

ABSTRACT

MAY, JONATHAN EUGENE. Conservative Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Working Women: Conservative Religious Affiliation and Female Labor Force Participation, 1974-2004. (Under the direction of Theodore N. Greenstein.)

Conservative Protestants (CPs) have been known for their resistance to female labor force participation (LFP), which has been generally attributed to a preference for a gendered division of labor in the home. Using data from the 1974-2004 General Social Survey, I test whether CPs really do have lower rates of female LFP, whether those reduced rates have been maintained over time, and whether a preference for a gendered division of labor best explains those lower rates of female LFP. I find that lower levels of educational attainment explain a large portion of the differences between the female LFP of CPs and non-CPs, and that both male and female CPs have reduced LFP due to reduced educational attainment. I also find that differences in female LFP between CPs and non-CPs vary over time as changes in economic conditions occur and that while married CPs without children have lower rates of LFP than similar non-CPs, those with larger numbers of children actually have greater rates of participation when compared to similar non-CPs. I argue that these differences between the female LFP of CPs and non-CPs can best be explained not by gender attitudes but by educational attitudes and a family ethic that is family centric and anti-individualistic. Not only does this research shed light on how the attitudes of CPs affect their economic behaviors, but it also reveals how religious ethics may have differing effects on economic behaviors depending on the context of those behaviors.

Conservative Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Working Women: Conservative Religious
Affiliation and Female Labor Force Participation, 1974-2004

by
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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
North Carolina State University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Sociology

Raleigh, North Carolina

2010

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DEDICATION

To Candy

For everything you do for me

BIOGRAPHY

Jonathan May was born to Elton and Sherry May in New Orleans, Louisiana on September 29, 1969. As the son of a Baptist minister who became a non-denominational minister early in Jonathan's life, Jonathan spent much of his early life moving across the South and travelling to various regions of the country. He attended Scotlandville Magnet High School in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and graduated in 1987 from Herrin High School in Herrin, Illinois. After graduation he briefly studied engineering at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale and then transferred to Oral Roberts University where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Theological and Historical Studies in 1991. After graduation, Jonathan moved to Belo Horizonte, Brazil and spent the next two years of his life working as a missionary with a Brazilian-based team travelling throughout Central and South America. After returning home in 1993, Jonathan began a career in construction and worked as a lay leader in his local church in Clarksville, Tennessee in a variety of capacities. During this time, Jonathan developed an interest in anthropology that eventually led him to enroll in an anthropology course and sociology courses at Austin Peay State University in his adopted hometown of Clarksville. In the fall of 2001, he married Candy Smith Foster and the next spring enrolled in graduate school at Western Kentucky University. Jonathan received a Master of Arts degree in Sociology from that institution in 2004, writing a thesis that explored the ways in which devout Christian popular musicians construct their identities. Upon graduation from Western Kentucky University, Jonathan resigned his job in

construction and enrolled in the PhD program in Sociology at North Carolina State University. During his stint at North Carolina State, Jonathan has worked as a sociology instructor teaching a variety of classes and as a research assistant to Robert Moxley investigating the social determinants of the behavior of private forest owners. He also spent a month in 2006 in Carriacou, Grenada with three other graduate students working on a project involving sustainable development and continues to write with these students concerning their findings. Jonathan worked for a year as an adjunct professor at Elon University and is currently an adjunct at both Campbell University in Buies Creek, North Carolina and North Carolina State University. He continues to work on the forest-owners project with Dr. Ed Kick as well as expanding his research into religion by investigating recent growth and decline in American denominations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all those who made it possible for me to complete this dissertation. First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife Candy who spent far more time and energy supporting us than I did in completing my education. I find it fascinating and quite appropriate that I ended up writing a dissertation about the labor force participation of conservative Protestant women while being financially supported by the labor force participation of a conservative Protestant woman. Second, I would like to thank my parents who have supported me in all my endeavors even when they did not understand their direction. I thank you for the value you placed on education and the time and energy you spent teaching us how to learn. Without those two things this would never have been possible. I would also like to thank my brother Robert and sister-in-law Connie as well as little Becky, who passed away during the writing of this paper. No one has inspired me more than Robert and Connie to persevere when you just want to give up. I would also like to thank my sister Shelley who helped me to see the conflicting demands that religious ideals places on the lives of women. Furthermore, I would like to thank the members of my committee for the time and energy they have spent thoughtfully reading and re-reading drafts over the past two and a half years. I would like to especially thank Steve McDonald, who has gone over and above in giving me honest and constructive advice throughout the writing process, and former committee member Rod Engen, who was unable to finish this path with me but who spent many hours helping me learn HLM. Finally, I would like to thank Ted for

his tireless dedication and hours spent reading drafts, for getting drafts back in a couple of days when many professors would have spent weeks, and for always having a positive attitude (and for discouraging me from getting a job too early in the process. Thanks! That was very good advice). And, to all the many friends and colleagues who made this journey bearable, thank you.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Weber (2009 [1905]) began his now famous treatise, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, by asking why it is that Protestants are more involved in capitalist enterprises than Catholics. Many of his contemporaries, he contended, thought they already knew the answer to that question; they explained it in terms of differences in wealth and Catholic disregard for present-worldly gain and a preference for security over acquisition. While Weber saw a germ of truth behind these ideas, he was not content to rest on what appeared obvious to the observer. He argued that beneath these behavioral tendencies was a specific Protestant ethic, an ethic that with the right economic climate led to more capitalistic behaviors on the part of Protestants and eventually the rise of capitalism as the dominant economic spirit of the age.

In this dissertation I ask a similar question: Why do Conservative Protestant (CP) women have lower labor force participation than other women? Like Weber's question, the answer may seem obvious to many readers; CPs are patriarchal traditionalists and prefer women to remain in their domestic role. Although this may be true in part, I do not believe it to be a complete explanation. CPs do indeed have more traditionalist views with regard to gender, but these views may not be the only factors that influence their female LFP to differ from that of other American women (McConkey 2001; Peek, et al. 1991). CPs also tend to have lower educational attainment due to a distrust of modern higher education and a family

ethic that differs somewhat from that of the American mainstream in ways not entirely related to gender (Darnell & Sherkat 1997; Ellison & Musick 1995; McNamara 1985). I believe that these ethics as much or more than their views concerning gender are responsible for the behavioral differences between CP women and their non-CP counterparts within the U.S. labor market. In order to understand how these ethics relate to actual female LFP, I will examine data accumulated over three decades (1974-2004) in order to determine differences in the LFP of CP women and non-CP women as well as changes over time in these differences. An examination of these differences and trends, I believe, will lead to a fuller understanding of how CP beliefs are translated into differences in female LFP.

That CP women are less likely to participate in the paid labor force has been demonstrated by Glass and Jacobs (2005), and two other studies have revealed the greater tendency of CP women to leave work after having a child or getting married (Glass and Nath 2006; Sherkat 2000). In addition, Lehrer (1999) found that married CP women with only school-aged children in the home were less likely to be both full-time employed and part-time employed than other women. With the possible exception of Sherkat (2000), all of these studies assumed that CPs differed in their female LFP due to their patriarchal view of gender, specifically their preference for the separate spheres division of labor in which men are breadwinners and women stay home and take care of the family. However, there are at least two reasons to believe that this is not the entire picture. First, CPs have also been found to have significantly lower than average levels of educational attainment, particularly lower likelihoods of obtaining a college degree, due to a suspicion of modern higher education and

general anti-intellectualism among CPs (Darnell & Sherkat 1997; Ellison & Musick 1995; Sherkat & Darnell 1999). As education is one of the key factors in female LFP, it is possible that much of the difference between CPs and non-CPs in female LFP in the U.S. is due to educational differences (Cohen & Bianchi 1999; Smith-Lovin & Tickamyer 1978). Second, CP attitudes on gender have changed dramatically over the past few decades to become more like those of other Americans (McConkey 2001). Rather than maintaining opposition to female LFP, changes in these attitudes appear to be an attempt to adapt CP theology concerning the family to the demands of the postindustrial American economy, particularly the dual earner model of family life (Bloch 2000; Donovan 1998; Gallagher 2003; Heath 2003). Gallagher and Smith (1999; also Gallagher 2003) demonstrate, for example, that even though CPs continue to use patriarchal language to describe family relationships, in practice their families are as egalitarian as Americans of other religious backgrounds. Thus, differences in gender ideology do not translate into differences in marital dynamics; the same may be true for female LFP.

At least one scholar has suggested that the traditional tendencies in CP views concerning the family are not rooted in their allegiance to the separate spheres model but in an ethic of family-centeredness (that is, placing family needs, desires, and goals above those of the individual), and recent research supports this assertion (McNamara 1985). Sherkat (2000), for instance, found that CPs' concerns about female LFP are focused on women going to work when their children were very young. What CPs were most opposed to, he finds, is not women taking men's place as wage-earners but to women trading their

children's well-being for career ambitions or extra income for the family. This opposition is less about changing gender roles than it is about placing individual goals above family ones. In addition, CPs seem to be of an entirely different mind about female LFP when families are faced with economic hardships. CPs are actually more critical than non-CPs of women who are unwilling to look for work or to take a low-paying job when their family is in economic need (Will and Cochran 1995). At first these two positions may seem contradictory, but both stress family obligation as the key factor in LFP. When the family is economically okay without the wife's income, going to work for her own benefit or for family extras is discouraged, but when the family is in need she is encouraged to enter the labor force regardless of the quality of jobs available. To put it another way, in making female LFP decisions CP families focus more than other women on family needs and less on how the woman can individually benefit from participating in the labor market.

On the surface this dispute may appear to be merely a debate about the specific beliefs of an American religious minority and its economic implications for the present rather short era of American economic history. However, it has rather interesting theoretical implications concerning the relationship between religion and economic behavior. At the root of this debate is one of the central dividing principles between Marx and Weber over whether religious ideas really matter in the determination of economic behavior or does religion merely work to maintain existing economic relationships.

Marx (1844) argued that religious ideas are the outworking of the material state of man: "Man makes religion; religion does not make man." He further argued that religion

serves the purpose of justifying and legitimizing an oppressive social system. Although Marx spend very little time on this line of reasoning, later theorists (e.g. Gramsci 1971; Lukács 1971) greatly expanded upon the idea turning it into a theory of ideology in its own right. The basic idea behind this theory is that the material interests of a dominant group determine the religious ideas (as well as other values) that support and legitimize the behavior of both the dominant and the subjugated group. A feminist adaptation to this principle would be that ideas that repress the choices females have in their behaviors (such as the idea that women are God-ordained to maintain the domestic sphere and not work outside the home) develop in order to maintain male dominance. The religious idea is therefore not the ultimate source of the behavior but by presenting itself as a self-evident, God-given truth convinces women that it is right and natural to perform the behavior that maintains their subjugation. Thus, some feminist scholars view CP family ideals not as positive theology but as part of a reaction to feminism that seeks to prevent the erosion of male dominance within both their families and society at large (e.g. Donovan 1998; Heath 2003). They are, thus, described not as ideologues trying to maintain religious beliefs but as stalwarts in the fight to end patriarchy.

Weber, however, presents an alternative viewpoint of the relationship of ideas to behavior. For Weber, ideas like an ethic of asceticism, the concept of a calling, or family-centrality do have the ability to develop specific behavioral tendencies that affect material outcomes. That is not to say that economic conditions and interests do not matter but that ideas do have a large affect on how groups and societies respond to economic conditions

(Weber 1946). Weber's specific thesis about the relationship between Calvinistic Protestantism and the rise of Capitalism in Western Europe has been discredited to a large degree, as many of the institutions that led to the rise of capitalism had already begun to take root by the beginning of the reformation in the 16th century (Dellacroix 1992; Iannaccone 1998; Samuelsson 1993). However, it is difficult to dispute his argument that certain religious milieus provided more fertile soil for the growth of a capitalistic ethic. As well, the underlying theory that religious ideas have important consequences with regard to economic behavior remains quite useful. A variety of scholars have relied on this theory in order to understand the divergent paths that societies take in developing (or failing to develop) economic institutions (e.g. Landes 1998; Putnam 2003; Stulz and Williams 2001). However, Weber's principle has been much more rarely used to understand how the specific beliefs of a religious minority subculture may affect that subculture's economic behavior.

Gallagher (2003) makes such an application of theory to CP religious ideas by way of Swidler's (1986) cultural toolbox theory. She argues that, when faced with recent changes in economic conditions that made the separate-spheres family obsolete, CP families looked in their cultural toolbox and found a set of religious ideas that enabled them to adapt their family ideals in a specific way that works in the contemporary environment. CP ideas concerning the family, thus, represent neither a rejection of contemporary values for traditional ones or an embrace of contemporary values with a casing of religious language surrounding them. Rather, they are adaptations of core CP value commitments to contemporary purposes using cultural tools that fit with those core commitments.

In this paper, I take a Weberian approach similar to that taken by Gallagher by assuming that economic behaviors are informed by particular religious ethics and that those ethics are drawn from the higher commitments of CP theology. Moreover, this research allows me to expand on that theory by investigating how religious ethics affect behavior over time. If as Gallagher suspects CP family ideals have been in transition over the past few decades, then this research will identify how changes in those ideals produced changes in behavior. Or, if these family ideals have remained relatively constant, this research would reveal how the same ideals may produce different resulting behaviors when economic conditions change.

In the chapters that follow, I will challenge the traditional view (that the female LFP of CPs differs from that of other American women mainly because of the patriarchal gender views of CPs) by adding two additional explanations. In Chapter 2, I will test whether differences in the female LFP of CPs and non-CPs are due in part or whole to differences in education, which could be explained by CP anti-intellectualism. In Chapters 3 and 4, I will test whether the differences not explained by educational differences better fit the traditional explanation of patriarchy or are better explained by a family-centered work ethic. Each of these three chapters will be presented as distinct papers dealing primarily with the internal issues of the paper. In Chapter 5, I will explore the implications of the research's findings for theory and future research.

CHAPTER 2

Gender and Education as Factors in Understanding the Relationship between Conservative Protestantism and Female Labor Force Participation, 1974-2004

One of the most important determinants of female labor force participation (LFP) at least over the past few decades has been education, with women who have more education being more likely to be in the paid labor force (Cohen and Bianchi 1999; Eggebeen 1988; Smith-Lovin and Tickamyer 1978). One factor that has been found to influence both of these social outcomes is religion. Women from conservative Protestant (CP) denominations have been found to receive both less education than other women and to work outside the home less than other women (Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 2006; Lehrer 1995; Sherkat 2000). Given the strong relationship between education and female LFP it is surprising that the joint relationship between CP affiliation, education, and female LFP has received only scant attention. Only one published paper has investigated it to any extent and that only as a small part of a larger investigation (Glass and Jacobs 2005).

In explaining why CP women have reduced education and reduced LFP researchers tend to take two very different approaches. The reduced education of CPs is often explained by CP anti-intellectualism (which would be true for both males and females), while their reduced female LFP is explained by a preference for traditional gender roles (Darnell and Sherkat 1997; Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 2006; Hall 1995; Lehrer 1995; Sherkat and Darnell 1999). Even though education and female LFP are highly related, none of these

researchers (with the exception of Glass and Jacobs) has contemplated that the causes of reduced education and reduced female LFP for CPs might be more closely related.

Glass and Jacobs argue that early-adult life decisions, such as pursuing an education, that are influenced by religion serve to partially influence the LFP of women later in life. However, by not isolating education from three other factors they leave it unclear whether it is the reduced education of CPs or another factor that is influential in the reduced LFP that CP women experience. Furthermore, Glass and Jacobs along with other researchers in this area make the assumption that the affect of CP affiliation on both education and female LFP is consistent over time. Thus, they draw conclusions based on a snapshot of data taken at a single time in the history of the late twentieth century.

Ideas about gender in family life, though, have been a constant source of debate within CP circles for the past thirty years, if not longer (Gallagher 2003; Gallagher and Smith 1999). Social scientists who have observed these debates and the resulting changes in both theology and attitudes conclude that these debates and changes are a direct result of the need for CPs to come to terms with the growing involvement of women in the workplace, including their own wives and mothers (Denton 2004; Donovan 1998; Gallagher 2004a). With that in mind, it becomes dangerous to draw conclusions about the effect of conservative Protestantism in America on female LFP based on data drawn from a single point in time. To determine the effect that CP affiliation has *consistently* had on female LFP over the past several decades one must use data drawn from a longer time period and differentiate consistent effects from those which may be changing.

In this paper I use data collected over a 31 year period (1974-2004) to investigate what part gender and education play in the relationship between CP affiliation and LFP. It is well-established that education is directly and positively related to LFP for both men and women. Since CP affiliation has been found to reduce education, it is natural to consider education a mediator between CP affiliation and specifically female LFP. However, because gender attitudes are thought to reduce the female LFP of CP women as well, it is important to understand how much of a part gender plays in this process. On the one hand, it could be that CP gender attitudes tend to prevent CP women, more than CP men, from gaining an education. Because the primary purpose of an education is often considered to be career preparation, CPs might be more likely to allow their sons to risk the perils of a secular education for the sake of a career than their daughters, considering that their daughters are taught to be less career-oriented in the first place. On the other hand, CP anti-intellectualism could reduce education equally for both males and females, in which case it would work alongside gender (but separately) to reduce female LFP. It may also be that general (non-gender-related) educational differences between CP women and non-CP women explain most if not all of their LFP differences, in which case anti-intellectualism rather than gender attitudes would emerge as the primary cause of the reduced LFP of CP women.

Female Labor Force Participation

With the exception of one short period during the Great Depression, the participation of women in the paid labor force rose steadily from the early twentieth century to the early

twenty-first century (Anderson 1988; Szafran 2002). The rise was especially dramatic from the late 1940s to the late 1990s, as overall participation rates tripled from about 20% to over 60% within about two generations. Several inter-related processes led to this change. Most notably among these was the rising demand for laborers in occupations that were traditionally associated with women's work during the economic boom that followed World War II (Anderson 1988; Cotter, et al. 2001; Oppenheimer 1967; Oppenheimer 1973). This economic boom is often associated with manufacturing jobs, but many of the labor needs during this period were in clerical work, retail sales, and the service industry along with other jobs considered feminine in nature. However, the cohorts of young women in America during this time were rather small due to lowered birth rates during the 1920s and 30s (Oppenheimer 1967; Oppenheimer 1973). Thus, this increased demand for female labor occurred at a time when the supply of female workers was low, the result of which was increased recruitment of married women and mothers of school-aged children into the labor force.

Other factors also influenced the rise in female LFP. Reduced fertility, a general increase in the availability of domestic goods and services for sale in the market, and (according to some scholars) the introduction of timing-saving domestic technologies allowed more women time to work outside the home (Anderson 1988). Increased educational opportunities for women served also to increase their opportunities in the workforce. Women's wages continued to rise as well, and although they did not on average compete with men's wages they often rose more quickly than men's wages did (DeNavas-

Walt, et al. 2007; England and Farkas 1986). As more women participated in the labor force, attitudes about women in the labor force, the kinds of jobs they should have, and their responsibilities at home began to change as well (Brewster & Padavic 2000; Mason & Lu 1988; Rindfuss, et al. 1996). Women were thus less socially constrained from working outside the home. This trends both aided and were aided by the construction of feminist ideas of gender equality that became more commonplace over time, which resulted in even more women entering the workplace (Jackson 1998; Manza and Brooks 1998).

Probably the greatest change in both the causes and content of female LFP occurred around 1970. Previous to this time, the greatest economic influence on increased female LFP was demand for female labor (Cotter, et al. 2001). However, after this time, other economic forces began to play a much bigger part. One important factor was an overall decline in male earnings, particularly during the 1970s and 1990s when average male incomes declined in real terms even as the economy continued to grow (Bernhardt, et al. 1995; DeNavas-Walt, et al. 2007). Oppenheimer (1979) even argues that male wage decreases played a part in the 1950s and 1960s as well, because even though wages of male workers on average were increasing those of young men just starting their careers (and families) were not. In addition to declining male wages, economic instability during the turbulent 1970s and 1980s and increasing housing costs have been counted as contributing factors (Edwards 2001a; 2001b). These factors are all qualitatively different from those that contributed to the earlier increases in that these factors tend to push women into the workplace to meet family economic needs rather than pull them in through higher wages and opportunities. This difference in causes

may explain why after 1970 mothers, particularly those of pre-school-aged children and even those of middle-class families, began joining the workforce at an ever increasing rate (Anderson 1988; Hayghe 1997). These changes not only brought more mothers and other women into the workforce and began making labor force participation almost normative for women, they sparked much concern for the well-being of the family as the typical middle-class American family moved from a separate-spheres model to the dual-earner one. One group that showed great concern about these changes was conservative Protestants.

Conservative Protestants, Education, and Female LFP

The designation conservative Protestant (CP) is used in this paper to describe an inter-related set of Protestant denominations and congregations that stem from the fundamentalist, evangelical, and Pentecostal traditions (Smith 1990; Woodberry and Smith 1998). Although these traditions are different in their approaches to the relationship between Christianity and society, they are united by two key theological tenets: belief in the conversion or "born again" experience and belief in a literal interpretation of scripture (Smith 1990). In spite of their differences there is a long tradition of combining these groups into a single category for research, and there is ample reason to do so considering the difficulty researchers (and even CPs themselves) have had in discriminating between conservative traditions (Smith 1990; Woodberry and Smith 1998).

The conservative theological tendencies of CPs, particularly their support for a literal interpretation of scripture, have several implications for the life choices of children and

adolescents raised in CP churches. Their literalist view of Biblical texts makes CPs more resistant to social changes in the role that gender and sexuality plays in society (Bartkowski 1996; Bartkowski 1997; Bloch 2000; McNamara 1985). Thus, CPs are likely to be more traditional in both their attitudes towards family and in their marriage and family relationships (Grasmick, et al. 1990; Hall 1995; Peek, et al. 1991). In addition, the literalist view makes many CPs leery of modern higher education, as the modern academic philosophy places empirical evidence above Biblical “truth” and challenges the absoluteness of Biblical values and mores (Darnell and Sherkat 1997; Sherkat and Darnell 1999). Both of these attitudes have at least the potential for hampering employment outcomes for women by reducing both their employment opportunities and their actual employment.

Research has shown that CPs have consistently more traditional (also termed “patriarchal” or “sexist”) views of gender, particularly with relation to family roles (Grasmick, et al. 1990; McConkey 2001; Peek, et al. 1991). For instance, 56% of “Evangelicals” in 1998 agreed that “it is much better for everyone if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family” compared to 39% of religious moderates and 19% of progressives. Two themes tend to dominate CP discussions on gender in family life: husband headship and the role of mothers in children’s lives (Bartkowski 1997; Denton 2004; Gallagher 2003; Gallagher and Smith 1999; Sherkat 2000). The issue of husband’s headship appears to have come to the forefront because of the changing roles of spouses in American society, a change brought on by the transformation of married-couple families from the separate spheres family to the dual-earner family (Denton

2004; Donovan 1998; Gallagher 2003; Gallagher and Smith 1999). However, the headship issue plays less of a role in actual discussions of women's LFP. When it comes to women working outside the home, CP arguments against it focus on a woman's maternal duties, particularly when children are young (Sherkat 2000). Women are admonished to care for their own children as much as possible during this period for the good of the children.

These ideas, however, are not absolute. There is great amount of variation in both the theory and proposed application of CP gender attitudes (Bartkowski 1996; Bartkowski 1997; Gay, et al. 1996; Lockhart 2000). In addition, these attitudes and the theology behind them have been changing over the years as well. CPs have become less traditional in their ideology, church leaders have become more accepting of parishioner families who adopt the dual-earner norm, and CP family literature has turned from defending "traditional" family arrangements to a more pragmatic approach that makes scriptural injunctions an easier fit to the dual-earner family (Demmitt 1992; Gallagher 2003; Gallagher 2004b; Gallagher and Smith 1999; McConkey 2001). Although observers argue as to whether this new approach to gender and family life is a measured embrace of egalitarianism in marriage or an adaptation of patriarchal ideals to a new situation, they are generally agreed that the needs of CP families to adapt to increased female LFP is the main catalyst for this change (Donovan 1998; Gallagher 2003; Heath 2003).

CP attitudes towards education stem from their high degree of belief in Biblical "truth." Modern education (particularly higher education) in their opinion promotes relativistic thinking and denigrates the role of faith in the quest for truth (Darnell & Sherkat

1997; Sherkat & Darnell 1999). In addition, CPs are skeptical of the scientific perspective that is central to modern ideas of higher education. They are more likely than those of other religious backgrounds to believe that science “pries into inappropriate areas” and are more skeptical of science’s ability “to solve social problems” (Ellison & Musick 1995).

Furthermore, specific teachings of science and even the humanities run counter to the teachings of the Bible as interpreted by the majority of CPs: most prominently evolution but also issues of gender equality and gay rights. Perhaps most importantly, though, is that CPs see modern education as a bastion for secular humanism (Darnell & Sherkat 1997; Sherkat & Darnell 1999). Secular humanism’s belief that mankind can solve its own problems through learning clearly runs counter to CP theology, which posits that mankind’s problems are a result of mankind’s rejection of God and Godliness.

Despite these clear differences in beliefs and attitudes the real question is: How are these beliefs and attitudes turned into actual differences in behavior? With regard to behaviors typically associated to gender attitudes, CPs are more traditional in some respects but not others. CP wives and the wives of CP men, for example, do more hours of housework on average than other wives with similar family situations. Also, previous research has shown that CP women are less likely to work outside the home than other women and more likely to leave the workforce when they marry or have children (Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 2006; Sherkat 2000). However, there is some evidence that CP men may be more involved in the domestic sphere than other men, and despite their insistence on male headship CP married couples are as egalitarian in their decision-making as

those of non-CP religious backgrounds (Bartkowski and Xu 2000; Denton 2000; Gallagher 2003).

When it comes to education, CP behavior tends to match their attitudes more consistently, at least when CPs are viewed as a group. CP students are less likely to take college preparatory courses in high school and on average have lower educational achievement than students of other religious backgrounds with similar family and school situations (Darnell & Sherkat 1997; Sherkat & Darnell 1999). However, Beyerlein (2004) finds that only those CPs who identify as fundamentalists and Pentecostals have lower educational attainment than those of other religious backgrounds. Those identifying as evangelicals had similar educational attainments to mainline and liberal Protestants. The data used in this analysis, however, is based on self-identification, and it is difficult to determine to what degree educational level influences whether individuals from similar religious backgrounds identify as evangelicals or fundamentalists. Furthermore, a quick review of the dataset used by Beyerlein (Religious Influence and Identity Survey 1996), reveals that 51% of those who identified as Evangelicals also indentified as Fundamentalists, and 45% of those who identified as Fundamentalists also identified as Evangelicals. Regardless, the available data does not allow for differentiating between evangelicals and fundamentalists, as many CP denominations have members and leaders who embrace either or both titles (Woodberry and Smith 1998).

Because CPs hold strong views toward issues of both gender and education and because these views affect their behaviors, it might be guessed that gender may affect CP

educational participation and attainment. However, little is known about such a potential intersection. Glass and Jacobs (2005) find that being raised a CP reduces educational outcomes for women, but no comparison is made to the educational outcomes of men. Sherkat & Darnell (1999) find no gender difference in the negative impact of being a CP on educational attainment, but they do find that acceptance of CP theology has a different impact on the educational attainment for men than it does for women. CP children who share their parents' conservative theology were found to have increased educational outcomes over those who did not. The gender difference in this effect is that for males sharing in a conservative belief created a positive impact on education compared to all other belief/gender groups but for females the effect of not sharing their parents' conservative beliefs created a negative impact compared to all other groups. This set of results, while still somewhat open to explanation, suggest that a relationship between gender, conservative Protestantism, and education does in fact exist.

Another factor that must be taken into consideration is race. Religion within the United States has always been highly segregated. CP traditions, many of which are strongly rooted in the South, have been especially segregated. White and black CP denominations may share a common belief in Biblical authority and the conversion experience, but in other ways the two traditions are very different. In fact, a large number of researchers choose to consider black Protestantism (the majority of which is theologically conservative) as a tradition distinct from both conservative Protestantism and mainline Protestantism (Woodberry and Smith 1998). For one, black CP churches have been much more politically

active and embracing of the social gospel ideas of mainline Protestantism, while white CP churches have reserved political activism for a few specific issues (like abortion) and have considered the social gospel to be poor theology. Black CP denominations garner a much larger portion of the African-American population than white CP churches garner of the white population: according to the GSS data used in this study, 67% as compared to 28%. Moreover, gender divisions in the home are less stressed in the theology of black CP churches than their white counterparts, as might be expected considering the greater number of single-parent homes in the African-American community (Glass and Nath 2006). In fact, some scholars have suggested that CP affiliation may serve as a buffering effect on the disadvantage of being a black woman, as black CP churches tend to be greatly involved in the black community (Glass & Nath 2006; Patillo-McCoy 1998). Furthermore, black women have had higher rates of LFP than white women for some time as the high rates of poverty in the African-American community along with high rates of divorce and out-of-wedlock childbearing have not allowed many black women the luxury of opting out of the labor force (Spitze 1988; Smith & Tienda 1988). Considering the high rates of participation of African-Americans in CP denominations, it would be difficult for this tradition not to have come to terms with high female LFP. Thus, I suspect that CP affiliation may have differing effects on whites and blacks and following the lead of Glass and Nath (2006) I treat whites and blacks as separate in the analysis.

Research Questions

A key concern of this research is stipulating consistent effects from ones that may change over time. Previous research has claimed that being a CP or being raised a CP *has* an effect on education or female LFP, but it is not known whether that effect is a consistent one or one which is only valid for a the limited time period that the study's sample represents. Therefore, the first two questions of this research are:

1. *Is there a consistent effect of being raised a CP on educational attainment?*
2. *Is there a consistent effect of being raised (or becoming) a CP on female LFP?*

The answers to these questions are important because some authors claim that these religious viewpoints continue to have negative effects on women's outcomes (e.g. Glass and Jacobs 2005). In order to contend that results based on past data are relevant today, one must be able to assume that the effect is relatively consistent over time.

Another central concern of this paper is whether CP attitudes concerning education and gender act independently on LFP or whether they act in concert. One way in which they could act together is that CP resistance to education might be greater for females than for males. Thus, the third question of this research is:

3. *Is the negative effect of being raised a CP on education greater for females than for males?*

Although this question does not directly relate to female LFP, answering it will help determine whether there may be an indirect pathway (via education) by which the gender attitudes of CPs might affect female LFP.

The next three research questions relate to the direct effect of being a CP on LFP. As education is highly related to labor force participation (especially for women), it would be no surprise that if being raised as a CP reduces education that CPs would have reduced LFP.

Thus, the fourth research question is:

4. *Does education mediate the effect of conservative Protestantism on LFP?*

Assuming question four is answered in the affirmative, the question of whether education explains all or only part of the relationship between being a CP and LFP becomes important.

5. *Is there a relationship between CP affiliation and LFP beyond the effect mediated by education?*

Of course, the most important part of this question is whether that relationship exists for females. However, considering that the other hypothesized pathway (besides education) that links CP affiliation with female LFP is gender attitudes, it is important to note whether any relationship between CP affiliation and LFP not explained by education is shared by males and females. Thus, the final research question is:

6. *Is the effect of CP affiliation on LFP the same for both genders?*

As noted above, conservative Protestantism is a movement highly divided by race. The final research question seeks to determine whether this division plays a part in the effect of CP religious affiliation on female LFP.

7. *Do the effects of CP affiliation on LFP differ by race?*

Data and Variables

This study uses data from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is a survey of adults over the age of 18 living in the United States. It has been conducted on a regular basis (at least every other year) since 1972 using a randomized, cluster sample technique to sample households. Interviews are collected from one randomly selected adult living in each household. All white and black respondents from 1974 to 2004 for which data is available for all relevant variables were used in the analysis. Data from the years 1972-73 were not used because important variables are missing for those years (mother's and father's education in 1972 and respondents' income, used to calculate "other household income" in 1972 and 1973). The total number of white and black cases in the GSS for these years is 41,779 (35,824 white; 5,955 black). The data was weighted to correct sampling error caused by multiple adults living in a household.

Because of the sociocultural differences between white and black CP denominations detailed earlier, blacks and whites are analyzed separately. This approach follows that used in other research on this topic (Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 2006; Lehrer 1995). Those whose race is classified in the GSS as "other" were excluded from the analysis because the diversity of these groups, specifically the diversity in the role that might be played by conservative Protestantism in each of these groups, makes it difficult to draw conclusions about this group.

The two dependent variables in the analysis are respondents' education and labor force participation. Labor force participation is measured as a dichotomous variable with

respondents reporting in the previous week that they were working full time, working part time, employed but not working last week, unemployed, laid off, or looking for work being coded as in the labor force. Although distinctions could have been made between various degrees of participation, the dichotomous variable was chosen for two reasons. First, the key issues of this paper are ideological: whether working outside the home is the *right* thing for a woman to do. Thus, whether or not she is able to get a job or to work part-time or full-time is less important. Second, several formulations of this variable were used in earlier renderings of the research. These formulations showed that there were no significant differences at the intermediate levels of participation. Religious differences could only be found between the non-participation category and the other categories (mainly when placed in opposition to the full-time employment category). In other words, a multi-level dependent variable made the analysis far more complicated without providing any more clarity to the problem.

Education was measured in years completed with some adaptations made. Respondents with 12 or more years of education but without a high school diploma were recoded as having 11 years of education. Those with a high school diploma but no degree and more than 12 years of education were recoded as having 13 years of education. An Associate's degree was recoded as 14 years. A Bachelors degree was recoded as 16 years and a graduate degree was recoded as 18 years. Respondents who reported not having a high school diploma but not reporting an exact number of years of education were coded as

having 8 years of education (the median value for less than high school). Mother's education and father's education were coded similarly.

The key independent variable, conservative Protestant, is a dichotomous variable constructed from a three point fundamentalism scale within the GSS dataset that codes Christian respondents based on the relative fundamentalism or liberalism of the respondent's denomination. All respondents coded as "fundamentalist" are considered to be CPs; all other respondents, including non-Christians are considered to be non-CPs. Denominations considered to be fundamentalist were considered so because of their beliefs about the inerrancy of the Bible and a personal salvation experience (see Smith 1990 for a fuller description). Although the term fundamentalist was used it is clear from the description offered by Smith (1990) that the label is intended to describe the greater range of conservative Protestant groups. Respondents who gave no information about their religion or whose denominational conservatism was considered undeterminable in the fundamentalism scale were counted as missing for this variable.

Several other independent variables were used in the analysis. Marital status is differentiated by three dummy variables—married, divorced or separated, and widowed—with never married being the reference category. The total number of children in the home (under 18 years of age) and the presence of at least one child under six years of age in the home were also used. Other household income was calculated by subtracting the respondent's income from the household income. Both income measures were recalculations in constant dollars constructed by NORC (National Opinion Research Center) researchers

that are included in the GSS dataset (see Ligon 1989 for a description of this recalculation process). The natural log of other income was used in the analyses. The constant 1 was added to the income before transformation to maintain cases in which other income is \$0. The respondent's year of birth was used in some analyses; the respondent's age and an age-squared term were also used in others. All education variables, the natural log of other household income, year of birth, and age were centered on their grand mean (i.e. mean for the entire sample). Age-squared is the square of age after centering.

Additional variables were used to approximate changes in labor conditions over time that might have an effect on LFP outcomes. Annual economic growth as a percentage, the median annual income of a full-time male worker in constant 2006 dollars (in \$1,000s), the median annual income of a female worker (measured similarly), and female labor demand as a proportion of male labor demand (male unemployment rate / female unemployment rate) were used in different models depending on their theoretical relevance to the labor force participation of the group in question. A variable representing the year (survey year - 1974) was used in education models as educational opportunities have consistently increased over the years. Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 2-1: means are presented in standard font, standard deviations in italics, and the range of the variable is presented in block parentheses.

Table 2-1
Descriptive Statistics

	Whites	White Females	White Males	Blacks	Black Females	Black Males
Labor Force Participation		0.58 <i>0.49</i> [0-1]	0.80 <i>0.40</i> [0-1]		0.60 <i>0.49</i> [0-1]	0.77 <i>0.42</i> [0-1]
Education	12.60 <i>2.82</i> [0-18]	12.56 <i>2.65</i> [0-18]	12.77 <i>2.94</i> [0-18]	11.60 <i>3.03</i> [0-18]	11.76 <i>2.73</i> [0-18]	11.52 <i>3.29</i> [0-18]
Father's Education	10.39 <i>3.95</i> [0-18]			8.79 <i>4.03</i> [0-18]		
Mother's Education	10.62 <i>3.42</i> [0-18]			9.68 <i>3.65</i> [0-18]		
Female	0.55 <i>0.50</i> [0-1]			0.63 <i>0.48</i> [0-1]		
Married		0.55 <i>0.50</i> [0-1]	0.62 <i>0.49</i> [0-1]		0.30 <i>0.46</i> [0-1]	0.46 <i>0.50</i> [0-1]
Widowed		0.13 <i>0.34</i> [0-1]	0.04 <i>0.19</i> [0-1]		0.14 <i>0.35</i> [0-1]	0.06 <i>0.23</i> [0-1]
Divorced/ Separated		0.17 <i>0.38</i> [0-1]	0.13 <i>0.33</i> [0-1]		0.26 <i>0.44</i> [0-1]	0.20 <i>0.40</i> [0-1]
No. of Children		0.78 <i>1.15</i> [0-11]	0.69 <i>1.12</i> [0-12]		1.21 <i>1.47</i> [0-11]	0.77 <i>1.23</i> [0-8]
Child under 6		0.19 <i>0.39</i> [0-1]	0.16 <i>0.36</i> [0-1]		0.27 <i>0.45</i> [0-1]	0.17 <i>0.37</i> [0-1]
Age		45.64 <i>17.48</i> [18-89]	44.46 <i>16.75</i> [18-89]		42.18 <i>16.38</i> [18-89]	42.94 <i>15.96</i> [18-89]
Year of Birth	1943.23 <i>19.49</i> [1885-1986]			1946.97 <i>18.85</i> [1885-1986]		
Other Income (ln)		7.99 <i>3.81</i> [0-12.00]	6.17 <i>4.58</i> [0-12.00]		6.37 <i>4.18</i> [0-11.86]	6.12 <i>4.40</i> [0-11.85]
Raised CP	0.28 <i>0.45</i> [0-1]	0.29 <i>0.45</i> [0-1]	0.28 <i>0.45</i> [0-1]	0.67 <i>0.47</i> [0-1]	0.68 <i>0.47</i> [0-1]	0.67 <i>0.47</i> [0-1]
Raised CP-Left		0.08 <i>0.27</i> [0-1]	0.08 <i>0.27</i> [0-1]		0.09 <i>0.29</i> [0-1]	0.12 <i>0.32</i> [0-1]
Year Level Variables						
Year	13.48 <i>8.83</i> [0-30]	Proportion of Male/Female Unemployment (3 year avg.)		0.95 <i>0.11</i> [0.72-1.11]	Economic Growth (3 year avg.)	3.08 <i>1.27</i> [0.13-5.27]
Male Annual Income in \$1,000s (3 year avg.)	43.01 <i>0.76</i> [41.34-44.11]	Fem. Annual Income in \$1,000s (3 year avg.)		28.32 <i>2.59</i> [25.04-33.63]		

Table values are means with *standard deviation* in italics and range in [].

Analytical Methods and Results

The analysis was done using Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM). Models with education as the dependent variable use ordinary HLM, and those using LFP as the dependent variable use Bernoulli Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM), a version of HGLM that is basically the HLM version of logistic regression (see Raudenbush, et al. 2004 for details). The hierarchical or multi-level modeling techniques HLM and Bernoulli HGLM differ from their single-level counterparts primarily in the way they deal with random effects (often referred to at the individual level as error). Random effects are simply the variance in the data that cannot be accounted for by the model and are theoretically assumed to be due to unmeasured differences between cases. In a multi-level dataset in which individuals are clustered into groups, these random effects could be due to both unmeasured differences between individuals and unmeasured differences between groups. In other words, if one were to apply the model equation to each of the groups the model would fit some groups better than others just as it would fit some individuals better than others. Single level models assume that all of this error is caused by variations between individuals. This is problematic when it comes to estimating both the model and test statistics in a multi-level model because it violates the independence assumptions of the model (see Hox 2002 for a fuller explanation). Multi-level models and other random effects models divide the error into two parts, one attributed to random differences between individuals (termed error) and the other attributed to random differences between the groups (termed random effects). Ordinary random effects models do this by simply creating a

random error term, which applies to random variance between the groups (i.e. variance not related to any of the independent variables or to differences between individuals). However, this assumes that the coefficients of the independent variables in the model do not vary from group to group.

HLM and other multi-level modeling techniques allow not only for a general random effect that accounts for unmeasured differences between groups but allows also for random effects for each of the independent variables. Each of these random effects estimates how much the coefficient of an independent variable would vary from group to group if it were allowed to vary. In other words, it estimates how much the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable varies randomly from group to group. These random effects become important when adding group-level variables to the model. When group-level variables are added to the model, they affect the group-level random effects (hopefully by reducing them) just as adding individual-level variables serve to reduce the individual-level error by accounting for some of it. In addition, tests of significance of group-level variables are based on group-level variance estimates and not individual-level ones, making them less biased. In the models presented in this paper, all individual-level variables are given group-level random effects except age and age-squared. Adding a random effect to both age and age-squared creates computation problems due to their shared variance, whereas adding a random effect to one but not the other creates results that are difficult to define with regard to these variables.

HLM's ability to model multiple random effects and group-level variables (with appropriate standard errors) makes it an advantageous method for the present analysis for several reasons. First, the data were collected in waves, and each wave of data was collected in a different year representing a different economic situation; thus, they should be treated as grouped data with each year having some shared variance. Second, these different economic situations can be modeled and their effect on LFP can be controlled best by using a multi-level model. Third, the average amount of education achieved by Americans and the LFP of female Americans have both changed dramatically over the time period, and using HLM allows this change to be modeled as differences between groups. Fourth, the factors affecting female LFP are known to vary in their effects on female LFP, and it is possible that the factors affecting educational attainment could change in their effects on education over time as well (Cohen and Bianchi 2000; Eggebeen 1988). HLM allows this variation in effects to be controlled for in the models.

It should be noted that HLM is utilized in this research to accommodate the clustering of data into years. The present study is *not* a panel study in which individuals are followed over time. Survey data were collected from a different panel of individuals in each year. Thus, they create somewhat of a synthetic cohort as they represent the same population over time.

The first set of models created in this research are HLM models predicting educational attainment (see Table 2-2). Model1 shows that, over the entire time period

(1974-2004) and controlling for random effects due to the year, white CPs on average attain about one-half of a year less (-0.47) education than non-CPs. Although this may seem like a small difference, it should be noted that half a year is one-fourth of the difference between a high-school diploma and an Associate's degree or between degree levels. For blacks the difference is similar (-0.40), as shown in Model 3. For whites, women have about a sixth of a year less education on average than men, whereas black women have about half a year more education than black men.

Table 2-2
HLM Models Predicting Educational Attainment

	Model 1 White Main Effects Model	Model 2 White Interaction Model	Model 3 Black Main Effects Model	Model 4 Black Interaction Model
<u>Fixed Effects</u>				
Constant	12.73*	12.76*	11.91*	11.79*
Year	0.023*	0.022*	0.0030	0.0034
Year of Birth	0.000021	0.000054	0.041*	0.042*
Father's Education	0.17*	0.17*	0.080*	0.079*
Mother's Education	0.22*	0.22*	0.22*	0.22*
Female	-0.16*	-0.19*	0.51*	0.70*
Raised CP	-0.47*	-0.54*	-0.40*	-0.23
Raised CP*Female		0.14		-0.27
<u>Random Effects (Variance Components)</u>				
Constant	0.017*	0.012*	0.10*	0.24*
Year of Birth	0.00014*	0.00014*	0.00048*	0.00048*
Father's Education	0.00014	0.00015	0.0057*	0.0056*
Mother's Education	0.00047*	0.00044	0.0021	0.0020
Female	0.014*	0.013	0.11*	0.37*
Raised CP	0.0080	0.015	0.093	0.37
Raised CP*Female		0.037		0.51*
n	35,824	35,824	5,955	5,955
-2 Log Likelihood	122,602	122,598	15,126	15,120

*indicates statistically significant result ($\alpha=0.05$).

When the effect of being a CP is allowed to vary by gender (Models 2 and 4), the interaction term is not statistically significant for either whites or blacks. However, for whites the interaction term approaches significance ($p=0.06$) and is positive; this would tend to indicate that the reduction in education attributed to being raised a CP is slightly less for women than for men. Although CP women have an estimated 0.40 fewer years of education on average than non-CP women, they have only 0.05 years less education than the average CP man. As non-CP women have 0.19 years less education than non-CP men, it is clear that the educational constraints of being a CP are not greater for CP women than CP men. In fact, the educational differences between the sexes for CPs may even be slightly less than it is for non-CPs. For blacks, the interaction term is far from significant, and the coefficient for being raised a CP becomes non-significant when the interaction term is added to the model.

Despite being non-significant, the coefficients do suggest that the positive impact of being female on education found among blacks is reduced for CPs. This reduction, however, does not suggest that CP women have less education than CP men. Although CP women in Model 4 are estimated to have half a year less education than non-CP women, they are estimated as having 0.43 years more education than CP men. Here, as with whites, there appears to be a slightly smaller gender difference between CPs than non-CPs. Again, these findings refer to non-significant results and should not be overstated.

Tables 2-3 and 2-4 show models predicting LFP or specifically the log-likelihood of being in the labor force. These models, like those predicting education, are divided by race. However, these models are also divided by gender because several control variables are

Table 2-3
Bernoulli HGLM Models Predicting Labor Force Participation (Whites)

	Model 5 White Women CP Only	Model 6 White Women w/Controls No Education	Model 7 White Women Education Added	Model 8 White Men CP Only	Model 9 White Men w/Controls No Education	Model 10 White Men Education Added
Fixed Effects						
Constant	0.40	1.83	1.69*	1.43*	2.26*	2.24*
M/F Unempl.	0.69	0.62	0.34			
Econ. Growth				0.048*	0.050*	0.048*
Male Income	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.11*	-0.15*	-0.15*	-0.15*
Female Income	0.089*	0.097*	0.083*			
Married		-0.36*	-0.30*		1.10*	1.10*
Widowed		-0.30*	-0.20		0.71*	0.74*
Divorced/Separated		-0.17	-0.071		0.42*	0.45*
No. of Children		-0.20*	0.17*		0.18*	0.21*
Child under 6		-0.60*	-0.65*		-0.021	-0.032
Age		-0.062*	-0.058*		-0.065*	-0.063*
Age ²		-0.0032*	-0.0029*		-0.0034*	-0.0032*
Other Income (ln)		-0.18*	-0.19*		-0.21*	-0.22*
Raised CP	-0.17*	-0.14*	0.0037	0.030	-0.19*	-0.059
Raised CP-Left	0.11	0.10	-0.013	-0.078	-0.023	-0.14
Became CP	-0.33*	-0.28*	-0.16	-0.22*	-0.32*	-0.24*
Education			0.17*			0.11*
Random Effects (Variance Components)						
Constant	0.036*	0.14*	0.16*	0.013*	0.18*	0.21*
Married		0.20*	0.20*		0.10*	0.11*
Widowed		0.043	0.084		0.80	0.72
Divorced/Separated		0.060	0.11		0.13	0.094
No. of Children		0.0016	0.0020		0.021	0.021
Child under 6		0.050*	0.069*		0.025	0.026
Other Income		0.00042	0.00071		0.0017*	0.0018*
Raised CP	0.041*	0.062*	0.075*	0.034	0.065	0.071
Raised CP-Left	0.072*	0.20*	0.20*	0.033	0.069	0.071
Became CP	0.0065	0.074	0.075	0.016	0.072	0.065
Education			0.0015*			0.00061
n	16,814	16,814	16,814	14,033	14,033	14,033
-2 Log Likelihood	47,766	48,226	48,178	39,806	41,971	42,456

*indicates statistically significant result ($\alpha=0.05$).

theorized to have different effects on male LFP than on female LFP (e.g. those representing marital status and the presence of children). The models incorporate year-level control

variables thought to be relevant to changes in male and female LFP: female labor demand, median male annual income, and median female annual income for female LFP; and economic growth and median male annual income for male LFP (see p. 23 for an explanation of these variables). This paper is mostly concerned with the effect of CP affiliation on the LFP of women (Models 5-7 and 11-13); the models for men are provided for comparison.

For white women, being raised a CP has a negative effect of 0.17 on the log likelihood of being in the labor force before any individual-level controls are placed in the model, indicating that women raised as CPs have lower real-world participation rates than those who were never CPs. Interestingly, becoming a CP later in life has nearly double the negative effect (-0.33) on LFP that being raised a CP has. When the family, age, and income controls are added to the model, these coefficients change little (raised CP to -0.14 and becoming a CP to -0.28) and both remain statistically significant. However, when education is added to the model the effect of being raised a CP becomes basically 0. Although not quite statistically significant ($p = 0.07$), a negative effect of 0.16 remains for women who became a CP later in life.

The effect of CP affiliation on white men's LFP is very similar to its effects on white women. Although the model without controls included (Model 8) indicates no difference in the LFP of those raised CP and those who were never CPs, when the controls (sans education) are added a negative effect of being raised CP (-0.19) is seen in the LFP of white men similar in magnitude to that seen for white women in Model 6. Adding education reduces this effect to non-significance as it did for white women. The effect of becoming a

CP on LFP is negative for white men in all three models, and in the final model (with all controls) is greater in magnitude (-0.24 compared to -0.16) than that seen for white women and is statistically significant. Because it is not known exactly when (between age 16 and their completion of the survey) respondents changed religious affiliation, it is difficult to know whether becoming a CP has a negative impact on LFP or whether those who are interested in not participating in the labor force or have given up on finding paid work are more likely to be attracted to CP churches.

For black women and men (see Table 2-4), the effects of CP affiliation are not as notable, as smaller sample sizes create fewer significant (or even nearly significant) results. For black women, there is a small but non-significant negative correlation between being raised a CP and LFP before any controls are added to the model. As controls are added this relationship becomes positive but is again not significant. It appears that for black women who were raised or became CPs *may* have slightly reduced LFP due in part to differences in both family/demographic factors and education. Net of these factors, being raised or becoming a CP (if it has any effect at all) has a positive impact on the LFP of black women. However, these results are speculative as the results are not statistically significant. One result, though, does approach significance ($p = 0.06$) and is rather large in magnitude. Black women raised as CPs who left their CP affiliation later in life are more likely to be in the labor force than those who were never CPs. The magnitude of the effect is also relatively large at 0.41 (0.16 for being raised CP plus 0.25 for then having left). For black men, none of the coefficients for CP affiliation were statistically significant or very large in magnitude.

Table 2-4
Bernoulli HGLM Models Predicting Labor Force Participation (Blacks)

	Model 11 Black Women CP Only	Model 12 Black Women w/Controls No Education	Model 13 Black Women Education Added	Model 14 Black Men CP Only	Model 15 Black Men w/Controls No Education	Model 16 Black Men Education Added
Fixed Effects						
Constant	0.44	1.19*	1.07*	1.24*	1.78*	1.76*
M/F Unempl.	0.78	0.67	-0.22			
Econ. Growth				0.10*	0.030	0.0023
Male Income	-0.12*	-0.063	-0.074*	-0.047	-0.083	-0.17*
Female Income	0.12*	0.12*	0.10*			
Married		0.77*	0.63*		1.33*	1.28*
Widowed		0.024	0.038		0.49	0.46
Divorced/Separated		0.19	0.057		0.53	0.53
No. of Children		-0.17*	-0.13*		-0.16	-0.13
Child under 6		-0.49*	-0.48*		0.21	0.17
Age		-0.039*	-0.028*		-0.066*	-0.062*
Age ²		-0.0025*	-0.0022*		-0.0031*	-0.0029*
Other Income (ln)		-0.20*	-0.21*		-0.20*	-0.21*
Raised CP	-0.13	-0.04	0.16	-0.033	0.072	0.10
Raised CP-Left	0.40*	0.34*	0.25	0.13	-0.0027	-0.029
Became CP	-0.26	-0.05	0.21	-0.10	0.25	0.12
Education			0.24*			0.082*
Random Effects (Variance Components)						
Constant	0.14*	0.10	0.064	0.014	0.65	0.77*
Married		0.059	0.11		0.61*	0.59*
Widowed		0.15	0.18		1.18	1.27
Divorced/Separated		0.015	0.050		0.89	0.88
No. of Children		0.010	0.011		0.069	0.059
Child under 6		0.12	0.11		0.41	0.34
Other Income		0.0018	0.0035		0.0034	0.0078
Raised CP	0.11*	0.22*	0.16*	0.075	0.13	0.10
Raised CP-Left	0.049	0.085	0.10	0.15	0.43	0.37
Became CP	0.21	0.67	0.91	0.10	1.14	1.72
Education			0.0045			0.013*
n	3,035	3,035	3,035	1,885	1,885	1,885
-2 Log Likelihood	8,635	8,637	8,641	5,343	5,164	5,141

*indicates statistically significant result ($\alpha=0.05$).

Discussion

These results provide answers for the paper's six research questions, giving a fuller understanding of the relationship between CP affiliation, gender, education, and LFP. They also help determine whether sexism or anti-intellectualism can be plausibly seen as a cause of these relationships. As the focus of the paper is on the net results of each factor on LFP, I will begin with the educational outcomes and tie them to the LFP results later.

Question 1, whether there is a consistent relationship between being raised a CP and educational attainment, can be answered in the affirmative. However, while this relationship might be due to the anti-intellectualism of CPs it does not appear to be due to greater sexism among CPs. For whites, a CP upbringing does disadvantage women when it comes to educational attainment, but it disadvantages men as much or more than it does women. In fact, the educational gap between the sexes is smaller for white CPs than for white non-CPs. For blacks, being raised a CP also has a negative impact on education. However, the educational gap between the sexes is reversed with women receiving more education than men. Model 4 gives inconclusive evidence that the negative effect of being raised a CP is actually stronger for black women than black men, but this difference is much less than the educational advantage black women have over black men. CP women are still estimated to have 0.43 years more education than CP men. If being raised a CP disadvantages men's educational attainment at least as much as it disadvantages women's, then it is difficult to argue that CP attitudes towards women are to blame for the lower educational attainment of

CP women. It is more likely that both CP men and women are educationally disadvantaged by CP views towards higher education.

Question 2 asks whether there is a consistent effect of being raised a CP on female LFP. The answer to that question is not at all straightforward and relies on the conclusions of questions 4 and 5. The answer to question 4, whether the reduced education due to being raised a CP serves as a mediating pathway by which CP rearing affects female LFP, is most definitely yes. For white women, the effect of being raised a CP on LFP is negative but is eliminated entirely when education is added to the model, meaning that the CP effect is due to differences in education. For black women the effect of being raised a CP does change from negative to positive when education is added, but these differences are slight and not statistically significant so no conclusions can be drawn. However, they are consistent with the findings for white women that education mediates the effect of being raised a CP on female LFP.

These findings lead directly to research question 5, whether there is a residual effect of being raised a CP beyond those due to reduced education. For white women, the answer is no. Once education has been accounted for in the model, the coefficient for being raised a CP is not significant. For black women, it is unclear whether there is a residual effect, but if there is it is positive (not negative as anticipated). In other words, for black women being raised as a CP may actually increase female LFP net of the effects of education, particularly for women who are raised as CPs and then leave their CP affiliation later in life.

To return to research question 2, there is a consistent effect of being raised a CP on female LFP, but this effect is due mainly to reduced education. Beyond the effect of education for white women and education and family/demographic factors for black women, there is no consistent effect on female LFP over the 31 year time period represented in the data. Therefore, being raised a CP does not disadvantage white women in terms of LFP beyond that caused by disadvantages in educational attainment, and for black women it may even be an advantage.

It must be added, however, that even though this research found no *consistent* effect of being raised a CP on female LFP there may be a changing relationship during this time period. The random effects variance components for being raised a CP on LFP for both white and black women are statistically significant. This result means that there is substantial variance in the effect of being raised a CP on female LFP across the survey years. This *could* mean that in some years there is a positive effect and in some a negative effect and that these effects could have some meaningful pattern. It could also be a statistical anomaly caused by the small number of groups/years (23) used in the analysis. Further investigation is needed to know for sure.

Question 6, whether the effect of being raised a CP on LFP is the same for both genders, speaks (in a somewhat limited way) to whether or not gender attitudes play a substantial part in the relationship between CP affiliation and female LFP. This research finds no difference between men and women in the effects of being a CP on LFP. For white men, the negative effect on LFP of being raised a CP found before education is added to the

model (Model 9) is similar in magnitude to that found for white women. This effect is eliminated after the addition of education (Model 10), meaning that just like with white women being raised a CP reduces LFP for white men but only through its effect on educational attainment. For black men and women the coefficients for being raised a CP are similar in magnitude and direction but are not statistically significant. So, the evidence supports an affirmative answer to question 6 (no gender differences in the effect of being a CP), but the data are not strong enough to be conclusive for black men and women.

The relationship between being raised a CP and LFP is virtually identical for men and women. In addition, CP rearing affects female LFP almost entirely (if not entirely) through education, and the effect of CP rearing on education is the same for men and women. These findings support the premise that it is CPs resistance to education that is predominantly responsible for differences between CPs and non-CPs in female LFP and that attitudes toward gender play very little role in this process. Although it is possible that CP women have lower educational attainment because of CP gender attitudes and CP men have lower educational attainment for a different reason (e.g. anti-intellectualism), it seems unlikely that CP women would not also be disadvantaged by this other factor unless it is specifically related to gender. More research into the causes of CP educational disadvantages would be necessary to preclude this possibility.

Although the results of this study cast doubt on the proposition that CP gender attitudes have a widespread negative effect on LFP rates, it is possible that these attitudes may have some effect on religious switching and that this switching might be related to

female LFP. There is some limited evidence of this possibility in the results. White women who were not raised as CPs but *became* CPs appear to have reduced LFP, although this effect is not quite significant. It is possible that these women joined CP denominations because they preferred to be stay-at-home moms and the religious environment in the CP denomination was more amenable to that choice. However, the fact that men who were not raised as CPs but became CPs also have reduced LFP greater in magnitude than that of women who became CPs suggests a different interpretation. It could be that the downwardly mobile are for some reason or another drawn to CP denominations or that some other factor is involved. Without more information it is difficult to say.

For black women religious switching also plays a part in LFP. It appears that the combination of being raised a CP and leaving the denomination has a positive impact on LFP for black women. The fact that the majority of African-Americans were raised in CP denominations may provide the key to understanding this phenomenon. Being a member of a CP denomination may provide greater social capital (i.e. connections to the community) for black women, which could result in greater job opportunities and greater LFP. Upward mobility may then result in women leaving those conservative denominations for more liberal ones or their careers could make them less dependent on those religious social structures. Thus, greater LFP might be associated with religious switching out of conservatism. Because black women are more likely to be single parents, it is also possible that switching out of a CP denomination makes black women less able to utilize community support and therefore be more dependent on paid work. However, without knowing when in

their adult lives these women switched religions all of these possibilities are based on large amounts of speculation.

The answer to Research Question 7, whether there is a difference in the effect of CP affiliation on female LFP due to race, remains somewhat ambiguous. For both black and white women there are no statistically significant effects of being raised or becoming a CP once educational, household, and socioeconomic factors are controlled. However, for black women being raised a CP and leaving appears to have a positive effect. In fact, all of the CP variables in Model 13 are positive, and although these variables are not statistically significant the idea that CP affiliation may have some positive impact on the LFP of black women cannot be ruled out. The findings concerning race in this paper are at least enough to warrant continued investigation of racial differences in the effects of being a CP and of continuing to separate whites and blacks in the analyses.

Conclusions

Because of the more traditional gender attitudes of CPs it would seem logical that women who were raised in CP families would be less likely to be in the labor force than other women. As it turns out, the LFP of women raised as CPs is in fact less than that of other women, but this effect may have nothing to do with gender attitudes. CP women have lower rates of LFP because they have on average less education than other women. It might be assumed that this reduced education might be an alternate pathway by which gender mediates the effect of CP rearing on female LFP, as we might expect CPs to have lower

career aspirations for their young women than their young men. However, for white CPs at least this is not the case; in fact, the negative effect of a CP upbringing on education appears to be greater for white males (0.54 years) than it is for white females (0.40 years). If anything, white CPs have greater gender parity in educational attainment than white non-CP. For blacks, there may be greater gender parity in educational attainment for CPs as well, only this parity is achieved by a reduction in the educational advantage of black females over black males (from 0.70 years for non-CPs to 0.43 for CPs).

Besides showing that the effects of a CP upbringing on female LFP are primarily about education and that gender played little part in that relationship, the research in this paper shows that the effect of a CP upbringing on LFP is similar for both men and women. Being raised a CP reduces education which reduces LFP for both males and females. In fact, even the magnitudes of these effects are surprisingly similar. Such a finding has important implications for theorizing about this relationship. Any factor or set of factors that could be said to cause reduced LFP for CPs would have to: 1) work through education and 2) have similar effects on both genders. Anti-intellectualism fits the bill; gender attitudes does not, at least within the limits of the available data (i.e., no direct measures of gender attitudes). Thus, the findings in this paper support the idea that it is perhaps CP anti-intellectualism that has a negative effect on both male and female LFP through its effect on educational attainment. The results also fail to support the idea that CP gender attitudes reduce female LFP to any significant degree (within the limits of the study, lacking direct measures of gender attitudes).

This research does contain certain limitations. First and foremost, the operational definition of conservative Protestantism used in this paper is not the only possible way to definition. This set of religious groups is fairly diverse both theologically and socially. However, social scientists find it difficult to differentiate within the CP spectrum of denominations when designing surveys and respondents have difficulty differentiating when answering them. In addition, there have been a variety of different coding schemes for defining CPs, most of them done with a particular dataset in mind. Smith's (1990) technique is used in this research because it was designed using denominations found in the GSS dataset. This makes replication easier and avoids the possible accusation that the coding scheme was chosen to produce a particular result. Secondly, this research does not investigate whether there might be differences between CPs and non-CPs for married women or women with young children. This distinction could be important as so much of the CP literature opposing women working outside the home focuses on these women (Sherkat 2000). Such an investigation was left for future study. Finally, this research does not investigate the large and significant between-group (i.e. between-year) variance in the effect of being raised a CP on female LFP. This limitations, as well, will be addressed in future research.

Despite these limitations, this research indicates support for the idea that the relationship between conservative Protestant religious affiliation and female LFP is not so much an issue of gender inequality within conservative Protestantism as it is a product of CP reluctance toward education. This reluctance does not seem to be aimed specifically and

women and may even affect women less than men. As well, men's LFP is as negatively affected by this reluctance toward education as women's LFP is. Thus, in spite of evidence of greater gender discrimination among CPs when it comes to issues of education and work (at least in the CP population at large) it cannot be significantly found in their behavior.

CHAPTER 3

Trends in the Relationship between Conservative Protestant Religious Affiliation and Female Labor Force Participation, 1974-2004

Female labor force participation (LFP) has been strongly associated with more liberal attitudes toward gender. This association has been found to work in both directions. LFP tends to liberalize women's views and the views of other members of their family, and liberal gender views tend to make women more likely to participate in the labor force (Cunningham, et al. 2005; Fan & Marini 2000; Mason & Lu 1988; Wright & Young 1998). For this reason, groups with conservative gender attitudes such as conservative Protestants (CPs) have been thought to have lower rates of female LFP, and some research has confirmed this suspicion (Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 2006; Lehrer 1995; Sherkat 2000). However, most of this research uses data from a very limited time period, and it has not been known whether CP affiliation or a CP upbringing has consistently had negative impacts on female LFP over the recent history of labor in the United States.

In the previous chapter I tested this relationship using data collected from 1974-2004 and did in fact find that conservative Protestantism has a negative effect on female LFP, but I also found that this effect worked primarily through education, as CPs have significantly less than average education. Once differences in education are accounted for I found no significant effect of conservative Protestantism on female LFP, for either those raised as CPs or for those who became CPs later. In addition, I found that the effect of being raised a CP

on LFP was similar for both males and females in the sense that education seemed to account for this negative association for both white men and women, although becoming a CP after childhood had a significant negative effect on the LFP of men net of the mediating effect of education. However, those analyses only measured those effects that were relatively consistent over time, but during the analysis I also found evidence (i.e. a significant random effect for the variable “Raised CP”) to indicate that while being raised a CP may not have a consistent effect on female LFP it may have a time-varying effect. That is, there may be an effect in some years but not in others. The implication of such a finding (if it upholds further scrutiny) is that for some reason the effect of being a CP on female LFP has changed during the period in question (1974-2004).

The intent of the present chapter is to investigate the nature of that change and to understand the reason(s) why this change may have occurred. Three possibilities come to mind. First, the female LFP of CPs may have been less than that of other women in the early part of the period in question (the 1970s and early 1980s) and then as demands for women to enter the workforce increased CPs became less resistant and the difference in female LFP disappeared. Second, the reverse could have happened. In the 1970s when few women were in the labor force, families did not need religious reasons for women not to work, but as demands on families increased only women with strong convictions (i.e. those backed by religion) could stay out of the labor force. Finally, it is possible that CPs and non-CPs approach female LFP from slightly different perspectives so that forces that push women toward or pull women into the labor force have a different effect on CPs than on non-CPs. If

this third possibility is true, the effect of being a CP on female LFP will vary as economic forces vary. Understanding which of these three (if any) is true will help bring a better understanding of American CPs, their approach toward the family, and how that approach affects female LFP.

Changing Female Labor Force Participation

The impressive rise in female labor force participation (LFP) that has occurred since World War II is widely considered to be one of the most important demographic shifts in the twentieth century. Participation rates rose from 20% to more than 65% over the century, most of that increase occurring during a fifty year period between the mid-40s and mid-90s (Anderson 1988; Szafran 2002). Beyond this change in participation, the make-up of the female workforce changed dramatically as well. During the early part of the century and even during the Great Depression, most of the women with formal jobs were unmarried, African-American, foreign born, or fairly poor (Anderson 1988). During World War II and in its aftermath, the number of married women from the native-born, white majority (and from the middle classes) increased dramatically.

To a large degree, these women began entering the work force because of increased opportunities (often referred to as “pull factors”). The economic boom that occurred during the 1940s and 50s was not simply an expansion of previously strong industries but a massive increase in a variety of employment sectors that had been previously small or nonexistent. Some of the most important of these sectors included clerical work, retail sales, services, and

other jobs that were traditionally considered women's work (Anderson 1988; Oppenheimer 1967; Oppenheimer 1973). The increases in these sectors led to an increased demand for female labor. However, the birth cohorts during the early half of the twentieth century had been relatively small, meaning that the population of young female women was small as well (Oppenheimer 1967; 1973). Add to that the lowered age of marriage characteristic of the post-World War II period, and what remains is a highly restricted supply of unmarried women to fill the increasing demand for female labor. This supply and demand imbalance resulted in an increase in female LFP in general and the inclusion of more married women and mothers (England and Farkas 1986).

The demand for specifically female labor served as a prominent factor in the increase of female LFP at least until the end of the 1960s. Even after that point women's wages have continued to increase often out-pacing increases in the wages of men, although never truly competing with men's wages (Cotter, et al. 2001; DeNavas-Walt, et al. 2007). In addition, other opportunity factors continue to pull women into the labor force. Educational opportunities for women continued to become more prevalent throughout the period. The feminist movement helped to open opportunities for women in all aspects of life, and some feminists have focused on female LFP as a way to bring about more power for women (Jackson 1998; Manza & Brooks 1998). Thus, more women began to see a job as personally empowering. Furthermore, women are marrying later and having fewer children (Risman, et al. 1999). They are therefore more able to gain skills before starting a family, resulting in

their opportunities for continued employment once they have a family being greatly improved.

Despite the importance of increased opportunities for women, economic strains on families (i.e. push factors) have also been significant in their impact on female LFP. Even during the post-World War II expansion, households faced significant economic stressors that may have led to increased female LFP. Between the 1940s and 1970s male wages as a whole increased, but the wage trajectory within men's careers changed dramatically (Oppenheimer 1979; 1994). Rather than starting at a modest wage that increased steadily as was the case in the 1940s and early 50s, men were increasingly remaining at a low wage during young-adulthood before seeing accelerated income as they entered middle-age. Thus, families faced an economic bind during the time in which they were most likely to be raising children. Oppenheimer argues that this fact may have contributed to LFP increases of mothers of school-aged children during the 50s, 60s, and 70s.

Since the late 1970s, economic pressures have continued to play a significant role in female LFP. The overall decline in men's earnings during this time has been one of the most important factors. From the late 1970s to the late 1990s, the median income earned by a male worker in the United States, measured in constant dollars, declined (DeNavas-Walt, et al. 2007). More specifically, median earnings declined during the recession of the early 1980s, recovered in the mid 1980s and then declined significantly after 1987. It was not until the late 1990s that men's wages began to rise significantly again. Even then, male earnings only remained high for a few years before beginning to decline in 2003. During this time

female earnings suffered only a few slight setbacks within an overall steady upward rise. Some scholars argue that as male earnings declined men became increasingly unable to meet the economic demands of their households, and more women were *pushed* into the labor force (Bernhardt, et al. 1995). This meant increases in the LFP of mothers of young children, which had been the category of women most resistant to LFP for both pragmatic and ideological reasons.

Men's earnings are not the only push factor that led to continued increases in female LFP after 1970. Economic uncertainty due to global economic restructuring, particularly during the 1970s and early 1980s was an important factor that served to push women into the paid labor force (Edwards 2001b). Also, the rise in housing costs, which out-stripped increases in other goods and services over the period, may have led to more women entering the workforce (Edwards 2001a).

Although female LFP grew throughout the twentieth century, attitudes towards women, particularly mothers, working outside the home lagged behind considerably (Rindfuss, et al. 1996). Many Americans worried about the effect on children, especially young children, of maternal absence from the home, but they also worried about the demise of the separate spheres model as the family ideal. Many people believed (and some still do) that the division of family life into the domestic sphere of the wife and the breadwinning sphere of the husband is a natural phenomenon, one ordained by God (Bartkowski 1997; Gallagher 2003). Thus, people from various religious backgrounds struggled to accept the dual-earner family as the new American norm. Although members of a variety of groups

have shown a reticence to changing gender dynamics in the home, the one group that has been the most distinctive in their opposition to changing gender norms with regard to marriage and the division of labor in the home has been conservative Protestants (Grasmick, et al. 1990; Hall 1995; Peek, et al. 1991).

Gender and Family Views of Conservative Protestants

The designation conservative Protestant (CP) is used in this paper to describe an inter-related set of Protestant denominations and congregations that stem from the fundamentalist, evangelical, and Pentecostal traditions (Smith 1990; Woodberry and Smith 1998). Although these traditions are different in their approaches to the relationship between Christianity and society, they are combined by two key theological tenets: belief in the conversion or "born again" experience and belief in a literal interpretation of scripture (Smith 1990). In spite of their differences there is a long tradition of combining these groups into a single category for research, and there is ample reason to do so considering the difficulty researchers (and even CPs themselves) have had in discriminating between conservative traditions (Smith 1990; Woodberry and Smith 1998).

There is, however, another tradition within religious research of distinguishing between black and white traditions in conservative Protestantism, this distinction being much easier to apply in practice due to the great amount of segregation within American religion (Woodberry and Smith 1998). There is reason to believe that the family and gender ideas of the African-American CP tradition do not differ from those of mainstream Americans in the

same way that the ideas of the white CP tradition do and that CP affiliation may affect the LFP of women differently for those in black CP churches compared to those in white CP churches (Glass & Nath 2006). The previous chapter offers continued support for treating blacks and whites separately when examining the effects of CP affiliation. In the present chapter, this separation means that the analysis done here only refers to white CPs for two reasons. First, the ideological differences described herein between CPs and non-CPs refer primarily to the white CP tradition. Second, none of the time-varying effects of CP affiliation found for whites in this paper were found in the analysis of blacks. Rather than reporting only null findings for black women I have limited this paper to comparing white CPs and white non-CPs.

Much social science research on CP families has focused on their support for a traditional view of gender that includes the separate spheres model of the family that dominated American family life during the early-to-mid twentieth century (Denton 2004; Gallagher 2004). According to this model, wives are responsible for the maintenance and care of the home and the children and husbands are responsible for earning an income and leading in family relations with respect to the world at large (Anderson 1988; Rindfuss, et al. 1996). Although the belief that the separate spheres model represents the ideal family form continues to permeate American society, CPs support these beliefs for a more fundamental reason. The separate spheres division of household labor and responsibility reinforces the gender essentialist ideas that they see in the Bible (Bartkowski 1997; Gallagher and Smith 1999). The dominant CP perspective has been that the family is an inherently gendered

institution and that this gendered nature is God-ordained (Bartkowski 1997; Gallagher 2004; Gallagher 2003). From this perspective, males and females are different not just biologically but functionally as well. God made the sexes different for a reason, and that reason is brought to fruition in their different roles within the family (Bartkowski 1997; Bloch 2000; Gallagher 2003; Heath 2003).

Although these views may not be exclusive to CPs, a positive relationship has been established between both affiliation with a CP denomination and belief in Biblical inerrancy on the one hand and conservative views on gender on the other (Peek, et al. 1991; Grasmick, et al. 1990). In addition, CP affiliation has been associated with more traditional family behaviors as well. CP wives and wives of CP husbands report doing more housework than other wives, and previous research has found that CP women and women raised in CP families are in general less likely to work outside the home than other women (Ellison & Bartkowski 2002; Glass and Jacobs 2005; Lehrer 1995). Other research has shown that CP women are different from non-CP women in their LFP in more specific ways. Sherkat (2000), for example, finds that CP women were more likely than non-CPs to drop out of the labor force if they had a child in the past few years. Glass and Nath (2006) finds similarly that women raised as CPs who married or had children between 1988 and 1993 had reduced LFP in 1993.

In each of the above cases, the effect of being a CP on female LFP is assumed to be constant, and the conclusions drawn about that effect are based on that assumption.

However, women's participation in paid labor has changed dramatically over the past few

decades, as have the effects of other factors on female LFP. The positive effect of education on female LFP has increased over time, as has the effect of the number of children in the home (Cohen & Bianchi 1999; Eggebeen 1988). Moreover, the effects of marriage, other household income, and having children under the age of six on female LFP have become less negative over time (Cohen and Bianchi 1999; Eggebeen 1988; Goldin 1990). In light of these changes it would be wise to consider that the effect of being a CP on female LFP might have changed as well.

Previous investigations of the effect of CP religious affiliation on the female LFP of CPs have consistently focused on CP views concerning gender and their stronger than average support for the gendered division of labor in family life. However, there are considerable questions as to the extent to which gender viewpoints are responsible for differences in female LFP. Although in the aggregate CPs may be more conservative on views about gender than those of other religious backgrounds CP views vary greatly even within sub-traditions, and many adherents of mainline Protestant and other religious traditions also share in these traditional views (Bartkowski 1996; Bartkowski 1997; Gay, et al. 1996; Lockhart 2000). In addition, the differences between CPs and other Americans on gender views have declined in recent years (McConkey 2001). Furthermore, CPs have been able to re-interpret their theological viewpoint on gender to a more egalitarian perspective that enables them to adapt to the economic and cultural needs of contemporary life (Bloch 2000; Gallagher 2003; Gallagher and Smith 1999). Gallagher and Smith (1999; also Gallagher 2003) argue that during the 1980s, the focus of CP literature and leadership turned

from the polemic to the pragmatic in their discussions of gender and family life. They contend that this change in perspective specifically allowed CPs to adapt to the growing need to send their wives and mothers into the labor force, an assertion that is supported by other researchers as well (Bloch 2000; Donovan 1998; Heath 2003).

Some scholars go on to suggest that CP family ideology is far less about placing the man over the woman and much more about placing the interests of the family over the interests of the individual (e.g. McNamara 1985). Gallagher (2004), for instance, finds that CPs tend to be critical of feminism but not because they oppose the idea of gender equality. Many CPs applaud feminists for working to end the oppression of women (or at least aspects of it), but they find many feminist arguments to be self-centered—too focused on what the woman can gain for herself or for women as a gender. These views run counter to the CP perspective in which both women and men are called to sacrifice their own desires for the good of the family (McNamara 1985). Furthermore, a review of CP writers' views on female LFP found that their opposition focused on the needs of children to have their mothers at home; that is, they focused on the needs of the family out-weighting the needs of the woman (Sherkat 2000). Several authors even went out of their way to be respectful of women in the workplace especially those in positions of authority. Their view was by and large not against women in the workplace but for making decisions that are best for the family first.

These findings suggest that CP women might be less likely than other women to be pulled into the labor force when economic forces make LFP more advantageous for women. In other words, CP female LFP would be less affected by pull factors. There is also evidence

that CP women might be more likely to be pushed into the labor force by economic needs in the household. In a study of comparative responses to vignettes presented in the 1986 GSS, CPs were found to be more critical than members of other Christian groups of women who do not go to work when their family was in economic need (Will and Cochran 1995). While that study found that both conservative and mainline Protestants were less generous than liberal Protestants in offering welfare to needy families, CPs were differentiated from all other groups in that they were less generous in recommending welfare support for families whose mothers were depicted as unemployed because they were either not looking for work or because they could only find low-wage employment. Thus, while CPs have a greater expectation that women stay home with their children if the family can afford it, they also have a greater expectation that women to go to work if the family is in financial need. These two seemingly incompatible expectations make sense from the perspective that CP attitudes about female LFP are mostly about placing family needs above individual ones.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The analysis performed in the previous chapter suggests that the female LFP of CPs, though not consistently different from that of non-CPs, may have differed from that of non-CPs at certain times between 1974 and 2004. In this research I am interested in understanding the nature of that variation. From a simply historical perspective, the female LFP of CPs when compared to that of non-CPs may have increased, decreased, varied in a more complex but systematic manner, or varied randomly over the time period. Before

addressing the more theoretical hypotheses, I will try to answer the question: What historical pattern does the difference between the female LFP of CPs and that of non-CPs follow over the period 1974-2004?

A second research question, which is more theoretically relevant is: Do the differences in female LFP between CPs and non-CPs follow any relevant changes in the economic climate? If differences in the ideology behind female LFP are due to an emphasis of CPs on family needs over individual ones as I have argued, then the LFP of non-CP women would increase more than that of CP women when pull factors are greatest and the LFP of CP women would increase more than that of non-CP women when push factors are the greatest. In this research I test three hypotheses: two related to pull factors (female labor demand and female wages) and one related to a push factor (men's wages).

Hypothesis 1: The female LFP of non-CPs will increase more than that of CPs as female labor demand increases.

Hypothesis 2: The female LFP of non-CPs will increase more than that of CPs as female annual wages increase.

Hypothesis 3: The female LFP of CPs will increase more than that of non-CPs as male annual wages decline.

Data and Variables

This study uses data from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is a survey of United States adults over the age of 18. It has been conducted on a regular basis (at least every other year) since 1972 using a randomized, cluster sample technique to sample households. Interviews are collected from one randomly selected adult living in each

household. All white, female respondents from 1974 to 2004 for which data is available for all relevant variables were used in the analysis. Data from the years 1972-73 could not be used because respondents' income was not measured in those years, meaning that an important control variable "other household income" could not be calculated. The total number of white, female cases in the GSS for these years is 19,867. After those with missing data were excluded 16,665 cases were used in the analysis. The data was weighted to correct sampling error caused by multiple adults living in a household.

Because of the sociocultural differences between white and black CP denominations detailed earlier, blacks and whites are analyzed separately. This approach follows that used in other research on this topic (Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 2006). Preliminary analysis showed that there were no differences between black CPs and black non-CPs with regard to female LFP except for those described in the previous chapter. For this reason, these models are not discussed in this paper, and the paper refers only to differences among whites. Those whose race is classified in the GSS as "other" were also excluded from the analysis because of the diversity of this group and the fact that their small numbers prevented a separate analysis. Thus, the results of this research should only be used to apply to white Americans.

The dependent variable, labor force participation, is measured as a dichotomous variable. Respondents are considered in the labor force if in the week before taking the survey they were working full time, working part time, employed but not working last week, unemployed, laid off, or looking for work. Although distinctions could have been made

between various degrees of participation, the dichotomous variable was chosen for two reasons. First, the key issues of this paper are ideological: whether working outside the home is the *right* thing for a woman to do. Thus, whether or not she is able to get a job or to work part-time or full-time is less important. Second, several formulations of this variable were used in earlier renderings of the research. These formulations showed that there were no significant differences at the intermediate levels of participation. Religious differences could only be found between the non-participation category and the other categories (mainly when placed in opposition to the full-time employment category). In other words, a multi-level dependent variable made the analysis far more complicated without providing any more clarity to the problem.

The key independent variable, conservative Protestant, is a dichotomous variable constructed from a three point fundamentalism scale within the GSS dataset that codes Christian respondents based on the relative fundamentalism or liberalism of the respondent's denomination. All respondents coded as "fundamentalist" are considered to be CPs; all other respondents, including non-Christians are considered to be non-CPs. Denominations considered to be fundamentalist were considered so because of their beliefs about the inerrancy of the Bible and a personal salvation experience (see Smith 1990 for a fuller description). Although the term fundamentalist was used it is clear from the description offered by Smith (1990) that the label is intended to describe the greater range of conservative Protestant groups. Respondents who gave no information about their religion or

whose denominational conservatism was considered undeterminable in the fundamentalism scale were counted as missing for this variable (599 missing cases).

In order to limit the possibility of reverse causality, respondents were also grouped based on a combination of their childhood and current religious affiliation. Respondents who were CPs as a child and were currently CPs when interviewed are coded as continuous CPs. Those who were CPs as a child but not CPs when interviewed are coded as early CPs. Those who were not CPs as a child but were CPs when interviewed are coded as late CPs. Other respondents are coded as never CPs, which is used as the reference category.

Several other independent variables were measured at the individual level and used in the analysis. Marital status is differentiated by three dummy variables—married, divorced or separated, and widowed—with never married being the reference category. The total number of children in the home (under 18 years of age) and the presence of at least one child under six years of age in the home were also used, as well as the respondent's age and an age-squared term. Education was measured in years completed with some adaptations made to place respondents with the same diplomas and degrees earned at the same education levels (see Chapter 2 for details). Other household income was calculated by subtracting the respondent's income from the household income. Both income measures were recalculations in constant dollars constructed by NORC (National Opinion Research Center) researchers that are included in the GSS dataset (see Ligon 1989 for a description of this recalculation process). The natural log of other income was used in the analyses (where other income was \$0 the natural log of other income was defined as 0).

Other variables were measured for the survey year and used to approximate changes in labor conditions. The median annual income of a full-time male worker in constant 2006 dollars (in \$1,000s), the median annual income of a female worker (measured similarly), and female labor demand as a proportion of male labor demand (male unemployment rate / female unemployment rate) were used. In Chapter 2 it was found that these variables are correlated to LFP most readily when short-term fluctuations are minimized by averaging them over a three year period. Thus, each year-level variable is the average of that indicators value for the survey year and the two previous years. Each of these variables was centered on their mean for the dataset. Variables representing the year (survey year - 1974), the year squared, and the year cubed were also used to give an historical approximation of the changes in female LFP and the effect of being a CP on female LFP over time. Descriptive statistics on all variables are listed in Table 3-1.

Analytical Methods and Results

The analysis was done using Bernoulli Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM), a version of HGLM that is basically the HLM version of logistic regression (see Raudenbush, et al. 2004 for details). The hierarchical or multi-level modeling techniques differ from their single-level counterparts primarily in the way they deal with random effects, also referred to as error. Random effects are simply the variance in the data that cannot be accounted for by the model and are theoretically assumed to be due to unmeasured differences between cases. In a multi-level dataset in which individuals are clustered into

Table 3-1
Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Labor Force Participation	0.55	0.50	0	1
Married	0.55	0.50	0	1
Widowed	0.15	0.36	0	1
Divorced/Separated	0.16	0.37	0	1
Number of Children	0.70	1.09	0	5
Child Under 6	0.17	0.38	0	1
Age	46.87	18.11	18	90
High School	0.55	0.50	0	1
Any Degree	0.24	0.43	0	1
Other Income (ln)	8.00	3.80	0	12.00
Conservative Protestant	0.28	0.45	0	1
Continuous CP	0.21	0.41	0	1
Early CP	0.07	0.26	0	1
Late CP	0.07	0.25	0	1
WT7204 (household weight)	0.97	0.40	0.46	4.13
Male Wages (annual earnings in thousands of 2006 dollars)	42.94	0.97	41.13	44.61
Male Wages—3 yr. average	43.01	0.76	41.34	44.11
Female Wages (annual earnings in thousands of 2006 dollars)	28.61	2.61	24.99	33.85
Female Wages—3 yr. average	28.32	2.59	25.04	33.63
Female Labor Demand (Male Unemp./Female Unemp.)	0.96	0.11	0.73	1.11
Female Labor Demand—3 yr. average	0.95	0.11	0.72	1.11

groups, these random effects could be due to both unmeasured differences between individuals and unmeasured differences between groups. In other words, if one were to apply the model equation to each of the groups the model would fit some groups better than

others just as it would fit some individuals better than others. Single level models assume that all of this error is caused by variations between individuals. This is problematic when it comes to estimating both the model and test statistics in a multi-level model because it violates the independence assumptions of the model (see Hox 2002 for a fuller explanation). Multi-level models and other random effects models divide the error into two parts, one attributed to random differences between individuals (termed error) and the other attributed to random differences between the groups (termed random effects). Ordinary random effects models do this by simply creating a random error term, which applies to random variance between the groups (i.e. variance not related to any of the independent variables or to differences between individuals). However, this assumes that the coefficients of the independent variables in the model do not vary from group to group.

HLM and other multi-level modeling techniques allow not only for a general random effect that accounts for unmeasured differences between groups but allows also for random effects for each of the independent variables. Each of these random effects estimates how much the coefficient of an independent variable would vary from group to group if it were allowed to vary. In other words, it estimates how much the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable varies randomly from group to group. In the present analysis, all individual-level variables are assumed to have group-level random effects except age and age-squared (attributing random effects to age-squared creates computation problems). These random effects become important when adding group-level variables to the model and when interacting group level variables with individual level variables. When group-level variables

are added to the model, they affect the group-level random effects (hopefully by reducing them) just as adding individual-level variables serve to reduce the individual-level error by accounting for some of it. In addition, tests of significance of group-level variables are based on group-level variance estimates and not individual-level ones, making them less biased.

HLM also allows for cross-level interactions. In a cross-level interaction, an individual-level variable is multiplied times a group-level variable. The coefficient of the individual level variable is then assumed to vary from group to group by some multiple of the value of the group-level variable for that group. In essence the effect of the individual-level variable is predicted to change from group-to-group and the change in the effect is predicted to be correlated with the group-level variable. The coefficient of the cross-level interaction estimates the magnitude of the correlated change, and the test statistic estimates whether the change in the individual-level variable is in fact correlated with the group level variable. Here the random effect for the individual-level independent variable estimates the variance in the variable that remains unaccounted for by adding the cross-level interaction term. Tests of significance for these interaction terms, like those for group-level variables are based on group-level variance estimates.

HLM's ability to model multiple random effects, group-level variables (with appropriate standard errors), and cross-level interactions (also with appropriate standard errors) makes it an advantageous method for the present analysis for several reasons. First, the data was collected in waves, and each wave of data was collected in a different year representing a different economic situation; thus, they should be treated as grouped data with

each year having some shared variance. Second, female LFP has changed dramatically over the time period, and this change should be modeled as differences between years. Third, the factors effecting female LFP are known to vary in their effects on female LFP, and this variance should be included in the model (Cohen and Bianchi 2000; Eggebeen 1988). Fourth and perhaps most importantly, the key questions in the paper are whether the *effect* of being a CP on female LFP varies over time and what the nature of this variance is. HLM's modeling of cross-level interactions helps to answer these questions.

All individual level variables were group-mean centered. Group-mean centering allows for less biased estimates of the variance in a coefficient from year-to-year because it eliminates the effect of any correlations that may exist between changes in the coefficient of a variable from year to year and changes in that variable's distribution from year to year. For example, the effect of having a college education on female LFP might be shown to be stronger in 2004 than in 1974, not because the effect is actually stronger but because there are more female college graduates in 2004 and the likelihood of being in the labor force is greater in 2004. By adjusting for these group (i.e., year) differences in the distribution of the variable through group-mean centering, it is possible to isolate the true change in the effect from any residual effect of changes in the distribution. Only the variable age-squared was not group-mean centered because group-mean centering would render it meaningless; the age-squared variable was calculated by squaring the respondent's age once that age was group-mean centered.

Table 3-2
Bernoulli HGLM Models Predicting the Labor Force Participation of White Women

Variables	Model 1 No Interactions Simple CP Variable	Model 2 Year Interactions Simple CP Variable	Model 3 Year Interactions Complex CP Variable
<u>Fixed Effects</u>			
Constant	1.29*	-0.050	-0.0037
Year		0.15*	0.14*
Year ²		-0.0030*	-0.0028*
Married	-0.29*	-0.28*	-0.28*
Divorced or Separated	-0.073	-0.061	-0.049
Widowed	-0.20	-0.18	-0.18
Number of Children	-0.16*	-0.16*	-0.16*
Child under Six	-0.67*	-0.67*	-0.67*
Age	-0.052*	-0.053*	-0.053*
Age Squared	-0.0030*	-0.0030*	-0.0030*
Education	0.16*	0.17*	0.17*
Other Income (ln)	-0.19*	-0.19*	-0.19*
Conservative Protestant	-0.032	0.37*	
CP*Year		-0.17*	
CP*Year ²		0.013*	
CP*Year ³		-0.00027*	
Continuous CP			0.56*
Continuous CP*Year			-0.17*
Continuous CP*Year ²			0.013*
Continuous CP*Year ³			-0.00026*
Early CP			-1.07*
Early CP*Year			0.31*
Early CP*Year ²			-0.019*
Early CP*Year ³			0.00034*
Late CP			-0.17
<u>Random Effects (Variance Components)</u>			
Constant	0.19*	0.066*	0.060*
Married	0.16*	0.15*	0.15*
Divorced or Separated	0.10	0.13	0.11
Widowed	0.045	0.050	0.054
Number of Children	0.0017	0.0016	0.0021
Child under Six	0.084*	0.077*	0.080*
Education	0.0019*	0.0019*	0.0020*
Other Income (ln)	0.00062	0.00063	0.00082
Conservative Protestant	0.061*	0.052*	
Continuous CP			0.053*
Early CP			0.20*
Late CP			0.075
-2 log likelihood	49,170	49,253	49,264

n = 17,131. *indicates statistically significant result ($\alpha = 0.05$).

Table 3-2 (continued)

Variables	Model 4 Economic Indicator Interactions Simple CP Variable	Model 5 Economic Indicator Interactions Complex CP Variable
<u>Fixed Effects</u>		
Constant	1.21*	1.21*
Female Labor Demand	1.15	0.96
Female Annual Wages	0.14*	0.13*
Male Annual Wages	-0.20*	-0.19*
Married	-0.28*	-0.28*
Divorced or Separated	-0.074	-0.064
Widowed	-0.19	-0.18
Number of Children	-0.17*	-0.17*
Child under Six	-0.66*	-0.66*
Age	-0.053*	-0.053*
Age Squared	-0.0030*	-0.0030*
Education	0.17*	0.17*
Other Income (ln)	-0.19*	-0.19*
Conservative Protestant	-0.036	
CP* Female Labor Demand	-2.25*	
CP* Female Annual Wages	0.075*	
CP* Male Annual Wages	-0.16*	
Continuous CP		0.0056
Continuous CP* Female Labor Demand		-1.81*
Continuous CP* Female Annual Wages		0.050
Continuous CP* Male Annual Wages		-0.14
Early CP		0.013
Early CP* Female Labor Demand		3.48*
Early CP* Female Annual Wages		-0.054
Early CP* Male Annual Wages		-0.10
Late CP		-0.18
Late CP* Female Labor Demand		-2.05
Late CP* Female Annual Wages		0.14*
Late CP* Male Annual Wages		-0.33*
<u>Random Effects (Variance Components)</u>		
Constant	0.064*	0.058*
Married	0.15*	0.15*
Divorced or Separated	0.11	0.11
Widowed	0.051	0.049
Number of Children	0.0026	0.003
Child under Six	0.082*	0.084*
Education	0.0020*	0.0020*
Other Income (ln)	0.00062	0.00075
Conservative Protestant	0.053*	
Continuous CP		0.067*
Early CP		0.19*
Late CP		0.057
-2 log likelihood	49,167	49,213

n = 17,131. *indicates statistically significant result ($\alpha = 0.05$).

The results of the statistical analyses are presented in Table 3-2. Similar to the results in Chapter 2, Model 1 finds that for white women there is no fixed (i.e. consistent) effect of being a CP on LFP. When year, year-squared, and year-cubed are added in Model 2, a varying effect is found. The model estimates that the log-odds of being in the labor force were 0.37 *greater* for CP women than non-CP women in 1974 (year 0); the log-odds difference changes after that point following the equation $0.37-0.17x+0.013x^2-0.00027x^3$ (where x is the year minus 1974). The LFP of all women during this period also varied significantly along the equation $-0.05+0.15x-0.003x^2$.




Figure 3-1
Estimated Female Labor Force Participation by Religious Affiliation over Time (Model 2)

Figure 3-1 shows a graph of Model 2 for CP and non-CP women, holding all other variables at their year mean, and converting the equations to percentages. The figure shows that during the mid-1970s the LFP of CP women was higher than that of non-CP women, during much of the 1980s and in the early 2000s it was lower than that of CP women, and during much of the 1990s the LFP of both groups was about the same.

Model 3 is similar to Model 2 but factors in the effect of religious switching. The results of Model 3 show some interesting differences with Model 2. The effect of being a continuous CP (compared to never being a CP) is very similar to that of being a CP in Model 2. Each of the year-interaction coefficients is roughly the same, meaning the effect of being continuously a CP changes along the same curve as the effect of being a CP in Model 2; however, the base coefficient is larger in Model 3 than in Model 2 (0.56 rather than 0.37). This means that the curve representing the effect of being a continuous CP will be shifted upwards. Figure 3-2 shows that difference. In the 1970s and from the early 1990s onward continuous CPs had significantly greater LFP than women who had never been CPs. Only in the 1980s was the LFP of continuous CP women less than that of other women and then only slightly (if at all).

The differences in these coefficients imply that the LFP of religious switchers affects the overall LFP of CPs, non-CPs, or both. The coefficient for Late CPs (-0.17) supports this implication. Although this coefficient is not quite significant ($p = 0.065$), it appears to indicate that women who were raised as non-CPs but became CPs are consistently less likely to be in the labor force than those who remained non-CPs. A more complex situation is




Figure 3-2
 Estimated Female Labor Force Participation by Religious Affiliation over Time (Model 3)

suggested by the coefficients of Early CP and its year interactions. Plotting Model 3 for early CPs in Figure 3-2 illustrates that in the mid-1970s the women who had a CP upbringing but left their religion had lower LFP than either CP women who stayed or those who were never CPs. Then, during the 1980s these women had higher LFP than either group. By the 1990s their LFP was lower than that of CPs but higher than that of non-CPs but did not differ that much from either.

Model 4 shows that the LFP of all white women increased when female wages increased and decreased when men's wages increased (or increased when men's wages declined). The effect of female labor demand is positive but not significant. However, the

effect of each of these indicators on female LFP differs for CPs and non-CPs. As predicted, the effect of female labor demand on LFP is significantly less positive for CPs than non-CPs, and the effect of male wages on LFP is significantly more negative for CPs than non-CPs. However, contrary to predictions, the effect of female wages on LFP is significantly more positive for CPs than non-CPs.

Model 5 shows the effect religious switching has on the effects shown in Model 4. Net of the effects of male and female wages, the effect of female labor demand varies across groups although it is not significant in the entire population. Two of the CP coefficients are statistically significant, meaning there is a significant difference between these women and those who were never CPs, and one (late CP) that is large but not statistically significant. Because the variables in the model were centered, comparisons of these coefficients are not straightforward but requires some recalculation.* After recalculation, the effect of female labor demand on the LFP of women who were never CPs is 1.24, on women who were continuous CPs it is -0.57, on women who were early CPs it is 4.72, and on women who were late CPs it is -0.81. Figure 3-3 shows a graphic representation of this effect over the range of values in the dataset. These calculations reveal that despite some differences between religious switchers and those who maintained their religious affiliation, what really matters in the effect of female labor demand on LFP is current religious affiliation, as both groups of current non-CPs were affected positively and both groups of current CPs were affected negatively.




Figure 3-3
 Estimated Effect of Change in Female Labor Market Strength on Female LFP (Model 5)

Despite this difference in the effects of female labor demand, continuous CPs do not differ significantly from those who were never CPs in the degree that their LFP is affected by changes in either female wages or male wages. However, for late CPs, female wages are more positively correlated with LFP than with those who were never CPs and male wages are more negatively correlated with LFP. A \$1,000 increase in female wages increases the logged likelihood of LFP for the average woman by 0.13—for women who were never CPs it increased this likelihood by 0.11 and for late CPs by 0.25. A \$1,000 increase in male wages decreases the logged likelihood of LFP for the average woman by 0.19—for women who were never CPs it decreased this likelihood by 0.13 and for late CPs by 0.46. Thus, the

greater effects of both male and female wages on the LFP of CPs are much greater for new CPs than lifelong CPs.

Discussion

From a purely historical perspective, the relationship between the LFP of CP women and non-CP women varies over four periods, roughly corresponding to the decades—1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Just comparing CPs and non-CPs (see Figure 3-1) finds that CPs had lower LFP during the 1980s and 2000s, higher participation in the 1970s, and about equal participation in the 1990s. However, once religious switching is included in the model a slightly different picture emerges. Comparing those who have always been CPs to those who have never been CPs finds that during the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s CPs had higher LFP than non-CPs and only during the 1980s did they have lower LFP and then only slightly. Part of the reason for this difference is that women who became CPs later in life appear to have consistently lower LFP than those who have always been CPs. Perhaps more importantly, though, is the LFP of women who were raised as CPs but left their religion later in life. From the early 1980s until the early 1990s, these women had considerably higher LFP than both women who had never been CPs and those who had always been CPs. Interestingly, during the part of the 1970s represented in the data these women had lower LFP than any of the other groups.

These trends suggest that either attitudes, conditions, or both changed dramatically over this time period. It is possible that during the 1970s women working outside the home

was less of an issue within conservative Protestantism as female LFP rates were still relatively low and women (at least white, non-poor women) tended to work after their children had begun school. As female LFP increased in the 1980s, however, female LFP became more of an issue. Although no groups actually reduced their participation, many CP women who worked outside the home may have left their religious denomination because they felt unsupported or their viewpoint became incompatible with conservative Protestantism. The fact that CP joiners have lower LFP supports this idea. Women who stay at home may feel that a CP denomination supports their lifestyle more than a non-CP one, and therefore they may be more likely to join a CP denomination. The gender ideology issue within CP circles took place mostly during the late 1980s and by the early 1990s CPs had begun to change their ideology to better fit the dual-earner family. Thus, CP women were less likely to leave their denomination if they worked outside the home.

I believe this to be only a partial explanation. It does not include the underlying causes of increases in female LFP, and although it could explain equal LFP for CPs and non-CPs it does not explain why CP women had greater LFP than non-CP women, particularly during the 1970s. The theory I have suggested is that CPs respond to push and pull forces differently than non-CP women, and I laid out three hypotheses to test this theory.

Hypothesis 1 is supported by these findings. In Model 4 the effect of female labor demand on CPs is negative compared to that of non-CPs, and in Model 5 the effect of female labor demand on continuous CPs is negative compared to that of never CPs. The graphic representation of the model in Figure 3 shows that the effect of female labor demand on CPs

(both those who have always been CPs and those who became CPs) is almost 0, and the effect on never CPs is slightly positive. However, for those who became CPs later in life their LFP is highly and positively correlated with female labor demand. Thus, women who have never been CPs are somewhat more likely than those who have always been CPs to be positively influenced by a favorable labor market (i.e. increased opportunities), and those women who left CP denominations are *much* more likely than all of the other groups to be positively influenced toward LFP by a favorable labor market.

Hypothesis 3 is also supported to a degree by these findings. In Model 4, the LFP of both CPs and non-CPs were negatively correlated to male wages, but the LFP of CPs was more negatively correlated to changing male wages. Thus, CP women were more likely to increase their LFP as male wages declined than non-CP women were. In Model 5, this difference still exists between continuous CPs and never CPs but is not statistically significant. However, those women who become CPs later in life are the more greatly and negatively affected by changes in men's wages than any other group.

Hypothesis 2 is not supported by these findings. In Model 4, the LFP of non-CPs is actually more positively correlated with female wages than that of CPs. In Model 5, continuous CPs are not significantly different from never CPs in this respect, but the LFP of both are positively correlated with female wages. Model 5 also finds that the LFP of late CPs is more positively correlated with female wages than that of never CPs.

These results support the basic premise that the LFP of CP women and non-CP women are affected differently by changes in economic conditions; however, the greater

effect is seen on religious switchers. The effect of a labor market favorable to females is more positive for women who were never CPs than on CP women. However, it has a greater effect on the LFP of non-CP women who were formerly CPs. Reduced male wages has a greater negative effect on CPs in general, but it was those who changed denominations who were more greatly affected. Female wages works in the opposite direction than anticipated, but it is also more positively correlated with the LFP of women who became CPs later in life.

Although these findings do not fully support the hypotheses, they do make sense in light of the underlying theory that CP attitudes toward female LFP are more about family need than personal opportunity. Note that those women who left CP denominations have LFP that is highly correlated with the female labor market. This may indicate that women whose attitudes towards work were more opportunity-oriented were also more likely to feel at odds with their CP upbringing and leave their denomination. Hence, these women were among those more likely to respond to increased opportunities for women. Women who were continuously CPs were not affected (or perhaps slightly negatively affected) by the female labor market in contrast to non-CP women. CP women are in general more likely to increase LFP as men's wages decline, but it is CP newcomers who are more affected by this tendency. Two explanations seem plausible. First, women who choose to become CPs may do so because their philosophies are in line with the CP family-first philosophy; therefore, their LFP tends to vary more with family need than with the labor market. Second, it could be that the growth of CP denominations during this time-period has come mostly by bringing in families with this philosophy. Of course, each of these findings and their explanations fit

with the general expectations of this paper. The findings with regard to changes in female income, however, are contrary to expectations. The LFP of CPs in general and late CPs in particular is more positively correlated with female wages than that of women who were never CPs. Female wages are a pull factor; however, if CP women are entering the labor force due to economic needs, then they are making an economic decision based on whether the woman can earn enough to justify working outside the home. Thus, this finding does fit with the basic theory. For CPs in general, and specifically those who became CPs as adults, female LFP is more highly associated with economic forces than with increased opportunities.

Perhaps the best way to explain these results is to use the results from Models 4 and 5 (those using economic factors) to help interpret the purely historic trends found in Models 2 and 3. Model 3 shows that during the mid-1970s CP women had greater participation than non-CP women. At that point male incomes were on the decline, whereas female incomes continued to rise. During the early 1980s, when the LFP of women who had never been CPs equaled that of CPs and those who had left CP denominations passed it, the situation had changed. Male wages had recovered in the late 1970s but declined to mid-1970s levels by 1982. Then, they rose throughout the 1980s. The female labor market during the mid-to-late 1970s was rather weak, with much higher unemployment than the male labor market. In the early 1980s, both male and female labor markets were poor. However, they were equally poor, and once the markets recovered in the mid-1980s the female labor market was as strong as the male labor market. So, if the short-term recovery of men's wages in the late-1970s is

removed from the picture, the two time periods appear very different. The mid-1970s features declining men's wages and a weaker female labor market. The mid-to-late 1980s features increasing men's wages and a strong female labor market. Given this perspective, perhaps the 1980s featured a greater proportion of women working because they wanted to and not because they needed to. As this difference seems to be the key element in CP attitudes on the subject (Sherkat 2000), it would make sense that the LFP of non-CP women would be greater than that of CP women during this period.

The 1990s, however, presented a very different economic period. Men's wages declined sharply in 1989 and 1990 and remained low throughout the decade. Female wages continued to increase and the female labor market, as it focused on services rather than construction and manufacturing remained more stable. Thus in the 1990s, it is likely that when compared to the 1980s more women were working because they needed to rather than because they had to. Thus, women who had always been CPs actually became more likely to participate in the labor force than those who had never been CPs. It is likely that this need of CP women to work outside the home that more than anything else led to the recent changes in CP ideology concerning gender roles in the home. After 2000, female LFP stabilized and differences between the religious groupings diminished.

This research is not without its limitations. Measurements of the conservativeness of religious denominations are not exact, and there are substantial differences in attitudes toward gender roles in general and female LFP in particular within and between CP denominations as well as in other religious circles outside CP denominations. The variables

used in this paper may not completely capture that difference. In addition, this research uses economic indicators that only partially represent the trends that they are intended to indicate. I attempt to counter this limitation by using both the models using indicators with those using a curvilinear trend estimation in my final explanation of the findings. Finally, this research does not take into consideration differences in family situations, other than controlling for those differences. If CP women are more likely to be in the labor force in response to family need, as I argue, then the presence or absence of push factors within the family might result in greater or lesser LFP for CPs than for non-CPs. I plan to deal with this issue in the next Chapter.

Conclusions

As was already established in Chapter 2, the LFP of white CP women is not consistently less than that of other white women, nor was it 35 years ago in the mid-1970s. In fact, it was actually greater then. Differences in the female LFP of CPs and non-CPs vary over time between 1974 and 2004 so that at times CPs have greater LFP, at other times non-CPs do, and at times their LFP is about equal. These trends are consistent with a CP ideology that encourages female LFP when economic circumstances are pushing women into the labor force but discourages female LFP when women are entering due to increased opportunities. Economic trends that pushed women into the labor force may then have led to changes in CP attitudes toward female LFP, which may in the future diminish any differences between CPs and non-CPs with regard to female LFP.

CP attitudes towards female LFP may also be influential in religious switching. It is apparent that those women who had grown up in CP denominations but had left were more likely to be in the labor force in the 1980s, which could indicate that during the 1970s and 1980s CP gender attitudes worked to drive some women (those more likely to work outside the home) out of their denominations. This same difference is not seen in the 1990s, perhaps due to changes in gender ideology within CP denominations. In addition, those women who entered CP denominations as adults were less likely overall to work outside the home. This could mean that women who intend to stay out of the labor force also tend to be drawn to CP ideology (or to marry CP men).

Note

*In a centered model, coefficients of group-level variables represent the effect of the variable on the average unit. Dummy variables do not have values of 0 and 1 but values relative to the distribution of the variable in the dataset. For example, 21% of the dataset are continuous CPs, giving the variables continuous CP the values -0.21 and 0.79 (thus, a mean value of 0). As the difference between these two values is still 1, coefficients still measure the difference between the reference variable and the dummy variable (in this case never CPs and continuous CPs), but the estimated values for each class (never CPs and continuous CPs) must be recalculated using all of the dummy variables.

CHAPTER 4

Working Mothers and Other Conservative Protestant Family Values: The Moderating Impact of Religious Affiliation on Factors Influencing Female Labor Force Participation

The perception within the social sciences is that Conservative Protestants (CPs) have a more patriarchal view of gender and are highly resistant to the labor force participation (LFP) of women (Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 2006; Hall 1995; Lehrer 1998). This perception has been reinforced by studies that have shown the LFP of CP women to be significantly less than that of other women as well as CP women being more likely than other women to leave the labor force when they marry or have children (Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 2006; Lehrer 1998; Sherkat 2000). However, in two previous papers (May, Chapter 2; Chapter 3) I found that within the period 1974-2004, the female LFP of CPs was not consistently less than that of other women, when factors such as education, marital status, children, and other household income were controlled for. In fact, the difference in LFP of CP women and non-CP women (i.e. all other women) varied significantly during that time period (May, Chapter 3). During much of the 80s and early 2000s, CP women were in the labor force less than other women, but during the mid-to-late 70s and the 90s their LFP was equal to or greater than that of other women.

A more detailed look at the beliefs and values of CPs in relation to female LFP suggests a solution to this puzzling finding. The conventional wisdom is that CPs favor

traditional, separate-spheres gender ideals and would therefore simply prefer women not to work outside the home, but there are two ways in which CP female LFP has been found not to be so simple. On the one hand, Sherkat (2000) argues that CPs are not so much interested in women working outside the home as much as they are in *when* women work outside the home. He finds that CP attitudes towards female LFP are for the most part only negative when the women have young children in the home. This argument supports the conventional view that CP families maintain a stronger commitment to the separate spheres division of labor, with the caveat that CPs focus on the childcare role of women within that separate spheres ideal. I argue, on the other hand, that CP attitudes concerning female LFP are not about *when* women work as much as they are about *why* women work. Sherkat focuses on the needs of the children, but I would argue that the CP attitudes focus on the duties of the mother. The mother is expected to do what is “best” for her family, to place its needs above her own. In one situation, this may require her to stay home with her children. In another situation, this same expectation of doing what is best for the family may require her to work outside the home. From this perspective, economic strains on the family are considered legitimate reasons for women to work outside the home. However, personal opportunities are considered less legitimate reasons. Consequently, it would be expected that the female LFP of CPs and other women (henceforth non-CPs) would differ to the extent that their participation is influenced by the factors related to opportunities (pull factors) and those related to economic strains (push factors).

Differences between CPs and non-CPs in their aggregate female LFP vary from year to year in a pattern that provides support for these expectations (May, Chapter 3). The LFP of CP women were more highly correlated with declining men's wages and increasing women's wages, whereas the LFP of non-CPs is more highly correlated with the relative strength of the female labor market. These findings imply that CP women are more responsive to changes in the economic picture with regards to family needs, whereas non-CP women are more responsive to changes in opportunities. Such a conclusion supports the thesis that the female LFP of CPs differs from that of non-CPs mainly with regard to how much they place family wants, needs, and goals above individual ones.

In that paper I only examined differences between the LFP of CPs and non-CPs in the aggregate and how those related to national-level changes over time. However, if CPs and non-CPs approach female LFP in different ways as my theory suggests, then differences in individual-level measures would affect LFP differently for CPs than for non-CPs. In other words, the extra economic stress provided by more children or a lower level of other household income might have a greater overall impact of CPs as opposed to non-CPs, or the greater personal opportunities available to women with more education might have a greater impact on non-CPs than on CPs. In this paper I will test whether differences in marital status, number of children, education, and other household income have different effects on LFP for CP women than they do for non-CP women. These findings will provide further tests of the theories regarding the differences in the female LFP of CPs and non-CPs and

allow a greater understanding of how religious ideologies about gender and family life are translated into differential behavior.

Female Labor Force Participation

Throughout the twentieth century female labor force participation (LFP) rose dramatically. However, during that time period not all women have participated in the labor force equally. Several factors have been known to affect the likelihood of any particular woman participating in the labor force. The structure of her family, specifically her marital status, the number of children she has at home, and whether she has young (pre-school-aged) children in the home all play an important role in whether or not the woman is in the labor force (Cotter, et al. 2001; Eggebeen 1988; Risman, et al. 1999; Spain & Bianchi 1996). Furthermore, the level of education a woman has and the amount of income other members of her household are able to provide also influence her LFP (Cohen and Bianchi 1999; Eggebeen 1988; Greenstein 1986; Smith-Lovin and Tickamyer 1978).

These factors are theorized to affect women's LFP in two ways. First, they affect her opportunities, meaning they affect her likelihood to get a job and how good a job she can get (i.e. how well-paying, difficult, satisfying, etc.). Those factors that affect opportunities are often referred to as pull factors because the opportunities to make money or achieve personal success tend to pull women into the workforce. The second set of factors, often referred to as push factors, are economic needs on the household finances that are said to "push" women into the labor force to earn money for the family. Of the factors listed above there are at least

three that affect female LFP by influencing opportunities. First, economic conditions determine whether or not there are available jobs and whether these jobs are those that typically hire women. This factor affects women in the aggregate, but at the individual level, education is probably the most important opportunity factor in influencing a woman's LFP. The higher level of education, the greater the opportunities, the greater likelihood of participating in the labor force. The third factor affecting opportunities is household responsibilities. In the past, being married and having children in the home had a negative impact on women's opportunities. However, in more recent decades only having young children in the home has had a negative impact due to opportunities. Both marriage and the presence of children have become more related to household economic stresses. Marriage generally reduces the level of economic need in the household by increasing the number of potential wage-earners; thus, giving women a greater degree of choice in their LFP and potentially allowing reduced participation. Having children, however, increases the economic needs in the family, and thus increases the likelihood of female LFP. A third factor that influences female LFP through economic needs is other household income, usually the wages of a husband, significant other, or parent. The more substantial the other sources of income, the less a woman is pushed into the labor force to meet family needs.

If CPs differ from other women in their female LFP it is because their ideology makes them more or less susceptible to these push and pull factors. The conventional sociological approach to CP family ideology has been to argue that CPs supported a traditional (separate spheres) view of marriage to a greater extent than other Americans; thus,

they valued domestic opportunities for women more than labor-force opportunities.

Consequently, CP women are less likely to be pulled into the labor force. I agree with this appraisal but believe that it is only part of the picture.

I argue that CP family ideology is distinctive from current American family norms not in the way that it treats gender but in the way that it treats the individual. CPs may believe in a more traditional gender order, but they more strongly believe in sacrificing individual wants and desires for the good of the family. Therefore, the debate about working wives and mothers is less about gender than it is about placing family above individual. However, the result is the same with regard to pull factors; CP women are less likely to be pulled into the labor force. If, though, CP ideology is less about a certain gender order than it is about placing family interests above individual interests, CP women are as likely or even more likely to enter the labor force when the family is in financial need. In other words, CP women are more susceptible to push factors.

Conservative Protestant Attitudes and Ideology

Most social science research on CP family ideology has focused on their support for a traditional view of gender in which wives are responsible for the maintenance and care of the home and the children and husbands are responsible for earning an income and leading in family relations with respect to the world at large (Anderson 1988; Denton 2004; Gallagher 2004; Hall 1995; Rindfuss, et al. 1996). Although this “separate spheres” model represents the ideal family form for many Americans, CPs support these ideals for a more fundamental

reason. Separate spheres reinforces the gender essentialist ideas that they see in the Bible, and because CPs are united in their concern for a literalist interpretation of scripture they are weary about challenging these ideals (Bartkowski 1997; Gallagher and Smith 1999). The dominant CP perspective has been that the family is an inherently gendered institution and that this gendered nature is God-ordained (Bartkowski 1997; Gallagher 2004; Gallagher 2003). From this perspective, males and females are different not just biologically but functionally as well. God made the sexes different for a reason, and that reason is brought to fruition in their different roles within the family (Bartkowski 1997; Bloch 2000; Gallagher 2003; Heath 2003).

Although these views may not be exclusive to CPs, a positive relationship has been established between both affiliation with a CP denomination and belief in Biblical inerrancy on the one hand and conservative views on gender on the other (Peek, et al. 1991; Grasmick, et al. 1990). In addition, there is some support for these views influencing gendered behavior, as CP wives and wives of CP husbands report doing more housework than other wives (Ellison & Bartkowski 2002). However, there are considerable questions as to the extent to which gender viewpoints are responsible for differences in female LFP. Although in the aggregate CP gender views may be more conservative than those of other religious backgrounds CP views vary greatly even within sub-traditions, and many adherents of mainline Protestant and other religious traditions also share in these traditional views (Bartkowski 1996; Bartkowski 1997; Gay, et al. 1996; Lockhart 2000). In addition, the differences between CPs and other Americans on gender views have declined in recent years

(McConkey 2001). Furthermore, CPs have been able to adapt their theological viewpoint on gender to a more egalitarian perspective that enables them to adapt to the economic and cultural needs of contemporary life (Bloch 2000; Gallagher 2003; Gallagher and Smith 1999). Gallagher and Smith (1999; also Gallagher 2003) argue that during the 1980s, the focus of CP literature and leadership turned from the polemic to the pragmatic in their discussions of gender and family life. They contend that this change in perspective specifically allowed CPs to adapt to the growing need to send their wives and mothers into the labor force, an assertion that is supported by other researchers as well (Bloch 2000; Donovan 1998; Heath 2003).

McNamara (1985) sees within CP ideology on gender and family life an organizing ethic that had less to do with gender and more to do with the relationship of the individual to the family. He sees in CP teachings an ideology of both husbands and wives sacrificing their individual wills and desires for the good of the family. Family needs are placed above individual ones. Gallagher (2004) echoes this perspective when she finds that CPs are critical of feminism but not because they oppose the idea of gender equality. Many CPs applaud feminists for working to end the oppression of women (or at least aspects of it), but they find many feminist arguments to be self-centered. For them, feminist arguments focus too much on what the woman can gain for herself or for women as a gender. Thus, it is not challenges to the gender order that CPs find most objectionable but individualism, at least the kind that sees the individual as more important than the family.

CP rhetoric concerning women in the workforce tends to focus on the needs of the family, especially the needs of young children for their mothers (Sherkat 2000). Rather than being sexist in their views toward women in the workplace, Sherkat finds most CP writers to be supportive of women's abilities and authority in the workplace. Their arguments are not that LFP is a man's duty but that families, especially when they have young children, need their mothers at home. However, the financial situations of families tend to modify these arguments. According to one study, a family's financial issues were offered as a ready excuse for female LFP (Demmitt 1992). Another study suggests that financial hardships might even create, among CPs, a greater expectation that wives and mothers go to work (Will and Cochran 1995). Although both conservative and mainline Protestants were less generous than liberal Protestants in offering welfare to needy families, Will and Cochran found CPs to be differentiated from all other groups in that they were less generous in recommending welfare support for families whose mothers were depicted in vignettes as unemployed because they were either not looking for work or because they could only find low-wage employment. Thus, the obligation of women to enter the labor force for family economic reasons (i.e. to be pushed into it) appears to actually be stronger for CPs than non-CPs.

Research on the direct relationship between CP religious affiliation and female LFP has shown that CP women do indeed differ significantly from other women in at least certain aspects of their LFP. Two studies using a single-wave of data found that the CP women were significantly less likely than other women to be in the labor force in the year the data was collected (Glass and Jacobs 2005; Lehrer 1995). Other studies found that CP women were

more likely to leave the labor force if they had a child or got married than other women (Glass and Nath 2006; Sherkat 2000). However, these studies did not take into account the possibility that these differences in LFP might change over time and might even vary depending on economic circumstances. This appears to in fact be the case; differences in female LFP between CP women and other women have varied during the past three decades (May, Chapter 3). These variations follow a complex pattern in which the female LFP of CPs was less than that of non-CPs during most of the 1980s and early 2000s as would be expected. However, the female LFP of CPs was greater than that of non-CPs during the mid-to-late 70s and at least equal and possibly greater than that of non-CPs during most of the 1990s. I concluded in the previous paper that these variations were due to differences between CPs and non-CPs in their responses to the push and pull factors that influence female LFP, as explained above.

Because CP rhetoric on the subject has focused on the female LFP of the mothers of young children (i.e. those not yet school-aged), Sherkat (2000) argued that CPs were mostly concerned with the timing of female LFP—that women do not work outside the home during the tender years of early development. In support of this theory, Sherkat found that CP women were more likely than other women to become housewives when they had children. Such an argument might explain at least some of the differences I found in the aggregate rates of female LFP. Since fertility declined in the United States over the period in question and more women with young children entered the labor force, higher CP resistance to only the LFP of mothers of young children might produce the differences found in my research

even with the relevant control variables. Sherkat's explanation would predict that the female LFP of mothers with young children would be less for CPs than non-CPs but might not differ for other women. In a similar study, both a recent birth and a recent marriage reduced the female LFP of CPs more than that of non-CPs (Glass and Nath 2006). If this is indeed the case, it would be expected that the female LFP of married CP women is less than that of non-CP women. Such a possibility might be part of the overall picture and help explain differences between CPs and non-CPs.

It must be noted that the differences described herein between CPs and non-CPs relate primarily to whites. There is reason to believe that the effect of CP affiliation on black women's LFP is different enough from the effect on white women's LFP that the two should be investigated separately (see Chapter 2, pp. 18-19). All of the analyses performed in this chapter on data from white women were also performed using data from black women, although no significant results came from those investigations.

Hypotheses

The central aim of this chapter is to test the argument that the differences between the female LFP of CPs and non-CPs are due to CPs placing a greater emphasis on family need and less of an emphasis on individual opportunities for the woman, when compared to non-CPs. If this is true, then factors in the individual and family lives of women would have different impacts on the participation of women depending on their religious affiliation (CP v. non-CP). Marriage would, thus, be expected to decrease the likelihood of participation for

CPs more than non-CPs, as marriage reduces financial burdens for women by adding a male earner to the family. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the addition of children would be expected to increase the likelihood of participation for CPs more than non-CPs, because of the added expense of children. Even the addition of young children should increase the LFP of CP women more than that of non-CP women. An increase in income other than that provided by the woman would reduce the need for the woman's income; thus, the LFP of CP women would be more negatively correlated with other income than that of non-CPs. Education being the only individual factor associated with female LFP would be expected to have less of a positive impact on CPs than on non-CPs. These expectations yield the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Marriage will have a more negative effect on the LFP of CPs than on that of non-CPs.

Hypothesis 2: The number of children in a household will have a more positive effect on the LFP of CPs than on that of non-CPs.

Hypothesis 3: The presence of children under six in the household will have a more positive effect on the LFP of CPs than on that of non-CPs.

Hypothesis 4: An increase in education will have less of a positive effect on the LFP of CPs than on that of non-CPs.

Hypothesis 5: An increase in other income will have a more negative effect on the LFP of CPs than that of non-CPs.

Data and Variables

This study uses data from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is a survey of United States adults over the age of 18. It has been conducted on a regular basis (at least every other year) since 1972 using a randomized, cluster sample technique to sample households. Interviews are collected from one randomly selected adult living in each household. All white, female respondents from 1974 to 2004 for which data is available for all relevant variables were used in the analysis. Data from the years 1972-73 could not be used because respondents' income was not measured in those years, meaning that an important variable "other household income" could not be calculated. The total number of white, female cases in the GSS for these years is 19,867. After those with missing data were excluded 16,665 cases were used in the analysis. The data was weighted to correct sampling error caused by multiple adults living in a household.

Because of the sociocultural differences between white and black CP denominations detailed earlier, blacks and whites are analyzed separately. This approach follows that used in other research on this topic (Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 2006). Preliminary analysis showed that there were no differences between black CPs and black non-CPs with regard to female LFP except for those described in the previous chapter. For this reason, these models are not discussed in this paper, and the paper refers only to differences among whites. Those whose race is classified in the GSS as "other" were also excluded from the analysis because of the diversity of this group and the fact that their small numbers prevented

a separate analysis. Thus, the results of this research should only be used to apply to white Americans.

The method of analysis used in this paper is multi-level modeling for which the data is arranged in two levels: the individual level and the year level. Individuals in the dataset are grouped within years. This is not to be confused with panel data in which observations are grouped within individuals. In this data, there is only one observation per individual. Coefficients measured at the group (year) level refer to differences in the population between years and not changes in the situations of individuals.

The dependent variable, labor force participation, is measured as a dichotomous variable. Respondents are considered in the labor force if in the week before taking the survey they were working full time, working part time, employed but not working last week, unemployed, laid off, or looking for work. Although distinctions could have been made between various degrees of participation, the dichotomous variable was chosen for two reasons. First, the key issues of this paper are ideological: whether working outside the home is the *right* thing for a woman to do. Thus, whether or not she is able to get a job or to work part-time or full-time is less important. Second, several formulations of this variable were used in earlier renderings of the research. These formulations showed that there were no significant differences at the intermediate levels of participation. Religious differences could only be found between the non-participation category and the other categories (mainly when placed in opposition to the full-time employment category). In other words, a multi-

level dependent variable made the analysis far more complicated without providing any more clarity to the problem.

The key independent variable, conservative Protestant, is a dichotomous variable constructed from a three point fundamentalism scale within the GSS dataset that codes Christian respondents based on the relative fundamentalism or liberalism of the respondent's denomination. All respondents coded as "fundamentalist" are considered to be CPs; all other respondents, including non-Christians are considered to be non-CPs. Denominations considered to be fundamentalist were considered so because of their beliefs about the inerrancy of the Bible and a personal salvation experience (see Smith 1990 for a fuller description). Although the term fundamentalist was used it is clear from the description offered by Smith (1990) that the label is intended to describe the greater range of conservative Protestant groups. Respondents who gave no information about their religion or whose denominational conservatism was considered undeterminable in the fundamentalism scale were counted as missing for this variable (599 missing cases).

Several independent variables used in the analysis relate to family structure. Marital status is differentiated by three dummy variables—married, divorced or separated, and widowed—with never married being the reference category. The total number of children in the home (under 18 years of age) and the presence of at least one child under six years of age in the home are the two other family structure variables. Number of children was truncated so that households with more than five children in the home (0.5% of households) were coded as having five children. It is assumed that children in the home are those for whose

care the female respondent is responsible as a parent, step-parent, or quasiparent. However, after examining the age distribution of women with children in the home in the sample and the ages of their children it became apparent that there are a significant number of adult children living at home in the sample whose siblings would be counted as children in their care. In order to eliminate this measurement error, respondents who said that they never had any children of their own but who reported children in the home were coded as having no children in the home and having no children under six in the home.

Other independent variables include age, education and other household income. Age is the respondent's age in years. An age-squared variable is also used because previous research has indicated that LFP has a curvilinear relation to age. Education is coded using two dichotomous variables. The first, High School, is coded 1 for those who have a high school diploma but have not completed a college degree and 0 for all other education levels. The second, Any Degree, is coded 1 for all those who have a college degree, including anyone with an Associate's Degree or higher, and 0 for all others. This coding leaves those without a high school diploma as the reference category. Other household income was calculated by subtracting the respondent's income from the household income. Both income measures were recalculations in constant dollars constructed by NORC (National Opinion Research Center) researchers that are included in the GSS dataset (see Ligon 1989 for a description of this recalculation process). The natural log of other income was used in the analyses (where other income was \$0 the natural log of other income was defined as 0). Interaction terms between the CP variable and the other independent variables were used to

determine the difference in the effect a certain variable on the dependent variable between CPs and non-CPs. For part of the analysis, separate models were constructed for married and non-married women in order to render complex interactions more easily interpretable.

Descriptive statistics of both the individual-level variables are given in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1
Descriptive Statistics

Variable	All Women				Married Women				Unmarried Women			
	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Labor Force Participation	0.55	0.50	0	1	0.54	0.50	0	1	0.56	0.50	0	1
Married	0.55	0.50	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Widowed	0.15	0.36	0	1	-	-	-	-	0.33	0.47	0	1
Divorced/ Separated	0.16	0.37	0	1	-	-	-	-	0.36	0.48	0	1
Number of Children	0.70	1.09	0	5	0.96	1.20	0	5	0.39	0.85	0	5
Child Under 6	0.17	0.38	0	1	0.24	0.43	0	1	0.09	0.29	0	1
Age	46.87	18.1	18	90	44.56	15.0	18	89	49.65	20.9	18	89
High School	0.55	0.50	0	1	0.57	0.49	0	1	0.52	0.50	0	1
Any Degree	0.24	0.43	0	1	0.24	0.43	0	1	0.23	0.42	0	1
Other Income (ln)	8.00	3.80	0	12.00	9.72	1.92	0	12.00	5.87	4.42	0	12.00
Conservative Protestant	0.28	0.45	0	1	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.27	0.44	0	1
CP*Married	0.17	0.37	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CP*Number of Children	-	-	-	-	0.29	0.80	0	5	0.11	0.49	0	5
CP*Child under 6	-	-	-	-	0.07	0.26	0	1	0.02	0.15	0	1
CP*Other Income (ln)	2.05	3.94	0	11.87	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CP*High School	0.16	0.36	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CP*Any Degree	0.04	0.20	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
WT7204 (household weight)	0.97	0.40	0.46	4.13	1.13	0.29	0.46	4.13	0.78	0.44	0.46	3.85

Analytical Methods and Results

The analysis was conducted using the Bernoulli Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM) technique found in the HLM6 statistical package. This method is a multilevel modeling technique that is analogous to performing logistic regression using multilevel data. This statistical package computes models using penalized quasi-likelihood

(PQL) estimation, a double-iteration variant of maximum likelihood estimation (see Raudenbush, et al. 2004, pp. 103-05 for details).

Like logistic regression, Bernoulli HGLM is used to create models when the dependent variable is dichotomous by producing an equation that predicts a logit function value for any particular case. That is, it estimates the natural log of the likelihood of a case being in a class divided by the likelihood of it not being in that class, $\ln[p/1-p]$, using characteristics of the case measured by the independent variables. Because it produces similar results, Bernoulli HGLM coefficients can be read like logistic regression coefficients, with one unit change in an independent variable causing the value of the coefficient's amount of change in the log likelihood value (i.e. $\ln[p/1-p]$). In some of the graphs of these equations, logit values have been converted into percentages (i.e. the percentage of women predicted to be in the labor force given a set of independent variable values).

Hierarchical or multi-level modeling techniques differ from their single level counterparts primarily in the way that they deal with random effects, also referred to as error. Random effects are simply the variance in the data that cannot be accounted for by the model and are theoretically assumed to be due to unmeasured differences between cases. In a multi-level dataset in which individuals are clustered into groups, these random effects could be due to both unmeasured differences between individuals and unmeasured differences between groups. In other words, if one were to apply the model equation to each of the groups the model would fit some groups better than others just as it would fit some individuals better than others. Single level models assume that all of this error is caused by

variations between individuals. This is problematic when it comes to estimating both the model and test statistics in a multi-level model because it violates the independence assumptions of the model (see Hox 2002 for a fuller explanation). Multi-level models and other random effects models divide the error into two parts, one attributed to random differences between individuals (termed error) and the other attributed to random differences between the groups (termed random effects). Ordinary random effects models do this by simply create a random error term, which applies to random variance between the groups (i.e. variance not related to any of the independent variables or to differences between individuals). However, this assumes that the coefficients of the independent variables in the model do not vary from group to group.

HLM and other multi-level modeling techniques allow not only for a general random effect that accounts for unmeasured differences between groups but allows also for random effects for each of the independent variables. Each of these random effects estimates how much the coefficient of an independent variable would vary from group to group if it were allowed to vary. In other words, it estimates how much the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable varies randomly from group to group. These random effects become important when adding group-level variables to the model and when interacting group level variables with individual level variables. When group-level variables are added to the model, they affect the group-level random effects (hopefully by reducing them) just as adding individual-level variables serve to reduce the individual-level error by accounting for

some of it. In addition, tests of significance of group-level variables are based on group-level variance estimates and not individual-level ones, making them less biased.

HLM also allows for cross-level interactions. In a cross-level interaction, an individual-level variable is multiplied times a group-level variable. The coefficient of the individual level variable is then assumed to vary from group to group by some multiple of the value of the group-level variable for that group. In essence the effect of the individual-level variable is predicted to change from group-to-group and the change in the effect is predicted to be correlated with the group-level variable. The coefficient of the cross-level interaction estimates the magnitude of the correlated change, and the test statistic estimates whether the change in the individual-level variable is in fact correlated with the group level variable. Here the random effect for the individual-level independent variable estimates the variance in the variable that is not accounted for by adding the cross-level interaction term. Tests of significance for these interaction terms, like those for group-level variables are based on group-level variance estimates.

HLM's ability to model multiple random effects, group-level variables (with appropriate standard errors), and cross-level interactions (also with appropriate standard errors) makes it an advantageous method for the present analysis for several reasons. First, the data was collected in waves, and each wave of data was collected in a different year representing a different economic situation; thus, they should be treated as grouped data with each year having some shared variance. Second, female LFP has changed dramatically over the time period, and this change should be modeled as differences between groups. Third,

the factors effecting female LFP are known to vary in their effects on female LFP, and this variance should be included in the model (Cohen and Bianchi 2000; Eggebeen 1988).

In this analysis, female LFP and the effects of the factors that influence female LFP are assumed to vary over time. This variance is accounted for by including random effects for each independent variable. In addition to these random effects, I used a set of time variables to model the change in female LFP and in the change of the effects of some factors on female LFP over time. To estimate these changes, a variable for the year was constructed by subtracting 1974 from the survey year. The square and cube of this term were also used in the analysis to allow for the estimation of curvilinear changes over time.

All individual level variables were group-mean centered. Group-mean centering allows for less biased estimates of the variance in a coefficient from year-to-year because it eliminates the effect of any correlations that may exist between changes in the coefficient of a variable from year to year and changes in that variable's distribution from year to year. For example, the effect of having a college education on female LFP might be shown to be stronger in 2004 than in 1974, not because the effect is actually stronger but because there are more female college graduates in 2004 and the likelihood of being in the labor force is greater in 2004. By adjusting for these group (i.e., year) differences in the distribution of the variable through group-mean centering, it is possible to isolate the true change in the effect from any residual effect of changes in the distribution. Only the variable age-squared was not group-mean centered because group-mean centering would render it meaningless; the

Table 4-2
Bernoulli HGLM Models Predicting the Labor Force Participation of White Women

Variables	Model 1 Base Model	Model 2 CP*Married Model	Model 3 CP*Married with Econ. Interactions	Model 4 Married Women Only	Model 5 Unmarried Women Only
<u>Fixed Effects</u>					
Constant	1.15*	1.14	1.15*	0.77*	1.82*
Female Labor Demand	0.46	-0.38	0.78	1.04*	0.99
Female Annual Wages	0.14*	0.16*	0.11*	0.12*	0.021
Male Annual Wages	-0.22*	-0.29*	-0.20*	-0.12	-0.23*
Married	-0.050	-0.033	-0.046		
Mar.*Fem. Labor Demand			2.47*		
Mar.*Fem. Annual Wages			0.046		
Mar.*Male Annual Wages			0.14		
Divorced or Separated	-0.0032	-0.012	-0.0051		-0.30*
Widowed	-0.090	-0.10	-0.11		-0.52*
Number of Children	-0.17*	-0.17*	-0.17*	-0.22*	0.002
Child under Six	-0.74*	-0.74*	-0.73*	-0.69*	-0.65*
Age	-0.054*	-0.054*	-0.054*	-0.58*	-0.041*
Age Squared	-0.0028*	-0.0028*	-0.0029*	-0.0031*	-0.0030*
Education	0.18*	0.18*	0.18*	0.16*	0.19*
Other Income (ln)	-0.23*	-0.23*	-0.23*	-0.21*	-0.18*
Conservative Protestant	-0.031	0.03	0.038	-0.080	0.049
CP*Fem. Labor Demand			1.11	-2.48*	1.47
CP*Fem. Annual Wages			-0.038	0.067*	0.068
CP*Male Annual Wages			0.060	-0.28*	-0.029
CP*Married		-0.095	-0.11		
CP*Mar.*Fem. Lab. Dem.			-3.88*		
CP*Mar.*Fem. An. Wages			0.12		
CP*Mar.*Male An. Wages			-0.31		
<u>Random Effects (Variance Components)</u>					
Constant	0.063*	0.074*	0.055*	0.032*	0.059*
Married	0.12*	0.13*	0.020		
Divorced or Separated	0.049	0.047	0.045		0.072
Widowed	0.051	0.051	0.053		0.031
Number of Children	0.0022	0.0023	0.0022	0.0018	0.028*
Child under Six	0.085	0.087*	0.085*	0.047	0.20
Education	0.0013*	0.0013*	0.0045*	0.0018*	0.0050*
Other Income (ln)	0.00055	0.00062	0.00057	0.0051*	0.00074
Conservative Protestant	0.029	0.032	0.058	0.039	0.12*
CP*Married		0.080	0.10		
n	17,131	17,131	17,131	9,443	
-2 log likelihood	49,141	49,110	49,146	27,429	

*indicates statistically significant result ($\alpha = 0.05$).

age-squared variable was calculated by squaring the respondent's age once that age was group-mean centered.

In order to test Hypothesis 1, Model 1 (see Table 4-2) is constructed as a base model containing a variable for CP affiliation and all relevant control variables. Then, an interaction term, CP * Married, is added to make Model 2. This term is found to be negative (as expected) but not significant. Thus, the effect of being married on female LFP is not shown to be significantly more negative for CPs than it is for non-CPs. However, it is possible that the interactive effect on female LFP of being both married and a CP is more complicated than this simple model predicts. After all, Chapter 3 shows that the effect of being a CP on female LFP for all women varied from year-to-year as labor conditions and wages changed. It is possible, if not likely, that this pattern is reflected when marital statuses are brought into this picture.

Model 3 adds cross-level interaction terms to the variables Married, Conservative Protestant, and CP*Married, and reveals that changing labor and wage conditions have different impacts on women with respect to marital status and religious affiliation. The interaction term *Married*Female Labor Demand* is statistically significant and reveals that married women are found to increase their LFP more than unmarried women when female labor demand increases, which is to be expected. Although none of the CP two-way




Figure 4-1
Estimated Effect of Change in Female Labor Market Strength on Female LFP (Model 3)

interaction terms (those that interact *CP* with an economic indicator but not *Married*) were statistically significant, the interaction term *CP*Married*Female Labor Demand* is statistically significant, revealing a difference between married CPs and married non-CPs in the effect of labor demand on female LFP. Figure 4-1 shows that female labor demand positively affects the LFP of married non-CPs but has no significant affect on the LFP of unmarried women or married CPs. The other three-way interaction terms, *CP*Married*Female Annual Wages* and *CP*Married *Male Annual Wages*, are not statistically significant but approach statistical significance ($p=0.063$ and $p=0.065$ respectively). Figures 4-2 and 4-3 show these differences in the effect of female wages and




Figure 4-2
 Estimated Effects of Change in Female Wages on Female LFP (Model 3)

male wages respectively, assuming that those differences are real. Figure 2 suggest that the effect of female wages on the LFP of CPs affects only married CPs but that the lesser affect of female wages on non-CPs is undifferentiated by marital status. Figure 3 suggests that for unmarried women the effect of male wages on LFP is the same for CPs and non-CPs alike but for married women the effect of male wages is very negative for CPs but is virtually nothing for non-CPs.

In order to confirm these observations and to make the interactions simpler and more easily interpretable, I disaggregated the data into married and unmarried sub-samples to construct Models 4 and 5. Model 4 shows that the effect of being a CP on the LFP of married women varies from year to year with changes in economic conditions. High female labor




Figure 4-3
 Estimated Effects of Change in Male Wages on Female LFP (Model 3)

demand (measured by the ratio of male unemployment to female unemployment) results in an increased likelihood of female LFP in the entire married population, a log-likelihood increase of 1.04 times the increase in the unemployment ratio. However, that figure is for the entire married population, the difference in the effect of female labor demand on the LFP of CPs and non-CPs is -2.48, meaning that for married non-CP women the log likelihood of LFP is increased by 1.76 times the increase in the unemployment ratio but for married CP women the log likelihood of LFP decreases by 0.72 times the increase in the unemployment ratio. Model 4 also indicates that likelihood of LFP increases with an increase in women's average wages (log likelihood increases 0.12 for every \$1,000 increase in real annual wages)

and that this increase is greater for CPs than for non-CPs (0.17 for CPs and 0.10 for non-CPs). Furthermore, the model shows that although change in male wages does not have a significant effect on LFP among married women in general, it does have a significant and negative effect on the LFP of married CPs. A log likelihood difference between the effect of annual male wages on CPs and non-CPs of -0.28 per every \$1,000 change in real annual wages added to an effect of -0.12 for all married women translates into a 0.32 decrease in the log likelihood for every \$1,000 increase in the annual real wages of the average male worker. These variations are similar to those found among all females in Chapter 3.

Model 5 shows that the effect of being a CP on the LFP of unmarried women does not vary with changes in the tested economic conditions, although it is possible that some other pattern of variance exists (note that the random effect of Conservative Protestant in Model 5 is significant). Various exploratory tests to determine a pattern in this variance found no significant relationships (models not shown). In addition, interaction terms were added to the model to determine whether being divorced or widowed impacted the effect of being a CP on LFP (CP*divorced/separated and CP*widowed); however, these were removed from the model, as they were found to be non-significant and added undue complexity to the model. Because the effects of being a CP in Model 4 are similar to those found in Chapter 3 and no effect of being a CP is found in Model 5, the two models taken together indicate that the findings of Chapter 3—that the effect of being a CP on female LFP varies over time depending on the economic circumstances—were driven by differences between married CPs and married non-CPs.

Table 4-3
Bernoulli HGLM Models Testing CP/Non-CP Differences in the Effect of Children on LFP

Variables	Model 6 Married (CP*Number of Children)	Model 7 Married (CP*Child Under 6)	Model 8 Unmarried (CP*Number of Children)	Model 9 Unmarried (CP*Child Under 6)
<u>Fixed Effects</u>				
Constant	0.78*	0.78*	1.83*	1.83*
Female Labor Demand	0.96*	1.07*	0.79	0.91
Female Annual Wages	0.12*	0.12*	0.026	0.021
Male Annual Wages	-0.13	-0.12	-0.23*	-0.24*
Divorced or Separated			-0.30*	-0.30*
Widowed			-0.53*	-0.52*
Number of Children	-0.25*	-0.22*	0.032	0.0008
Child under Six	-0.69*	-0.76*	-0.64*	-0.61*
Age	-0.058*	-0.058*	-0.041*	-0.041*
Age Squared	-0.0031*	-0.0031*	-0.0031*	-0.0030*
Education	0.16*	0.16*	0.19*	0.19*
Other Income (ln)	-0.21*	-0.21*	-0.18*	-0.18*
Conservative Protestant	-0.20*	-0.15*	0.15	0.08
CP*Fem. Labor Demand	-2.25*	-2.51*		
CP*Fem. Annual Wages	0.069*	0.068*		
CP*Male Annual Wages	-0.27*	-0.28*		
CP*Number of Children	0.11*		-0.14*	
CP*Child Under 6		0.25*		-0.14
<u>Random Effects (Variance Components)</u>				
Constant	0.032*	0.032*	0.058*	0.057*
Divorced or Separated			0.079	0.073
Widowed			0.036	0.028
Number of Children	0.0023	0.0019	0.046*	0.028*
Child under Six	0.048	0.055	0.20	0.18
Education	0.0019*	0.0018*	0.0051*	0.0051*
Other Income (ln)	0.0055*	0.0053*	0.00073	0.00073
Conservative Protestant	0.073*	0.032	0.092	0.084
CP*Number of Children	0.016		0.042	
CP*Child Under 6		0.0078		0.23
n	9,443	9,443	7,688	7,688
-2 log likelihood	27,554	27,463	21,674	21,661

*indicates statistically significant result ($\alpha = 0.05$).

Because children may have a considerably different impact on married and unmarried women, tests of whether the effect of children on female LFP differs for CPs and non-CPs used separate married and unmarried samples. Model 6 reveals that the negative effect of

each additional child on the LFP of married women (a log likelihood reduction of 0.25 per child) is less negative (by a log likelihood of 0.11) for CPs than for non-CPs. This model also reveals that once this difference in the effect of children is taken into account, married CP women are less likely to work outside the home than married non-CP women. Taken together these effects mean that for married CP women with no children the log likelihood of LFP is 0.20 less than married non-CP women but that that difference declines to 0.9 with the addition of one child and becomes an equal likelihood of LFP with a second child. With 3 or more children the LFP of married CP women becomes greater than married non-CP women (0.13 for the third child and a 0.11 increase for each additional child). Model 7 reveals similarly that the strong negative effect on female LFP of having a child under six (a log likelihood reduction of 0.76) is less negative for CPs (by a log likelihood of 0.25). In this case as well, once the effect of having at least one child under six is taken into account, a negative effect of being a CP on female LFP can be seen. Taken together, these effects result in married CPs with no child under six being less likely to participate in the labor force (log likelihood difference of -0.15) than married non-CPs, whereas for those with a child under six CPs are more likely to be in the labor force (log likelihood difference of 0.10). Because the effects of the number of children and children under six on female LFP are not independent of each other, models using interaction terms for both number of children and children under six rendered models with insignificant coefficients for both of these terms; as these models were useless in clarifying these effects, they were not used in the results.

Models 8 and 9 demonstrate that these effects are very different for unmarried women. Both models reveal that for unmarried women the number of children does not significantly affect LFP, only the presence of a child under six does. However, Model 8 shows that for CP women there is a significant negative effect of the number of children on LFP (a difference of -0.14 between CPs and non-CPs). To interpret this finding, the effect of being a CP in this model, a positive but not significant 0.15 must be included. Calculations using these coefficients reveal that unmarried CP women with no children could be predicted to have increased LFP compared to unmarried non-CP women with no children (log likelihood of 0.15); however, this difference is not statistically significant. For unmarried women with one child CPs and non-CPs differ by a log likelihood of only 0.01 (or virtually no difference). Only when it comes to larger families (2 or more children) would any difference be seen between CPs and non-CPs with the number of children having a negative impact on CPs and little impact on non-CPs (log likelihood difference of 0.16 for two children and 0.30 for three children). Model 9 finds that the effect of having a child under six on the LFP of unmarried women is not significantly different for CPs than for non-CPs.

The next set of models (10-11, see Table 4-4) test whether the effect of education on female LFP differs for CPs and non-CPs. As in the previous models, married and unmarried women are treated separately. Model 10 finds no difference in the effect of education on female LFP for CPs and non-CPs for married women, although the coefficient for CP*Education is positive and approaches significance ($p = 0.12$). Model 11 also finds no

Table 4-4
Bernoulli HGLM Models Testing CP/Non-CP Differences in the Effect of Educational Attainment and Other Household Income on LFP

Variables	Model 10 Education Married	Model 11 Education Unmarried	Model 12 Other Income Married	Model 13 Other Income Unmarried
<u>Fixed Effects</u>				
Constant	0.77*	1.82*	0.78*	1.83*
Female Labor Demand	1.04*	0.70	1.05*	0.93
Female Annual Wages	0.12*	0.025	0.12*	0.020
Male Annual Wages	-0.12*	-0.21*	-0.12	-0.23*
Divorced or Separated		-0.30*		-0.31*
Widowed		-0.52*		-0.52*
Number of Children	-0.22*	0.0016	-0.22*	0.0054
Child under Six	-0.69*	-0.65*	-0.69*	-0.65*
Age	-0.058*	-0.041*	-0.058*	-0.041*
Age Squared	-0.0031*	-0.0030*	-0.0031*	-0.0030*
Education	0.15*	0.18*	0.16*	0.19*
Other Income (ln)	-0.21*	-0.18*	-0.23*	-0.18*
Conservative Protestant	-0.49	-0.45	-0.58	-0.33
CP*Fem. Labor Demand	-2.49*		-2.42*	
CP*Fem. Annual Wages	0.058*		0.066*	
CP*Male Annual Wages	-0.28*		-0.28*	
CP*Education	0.034	0.042		
CP*Other Income (ln)			0.051	0.035
<u>Random Effects (Variance Components)</u>				
Constant	0.031*	0.056*	0.032*	0.057*
Divorced or Separated		0.071		0.076
Widowed		0.029		0.030
Number of Children	0.0018	0.029*	0.0018	0.030*
Child under Six	0.047	0.20	0.047	0.21
Education	0.0024*	0.0056*	0.0017	0.0050*
Other Income (ln)	0.0054*	0.00068	0.0050	0.00056
Conservative Protestant	0.58	1.05	0.44	0.27
CP*Education	0.0022	0.0059	0.0028	0.0026
n	9,443	7,688	9,443	7,688
-2 log likelihood	27,445	21,663	27,509	21,648

*indicates statistically significant result ($\alpha = 0.05$).

difference in the effect of education on LFP between CPs and non-CPs for unmarried women.

The final models (12-13, see Table 4-4) test whether the effect of other household income on female LFP differs for CPs and non-CPs. No significant differences were found for either married or unmarried women.

Discussion

These results present two rather important points. First, they clarify the results found in Chapter 3. The year-to-year variations in the effect of being a CP on female LFP found in that chapter appear to be true for the LFP of married women but not for that of unmarried women. For married women, changes in female labor demand have a positive effect on the LFP of non-CPs but not CPs, whereas changes in male wages have a negative effect on the LFP of CPs but not non-CPs. In addition, changes in female wages have a positive effect on the LFP of both groups but a greater effect on the LFP of CPs. As I discussed in that chapter, each of these outcomes suggest that for CPs female LFP decision-making is a more financially rational process—it places meeting financial needs above career opportunities for the woman. That these effects are only seen for married women reinforces this conclusion, as most unmarried women in the United States are the primary breadwinner of their household, unless they are young and still largely dependent on their parents. If LFP is chiefly an issue of financial obligation for CPs, it would make sense that unmarried CP women are as likely as unmarried non-CP women to be in the labor force.

The second major point is related to the first three hypotheses, although to some extent these hypotheses must be looked at jointly to make sense of them. Direct tests of

Hypothesis 1 were inconclusive; it could not be conclusively shown that marriage reduces LFP for CPs more than for non-CPs. However, both Models 6 and 7 show that married CP women with no children are less likely to participate in the labor force than their non-CP counterparts. However, the addition of a child under six or two children (of any age) eliminates this difference entirely and creates a somewhat greater likelihood of LFP for CPs, and the addition of more children creates a definitive increased likelihood for CPs compared to non-CPs. Thus, for married women Hypotheses 2 and 3 are both supported: the effect of children on the LFP of married CPs is greater than the effect of children on the LFP of married non-CPs.

These results create a picture that supports the general argument that differences between CPs and non-CPs in female LFP reflect a greater emphasis on the part of CPs of family financial need and a de-emphasis of personal and career opportunities for the woman. Unmarried CP women would be just as likely to have financial needs as unmarried non-CP women; thus, they are just as likely to participate in the labor force. However, married CP women with no children would have far fewer family financial needs pushing them into the workforce. Married women without children would be more likely to work for personal or career reasons; thus, it is no surprise to see CPs and non-CPs differ in LFP here. However, the addition of children adds to the financial demands and thus quickly reduces this difference and then reverses it. Once children are in the picture, CP women go to work not for personal reasons but for family ones. That this runs counter to the recommendation of CP literature but is in accordance with their family-over-individual values system suggests that

American CPs are motivated in this area more by core value commitments than by normative standards.

At least two of this paper's findings, however, are difficult to reconcile with this conclusion. Unmarried CP women with large numbers of children (two or more) have a lower likelihood of LFP than non-CP women in similar circumstances. There seems to be two possibilities for understanding this finding. First, such women are substantially outside the family norm for CPs and thus may not feel as compelled toward work as married CP mothers. Second, unmarried CP women may be substantially different from unmarried non-CP women in their life conditions. As CPs tend to be less supportive of divorce and premarital pregnancy, the fathers of the children (who are somewhat likely to be CPs themselves) might be more compelled to support the mother. Although I find neither of these explanations completely satisfying, I believe that this finding does not bear negatively on the conclusions of this paper with regard to married families, as that is the family model from which CP family values are directly drawn.

The second finding that is difficult to reconcile is that the research failed to find a significant difference between the effect of other household income on LFP for CPs and that effect for non-CPs. Such a finding would have offered the greatest level of support for this paper's general argument, as other household income offers the best measure of household economic stress or lack thereof. Thus, not finding a difference is discouraging. A null finding with relation to differences in the effect of educational attainment is not as much of a concern, however, as the relationship of such a difference to the paper's central argument is

not as clear. It has already been established in Chapter 2 that CP women have less education than non-CP women; thus, it could be that only CP women with career aspirations will have high levels of education, making education more meaningful for CPs; or, it could be that a woman's career potential as a function of education is less important for CPs, making the effect of education less for CPs than non-CPs. As both possibilities could support the general argument of the paper, a null finding has little impact on the paper's conclusions.

Conclusions

Despite the popular perception of the ideal CP woman as the stay-at-home mom, the presence of children in the homes of married CP women actually makes those women more likely to participate in the labor force than non-CP women in similar situations. Among married women, it is only those women without children that participate less in the labor force than similar non-CP women. I believe that this is due to a CP family value system that places family financial needs above the personal and career aspirations of the woman. Such a value system appears to affect the LFP of married women more than it does unmarried women, as differences between unmarried CPs and unmarried non-CPs are less apparent.

It must be noted that this research attempts to discern differences in values and attitudes based on data concerning behavior covering a substantial time period in which those values and attitudes could have changed. While the research is clearly suggestive of one conclusion, there remains a great need for research at the micro level dealing specifically with values and attitudes concerning female LFP and how those values and attitudes directly

affect the decision-making process. In addition, definitions of conservative Protestant and variations within conservative Protestantism might have some bearing on these values and their ultimate effect on female LFP. Better measures of religious affiliation are needed to expand knowledge in this area but such measures remain tricky (Woodberry and Smith 1998).

Despite these limitations to the present research, its findings are quite illuminating in light of public debates on family values. CPs have made much ado about their adherence to “family values,” which generally refer to conservative sexual norms, negative attitudes toward divorce, and support for the nuclear family. Until I embarked on this research I would never have guessed that working mothers was a conservative Protestant family value.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions and Implications

I began this dissertation by asking a simple question: “Why do Conservative Protestant women have lower labor force participation than other women?” The answer to that question, though, is far from simple. For one thing, Conservative Protestant women do not always have lower labor force participation than other women; at times, their LFP is even greater than that of other women in similar family and economic circumstances. There are, however, differences in the LFP of CP women and non-CP women, at least among white women. These differences can be attributed to two key elements in the religious ideology of CPs: an aversion to the ideals of modern education and a family-centered ethic with regard to economic production.

The first finding of this research is that the main reason CP women are less likely to participate in the labor force than other women is lack of educational attainment. CP women are on average less educated than other women and therefore are less likely to work outside the home. Once differences in education are taken into account, however, aggregate LFP rates for CP women do not differ from those of non-CP women. Perhaps even more interestingly, CP men have lower participation rates than other men for exactly the same reason: they have less education. Moreover, reductions in education due to CP affiliation are the same for both men and women. Furthermore, the models that find these educational impacts control for parental education and religious switching, meaning that CP affiliation

itself has a similar negative impact on the educational attainment of males and females that reduces the LFP of both. Taken together, these findings show that the lowered female LFP of CPs is less about gender or family attitudes and more a by-product of CP anti-intellectual attitudes toward education.

These negative attitudes towards education stem from CPs' high degree of belief in Biblical "truth." Modern education (particularly higher education) in their opinion promotes relativistic thinking and denigrates the role of faith in the quest for truth (Darnell & Sherkat 1997; Sherkat & Darnell 1999). In addition, CPs are skeptical of the scientific perspective that is central to modern ideas of higher education. They are more likely than those of other religious backgrounds to believe that science "pries into inappropriate areas" and are more skeptical of science's ability "to solve social problems" (Ellison & Musick 1995).

Furthermore, specific teachings of science and even the humanities run counter to the teachings of the Bible as interpreted by the majority of CPs: most prominently evolution but also issues of gender equality and gay rights. Perhaps most importantly, though, is that CPs see modern education as a bastion for secular humanism (Darnell & Sherkat 1997; Sherkat & Darnell 1999). Secular humanism's belief that mankind can solve its own problems through learning clearly runs counter to CP theology, which posits that mankind's problems are a result of mankind's rejection of God and Godliness.

Although reduced educational attainment is the most prominent and consistent reason why the LFP of CP women is lower than that of non-CP women, education is only part of the picture. It is true that once education is taken into account there is no difference in the

likelihood of LFP between CP and non-CP women in the aggregate, but that is in the aggregate. When the data is disaggregated by marital status and when the effect of being a CP on female LFP is allowed to vary over time, new patterns emerge. In Chapters 3 and 4, three inter-related facts become prominent as time, marital status, and other factors are taken into consideration. First, when the effect of CP affiliation is allowed to vary over time a pattern emerges in which CP women sometimes have greater, sometimes lesser, and sometimes equal LFP when compared to other women. Second, these differences are only seen in married women. Third, the presence of children has a more positive influence on the LFP of married CP women than that of other married women.

For married women, both the LFP of CPs and that of non-CPs changed over time. However, these changes in LFP corresponded to different changes in economic conditions. The LFP of CP women was more affected by changes in both male wages and female wages, whereas that of non-CP women was more affected by the demand for female labor. These findings indicate that CPs see female LFP as a more purely economic decision. The opportunities associated with work mean far less to the CP woman than whether her husband is able to provide and whether her job will be willing to bring in enough income.

In addition, married CP women differ from non-CP women in the affect of children on LFP. CP women who are married but have no children at home are less likely than non-CP women to be in the labor force. However, once children are added, this difference disappears and even reverses for families with three or more children. The presence of at least one child under six has a similar effect, with CP women without a child under six being

less likely to be in the labor force and those with a child under six being more likely to be in the labor force.

Neither of these findings is explained by simple differences in gender attitudes. However, both can be explained by an ethic of family-centrality in which individual needs and desires are placed beneath family ones and the world of paid work is treated as secondary to the domestic sphere. Under this ethic, married CP women are less likely than other married women to be in the labor force when the economy is good for their husbands or if they do not have children at home to support but are more likely to go into the labor force during more difficult economic times or when they have children. The decision is less about whether women should or should not be in the labor force as it is about placing family needs above individual ones. Interestingly, this family-centrality ethic is quite the opposite ethic of Weber's (2009[1905]) Calvinists who considered the world of paid work their "calling." For modern day CPs, family life is the "calling" and the world of work is merely economic support of the calling.

This explanation in many ways runs counter to the traditional explanation that CP attitudes concerning the family show a stalwart support of the separate spheres model of the family. However, the separate spheres model of the family is at root an exchange model in which husbands and wives create dependency on one another through separate activities. What CP families seem to be reacting to is not the abandonment of the separate spheres model but the exchange notion at the root of the separate spheres model itself. CP reactions to the family ideals of contemporary America are not a reaction to the loss of male

dominance but a reaction to the rise of individualism (McNamara 1985). Such an understanding of CP resistance on family issues explains why CP spouses, both males and females, are more dependent on their marriage than Americans of other religious backgrounds (Wilson and Musick 1996). It also explains why CP literature is as concerned with the overly career-oriented father (the epitome of the separate spheres family) as it is the working mother (Bloch 2000; Donovan 1998; Gallagher 2004a).

As Coontz (1992) points out, the ideal traditional family is a product of cultural memory and often an idealized mishmash of several realities. For many Americans, the separate spheres family of the post-World-War-II era in which the husband went to work and the mother stayed home and raised the children form the basis of this ideal. However, it should be noted that a large portion of families in the South and Midwest were not living this model during the same period. In much of the heartland, the bastion of conservative Protestantism, the family farm was still a prominent mode of economic production (or had been in the not too distant past). It should not be surprising, then, that CP families are establishing a family ethic that is less like the exchange-dependent separate-spheres family and more reminiscent of the interdependency of the farm family of the nineteenth and early twentieth century in which the family was not merely the unit of economic consumption but the unit of economic production as well.

It is true that this family form was (like the separate spheres model) rather patriarchal in its day, and it might be reasonable to agree with critics of CP family ideology that in their quest to re-invent CP family ideology CPs have re-established male dominance, albeit a

softer male dominance (Bloch 2000; Donovan 1998; Heath 2003). The prominent gender idea that consistently emerges in CP debates about the family is in fact “husband headship” (Denton 2004; Gallagher 2003). However, maintaining the gender order seems to be far less important to CPs than maintaining the family as a social institution (Wilcox 2009). CPs may emphasize the role of the male as leader of the family, but the imagery found in CP rhetoric is not of the husband as king of the castle but as the servant who gives up his own wishes for the good of the household (Denton 2003; McNamara 1985). Feminist critics are right to point out that even softer power is power and can lead to oppression (Bloch 2000; Donovan 1998; Heath 2003), but CP family views do not seem to be any more gender-oppressive than those of other American families (Denton 2004; Gallagher and Smith 1999). In fact, CP men appear to be more engaged husbands and fathers than other Christian men (Bartkowski & Xu 2000; Denton 2004). From the research I have presented it appears that CP women follow a similar viewpoint, personal sacrifice for the good of the family.

This finding demonstrates the importance of withholding judgment when attempting to understand the implications of the views of religious minority groups. Researchers should take as real the explanations of group members when they describe their own motivations and not succumb to the researcher’s biases. However, it is also important to note that group members are often unaware of inconsistencies in their own beliefs and behaviors. In the present case, Sherkat (2000) surveyed the family literature of CPs and found that their concerns regarding female LFP focused primarily on mothers of young children. I found that in practice, though, it is not CP mothers (at least not married mothers) that refrained from

LFP to a greater extent than other women in similar circumstances but married mothers with no children at home. In fact, as families got larger CP married mothers were comparatively more likely to be in the labor force than similar non-CP mothers. The idea of the stay-at-home mom remains alive in the CP ideological repertoire, but in practice the ethic of placing family responsibility over individual desires trumps that idea more often than not.

It is also important to understand how religious ideas may have results that in the short term are consistent with overriding ethics but in the long term produce incompatible results. CPs anti-intellectual bias that serves to reduce the average educational attainment of CPs may be compatible with CPs family-centered ethics in the short-term but in the long-term makes it difficult for CPs to live up to their family ideals. If a career should be primarily for the economic support of the family and individual success should be treated as secondary, it would be reasonable to assume that CPs would be less likely to invest in a professional career that would likely demand more personal investment. However, this lack of interest in higher education actually produces results that are contradictory to CPs family-centered approach towards paid work. Lower education means lower income; it also means greater likelihood of being without a job. Jobs available to workers without at least some college or technical training are often the first to go during economic downturns. This may be doubly true about jobs that are traditionally held by men, who are as likely to succumb to reduced LFP due to reduced education as are women (see Chapter 2). For instance, in the current recession male unemployment rates and male wage rates have suffered far more than those of women, leading some to refer to the current recession as a mancession (Rampell

2009). The point is that men without a college education are more likely to find themselves out of the labor force, which might push their wives into the labor force. So, failure of CP men to pursue higher levels of education may actually cause greater female LFP rate among CPs. Also, since most CP women will find themselves in the labor force at some point in their lives, failing to get an education reduces the likelihood that their entrance into the labor force will actually be worth their while. It will also mean that they are more likely to work strenuous jobs and less likely to work standard (9-to-5) hours. Both of these likelihoods mean less time with family and greater difficulty balancing family and work. Thus, by being resistant to education, CPs are actually making it more difficult for their families to achieve the CP family ideal.

Although understanding the ethics of a large religious minority and how those ethics translate into economic behaviors is in itself an important contribution of this project, the project also offers some insights into the more general relationship between religious belief and economic behavior. Beyond confirming Weber's general thesis that beliefs do matter in the construction of economic behavior, the present research shows that a single religious ethic may have differing effects on religious behavior depending on differing individual or family constraints and differing market conditions. The effect of a family-centered ethic during the mid-1970s or 1990s when male wages were relatively low were just the opposite of the effect of a family-centered ethic during the mid-1980s or early 2000s when male wages were relatively high. The same ethic that produced higher LFP at one time produced lower LFP at another time. This is because ethics are outcome oriented, not behavior

oriented. Religious motivations produce particular behaviors only to the extent that those behaviors can be perceived to produce the religiously desired outcomes. The focus on future research must, therefore, take into consideration that religious ethics may be context specific, as they are oriented towards specific outcomes and not necessarily specific behaviors.

Furthermore, it should be noted that behavioral differences between religious groups could have more than one root and that those roots might be rather disconnected theologically. In this case, differences in LFP were due to both a disaffection towards education and a particular family ethic. Although past research had for the most part focused on the gender and family attitudes of CPs, it was the educational attitudes that had the greatest effect on actual outcomes. A look at CP theology shows that these two issues are rather disconnected but compatible, at least in the short term. Their affects on LFP, however, are quite different, as educational attitudes served to reduce LFP and family ideals had more situational affects. In the case of Weber's original thesis, three particular elements of Calvinist thought worked together to produce a perfect storm. In my research two elements of CP thought work quite separately to produce differing outcomes. In future research it should be noted that either situation is possible. Separate ethics may work together toward an end or may work separately to produce a more complex scenario.

Two key measurement issues are important to the findings of this research and different decisions concerning them may serve as points of departure for future research. The first is definitions of conservative Protestant. It has already been noted several times in this dissertation that conservative Protestants are a diverse group; however, due to data

limitations I was unable to address this variance and its implications for my results. There is reason to believe that CPs who come from and/or identify with different traditions (e.g. Evangelical, Fundamentalist, Pentecostal) may have different views on education, family, and gender issues and those differences may produce different behavioral outcomes (Beyerlein 2004; Denton 2004; Gallagher 2003). Although social scientists continue to struggle with measuring variations within conservative Protestantism, future research may be able to take these variations into consideration to a greater extent. The second measurement issue is the measurement of LFP. In this research I measured LFP as a dichotomous variable, although I used an ordinal measurement in earlier investigations. Because of the ideological nature of the issues concerning the participation of CP women in the labor force, measuring *whether* a woman is or is not in the labor force makes sense. Although I found an ordinal measure not to be useful, some other formulation of an ordinal LFP measure or a continuous variable might add more information to the problems addressed in this paper. For if CPs truly approach LFP from a family-centered ethic it might not only affect their being in or out of the labor force but also the extent of their labor force involvement.

In going forward, it is my hope that this dissertation serves as an impetus for investigating the taken-for-granted perceptions of both social scientists and popular culture towards religious groups and the affects of religion on behavior. The beliefs that groups like conservative Protestants, Mormons, Scientologists, or small non-mainstream religious groups are known for in popular culture may not be the driving force beyond their differing behaviors. In fact, these beliefs may be quite misunderstood by researchers if popular

assumptions about these groups are not challenged in their research. As I have shown in this paper, CP religious beliefs and attitudes affect female LFP in more than one way and in more than one direction. The same may be true about the way the beliefs and attitudes of other religious groups affect their members' behaviors as well.

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