ABSTRACT

LAMBERT, CRISTINA PERRY. Gender Quotas in Electoral Systems: Explaining Voluntary versus Legal Quotas Worldwide. (Under the direction of Margaret Zahn.)

Quotas, which can be defined as a type of affirmative action policy in which a specific percentage or number is established to ensure the representation of a specific group, are nothing new to the governments of the world. This paper examines in more detail the implementation of electoral gender quotas. Specifically, the characteristics that differentiate countries with voluntary electoral gender quotas as opposed to those with legal electoral gender quotas are discussed. Using data from the International IDEA and Stockholm University’s “Global Database of Quotas for Women,” multinomial logistic regressions are conducted to determine the correlation between religion, democracy, female labor force participation and type of gender quota present. Findings indicate a need for future research examining the intricacies of religion and democracy in a more in-depth manner.
Gender Quotas in Electoral Systems: Explaining Voluntary versus Legal Quotas Worldwide

by
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For my Mother, who is a shining example of what a parent and friend should be, never ceasing to amaze me with her strength, courage, and love.
BIOGRAPHY

Cristina Lambert was born December 18th, 1986 in Fort Campbell, Tennessee. She is currently a graduate student in Sociology at North Carolina State University. She graduated from North Carolina State University in 2009 with a bachelor’s degree in Criminology.
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INTRODUCTION

Quotas, which can be defined as a type of affirmative action policy in which a specific percentage or number is established to ensure the representation of a specific group, are nothing new to the governments of the world. There have been many forms of political quotas implemented to increase minority representation, and nearly all governments utilize a form of geographical quotas (Dahlerup 2006). In more recent years, political gender quotas have been introduced in an attempt to increase female representation in government (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). Previous research has attempted to uncover why political gender quotas have been introduced in some government systems, but little attempt has been made to examine the characteristics that define countries where voluntary gender quotas are implemented as opposed to legal gender quotas. In the following paper, I will attempt to determine what characteristics - in terms of religion, democracy, and female labor force participation - are found in countries with quotas, and the differences between countries where voluntary quotas are implemented as opposed to legal gender quotas. Both the strengths and weaknesses of previous literature will be used to frame the following discussions and analyses.

FEMALE (UNDER)REPRESENTATION

*Incremental versus Fast-track Approach: Equality of Opportunity or Equality of Result?*

Female governmental representation is a matter of equality. However, there are many ways in which to approach the idea of equality, from defining the goal of equality itself to the different approaches available to reach this goal. Equality of opportunity and equality of result are two concepts relevant to the debate regarding female governmental representation.
and the use of electoral gender quotas (Dahlerup 2007). Historically along these lines, two major trends exist in terms of reaching the goal of female equality in representation: the incremental track and the fast track (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).

The implementation of quotas - a central component of the fast-track method - represents a shift towards “equality of result” (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, Dahlerup 2007). Conversely, the incremental approach is aligned along the idea of “equal opportunity” or “competitive equality” (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, Dahlerup 2007). Social structural accounts have previously been used to examine female government representation and this group of accounts falls in line with the incremental approach, aiming for equality of opportunity. However, this approach has not been the focus of much current research, and the introduction of political gender quotas is proof of the shift away from incremental - including social structural - views of female governmental representation to more of the fast-track approaches (Dahlerup 2007).

The fast track views the representation of women in government as something that must be encouraged in an active manner. The fast track approach to female representation adopts a more active approach to gaining representational equality. Proponents of this position believe that supplying equal resources for both men and women will not result in equal governmental representation. Women lack equal representation in government because their experiences are not recognized and valued (Dahlerup 2006). Here, quotas are seen as necessary to achieve gender equality (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).

The incremental track, in contrast, is based on the belief that equal representation will naturally occur as a country develops (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). The two tracks differ
in terms of defining the core problem that hinders equal gender representation in government. The incremental track sees the crux of this issue as a resource-based problem. That is, because women lack political resources equal to those of men, they also lack equal representation in government. This approach strives not only to gain equality for women, but to also promote equality for both sexes. However, there are some people that believe the implementation of quotas favoring women is in fact a hindrance put in place for men seeking positions in government (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). As an elaboration of the incremental track, the social structural approach towards female governmental representation will be discussed below.

_Social Structural Accounts_

This approach has lost some of its appeal, especially when juxtaposed to the “fast track” approach, including the implementation of quotas (Norris 2010). Social structural accounts of gender inequality, measured as female participation in government, peaked in popularity during the 1960s and 1970s. This perspective argues that the traditional roles of women, including their roles within the workforce, the home, and the family, reduce their involvement in politics (Norris 2010). Subsequently, it has been predicted that as more women enter the paid workforce, the gender gap in politics would decrease. However, this approach has come under much criticism, mostly through the examples of the United States and Japan. Both countries have had increases in the number of women entering the workforce and higher education system, yet still rank extremely low in terms of the number of women in government positions (Norris 2010). Since the introduction of gender quotas,
which are predicted to increase female participation within government at a much faster rate than through the effects of the entrance of women into the workforce and higher education (i.e. the fast track versus the incremental approach), this approach has lost popularity.

Despite the decline in support for the social structural approach to female political power, there have been recent attempts to revive this view and reopen the floor for discussion. In his discussion of the “resource curse” plaguing many of the Arab states, Ross (2008) gives a good example of the arguments related to the incremental approach to female government participation. Ross (2008) argues that a lack of women in the paid labor force lessens the number of women in government positions, leaving oil-producing states with “atypically strong patriarchal cultures and political institutions” (p. 1). Female labor force participation, according to Ross, affects female participation in government on three levels: individual, social, and economic. When women participate in the labor force, it is predicted to increase school enrollment and literacy rates, lower fertility rates, and increase social networks. Ross asserts that all of these characteristics works together to boost female political influence. He argues for the use of these avenues for the involvement of women regardless of the presence of quotas because according to him, the decision to enact quotas is usually a sign of female influence (Ross 2008).

The work of Ross (2008) has spurred much controversy and researchers are quick to highlight the shortcomings within his work. In her criticism of Ross’s (2008) notion that “petroleum perpetuates patriarchy” (p. 120), Norris (2010) identifies three main concerns. First, she questions the case-study evidence used by Ross. According to the “resource curse” theory, it is plausible to predict that countries rich in resources besides oil will experience
similar issues as those found in Arab states. However, Norris (2010) discusses examples of countries such as South Africa, which has an economy based on gold and diamond production, where women are able to participate and engage in government and other social issues. Ross (2008) fails to offer any comparisons between Arab countries and other resource-rich states that have lower levels of gender inequality. Norris (2010) also suggests a comparison between non-Muslim oil-rich countries and those discussed by Ross would better illustrate the proposed effects of the “resource curse”.

Perhaps one of the strongest criticisms of Ross by Norris (2010) (and one that is most relevant to this discussion of gender quotas and gender inequality) is the lack of a theoretical argument as to why female participation in the labor force would have any effect on female participation in government. The economic models employed by Ross (2008) also come under great criticism. The issue here is specifically the models used to represent the female proportion of parliament. Norris (2010) suggests that the controls used in these models may in fact be misspecified. Ross (2008) uses closed lists to control for the effect of electoral systems based on proportional representation. However, he fails to examine the role played by affirmative action (meaning the usage of reserved seats) used for females in these elected positions, which have been used in many Muslim majority countries (Norris 2007; Kang 2009; Norris 2010).

The direct and indirect effects of oil rents per capita on female labor force participation and female representation in government respectively are noted as being underdeveloped in Ross’s (2008) argument. Norris (2010) points to previous literature that suggests that when female labor participation is low, traditional attitudes towards women are
reinforced through voting patterns and the possibility of effective female government campaigns are also affected. However, Ross (2008) makes no assertions of this kind, and beyond stating the predicted direct and indirect effects of oil rents per capita does not point to any reasoning as to exactly how these effects will affect female labor force participation and subsequently female representation in government.

Norris (2010) also points to problems with the use of oil rents to examine the “resource curse” theory. According to her, it is logical to assume that if the oil production field is male dominated, then other types of natural resource extraction economies will also be male dominated. To better examine the relationship between Islam and oil, a broader examination of gender inequality and natural resource extraction, not limited to just oil, may be necessary. It is also premature to assume that a country dependent on oil or any other type of natural resource for revenue has a labor market that is dominated by jobs in the extraction field. It is proposed that an examination of the proportion of the population employed in the extraction field and the presence of females within government may provide a better picture of the relationship between the two and free research from “cultural stereotypes” about resource rich countries (Norris 2010).

One branch of thought based on the criticisms of Ross suggests that culture may play a crucial part in determining the gender equality (or lack thereof) in Arab states, but the question is why? Previous research has argued that the religious traditions of a society have a substantial effect on the values and morals present within a population, including those related to the appropriate gender roles. It is suggested that the dispersal of more modern and gender equal attitudes within a society pushes for more female participation in government
and other arenas traditionally viewed as appropriate only for males (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004). To fully explain the lack of females in government within Arab states, previous research stresses the need to examine the “substantial gulf” that separates the traditional view of gender roles in Muslim societies to the egalitarian views present in Western societies (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004).

In her replication of Ross, Norris (2010) concludes that female governmental participation is most successful in non-Islamic societies, regardless of whether they are oil rich or oil poor. Based on her analyses, she sees religious culture as having an extremely strong influence on the opportunities available for females, through influencing the attitudes of female candidates and influencing those in charge of government to limit the available entry ways for females into office (Norris 2010).

Others have followed in Norris’s footsteps and attempted to replicate Ross’s study. Kang (2009) utilizes the same data used by Ross, but suggests two modifications to his analyses that may better examine the relationship between Islam, oil production, and gender inequality. Similar to issues discussed by Norris (2010), Kang considers the inclusion of gender quotas within the analysis. Of 49 Muslim-majority countries throughout the world, 22 have adopted gender quotas. Thirty-three of the 64 countries with oil rents greater than $100 per year have adopted these quotas. According to Kang (2009), this will allow the models used by Ross to have more accurate estimations of women’s government participation. Also suggested is the consideration of the dialectic relationship between institutions and natural resources, and a further examination of situations where the presence
of natural resources produce gendered effects in government and the economy (Kang 2009). Kang (2009) hypothesizes that without quotas in place, oil-rich countries may be more likely to disregard the interests of female voters during oil booms. However, when quota systems are in place, there may be more of an interest in female voters, regardless of the oil economy. Authoritarian states may ignore demands of the female population when oil is abundant, and leaders in democratic states may use oil rents to provide social services to increase the interest of female voters.

Kang (2009) finds that gender quotas may offset the negative effect of oil rents on the presence of females in national parliaments. Gender quotas have increased female governmental participation in both oil-rich and oil-poor Muslim and non-Muslim countries alike. The question most relevant to the discussion at hand resulting from Kang’s (2009) analysis asks whether or not institutions constrain the way religion influences political outcomes for females. Kang (2009) notes that her findings support Ross’s claim that Islam is not correlated with low rates of female representation. However, as her question notes, there may be an influential relationship between the distribution of resources and the strength of religion within a state. Also, the possible influence the distribution of resources has on the relationship between the state and leaders within society must be examined (Kang 2009).

Despite the criticisms of Ross, it is important to take into account his argument when further examining female governmental representation. His argument regarding women in government must be utilized when examining quotas, both in the implementation and type. Shifting focus, a more in-depth discussion of quotas will follow, including the characteristics associated with voluntary versus legal quota
ELECTORAL GENDER QUOTAS: DEFINITIONS AND DIFFERENTIATIONS

Quota Level

When attempting to define quotas, it is important to consider the level of the electoral process in which the quota is implemented and who mandates the quota (Dahlerup 2007). As far as the level of implementation is concerned, a quota may be introduced to change the group of potential candidates, the actual candidates up for election, or those who are actually elected. The quota system may either be legally mandated, meaning it was introduced through electoral law or written into the constitution, or it may be voluntary and adopted into the rules of the political party (Dahlerup 2007).

There are three types of gender quotas most commonly used in political structures today. These types include reserved seats, legal candidate quotas, and political party quotas. The first two, reserved seats and legal candidate quotas, are constitutionally or legislatively driven, meaning that they are implemented by the country’s government. Political party quotas are voluntarily adopted by political parties. Reserved seats are just what the word suggests, a setting aside of a number of seats within government for women; whereas, legal candidate quotas make it a requirement of all parties to ensure a certain number of female candidates are placed on electoral lists (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Dahlerup 2006).

According to Dahlerup (2006), when attempting to define a particular type of quota, beyond basic operational characteristics, it is important to differentiate between exactly who mandates the quota system and exactly what the quota aims to change. As previously noted, legal gender quotas are either written into the constitution, the law, or adopted as part of electoral law. Although voluntary quotas seem to be gaining some steam as of late, the
majority of the political parties around the globe have not yet adopted them. However, if a country’s leading party does adopt a quota (i.e. the ANC in South Africa), then the possibility for change in terms of female representation grows dramatically. Quotas then may aim to change the list of individuals being considered for nomination, or may focus on the actual nomination of candidates (Dahlerup 2006).

Dahlerup (2006) indicates that one type of quota (i.e. voluntary versus legal) may not be necessarily more successful at increasing female representation than the other. What appears to be important are the possible sanctions resulting from non-compliance and the actual opportunities available for quota implementation within a country. Even if women are nominated, are they in a position where the possibility of their being elected is real and tangible? Quotas can be implemented at any level of government, from federal to local. The actual implementation of quota systems is heavily dependent on the type of electoral system in place (Dahlerup 2006). Sanctions differ in terms of voluntary and legal quota non-compliance. For voluntary quotas, there are no legal ramifications, but the political party may be criticized by activism groups or voters. In terms of legal quotas, the sanctions for non-compliance vary from country to country and may include nothing to the complete rejection of candidate lists that do not comply with the quota. But, even with sanctions in place, there is no guarantee that they will be enforced (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).

The goal of a quota system is to allow women to constitute a “critical minority” of the government, usually in the thirty to forty percent range. Some systems attempt to create a gender neutral body of representatives, where each sex must occupy at least forty percent of the seats but no more than sixty percent. Certain countries go beyond this ratio and attempt
to create a fifty-fifty ratio of males and females in government positions. References to “double quota” and “placement mandates” refer to systems where women must occupy a certain percentage of an electoral list and cannot be placed at the bottom of the list of candidates up for election (Dahlerup 2006).

Regional Preferences

The type of quota system adopted by a country has been found to be correlated with region worldwide. Previous research has found that reserved seats are most used in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Voluntary party quotas are most often found in Western European governments. Legislative quotas are most often found in the countries in Latin America, which is the region with the most quota regulations worldwide (Krook 2006; Dahlerup 2007). Many countries in Africa and the Middle East have introduced quotas into their governments. South Africa has one of the highest percentages of female representation, due in part to the thirty percent quota system of the ANC party (Dahlerup 2007).

Previous research indicates that voluntary quota systems are most common in the Western world. However, Western countries are the least likely to implement quota systems. In terms of quota type found in South Asia and the Arab region, it appears that reserved seats are preferred (Dahlerup 2007). It is difficult to list an exact number of countries that have adopted some type of quota, but as of 2006, approximately forty countries have implemented some form of legal quota through constitutional amendment of electoral law and in more than fifty countries, political parties have adopted voluntary quotas (International IDEA and Stockholm University).
Electoral Systems, Democratic Systems, and Quotas

Previous research has found that proportional representation (referred to as PR) systems are the most successful in pushing for the rights of women in government (Bacchi 2006; Dahlerup 2006; Davisdon-Schmich 2006; Tripp and Kang 2008). The PR system appears to be more female-friendly in terms of representation because there is a higher number of seats allotted per district than in other systems, such as plurality or majority systems, where only one seat is allotted (Dahlerup 2006; Tripp and Kang 2008).

However, the importance of the electoral system in place may vary for individual countries (Tripp and Kang 2008). It has been found that PR systems in countries that are considered “developed” and/ or Protestant are more associated with successful female representation, based on the prevalence of popular beliefs that are accepting of females in government positions (Matland 1998; Reynolds 1999; and Norris 2004). Therefore, it can also be assumed that party gender quotas specifically will have more success in countries with these characteristics. However, the importance of agency in terms of the success of quotas must be stressed here.

Previous cross-national studies have also shown that quotas are more likely to be successful in countries that possess “quota-friendly political structures” and political party compliance to the quotas set in place (Davidson-Schmich 2006). Quotas may be implemented, but without popular support, compliance is not common and instances of non-compliance are more likely to go unpunished. Quotas implemented without ongoing support may cause many women to end up as token members of government, and this is important
when dissecting the relationship between gender quotas and levels of gender inequality (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).

Independent from the electoral system in place, does the level of democracy within a country matter in terms of female representation and the presence of gender quotas? Previous research has found an insignificant or weak relationship between level of democracy and female representation. (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). According to Dahlerup (2007), gender quotas have been introduced in countries with various types of political systems. However, quotas are most likely found in countries with higher levels of democracy. When looking at the type of gender quota (i.e. voluntary versus legal) implemented, voluntary quotas appear to be the preferred form of quota in democratic countries, a level which is based on the Freedom House’s ranking system. Of the semi-democratic countries with quotas, legal appear most often. There appears to be equal presence of both types of quotas in the non-democratic countries with quotas (Dahlerup 2007).

The *Freedom in the World* survey is a yearly examination of the freedoms of individuals worldwide. In terms of measuring freedom, which is defined as “the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination,” the survey examines the level of political rights and civil liberties individuals experience (Freedom House 2011). Included in the area of political rights is the right to vote freely, compete for office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives. The concept of civil liberties refers to the ideas of freedom of expression, belief, and a sense of independence free from state interference. In terms of the
survey itself, there are ten questions related to political rights and fifteen questions examining civil liberties asked to derive a score for each country included in the survey (Freedom House 2011).

Culture, Religion, and Quotas

It would appear logical to assume a strong relationship between the culture of a nation and the number of female representatives in government. However, research in this area has yet to conclusively prove this as fact (Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2002). Religion can be used – and will be utilized in the following analyses - as a proxy to tap into the cultural atmosphere of each country. Previous Research has shown that religion is a very strong predictor of female governmental representation (Rule 1987; Reynolds 1999.) Looking specifically at “post-industrial” societies, research has uncovered a negative relationship between the number of women in parliamentary positions and Catholic history within a country (Rule 1987; Kenworthy and Malami 1999). Catholicism has a history of more traditional values in terms of gender roles than other Christian, namely Protestant, religions.

Legal versus Voluntary Quotas

Previous research has examined the factors associated with implementation of quotas, but there is little conclusive research asking why some countries appear to implement legal and/or voluntary quotas. Dahlerup (2007) approaches this issue through the previously discussed lens of equality of opportunity versus equality of result. Level of democracy and electoral system are supported by Dahlerup (2007) as important country characteristics in
terms of quota frequency. In terms of type of quota implemented, countries considered democratic by the Freedom House Index tend to favor voluntary party quotas, with legal quotas most commonly found among semi-democratic countries that use quotas. However, even Dahlerup (2007) notes that more factors must be taken into account when trying to determine why certain countries prefer one type of quota over another.

Support and Criticisms of Quotas

The criticism of electoral gender quotas appears to center around two main premises. First, there are those that feel “merit-based” competition is the necessary approach to improving female governmental representation. Second, there are those who believe that there is a lack of women who actually desire a role in government, and that there are few women who are actually qualified to fill these roles (Gray 2003). Other arguments against quotas highlight their “antidemocratic” nature and while some feel there is merit in the implementation of quotas, there are still concerns that they will actually hinder the possibility of equal representation for women by requiring such a low percentage of women in government, possibly leading women to only be seen as “tokens” (Craske 1999).

Those against quotas make the argument that quotas may result in women receiving positions simply because of their gender, and that men who are far more qualified may not be considered for the position (Dahlerup 2006; 2007). There are even those who see gender as an irrelevant topic within politics and if quotas are implemented for women, there may be a backlash of requests for quotas to represent other qualities deemed politically irrelevant, such as hair color (Dahlerup 2007).
Those in support of electoral gender quotas believe that they go above and beyond other attempts at increasing female representation in government, because the goal of quotas is to change the structure of the government institution, which may be easier to alter than culture and economic development (Gray 2003).

**METHODS**

*Hypotheses*

Level of democracy, religion, and female labor force participation, at one time or another, have previously been found necessary in explaining the variations of female representation throughout the world. Here, the interest is in looking if these factors are correlated with the presence of legal versus voluntary quotas. Based on previous research, the predictions for the outcome of the following analyses are as follows:

Predominantly Muslim states, characterized by lower levels of female labor force participation and lower levels of democracy are more likely to have implemented legal gender quotas as opposed to voluntary gender quotas. Predominantly Christian (other) states, characterized by higher levels of both female labor force participation and democracy are more likely to have implemented voluntary gender quotas as opposed to legal gender quotas.
Sample

Countries for the following analyses were drawn from the International IDEA and Stockholm University “Global Database of Quotas for Women” (2010). This database includes information on the countries throughout the world that have implemented some form of electoral gender quota and draws heavily on the work of Dahlerup (2006) to provide and classify information regarding quota types, level of implementation, and other basic information. For the current study, 89 countries were included in the dataset created for analyses, all having implemented legal, voluntary, or both legal and voluntary gender quotas at some level of government (See Table 1 for list of countries).

Dependent Variable

“Quota Type” is the categorical dependent variable for this study. Each country is classified as having only voluntary gender quotas, only legal gender quotas, or both voluntary and legal gender quotas in order to ensure that each category is mutually exclusive. For the purpose of analysis, the dependent variable is coded as follows: voluntary gender quota (3), legal gender quota (2), and both voluntary and legal gender quotas as (1). Coding has been done in this manner because voluntary quotas have the most cases falling into that category and will be the reference category in the multinomial logistic regression conducted.

Independent Variables

To examine the level of democracy within countries, data was drawn from the Freedom House *Freedom in the World 2011* survey. This annual survey collects
information regarding the population capital, political rights, civil liberties, status, and a ten-year ratings timeline for 194 countries and 14 territories worldwide (Freedom House 2011). A score of one to seven is given to each country for their level of political freedom and civil liberties, with a one representing most free and seven representing least free. Using the average of these two scores, each country is then given a status ranking in survey results as either “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” This status ranking represents the general state of freedom within the country (Freedom House 2011). According to the survey, countries with combined averages from 1 to 2.5 are considered Free. Countries with combined averages from 3 to 5 are considered Partly Free, with countries considered Not Free having averages between 5.5 and 7 (Freedom House 2011). For the purpose of this analysis, each country’s combined average rating was used to examine their level of freedom in the variable “Freedom Average.”

In terms of the prominent religion in each country, data were collected from the CIA World Factbook (2011). For each country, the predominant religion was classified as that which had the largest portion of the population identifying with it. Data regarding the predominant religion for each country is the most current information available, and the CIA World Factbook is updated weekly as more current information becomes available.

For purposes of this study, countries are classified as falling into one of four categories: Christian-Catholic, Christian-Other, Muslim, and Other. These categories were created based on the religions present in the countries included in the analysis and on previous literature. Four dummy variables were created based on the prevalence of religions within the sample: “Christian-Catholic”, “Christian-Other”, “Muslim”, and “Other,” with the
dumy variable “Christian-Catholic” serving as the reference category for the purposes of analysis.

Catholicism is the world’s largest religion, comprised of 23 different churches, including Roman Catholicism. Within the Christian-Other category, both Orthodox and Protestant forms of Christianity are included. Orthodox Christianity is the oldest established form of Christianity in the Eastern world. There are many forms of Orthodoxy, such as Greek Orthodox, and while it shares many of the same core beliefs as Catholicism, Orthodoxy does not recognize the Pope. Protestant Christianity emerged from an attempt to reform certain aspects of Roman Catholicism. Included in Protestantism are various denominations, including Lutherans and Episcopalians (CIA World Fact Book 2011). The Muslim faith, also referred to as Islam, is based on five pillars that guide the lives of followers. Sunni and Shia are the two main branches of Islam, but there are many variations of Islam throughout the world (CIA World Fact Book 2011). The religions included in the “Other” category for the purposes of this study are Buddhism, Hinduism, Indigenous beliefs, Judaism, Atheism, and Syncretic beliefs. There are fifteen countries that are considered to have religions classified as “Other,” representing 16.9 percent of the cases analyzed.

The variable “Labor Force Participation” was created with data gathered from the 2010 Global Gender Gap Report. Included in this report is the ratio of female to male workforce participation, which is a value ranging from zero to one, with zero being no equality between the number of women to men working and one being total equality between the numbers of women to men working (Global Gender Gap Report 2010).
Control Variables

The control variables of “Female School Life Expectancy” and “Percent Industry” were both constructed using data from the CIA World Factbook (2011). “Female School Life Expectancy” refers to the total number of years of schooling a female in each country can expect to receive, from primary to tertiary levels of education. While this variable gives a good indication of the education levels within each country, it is important to note that one year of schooling in one country may not be equal to another country. This variable represents the expected number of years of school that will be completed by females in each country, including time spent repeating grades (CIA World Factbook 2011).

“Percent Industry” refers to the percentage distribution of the labor force within each country that is employed in what is classified as an industry occupation. According to the CIA World Factbook, these occupations include mining, manufacturing, energy production, and construction, which, as previously discussed (Ross 2008), are often male dominated fields. This variable is controlled for to further examine Ross’s assertion that countries with male dominated fields of labor, mainly oil extraction, will have fewer women in the workforce and thus fewer women in government positions.

Analytic Strategy

The following analyses examine the correlation among the three independent variables with the type of quota present within each country, while controlling for female schooling and the percent of the workforce that is employed in industry. Three independent models were constructed to examine the possible correlation of each independent variable
with quota type, including the control variables previously discussed. A final model was constructed, including all variables previously discussed to assess the strength of the correlation of each independent variable while controlling for all other independent variables.

RESULTS

Model One examines the significance of the level of democracy within a country in terms of what quota type is associated with level of democracy, while controlling for the percentage of the workforce employed in industry and the average years of schooling predicted for females. The significance level for the fit of the model to the data is .003, meaning that the model is a good fit for the data and further interpretation is allowed. However, when looking at the parameter estimates for Model One, it appears that the level of democracy is not significantly correlated to quota type.

Model Two, testing the correlation between religion and quota type, fits the data according to the significance level of .001. Therefore, it is appropriate to move on and interpret the parameter estimates produced from the analysis. When looking at the significance provided, the dummy variable for Muslim religion is significant at the .05 level, with a p-value of .045. Results indicate that Muslim countries are almost twice as likely as Catholic countries to have legal quotas as opposed to voluntary quotas.

Model Three examines the correlation between labor force participation and quota type while controlling for the percentage of the workforce employed in industry and the average years of schooling predicted for females. This model is a good fit to the data, with a significance level of .027. When moving on to interpretation of the significance of labor force participation, we see that it is not significantly correlated to any of the quota types.
Model Four combines all three independent variables and both control variables. This model is a good fit to the data with a significance level of .015. However, with all the variables together, the only significant relationship found in the previous three models (Muslim Variable in Model Two) is no longer statistically significant at the .05 level.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

From the results of the analysis, there appears to be no strong correlation between the independent variables of level of democracy, predominant religion, and female labor force participation and quota type. Here, an explanation for these findings and their possible implications for future research are discussed.

The prediction of a correlation between female labor force participation and the presence of quotas was drawn from the work of Ross (2008). This prediction attempted to reexamine his assertion that female participation in the labor force is associated to the gender gap in political representation. The correlation between religion and quota type was drawn from the criticisms of Ross, specifically those presented by Norris (2010) regarding the relationship between Islam and gender equality.

In terms of religion and female political representation, previous literature has proposed that female governmental participation is most successful in non-Islamic societies because of the intense interaction between traditional Islamic values and culture (Norris 2010). Specifically, in instances where electoral gender quotas have been implemented, it has been predicted in the current analyses that legal gender quotas will be found in the predominantly Islamic countries. Protestant countries are more associated with successful female representation because of the prevalence of popular beliefs that are accepting of
females in government positions (Matland 1998, Reynolds 1999, and Norris 2004). Based on the previous literature, these countries have been predicted to most likely employ voluntary gender quotas, which can be indicative of a more accepting atmosphere regarding females holding government positions.

Model Two initially confirms the predictions of the hypothesis in terms of the relationship between Islam and legal quotas, with results indicating that Muslim countries are almost twice as likely as Catholic countries to have legal quotas as opposed to voluntary quotas. Referring back to Norris (2010), this appears to be a logical result, illustrating previous assertions that while Catholicism may view female governmental representation more negatively than Protestantism, Islam views female governmental representation even more negatively than Catholicism.

However, when introducing religion into the full model (Model Four), the significance of Islam is no longer present when attempting to differentiate between types of quotas. This is not to say that there is no relevant linkage between religion and type of quota implemented though. Perhaps the importance lies in a more in-depth examination of Islam as a religion. One may ask why predominantly Muslim countries would implement any form of electoral gender quota if Islam appears to be against having women in government positions at all. More specifically, if a predominantly Muslim country does implement electoral gender quotas, why would it be a legal one that would be even more likely to guarantee women making it into the positions. This is a very interesting question that extends far beyond the scope of this paper. Future research may need to examine the differences in the different sects of Islam (i.e. Sunni versus Shia) and their relation with quota types.
The categorization of religion for the purposes of this study may not capture the nuances that are found even within religions falling under the same classifications. It is plausible that the interaction between religion and culture may impact popular beliefs about the role of women in government, and the effects of this interaction are not being detected by the current study. To ensure that this interaction is seen, future research may need to conduct more in-depth qualitative research examining the regional differences that may affect the relationship between religion, culture, and political processes around the world.

These factors have been found, in conjunction with quotas, to be necessary to explain the variations of female representation throughout the world. Here, the interest is in looking if these factors are correlated with the presence of quotas in general. We cannot say that these factors had influenced the implementation of quotas, but future research of a longitudinal design using the same variables pre and post implementation may be able to shed light on this aspect. While the results of the analysis in the current study did not find total support for the hypothesis presented, the findings emphasize the work of Dahlerup (2007), which states that more factors must be examined when trying to determine the preference certain countries have over one type of quota versus another.
REFERENCES


## Table 1: Countries Analyzed

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<tr>
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## Table 2: Likelihood Ratios for Multinomial Logistic Regression

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
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<td>Percent Industry</td>
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<td>-0.302 0.30</td>
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<td>-0.057 0.899</td>
<td>-0.109 0.587</td>
<td>-0.109 0.587</td>
<td>-0.657 0.232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Religion Dummy Variables** |                  |                  |                  |                  |
| Christian (Other)         | -1.294 0.263     | -0.944           | -1.228 0.296     | -1.228 0.296     |
| Muslim                    | 0.221 0.848      | 1.90 0.045*      | -1.174 0.516     | -1.174 0.516     |
| Other                     | 21.126           | 0.163            | -20.45           | -3.67 0.714      |

| **Female Labor Force Participation** |                  |                  |                  |                  |
|                                    | -3.86 0.102      | 1.19 0.563       | -3.965 0.248     | 2.852 0.336      |

Note: Voluntary is the reference category for Quota Type and Catholic is the reference category for Religion. * p < 0.05