j} (\text{WPTEMP})_{ij} + \\
\beta_{10j} (\text{HFTEMP})_{ij} + \beta_{11j} (\text{HPTEMP})_{ij} + \beta_{12j} (\text{WMIDED})_{ij} + \\
\beta_{13j} (\text{WSECD})_{ij} + \beta_{14j} (\text{WPSED})_{ij} + \beta_{15j} (\text{HMIIDED})_{ij} + \\
\beta_{16j} (\text{HSECE})_{ij} + \beta_{17j} (\text{HPSED})_{ij} + \beta_{18j} (\text{WAGE})_{ij} + \\
\beta_{19j} (\text{HAGE})_{ij} + \beta_{20j} (\text{HHNUM})_{ij} + \beta_{21j} (\text{HHLDINIC})_{ij} + \\
\beta_{22j} (\text{WRELINC})_{ij} + D_{2ij}\delta_{2j} + D_{3ij}\delta_{3j},
$$

(4.14)
where

\[ FATAL_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the fatalistic justice ideology}, \]
\[ ASCRP_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the ascriptive justice ideology}, \]
\[ EGAL_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the egalitarian justice ideology}, \]
\[ OFTSXINJ_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for often perceiving injustice based on their sex}, \]
\[ SOMSXINJ_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for sometimes perceiving injustice based on their sex}, \]
\[ EQLHW_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for equal division of household labor}, \]
\[ GENHHW_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the husband generally doing the household labor}, \]
\[ WFTEMP_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the respondent employed full-time}, \]
\[ WPFEMP_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the respondent employed part-time}, \]
\[ HFTEMP_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the spouse employed full-time}, \]
\[ HPTEMP_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the spouse employed part-time}, \]
\[ WMIDED_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the respondent having mid-range educational} \]
\[ \text{attainment}, \]
\[ WSECED_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the respondent having secondary educational} \]
\[ \text{attainment}, \]
\[ WPSED_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the respondent having post-secondary educational} \]
\[ \text{attainment}, \]
\[ HMIDED_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the spouse having mid-range educational} \]
\[ \text{attainment}, \]
\[ HSECED_{ij} = \text{a dummy variable for the spouse having secondary educational} \]
\[ \text{attainment}, \]
HPSED_{ij} = a dummy variable for the spouse having post-secondary educational attainment,

WAGE_{ij} = respondent’s age at interview,

HAGE_{ij} = spouse’s age at interview,

HHNUM_{ij} = number of people in the household,

HHLDRINC_{ij} = relative household income, and

WRELINC_{ij} = wife’s relative income.

The full level-2 model is specified as

\[ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} (GEM)_{j} + \gamma_{02} (POSTSOC)_{j} + \gamma_{03} (SEXRATIO)_{j} + u_{0j}, \]

\[ \beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10}, \]

\[ \beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20}, \]

\[ \beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30}, \]

\[ \beta_{4j} = \gamma_{40}, \]

\[ \beta_{5j} = \gamma_{50}, \]

\[ \beta_{6j} = \gamma_{60}, \]

\[ \beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70}, \]

\[ \beta_{8j} = \gamma_{80}, \]

\[ \beta_{9j} = \gamma_{90}, \]

\[ \beta_{10j} = \gamma_{100}, \]

\[ \beta_{11j} = \gamma_{110}, \]

\[ \beta_{12j} = \gamma_{120}, \]

\[ \beta_{13j} = \gamma_{130}, \]

\[ (4.15) \]
\[ \beta_{14j} = \gamma_{140}, \]
\[ \beta_{15j} = \gamma_{150}, \]
\[ \beta_{16j} = \gamma_{160}, \]
\[ \beta_{17j} = \gamma_{170}, \]
\[ \beta_{18j} = \gamma_{180}, \]
\[ \beta_{19j} = \gamma_{190}, \]
\[ \beta_{20j} = \gamma_{200}, \]
\[ \beta_{21j} = \gamma_{210}, \]
\[ \beta_{22j} = \gamma_{220}, \]
\[ \delta_{2j} = \delta_{2}, \text{ and} \]
\[ \delta_{3j} = \delta_{3}, \]

where

\( GEM \) = the Gender Empowerment Measure,

\( POSTSOC \) = a dummy variable indicating a post-socialist nation, and

\( SEXRATIO \) = the number of women per 100 men in the nation.

The models specified in 4.14 and 4.15 are the models used to test Hypothesis 3.

The models used to test Hypothesis 2 have different level-1 and level-2 specifications.

The level-1 model is

\[ \eta_{mj} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} (FATAL)_{ij} + \beta_{2j} (ASCRP)_{ij} + \beta_{3j} (EGAL)_{ij} + \]
\[ \beta_{4j} (OFTSINJ)_{ij} + \beta_{5j} (SOMSSINJ)_{ij} + \beta_{6j} (EQLHW)_{ij} + \]
\[ \beta_{7j} (GENHHW)_{ij} + \beta_{8j} (WFTEMP)_{ij} + \beta_{9j} (WPTEMP)_{ij} + \]
\[ \beta_{10j} (HFTEMP)_{ij} + \beta_{11j} (HPTEMP)_{ij} + \beta_{12j} (WMIDED)_{ij} + \]

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\[ \begin{align*}
\beta_{13j} (WSECED)_{ij} + \beta_{14j} (WPSED)_{ij} + \beta_{15j} (HMIDED)_{ij} + \\
\beta_{16j} (HSECED)_{ij} + \beta_{17j} (HPSED)_{ij} + \beta_{18j} (WAGE)_{ij} + \\
(4.16) \\
\beta_{19j} (HAGE)_{ij} + \beta_{20j} (HHNUM)_{ij} + \beta_{21j} (HHLDRINC)_{ij} + \\
\beta_{22j} (WRELINC)_{ij} + \beta_{23j} (FATAL*WFTEMP)_{ij} + \\
\beta_{24j} (FATAL*WPTEMP)_{ij} + \beta_{25j} (ASCRP*WFTEMP)_{ij} + \\
\beta_{26j} (ASCRP*WPTEMP)_{ij} + \beta_{27j} (EGAL*WFTEMP)_{ij} + \\
\beta_{28j} (EGAL*WPTEMP)_{ij} + \beta_{31j} + D_2 \delta_{2j} + D_3 \delta_{3j}.
\end{align*} \]

The level-2 model is

\[ \begin{align*}
\beta_{0j} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} (GEM)_{j} + \gamma_{02} (POSTSOC)_{j} + \gamma_{03} (SEX RATIO)_{j} + u_{0j}, \\
\beta_{1j} &= \gamma_{10}, \\
\beta_{2j} &= \gamma_{20}, \\
\beta_{3j} &= \gamma_{30}, \\
\beta_{4j} &= \gamma_{40}, \\
\beta_{5j} &= \gamma_{50}, \\
\beta_{6j} &= \gamma_{60}, \\
\beta_{7j} &= \gamma_{70}, \\
\beta_{8j} &= \gamma_{80}, \\
\beta_{9j} &= \gamma_{90}, \\
\beta_{10j} &= \gamma_{100}, \\
\beta_{11j} &= \gamma_{110}, \\
\beta_{12j} &= \gamma_{120}, \\
\beta_{13j} &= \gamma_{130}.
\end{align*} \]
\[ \beta_{14j} = \gamma_{140} \]
\[ \beta_{15j} = \gamma_{150} \]
\[ \beta_{16j} = \gamma_{160} \]
\[ \beta_{17j} = \gamma_{170} \]
\[ \beta_{18j} = \gamma_{180} \]
\[ \beta_{19j} = \gamma_{190} \]
\[ \beta_{20j} = \gamma_{200} \]
\[ \beta_{21j} = \gamma_{210} \]
\[ \beta_{22j} = \gamma_{220} \]
\[ \beta_{23j} = \gamma_{230} \]
\[ \beta_{24j} = \gamma_{240} \]
\[ \beta_{25j} = \gamma_{250} \]
\[ \beta_{26j} = \gamma_{260} \]
\[ \beta_{27j} = \gamma_{270} \]
\[ \beta_{28j} = \gamma_{280} \]
\[ \delta_{2j} = \delta_{2}, \text{and} \]
\[ \delta_{3j} = \delta_{3}. \]

The models used to test Hypotheses 4 and 5 have the same level-1 specification but different level-2 specifications. The level-1 model to test Hypotheses 4 and 5 is

\[ \eta_{mij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{ij} (\text{FATAL})_{ij} + \beta_{2j} (\text{ASCRP})_{ij} + \beta_{3j} (\text{EQLHW})_{ij} + \]
\[ \beta_{4j} (\text{OFTSXINJ})_{ij} + \beta_{5j} (\text{SOMSXINJ})_{ij} + \beta_{6j} (\text{GENHHW})_{ij} + \beta_{7j} (\text{WFTEMP})_{ij} + \beta_{8j} (\text{HFTEMP})_{ij} \]

\[ + (4.18) \]
\[ \beta_{10j} (\text{HPTEMP})_{ij} + \beta_{11j} (\text{WSECE})_{ij} + \beta_{12j} (\text{WPSED})_{ij} + \\
\beta_{13j} (\text{HMI}DE)_{ij} + \beta_{14j} (\text{HSECE})_{ij} + \beta_{15j} (\text{HPSE})_{ij} + \\
\beta_{16j} (\text{WAGE})_{ij} + \beta_{17j} (\text{HAGE})_{ij} + \beta_{18j} (\text{HHNUM})_{ij} + \\
\beta_{19j} (\text{HHLDRINC})_{ij} + \beta_{20j} (\text{WRELINC})_{ij} + D_{2j} \delta_{2j} + D_{3j} \delta_{3j}. \]

The level-2 model testing Hypothesis 3 is

\[ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} (\text{GEM})_{ij} + \gamma_{02} (\text{POSTSOC})_{ij} + \gamma_{03} (\text{SEX}RATIO)_{ij} + u_{0j}, \]

\[ \beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10}, \]

\[ \beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20}, \]

\[ \beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30}, \]

\[ \beta_{4j} = \gamma_{40}, \]

\[ \beta_{5j} = \gamma_{50}, \]

\[ \beta_{6j} = \gamma_{60}, \]

\[ \beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70}, \] (4.19)

\[ \beta_{8j} = \gamma_{80} + \gamma_{82} (\text{POSTSOC})_{ij}, \]

\[ \beta_{9j} = \gamma_{90}, \]

\[ \beta_{10j} = \gamma_{100}, \]

\[ \beta_{11j} = \gamma_{110} + \gamma_{112} (\text{POSTSOC})_{ij}, \]

\[ \beta_{12j} = \gamma_{120} + \gamma_{122} (\text{POSTSOC})_{ij}, \]

\[ \beta_{13j} = \gamma_{130}, \]

\[ \beta_{14j} = \gamma_{140}, \]

\[ \beta_{15j} = \gamma_{150}, \]

\[ \beta_{16j} = \gamma_{160}. \]
\[ \beta_{17j} = \gamma_{170}, \]
\[ \beta_{18j} = \gamma_{180}, \]
\[ \beta_{19j} = \gamma_{190}, \]
\[ \beta_{20j} = \gamma_{200} + \gamma_{202} (\text{POSTSOC}), \]
\[ \delta_{2j} = \delta_2, \text{ and} \]
\[ \delta_{3j} = \delta_3. \]

As noted above, the level-1 model used to test Hypothesis 5 is described in Equation 4.18. The level-2 model is

\[ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} (\text{GEM})_j + \gamma_{02} (\text{POSTSOC})_j + \gamma_{03} (\text{SEXRATIO})_j + u_{0j}, \]
\[ \beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10}, \]
\[ \beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20}, \]
\[ \beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30}, \]
\[ \beta_{4j} = \gamma_{40}, \]
\[ \beta_{5j} = \gamma_{50}, \]
\[ \beta_{6j} = \gamma_{60}, \]
\[ \beta_{7j} = \gamma_{70}, \]
\[ \beta_{8j} = \gamma_{80} + \gamma_{81} (\text{GEM})_j, \]
\[ \beta_{9j} = \gamma_{90} \]
\[ \beta_{10j} = \gamma_{100}, \]
\[ \beta_{11j} = \gamma_{110} + \gamma_{111} (\text{GEM})_j, \]
\[ \beta_{12j} = \gamma_{120} + \gamma_{121} (\text{GEM})_j, \]
\[ \beta_{13j} = \gamma_{130}. \]
\( \beta_{14j} = \gamma_{140} \)
\( \beta_{15j} = \gamma_{150} \)
\( \beta_{16j} = \gamma_{160} \)
\( \beta_{17j} = \gamma_{170} \)
\( \beta_{18j} = \gamma_{180} \)
\( \beta_{19j} = \gamma_{190} \)
\( \beta_{20j} = \gamma_{200} + \gamma_{201} (GEM) \),
\( \delta_{2j} = \delta_{2}, \text{ and} \)
\( \delta_{3j} = \delta_{3}. \)

Finally, the level-1 model used to test Hypothesis 6 is also be the one specified in 4.18.

However, the level-2 model is specified as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\beta_{0j} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} (GEM)_{j} + \gamma_{02} (POSTSOC)_{j} + \gamma_{03} (SEXRATIO)_{j} + \\
& \quad \gamma_{04} (GEM*POSTSOC)_{j} + u_{0j}, \\
\beta_{1j} &= \gamma_{10}, \\
\beta_{2j} &= \gamma_{20}, \\
\beta_{3j} &= \gamma_{30}, \\
\beta_{4j} &= \gamma_{40}, \\
\beta_{5j} &= \gamma_{50}, \\
\beta_{6j} &= \gamma_{60}, \\
\beta_{7j} &= \gamma_{70}, \\
\beta_{8j} &= \gamma_{80} + \gamma_{81} (GEM)_{j} + \gamma_{82} (POSTSOC)_{j} + \gamma_{84} (GEM*POSTSOC)_{j}, \\
\beta_{9j} &= \gamma_{90}
\end{align*}
\]
\[ \beta_{10j} = \gamma_{100}, \]
\[ \beta_{11j} = \gamma_{110} + \gamma_{111} (GEM)_j + \gamma_{112} (POSTSOC)_j + \gamma_{114} (GEM*POSTSOC)_j, \]
\[ \beta_{12j} = \gamma_{120} + \gamma_{121} (GEM)_j + \gamma_{122} (POSTSOC)_j + \gamma_{124} (GEM*POSTSOC)_j, \]
\[ \beta_{13j} = \gamma_{130}, \]
\[ \beta_{14j} = \gamma_{140}, \]
\[ \beta_{15j} = \gamma_{150}, \]
\[ \beta_{16j} = \gamma_{160}, \]
\[ \beta_{17j} = \gamma_{170}, \]
\[ \beta_{18j} = \gamma_{180}, \]
\[ \beta_{19j} = \gamma_{190}, \]
\[ \beta_{20j} = \gamma_{200} + \gamma_{201} (GEM)_j + \gamma_{202} (POSTSOC)_j + \gamma_{204} (GEM*POSTSOC)_j, \]
\[ \delta_{2j} = \delta_2, \text{ and} \]
\[ \delta_{3j} = \delta_3. \]

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a description of the International Social Justice Project, including the specific measures used in this research project. I have also described the multi-level ordinal logistic regression, the analytic technique used to perform the multivariate analyses of married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Chapter Five provides the descriptive and summary statistics of all individual- and nation-level variables used in the analyses.
CHAPTER FIVE
DESCRIPTIVE AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe all variables included in this research, beginning first with the distribution of the dependent variable within each nation. I then present general summaries of the individual-level and nation-level variables, followed by a more detailed description of all predictor variables by respondent’s nation of residence.

5.2 Distribution of the Dependent Variable

Most respondents, regardless of the nation in which they live, are unlikely to report they felt their division of household labor was very unfair. As shown in Table 2, Bulgarian women are most likely to report that their division of labor is very unfair. In general, respondents feel their division of labor is fair, although some interesting comparisons can be noted in whether respondents note their division of labor is very fair as compared to somewhat fair. For example, over half the respondents from East Germany, Great Britain, and the United States note that their division of labor is very fair, while less than 20% of Polish respondents feel their division of labor is very fair. West German respondents are the most likely of all respondents to say their division of labor is fair, as less than 10% of the women note that they feel their division of labor is unfair.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
5.3 Descriptive and Summary Statistics for All Individual-Level Variables

As noted in Table 3, the average age for the women in this sample is approximately 44 years old. Almost equal proportions of the women are employed full-time and out of the labor force, with only 13% of the sample employed part-time. The women in this sample earn income at about two-thirds the median individual income, as compared to all respondents in the ISJP within their country. Almost 40% of the women have a mid-range education, with approximately 20% of the sample reporting their highest level of education in each of the other three educational categories (primary level, secondary level, and post-secondary level). The respondents also are relatively equally dispersed among ideology categories with each ideology group comprising between twenty and thirty percent of the entire sample. The vast majority of the respondents say they never perceived they were treated unfairly because they were women.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Respondents’ husbands are about 46 years of age, on average. Almost three-fourths of their husbands are employed full-time, and a little less than one-fourth are not in the labor force. Approximately one-fourth of respondents’ husbands have received a post-secondary education, with 18% having received a secondary-level education and over 40% completing a mid-range level of education. Overall, the education levels of respondents and their husbands are approximately the same, as about 40% of both women and their husbands have secondary levels of education or higher.

The average household size is 3.5 people, suggesting that the average household had individuals other than the respondents and their husbands, perhaps children and/or
other adult family members. The relative household income for these women’s households is a little above the median, based upon all ISJP respondents from their country of residence. An overwhelming majority of respondents note that they perform the majority of the household labor in their homes, although one-fourth of the respondents say that they and their husbands generally split the household labor equally.

5.4 Descriptive and Summary Statistics for All Nation-Level Variables

Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the thirteen nations in the ISJP. Just over half of the nations in the ISJP are former socialist nations. The average sex ratio is 106, meaning that on average, there are more females than males in the nations’ populations.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Table 4 also provides the descriptive statistics for the overall UN Gender Empowerment Measure and its four components. While the multilevel analyses uses the nations’ GEM score, the individual components are presented to provide additional information on the extent to which women have gained power in politics, the labor force and the economy overall. The average Gender Empowerment Measure score across the nations is .528. The parliaments or legislative branches of the ISJP nations are less than 14% female in 1991. Around 28% of administrators and managers are women, while over half of professional and technical jobs are held by women. On average, women earn about one-third of the income in these nations.
5.5 Descriptive Statistics for All Independent Variables by Respondent’s Nation of Residence

Table 5 shows the wide variation across nations in the women’s characteristics, the characteristics of the husbands and households, as well as the national-level statistics. Most of the women are in their early-to mid-40's, regardless of nation of residence. There is great variation within this sample by nation of residence in the women’s employment status. For example, less than ten percent of the Dutch women in the sample are employed full-time, while over 60% women in Estonia, Russia, and Slovenia are employed full-time. Additionally, half or more of the women in West Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Poland are not in the labor force. This means they are either homemakers, students, or retired. This variation in employment status can also be evidenced in the women’s relative income as compared to all those in her country of residence in the ISJP. Women in West Germany have the lowest relative income, as well as the highest proportion of women not in the labor force in this sample. A seemingly contradictory example is Hungary, where women have the highest relative income (as compared to all Hungarians included in the ISJP) but over half of the women are not in the labor force. I can only speculate that these women may have been employed in well-paying sectors of the economy or may not be completely representative of the nation’s women as a whole.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Women in Bulgaria, Japan, and the United States are the most educated, as approximately 75% of the women in each of those nations has earned a secondary
education or more. In contrast, the majority of women in East and West Germany, Great Britain, Poland and Slovenia have earned at most a mid-range education.

There are three basic patterns to the distribution of the ideology measures across the nations. The first pattern is where one ideology category is much less likely than the other three to have been reported by the residents within that nation. East German, Dutch and Slovenian women are less likely to hold an ascriptive ideology than any of the other three ideologies, while British women are less likely to be individualistic and Russian women are less likely to be egalitarian.

The second pattern is where one ideology category is much more likely than the other three to have been reported by the residents within that nation. Bulgarian, Estonian, and Hungarian women are more likely to hold fatalistic ideologies than any other ideology, while women in the United States are more likely to hold egalitarian ideologies.

The third pattern is where two ideologies are equally likely to be reported by women within that nation. Czechoslovakian women are equally likely to report holding fatalistic and individualistic ideologies. West German women are equally likely to report holding egalitarian and ascriptive ideologies, where Japanese women are equally as likely to report holding ascriptive ideologies as they were to report holding individualistic ideologies.

Poland is the only nation which does not fit any of these patterns, as the respondents seem equally likely to fall into any of the ideology categories.

The majority of respondents, regardless of nation of residence, are unlikely to report that they feel they have been treated unfairly because they are women. About 30%
of women in Czechoslovakia, West Germany, and the United States report that they feel they were treated unfairly at least sometimes because they were women. Polish women are the least likely to report they felt treated unfairly because they were women.

Table 5 also describes the respondents’ husbands’ characteristics. The men are, on average, about two years older than their wives. The majority of men in each nation are employed full-time, although over a third of men in East Germany, Hungary, and Poland are not in the labor force. The respondents’ husbands’ education levels fall into a different pattern than do the respondents, in that while Bulgarian men (like their wives) are the most educated in this sample, most other nations show that husbands’ education levels are concentrated at the mid-range level.

The average household size in most nations is around three people. The exceptions to this are in Japan and Poland, where the average household size in those counties is over four. Compared to all other households in the ISJP data, most of the households in the sample are around the median in household income. Japan is the exception, in that the average household in my sample had a household income much lower than the median for all ISJP households.

The division of household labor in the majority of households regardless of nation of residences is fairly traditional, in that the wives reported generally performing the majority of the housework. Russia is an interesting exception, in that the majority of respondents report that the housework is generally equally split. Between thirty and forty percent of respondents report that the housework is generally equally split in Czechoslovakia, Estonia, and the United States. In no nation does a sizable proportion of
respondents note that their husbands perform the majority of the housework, with a maximum of 4% of Polish respondents reporting that their husbands perform the majority of the household labor.

Table 5 also presents the national characteristics of women’s empowerment by nation for comparison. In all nations in this sample, women outnumber men, as noted by the sex ratios above one-hundred. Estonia and Russia have the greatest disparities in population by sex, with 112 and 111 women per 100 men in these nations, respectively.

The last characteristics reported in Table 5 are those based upon the United Nations Human Development Report Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). The GEM is noted first, and the four components are listed below. Note that the values for East and West Germany are the same; this is a function of the time period for which the data were reported. Among the nations included in the ISJP, East and West Germany have the highest GEM, suggesting that Germany is the nation where women overall have the most power (in comparison to the other nations listed). The United States and the Netherlands have values just below that of the Germanies. The nations with the lowest GEM scores are Poland and Russia.

Examining the individual components of the GEM shows that the Netherlands has the highest proportion of women in parliament (almost 30%), while Russia has the lowest proportion. Over one-half of administrators and managers in Hungary are women, while less than 10% are women in Japan. At least one-half of professional and technical jobs are held by women in all of the nations, except in Great Britain, Japan, and the Netherlands. In no nation does women’s share of the income earned equal or exceed that
of men, but in all nations except the Netherlands women earn at least one-third of the income.

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I provided detailed descriptions of the two data sources I use to examine individual- and nation-level predictors of married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. I show that most respondents, regardless of the nation in which they live, are likely to report they feel their division of household labor is fair. I described the nature of the respondents in the ISJP as a group, and compared the women on those descriptive characteristics across their nation of residence. I also presented general and specific comparisons of the nation-specific characteristics for the ISJP nations.

While the descriptive similarities and differences are interesting, what is more interesting is how these contrasts play out in predicting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. The specific effects of married women’s individual characteristics and the effects of the nation in which they reside on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor are presented in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SIX

PREDICTING MARRIED WOMEN’S PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS OF THE DIVISION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR: MODELS INCLUDING INDIVIDUAL AND NATIONAL-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the findings from all analyses predicting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor from the International Social Justice Project data. I include explicit tests of the six hypotheses presented in Chapter Four and additional explanatory models connecting those tested in the hypotheses. First I describe the findings where perception of fairness of the division of household labor is predicted only by individual-level characteristics. Next, I discuss the findings for the models with national-level predictors. Among these models are some where the effect of the division of household labor is predicted to be moderated by justice ideology. The next models I discuss are those including interaction effects between the division of household labor and women’s empowerment. The final models examine the cross-level effects of the political/economic history of the respondent’s nation of residence.

6.2 Individual-Level Effects on Married women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor

The first analysis examines whether there is any variation across nations in the average perception of fairness of the division of household labor, an explicit test of
Hypothesis 1. This baseline model includes respondents from all nations in the ISJP, and is shown as Model 1 of Table 6. Model 1 shows that there is variation in the reports of perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor between nations, as noted in the statistically significant variance component.

The variance component is the variance estimated for the level-2 model. As noted in Chapter Four, the variance at level-1 is the constant $\pi^2/3$, or 3.29. To evaluate the proportion of the total variance attributable to between nation differences, I calculated the intraclass correlation, $\tau_o^2/ (\tau_o^2 + \delta_o)$, where $\tau_o^2$ is the variance component estimated for the model and $\delta_o$ is the level-1 variance (3.29). The intraclass correlation is used as an indicator of the relative importance of context, with larger values indicating a greater relative importance of nation of residence in predicting the likelihood of reporting a *very fair* division of household labor. Therefore, according to Model 1 in Table 6, approximately 4.8% of the variation in the baseline model estimating the likelihood of reporting a *very fair* division of household labor can be attributed to national differences.

Prior to describing the predicted effects on married women’s perceptions of fairness, I want to review briefly the interpretation of the coefficients presented in the multi-level analysis tables. A positive coefficient means that as the independent variable increases, the model predicts that there is a greater likelihood of the respondent being in the first category of the dependent variable as compared to the second category. In substantive terms, a positive coefficient means that the woman is more likely to report she feels the division of labor is *very fair* as compared to *somewhat fair*. A negative
coefficient means just the opposite, that an increase in the independent variable is predicted to lead to a lower likelihood of being in the first category of the dependent variable as compared to the second category. In substantive terms, a negative coefficient means that the woman is more likely to report she feels the division of labor is somewhat fair as compared to very fair, or that she is more likely to perceive some unfairness.

The coefficients presented are effects on the log-odds of reporting the division of labor is very fair as compared to fair. To aid in interpretation, these coefficients are exponentiated to determine the effects of predictor variables on the odds of the respondent reporting their division of household labor was very fair. For example, if the effects on the log-odds is -.51, the effects on the odds is $e^{-0.51}$, or .60. This suggests that a one unit increase in the predictor variable is predicted to lead to respondents being 40% less likely (1.00-.60) to report that their division of labor is very fair.

The threshold parameter (2-3) captures the difference in predicting that a respondent would say that the division of labor is either very fair or somewhat fair as compared to the division of labor being somewhat unfair. Similarly, the threshold parameter (3-4) captures the difference in predicting that a respondent would say that the division of labor is very fair, somewhat fair, or somewhat unfair as compared to the division of labor being very unfair. In more substantive terms, the calculated value of the intercept (-.47) plus the first threshold parameter (1.92) is the expected log-odds of the respondent to say the division of labor is either very fair or somewhat fair as compared to somewhat unfair (1.45). The expected log-odds of the respondent saying the division of labor is very fair, somewhat fair or somewhat unfair as compared to very unfair is (-.47)
Model 2 in Table 6 presents the findings of the analyses with all of the primary individual-level predictors in the model. On average, women are less likely to say the division of labor is *very fair* than they are to report some level of unfairness. Women’s employment status and education level are statistically significant predictors of perceptions of fairness.\(^4\) In general, women’s increased levels of individual power, such as employment outside of the home, either full-or part-time, increased education levels, and increased relative income, all increase the likelihood the respondent reports that she does not perceive the housework to be divided *very fairly*. Respondents’ age does not have a statistically significant effect on reported perception of fairness. Married women who sometimes or often perceive they are treated unjustly because they are female are predicted to be less likely to report their division of labor is *very fair*. There is no effect of justice ideology on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor ($\chi^2 = .708$ with 3 degrees of freedom).\(^5\)

Only one characteristic of the respondents’ husbands has a statistically significant effect on respondents’ perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Women whose husbands are employed full-time are statistically significantly more likely to report that their division of labor is *very fair* as compared to women whose husbands are not in

\(^4\) The significance test here is a multivariate contrast test distributed as a Wald chi-square. This test determines whether the effects of a group of measures are simultaneously equal to zero.

\(^5\) Other analyses not shown here determined that only having an individualistic ideology is significantly different from having an egalitarian ideology in the effects on respondents’ perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.
the labor force. Overall, husbands’ labor force status is a statistically significant predictor of wives’ perception of fairness of the division of household labor, while husbands’ educational attainment is not ($\chi^2 = 1.37$ with 3 degrees of freedom).

The reported division of labor is a statistically significant predictor of wives’ perceptions of fairness of the division of labor ($\chi^2 = 743.47$ with 2 degrees of freedom). Women whose husbands perform one-half of the household labor are much more likely to report that the division of labor is *very fair* as compared to women who perform the majority of the household labor. Women whose husbands perform the majority of the household labor are statistically significantly more likely to report that the division of labor is *very fair* as compared to women who perform the majority of the household labor. Additionally, an increased number of people in the household leads to a lower likelihood that the woman perceives the division of household labor as *very fair*.

Once the individual-level predictors have been included in the model, the amount of variance between nations in reported perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor increases. Approximately 7.5% of the variation in married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor can be attributed to nation-level differences.

Model 3 adds an interaction between ideology and married women’s employment status, an explicit test of Hypothesis 2. The effect of married women’s employment status on their perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor is not contingent upon justice ideology ($\chi^2 = 3.972$ with 6 degrees of freedom).
6.3 National-level Effects on Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor

The two models in Table 7 add the effects of nation-level characteristics in predicting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Model 1 tests Hypothesis 3, which hypothesized about the effects of women’s overall empowerment (here measured by the United Nations Gender Empowerment Measure [GEM] and the nation’s sex ratio). Model 1 also includes the effects of political history (as measured by whether the nation is a former socialist nation) on respondents’ perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Net of the effects of all other variables in the model, married women living in a post-socialist nation are less likely to say their division of labor is very fair as compared to married women living in continuously capitalist nations. Additionally, married women living in nations where women overall have higher levels of empowerment are more likely to report their division of labor is very fair. The nation’s sex ratio has no effect on overall perception of fairness of the division of household labor.

Model 1 also shows the individual-level effects of characteristics of the respondents, their husbands and their household, net of the effects of nation-level characteristics. As was the case in Model 2 of Table 6, married women’s increased individual levels of power are predicted to lead to a lower likelihood of reporting a very fair division of household labor. Respondents’ age has no effect on perception of fairness of the division of household labor, nor do the measures of ideology. Married women who
sometimes or often perceive they are treated unfairly because they are female are less likely to say their division of household labor is very fair than are married women who never perceive they are treated unfairly because they are female.

Again, only one characteristic of the respondents’ husbands is a statistically significant predictor of the respondents’ perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Women whose husbands are employed full-time are more likely to report that their division of household labor is very fair as compared to women whose husbands are not in the labor force.

Respondents who report that their household labor is equally divided or that their husbands perform the majority of the household labor are statistically significantly more likely to report that their division of labor is very fair as compared to those who report that they perform the majority of the household labor. An increased number of people in the household is predicted to decrease the likelihood of the respondent saying the division of household labor is very fair. Household relative income has no effect on the respondents’ perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.

Once the three nation-level characteristics (whether the nation is a post-socialist nation, the sex ratio and the GEM) are included in the model, the variance component drops. After controlling for the political/economic history of the country, two measures of women’s empowerment, and individual-level characteristics, approximately 1.5% of the variation in married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor can be attributed to nation-level differences.

Model 2 in Table 7 adds an interaction effect at the individual-level between the
respondents’ ideology and the reported division of labor. Once nation-level characteristics are controlled, I assess whether the effect of ideology differs based upon the reported division of labor and whether the effect of reported division of household labor differs based upon married women’s ideology. There is a statistically significant interaction between ideology and reported division of household labor ($\chi^2 = 15.48$ with 6 degrees of freedom). Table 8 presents the conditional effects of personal ideology on the log-odds (and odds ratios) of reporting the division of household labor as *very fair* based upon the reported division of labor. Married women with egalitarian ideologies are more likely to report their division of labor as *very fair* than are women with individualistic ideologies if they report an unequal division of household labor. However, egalitarian women who report an equal division of labor are less likely to report their division of labor as *very fair* as compared to individualistic women with an equal division of labor. Married women with ascriptive ideologies are more likely than are individualistic women to report their division of labor is *very fair* if they report performing the majority of housework, but are less likely to report a *very fair* division of labor if their husbands perform at least one-half of the housework. Married women with fatalistic ideologies are more likely than individualistic women to report their division of labor is *very fair* if their husbands perform the majority of the household labor but are less likely to report this if they perform at least one-half of the housework.

**TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE**

Table 9 details the effects on the log-odds (and odds ratios) of the reported division of labor based on personal ideology. Women who report an equal division of
labor are much more likely to report that their division of labor is very fair than are those who perform the majority of household, regardless of personal ideology. The majority of women whose husbands perform the majority of housework are also more likely than are women who perform the majority of housework to report their division of labor is very fair. However, the magnitude of the effects differs based on ideology. Individualistic women whose husbands perform the majority of the household labor are only three percent more likely to report that their division of labor is very fair as compared to individualistic women who perform the majority of the household labor. Egalitarian women whose husbands perform the majority of the household labor are more than twice as likely to report that their division of labor is very fair as compared to egalitarian women who perform the majority of the household labor. Fatalistic women are almost three times as likely to report that their division of labor is very fair as compared to fatalistic women who perform the majority of the household labor. Ascriptive women whose husbands perform the majority of the household labor are 15% less likely to say that their division of labor is very fair as compared to acriptive women who perform the majority of the household labor.

TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

6.4 Interactions between Reported Division of Labor and Women’s Empowerment Measures on Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor

Table 10 provides three models examining the effects of women’s empowerment
on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Model 1 includes the three nation-level predictors for married women’s perceptions of fairness. Married women’s reports of the fairness of the division of household labor are not affected by the sex ratio of the county in which they live. However, married women living in post-socialist nations are 36% less likely to report that their division of labor is very fair as compared to married women living in continuously capitalist nations, net of the effects of all other variables in the model. Further, increased levels of the overall empowerment of women in a nation is predicted to lead to a greater likelihood that respondents will report that their division of labor is very fair, net of the effects of all other variables in the model.

TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE

In Model 1, all individual-level predictors of married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor (both for the respondents and their husbands) have similar effects as were shown in previous tables. This model also includes cross-level interactions between women’s national-level empowerment (as measured by sex ratio and GEM) and the reported division of household labor. However, these interactions are not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 6.637$, with 4 degrees of freedom). As a result, these interaction terms are not included in subsequent models.

Model 2 of Table 10 includes all individual-level predictors and adds a product-term interaction between individual measures of empowerment (i.e., employment status, educational attainment, and relative income) and the reported division of household labor. There is a statistically significant interaction between the reported division of labor and individual measures of power ($\chi^2 = 44.233$ with 12 degrees of freedom).
Model 3 expands on Model 2 by adding the three nation-level predictors of political history, sex ratio and GEM. As a group, they do add significantly to the predictive ability of the model ($\chi^2 = 38.198$ with 3 degrees of freedom). Both the nation-level and individual-level predictors in Model 3 have very similar effects as were reported in previous models. This model includes the product-term interactions between reported division of labor and the respondent’s measures of empowerment included in Model 2.

There is a statistically significant interaction between married women’s reported division of household labor and their personal measures of empowerment in Model 3 as well. The calculated conditional effects on the log-odds of respondents reporting a very fair division of labor for the individual measures of power are shown in Table 11. These conditional effects are listed by the reported division of labor. Any increase in individual power is predicted to decrease the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor for married women who report they perform the majority of the household labor. Being employed as compared to not being in the labor force is predicted to increase the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor for married women with an equal division of labor. Increased relative income is also predicted to increase the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor if the labor was reported to be shared equally. Generally speaking, having more than primary level education is predicted to decrease the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor for married women with an equal division of labor. However, having a secondary level of education as compared to primary is predicted to slightly increase the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor for married women with an equal division of labor.
The trends in effects of personal empowerment are different for women who report that their husband performs the majority of the household labor. Among women whose husbands perform the majority of household labor, those who are employed or who have a higher relative income are predicted to be less likely to report that their division of labor is very fair. However, having more than a primary level of education is predicted to increase the likelihood of reporting the division of labor is very fair when husbands are reported to perform the majority of the household labor.

Table 12 presents the conditional effects of the division of labor for each combination of employment status and education level. The effect of reporting an equal division of labor as compared to reporting the respondent performs the majority if the household labor varies little across education levels within labor force participation status. However, the effect of reporting that husbands perform the majority of the household labor as compared to wives performing the majority differs based upon the combination of labor force participation status and education level. Within each category of labor force participation status, increases in education level are predicted to increase the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor. However, regardless of education level, respondents employed part-time whose husbands perform the majority of household labor are less likely to report the division of labor is very fair than are similar women who perform the majority of the household work.
6.5 Cross-level Effects of Nation’s Political History on Married Women’s

Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor

Tables 13 and 14 show five models predicting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor focusing on the effects of women’s empowerment and the nation’s political history. Table 13 examines whether married women’s individual measures of power affects perceptions of fairness differently based upon nation-level characteristics. Model 1 in Table 13 includes an interaction between living in a post-socialist nation and the highest levels of personal empowerment, testing Hypothesis 4. Model 2 includes an interaction between the highest levels of personal empowerment and the gender empowerment measure, testing Hypothesis 5. As both hypotheses predicted about the relationship between the highest levels of personal power and national-level characteristics, the analyses shown in Table 13 include only the highest levels of personal empowerment (i.e., employed full-time vs. less than full-time, secondary and post-secondary educational attainment vs. less than secondary education, and relative income).

Most of the effects of national and individual characteristics on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor are similar to those reported in earlier models, even though the individual model has changed slightly. The intraclass correlation for Model 1 is .01611, suggesting that approximately 1.6% of the variation in predicting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor can be attributed to nation-level differences. Sex ratio of the respondents’ nation of residence
does not affect perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Living in a post-socialist nation is predicted to decrease the likelihood respondents will report that their division of labor is very fair. Increased levels of overall empowerment for women in a nation as measured by the GEM is predicted to increase the likelihood respondents will report that their division of labor is very fair.

As the majority of the effects of individual-level characteristics is the same as reported in earlier models, I will focus here on the effects not previously tested. In this model, the added variables estimate whether there is an interaction between the highest levels of personal empowerment and the political history of the nation (whether or not the nation was once a socialist state). There is not a statistically significant interaction between the highest levels of personal empowerment and whether the nation was once socialist in predicting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor ($\chi^2 = 5.525$ with 4 degrees of freedom). Further, none of the individual variables (employment status, educational attainment and income) have a statistically significant interaction with whether the nation was once socialist in affecting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.\(^6\)

Model 2 of Table 13 examines whether the effects of married women’s personal empowerment on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor differs by the overall level of women’s empowerment in the nation. The effects of the nation-level characteristics shown in this model on the average perception of fairness are similar to those shown in Model 1. Sex ratio has no effect on perceptions of fairness of the division

\(^6\)Additional analyses with all categories of individual power show similar results.
of household labor, living in a post-socialist nation decreases the likelihood of reporting the division of labor is very fair and an increase in women’s overall empowerment in a nation increases the likelihood the respondent will report her division of labor is very fair. The intraclass correlation for Model 1 is .01546, suggesting that approximately 1.5% of the variation in predicting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor can be attributed to nation-level differences.

As this model adds a cross-level interaction between personal empowerment measures and GEM that has not been previously tested, I will describe only those effects here. All other individual-level characteristics have similar effects as were presented in previous models. There is a statistically significant interaction between the highest levels of personal empowerment and the gender empowerment measure on married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor ($\chi^2 = 17.758$ with 4 degrees of freedom). However, relative income is the only individual variable with which there is a statistically significant relationship, as neither employment status nor educational attainment alone produce a statistically significant interaction. As shown in Figure 3, increased relative income is predicted to decrease the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of household labor. However, the effect is stronger in high GEM nations than in low GEM nations. This difference is more marked for married women with low relative

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7 Additional analyses replicate these findings when all categories of variables measuring personal empowerment are included.

8 The lines in all figures in this chapter are predicted outcomes using the actual mean values and values one and two standard deviations above and below the mean.
incomes, as the lines representing the effect of relative income across nations based upon GEM begin to converge at high levels of relative income. Married women with low relative incomes living in low GEM nations are about 40% less likely to report that their division of labor is very fair, while women with low relative incomes living in high GEM nations are about 62% less likely to report that their division of household labor is very fair.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

Table 14 elaborates on the models presented in Table 13 by including cross-level interactions with all measures of personal power for both the measure of political history and overall gender empowerment. In total, these three models provide a complete test of Hypothesis 6. Model 1 is a combination of the models presented in Table 13, where the highest levels of individual empowerment are included in interaction terms with both the measure for living in a post-socialist nation and the gender empowerment measure. The intraclass correlation for Model 1 is .01536. The nation-level characteristics have approximately the same effects in this model as in both models in Table 13. The sex ratio of the respondent’s nation of residence has no effect on the respondents’ perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Living in a post-socialist nation decreases the likelihood of reporting that the division of labor is very fair, while increased empowerment for women within the nation increases the likelihood the respondents will report that their division of labor is very fair.

TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE

The findings for the individual-level control variables are similar to the findings
described in previous models. The discussion here will focus on the variables crucial to testing Hypothesis 6. As noted above, Model 1 is a combination of the models presented in Table 13, in that the highest levels of individual empowerment are included in interaction terms with both the measure for living in a post-socialist nation and the gender empowerment measure. There is a statistically significant interaction between married women’s individual measures of power and both the nations’ political history and overall gender empowerment ($\chi^2 = 23.027$ with 8 degrees of freedom).  

The final two models in Table 14 address whether the effects of women’s empowerment differ based on the nation’s political history. Model 2 adds an interaction effect between the variable measuring whether the nation in which the respondent lives is a former socialist nation and the nation’s GEM has a direct effect on respondent’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. This interaction effect is statistically significant. Model 3 answers the question of whether there is a three-way interaction among married women’s individual empowerment and the interaction of the GEM and the nation’s political history. There is not a statistically significant three-way interaction among those variables in their effects on married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor ($\chi^2 = 2.00$ with 4 degrees of freedom).  

The model best describing the factors affecting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor seems to be Model 2 in Table 14. This determination is based on the low variance term (and correspondingly low intraclass

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Additional analyses with all categories of individual empowerment variables included show similar results.
correlation) and the fact that all primary independent variables in the model are statistically significant. Below I describe the nature of the effects found in Model 2 that pertain to Hypothesis 6, while Figures 4 through 7 are graphical representations of the interaction effects.

As noted above, there is a statistically significant interaction between nation’s political history and GEM in the effects on married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Figure 4 depicts the effect of gender empowerment at the national-level on married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor as moderated by nation’s political history. Married women living in continuously capitalist nations have a greater likelihood of reporting that their division of labor is very fair than do married women in former socialist nations for all levels of gender empowerment except at the very highest levels.

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

Married women employed full-time who lived in a continuously capitalistic nation were statistically significantly less likely to report that their division of household labor was very fair as compared to married women employed less than full-time. However, there was only a small effect of employment status on the likelihood of reporting that the division of household labor is very fair for married women living in former socialist nations. The differential effect of being employed full-time on perceptions of fairness by women’s overall empowerment in a nation is shown in Figure 5. Married women employed full-time in nations with high gender empowerment are almost twice as likely to report that their division of labor is very fair rather than to report some unfairness,
whereas married women employed full-time in nations with low gender empowerment are only slightly more likely to report that their division of labor is very fair.

FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

There is a statistically significant interaction between educational attainment and nation’s political history. As compared to married women with mid-range education or less, married women with secondary levels of education living in a continuously capitalist nation are less likely to report that their division of household labor is very fair. However, married women with secondary levels of education living in former socialist nations are more likely to report that their division of labor is very fair as compared to married women with mid-range educations. Married women with post-secondary levels of education living in continuously capitalist nations are also less likely than are married women with mid-range or lower educations to report that their division of labor is very fair. Living in a former socialist nation further decreases the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor.

The differential effect of having greater than a mid-range level of education on perceptions of fairness by women’s overall empowerment in a nation is shown in Figure 6. There is very little difference between having a mid-range or lower level of education and having a post-secondary level of education on women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor based upon the overall gender empowerment in the nation. However, women with secondary levels of education living in nations with high gender empowerment are almost twice as likely to report that their division of labor is very fair than are similar women living in nations with low gender empowerment.
Increases in relative income are predicted to lead to a decreased likelihood of reporting a *very fair* division of labor in a continuously capitalist nation. This effect is even stronger in a former socialist nation. The differential effect of relative income on perceptions of fairness by women’s overall empowerment in a nation is shown in Figure 7. Married women with low relative income are predicted to be more likely to report a *very fair* division of labor than are married women with high relative incomes, regardless of the nation’s overall gender empowerment. However, the effect of relative income on perceptions of fairness is stronger in nations with low gender empowerment. The higher the relative income, the lower the moderating effect of nations’ gender empowerment, as can be seen in the trend toward convergence of the lines at the upper end of relative income.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the findings of my analyses of the International Social Justice Project data in an attempt to address my primary research question: Are there contextual differences in the factors which predict married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor? I have presented the analyses in stages, focusing first on individual-level predictors, while controlling for the nesting of respondents in the thirteen nations of the ISJP. I then examined the effects of whether the nation in which the respondent lived was a post-socialist nation and women’s overall

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empowerment (as measured by sex ratio and the GEM) on respondent’s perceptions of fairness. These effects included direct effects on perceptions of fairness and moderating effects modeled as interaction terms.

I have not addressed whether these findings support my six research hypotheses, and what can be learned about married women’s perceptions of fairness overall through these analyses. In the next chapter I will explicitly determine whether I found support for my research hypotheses and provide a general summary of the major research findings.
CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCUSSION: SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESES
AND OTHER NOTABLE FINDINGS

7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this project was to examine married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor using a cross-national sample. I set out to determine whether the factors affecting married women’s perceptions of fairness were the same across national context, and if there were factors within the context that directly affected married women’s perceptions of fairness. In Chapter Four, I proposed six hypotheses based upon previous research to be tested using the International Social Justice Project data. In this chapter, I evaluate the support for these six hypotheses. Additionally, I evaluate the Contextual Distributive Justice Theory proposed in Chapter Three and describe other sociologically interesting and notable findings based on my analyses of the ISJP data.

7.2 Restatement and Evaluation of Support for Hypotheses

Below I list the six hypotheses derived and explained in Chapter Four. After each hypothesis I evaluate whether I found empirical support in the analyses described in Chapter Six. Further, I attempt to explain the findings, including why in some cases the hypotheses were not supported by the data.
Hypothesis 1: There will be a statistically significant portion of the variation in perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor explained by nesting women within nations (that is, $\tau_0^2$ will be statistically significant).

The purpose of testing this hypothesis was to determine whether married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor differed by nation of residence once individual-level predictors were controlled. The first test of this hypothesis is shown in Model 1 of Table 6, the baseline model. This model shows that without any predictors in the model there is a statistically significant difference in married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor based upon their nation of residence, as the variance component ($\tau_0^2$) is statistically significant.

However, the hypothesis specifically suggests that there would continue to be differences in married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor once individual-level predictors had been controlled in the models. There is support for this hypothesis. The variance component of Model 2 of Table 6, a model which includes all individual-level predictor variables, is statistically significant. These models suggest there are differences in married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor based on context. In fact, adding the individual-level predictors enhanced the effect of context on married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Later models examine the extent to which the three nation-level characteristics I included contribute to these national differences in perceptions of fairness.
Hypothesis 2: There will be a statistically significant interaction between married women’s justice ideologies and employment status as they affect their perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.

This hypothesis was designed as a test of whether gender ideologies are a form of justice ideologies. Previous research has found that individuals who hold egalitarian gender ideologies are more likely to perceive the division of household labor as unfair (Blair and Johnson 1992; DeMaris and Longmore 1996; John, Shelton and Luschen 1995; Sanchez and Kane 1996). Additionally, married women who work outside of the home for pay are more likely to perceive unequal divisions of household labor as unfair (Baxter 2000; Demo and Acock 1993; Greenstein 1996; Sanchez 1994; Sanchez and Kane 1996). Further, there is a statistically significant interaction between gender ideology and employment status, such that those who work outside of the home for pay and have egalitarian gender ideologies are more likely to report that the division of household labor is unfair when compared to those who have similar working statuses but are more traditional in their attitudes (Iwama 1997; Piña and Bengtson 1993). If gender ideologies are a form of justice ideologies, then I should find empirical support for Hypothesis 2.

Model 3 of Table 6 tests for an interaction between justice ideology and employment status in their effects on the likelihood married women will report that their division of household labor is very fair. There was not a statistically significant interaction between justice ideology and employment status. Does this mean that gender ideologies are not a form of justice ideologies? I do not believe we have enough evidence to answer this question.
These analyses determined that married women’s responses to questions about social justice and justice scenarios in general are not predictors of their perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. It could be that women in general do not see that household labor is a social justice issue, therefore their beliefs about social justice would not affect their perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Instead, the division of labor, because of the historical influence of patriarchy, is seen as a “women’s issue.” Therefore, married women’s justice ideology would not affect their perceptions of fairness. Gender ideology may indeed be a form of justice ideology; however, further research would need to examine the construction of and connection of those ideologies, including how gender fits with social justice. Specific suggestions for future research into the connection between gender ideologies and justice ideologies in general are discussed in Chapter Eight.

Hypothesis 3: Increased power and prestige of women in a nation will increase the likelihood of married women saying the division of household labor in their home is unfair.

Previous theory and research have argued that there may be direct effects of gender stratification in a nation on individual household arrangements (Mason 1986; Safilios-Rothschild 1982; Young 1993). Consequently, I hypothesized that there would be an effect of women’s empowerment in a nation on married women’s perceptions of fairness at the individual-level. I argued that nations where women have greater levels of empowerment would be predicted to have greater levels of perceptions of unfairness
Based on Model 1 in Table 7 (and all subsequent models including the nation-level measures of women’s empowerment), I did not find support for my hypothesis. In fact, the findings are exactly opposite of what I hypothesized. Living in nations where women overall have high levels of empowerment (as measured by the Gender Empowerment Measure) was found to increase the likelihood of reporting that the division of labor is very fair, net of the effects of all other variables in the model. There was no direct effect of the second measure of women’s empowerment, sex ratio, on perceptions of fairness.

How can these findings be explained? The lack of variation in the predictor variable of sex ratio may explain the lack of effect. It is also possible that the kind of change predicted based upon sex ratio affects the actual division of labor but not the perceptions of fairness. Guttentag and Secord (1983) argued that high sex ratios, which indicate a relative under-supply of women, would be associated with women having dyadic power. Further research found mixed results of the effects of the sex ratio on power-sharing outcomes (Fu 1992; Fu and Heaton 1995; South and Trent 1988), although the effects seemed to have been more pronounced in economically developed nations than in less-developed nations. It is possible that not only were the effects of sex ratio the same because all nations were approximately at the same development level, but also that sex ratio would affect the dyadic power and predict the actual division of household labor rather than women’s response to that division.

The sex ratio used in these analyses was the sex ratio for the entire nation rather
than an age-specific sex ratio. The surplus of women in the nation could be a function of women having greater longevity than men. It is unlikely that greater numbers of elderly women could work to alter the dyadic power within younger couples’ relationships in the way that Guttentag and Secord argue. As such, future research could better examine this process by using an age-specific sex ratio for those eligible to be in the work force.

Living in a nation where women overall have more power increases rather than decreases the likelihood of reporting the division of labor as very fair. I expected that individual married women living in a nation where women overall have more power would be less willing to accept anything less than equality and would be likely to report inequity. In fact, married women living in a nation where women have less overall power are more likely to report inequity. This may be evidence of the beginning of social change in a nation where women do not have overall high levels of power. Being powerful is not necessarily an ascribed status for individual women; they must fight to achieve it. To do so, they must believe that they are being treated unfairly.

This finding may be evidence of a correlational but not necessarily of a causal relationship. The hypothesis predicted that nation-level empowerment would cause individual-level perceptions of fairness. Indeed, they may be correlated, but the causation reciprocal rather than unidirectional. Individual women may feel like they are treated unfairly and work to find ways to change their situation. One possibility is to change the dynamics at home; an alternative possibility is for women to try to change the national belief systems regarding married women and the division of household labor. It is also possible that those women who were most dissatisfied have already been divorced and do
not show up in this sample. Therefore, the correlation seen in the data between the
Gender Empowerment Measure and married women’s perceptions of fairness may be
evidence of this struggle at either the individual- or national-level. Only longitudinal
analyses examining the nature of the relationship between women’s overall
empowerment and perceptions of fairness over time will be able to disentangle this
question of causality.

Hypothesis 4: There will be a statistically significant interaction between whether a
nation has been continuously capitalist and the individual-level predictors of working
outside the home full-time for pay, having achieved secondary or post-secondary
education levels, and wife’s relative income, such that these factors will affect
perceptions of fairness of the divisions of household labor more in capitalist nations.

In Chapter Four, I argued that national level ideology, measured here as whether
the nation has been a continuously capitalist nation, would have a direct effect on the
average woman’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. I also argued
that factors which are important to perceptions of fairness in capitalist nations (e.g.,
working full-time outside the home for pay and income) would not be statistically
significant predictors of perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor in
post-socialist nations as a result of differing beliefs regarding social justice. I argued that
living in a post-socialist nation would decrease the effects of the individual level
predictors of perceptions of fairness.

In Model 1 of Table 13, I tested for the cross-level interaction between nation’s
political history and individuals’ level of empowerment to determine whether the effects of having high levels of personal power on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor differed by nations’ political history. I did not find support for the hypothesis that personal empowerment affected perceptions of fairness differently based upon this characteristic of the married women’s nation of residence. While living in a post-socialist nation is predicted to lead to a decreased likelihood of reporting that the division of labor is very fair, net of the effects of all other predictors, the effect of personal empowerment does not differ for married women in post-socialist nations as compared to women in continuously capitalist nations.

The lack of support for this hypothesis suggests that increased empowerment for individual women leads to an increased sense of entitlement to equality at home, regardless of the ideology/political history of the nation of residence. The historical intersection between capitalism and patriarchy is no more powerful than patriarchy alone in the effects on married women’s sense of expectation for shared labor at home. Once women move into situations where they see themselves as equals outside of the home (either via employment, education, or income) they expect to be treated as equals inside the home. Living in a nation where capitalism has not been the only economic system women and men have known in their lifetimes has no effect on the effect of women’s empowerment. However, this hypothesis did not test for an interaction between individual empowerment and nation’s political history while controlling for other national characteristics. This results of this test are described below under the evaluation of Hypothesis 6.
Hypothesis 5: Married women with higher levels of power and prestige will be more likely to respond that the division of household labor is unfair if they live in a nation where women overall have higher levels of power and prestige.

I argued that the individual measures of empowerment of full-time employment, having achieved secondary or post-secondary levels of education and relative income would affect perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor differently based upon the level of women’s power and prestige in a nation. As shown in Model 2 of Table 13 and described in Chapter Six, there is a statistically significant relationship between the nation’s Gender Empowerment Measure and the variables measuring married women’s employment status, educational attainment, and relative income as they affect married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. However, relative income is the only individual variable with which there is a statistically significant relationship. Therefore, there is only marginal support for Hypothesis 5.

Relative income is measured as relative to all other ISJP participants in the woman’s nation of residence, and is group-mean centered. As a result, this finding tells us about the effect of married women’s increased income relative to others in her nation on perceptions of fairness as affected by women’s overall empowerment. As shown in Figure 3, married women living in low GEM nations with low relative incomes are twice as likely to report that they have a very fair division of labor as are women with high relative incomes. However, this effect is not as strong for married women living in high GEM nations. Married women who have low relative incomes living in nations where women overall have low levels of power are more likely to say that their division of labor
is very fair, potentially because they have internalized the expectations of their nation where women are supposed to do the household work. Married women feel that their division of labor is very fair because they live in a context where women overall do not have a great deal of power.

All of the nations in the ISJP were capitalist at the time of the survey. Therefore, there is a possibility of a shift toward the notion that income is equivalent to power, and individuals with power should be able to “buy out” of unpleasant tasks, such as household labor. Married women in low GEM nations with low relative incomes may perceive that since they have low incomes, their contribution to the household is to perform the household labor, and as a result perceive the division of labor as very fair. However, married women with relatively high incomes as compared to others (including men) in low GEM nations are more likely to report that the division of labor is very fair than to report some unfairness. These women may be comparing themselves to other “empowered” women, of whom overall there are few, and believe that their division of labor is very fair. Married women with relatively high incomes who live in high GEM nations are the least likely to report that their division of labor is very fair, but they are still more likely to report the division of labor is very fair than to report some unfairness. Again, this may be a function of those women comparing themselves to other “empowered” women rather than to their husbands. This is particularly interesting in that I expected women to compare themselves to the generalized other woman, and in nations where women have more power, empowered married women to expect fair treatment. The finding that married women with relatively high incomes who live in high GEM
nations are the least likely to report that their division of labor is very fair provides a modicum of support for my expectation.

*Hypothesis 6: Married women with higher levels of power and prestige will be more likely to respond that the division of household labor is unfair if they live in a capitalist nation where women overall have higher levels of power and prestige.*

The theoretical considerations and empirical research summarized in Chapter Two suggested that the historical intersection of capitalism and patriarchy would lead married women in a continuously capitalist nation to be less likely to report unfairness than women who have experience with state-sanctioned social justice as a priority. Married women who have lived in a previously-socialist state would be more likely to report what they perceive to be an unfair division of labor. However, this relationship may have been less pronounced for married women who had achieved individual power and prestige in a capitalist nation. I hypothesized that the differential effect of an individual woman’s power and prestige based upon women’s overall empowerment in a nation would differ based upon the nation’s political history.

Table 14 as a whole tests this hypothesis in pieces. The actual test of Hypothesis 6 is in Table 14, Model 3. There is not a statistically significant three-way interaction among married women’s individual empowerment and the interaction of a nation’s Gender Empowerment Measure and political history, meaning there is not support for Hypothesis 6 as written. However, there is a statistically significant interaction between the effects of a nation’s Gender Empowerment Measure and political history on married
women’s perceptions of fairness, as is shown in Model 2 of Table 14 and graphically represented in Figure 4. Additionally, the effects of married women’s individual-level empowerment on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor do differ based upon both the nation’s political history and Gender Empowerment Measure.

Married women living in a low GEM post-socialist nation were predicted to be much less likely to report that their division of labor was very fair than to report some unfairness. Further, married women living in a high GEM post-socialist nation were predicted to be the most likely to report that their division of labor was very fair. Both of these findings are logical thinking about the earlier predictions. First, married women in post-socialist nations were expected to be less likely to report a very fair division of labor if the labor was unequally divided, as they were predicted to be used to equal treatment and would be likely to note unequal treatment. Therefore, married women living in nations where women overall have low power but where the nation was once socialist expect that they will be treated fairly and will report unfairness if they see it. Similarly, married women living in post-socialist nations where women do have a lot of power are likely to have higher standards and are likely to report a very fair division of labor because they compare themselves to other similar women and recognize whether they are treated as equals.

As noted above, the effects of married women’s individual-level empowerment on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor do differ based upon both the nation’s political history and the Gender Empowerment Measure. Married women living in a post-socialist nation have approximately the same likelihood of reporting a very fair
division of labor regardless of their employment status, whereas full-time employed women living in a continuously capitalist nation are less likely to report that their division of labor is very fair. This difference is a result of the differing expectations of fair treatment in post-socialist nations. Married women in post-socialist nations have the expectation of being treated fairly regardless of other personal characteristics, so they are just as likely to report unfairness when employed full-time or employed less than full-time.

The effects of educational attainment and relative income in post-socialist nations are also predicted to be different than in continuously capitalist nations. Having a post-secondary level of education as compared to less than secondary level has more of an effect on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor in post-socialist nations than in continuously capitalist nations, such that women in post-socialist nations are less likely to report a very fair division of labor. Living in a post-socialist nation changes the direction of the effect of having a secondary level of education (as compared to less than secondary level) such that women living in post-socialist nations were more likely to report a very fair division of labor. Why the differences in the effects based upon political history?

Increased education is predicted to lead to a decreased likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor except for married women living in post-socialist nations who have secondary levels of education. In all other cases, education is seen as providing women with additional information upon which to base their fairness decisions, including access to alternative ideologies. However, in the case of married women with secondary
levels of education living in post-socialist nations, having access to these alternative ideologies does not decrease the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor, but instead increases it. I can only speculate that married women in post-socialist nations who have earned secondary levels of education believe that they are receiving equal treatment at home because they have received equal access to education outside of the home as compared to women with less than secondary levels of education, a kind of spill-over effect. Married women with the highest levels of education are less likely than those with the lowest in post-socialist nations to report a very fair division of labor because they have been exposed to ideologies reinforcing the importance of equal treatment in and out of the home.

The effect of relative income is stronger in post-socialist nations than in continuously capitalist nations, such that married women with the highest relative incomes are least likely to report a very fair division of labor if they live in a post-socialist nation, net of the effects of all other predictors. This could be the result of the women being able to negotiate a less equitable division of labor in their favor, and realizing that they have created an unfair division of labor. The question for the dependent variable did not ask whether the division of labor was very fair for them, only whether the division of labor was very fair.

There was also a statistically significant interaction between the nation’s Gender Empowerment Measure and the individual empowerment measures in their effects on married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. Figure 5 depicts the relationship between GEM and married women’s employment status as they
affect perceptions of fairness. Full-time employed women in high GEM nations are more likely to report that their division of labor is very fair than are women in low GEM nations (relative to women working part-time or less). I suspect that married women employed part-time or less in high GEM nations notice that women overall have achieved some success and power across the nation. Those women are comparing themselves to the generalized other woman and notice that even though they may not have great levels of power, they feel they deserve to be treated as equals. As a result they are less likely to report that their division of labor is very fair as compared to women employed full-time in the high GEM nations because they feel that they are not being treated as equals. Married women employed less than full-time in low GEM nations could then be comparing themselves to the average woman and feel that they are being treated about right, and are only slightly less likely than are full-time employed women to report that their division of labor is very fair.

Figure 6 depicts the effects of married women’s educational attainment on perceptions of fairness as they differ by the nation’s Gender Empowerment Measure. In comparison to women with less than secondary levels of education, the effects of having a post-secondary level of education differ very little based upon the GEM of the women’s nation of residence. However, married women with secondary levels of education are more likely than are women with less than secondary levels of education to report that their division of labor is very fair, and this relationship becomes stronger as GEM increases. Why the dramatic difference between married women with secondary and post-secondary levels of education? As noted above in discussing the differential effects
of educational attainment based on nation’s political history, married women with increased education will have been exposed to alternative ideologies, and will be more likely to report that their division of labor is unfair. However, married women with secondary levels of education in low GEM nations are more likely to report unfairness in their division of labor than are married women in high GEM nations. While the married women in high GEM nations are as likely to have been exposed to alternative ideologies, they are more likely to be in positions of power in their nation (as they are in a high GEM nation). As a result, they may have been able to negotiate a more fair division of labor and are reporting as such.

Figure 7 depicts the effects of relative income on perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor based upon nation’s Gender Empowerment Measure. As relative income increases, married women are less likely to report that their division of labor is very fair, and this relationship is stronger for married women in low GEM nations than in high GEM nations. As married women earn more income (relative to others in their nation), they are increasingly likely to report unfairness in their division of labor. Married women in low GEM nations with high relative income are among the few women in relative power within their nation. As a result, they are more likely to report unfairness than are women with similar relative incomes in high GEM nations because they have fewer women with whom to compare themselves and are thus likely to compare themselves to men. If they compare themselves to men (Coltrane 1990; Gager 1998; Hawkins, Marshall and Meiners 1995; Thompson 1991), married women are much more likely to report unfairness in the division of household labor.
7.3 Other Notable Findings

Previous research suggested that there would be an interaction between ideology and reported division of labor in their effects on perceptions of fairness of that division of labor (Blair and Johnson 1992; DeMaris and Longmore 1996; Greenstein 1996; John, Shelton and Luschen 1995; Piña and Bengtson 1993; Sanchez and Kane 1996). As shown in Table 7, Model 2 and described in detail in Tables 8 and 9, there was a statistically significant interaction between ideology and reported division of labor. The effect of ideology on the likelihood of married women reporting that their division of labor is very fair differed by the reported division of labor. There is a pattern to the changed effect of ideology based upon the distribution of resources (in this case, time available to spend on activities other than housework). This can be seen by ranking ideology along a continuum, such as in Figure 1. Having an egalitarian ideology would be on the left side of the continuum, similar to holding the belief that all resources should be distributed according to strict equality. Having an individualistic ideology would be to the right of the middle on the continuum, meaning holding a belief that resources should be distributed based upon individual results. Having an ascriptive ideology would be at the right side of the continuum, as noted by holding the belief that resources should be distributed based upon differential ascribed characteristics. Having a fatalistic ideology could be placed on this continuum off to the right of ascription, as fatalists believe that resources will be distributed as they currently are because individuals have no way to make change.

Married women confronted with a distribution of resources must compare that
distribution to what they would expect based upon their ideology and decide whether that distribution is fair. As Table 8 shows, egalitarian women with an unequal division of labor are more likely to report that their division of labor is very fair than are individualistic women, although the difference is substantial when examining the effect of an egalitarian ideology when the husband is reported to perform the majority of household labor. Egalitarian women are less likely than are individualistic women to report that their division of labor is very fair if they report an equal division of labor. This may be a result of high expectations that egalitarian women have for their husbands. Individualistic women may be more likely to report that their equal division of labor is very fair because they did not expect to have an equal division of labor; they expected each person to do the amount of labor to balance their amount of input. Therefore, they are more likely to report an equal division of labor as very fair as compared to fair. Egalitarian women are more likely to report that their equal division of labor is fair as compared to very fair simply because they expect that they will have an equal division of labor.

Ascriptive women are less likely than individualistic women to report that their division of labor is very fair unless they are performing the majority of the household work. This finding fits with the belief systems as ascriptive women are more likely to believe they should be doing the household labor than are individualistic women.

Fatalistic women are less likely than individualistic women to report that their division of labor is very fair unless their husbands perform the majority of the housework. As fatalistic women feel that they cannot change the local situation, and while it may not
be fair, it doesn’t matter, it is logical they are less likely than are individualistic women to believe their division of labor is very fair if their situation is more like the status quo. However, if their distribution of resources is different from the status quo, in this case that the husband performs the majority of the household labor, they are more likely than are individualistic women to report that their division of labor is very fair rather than simply fairly divided.

Why would fatalistic women whose husbands perform the majority of the household labor be more likely than individualistic women to report that their division of labor is very fair? Having their husbands perform the majority of the household labor is definitely not the status quo. Fatalistic women may see this as evidence that either the status quo can be changed (thus this is a challenge to their belief system) or that the outside world is so out of control that they are willing to report that their husbands perform the majority of the household labor so their household also fits with their belief that a person cannot change anything. They are willing to say that the division of labor is very fair because they have no expectation of it being anything else, since there is no rhyme or reason to changing it. Fatalistic women are just as likely as ascriptive women to report that their husbands perform the majority of the household labor, more likely than are individualistic women and less likely than are egalitarian women. Therefore, the explanation for this finding is not based on the distribution of the data. I am unwilling to go beyond my speculations above to provide an explanation.

Previous research also found that married women with increased levels of personal empowerment were more likely to perceive inequality in the division of labor as
inequity (e.g., Baxter 2000; Piña and Bengtson 1993; Demo and Acock 1993; Greenstein 1996; Kiger and Riley 1996; although there is considerable variation in previous findings - see Chapter Two). Models 2 and 3 in Table 10 tested whether this empirical finding would exist in a cross-national sample (Model 2) and once nation-level predictors of perceptions of fairness were controlled. Model 3 of Table 10 shows that there is a statistically significant interaction between reported division of labor and individual married women’s empowerment. Table 11 shows the effects of married women’s empowerment on their perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor conditional upon the division of labor. Indeed, employed women who performed the majority of the household labor were less likely to report that their division of labor was very fair as compared to women not in the labor force. Women with more than primary level education who performed the majority of the household labor were less likely to report that their division of labor was very fair as compared to women with only a primary level of education. Women with increased relative income who reported performing the majority of the household labor were less likely to report a very fair division of labor.

The differences in effects of personal empowerment by division of labor are interesting. Employed women are more likely than are non-employed women to report that their division of labor is very fair if it is equal; however, an unequal division of labor leads to an increased likelihood of reporting that the division of labor is simply fair. This shows support for the idea that employed women see paid and unpaid work as work, and under the exchange theory, that if they do more housework than their husband (and they
are employed) they see it as unfair. If they are employed and their husband does more household labor than they do, they see it as unfair. Equal input is the only way they will see this as very fair.

Increased levels of education are predicted to lead to a decreased likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor as compared to having a primary level of education unless the husband performs the majority of the housework. Increased education could mean increased exposure to alternative ideologies, as was argued in Chapter Three. As a result, women with increased education may perceive that they are being treated unfairly by their husbands if their husbands are not doing their fair share around the house. However, increased education is still predicted to decrease the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor even when the labor is equally divided. Having a secondary level of education and an equal division of labor is most similar to primary education. However, having mid-range and post-secondary are still 10-15% less likely to report having a very fair division of labor when the labor is equally divided. One explanation for this is that women with mid-range and post-secondary levels of education are employed at kinds of jobs that lead them to feel entitled to a smaller share of the household labor, as compared to their husbands. For example, some recent research in the United States has found that some women with high levels of education are like “superstar” spouses, that they have become the primary breadwinner (Raley et al. 2003). It is reasonable to believe that these women would expect that their husbands will do the majority of the household labor in return. Other empirical evidence has shown that these women with high relative incomes do more household labor than do their husbands to
protect the gender identity of their husbands (Greenstein 2000). However, this does not mean that the women will see this division of labor as very fair.

As a control variable, I included the measure asking how often respondents felt they were treated unfairly because they were women. I wanted to have a “pure” measure of perceptions of fairness. It is possible that without this measure the analyses would confound married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor with their perception of being treated unfairly because they were women, as they connected housework with being female. Indeed, there is evidence that there is a relationship between believing that one is being treated unfairly solely because they are female and that their division of labor is unfair. The more frequently that women believe they are treated unfairly because they are women, the less likely they are to report that their division of labor is very fair. Why does this relationship exist, particularly since it seems to exist beyond the effects of personal ideology?

It seems that justice ideology as was measured here did not capture the effects of gender discrimination in the home. The women did not see gender discrimination in the home manifested as the division of household labor as part of social justice. This could be an example of the influence of patriarchy and capitalism in intertwining the gendered nature of housework with notions of what is natural, right, and fair. Therefore, being treated unfairly because of one’s sex is seen as something that happens outside of the home, either as a potential employee or as a consumer. However, the more frequently women perceive they have been treated unfairly because they are women, the less likely they are to report that their division of household labor is very fair. They may have
become more sensitized to the notion of gender discrimination as a result of their frequent encounters. This leads to an evaluation of the Contextual Distributive Justice Theory.

7.4 Evaluation of Contextual Distributive Justice Theory

I described the Contextual Distributive Justice Theory in Chapter Three. In this theory, I posited that personal ideologies directly affect perceptions of fairness. I also argue that personal ideologies were constructed via the self-evaluation process at the intersection of the nation’s dominant ideology and the institutional reflection and reinforcement of the dominant ideology. Personal ideologies were likely to be congruent with the dominant ideology unless individuals encountered alternative ideologies and situations that called the dominant ideology into question.

Contextual Distributive Justice Theory predicts that the more people have internalized the dominant ideology’s specification of status for someone like them, the less likely they will be to perceive inequalities in social interactions as inequities. The process through which the personal ideology is constructed and the resulting expectations of rewards and determinations of fairness are expected to be the same regardless of the social context.

How much of this theory was I able to test using the ISJP data? In reality, very little of the theory was able to be examined empirically with these data. The measure of national political history was a proxy for dominant ideology, while the Gender Empowerment Measure was a measure of the institutional structure. Educational attainment is a proxy measure for frequency of contact with alternative ideologies. The
theory predicted that the self-evaluation process, reflecting upon the dominant ideology and resulting institutional structure, would be modified by frequency of contact with alternative ideologies and proportion of experiences not easily explained by the dominant ideology. I was able to examine the effects of ideology on perceptions of fairness as described in the theory, and found no support for this proposition. However, this does not necessarily imply that the theory of Contextual Distributive Justice has been disconfirmed. There is some evidence that the theory’s causal mechanisms do operate as suggested, as there are contextual differences in perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor that would have been predicted by the theory. These contextual effects are described below.

As noted above, there were direct effects of married women’s educational attainment on perceptions of fairness. Further, the more frequently women perceive they have been treated unfairly because they are women, the less likely they are to report that their division of labor is very fair. These individual-level characteristics were posited to alter the self-evaluation process and indirectly affect perceptions of fairness via personal ideology. However, the theory did not specify that the characteristics would not also directly affect perceptions of fairness. Indeed, these findings suggest better specification of future models to determine whether frequency of contact with alternative ideologies and proportion of experiences not easily explained by the dominant ideology have both direct and indirect effects on perceptions of fairness. This and other suggestions for future research are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight.
7.5 Placing the Findings in Sociological Context

The purpose of this research was to answer the question of whether context matters in the construction of married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. I wanted to examine the predictability of the distributive justice theory once women from many differing nations were included in the analysis. I also wanted to see whether the empirical findings regarding married women’s individual-level empowerment, ideology, and the division of household labor would be found once women from many nations were included in the analysis.

The findings presented in Chapter Six and discussed above suggest that context does matter in understanding married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. While many of the individual-level predictors found in research based solely in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia were found to be statistically significant predictors in this cross-national sample, there was still considerable variation across nations in average perceptions of fairness. Further, the variance component increased once the individual-level predictors were included in the model (compare Models 1 and 2 in Table 6). This suggests that there are contextual differences in married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor once individual differences are controlled. What is it about context that matters? Political history and the overall empowerment of women in a nation both matter, and matter in conjunction with one another. Additionally, the effects of married women’s individual-level measures of empowerment differ based upon context, such that they have different effects in differing kinds of nations.
Theories regarding married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor have been predicated on the fact that most of the empirical research has occurred in capitalist nations. Distributive justice theory has noted that individuals make justice decisions based upon what is considered a valued outcome, the justifications necessary for making sense of the outcome, and the comparison referents against whom the resources are compared. Ideology leads individuals to determine what is valued, the justification for appropriate outcomes, and who will be considered a comparison referent. I have shown that political history, my proxy for national ideology, does have an effect on perceptions of fairness, perhaps because it led women to have differing ideologies (and thus have different valued outcomes, justifications and comparison referents). I did not explicitly test for an interaction between individual justice ideology and national history. However, the lack of a direct effect of justice ideology may be a function of poor measurement, as I discuss in the next chapter.

The findings discussed here suggest that context has an indirect effect on married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor, although the indirect effect operates via two mechanisms. The first mechanism is described above. Women living in contexts where the overall ideology within their living history has focused on equal treatment for all, even when empirically that may not have been the experience, have different perceptions of fairness than those whose national history has focused on individualism. The national ideology itself does not actually affect married women’s perceptions of fairness; it does, however, increase the likelihood (via the process described in Chapter Three) that women will come to expect equal treatment and thus be
more inclined to report unfairness.

The second mechanism is through women’s empowerment. Women living in nations where women overall have more power are more likely to report that their division of labor is very fair than to report that the division of labor is only fair. While the effect of living in a nation where women have achieved access to more power may directly affect married women’s perceptions of fairness, I believe that the effect is more indirect. Individual women may be included in the aggregate calculation of empowerment; however, the likelihood is greater that they are affected by the empowerment either via their own position in their society or the change in the society created by having women empowered. Living in a nation where women have greater power affects women’s perspectives on and expectations from their society. As Della Fave (1980) notes, the distribution of resources in a society (along a stratified continuum) leads to routinized relationships between individuals based upon the distribution of resources. Those routinized relationships lead to internalized expectations of the self and others, but particularly a self-evaluation relative to one’s position in their society.

The routinized relationships in a nation where women have power will lead to individual women expecting equal (or more equal) treatment, particularly as compared to women living in nations where women overall have lower levels of empowerment. These differing self-evaluations would be the result of social context. As the self-evaluations would influence the creation of personal ideology and as such affect perceptions of fairness, as documented in Chapter Three, social context as measured by women’s overall empowerment (here the Gender Empowerment Measure) would indirectly affect married
women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor.

Interestingly, the effect of one mechanism is enhanced by the other. There was a statistically significant interaction between the effect of living in a post-socialist nation and the effect of women’s overall empowerment on perceptions of fairness. As described in Chapter Six and shown in Figure 4, the likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor is lowest for women living in a low GEM, post-socialist nation and highest for women living in a high GEM, post-socialist nation. Context seems to matter in that it both creates a differing dominant ideology as well as set of generalized comparison referents against whom women (and possibly men) compare themselves. These findings suggest that women in all of these nations continue to compare themselves to other women in making justice determinations. This can be more clearly seen in the case of women living in high GEM, post-socialist nations. Women living in those nations have the greatest average likelihood of reporting a very fair division of labor. They are probably comparing themselves to the generalized other woman (who has power and expects to be treated equally) and realize that they have a very fair division of labor. At least they are not expected to do all of their share of the domestic work and hold powerful positions in the nation as well. The women in low GEM, post-socialist nations, who are the least likely to report a very fair division of labor, realize that all women are similarly situated regarding access to power. Therefore, as they expect equal treatment in comparison to the generalized other, they are more likely to consider similarly situated others to include men, particularly their spouses. In this case, they have a greater chance of considering their division of labor as less than very fair, as noted above, women who
compare themselves to their husbands are more likely to report unfairness in their division of labor than if they continue to compare themselves with other women.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the findings from the analyses in Chapter Six and placed them into sociological context. The processes through which women determine whether their division of household labor is very fair are similar across national contexts, although there are some important differences. I have examined both the process and the nation-level characteristics that lead to contextual differences. Further, I have provided tentative explanations for the empirical findings not predicted by previous theory and research.

The final chapter extends the findings and sociological explanations as suggestions for guiding future research, including ways to correct methodological and theoretical limitations.
CHAPTER EIGHT
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

The last chapter provided possible explanations for the findings described in Chapter Six. I placed those findings in sociological context, including their usefulness in testing the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice. In this chapter, I first provide a short summary of my findings and conclusions. I then discuss the limitations of this study of married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor, focusing both on the application of the theory and the methodological shortcomings. I follow then with a discussion of the implications of this research for sociological theory building and empirical research. Finally, I provide a general conclusion to this research with my vision for future research on similar subject matter.

8.2 General Summary of Findings

As noted in Chapter Seven, national context does matter in predicting married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor. There are statistically significant differences in married women’s average perception of fairness of the division of household labor based on their nation of residence. Context indirectly affects married women’s perceptions of fairness through national ideology and women’s overall empowerment. Further, married women’s individual measures of empowerment affect their perceptions of fairness differently based upon the overall empowerment of
However, I did not find support for all of my hypotheses. There was not a statistically significant interaction between justice ideology and employment status as they affected perceptions of fairness. The effect of personal empowerment does not differ for married women in post-socialist nations as compared to women in continuously capitalist nations. Living in a nation where women overall have greater power and prestige increases rather than decreases the likelihood married women will report that their division of labor is very fair. My analyses show that the process of constructing perceptions of fairness becomes increasingly complex as we take into consideration context.

8.3 Limitations

The main methodological limitations to this research are measurement related. The first limitation is not having measures of all of the variables posited by the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice or that have been found to be predictors of married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor in previous research. I did not have measures of proportions of experiences not explained by the dominant ideology, nor did I have measures of the extent of justification necessary to explain those experiences. Taking into consideration that my measure of personal ideology was an absolute measure of justice ideology rather than a measure of the extent to which the women had ideologies similar to the dominant ideology of their nation, I was not actually measuring ideology as it was described in the theory. As the reference
category for nation’s political history was capitalist and the reference category for justice ideology was individualist, the value for the intercept is the value for someone whose personal ideology was approximately the same as the dominant ideology, at least in one possible combination, when both sets of variables were included in the models. However, with the available measures, I was unable to construct a better test of the theory. To perform a comprehensive test of the theory, an alternative construction of the personal ideology measure would have been required. This alternative construction would be nation-specific, as individual ideology would be included as a continuum measuring the extent to which it corresponded to the dominant ideology of the nation.

Additionally, I presumed both in the construction of the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice and my corresponding inclusion of the Gender Empowerment Measure as a measure of the extent to which the institutional structure reflects the dominant ideology that women use other women as comparison referents. Previous theoretical and empirical work (noted in Chapters Two and Three) suggest that knowledge of the individuals to whom people compare themselves is crucial to determining how fair they think their share of the outcome is. To really know whether the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice works the way I suggest it does, I need to know who individuals see as similarly situated others and to whom they compare themselves in a variety of situations and experiences.

Other predictor variables noted in previous research were not included in these analyses for a variety of reasons. Occupational prestige of both spouses was not included, as there was a great deal of missing data for many of the married women and/or their
husbands on the occupational prestige variables. In fact, very little information about the
spouses was included because the ISJP was an individual-respondent based survey, rather
than couple- or household-based.

While I argue below that I do not believe the measurement of the division of
household labor variable was problematic in this research, some kind of measure of the
type of tasks each spouse performed would have been desirable. An important factor in
married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor is husband’s
contributions to “female” tasks (Blair and Johnson 1992; DeMaris and Longmore 1996;
John, Shelton and Luschen 1995; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Perry-Jenkins and Folk
1994). Men’s lower levels of participation in household labor are associated with women
perceiving more unfairness in the division of household labor (Blair and Johnson 1992;
Dancer and Gilbert 1993; Greenstein 1996; Sanchez 1994). This is especially true when
men contribute little to the routine tasks of cooking, cleaning and washing (Baxter 2000;
Baxter and Western 1998; DeMaris and Longmore 1996; John, Shelton, and Luschen
1995; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Perry-Jenkins and Folk 1994; Robinson and Spitze
1992). I can only presume these were the kinds of tasks the women in my sample thought
about when reporting both the division of household labor and their perceptions of
fairness.

The second limitation is the lack of good measurement of many of the variables I
included in the analyses. While the question for the dependent variable asked how fair
the division of labor was, it did not ask whether the division of labor was fair for the
respondent. Therefore, as I noted in Chapter Seven, some of the unanticipated findings
may actually be a function of the women perceiving that the division of labor was unfair for their husbands. Future research using the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice should incorporate measures of perception of over-reward and under-reward. As noted in Chapter Three, these components of the determination of fairness do differ in their effect based upon personal ideology. Including measures of individuals’ perceived expected outcome as well as their perceptions of fairness of the outcome could add greatly to our understanding on the distributive justice process.

Additionally, I constructed the measures for justice ideology based upon previous research that focused on economic justice issues (Davidson, Steinmann, and Wegener 1995; Wegener and Liebig 1993, 2000) rather than using a justice index score (Jasso 2000). The measures for justice ideology included several measures of beliefs about social justice, but excluded many similar measures included in the questionnaire. It is possible that alternative constructions of justice ideology may be more valid measures that capture a greater portion of the content of beliefs about justice. In future research using these data I anticipate constructing several measures of justice ideology beyond the ones used in these analyses to determine whether the way the construction of the justice ideology measures affects the analyses.

Finally, as discussed in Chapter Seven, it is possible that not finding a direct effect of a nation’s sex ratio on the perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor could be because an age-specific sex ratio was not used. Future research should include the sex ratio of a nation’s residents aged 15-64. To do so will more clearly examine whether the process suggested by this measure of women’s empowerment (Guttentag and
8.4 Implications for Theory and Research

The above limitations notwithstanding, the present research has important implications for future research. First, this research shows that we need greater international cooperation for multi-national research on family issues. The International Social Justice Project developed in response to a momentous change in the political and economic systems of several nations at approximately the same time. The focus of the project was on social justice (based on economic issues) and luckily, a few questions about family justice (and process) were included. As nations become more dependent on one another for economic development via open trade, social scientists cannot ignore the effects of globalization on individuals, families, households, and communities all over the world. Therefore, we must work to gather more data similar in form to the ISJP from many nations on a continuous basis.

My second suggestion builds on the above suggestion. We need to design questionnaires to be implemented in many nations with the goal of trying to understand family processes. As Milardo (2000) recently noted, research on families needs to include more about “the internal character of relationships, not only in terms of the psychological character of participants, but also in terms of what they actually do with one another (p. 874).” This is connected to another frequent concern regarding research on families, namely that we are trying to understand family processes with research designs that do not seriously consider the issue of determining the appropriate unit(s) of
analysis (Greenstein 2001). In order to see more clearly the effects of political history and women’s empowerment in a nation on family processes, researchers need to talk with more than one family member within the household.

Additionally, as I allude to in Chapter Three, the effects of dominant ideology are not static, nor is the construction of personal ideology. As such, longitudinal research must be performed examining the effects of the dominant ideology on perceptions of fairness, including the possibility of reduction of the effect over time on individuals and a generational effect. We have seen this generational effect in the United States, with the cohort who came of age during World War 2 being touted as the “best generation,” those who became the most engaged in civic and community organizations and against whom future generations’ voluntary participation are measured (Putnam 2000), and with the “Civil Rights Movement Generation” among African-Americans in the United States. Certainly there could be a similar generational effect for married women living in post-socialist nations who lived through socialism as compared to those who vaguely remember socialism from their childhoods, or have only heard about it from their parents.

A more appropriate way of testing the theory presented in Chapter Three would be to combine the two statistical techniques of multi-level modeling and structural equation modeling. As the theory notes, the self-evaluation process is predicted to create personal ideology, which is then predicted to affect perceptions of fairness. In order to model the specified causal relationships of both processes simultaneously, structural equation modeling would be the appropriate statistical technique. Structural equation modeling can incorporate some of the benefits of multi-level modeling, including controlling for
correlated error terms based upon the nesting of the data. Indeed, one of the recent developments in multi-level modeling is to blend with structural equation modeling, including modeling where some of the indicators are not continuous variables (Heck 2001; Kaplan and Elliott 1997; Kaplan and Kreisman 2000). This kind of model would more precisely test the propositions of the Contextual Distributive Justice Theory.

The literature predicted that there would be an effect of the division of labor, such that if the division was unbalanced in favor of husbands, wives would be more likely to report an unfair division of labor, particularly if wives held a more egalitarian ideology (Greenstein 1996; Piña and Bengtson 1993). This previous research was based on actual amounts of housework performed (either in absolute hours or relative to their spouse) rather than the respondents’ perceptions of the amount of housework done. We have performed our previous research based on the belief that married women know how much housework they perform relative to their husbands and report their sense of fairness as a result. That relative amount is exactly what was reported in the measures used in these analyses, rather than the actual number of hours of housework performed. This is important, as some readers may feel that the measure used was too imprecise, particularly because all types of household work were lumped together. When discussing perceptions of fairness, the amount of housework spouses feel they perform relative to one another is as important as the actual division of labor. That perception is correlated with the actual number of hours but may be a more reliable estimate of the division of labor in general.

Future cross-national research should include measures of the division of household labor based on the actual number of hours of housework performed by both
spouses as well as women’s perceptions of the division of labor. These additional measures will provide more insight into whether married women use the actual division of household labor (measured in hours) or the relative amount they believe they perform as the material conditions upon which they base their sense of fairness.

This research has focused on married heterosexual women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor using a cross-national sample. Future research should not only take into consideration the limitations and corresponding suggestions in examining these women’s perceptions of fairness. Indeed, additional tests of the Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice would examine the perceptions of fairness of married heterosexual men as well as heterosexual and same-sex partners in non-marital long-term relationships.

8.5 Overall Conclusions

This research has provided one example of how researchers in the United States can join other social scientists around the world in extending our theoretical and empirical descriptions of family processes. This research, along with much other published research, shows that our theories have not been value free or neutral, but based instead on the historical development of the social context within which the theories were developed (Sprague 1997). Researchers and theorists need to begin thinking more broadly about human social behavior and how we try to explain the behavior with our theories. Further, we need to begin testing our current theories cross-nationally to determine contingencies under which the theories are more predictive than in others. We
can create stronger theories and have greater faith in our research if we move beyond our current knowledge. Political and economic histories that have differed by nation will not only help us understand how justice ideologies differ in their current incarnations but also in how they developed over time.

This research has found that married women’s perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor are based at least in part on personal ideology, which leads them to make decisions about to whom they compare themselves and what kind of situation they believe is fair. Personal characteristics affect perceptions of fairness differently based upon national context. However, married women on average are more likely to report some unfairness in their division of labor than to report it as very fair. This research also suggests ways in which individual women can become empowered as well as places where national structure can be changed in order to create a situation where individual women feel they are treated fairly.

We are at the cusp of a revolution in social research on families and family processes. As the social and academic worlds become increasingly smaller with the use of technology such as the internet, the pace at which we are doing science has increased remarkably. More comparative, exploratory, and descriptive research is bound to occur, quickly informing scientists all over the world of similarities and differences across families in different contexts. It is exciting for young sociologists to be a part of this rapid exchange of knowledge. If more data collection projects like the ISJP are funded and greater cross-national theoretical developments occur, there likely will be a proliferation of theoretical work focusing on elaborating current theories to take into
consideration contextual differences. Further, I expect that more theoretical integration
similar to that presented in Chapter Three will develop as theories will be needed to take
context into consideration. This will allow researchers to learn more about those
processes that are ubiquitous social processes, those which are similar but do differ
moderately across contexts, and those which differ substantially across contexts. For
instance, we can gain insight into whether and how other processes, like justice
evaluation process, are general and/or contextual.
REFERENCES


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-------. (Forthcoming). “Interactive Effects of Gender Ideology and Age at First Marriage on Women’s Marital Disruption.” Journal of Family Issues.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Ages</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Completion/Response Rate</th>
<th>Cases</th>
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</tr>
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<td>82.7/--</td>
<td>1181</td>
</tr>
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<td>German</td>
<td>Household</td>
<td>18+</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>62.5/70.7</td>
<td>1019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>German</td>
<td>Household</td>
<td>18+</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
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<td>1837</td>
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<td>Estonia, Russian</td>
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<td>93.2/--</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<td>English</td>
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<td>1319</td>
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<td>Hungarian</td>
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<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>74.1/--</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
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<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>51.8/--</td>
<td>777</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
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<td>18+</td>
<td>Computer self-administered</td>
<td>66.1/70.2</td>
<td>1783</td>
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<td>1542</td>
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<td>Russian</td>
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<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>76.3/--</td>
<td>1734</td>
</tr>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Slovene</td>
<td>List of inhabitants</td>
<td>18+</td>
<td>Face-to-face</td>
<td>91.1/95.0</td>
<td>1375</td>
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<td>RDD Telephone</td>
<td>18+</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>68.1/71.7</td>
<td>1414</td>
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*Data from Table A.1. in Kluegel, Mason, and Wegener (1995).
Table 2. Distribution of Respondent’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor by Nation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Very Fair</th>
<th>Somewhat Fair</th>
<th>Somewhat Unfair</th>
<th>Very Unfair</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Bulgaria (N=398)</td>
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<td>47.5%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia (N=342)</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
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<td>4.7%</td>
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<td>East Germany (N=292)</td>
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<td>36.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
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<td>West Germany (N=345)</td>
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<td>43.8%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (N=238)</td>
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<td>17.2%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
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<td>Great Britain (N=340)</td>
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<td>10.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (N=275)</td>
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<td>37.4%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (N=234)</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands (N=510)</td>
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<td>43.4%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland (N=419)</td>
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<td>7.6%</td>
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<td>Russia (N=381)</td>
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<td>6.0%</td>
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<td>Slovenia (N=436)</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States (N=371)</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for all Individual-Level Predictor Variables - ISJP Married Women (N=4581)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ Characteristics</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>43.73 (13.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed Full-time</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed Part-time</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in the Labor Force</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Income</td>
<td>.66 (.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Range Education</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian Ideology</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascriptive Ideology</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalistic Ideology</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualistic Ideology</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often Perceives Injustice Because of Sex</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes Perceives Injustice Because of Sex</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Perceives Injustice Because of Sex</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Husbands’ Characteristics                     |        |
| Age                                           | 46.40 (13.64) |
| Employed Full-time                            | .73    |
| Employed Part-time                            | .03    |
| Not in the Labor Force                        | .24    |
| Primary Education                             | .15    |
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for all Individual-Level Predictor Variables - ISJP Married Women, continued (N=4581)†

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Range Education</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>.18</td>
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<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>.23</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Household Characteristics**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>3.50 (1.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Relative Income</td>
<td>1.04 (.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife Generally Performs Majority of Housework</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housework Generally Equally Split</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband Generally Performs Majority of Housework</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Table entries are means (standard deviations in parentheses), or for categorical variables, percentages.
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for all Nation-Level Predictor Variables (N=13)<sup>†</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-Socialist Nation (1=yes)</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
<td>106.15 (3.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measure</td>
<td>.528 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Women in Parliament</td>
<td>13.83% (7.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Administrators and Managers who are Women</td>
<td>28.38% (13.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Professional and Technical Jobs held by Women</td>
<td>52.36% (8.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Share of Earned Income</td>
<td>36.32% (4.65)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<sup>†</sup> Table entries are means (standard deviations in parentheses), or for categorical variables, percentages.
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of all Included Predictor Variables by Nation of Residence - ISJP Married Women †

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent’s</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Czecho-slovakia</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>43.20</td>
<td>44.67</td>
<td>43.71</td>
<td>43.43</td>
<td>44.05</td>
<td>45.45</td>
<td>45.65</td>
<td>46.86</td>
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<td>43.79</td>
<td>42.74</td>
<td>42.81</td>
<td>43.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed Full-time</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.41</td>
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<td>.60</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.48</td>
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<td>.09</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed Part-time</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.21</td>
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<td>.35</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not in the Labor Force</td>
<td>.39</td>
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<td>.66</td>
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<td>.50</td>
<td>.51</td>
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<td>.54</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Income</td>
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<td>.62</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.95</td>
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<td>.66</td>
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<tr>
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of all Included Predictor Variables by Nation of Residence - ISJP Married Women, continued †

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† Table entries are means (standard deviations in parentheses), or for categorical variables, percentages.
Table 6. Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor Including Only Individual-Level Variables

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* p<.05, one tailed test
Table 7. Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor Including Nation-level Characteristics

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Respondent’s Characteristics

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Husband’s Characteristics

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Table 7. Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor Including Nation-level Characteristics, continued

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*p<.05, one tailed test
Table 8. Conditional Effects on Log-Odds for Personal Ideology by Division of Household Labor:
Table 7, Model 2*

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<th>Equal Division of Household Labor</th>
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<td>-0.29 (.75)</td>
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* relative to Individualistic Ideology; numbers in parentheses are odds ratios
Table 9. Conditional Effects on Log-Odds for Division of Household Labor by Personal Ideology: Table 7, Model 2*

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*relative to the wife performing the majority of household labor; numbers in parentheses are odds ratios
Table 10. Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor - Baseline Models for Interactions between Individual- and National-levels of Power

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### Table 10. Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor - Baseline Models for Interactions between Individual- and National-levels of Power, continued

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* p<.05, one tailed test
### Table 11. Conditional Effects on Log-Odds for Individual Measures of Empowerment by Division of Household Labor: Table 10, Model 2

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<td>(1.77)</td>
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<td>(.74)</td>
<td>(.85)</td>
<td>(3.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Income</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.90)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(.71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Numbers in parentheses are odds ratios

b Relative to not in the labor force
c Relative to primary education
Table 12. Conditional Effects on Log-Odds for Division of Household Labor by Level of Individual-Empowerment: Table 10, Model 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division of Labor</th>
<th>Respondent Employed Full-time</th>
<th>Respondent Employed Part-time</th>
<th>Respondent Not in Labor Force</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary Education</td>
<td>Mid-Range Education</td>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Division of Labor</td>
<td>2.41 (11.13)</td>
<td>2.53 (12.55)</td>
<td>2.67 (14.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband Performs Majority of Household Labor</td>
<td>-0.09 (.91)</td>
<td>.70 (2.01)</td>
<td>.98 (2.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Calculated using mean relative income; relative to wife performing the majority of household labor; numbers in parentheses are odds ratios
Table 13. Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor - Cross-Level Effects of National Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Effects on Log-Odds</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.57*</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Socialist</td>
<td>-.42*</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measure</td>
<td>3.39*</td>
<td>29.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed Full-time</td>
<td>-.41*</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Socialist</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measure</td>
<td>-.07*</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Socialist</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Level Education</td>
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<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Socialist</td>
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<td>.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary Level Education</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Socialist</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Income</td>
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<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Socialist</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>1.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Empowerment Measure</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes Perceives Injustice because Female</td>
<td>-.34*</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often Perceives Injustice because Female</td>
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<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascriptive Ideology</td>
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<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian Ideology</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalistic Ideology</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.93</td>
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</table>
Table 13. Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Married Women’s Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor - Cross-Level Effects of National Characteristics, continued

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<td>Effects on Log-Odds</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband’s Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed Full-time</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed Part-time</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid-Range Level Education</td>
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<td>1.04</td>
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<td>1.01</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>1.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household Characteristics</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Household Labor Equally Divided</td>
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<td>9.39</td>
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<td>Husband Generally Performs Household Labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of People in Household</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household Relative Income</td>
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<td>.97</td>
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<td>Threshold Parameter (3-4)</td>
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* p<.05, one tailed test
Table 14. Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Married Women's Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor - Interactions between Nation's Political History and Women’s Empowerment

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<td>Effects on Log-Odds</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Effects on Log-Odds</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.55*</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>-.55*</td>
<td>.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
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<td>1.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Socialist</td>
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<td>.64</td>
<td>-2.10*</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-1.93*</td>
<td>.15</td>
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<td>7.85</td>
<td>2.37*</td>
<td>10.70</td>
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<tr>
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<td>22.42</td>
<td>2.79*</td>
<td>16.28</td>
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Respondent’s Characteristics

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<td>Effects on Log-Odds</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Effects on Log-Odds</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
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<td>-.34*</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>-.37*</td>
<td>.69</td>
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<td>.32*</td>
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<td>-.06</td>
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<td>.81</td>
<td>-.21*</td>
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Table 14. Multi-level Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Married Women's Perceptions of Fairness of the Division of Household Labor - Interactions between Nation's Political History and Women's Empowerment, continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Effects on Log-Odds</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes Perceives Injustice because Female</td>
<td>-.33*</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>-.33*</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>-.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.44</td>
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<td>.44</td>
<td>-.82*</td>
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**Husband’s Characteristics**

<table>
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<td>.25*</td>
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<td>.25*</td>
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**Household Characteristics**

<table>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1.68</td>
<td>.52*</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>.51*</td>
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<td>.94</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
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* p<.05, one tailed test
Figure 1. Norms of Distributive Justice*

Figure 2. Conceptual Diagram of Contextual Theory of Distributive Justice
Figure 3. Differential Effects of Personal Relative Income by Nation's Gender Empowerment Measure: Table 13, Model 2
Figure 4. Differential Effects of Nation's Political History by Gender Empowerment Measure: Table 14, Model 2
Figure 5. Differential Effects of Full-time Employment by Gender Empowerment Measure: Table 14, Model 2
Figure 6. Differential Effects of Personal Educational Attainment by Nation's Gender

Empowerment Measure: Table 14, Model 2
Figure 7. Differential Effects of Personal Relative Income by Nation's Gender Empowerment Measure: Table 14, Model 2