ABSTRACT


This dissertation attempts to develop common ground between the fields of media studies and rhetoric by exploring the way in which the media rhetorically construct collective memory through an analysis of popular texts using Robert Entman’s concept of media framing along with the rhetorical perspective of Kenneth Burke’s Frames of Acceptance as a guide for analysis. It focuses on American collective memory of Pearl Harbor because of the prominent place the attack holds in our understanding of World War II as well as its close association with September 11. I argue that the concept of collective memory can be enhanced by the concept of media ecology and the continual interaction and evolution of media texts and technologies. What emerges from these two concepts is what we might call memory ecology: a collection of representations that together create the texture of memory and influence society’s attitudes toward the past. So, the dissertation emerges at the intersection of three concepts: collective memory, media ecology, and the frames of acceptance. To combine these concepts I conducted what I called an ecological frame analysis which attempted to examine the most prominent ways of framing Pearl Harbor as those frames were embedded within multiple artifacts from across the media ecology.

The result of the analysis is a history of American collective memory of Pearl Harbor as current events shaped and reshaped the United States’ role in the world and Americans’ understanding of that role. The analysis demonstrates that the epic frame, characterized by the unification of the everyday citizen and the warlike hero in order to overcome adversity
and win a great victory, dominates popular American understanding of Pearl Harbor. The epic frame persists across changing historical and media contexts due to its adaptability and apparent inherent appeal for Americans. This reflects key characteristics of American identity and demonstrates the role that collective memory may play in the shaping and reshaping of that identity over time.

The method used in this dissertation is a way for scholars to trace the evolution of the past by examining how media artifacts influence audiences’ attitudes toward history and rhetorically construct collective memory. Collective memory refers to a collection of attitudes toward the past. If we understand collective memory in such a way, then Burke’s frames of acceptance provide valuable insight into its construction because they do not merely take which aspect of a story is emphasized or deemphasized, but encompass and define the audience’s attitudes toward the story’s subject, presumably some past event or era. Integrating the concept of attitudes into the study of framing enriches media studies by providing a rhetorical perspective and vocabulary for a more complete analysis of how a particular topic such as Pearl Harbor is framed by media representations. It also enriches rhetorical studies by adding an analysis of media technology and context to typically more content-centric rhetorical analysis.

Pearl Harbor, as the event that triggered active American involvement in World War II, is one of the most significant dates in American history. The dominance of the epic frame implies a particular understanding of the importance of December 7th, 1941. Within that understanding, Pearl Harbor is not merely a date which has lived in infamy. It is the day that Americans, in all of their diversity, finally came together as one, fighting for the common
cause of freedom and justice. In American collective memory, informed by the epic frame, Pearl Harbor is merely a prominent step in the inevitable progression of the larger story of American history.
Framing Infamy: Media and Collective Memory of the Attack on Pearl Harbor

by

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For Susan. Without her patience and support this would not have been possible.
BIOGRAPHY

I began my academic career as a student at Juniata College, a small liberal arts school in Central Pennsylvania and earned my Master's Degree at the University of Colorado in Boulder. During those years I developed an interest in rhetoric and the critical examination of the media. This led me to join the doctoral program in Communication, Rhetoric, and Digital Media at North Carolina State University where I also became interested in collective memory due to a personal interest in history. My dissertation grew from these three interests as I began to identify myself as an interdisciplinary scholar looking to bridge the gap between rhetoric and media studies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my committee for their help in imagining and planning this project and for helping to jumpstart my thinking about memory and media during a trying but (in retrospect) rewarding exam process. I would especially like to acknowledge the help of Carolyn Miller and Steve Wiley for their guidance, feedback, and encouragement throughout the writing process. Their contributions and advice have been invaluable. And to Ken and Carole, thank you for your patience and your willingness to provide assistance when needed. I am truly honored and humbled by the opportunity to work with my entire committee.

Second, I would like to thank the rest of the Communication, Rhetoric, and Digital Media program. The faculty has been wonderful and I have learned a great deal from them. The other students are always there and always offering support whether through stress-relieving chats and emails or in casual conversations in the office. But most of all, I owe my success in the program to my cohort – the close friendships and scholarly relationships that have developed within our small group have truly enriched my time in the program.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. vii

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1

  Rhetoric, Memory, and Pearl Harbor .............................................................................. 8
  Method and Chapter Outline ......................................................................................... 12

LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................................................... 23

  Studying Collective Memory ......................................................................................... 23
  Media and Culture ........................................................................................................... 39
  The Frames of Acceptance ............................................................................................ 46
  Moving Forward ............................................................................................................. 57

1941-1945: PEARL HARBOR IN THE WAR YEARS ......................................................... 59

  The Media during the War Years ................................................................................. 61
  Inconsistent Initial Framing .......................................................................................... 71
  Epic Unity in Response to the Attack ......................................................................... 83
  Maintaining the Frame ................................................................................................. 89
  Framing and Memory ................................................................................................... 107

1945-1970: QUESTIONING AND RECONSTRUCTING THE FRAME ......................... 112

  The Media at Mid-Century ........................................................................................... 115
  Countering the Dominant Frame ............................................................................... 121
  Rebuilding the Epic Frame ........................................................................................ 136
  The Comedy of Tora! Tora! Tora! .............................................................................. 149
  Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 167


  Television Events, 24-hour News, and Blockbuster Films ....................................... 181
  Blended History and a Return to the Epic ................................................................... 195
  Commemorating the Past, Defining the Present ....................................................... 209
  Pearl Harbor at the Turn of the Century ................................................................... 225
  Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 239

2001-2011: REVISITING PEARL HARBOR ................................................................. 244

  The Internet, Videogames, and Audience Participation ............................................ 249
Remembering Shared Sacrifice, Coping with Shared Trauma ............................................ 259
Memory Communities and Pearl Harbor Online .................................................................. 278
Preventing the Pearl Harbor of the Future ......................................................................... 305
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 307
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 312
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 335
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................... 360
Appendix A: The Texture of Memory .................................................................................. 361
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1 Listening to FDR's Address to Congress...................................................... 66
Figure 3.2 The burning Arizona..................................................................................... 94
Figure 3.3 Carrying a body from a burning school......................................................... 95
Figure 3.4 Stranded soldiers climb aboard a ship.......................................................... 96
Figure 3.5 Bullet-riddled Cars ....................................................................................... 99
Figure 3.6 In Memoriam Poster ................................................................................... 101
Figure 3.7 Produce for Victory! ..................................................................................... 102
Figure 3.8 Remember Pearl Harbor, Buy War Bonds ..................................................... 103
Figure 4.1 Schofield Barracks under attack................................................................. 154
Figure 4.2 Smiling Japanese........................................................................................... 159
Figure 4.3 Two versions of the Arizona........................................................................ 162
Figure 4.4 Suspicious Japanese man from Day of Infamy, Part 1................................. 164
Figure 5.1 Dorie Miller Past and Present...................................................................... 237
Figure 6.1 National Geographic Pearl Harbor Attack Map......................................... 298
Figure 6.2 The Arizona shortly after it is bombed in Medal of Honor: Rising Sun........ 302
Figure A.1 Texture of Memory, 1941-1945.................................................................. 362
Figure A.2 Texture of Memory, 1945-1970. ................................................................. 363
Figure A.3 Texture of Memory, 1971-2001 ................................................................. 363
Figure A.4 Texture of Memory, 2001-2011. ................................................................. 364
INTRODUCTION

In the introduction to his book *Attitudes toward History*, Kenneth Burke (1984) states that, while a reader may be inclined to pronounce the title “with the accent on *history*, so far as meaning goes the accent should be on *attitudes*” (p. i).¹ This statement highlights my own belief that representations of history illuminate and shape our feelings about, or *attitudes toward*, the past. Additionally, we might think of popular representations of history as windows onto small pieces of our society’s collective memory – evidence of dominant shared attitudes toward the past. Therefore, this dissertation begins with the following general assumption: scholars can learn how members of a society are encouraged to feel about certain events in their past by examining how representations of those events may encourage certain attitudes toward the past. We might think of those attitudes both as affective responses to representations of the past and as key components of a society’s collective memory of a particular event or time period.

Collective memory is constructed over time by a community’s interactions with history. Its content is made up of various feelings, meanings, and understandings of – in other words, our attitudes toward – the past. As historian W. Fitzhugh Brundage (2005) describes it, collective memory is a “product of intentional creation” that structures our social norms and identities (p. 4). Similarly, Maurice Halbwachs (1992) claims that collective memories “reconstruct an image of the past which is in accord … with the predominant thoughts of the society” (p. 40). Halbwachs also argues that we cannot have a memory outside of societal

¹ My edition of *Attitudes toward History* does not include page numbers for the introduction. For citation purposes, however, I will use Roman numerals whenever referring to that section of the book.
influence. Collective memory has a reflexive relationship with society: it can contribute to the construction of social norms and ideologies through the way it defines how a particular group understands its own past. However, it is also constructed by those social norms and ideologies since they are embedded within representations of the past and the attitudes those representations may encourage a group or community to adopt. Halbwachs tells us that the social groups to which members of a society belong give those members the ability to remember under the condition “that [they] turn toward them and adopt, at least for the moment, [the group’s] way of thinking” (p. 38).

Collective memory exists at the intersection of the attitudes we may develop in response to representations of the past and the social norms and ideologies that may be present within those representations as well as other encounters with the past such as commemorative events. By representations of the past, a phrase I will return to throughout this dissertation, I mean narratives that attempt to explain or recreate a particular historical event or period. These may take the form of oral or written accounts, photographs, films, or any other form of storytelling, whether they are entirely fabricated or somehow grounded in documented factual information. Representations do not only exist in story form, however – they may also be found in memorials or commemorations. I define a commemoration as any event meant to honor certain aspects of or individuals involved with past events. Often, though not always, representations and commemorations are the same – we might tell a story about the past in order to honor the actions of the story’s characters. Therefore, I use the term “representations” to generically refer to the stories we tell about the past as well as events
held to honor it, although I will occasionally refer to commemorations as a specific form of representation, one explicitly intended to honor certain people or events of the past.

Each subsequent representation responds to the effects of those which came before, reinforcing some aspects of collective memory while potentially challenging others. In this way, collective memory evolves over time, both contributing and responding to society’s attitudes toward the past and the present ideologies that support them. Scholars may, on the basis of this relationship, think of representations of the past as rhetorical artifacts that help shape the attitudes embedded within collective memory. We may think of commemorations in the same way, as they emphasize the worth of some aspects of an event over others and encourage the adoption of certain emotions regarding those aspects. As rhetorical artifacts, representations and commemorations have the potential to shape collective memory in a way that supports a particular ideology or understanding of history. They are invitations to share a particular vision of, or attitude toward, history.

Attitudes toward history do not arise spontaneously – they are a result of a collection of interwoven memory texts. Witness testimonies, education, fictional narratives, and commemorative events or memorials all intersect to create what James Young (1993) calls the texture of memory. The texture of memory is such that we, as a society, do not often recall major cultural events as such, but rather as those events have been re-told and re-created by witnesses, historians, or other storytellers. The elements that construct the texture of memory may be thought of as remembering one another rather than their explicit subject. In other words, as a society, we do not “Remember Pearl Harbor” so much as we remember a collection of stories that have been told about Pearl Harbor. We may also consider those
stories to be competing with one another for authority in the re-telling of the past, integrating or referencing earlier, “reliable” representations in order to gain some measure of cultural authority. The nature of the texture of memory suggests that representations of the past may be understood as rhetorical texts that contribute to the construction of collective memory and that scholars can engage them through rhetorical criticism to learn more about collective memory. And, if Halbwachs is correct in claiming that collective memory expresses the dominant ideology of a particular society, we must utilize a form of criticism that allows for the analysis of the ideological aspects of such texts. Such a move requires the study not just of the particular rhetorical artifact, but also the context within which the text was created and consumed. This may include the social context as well as the narrative context – what other versions of the story were being told during the same period – but it must also pay attention to the media context and how society consumes and experiences the story.

In this dissertation, I employ the concept of framing as an entry point for thinking about collective memory. For Kenneth Burke (1984), society looks through what he calls frames of acceptance and rejection when its members examine their own history, meaning that frames are necessarily affected by present conditions and change over time. Since the frames are dependent upon changing attitudes and ideologies, studying them can be thought of as a form of social criticism (Ivie, 2001). And, for Burke, social or ideological criticism cannot be separated from rhetorical criticism. My approach, described in more detail below, combines the concept of framing as understood by media studies scholars – the selection and arrangement of information in order to make certain parts of a narrative more salient for the audience (Entman, 1993) – with the concept of framing as a way to shape attitudes as
developed in rhetorical studies. The frames of acceptance as a concept are an underutilized critical tool for examining rhetorical texts and I employ them as a starting point for revealing the rhetorical and ideological aspects of popular representations and commemorations of the past. Because, according to Burke, it is impossible to look to the past without one’s understanding being affected by the frame through which s/he views it, the frames of acceptance can be understood as shaping not just the storyteller’s attitude toward the past, but also those of the audience and the critic. The audience, including the critic, views a representation through a particular frame that may or may not be the same as that of the storyteller. The critic’s job, then, becomes to identify which frame or frames appear to be manifested within a particular text, and examine their potential influence on the audience’s understanding of the depicted historical events. These two elements, the frame and its potential influence, can together reveal clues as to the text’s implicit attitude toward history. These attitudes then influence society’s collective memory. The frame through which we view the past affects the content of our memory (which aspects of the past are integrated into narratives and which are not), while the implied attitudes encourage us to feel a certain way toward or make a particular use of that version of the past.

In addition to the way that events are framed within texts, the way that the text is delivered is essential to understanding the text’s possible effects on the audience’s attitudes and understandings. A text’s media context, the media ecology within which it is embedded, has a large influence on the way it is consumed and understood (Innis, 1951; McLuhan, 1964; Fuller, 2007). The audience’s prior interactions with relevant information, the way in which one medium may replicate the style of another, and the audience’s awareness of other
representations of the same event may all have an effect on the audience’s collective memory. Therefore, as Harold Innis (1951) points out, “it becomes necessary to study [the medium’s] characteristics in order to appraise its influence in its cultural setting” (p. 33). The rapid development of digital media and the increasing role that all media play in our daily lives make it important to think about how different media intersect, reproduce, and interact with one another and how audiences make use of those relationships in their consumption of media artifacts. As scholars, we cannot maintain what N. Katherine Hayles (2002) describes as “a sharp line between representations and the technologies producing them” (p. 19). If media ecology is important, then we must consider it when regarding all media representations, including representations of and from the past. In studying how previous media artifacts may have contributed to the construction of collective memory, we must study them within their own media ecology – in what media context may the artifacts have been consumed? How might they have intersected or interacted with one another? What other representations might audiences have been familiar with when exposed to new versions of the past? By thinking about such questions, we can learn how the evolution of collective memory may be tied to that of the media used to represent the past.

As I have mentioned, no media artifact stands alone – each responds to, interacts with, and builds upon those which came before. They also interact with the time and society in and for which they are produced, struggling to be both contemporary and unique. The result is an interwoven and intertextual media ecology that is not unlike the texture of memory created over time (Young, 1993). As mentioned above, the texture of memory is made of overlapping representations of the past (for a visual representation of the texture of
memory of Pearl Harbor, see Appendix A). We often do not recall a particular event, only previous recollections. The recollections incorporate elements of one another and memory becomes a tapestry of stories, developing a texture as some elements of the past are repeated, some are revised, and some are ignored. Just as testimony and representations overlap and inform one another in our collective consciousness, media representations of the past refer to and expand upon one another. The type of collective memory that emerges from the intersection of complex media ecology and a rich, textured memory is the broader focus of my dissertation. In short, I hope to pursue the question of how media ecologies contribute to the continuing development of collective memory.

As mentioned above, Burke’s frames of acceptance can be useful for exploring the ideological leanings of popular representations of the past by providing a rhetorical approach to a frame analysis. Since there are multiple, related, and overlapping frames, they provide an opportunity for a comparison of representations across time as well as how multiple representations, as pieces of the broader media ecology, may be considered together within a frame or set of frames. In this dissertation, I explore how Burke’s frames can be applied to a collection of artifacts as a collection. I am interested in how collective memory emerges from media ecology, resulting in what we might think of as memory ecology – a collection of representations that together create the texture of memory and influence society’s attitudes toward the past. I believe that the frames allow for a single, coherent analysis of the memory ecology. Since, by definition, collective memory relies upon representations of the past that play a role in the imagination of many people within a society or community, I believe that popular texts, those available to a significant portion of the population, can best illustrate the
way that collective memory can be constructed and use them as my primary objects of analysis. In sum, I am studying the way that media texts, such as books or films, contribute to the construction of Americans’ collective memory by employing Burke’s frames of acceptance as a guide for rhetorical analysis.

I have chosen the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor as an anchor for my analysis. I will be studying representations of the attack, beginning with news reports published on December 8, 1941, and culminating with coverage of the seventieth anniversary of the attack in 2011. While my primary interest is the interaction between the media and memory, I will be focusing specifically on collective memory of Pearl Harbor. The remainder of this introduction provides a more complete explanation of my choice of the attack on Pearl Harbor to exemplify the link between media ecology and collective memory as well as an overview of how I will proceed with my analysis, and a brief outline of my remaining chapters.

**Rhetoric, Memory, and Pearl Harbor**

Collective memory, attitudes toward history, and media representations of the past are all intertwined, each containing elements relevant to the others. Because these areas are closely related, it is important to study how they intersect within popular representations of the past. Therefore, I will explore how popular culture rhetorically constructs collective memory by analyzing popular texts using Burke’s (1984) concept of the frames of acceptance as a guide for my analysis. I have chosen to focus on representations of Pearl Harbor for two reasons. The first is that the attack, or at least representations of it, holds a
prominent place in American collective remembrances of World War II. It is difficult to
discuss the war without making reference to the bombing. Due to this relative importance,
Pearl Harbor has been the subject of many representations from a number of perspectives:
that of the everyday individual, as a dastardly deed by an evil enemy, from the point of view
of the Japanese, and from the perspective of the American sailors and soldiers who fought in
the attack. While the attack on Pearl Harbor, as the event which began the United States’
active involvement in World War II, is important in world history, I have chosen to limit my
analysis to American representations and memory of the bombing. This is not to discount
other representations of and attitudes toward the events of December 7, only to provide focus
for my analysis.

A second reason for my choice of Pearl Harbor is based upon my belief that
collective memory influences and is influenced by events, issues, and concerns of the present
(Biesecker, 2002; Dickinson, 2006; Zelizer, 1995). More than seventy years after the attack,
due to its association with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Pearl Harbor is once
again salient and surprisingly fresh in Americans’ minds. The 2001 attacks occurred at a time
when Americans were preparing to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor.
The summer of 2001 had seen numerous documentaries and a major motion picture released
to the public, so it is reasonable to assume that the 1941 bombing, or at least representations
of it, were relatively fresh in Americans’ minds during and immediately following the 2001
attack. This recency likely played at least a small part in the popular association of the two
events. In the fall of 2011, Lexis-Nexis Academic returned over 900 results of articles
containing both “9/11” and “Pearl Harbor” since September 11, 2001. The first of these
appeared on September 12, 2001, claiming that the response to the attacks “reminded older
Americans of the futility, the frustration that had followed Pearl Harbor nearly 60 years ago.”
The same article included a comment from an individual who had friends among the victims
of 9/11, saying, “We have to come together like ’41 - go after them” (Infield, 2001). As an
online memorial for the USS Utah, a target ship sunk during the attack on Pearl Harbor, puts
it in capital red letters: “Remember Pearl Harbor! Remember 9/11/2001! Two Days of
infamy!” (Hughes, 2010).

Because of this association, and because collective memory is just as much about the
present as it is the past, it is important to examine how collective memory of the attack on
Pearl Harbor has evolved and how that evolution led to the point at which Pearl Harbor
became closely associated with and in some ways instructive of how to respond to September
11. If collective memory is instructive about how we should respond to issues arising from
what is presented to us as similar to past events, an analysis of those instructions which takes
a critical approach to the rhetorical and ideological aspects of representations of the earlier
event can perhaps help scholars to understand the response to the later event.

In his description of the frames of acceptance and rejection, Burke (1984) highlights
certain attitudes characteristic of each frame that suggest certain elements of stories that
might be told from within that frame. For example, those viewing the past through a tragic
frame may tell stories about the past that revolve around the view of pride or hubris as “the
basic sin” and how the enactment of that sin harms others or is punished (p. 39). In my
analysis, I look for evidence of such attitudes within a collection of artifacts that re-tell the
story of the attack on Pearl Harbor in order to determine which frame or frames the story
may fit within or may be embedded within the story. Over time, as contexts change, frames may shift and change or perhaps different frames will gain or lose prominence, overlapping with or superseding previously dominant ways of framing the past. As we study the evolution of how the past is framed, we can also trace the evolution of how it is remembered.

I will also be considering the role that media ecology plays in the construction of collective memory, leading to the question of whether or not certain parts of history may be more salient in one representation than another, even if they are embedded within the same frame. This requires a larger picture of the media environment within which a particular artifact is embedded. Therefore, I will be conducting what I am calling an ecological frame analysis, in which I attempt to address the following questions: In what ways do changing media and technological contexts affect the way audiences experience representations of the past? Although representations may each be framed differently, is there a particular frame that emerges as dominant or most common as time goes on and collective memory evolves? And what role might representations that resist the dominant frame play in the construction of collective memory? In short, I plan to examine how media ecology becomes memory ecology and how each evolves over time.

In summary, my dissertation attempts to address the issue of how media representations of the past contribute to the development of collective memory by taking into account the broader media ecology surrounding representations of the past and the frame within which the stories appear to be embedded. I hope to be able to foster an understanding of the way that popular media artifacts present the past rhetorically and construct our collective memory. In the final section of this chapter, I lay out my intended chapters,
beginning with an explanation of my ecological frame analysis and including a brief
description of the media ecology as it evolves over time and through chapters as well as
specifying some major artifacts that I will be analyzing.

**Method and Chapter Outline**

Following this introductory chapter, I provide an overview of the literature
concerning collective memory, media studies, and Burke’s frames of acceptance. This
includes a detailed definition of how I am using collective memory and its role in defining
how society understands the past. I also discuss the implications of the frames of acceptance
for the detailed analysis of rhetorical texts and how they can help critics to recognize the
attitudes toward the past present within them, attitudes which are a major component of
collective memory. Through my review, I establish how media and memory are closely
related and the ways in which Burke’s frames can help to illuminate that relationship. The
connections between these three areas are essential for justifying my ecological frame
analysis, described in detail below.

After my review of relevant literature, I examine media representations of Pearl
Harbor through four different historical periods, progressing from the beginning of World
War II through the present, with each period examined within a single chapter. Organizing
my dissertation in this way provides two primary advantages. First, it allows me to situate the
texts within their respective cultural contexts and media ecologies. As noted above, a text
cannot be fully understood if removed from its contextual setting. This structure allows me to
examine multiple media texts within the same time frame: the novel and film versions of
From Here to Eternity (Jones, 1951; Zinneman, 1953) as well as the nonfiction book, Day of Infamy (Lord, 1957), for example. In other words, it provides potential boundaries for the analysis of media ecologies and the way particular media artifacts may fit within them.

The second advantage to organizing my analyses according to historical period is that it allows me to observe the construction of collective memory in popular culture texts as it may evolve along with the broader media ecology. Audiences experience media representations at a particular time, which means they would be unaware of representations that came later. By organizing this dissertation in the way I have chosen, I can view the texture of memory as each new representation is laid on top of those that came before. This allows me to make claims about attitudes toward Pearl Harbor at specific points in time, viewing snapshots of the memory ecology as it grows. By dividing the dissertation in this way, as opposed to attempting to analyze the entire memory ecology at once, I can examine a greater number of representations and present a more complete picture of the evolution of collective memory of Pearl Harbor. In short, I have chosen a period approach because it allows for a better situated and more complete analysis. Additionally, since no media artifact can be examined without also considering its relation to other media (Bolter & Grusin, 1999), my period approach avoids the danger of reifying any specific medium as discrete and isolable by situating them within evolving historical periods and ecologies.

The method employed in my analysis chapters is what I am calling an ecological frame analysis. This is, in essence, a close rhetorical analysis of a snapshot of the media ecology. Using Burke’s (1984) frames of acceptance as a guide for rhetorical analysis requires a close examination of the artifacts being studied. Although there is a potentially
unlimited number of frames as different ways of understanding the past come together and evolve over time, Burke explains that each of the eight frames he describes “stresses its own peculiar way of building the mental equipment by which one handles the significant factors of his time” (p. 34). In order to paint a complete picture of a particular frame’s “peculiar way of building,” a critic must look at all aspects of how a story is told. Which elements are emphasized, which are placed in the background, and which are ignored altogether? Or, in media scholar Robert Entman’s (1993) terms, which aspects of the story are made more salient by the selection of particular elements rather than others? Therefore, using the concept of framing, and Burke’s frames as a particular instantiation of that concept, as a mode of media criticism requires a relatively close reading of the texts being analyzed. In an ecological frame analysis, a large collection of texts that represent the most prominent components of the ecology are assembled and each is closely examined, searching for how the texts combine to form a relatively coherent story and how that story fits within a dominant frame or frames, including how that frame provides a society with “mental equipment” to “handle the significant factors” of its time.

Of course, it is impossible to truly isolate such a thing as a single media ecology – all artifacts and media intersect and interact with one another. However, if one were to draw borders around a segment of the environment (i.e., media artifacts referencing the attack on Pearl Harbor), a picture of how that segment’s primary subject matter is represented will begin to form; creating what might be thought of as a sub-ecology. An ecological frame analysis attempts to examine how a dominant frame is rhetorically constructed across different artifacts and media within such a particular structure. For example, if there are
books, films, and series of news reports all dealing with a single event, is there a frame that is common to their retelling of that event? And if so, how does each artifact contribute to the construction of that frame through its own representations as well as its potential interactions with the others?

Conducting an ecological frame analysis begins with the collection of a number of media artifacts concerning a particular topic, in this case, the attack on Pearl Harbor. These artifacts may come from anywhere – newspaper reports, magazine photographs, fiction films, documentaries, or nonfiction books are all potential sources. The collected artifacts are then reviewed, looking for consistent or contradictory themes that may suggest a dominant frame. The review is made with consideration paid to how each artifact was made available to audiences, which other artifacts the audience may have been aware of when they encountered it, and when and how the audience may have consumed the artifact. The intertextuality of the artifacts is also important. How do they refer to one another, repeating and referencing the images or stories of other representations, reinforcing or challenging the dominance of those representations? In the end, I attempt to use the information gained from the analysis of artifacts and their potential interactions with other representations to construct an image of the Pearl Harbor media/memory ecology. I also look for evidence of a frame or frames that seems to be common to a majority of the representations that make up that ecology, arguing that such a frame has a strong influence on the way that the event is collectively remembered. Each analysis chapter will include such an examination, adding to an increasingly larger image as the ecology has grown over time, and exploring the evolution of American
collective memory of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. As the media ecology evolves, so does the memory ecology.

To conduct my analysis, I have divided the years since the attack on Pearl Harbor into four historical periods. The periods include two longer sections, each roughly corresponding to generational shifts, bookended by two shorter periods in which our collective memory of Pearl Harbor was radically affected by world events. Each of these four historical periods corresponds to an analysis chapter, with each chapter proceeding in a similar fashion (chapters 3-6). First, I present a summary of the prominent media in each historical period, including its technological development and popular adoption. This is followed by the ecological frame analysis, exploring a collection of everyday media artifacts such as news reports, but also giving attention to what might be considered landmark artifacts – single artifacts that drew large audiences or were given a prominent place in the media ecology. Lastly, I will provide suggestions as to how the developments in media and evolution of dominant frames discussed in each chapter contributed to the construction and evolution of Americans’ collective memory of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Chapter three covers the war years, 1941-1945, focusing on the initial framing of the bombing of Pearl Harbor during the immediate aftermath of the attack as well as how the story was told during the war, including through propaganda and popular film. Stories of the attack would likely have been particularly salient for audiences and played a major role in both justifying and maintaining support for the American war effort. During this period, print held a prominent position in the American media landscape, particularly in the form of newspapers and magazines. Aural media such as radio also played an important role in the
daily lives of Americans, and therefore reports and broadcasts of public addresses would have figured prominently in framing the story of the attack. Finally, Americans also would have encountered film newsreels of the events in theaters, combining what they saw with the images from magazines and the reports from newspapers to form an understanding of what happened on December 7, 1941. In addition to the everyday artifacts collected from newspapers, magazines, and newsreels, this chapter includes analysis of two landmark artifacts: President Franklin Roosevelt’s December 8, 1941, address to Congress requesting a declaration of war against Japan (known as the Infamy Speech), and John Ford’s Oscar-winning “documentary,” *December 7th*, released in 1943.

Chapter four covers the years 1945-1970 and represents a significant shift in the framing of Pearl Harbor. Army, Navy, and Congressional investigations into the attack played a large role in changing the way Americans understood Pearl Harbor at the beginning of the period, giving rise to a number of counter-narratives, sometimes in the form of conspiracy theories. The counter-narratives, while briefly popular, gave way to versions of the Pearl Harbor story that more closely fit the government’s official stance on the attack, culminating in the film *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (Fleischer, Fukasaku, & Masuda, 1970). During this period much (though certainly not all) media would have been consumed by individuals who had experienced the war years firsthand. Such people were likely to be the target audience of many representations produced during this time. In terms of prominent media during the period, while print and radio were still dominant in the years immediately following the war, the decades covered in chapter four witnessed a rise in the importance of television. A culture still reliant on print, and within living memory of the War, is likely to
have constructed its memories of Pearl Harbor differently than later generations whose media landscape, not to mention distance in time from the attack, had changed dramatically.

In addition to everyday artifacts, chapter four will include the analysis of two landmark artifacts. Walter Lord’s (1957) *Day of Infamy*, originally published in part as a serial feature in *Life* magazine, is a non-fiction book which includes interviews and meticulous archival research, presenting what one reviewer called “the human drama of Pearl Harbor” (Morton, 1957, p. 154). The second landmark artifact examined in this chapter is the 1970 film *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (Fleischer, et al., 1970), a fictional documentary-style film dramatizing both the Japanese and American viewpoints before and during the attack on Pearl Harbor. The film has been praised for its apparent historical accuracy, yet panned for its lack of characterization.

Chapter five includes artifacts produced between 1971 and 2001, a period in which the population was largely composed of the children of those of age to remember World War II. Herman Wouk’s 1971 novel *The Winds of War* was published at the beginning of this period, while the blockbuster film *Pearl Harbor* (Bay, 2001) provides an emphatic punctuation at its end. While the time period was a generation or more removed from the War, most government and media institutions would have been controlled by those who had come of age during the earlier period. The role of radio in American lives began to decline as television became prominent prior to the beginning of this time period. The filmic nature of television would also have an effect on how audiences experienced film. In addition, the spread of television made the consumption of representations of the past relatively less time-intensive and the influence of print media began to decline. However, television also allowed
for the adaptation of print media into televisual media, creating a media environment in which print, television, and film all referenced and intersected one another. Near the end of this time period, the Internet entered homes and schools and became a major source of information, particularly for the nation’s youth. While the Internet first began to take hold during this time, it would play a more central role during the next period.

In chapter five, I will focus on two landmark artifacts, including the novel *The Winds of War* (Wouk, 1971) and its adaptation into a television miniseries (Curtis, 1983). The adaptation of the novel (and its sequel) into television miniseries adds an extra dimension to the analysis of the work, which will focus on the portion of the story directly involving the attack on Pearl Harbor. Wouk’s novels and their respective adaptations provide an excellent demonstration of how different media can interact and depend upon one another within the media ecology. The second landmark artifact of this chapter is the 2001 film *Pearl Harbor* (Bay, 2001). The film was largely panned by critics, but was a large financial success. As a summer blockbuster heavy with digital special effects, *Pearl Harbor* represents a moment of transition into a 21st-century media environment. In addition to its special effects, the film’s success was largely dependent on youth who were just coming of age and bringing a comfort with digital technologies and media along with them.

Finally, chapter six spans the years 2001-2011, beginning with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and concluding with the 70th anniversary of Pearl Harbor. During these years, the third generation born after Pearl Harbor has come of age. The growth of the role of television and film in Americans’ lives continued in this period and digital media became prominent with the World Wide Web reaching its saturation point and the development of
user-driven content (e.g., YouTube) in the first decade of this century. Video games also became an important piece of the media landscape during this period. Video games and digital media affected the media ecology not just as additional forms of media to consume. They also re-shaped the way that filmic and televisual media were produced with the use of computer graphics and digital video, as well as the way that stories are constructed and told. These changes help the older media to remain relevant and to blend into the evolving media ecology. And as the way stories are told and media artifacts are produced continues to change, I explore the way those changes may also influence the development of collective memory.

The ecological frame analysis in this chapter will focus primarily on the connections between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 made in media representations of both of those events. Landmark artifacts from this period are all digital in nature and circulate in one form or another through the Internet, making the active sharing of remembrances and construction of collective memory possible. Digital artifacts provide audiences the potential to play a role in the creation of the representations of the past and may include online memorials, message boards, social networking groups, and, importantly, video games which may place the audience/user directly into the event being reconstructed/remembered. Landmark artifacts analyzed in this chapter include “Pearl Harbor Remembered,” an online memorial site that includes a description of the events of the attack as well as a collection of “Survivors’ Remembrances” (Schaaf, 2007), and the 2003 first-person shooter video game Medal of Honor: Rising Sun (Electronic Arts, 2003). In this
game, players experience the attack from the point of view of Joe Griffin, a marine stationed on the USS California.

These four analytical chapters, moving through four historical periods, draw attention to cultural changes and the evolving media ecology over the intervening seventy years since the attack on Pearl Harbor. Most artifacts during the first period tend toward nonfiction – news reports and documentaries. This is likely due to the proximity in time to the attack and the nature of the media ecology of the time (dominated by print and radio). A landmark artifact from the second period is a nonfiction, print text, while the same chapter closes with an illustration of the dominance of film, as *Tora! Tora! Tora!* has provided a lasting image of the battle. Yet, in the next time period and chapter, we can observe a shift toward the television medium as the Wouk novels were developed into successful television miniseries. Another shift occurred around the turn of the twenty-first century as digital technologies made it easier to recreate what the attack may have looked like to those involved. Digital media also provide the potential for audience involvement and personal remembrances became prominent in the age of the internet. My hope is that this evolution becomes more obvious in the details and analyses of specific popular culture texts from each of the four time periods.

I explore this evolution of media ecologies in my concluding chapter, as well as discuss the possible effects of different media on the construction of collective memory. What themes remain constant throughout the evolution of the collective memory of Pearl Harbor? What can we learn about Pearl Harbor itself? And, finally, how does the method presented in this dissertation contribute to the continuing study of the relationship between
media and memory? In short, I hope to provide an answer to my primary question: how do popular media artifacts frame the attack on Pearl Harbor and, therefore, contribute to how American collective memory of that event has been shaped.
LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I review the literature necessary for understanding the intersection of collective memory, media studies, and rhetorical frame analysis. These fields overlap in ways that are key pieces of this dissertation. As discussed in my introduction, collective memory arises from mediated representations of the past. Memory is textured, made up of layers of remembrances that are thicker in some areas than others (Young, 1993). Media ecology is also textured, with each new medium building on the characteristics of those which came before it and each new representation influenced by its predecessors and contemporaries (Bolter & Grusin, 1999; Fuller, 2007). As the media ecology evolves, so must the collective memory that arises from and within it. As the media and memory interact, they inevitably frame their subjects, opening the door for an analysis not just of single artifacts, but of the entire media ecology. This is what I hope to achieve in my analysis of the memory ecology: an interdisciplinary framing analysis combining rhetorical criticism with a media-ecological analysis. In this chapter, I introduce how I understand the relationship between these concepts, beginning with a summary of the relevant literature on the study of collective memory, and then moving on to discuss media studies and the concept of media ecology, and closing with an overview of the concept of framing, including Kenneth Burke’s (1984) frames of acceptance which provide a guide for my method of rhetorical analysis.

Studying Collective Memory

It is important to begin by discussing the differences between the concepts of history and memory. There has traditionally been an assumption that history is made up of
nonfiction accounts of the past – assemblages of facts arranged in a relatively objective narrative style. Memory, on the other hand, is often considered as an assembly of recollections, imperfect and incomplete, colored by personal experiences and biases. However, such a distinction between the two overlooks the necessarily rhetorical nature of history and its practice as the selection of important or relevant information arranged into a story told for a particular purpose. So although scholars such as Pierre Nora (1989) argue that history and memory are entirely opposed to one another, others tend to believe that there is a thin, porous line between the two. For example, Edward Morgan (2006) claims that the “distinction between history and memory may no longer be so clear” (p. 138). Similarly, Romano and Raiford (2006) note that “history and memory necessarily challenge and blur each other’s boundaries” (p. xiv). While I agree that the two concepts can be difficult to tell apart, this dissertation deals primarily with memory construction, and it is therefore important to define how I understand the concept of memory and, more specifically, the idea of collective memory.

Memory, in the form of remembrances shared by groups of people, has many names. It may be referred to as social, public, or collective, among others (Casey, 2004). While each term has its own nuances and carries its own connotations, the terms’ uses in conjunction with the word memory often overlap and, in some cases, may even be used interchangeably. It is important, therefore, to provide a concise definition of what I mean by the term “collective memory” and why I have chosen that particular phrase. Collective memory, as I use it here, refers not necessarily to any ability to recall certain factual information (although that may be a part of it), but rather to a shared sense of the meaning of the past and its
relevance to life in the present. In Burkean terms, I am primarily concerned with society’s attitudes toward the past and view collective memory largely as built from and contributing to the ongoing evolution of those attitudes. This means that collective memory is much more about understanding the role of the past in shaping the present and defining a society’s identity than it is about questions of “accuracy” that one may ask.

I have chosen the word collective over some of its rivals, particularly social and public, for various reasons. First, while a word such as “social” may be used in the same way I have chosen to use “collective,” social may also carry with it an implication of the active and purposeful sharing of particular memories, as mundane daily routines may be shared in an online social network (e.g., Facebook). As Casey (2004) defines it, social memory “is tantamount to ‘co-reminiscing’” – the active, conscious sharing of a common past with those with whom one has a relationship (p. 22). Second, public memory is “[meant] to contrast … with anything privately … in the idios cosmos of one’s home or club” (p. 25). While I believe that public displays have a role in the construction of memory, I cannot ignore the effect of private interests and experiences on memory construction. Another definition of the word public may also imply some connection to conscious actions or stories of some official institution such as the government, an association that does not encompass all elements of how the past is put to use in the lives of many people. Collective memory implies the sharing of memory in ways that are not necessarily active, intentional, or directed by powerful institutions. I do not choose to share my memory with others; our collective memory has been built through exposure to similar representations of the past.
Collective memory may be built by watching, for example, a television documentary. While many people may watch the documentary, it has been consumed privately and, in our present media environment of video recorders and Internet streaming, not even necessarily simultaneously. As Casey (2004) puts it, “[collective memory] allows for co-remembering without co-reminiscing,” an act contrary to social and/or public memory as they have been defined above (p. 25). Additionally, collective memory can be applied to smaller groups without the baggage of an entire “culture” or official influence as in the term cultural memory (or, potentially, public memory). This is not to say that the term “collective memory” cannot also imply these things or that the phrase solves the confusion and conflict between the other terms, but I hope that it can avoid some of their potential limitations. In what follows, I provide a brief overview of the study of memory, focusing on theorists who share my understanding of collective memory, if not my choice of the term “collective.”

Related to my position that memory is not necessarily dependent upon the “accurate” recollection of facts, a common line of thinking in memory studies is that there is no one true way to remember or represent the past. David Glassberg (1996) describes the study of memory as the study of “how various versions of the past are communicated in society through a multiplicity of institutions and media” (p. 9). I believe, however, that memory goes beyond the communication of different versions of the same story. The study of memory also involves the attempt to understand the potential effect of such stories on the subsequent construction of the meaning of the past and our present cultural identities. This is not to say, however, that it can be divorced from history. Memory is created by the ideological re-telling of historical narratives, meaning that even the first representations of an event (e.g., news
stories describing something that happened earlier in the day) carry with them attitudes and ideologies that construct (collective) memory. Events become ingrained in our consciousness, colored by the perspective from which they were experienced or explained. Because of these ideological shadings, memory dictates how people relate to prior events and the role those events play in our understanding of our present historical conjuncture. The remembrance of a particular past event helps members of a particular group locate themselves in the present (Romano & Raiford, 2006), linking collective memory to group identity. And, as Wulf Kansteiner (2002) argues, “our crises of memory are concomitant with crises of identity” (p. 184). Building on this assumption, we might consider times of social unrest as particularly reliant upon instruction from a society’s collective memory of its past. The close relationship between memory and identity forces us to consider the use-value of a particular memory – how can remembering a past event, place, or time in a certain way help to determine or define our identity in the present?

By relating the construction of collective memory to our identity, we can also say that it is often just as much about present issues as it is about the past. We may think of collective memory as a “meeting ground between the past and present” (Zelizer, 1995, p. 215). Put differently, stories of the past are useful tools for making sense of the present (Biesecker, 2002). Greg Dickinson (2006) argues that representations of the past provide us a way to map our everyday experiences. In other words, we can use representations of the past in order to come to terms with our concerns about the present. In this way, collective memory may be shaped so that it can reassure a community about current conditions and potential questions about the future. But in fulfilling such a role, collective memory also becomes a site of
struggle over the definition of both the past and the group’s collective identity. Those with
the ability to widely distribute their own understanding of the past have greater power to
influence the attitudes and ideologies that compose collective memory while other versions
of history may be relegated to the margins of memory. Collective memory can also work as a
site of concern about the present state of a society in relation to its perceived past. It can
explain to a group how problems similar to those of the present were dealt with and
overcome in the past so that the present issues may be approached with confidence.
Collective memory, then, can be thought of as instructive: it explains to us how we should
feel about the past as well as how to approach the present – a distinctly rhetorical function.
For example, the common comparisons between the Pearl Harbor attack and that of
September 11 led many Americans to turn to their collective memory of Pearl Harbor to
reassure themselves about their ability to recover from a surprise attack and for guidance on
how to do so.

So, if we think of collective memory as providing rhetorical instructions for
interpreting both the past and present, we must also acknowledge that collective memories
are always changing. As the needs of the present evolve, so must the structure and content of
our collective memory. We can think about collective memory as a process. It is constantly
being constructed as personal recollections, official commemorations, and popular
representations intersect and interact with one another (Bodnar, 1992). These intersections
create a constantly evolving set of cultural practices that are informed by and, to some extent,
react to the past. As an always-evolving process, collective memory is never complete – as I
have noted, it changes with the present. It is important to think about collective memory in
this way because if memories did not change and develop, it is not likely that they would (or could) be shared across or within groups (Zelizer, 1995). Thinking of collective memory as a continual process also allows for engagement by an active audience, requiring the audience to make use of the past in order to maintain the evolution of their own collective memory. In this way, memory is similar to the rhetorical canon of invention, involving what those doing the remembering are able to recollect and how they organize and interpret those events publicly (Thelen, 1989). This way of thinking is particularly important in regard to the analysis conducted in this dissertation. An ecological frame analysis, as described in the introduction, is primarily concerned with the construction of collective memory by a number of representations and can also be used to trace the evolution of the assemblage of collective memory resulting from that construction. The method relies upon the continual layering of representations, examining how collective memory of Pearl Harbor grows and changes as its story is repeated or retold over time.

Thinking of collective memory as an ongoing process, we might consider objects of memory – be they commemorative events, public memorials, or historical narratives such as books or films – as only “apparently finished” pieces of discourse (McGee, 1990). The audience for those objects construct the meaning more than does the author or creator of the piece (Blair, Jeppeson, & Pucci, 1991; McGee, 1990). The audience, engaged with the present, contributes to the evolution of the presented memory by making its own use of representations of the past, gravitating toward some while ignoring others. For example, there is a rather extensive literature of Pearl Harbor narratives that contradicts commonly held beliefs about the attack and its causes. Nonetheless, and no doubt influenced by more
prominent, easily accessible, or attractive representations, Americans tend to turn toward more familiar versions of the story in order to support their pre-existing beliefs about the attack’s role in American history and current events. With this in mind, we might think about collective memory as a form of vernacular memory (as opposed to official or state memory) that can, therefore, be studied by examining how audiences employ memory constructions in their daily lives. As Rosenzweig and Thelen (1998) found, many people are inspired by the past, using it as a reason to shape the future in a way that matches their own understanding of the past. On one hand, vernacular memory is often appropriated by corporate or state institutions to support economic or political interests (Zelizer, 1995). For example, a particular product may be presented as an integral part of a happier past (and, by extension, an improved present if it is purchased) or the story of a local hero invoked to support a political candidate or policy. On the other hand, vernacular memories tend to be enacted with emotional rather than concrete meanings and employ non-hierarchical, possibly subversive symbols (Haskins, 2007). In other words, while collective memory may be built from stories told by powerful institutions, those stories may not always be put to the use their creators imagined.

While Bodnar’s (1992) examination of the construction of collective memory throughout American history supports that claim, he also notes that vernacular memory constructions usually lacked the widespread influence of more official representations of the past which were more “concerned with preserving unity and authority.” He points out that “unlike official culture which was grounded in the power of … institutions, vernacular interests lost intensity with the death and demise of individuals who participated in historic
events” (p. 247). Rosenzweig and Thelen (1998) found that people are more likely to believe history that is presented to them by individuals who actually “experienced” it than by professional historians. Therefore, it makes sense that as we lose those individuals as historical sources, our confidence in representations of their history may begin to fade.

Alternatively, and more in line with Bodnar’s (1992) and Kammen’s (1991) studies of commemoration, our confidence does not necessarily fade. Instead, we turn to representations of the past constructed by official institutions or the media, perhaps because of those organizations’ seeming permanence. Although individuals who remember an event in the distant past are no longer with us, the government existed then and is still here today. In other words, the organizations may come to stand in for the eyewitnesses. Going along with this, in the absence of living eyewitnesses, we may also come to rely on representations of the past that claim to integrate or recreate personal testimony. Audiences may hold such depictions as having more authority and carrying greater emotional weight. For that reason, many retellings of past events put “authentic” testimony or images to use (Young, 1988). As I will demonstrate in my analysis, this loss of “intensity” is evident in American collective memory of Pearl Harbor. As those who experienced the attack or the war years firsthand began to age and pass away, recordings of their testimony became more and more important to the re-telling of the Pearl Harbor story. The presence of the recordings of their eyewitness accounts helped to provide a level of authority and credibility to official narratives, making the stories told by professional historians seemingly less reliable or “authentic.” By necessity, then, these later representations of the past are mediated not only by their own distance in time from the events and the medium in which they are presented, but also by the mediation
of the “authentic” representations being used or reproduced – an added layer that contributes to the texture of collective memory as it is studied in this dissertation.

Collective memory is not constructed only by commemorative events or material presentations of the past such as museums and memorials, but also by our interactions with the media. All representations of the past interact with one another in the audience’s construction of meaning. For example, a visit to the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., may evoke thoughts of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech and Forrest’s reunion with Jenny in the film *Forrest Gump*. All three of these instances might be combined in the visitor’s mind and contribute to the meaning she ascribes to that place, and the Lincoln Memorial may become a key site in her personal memory of the Civil Rights Movement and protests of the war in Vietnam, not to mention the influence of the memorial’s narrative of Lincoln’s life and the Civil War. In this way, collective memory, as it has been formed through media representations of the past such as *Forrest Gump* and official narratives such as those found at national memorials, is integrated with personal memory, influencing our attitudes toward the present point in time by encouraging us to adopt certain attitudes toward the past with which we interact. The attitudes toward the present then influence future understandings of that same past as the media attempts to recreate certain experiences as common examples of some mythical American past, recreating the experience of visiting the Lincoln Memorial for large audiences, eventually integrating it into the broader collective memory of the past commonly associated with that site.

The integration of common interactions with the past into collective memory, even if many individual members of a society have never had the experience firsthand, illustrates in
part how collective memory is formed by the assembly of disparate representations of and interactions with the past, meaning that it is not necessarily tied to a specific location or event. As Dickinson (2006) argues, memory exists not only in material space, but also in relation to our textual influences – no single object of memory can be taken on its own; they are all mediated by other representations of the past. Memory texts refer not only to the events they depict, but also to previous representations of those events. Haskins (2007) considers the role of digital media in memory construction, arguing that rhetoricians need to think about the role of new media in shaping our collective memories. She suggests that digitally mediated memory, more than any other form of mediation, collapses the distinction between archival and “lived” memory (p. 401). I address this issue in this dissertation by examining ways in which Pearl Harbor is represented and commemorated online and in interactive media such as videogames. New media allow audiences to play a more visible role in memory construction by sharing personal stories and feelings, publicly integrating testimony with the attitudes and emotions of those reading, hearing, or viewing that testimony. Digital media also provide simulated access to parts of the story never before seen or told, giving audiences a presumably more complete understanding of the past, despite the necessity of fabricating much of that previously unknown or inaccessible information.

We should also consider how the line between fiction and nonfiction as it exists within collective memory may be blurred by media representations of the past. Mike Wallace (1996) claims that Americans have developed a “celluloid unconscious” in which our memory of the past is embedded within the filmic representations of that past (p. 265). The past we believe we remember was in reality presented to us on film or, more broadly, in the
media. Those representations become inextricably entwined with other external influences and personal experiences. Therefore, any references to representations that have become tangled with our understanding of the past seem to us to be references to an authentic history. While I do not believe that audiences necessarily confuse fictional retellings of the past with nonfiction versions of events, I view the celluloid unconscious to be the general feelings toward an historical event encouraged by media representations – the affective nature of collective memory (as opposed to memory of specific events). For instance, I do not think that audiences necessarily think that the movie *Pearl Harbor* (Bay, 2001) depicts the lives of people actually present in Hawaii in 1941, but I do think that the attitudes embodied in that film have the potential to influence the attitudes audiences will have toward more “factual” representations of the event and, therefore, color their collective memory of the attack.

While scholars study the way that memory is constructed and used, it is also important to take a more critical approach to collective memory. Marouf Hasian (2001) calls for critical memory studies that insist upon self-reflection while also fostering a tolerance for alternative perspectives. This approach engages what Svetlana Boym (2001) calls *reflective nostalgia*, which acknowledges contradictions and shows some ambivalence toward the past. We must be aware that memory is constructed contextually and that there is no single interpretation of the past, although some may be “better” than others. While we can be critical of certain interpretations or understandings of the past, we must acknowledge that other understandings may be no less grounded in (what we believe to be) facts than our own. This is not to discount the importance of potential questions of accuracy, but rather to foreground the fact that different audiences may have differing attitudes toward the merits of
a particular event. In short, critical memory and reflective nostalgia emphasize the possibility of different interpretations of a shared knowledge of what happened. This allows for the presence of subgroups within a society or narratives counter to those told by “official” institutions. Collective memory is more about attitudes toward the past than the accuracy of representations or interpretations. Therefore, although there may be a large group whose collective memory is more dominant than others, we cannot discount the viability of multiple attitudes and the fact that the collective memory of some groups may vary from that of the dominant group. While I acknowledge that such alternatives exist, this dissertation focuses on dominant representations of Pearl Harbor.

Different interpretations may be a result of focusing upon different aspects of the same event. Or, in keeping with the language of this dissertation, different interpretations may likely be a result of viewing representations of the past through different frames. So, while we may have certain assumptions about what others may know or think about the past based upon encounters with common teachings or representations, our individual experiences and personal memories may alter our frames. For example, while most will share the understanding that dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought about a quicker end to World War II, some may remember the event by thinking about the American lives that might have been lost had the war continued. Others may think of the large number of Japanese civilians killed in the attack. While both groups would agree that bombs were dropped, they would likely assign different meanings to those bombs and each meaning would be informed by (presumably) equally valid reasons.
Those familiar with a represented event may find it difficult to understand how some could “forget.” For example, we are told to “never forget” what happened on September 11, 2001. However, from a critical memory perspective, the event is never really “forgotten.” Instead, a version of the story informed by different reasons or experiences may become dominant. In other words, it may be remembered differently or perhaps not recalled as frequently – but it has not truly been forgotten. Indeed, political and ideological lessons learned from watershed events and their common representations remain essential pieces of the cultural landscape. There cannot be a single, true representation of the past, and other memories of the same event constantly compete for attention (Hasian, 2001). This competition leads to a kind of forgetting of less successful versions of the past. In a related line of thinking, Haskins (2007) argues that the increased role of “everyday people” in the construction of memory, such as in the proliferation of new, “interactive” media, has altered the way that professional historians do their jobs, recognizing the importance of vernacular depictions of the past. She says that professional historians must strike a balance between accommodating many voices and providing common ground for such diverse opinions (p. 408).

Memory, as a rhetorical construction, cannot be considered without also asking questions of power and politics. As Zelizer (1995) claims, memory construction is, by definition, “at some level always political” (p. 228). Therefore, in order to avoid reinforcing unequal societal structures that may be embedded in the collective memory, it is important for scholars to take these diverse viewpoints, as well as the interactions of collective memory and power relationships, into account. As Thelen (1989) argues, “the struggle for
possession and interpretation of memory is rooted in the conflict and interplay among social, political, and cultural interests and values” (p. 1127). Social and political conflicts, issues of the present, become major aspects of representations of the past and the construction of collective memory. As mentioned above, the construction of collective memory is, at its heart, a rhetorical process. Scholars engaging in critical memory studies need to be sure they are examining the rhetorical aspects of memory construction as well as acknowledging what aspects of the past are included in representations of history and which are excluded. No representation of the past can be considered complete. Questions of inclusion and exclusion get at which version of the story is being told and, from a rhetorical perspective, may provide insights into potential persuasive effects upon the audience. When studying memory, according to Thelen, “the important question is not how accurately a recollection fitted some piece of a past reality, but why historical actors constructed their memories in a particular way at a particular time” (p. 1125). This requires the comparison of different versions of the past, looking at how each tells the story of the past and how they fit together within the memory ecology of a particular event or era. In what ways might the past be remembered by an audience exposed to a collection of different and perhaps contradictory stories of that past? Questions such as that drive my analysis in this dissertation as I explore the ways in which different representations in different media and from different time periods all interact and intersect to construct collective memory, propelling some images and narratives into wide circulation, validating and perpetuating them over time while marginalizing other images and narratives that do not fit within the dominant framework.
The formation of collective memory is a complex process. When scholars study that process, they must take multiple factors and contexts into account. An approach to collective memory that takes the rhetorical framing of a complex ecology into account provides scholars a method for studying those contexts. The concept of Burke’s (1984) frames provides us an entry point for ideological criticism as well as a vocabulary for discussing how attitudes toward the past are manifested within the artifact. The frames do this by illuminating which aspects of a particular version of the past are foregrounded and which are pushed into the background as well as by helping scholars to see how certain ways of framing the past become more prominent than others, privileging certain understandings of the past at the expense of others. Discussing how a particular event is framed necessarily involves discussing elements of the event’s context that may be overlooked by some, but made more prominent by others. Thought of differently, those who look at the past through different frames may draw attention to different aspects of the past. Or, they may find different ways to integrate previous versions of the story, creating a different relationship between the past and present. I believe that taking these two aspects of historical context into account at once can provide scholars with a wider view of how collective memory is formed rhetorically. I also feel that it is essential to include in my analysis the media ecology in which an artifact is embedded. As noted in the introduction, the effects of the media ecology upon our understanding of a text’s content are inescapable. Therefore, I believe that including media ecology as a contextual aspect of the formation of collective memory, when coupled with the use of Burke’s frames of acceptance, can provide critics with a more complete understanding of collective memory than has previously been explored. In the
following two sections, I introduce the basic concepts of media studies and ecology and lay out more details concerning Burke’s frames of acceptance.

Media and Culture

One area of interest within the media studies field is the study of the role of the media in popular culture. This area addresses questions of how audiences interact with the media and how cultural values inform and are informed by the media. This relationship is essential to my dissertation because of its focus on how the media contribute to the construction of collective memory, largely made up of an assembly of values and attitudes toward the past. Another area of media studies relevant to my analysis is media ecology. As discussed in the introduction and in the previous section of this chapter, we must consider the cultural and technological context of a particular media artifact in order to determine how it works with other related artifacts to create a relatively coherent image of the past. Media ecology, the study of how texts and technologies interact and intersect with one another, helps me to take those contextual factors into account in this dissertation. Therefore, I begin this section with a definition of popular culture and discussion of the relationship between it and the media, eventually transitioning into a more detailed discussion of media ecology.

Popular culture has a number of definitions, generally falling into one of two categories. Commonly, it is understood as the cultural artifacts produced for mass consumption, presumably by the middle and working classes. Such a definition necessarily presumes a distinction between artifacts produced for upper and lower classes, drawing a boundary between high and low culture. However, such a distinction is difficult to maintain. Theodor Adorno (1954) claims that the division between high and low culture is “largely a
function of commercialization” (p. 214), while Simon Frith (1991) places popular culture in the middle of high and low culture and blurs the boundaries between the two. Similarly, although he does not limit his definition of popular culture to the texts or artifacts, John Storey (2003) argues that members of the dominant class no longer consume only “high” culture, but increasingly consume elements of what they previously referred to as “mass” or “popular culture.”

The main problem with the understanding of popular culture described above, however, is that it is primarily focused upon the artifacts themselves. When the word “popular” is held to mean widely consumed by the masses, then it “is quite rightly associated with the manipulation and debasement of the culture of the people” (Hall, 1981, p. 231). But thinking of the popular in only this way implies that the audience is either debased or living in a permanent state of false consciousness. This view neglects “the absolutely essential relations of cultural power” (p. 232).

The second category of definitions for popular culture, exemplified by theorists such as Raymond Williams, is more concerned with the broader practices and everyday lives of those who consume the texts included in the other definition of popular culture. Michael Schudson (1987) defines popular culture as the “beliefs and practices, and the objects through which they are organized, that are widely shared among a population” (p. 51). By taking into account wider beliefs and practices of a group, definitions of this sort cannot help but take “essential relations of cultural power” into account. For example, John Fiske (1989) claims that popular culture “is the culture of the subordinated and disempowered” and, therefore, must necessarily “always [bear] within it signs of power relations” (pp. 4-5). He
also points out that popular culture “is formed always in reaction to, and never as part of, the forces of domination” (p. 43). For Fiske, popular culture always has the potential for resistance and subversion. Hall (1981), however, tempers this claim a bit, arguing instead that it is the site of both “containment and resistance” of dominant cultural formations (p. 228). Popular culture is often either celebrated as a site of resistance or attacked as mere reproduction of existing power relations. Instead, we should think of it as a site of struggle over power relations and as the set of practices enacted within that struggle (Grossberg, 1997).

In this dissertation, I subscribe to the second category of definitions of popular culture. I am concerned with popular culture texts – the artifacts consumed by a “mass” audience – insofar as they contribute to a broader set of practices, attitudes, and values. How we employ the past to meet cultural or political needs of the present is one of the practices that make up popular culture. In this way, collective memory becomes an element of popular culture. And, as such, it is a site in which audiences accept or reject certain aspects of history, adopting some values, but resisting the dominance of some others as they may be presented to them within certain representations of the past. So, while this dissertation is an exploration of the evolution of collective memory, it is also a study of popular culture and how it responds to and uses the media to reinforce or resist certain values and attitudes.

As I have discussed, if we consider popular culture as an entire set of practices, then none of those practices can be entirely divorced from the others. We must take into account the entire cultural context. Schudson (1987), in an analysis of the academic study of popular culture, states that, “It is now argued … that the aurality of art lies in how it is received, or in
how it is created within the context of reception, rather than in some quality intrinsic to the art object itself” (p. 59). In other words, it is not enough to attribute meaning to the construction of the object, but rather meaning construction involves a more complex intersection of contextual forces. Annette Kuhn (2009) brings those contexts into the realm of power relationships. She says that when analyzing media texts, we must think of those texts as “inhabiting various [cultural] contexts” and that those contexts “are rarely in harmony, [there] is always some space for ‘aberrant’ reception of dominant representations” (p. 43).

This claim gets at the fact that media texts can be used and interpreted differently by different audiences. For example, some may read a message sent to Hawaiian commanders shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor as a clear warning of an impending attack that was misunderstood by the commanders. Such a reading would reinforce the official evaluation of the attack as the fault of the commanders’ inability to adequately respond to the information they were given. Others may read the same message and use it as evidence that detailed information was withheld from the Hawaiian commanders and that the civilian authorities in Washington, D. C. were to blame for the devastation of the attack. For one audience, it reinforces a previous understanding, while for others it is evidence of the falsity of that understanding and a reason to resist the official story of the attack. The possibility of such differing interpretations is what makes popular culture a site of struggle for power. In the case of collective memory, it becomes a site for the struggle for the definition of the past and its meaning in the present.

When considering power relations and struggles for power, it is important to note the role of Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) theory of hegemony in the study of the media. An ideology
becomes hegemonic when members of the society within which it exists consent to the dominating power structures the ideology shapes, although they may not necessarily agree with the values within that ideology. Gramsci differentiates between hegemonic classes and dominant classes: hegemonic classes obtain consent, though not necessarily consensus, from the lower classes and are therefore able to lead, while dominant classes must control by force and coercion. Hall (1981) describes the media as “the arena of consent and resistance” and where “hegemony arises, and where it is secured” (p. 239). The media is where positions are reinforced and where they are contested. Hegemony can only be secured and maintained within popular culture, the sets of practices that make up the lives of the members of society. And the media make up one realm in which power relationships are enacted within popular culture. Within that realm, everyone is exposed to many different media and events and artifacts, participating in a wide range of practices (Grossberg, 1997).

**Media Ecology**

The sets of power relationships discussed above are part of what constitute the media’s contextual forces. Another important contextual force is the medium in which the message is embedded. As Marshal McLuhan (1964) has famously argued, “the medium is the message” (p. 23). For McLuhan and others, the medium itself has something to say – it influences the way in which we experience a particular text. As I noted in my introduction, understanding the medium is an essential piece of understanding an artifact’s cultural influence (Innis, 1951). Bolter and Grusin (1999) believe, as does McLuhan, that each medium is a re-presentation of a previous medium. They state that “no medium today, and certainly no single media event, seems to do its cultural work in isolation from other media,
any more than it works in isolation from other social and economic forces” (p. 15). This returns to my earlier discussion of interwoven and intertextual media ecology. Each media artifact is embedded within the broader ecology and must be considered in relation to other artifacts surrounding it as well as the artifacts that the text is influenced by or actively references. It is also important to note that media ecology evolves over time. As new media are developed and new artifacts produced, they continue to reference and build upon those which came before. Just as our collective memory of the past is textured by layers of representations, so is the media ecology with layers of technology and experience. And, if collective memory is constructed primarily by mediated representations of the past, it must necessarily change and evolve along with the media ecology that produced those representations. In this dissertation, I take this broader landscape and the interrelations between memory texts into account in my analysis of the popular cultural construction of collective memory.

In considering a text’s place within the media landscape, one must take into account the influence of the text’s medium on the audience’s experience of the message. Since a text cannot be thoroughly examined without consideration of its contextual forces, where and how an audience experiences a particular artifact, as well as their relationship with the broader media landscape, cannot be ignored. As N. Katherine Hayles (2002) argues, “the physical form of the [artifact] always affects what the words (and other semiotic components) mean” (p. 25). For example, watching a film on a large screen in a dark theater is a distinctly different experience from watching it on television while interrupted by advertisements or distracted by other activities. Hayles advocates what she calls “Media-
Specific Analysis,” saying that such an approach allows the critic to “explore how medium-specific possibilities and constraints shape texts” (p. 31). Part of that involves how a medium fits into a media ecology: what is its environment and how is it connected to other media or messages (Fuller, 2007)? So, this involves not only the medium’s affective or physical influence on the audience, but also the ways in which it makes use of or re-presents certain aspects of other media (Bolter & Grusin, 1999; Hayles, 2002; McLuhan, 1964).

Importantly, media ecology encompasses a number of contexts relevant to the construction of collective memory as it is being studied in this dissertation. First, it takes into account the technological background and structure of relevant media. This helps critics to understand how and why audiences may encounter a particular text and the technical form in which they will encounter it. Therefore, each analysis chapter in this dissertation begins with an overview of the technological developments of the dominant media in each time period. This is meant to shed some light on why the artifacts analyzed in each chapter may have played a significant role in the mediated lives of their audiences and contributed to American collective memory as it was constructed during each period. Another important context that figures into the study of media ecology is the connection between the artifacts themselves. This involves the consideration of intertextual references and reliance upon the conventions set forth by previous artifacts. This is an important piece of my analysis as the interconnectedness of the stories of Pearl Harbor reinforces certain ways of understanding the attack and establishes the shape of the texture of memory.

In this dissertation, I hope to explore the claim that the media ecology of a particular message has a profound effect upon the way a message is produced, received, interpreted,
and understood. I attempt to take such influences into account by examining how the interaction and interrelation of media texts coalesce to form a particular way of framing the past, thereby rhetorically constructing collective memory. As a part of this, I attempt to re-construct and examine the media ecology within which the targets of my analysis were produced and originally consumed. This involves not only their medium, but also how they reference other media artifacts or how previous media traditions may have influenced their production and consumption. In short, my dissertation is guided by the following questions concerning media ecology and culture: As the Pearl Harbor media ecology changes over time, do the ways that media representations frame the attack also change? What influence might the evolution of the media ecology of Pearl Harbor have on the construction of American collective memory of the attack?

**The Frames of Acceptance**

When studying the rhetorical construction of collective memory, we cannot ignore the way historical events are framed by their representations. By framing, I mean the symbolic or stylized depiction of particular elements of a story while others are ignored or appear only in the background. Framing makes the foregrounded elements more salient for the audience. While this selection may be intentional (e.g., a filmmaker may choose to follow a single historical character through a representation of the past while removing others from the story completely), it may be largely thought of as an unconscious result of cultural values and assumptions or constraints in storytelling. Framing serves to “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, [or] moral evaluation” for the events described (Entman, 1993, p. 52). The storyteller’s predisposition, or attitude, toward the event frames her
construction of the story and can, in conjunction with other experiences and textual influences, contribute to the shaping of the audience’s attitude, coloring their collective memory of the event.

The construction of collective memory through historical storytelling is a rhetorical task precisely because such stories may affect the audience’s attitude toward and memory of the depicted past event. So, from a rhetorical perspective, questions of collective memory may be considered questions of collective attitudes toward the past. As Burke (1984) argues, our attitudes toward history shape and are shaped by what he calls *frames of acceptance and rejection*: “the more or less organized system of meanings by which a thinking man [*sic*] gauges the historical situation and adopts a role with relation to it” (p. 5). These frames share a reflexive relationship with our attitudes. While viewing a text that presents a particular frame might influence our attitude toward the depicted past, the way that we view and interact with that text is influenced by our preexisting attitudes (Hall, 1980; Morley, 1980). In other words, our attitudes influence and are influenced by frames of acceptance within representations of the past. This suggests one assumption concerning the connection between rhetoric and collective memory upon which this dissertation rests: attitudes and the frames with which they interact are essential to understanding how a society defines and makes sense of its past. I do not necessarily mean how they remember specific events, but rather the meanings they attach to particular historical contexts and the roles they see those events playing in contemporary situations. In other words, my analysis springs from the assumption that attitudes toward history and collective memory of the past are tightly intertwined with one another.
The frames of acceptance, when viewed as framing narratives of history, can help scholars to determine who are the heroes and villains of those narratives. As Burke (1984) notes, the frames help us to “form ourselves and judge others (collaborating with them or against them) in accordance with our attitudes.” He also claims that the frames encourage particular forms of social action that are “in accordance with its particular way of drawing the lines” (p. 92). In other words, we act in ways that respond to and reinforce the view of the world provided by our frames of acceptance and rejection. Rhetorical discourse is an action in and of itself, embedded within our use of language (Burke, 1969). Our language is necessarily directed by our ideological frames and, therefore, directs attention toward symbolic elements that are consistent with that frame and away from others (Burke, 1968). While people may “seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality … they must develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any selection of reality must … function as a deflection of reality” (Burke, 1969, p. 59, emphasis in original).

In this way, the frames of acceptance are embedded within our language and cannot, therefore, be avoided in any case in which we make use of language. For instance, I cannot understand the past without viewing it through a particular frame and any story I tell of that past must necessarily be colored by that frame, which becomes embedded within the story. Likewise, the story’s audience cannot avoid their own frame when hearing the narrative nor can they remove the frame embedded within that narrative. The audience may accept my understanding of the past by adopting my frame or use it to reinforce their own frame, or they may resist and reject it because the story does not fit within their own preexisting frame of acceptance. In short, all representations of the past are always already embedded within and
have embedded within them a particular frame and their audiences cannot help but view those representations through the audiences’ own frames. The frames of acceptance become, then, the lens through which a society views itself, its past, and all representations or manifestations of those things.

As an unavoidable aspect of language, the frames necessarily direct the audience’s attention. If a critic can identify the points at which it does so, those points may indicate the cultural norms and values present within a text (Warnock, 1986). By analyzing a particular text, such as a media artifact, from a rhetorical perspective, one can posit potential descriptions of those norms and values. As discussed earlier in this chapter, collective memory may be thought of in part as an assembly of values that have been informed by a particular understanding of the past. Therefore, a rhetorical analysis that sheds some light upon the norms and values embedded within a historical narrative may also illuminate how that narrative fits into a society’s collective memory. If a scholar analyzes an artifact for evidence of norms and values, they are not only critiquing the artifact, but also the culture within which the artifact is produced and consumed. As Robert Ivie (2001) points out, Burke’s purpose is to present the frames as a mode of social criticism. Burke (1984) himself notes that frames of acceptance demonstrate an individual’s “allegiance to symbols of authority” (p. 21). The frames, then, provide a lens through which a critic can discern the ideological structures of a particular rhetorical discourse by examining how those structures are symbolically reproduced in a popular text. Thinking of a text as a symbolic manifestation of a particular frame of acceptance may also reveal how that discourse may encourage the audience to align themselves with that same ideological perspective. As noted above, our
language is not only directed by our frames, but also directs the attention of others in accordance with that frame.

Importantly, a frame of acceptance is necessarily also a frame of rejection. By accepting one perspective, you must deny others. It can sometimes be difficult to determine where acceptance ends and rejection begins, blurring the lines between the frames (Moore, 1992). So, while Burke (1984) describes eight frames, they all must be considered to both accept and reject. It is important to include here a description of each of those frames. I provide a detailed description of those frames that figure most prominently in this dissertation, but only a brief definition of the others. The first three frames, Burke says, “gravitate toward the positive” by tending to accept the ideology presented within them (p. 57).

The first of the “positive” frames is the epic. The epic frame “accepts the rigors of war by magnifying the role of the warlike hero” (Burke, 1984, p. 35). The epic frame comes from what Burke describes as “primitive conditions” in which the “rigors of war” are accepted as essential to a tribe’s (or nation’s) success (p. 35). A warlike hero is honored, but the common citizen is meant to feel as one with the hero through the process of identification. In other words, everyone’s ability to contribute to war is essential to attaining a positive outcome. At the same time, the ordinary citizen must recognize that she or he is not the hero. Within the epic frame one must remain humble in order to maintain “a realistic attitude for gauging his [or her] personal resources” (p. 36). So, while a humble citizen might share the importance of the hero, they are nonetheless distinct from one another. Humility allows the two to work together for a common goal. The hero and the everyday citizen must
both maintain humility, promoting an “attitude of resignation” that even the hero has limits and must bend to the will of God. In this way, the epic frame is one of what Burke calls “magical patterns,” relying on fate and divinity to pass judgment.

Next is the tragic frame, in which society is “resigned” to a “sense of [its] limitations,” fearing “good fortune” as “the first sign of punishment” for previous sins (p. 39). The tragic frame is one not only of death or loss, but is also defined by the causal relationships between the actions of a tragic hero, the necessity of humility, and the judgment of morality. Burke (1984) describes stories told in a tragic manner as “complex trials by jury, with plaintiff, defendant, attorneys, judges, and jury all rolled into one … we get in one piece the offence, the sentence, and the expiation” (p. 38). By providing accusation and conviction in a single package, tragic stories are inherently conservative and reactionary toward history. They recognize the presence of pride and surround it with “the connotations of crime” (p. 39). Humility, then, becomes an essential characteristic of the sympathetic figures of the tragic frame, while the presence of a tragic hero with whom the audience is meant to identify is necessary to illustrate the “basic sin” of pride and to receive some form of punishment for the commission of that sin. Importantly, however, Burke tells us that tragedy “deals sympathetically with crime. Even though the criminal is finally sentenced to be punished, we are made to feel that his offence is our offence” (p. 39, emphasis in original).

The final “positive” frame is the comedy. The comic frame, like the tragic, is concerned with the danger of pride, but “its emphasis shifts from crime to stupidity,” presenting people “not as vicious, but as mistaken” (p. 40). The next three frames “stress the negative” by tending toward the rejection of the ideology presented within them (Burke,
The first “negative” frame is the *elegy*, which involves structuring the world in such a way that a complaint is always possible. Burke notes that the elegiac is “a frame that does not properly gauge the situation” (p. 44). The next frame is *satire*. In this frame, “the satirist attacks *in others* the weaknesses and temptations that are really *within himself*” (p. 49, emphasis in original).

The third “negative” frame is the *burlesque*. This frame focuses on the “externals of behavior” and “converts every ‘perhaps’ into a ‘positively’” by “deliberately [suppressing] any consideration of the ‘mitigating circumstances’ that would put [the] subject in a better light” (pp. 54-55). The burlesque frame is an external critique of a particular historical actor. According to Burke, those who view the world through a burlesque frame “[make] no attempt to get inside the psyche” of their object, focusing instead on the “externals of behavior” and “obliterate” the actor’s “discriminations” (pp. 54-55). He goes on to point out that the frame is not only biased against particular actors, it also presents an incomplete view of the situation, blocking out information that may explain potentially mitigating circumstances. Importantly, the burlesque frame encourages those who look through it to view themselves as greater than the historical actors at whom they are looking, something which can happen only by focusing on external behavior and deliberately ignoring anything that may favor those actors. As Burke puts it, the burlesque converts “perhaps” into “positively” and a “manner” into a “mannerism” (p. 55). In other words, when viewed through the burlesque frame, all surface flaws become inherent traits.

Two other frames, the *grotesque* and *didactic*, Burke considers transitional frames and neither positive nor negative. Transitional frames can take either form and often appear
in times when a certain ideology is still dominant, but doubts and questions about its legitimacy begin to develop. These frames are transitional frame in the sense that it is most often employed during times of cultural or political uncertainty and they may have a tendency to gain popular traction at times in which a dominant frame has not yet been established or, in the case of collective memory, when new information about the past is revealed or new events influence our understanding of and relationship to the past, making the dominant frame either too repressive or no longer useful. The grotesque frame is “marked by great confusion of the cultural frame, requiring a radical shift in people’s allegiance to symbols of authority” (Burke, 1984, pp. 57-58).

Another transitional frame, the didactic, can be thought of as “propaganda” and attempts to “[coach] the imagination in obedience” (p. 75). According to Burke, the didactic is an “active frame” and an “‘applied’ art” (p. 75). In other words, stories told from within the didactic frame are consciously rhetorical, specifically attempting to influence one’s attitudes toward their subject.

These eight frames can help us to understand and describe collective memory by providing insight into a culture’s attitudes toward history as manifest in its representations of the past. And like the media texts they are embedded within, the frames overlap and intersect with one another. As Burke (1984) tells us, “none of these poetic categories can be isolated in its chemical purity” (p. 57), suggesting that the frames may exist in conjunction with one another, creating additional combined frames (e.g., an epic-comic frame). It is impossible to say that a certain event is presented only within the Comic or Satirical frame, for example. The frames are “symbolic structures designed to equip us for confronting given historical or
personal situations” (p. 57). They teach us how to make sense of the story, what the “situation” means to us as members of a larger community. Having conflicting frames can confuse those instructions. Therefore, in order for a particular representation to maintain coherence and resonance with an audience, that representation needs to employ a consistent frame.

This has implications for the ecological frame analysis employed in this dissertation. Since the end goal of the analysis is to examine the frames of individual artifacts in order to suggest potential dominant frames that emerge from the media ecology of Pearl Harbor, then the approach must take into account potentially conflicting frames and the presence of multiple frames that all appear to be equally prominent within the ecology. This is something that is likely to occur in the time immediately following an event such as Pearl Harbor as different voices, each telling their own version of the story, compete for the power to define the meaning of the attack and its role in American history.

It is important to note that, despite the frames’ titles, they should not necessarily be equated with literary genres (e.g., Greek tragedy or comedy). As Robert Martin states, frames of acceptance are instead “formulations of modes of thought, attitudes toward the world, [and] ways of coming to terms with the meanings of its triumphs” (as quoted in O'Leary, 1993, p. 392). The frames may influence the structure of narratives, but they also function to orient us to the world, creating links between our experiences (Blankenship, Murphy, & Rosenwasser, 1974). In other words, Burke intended the frames as ways of looking at the world rather than formulae for storytelling. By not limiting the frames to conventions for telling a story, it is easier to apply them to many different forms of media.
The media, as discussed above, play a large role in shaping our understanding of the world, including how we understand the past. Additionally, the audience may choose a particular representation of the past based on how well it fits within their own preexisting frame. The story may affect the audience’s acceptance or rejection of the narrative and its further influence on their understanding of the world (as well as potential future choices of media representations). In this same vein, Stephen O’Leary (1993) claims that our view of “historical time” is shaped by frames of acceptance “found within the dramatic representation of history as myth” (p. 392). If we consider media artifacts that represent or attempt to re-create historical events to be “dramatic representations of history as myth,” then we can see how frames of acceptance can be used for the analysis of such objects. Additionally, if a fictional representation is presented as based on or inspired by true events, “representations of history as myth” may be even more powerful than at first glance. Paul Meadows (1957) argues that frames of acceptance are “amplifying devices” (p. 85). The frames make the accepted ideological perspectives seem more dominant, more natural. Claiming that a fictional text is inspired by true events may provide an aura of authenticity and create a greater amount of amplification.

Ann-Marie Cook’s (2011) discussion of films based on the events of the 1994 Rwandan genocide can provide an example of how fictional representations might be amplified when the “true events” on which they are based are used to increase apparent cultural authority or authenticity. Cook points out that cinematic representation of historical events of which audiences have very little immediate familiarity with “acquire particular significance” because they reveal information that may have been previously hidden or
unknown. She goes on to claim that such representations become the “primary frame of reference” for the audience because “it is the means by which many of them will frame their understanding of what happened” (pp. 164-165). Although Cook is referring to an event that was intentionally censored by Western media, her claims nonetheless suggest why presenting an artifact as “based on true events” may amplify the effects of framing on the construction of collective memory. For most people, the media will provide the only source of information they have concerning past events such as Pearl Harbor. Even shortly after the attack, information was slow, incomplete, and censored. Therefore anything claiming to make use of information potentially unknown by audiences will become necessary for them to turn to in order to learn about, understand, and make use of the event as a part of history. And, when the media act as the primary source of information about the past, audiences have little choice but to accept the frames of acceptance embedded within a particular artifact or group of artifacts. In this way, especially as events like Pearl Harbor fade from living memory, media representations of the attack, especially those that make claims to some sort of truth, become the primary ways that collective memory is maintained.

Finally, Warnock (1986) describes texts as a “showing forth rather than a telling” (p. 66). As I have noted previously, my analysis is not necessarily concerned with the historical accuracy of the many representations of Pearl Harbor, but rather what those representations “show forth.” In other words, I am primarily interested in what we can learn about what the frames of acceptance can reveal about the intersection of media and collective memory. In terms of the frames of acceptance, my analysis addresses the following questions: Which frame or frames appear to be most prominent in mediated manifestations of American
collective memory of Pearl Harbor and what do those frames tell us about the perceived role of the attack in American history? How have those frames interacted with and informed one another in order to maintain the process of collective memory? What does the framing of Pearl Harbor tell us about how Americans might be expected to react to similar situations that arise in the future; how are the frames instructive? In short, the precise historical accuracy of the texts is less important than the attitudes they encourage us to adopt toward the past events they depict and the role those events play in our present understandings of society and reality.

**Moving Forward**

In my introduction, I described my method, an ecological frame analysis in some detail. In brief, the analysis proceeds in three primary steps: first, analyze each artifact within the ecology in order to determine the frame or frames the artifact seems to place the event within. Second, examine how all of the artifacts interact or intersect with one another within the media ecology. Third, search for a dominant frame or set of frames that is evident throughout the ecology. This process, informed by the literature reviewed in this chapter, will be repeated for each of four time periods since the attack on Pearl Harbor. Analyzing the media ecology of Pearl Harbor within these time periods will allow me to take an additional step with my analysis – the examination of how the dominant frame or frames have evolved along with the media ecology.

My analysis begins with a study of how the attack on Pearl Harbor was framed immediately after the bombing and during the four years of World War II. During this period, a number of different versions of the attack circulated for a number of cultural and
political reasons, including garnering support for the war effort and criticizing the Roosevelt administration. Many of the representations were framed differently, creating a struggle for the power to define the attack and influence the future of collective memory.
At just before 8 AM on December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked the American military bases at Ford Island and Hickam Field located at Pearl Harbor on the Hawaiian island of Oahu. Although the American government and military had expected an outbreak of hostilities for some time, the attack nonetheless took them, and the rest of the country, by surprise. But Pearl Harbor was not the only victim of Japanese attack. British and Dutch colonies in the Pacific were bombed the same day although not nearly to the extent of Pearl Harbor. There were attacks on Malaysia, Guam, Hong Kong, Wake Island, and the Philippines. And while information about these attacks is readily available if one is aware of them, an internet search for the Japanese attacks of December 7, 1941 yields almost exclusively results about Pearl Harbor. Of course, Pearl Harbor was the most devastating attack of the six and is most likely the one a person searching for information is looking for. But as news of the events began to take shape on Sunday and Monday, December 7 and 8, 1941, Pearl Harbor was presented as just one of a series of Japanese bombings. It was not until government officials and the media were able to process and frame the events that Pearl Harbor became the sole focus of the nation’s attention.
In the early days of World War II, the United States was a divided nation. Groups of isolationists decried President Franklin Roosevelt’s apparent desire to engage the United States in Europe’s problems as evidenced by the Lend-Lease Program in which the United States sent military supplies to Great Britain. There were battles among business, labor and the government, involving long and occasionally violent strikes. Some felt that the American people needed to be more concerned about the threat of Japanese aggression and Japan’s treaty with Germany than with Germany herself. But, by all accounts, the attack on Pearl Harbor brought these tensions to a halt and unified the country in an unprecedented way. How, though, were they unified? And, more importantly, how was the unity maintained throughout the war in a way that would fix the images of the attack on Pearl Harbor in our collective memory as not only an event that brought Americans together in grief but as a shining example of how they are capable of coming together “in their righteous might” and “win through to absolute victory” (Roosevelt, 1941a), overcoming seemingly impossible obstacles to get there?

The unification and maintenance of that unity resulted from a careful rhetorical balance in which multiple frames, embedded within a number of different versions of the Pearl Harbor story, competed for dominance and the power to define American understanding of the attack and its role in the war that followed. I do not mean to suggest that the attack on Pearl Harbor can be extracted from World War II. Instead, the two are inextricable from one another with the framing of one inevitably influencing the framing of the other. The war helped Americans place Pearl Harbor within the larger narrative of their history, but while the war was ongoing, the attack’s role in history was uncertain. Therefore,
it was framed in multiple ways throughout the war as Americans searched for answers to their questions about the implications of the attack.

In this chapter, I explore the complex frame of media representations of Pearl Harbor immediately following the attack and throughout the war. I begin by analyzing how the event was framed in initial news reports as well as public government responses to the attack. These early depictions reveal a complex frame, combining elements of the burlesque, tragic, grotesque, and epic frames with some assistance from the didactic. This collection of frames made Pearl Harbor an essential piece of Americans’ wartime mindset, while at the same time relegating the attack to the past in order to focus on the future. Prior to my analysis, I provide a brief overview of the technological and cultural context of the media ecology during this period as well as a detailed introduction to the most prominent frames embedded within representations of Pearl Harbor between 1941 and 1945. In my analysis, I examine the ways in which the initial frames were developed and reinforced in the days and weeks immediately following the attack and then later throughout World War II. This examination includes the ways in which earlier representations are adapted and reused in ways that adopt the rhetorical strategies of the initial frames for different media and later audiences. In this way, the initial framing of Pearl Harbor would become the basis for the way that the attack was remembered and employed as a rhetorical tool throughout World War II.

**The Media during the War Years**

Before analyzing how a particular event may have been framed within the media ecology, one must first take into consideration when, where, and how media artifacts of the time would have been produced and consumed. Of course, the ecology cannot be fully
defined or explored – reports of individual media experiences are few, and to examine every single media representation of the event would be nearly impossible. Therefore, in an approach that I repeat for each period analyzed in this dissertation, I approach the task of re-creating the media ecology of the days and years following the attack on Pearl Harbor first from the standpoint of which types of media dominated the landscape at the time. From there, I consider which individual sources would have been most widely consumed, how those sources may have reached their audiences, and what influence that may have had upon the audience. In this section, I provide an overview of the technological and social contexts of the media ecology as it existed during the first half of the 1940s.

During World War II, most Americans received their news either from the radio or newspapers, the two most developed and common media technologies of the time. Radio had its roots in the nineteenth century and the search for a wireless alternative to the telegraph, but it was not until the early twentieth century that it became practical. The first known radio broadcast intended for entertainment in the United States was on Christmas Eve, 1906, from Massachusetts. Amateurs dominated the medium until World War I, but ensuing regulation limited access to radio frequencies. The Radio Act of 1927 gave the Federal Radio Commission (later the Federal Communications Commission, or, FCC) the ability to grant and revoke licenses according to a broadcaster’s ability to support the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” (Briggs & Burke, 2009, p. 155). This regulation effectively gave the FCC control over who could broadcast via radio and what they could broadcast. Commercial interests would soon take precedence over the public, however.
The first commercial radio station appeared in 1920, broadcast networks began to appear later in that decade, and by 1930 more than 600 radio stations were broadcasting. In the meantime, listening to the radio had become the most popular leisure-time activity of Americans (Demers, 2007). Herbert Hoover described it as “one of the most astounding things that [has] come under my observation of American life” (as quoted in Gorman & McLean, 2009, p. 49). Radio reached its saturation point during the 1930s. In the decade before the United States’ entry into World War II, radio had found its way into 26 million homes – nearly 86 per cent of the population – with an average listening time of five to six hours per day (Ancestry.com, 2012; Regal, 2005).¹ This period has been called a “golden age” of radio, a time at which media historians Gorman and McLean (2009) note that radio “became an integral part of the domestic environment, a key supplier of entertainment, and a trusted source of information” (p. 49).

While radio gained traction during the 1920s partly because of technological advancements, it also became popular because of changes in the social landscape of the period. Increased mobility resulting from the rise of the automobile called for a more efficient means of communication. Additionally, a growing emphasis on the importance of home and family life created an environment conducive to a device that brought news and entertainment into the home that the entire family could enjoy together. These factors, coupled with the purchasing power associated with the economic boom of the 1920s and the spread of electricity into rural areas in the 1930s, created a mass audience for the medium and contributed to context necessary for it to become popular (Gorman & McLean, 2009).

¹ The percentage of the population was determined by an average of 4.1 persons per household and a total population of 123,202,624, according to the 1930 United States Census.
Along with that popularity, however, came the opportunity for broadcasters to make large amounts of money by selling airtime to advertisers.

Following a debate in the 1920s about the merits of commercializing radio, the three major broadcast networks – NBC, CBS, and the Mutual Broadcasting System (MBS) – settled on a model in which advertisers purchased airtime and filled it with programming designed to sell sponsors’ products (Gorman & McLean, 2009). As the financial backbone of the radio industry, advertisers could control the type of programming available, gaining even more power after the development of a ratings system during the 1930s that allowed advertisers to back out of unpopular programs, often resulting in those programs being pulled from the schedule (Gorman & McLean, 2009). This system would be repeated during the growth of the television industry in the 1950s (see chapter 4).

In contrast to print media, a radio audience could consist of multiple individuals all listening to the same program at the same time. People of all groups began to assemble not necessarily in the same physical space, but in what we might think of as a similar media space. That contributed to the rise of what Nick Couldry (2003) calls media rituals. A media ritual is one in which an illusion of a social center is created, shifting the balance of power to that center. An important aspect of the spread of radio as a medium is that it allowed individuals separated by great physical distance to be united within a media space for the first time, creating a version of what Benedict Anderson (1972) called “imagined communities” – groups brought together by media that imagine themselves as a coherent whole. Although Anderson was primarily concerned with print media, the ritual nature of listening to the radio contributes to the formation of an imagined community in the same way. As such a
contributor, radio played a large role in “fostering and sustaining community” (Gorman & McLean, 2009, p. 67) on both the local and national level.

Because radio was an important part of citizens’ daily lives and had become the primary source for instant news (Regal, 2005), when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor the radio acted as the central source of information – a single version of the story could be told to a large audience all at the same time. Prior to World War II, however, radio was not widely thought of as a reliable source of news – that distinction belonged to the newspapers. In fact, fearing the movement of news audiences to radio, some newspapers refused to print broadcast schedules and, in 1933, the wire services stopped selling news to radio stations. In the end, radio owners agreed to broadcast only brief updates, leaving in-depth coverage to the newspapers (Demers, 2007). The agreement that led to that development broke down in 1938, however, and radio, bolstered by its ability to provide live coverage of breaking news, became an important source of information by the beginning of the war (Gorman & McLean, 2009).

Although I acknowledge that there were a number of local radio stations and programs that could each have told their own story of the attack, for the purposes of this chapter, I focus on radio events that would have had a large national audience. These include President Roosevelt’s address to Congress on December 8 – an event that Life magazine reported was listened to by 80 million Americans (War declared, 1941), many of them gathered together in public places (see Figure 3.1).
While radio had the ability to bring audiences together for simultaneous media consumption or to form imagined communities, newspapers remained a primarily local medium, consumed solitarily. Newspapers were among the first contributors to the formation of imagined communities and had been published in one form or another for centuries prior to World War II. They first began to attract a truly mass audience, however, with the development of the steam-powered printing press in the early nineteenth century which allowed for larger circulation and, due to its speed, the printing of more up-to-date news (Briggs & Burke, 2009). The American Civil War and the public’s desire for information about battles further expanded the appeal of newspapers as a mass medium. The spread of advertising in the late nineteenth century, however, would truly make the format viable by increasing profits for publishers and, in turn, decreasing the cost for consumers (Gorman & McLean, 2009). As with radio, advertising was a key component of the success of the newspaper as a mass medium. Accompanying the rise of commercialism in the newspaper
industry, other changes affected the development of the medium in the decades leading up to World War II.

Most notable among the changes was the greater concentration of ownership of newspapers as “print barons” began to purchase smaller newspapers, placing them into a newspaper chain. Thus, although circulation numbers increased from 22.4 to 39.6 million daily newspaper subscribers between 1910 and 1930, the same period of time saw the loss of 258 daily newspapers because of concentration of ownership and the difficulty of competing with the newspaper chains (Gorman & McLean, 2009). By 1950, 559 daily newspapers had disappeared due to competition and consolidation, with the largest period of decline happening between 1937 and 1943 (Demers, 2007). Additionally, between the years 1915 and 1929, newspaper advertising revenue in the United States grew from $275 million to $800 million (Gorman & McLean, 2009). Concentrations of ownership and greater influence from advertisers in the early twentieth century are two primary reasons that many newspapers provided similar versions of national news stories. Of course, those versions were not identical to one another as local editors still had the power to change or remove certain stories as they saw fit, resulting in a plethora of ways in which the news could be presented.

Despite the loss of many daily publications, most small towns still had their own newspaper, carrying news that was important locally. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, finding a single newspaper consumed by much of the nation in the same way a radio program may have been is difficult. Even chain newspapers were subject to editing and each paper may have framed the news differently. For example, a single radio program produced
by NBC could have reached 15 million homes at once, with each household hearing an identical program. It is unlikely that the same could be said for any single newspaper. With that said, however, the Associated Press (AP) wire service, formed from regional services in 1900, provided news stories to papers nationally and globally (Associated Press, 2012). In this way, the same story could be reprinted in newspapers with as disparate of circulation numbers as the New York Times and the Altoona, Pennsylvania, Daily Mirror. In other words, during the early part of the twentieth century, the AP became a centralized source of information printed in newspapers nationwide much in the same way that radio broadcast networks acted as a central source of programming, even though the AP’s stories were subject to changes by local editors who could have chosen not to publish them at all.

The first reports of the attack on Pearl Harbor were sent by an AP reporter in Honolulu, but were cut off by government officials and never broadcast. The White House made an official announcement via radio approximately an hour later (Associated Press, 2012). In addition to the AP, the New York Times was one of only a handful of papers available nationally. For the purposes of this chapter, I explore the representation of the attack on Pearl Harbor in newspapers by looking in the pages of the Times. Most of the articles analyzed were written by anonymous AP reporters, with the exception of some editorials. For the sake of this chapter, I have chosen to limit my analysis of newspaper reports of the attack to those written by the AP or published in the Times. By doing so, I hope to concentrate primarily on versions of the Pearl Harbor story that would have been available to large portions of the population. While I am aware of the inherent incompleteness of such an approach, articles written by the AP and published in the nation’s most widely circulated
newspaper are likely to have been read, at least in some form, by a large enough percentage
of Americans to overcome the lack of analysis of articles written for and published in the
large number of local dailies published across the country.

In addition to newspapers, the print media were dominated by magazines. Magazines
have been in existence since the eighteenth century, but like newspapers, they were not
particularly successful until the technology of the steam-driven cylinder press drove down
costs in the early nineteenth century. By 1900, many magazines had over 250,000
subscribers. Magazines had always been involved in political issues, but were mostly
targeted to specialized audiences (home and lifestyle magazines notwithstanding). The news
magazine, most notably Henry Luce’s *Time*, was intended for a broad audience and made its
debut in the 1920s. Luce later introduced the picture magazine with *Life* in 1936 (Demers, 2007). Many magazines had wide circulation at the start of World War II, but few reached as
many people as *Life* magazine. Roughly 3 million people subscribed to *Life* in 1941, with
that number growing to 5.2 million by the end of the decade. The magazine’s reputation as
the foremost documentary magazine in the country began with its photo essays of World War
II, which included the damage at Pearl Harbor (Chlebek, 1990). Looking through *Life*
magazine was almost as much of a ritual as listening to the radio. Subscribers often shared
the latest issue with their friends, meaning that many more people viewed the magazine than
subscribed. By the late 1940s, *Life* was reaching 22.5 million people (21 percent of the
population), and bringing in 19 percent of all magazine advertising revenue in the country
(Doss, 2001). In contrast to the text-based news reports, *Life* told its stories primarily in
pictures. Images provide a more emotional rhetorical tool than do plain-text newspaper
articles, and the emotional images released a couple of weeks after the attack represented an important moment in the framing of the raid – and the images were shared with millions in the pages of *Life*.

While most people consumed radio and print media at home, the motion picture industry also played a large role in entertainment in the 1940s. The film industry had been growing since the turn of the century when short, silent movies such as *The Great Train Robbery* (1903) were popular. By 1910, there were 10,000 movie theaters in the United States and 26 million people (more than 28 percent of the population) were going to the movies weekly (Gorman & McLean, 2009). The expiration of patents just prior to World War I led to the convergence of production and distribution, putting mainstream filmmaking in the control of a small number of wealthy corporations, many of which produced films in Hollywood (Briggs & Burke, 2009). The film industry was recognized as the most popular form of mass entertainment by 1914 and would remain so into the 1940s (Gorman & McLean, 2009).

Also during this period, newsreels, a form of short documentary, emerged as a genre. Theaters devoted entirely to newsreels were opened, and some companies began to produce daily editions of the news (Briggs & Burke, 2009). Although the dedicated theaters did not last long, a newsreel accompanied nearly every film shown in theaters from 1911 to 1967 (Fielding, 1972). While newsreels were largely bits of entertaining news, and their credibility was often called into question, they provided something that the print media could not: moving pictures. Immediately following Pearl Harbor, many newsreels showed images of an idyllic Hawaiian vacation spot while providing a narrative report of the news. After the
release of Secretary of the Navy Henry Knox’s report on Pearl Harbor on December 16, 1941, however, they were able to include footage from the damage of the attack. Like the *Life* photographs (many of which, in the case of the first published images of the attack, were stills from newsreel footage), they gave emotional impact to the story being told. Images also have the potential to give an impression of objectivity by placing the viewer directly before the image, giving an illusion of reproduction rather than interpretation as would be necessary in order to produce a textual account of what is presented visually within an image.

These images, although the news included with them may have been old or presented as entertainment, would have blended with the images seen in magazines, the stories read in newspapers, and the reports heard on the radio. Together these media artifacts created a picture of what happened in Hawaii on December 7, 1941. And while each of them may have framed the event a little differently, they all worked together to establish a conglomerate frame that would provide the base for the development and evolution of American collective memory of the attack.

**Inconsistent Initial Framing**

Popular magazines such as *Time* and *Life* that were dated Monday, December 8, 1941, would have arrived on subscribers’ doorsteps and on newsstands a few days earlier, possibly on Friday, December 5. Any information they contained about tensions in the Pacific is likely to have blended in readers’ minds with news reports of the Japanese attacks that began to appear in the continental United States on Sunday afternoon. Some people may even have read those magazines, published just prior to the attacks, *after* the bombing. Therefore, while my analysis of the media ecology of the attack on Pearl Harbor begins with
news reports of the bombing, I also include a relevant piece from the December 8, 1941, issue of *Life* that would have been read in close proximity in time to the news reports and provides some insight into the media depiction of the impending conflict with Japan.

In the week before the attack on Pearl Harbor, *Life* dedicated four pages to the threat of war with Japan, noting that the United States had drawn a battle line when the Japanese envoy to Washington “was told frankly that Japan’s conquering course of empire had careened to its end, as far as the U.S. was concerned” (The ancient imperial power, 1941, p. 35). This statement refers to the message sent by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on November 26 which, in the name of peace, insisted that Japan withdraw its military presence from all territories beyond its borders, to acknowledge the American-recognized government of China, and for the American agreement to override Japan’s earlier treaty with Germany (Secretary Hull's statement, 1941). Interestingly, the text of the Hull note was not published in wide circulation at the time it was written (it appeared in newspapers a few days after Pearl Harbor), yet it was repeatedly referenced in reports on the attack as the American government’s attempt to negotiate peace with Japan. This continued reference to a note most Americans had not read would become a key part of the tragic framing of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Important to the rhetorical success of a tragic frame for the attack on Pearl Harbor was the presentation of the American people and military as unconcerned with the possibility of an attack from Japan. This reported lack of concern was later referenced as an example of American arrogance and inability to recognize the threat posed by the Japanese. So, while 64% of the people were willing to enter into military conflict with Japan (The ancient
imperial power, 1941) and newspapers “loomed heavy with portents” of war in the Pacific, American attentions were presumed to be elsewhere. The issue of *Life* that arrived in readers’ homes the weekend of the attack on Pearl Harbor pointed out that Americans “were not frightened by the Japanese” and that they “felt confident, rightly or wrongly, that the Japs [sic] were pushovers” (*Life on the newsfronts*, 1941, p. 38). Depictions of the Japanese in political cartoons prior to the attack showed them to be “untrustworthy” yet “more funny than dangerous” (*Speaking of pictures*, 1941, p. 7). This would change following the attack, however, as elements of caricature and the burlesque entered into the complex frame of the attack by removing all innocence from cartoon images of the Japanese, who, following the attack, were depicted as “swarthy, evil, and ominous” (p. 7). The idea that Americans did not take the Japanese threat seriously was further reinforced by a political cartoon published the day after the attacks in the New York *Herald-Tribune* which showed an isolationist guarding the door against Hitler while a large Japanese soldier sneaks in from behind (p. 6). Such seemingly conscious changes in depictions of the Japanese illustrate the role of didactic framing of the attack – in order to influence Americans’ understanding of Pearl Harbor, the cartoonists attempted to influence their opinions of the perpetrators of the attack, in some cases by showing them through the burlesque frame. Interestingly, these depictions, necessarily incomplete, entirely ignore the American ultimatum and attitude toward war with Japan that had been published in magazines and newspapers just a week earlier.

The media depiction of Americans as generally aware yet unconcerned about the possibility of a Japanese attack played a major role in the initial framing of the attack on Pearl Harbor by being continually reproduced in depictions of the raid. First, such a view
allows the attack, as a single event, to be understood as tragedy. Those with a tragic view of history may recognize the apparent hubris of the United States, exemplified by the apparent lack of preparedness of the American military, which is given the role of tragic hero. Such a view supports the attitude that the United States had nothing to fear from the Japanese military and Japan’s imperial ambitions were a criminal act in need of punishment. The view of Americans as unconcerned about the Japanese also allows the media to recognize the Japanese as a deceptive villain that took advantage of American passivity. It also opens the door for the adoption of another frame such as the burlesque, which “deliberately suppresses any consideration of the ‘mitigating circumstances’ that would put [the] subject in a better light” (Burke, 1984, pp. 54-55). In the case of Pearl Harbor, these “mitigating circumstances” might include the Hull note mentioned above or other American actions potentially interpreted as aggressive by the Japanese.

Initial news reports of the attack on Pearl Harbor did not isolate the American military base as an individual target as would become common in the days following. Instead, it was listed as just one of a number of Japanese attacks. A map on the front page of the December 8, 1941, *New York Times* showed the entire Pacific region with markers at each important location from the previous day’s events. This is not to say that Hawaii was not given attention, but that it was not depicted as the only attack that day, or even necessarily as the most important. The front page headline read “Japan Wars on U.S. and Britain; Makes Sudden Attack on Hawaii; Heavy Fighting at Sea Reported.” Articles on the attacks noted that heavy American losses had been sustained in the attack on Pearl Harbor, but also noted that the attack was followed quickly by others in Guam and the Philippines.
Notably, almost all references to the previous day’s events were largely referred to in the plural: “Sudden and unexpected attacks…,” “The news of these surprise attacks…,” and “Japan went to war against the United States and Britain today with air and sea attacks” (Kluckhohn, 1941, p. 1; Tokyo acts first, 1941, p. 1). There are a number of stories regarding the other attacks of December 7. It is as though, at this early date, the press were not yet sure what to make of the attacks themselves. Unclear details of casualties and damage sustained along with rumors of continued attacks and potential invasions probably contributed to this.

As mentioned briefly above, early retellings of the attacks repeatedly referred to the apparent peace negotiations between the United States and Japan. As if to make sure the American people were aware of the United States’ attempts to avoid conflict, Secretary of State Hull released the text of his November 26 note to Japan in which the United States drew the initial battle lines. He also released the text of the Japanese reply, which he received from diplomats as Pearl Harbor was under attack. The American note requested that the Japanese “withdraw all military … and police forces” and “give up all extraterritorial rights” in China and Indo-China (Secretary Hull's statement, 1941, p. 10). The Japanese response stated that “The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that … it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations” (p. 10). Reading these statements after the intervening 70 years, it is easy to see that the United States government was willing to risk provoking the Japanese and that Japan was not interested in further negotiation (the timing of the attacks and message delivery not withstanding). In other words, it is clear that both nations were prepared to go to war. However, their publication the day after the Japanese attack along with repeated claims
that the Americans were attempting to negotiate with a “deceptive” enemy made the notes a prominent piece of the early framing of the attack. While prior to the war the Japanese military threat was not taken seriously, it now needed to be respected. What could not be respected, however, was the apparently deceitful method they had used to assert themselves.

The nature and character of the attack was what made it so terrible. Secretary Hull was able to describe the attacks as “treacherous and utterly unprovoked.” Hull described the American ultimatum as a set of principles for peace and stated that the Japanese were actively engaged in peace negotiations, but that they had been “infamously false and fraudulent” (Secretary Hull's statement, 1941, p. 10). Statements such as these fit neatly within the burlesque frame by removing any possibility of American responsibility and all potential redeeming qualities of the Japanese. Ironically, Hull’s portrayal of Japanese “treachery” overlooks the ending of peace negotiations obvious in his own note, printed alongside his statement from December 8. News of the attack and Hull’s statement acted together to frame the messages – readers were told the United States had sent a message of peace and they were aware of the attacks of the previous day. This combination may have made it difficult to recognize that the battle lines had been clearly drawn by both sides and that Hull’s note had been delivered to the Japanese nearly two weeks prior to the attack. In this way, the burlesque depiction of the Japanese actions on December 7 is necessarily incomplete.

Because of the speed and difficulty of gathering information (not to mention the American government’s censorship of the AP reports filed immediately after the attack), early news articles on the attacks were at first unclear about their severity, placing Pearl
Harbor as one of a list of targets. However, there was never any question about the character of the aggressors. This aspect of the frame as well as the remaining structure of the version of the story that would go on to dominate the framing of Pearl Harbor came into better focus on Monday, December 8, in President Roosevelt’s address to a joint session of Congress to request a declaration of war. An examination of an early draft of this speech reveals how Roosevelt employed the didactic frame in order to garner support for the forthcoming war. The changes made between the draft and the final speech illustrate conscious choices made which placed the story of Pearl Harbor into the burlesque and tragic frames, but also called for a move toward an epic understanding of the attack’s role in American history – even before that history was written. The first step Roosevelt took in editing his speech was to make sure that Pearl Harbor was recognized as the primary target of the day’s attacks. Throughout the early draft of the speech, references to the attacks in the plural were all changed to refer to a single attack, that on Hawaii. For example, the sentence “The attacks yesterday on Manila and the Island of Oahu have caused severe damage” was altered to refer to a single attack on “the Hawaiian Islands” (Roosevelt, 1941c, p. 2, emphasis added). With this move, which would be repeated in future news reports on the attack, the scope of the story of December 7 was limited to a single attack, although Roosevelt did list the other attacks later in his address.²

Roosevelt also contributed to the construction of the burlesque framing of the events by making deliberate references to the character of the attacks. This happened most notably

² Of course, the damage suffered at Pearl Harbor was far greater than that in other locations. But early reports noted only 104 dead in Hawaii, a number nowhere near the final toll of over 2,300. Therefore, there was no reason for the media to limit their reporting to Pearl Harbor at first. Later news of damage would justify drawing the boundaries of the frame around Hawaii.
in his deliberate change of the words “world history” in the initial draft of the speech to “infamy.” This alteration would, of course, prove to create the sentence most ingrained in Americans’ collective memory of the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was not simply an important date – it was infamous. This matched Secretary Hull’s description of the Japanese negotiations as “infamously false” to their actions in attacking the United States. In the final version of his address, Roosevelt went on to describe the premeditated nature of the attack and to once again refer to the peace negotiations. He also states that the nation would “always … remember the character of the onslaught against us” (Roosevelt, 1941a).

Important here is not that we remember the onslaught, but rather the character of it.

In the burlesque frame, which may also be thought of as caricature, Burke (1984) notes an attack of the external characteristics of the subject is necessary. One who views the world through a burlesque frame “makes no attempt to get inside the psyche of his victim…. He [sic] deliberately suppresses any consideration of the ‘mitigating circumstances’ that would put his subject in a better light” (pp. 54-55). Burlesque rhetoric in this sense is not only partisan, it is incomplete. It deflects portions of reality that may call certain claims (e.g., Japanese treachery) into question. This portion of the burlesque frame was a major part of the initial framing of the December 7 attacks. Employing the frame in this way allowed storytellers to sharply differentiate between the United States, who were supposedly innocently negotiating peace, and the Japanese who had not only deliberately lied to American negotiators, but had then viciously attacked without provocation.

The burlesque framing of the Japanese was established throughout early reports of the bombing by explaining that the surprise attack was a single instance in a long line of
evidence showing the character of the Japanese people. In his address to Congress, President
Roosevelt (1941a) notes that because of the distance from Hawaii to Japan, it was obvious
that the attack had been planned long before December 7, the date on which the United States
received the Japanese declaration of war. This rhetorical move allows the peace negotiations,
which had come to an end as early as November 26 (the date of Hull’s note), to still figure
prominently in the story of Pearl Harbor by pointing out that the Japanese had planned an
attack long before negotiations were officially cut off. In his radio address on the evening of
December 9, Roosevelt (1941b) describes what he calls the “decade of international
immorality” of the Japanese “gangsters,” further solidifying the point. Articles making
similar observations appeared in newspapers across the country on December 8 and 9, such
as one article pointing out that the evidence shows that the attack had been long planned and
another stating that the attack repeated surprise tactics that the Japanese had used against
Russia (Attack long planned, 1941; Surprise by Japan, 1941). To further caricature the
Japanese people, there were also reports of Japanese celebrations before the attack, some of
which compared them to “Nazi pre-battle victory fests” (Japanese in Singapore, 1941).
Additionally, images from Japanese diplomats in Washington, D. C. burning papers were
published in newspapers, further suggesting that the Japanese were guilty and had something
to hide (Bonfire in Washington, 1941).

The United States was not depicted as entirely innocent in all early versions of the
Pearl Harbor story, however. In some, Americans, especially the military, were assigned the
role of the tragic hero. In the tragic frame, we must maintain a sense of our own limitations in
order to avoid committing the basic sin of hubris. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor,
Americans failed to do this and their (apparent) belief that they could or would not fall victim to such a devastating attack brought the punishment of that attack upon them. In the days following Pearl Harbor, media discussions of the event turned toward the question of how it could have been allowed to happen. The *New York Times* of December 9 noted that reporters had asked Stephen Early, Presidential secretary, if there was an explanation for why the American Navy had been “caught napping” (Hurd, 1941, p. 4). There were also reports that a prominent Senator had “given uncharted hell” to Navy Secretary Frank Knox (p. 4). From this early time, the idea that the United States may have been at least partially to blame for the extensive damage suffered in the attack began to take hold.

There was, however, a distinct difference between the representations of the American tragic hero and the Japanese villain when it came to assigning blame for the attack. While the Americans’ pride came before the attack, the devastation suffered on December 7 acted as their punishment, from which they learned their lesson and gained a level of humility – a lesson that needed to be taught to the Japanese. As President Roosevelt stated in his address to Congress, “The people of the United States … understand the implications to the very life and safety of our nation” and “will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us.” In these sentences, heard by an estimated 61% of the population (War declared, 1941), Roosevelt does not expressly state that the United States had been complacent in the lead-up to the attack, but implies that a lesson had been learned, one in which Americans now knew that their lives could be the price for allowing such an attack to happen again.
In his editorial of December 22, *Life Magazine* editor Henry R. Luce (1941) is clearer about the lesson that the American people had to learn through tragedy. He calls the attack a “disaster” and “a sign of all the weakness and wrongness of American life in recent years” (p. 11). He describes American soldiers and sailors as tragic heroes by stating that those killed at Pearl Harbor “were not merely the victims of Japanese treachery. They were the victims also of a weak and faltering America that had lost its way and failed the world in leadership” (p. 11). It was important, according to Luce, that the American people learn a lesson greater than simply that the Japanese were a threat. He states,

> Every American, not excepting Mr. Roosevelt, now faces the deepest necessity of his life – the necessity of learning that he must find a spiritual rebirth or lose his soul alive. ‘Still stands Thine ancient sacrifice, an humble and a contrite heart.’ (p. 11).

In the above quotations, Luce summarizes the tragic nature of the attack. The American people, guilty of sin, were punished. That punishment was the need to sacrifice and the learning of a lesson, that we must maintain a “humble and a contrite heart.” The punishment, the sacrifice, and the loss, suffered as a result of American hubris, is the final piece of the initial tragic framing of the attack.

The losses suffered in the attack as a result of tragic American weaknesses were commonly invoked in early descriptions of the events of Pearl Harbor. In the early days of the war, the public was not made aware of the full extent of the losses – *Life* attributed this to “tactical reasons” (Remember Pearl Harbor, 1941, p. 15) – but the information was made available to news organizations as it became known. Therefore, as more information became available, the numbers of casualties and lost ships increased, creating a sense of loss that
grew over time. After only 104 deaths were reported at first, the front page headline of the December 9 issue of the *New York Times* claimed 1,500 were dead and 1,500 more had been injured at Pearl Harbor (by this time, information about the other attacks of December 7 had stopped appearing in most news reports altogether). Roosevelt, in his address to Congress, pointed out that “very many American lives have been lost.” The speed of information during the period may also have contributed to a sense of growing loss. On December 8, images from the attacks were not yet available to the press. The *Times* published a series of pictures of the Pearl Harbor base in peacetime, looking serene and modern. Such images may have been recalled by audiences that encountered images of burning ships and dead or wounded sailors in the newspaper, newsreels, or magazines a few days and weeks later. Additionally, early emphasis on the peace negotiations and instances such as Universal’s newsreels referring to the launching of “death and destruction” onto a “nation of peace” may have made audiences feel that more than lives and battleships had been lost (McNamee, 1941). An innocence and peaceful way of life, exemplified by the images of palm trees and sailors acting as if they were on vacation, was also sacrificed in the name of learning a lesson of humility.

In Luce’s editorial, published in a widely read national magazine, the complex nature of the initial framing of the attack on Pearl Harbor is obvious. While he employs the tragic frame by placing some of the blame for the attacks on American failures, Luce (1941) is also quick to point out that what the United States needs is unity. Luce claims that to achieve unity, it is essential for everyone to be willing to contribute to the war effort. In the terms of Burke’s epic frame, Luce’s call for unity is an opportunity for all Americans to “share the
worth of the hero” (Burke, 1984, p. 36). This form of identification becomes a key part in the
epic framing of the attack on Pearl Harbor as it receded into the past, especially during the
war years. However, the importance of “unity” was particularly stressed in the initial framing
of the attack and its role in bringing about active American involvement in the war.

**Epic Unity in Response to the Attack**

Burke (1984) tells us that “a frame becomes deceptive when it provides too great
plausibility for the writer who would condemn symptoms without being able to gauge the
causal pressure behind the symptoms” (p. 41, emphasis in original). In other words, a frame
is deceptive when the causes are ignored, implying, of course, that it is a more “honest”
frame when the causes of events are recognized. This allows the epic to coexist with the
other frames that make up the complex presentation of Pearl Harbor during the early
construction of American collective memory of the attack. For instance, acknowledgement of
American faults keeps the tragic frame “honest,” thereby providing a solid rhetorical base for
a shift to the epic frame. This is why it is not the attack which will live in infamy, but the
date. We are meant to remember not just the crime committed by the Japanese against us, but
also the crime we committed against ourselves – everything that led to and happened on
December 7, 1941. In his radio address to the nation on December 9, President Roosevelt
stressed that the war would be fought for freedom, not for vengeance (Roosevelt, 1941b).
Similarly, *Life* described the battle cry of “Remember Pearl Harbor” as a call for unity and
the defense of freedom – not for revenge (Remember Pearl Harbor, 1941). As one reporter
put it, national unity was a direct result of the attack: it “seemed visibly to arise from the
wreckage at Honolulu” (Krock, 1941, p. 6).
In order for the response to the attack on Pearl Harbor, as the beginning of the United States’ involvement in the war, to fit within an epic frame, it was essential to stress unity and the ability of ordinary citizens to contribute. If the American people were together partially to blame for the extent of the loss in the attacks, then they should, as a group, contribute to the redemptive process. Roosevelt (1941a) instructed them to always remember “the character” of the attack, a statement that could also refer to the character of the American people before the attack, a character that Luce (1941) described as weak and wrong. In other words, in the initial framing of the response to the attack, one might say that there was a sense of having gotten into the situation together and a necessity to get out of it together. In his address to Congress, Roosevelt (1941a) stated, “No matter how long it may take *us* to overcome this premeditated invasion, the *American people in their righteous might* will win through to absolute victory.” He also claimed that the United States could win the war with “the unbounding determination of *our people.*” In these sentences, Roosevelt is clear that the United States was to work together to overcome the tragedy of the attack, something that could only be accomplished through unification.

When Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn was asked on the evening of December 7 if Congress would support a declaration of war, he responded “I think that is one thing on which there would be unity” (Trussell, 1941, p. 1). Reports on the response to the attack proclaimed national unity beyond just the Congress. Arthur Krock (1941), in a newspaper article on the unification of the American people, stated, “The circumstances of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor were such that national unity was an instant consequence” (p. 6). The *Times* further demonstrated the apparent national unity by including excerpts of editorials
from newspapers across the country, all of them stressing the same topics of unity and Japan’s deceit (Newspapers call, 1941).

Of course, simply professing national unity is not enough to make the story of the response to the attack on Pearl Harbor fit into an epic frame. The united people must be able to contribute or feel that they are contributing to the efforts of what Burke calls the war-like hero, who, in this case, is represented by the America military actively fighting in the war. While the newspapers reported that national opinion on the appropriate response to the attack was united, President Roosevelt went further, literally calling everyone to war, saying in his radio address of December 9, “We are now in this war. We are all in it all the way, every single man, woman and child” (Roosevelt, 1941b). In the same address, the President described how every American could contribute to the war effort by adding to current manufacturing and production, saying that it was a privilege rather than a sacrifice to give to the war effort through increased taxes or forgoing individual profits. In this way, ordinary American citizens could identify with the military personnel conducting the war in Europe and the Pacific and feel that they, too, were a part of the war.

The rhetorical identification of the ordinary citizen with the hero extended beyond government officials or news reports. Perhaps in illustration of how quickly the private sector adopted, if not exploited, the epic frame, advertisements printed on December 9 for Wanamaker’s department stores in Philadelphia and New York called on the American people, as consumers, to join the war effort. The advertisement read in part:

The bugle has sounded! The call to arms is ringing today in the ears of every single American in this land! To men, to women, to youngsters and oldsters alike – every
single one of us has his part to do! Winning a war isn’t just loading a gun and firing a bullet – it goes much farther and deeper than that. It starts with every tiny detail of our daily lives. … Why not accept the call today, while we are in the midst of this great Christmas preparation? … We are determined, with the aid and cooperation of our customers, to continue our Lowered Price Policy. In order to do this it is necessary to bring you more merchandise at less cost and thus help the budget problems of all individuals… (Wanamaker's, 1941, p. 17).

This large half-page advertisement does not explicitly reference the attack on Pearl Harbor, yet the connection between the sounding of the bugle and the bombing would have been obvious to an audience reading of and having listened to the President’s speech to Congress and the ensuing declaration of war. By characterizing the attack as the beginning of an epic war effort, companies and the government were able to leverage its emotional impact to encourage economic contributions. While on one hand the Wanamaker’s ad is professing the department store’s own sacrifice, it also makes it easy for consumers to contribute to the war effort without having to sacrifice their material needs or desires: “Make a firm resolution that your shopping will be more carefully planned. … This thoughtfulness on your part will reduce materially the tremendously wasteful and expensive practice of the return of merchandise” (p. 17). Of course, returning merchandise is more expensive for the store than for the customer, but suggesting such a “sacrifice” makes the process of identification with the hero more accessible to the citizen/consumer.

In addition to every person being able to meaningfully contribute to the war effort through either sacrifice or consumption, an important piece of the epic frame is for those
ordinary citizens to remember that they must not lose sight of their humility and the fact that they are not the true hero. In his description of the epic frame, Burke (1984) notes that the “proper ingredient of humility is retained only when one’s identification with the godlike hero is discounted by the realization that one is not the hero” (p. 36, emphasis in original). As Henry Luce (1941) stated in an editorial, “All of us will be in the fight – men, women, and children, for this is indeed total war. But let us never forget that the hardest fighting is done at the front by our soldiers and sailors” (p. 12).

By remembering that the ordinary citizen can contribute to the effort but is not the true war-like hero, the citizen avoids the basic sin of pride – the sin that got them into trouble in the first place. Here is one instance where the epic and the tragic frames overlap. The insistence upon the humility of the ordinary citizen allows for the recognition of a flaw which promotes an “attitude of resignation” (Burke, 1984, p. 37). In other words, the avoidance of excessive pride allows citizens to recognize that their fate lies in the hands of another. Those who view history through a tragic frame share this sense of limitation and resignation, but in that frame the focus is upon punishment for a lack of humility, while in the epic frame there is a reward for maintaining that quality. In the case of the response to the attack on Pearl Harbor that reward is the “inevitable triumph” promised by President Roosevelt.

One way that difference between the contributions of the everyday citizen and the war-like hero can be demonstrated is through the description of the actual contribution being made by the hero. In the case of the attack on Pearl Harbor, that most often took the form of sharing the names and in some instances faces of those who were killed in the attack. However, since news of the attacks blended with the start of the war, it could also include
reports of those who were volunteering to join the military. There were reports of military recruiting offices turning people away on Sunday December 7, telling the volunteers to come back on Monday (Recruiting stations, 1941). By Tuesday, images of those lined up outside of the offices, which would eventually become iconic symbols of the united support for the war, began appearing in newspapers and magazines.

Public casualty lists, although they would eventually be banned for the duration of the war, began appearing in newspapers on December 9 (First casualties, 1941). A two-page spread in the December 22 issue of Life showed the images of 30 American men killed in action, each image accompanied by a short description of the person’s home life. While the text at the top of the page states that they were all killed at Pearl Harbor, some were killed in the days following the attack. In fact, the only individual that receives specific mention in the article is Captain Colin Kelly, whose “bravery … provided America with its first war hero” when he was killed while bombing a Japanese ship in the Philippines on December 12 (Killed in action, 1941, p. 23). By associating Kelly’s death on December 12 with those of December 7, the connection between those killed tragically at Pearl Harbor and the epic heroism of those fighting in the war allows the two frames to intersect with one another.

While Americans were everywhere being called into action to sacrifice for and contribute to the war effort, it was also made very clear who was providing the real sacrifice – a distinction that is essential to maintaining an epic frame of victory. The interplay of the multiple frames employed in the initial framing of Pearl Harbor would continue in media representations of the attack throughout the war years, highlighted primarily in American propaganda publications such as posters and films, discussed in the next section.
Maintaining the Frame

If the tragic and burlesque frames helped to establish an epic frame for the response and ensuing war, then maintaining each of those frames was a rhetorical necessity during the war years. The tragic and burlesque could not be ignored because the people needed to be reminded of why they were fighting (to preserve their freedom and atone for their earlier failures, not necessarily for vengeance), and how important it was that they contribute to the war effort. Maintaining this complex frame kept support for the war high and encouraged ordinary citizens to continue to contribute to the wartime economy. After the initial flurry of news reports, analyses, and official responses to the attacks, the number of explicit references to Pearl Harbor naturally fell drastically. Therefore, the references that were made during the war tended to dramatize the bombing more than did earlier stories in order to make the attack more salient as the event itself receded in time.

The maintenance of the complex frame began just a week after the attack with the simultaneous release of Navy Secretary Frank Knox’s report on the attack and a series of photographs and film clips from Pearl Harbor. The Knox Report would provide most of the information used in future re-tellings of the Pearl Harbor story, including accounts of the damage suffered along with individual stories of heroism. The images and tales from the Knox Report further solidified the initial framing of the attack by assigning blame to both the Americans and the Japanese, demonstrating the loss suffered as a result of American mistakes, illustrations of the deceitful character of the Japanese and the honesty of Americans leading to an epic story of victory.
The report, broadcast on the radio and then published in newspapers, begins with an enumeration of damage incurred in the bombing. The casualty numbers were higher than had been expected at 2,897 total servicemen dead in both the Army and Navy (Hurd, 1941), but the human loss received just a single sentence in the report (Knox statement, 1941). Instead, the focus was upon material losses and the fact that they were not as great as had been rumored and claimed by the Japanese. Indeed, Knox is careful to refute Japanese claims before he begins his list of damaged warships, saying, “[The] Japanese purpose was to knock out the United States before the war began…. In this purpose the Japanese failed,” citing his observation that “after the attack the defense by both [Army and Navy] was conducted skillfully and bravely” (p. 1). In the conclusion of his report, Knox stated, “Without doubt the whole spectacle was the greatest spontaneous exhibition of cooperation, determination and courage that the American Navy has been called upon to make” (p. 7). In this way throughout the report, Knox acknowledges the tragedy of the attack, yet is quick to move on to the epic nature of the response to the attack not only in praise of the general defense effort, but also by relating stories of individual heroic acts, some of which included the death of those involved.

In his report, Knox acknowledged that American mistakes were made, noting that military forces at the base “were not on the alert against the surprise attack” (Hurd, 1941, p. 1). In response to this information, Knox says that the President will establish an investigative committee to determine “if (a) there was any error of judgment which contributed to the surprise, [and] (b) if there was any dereliction of duty prior to the attack” (Knox Statement, 1941, p. 1). Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, stated that the Navy and Army commanders “should be vigorously investigated. Theirs is a responsibility and it ought to be determined whether either or both are inefficient or criminally negligent. They must be one or the other” (Hurd, 1941, p. 7). This fits with Burke’s (1984) notion that the tragic frame “deals in crime” and that “any incipient trend will first be felt as crime, by reason of its conflict with established values” (p. 39). In other words, any actions that do not appear to support common cultural beliefs – such as a belief that the United States could never be attacked on its own soil, for example – are committing a crime against that culture or society. In this view, those who were complacent in the days leading up to the war were guilty of more than simply being mistaken – it was a potentially criminal act. Just as the nation was punished for its complacency, those guilty of perpetuating complacency were to receive their own punishment. That punishment was delayed by a formal investigation, but was clearly a part of how the events of December 7 were framed.

Two other pieces that contributed to the maintenance of the complex frame were released on the same day as the Knox Report. In one, President Roosevelt detailed the history of American-Japanese relations, especially highlighting Emperor Hirohito’s claim, received days after the Pearl Harbor attack, that he was interested in continuing peace negotiations with the United States (U.S. White paper, 1941). Additionally, an Associated Press report appeared to confirm rumors that Hitler and the Nazis had actively conspired with the Japanese to plan the attacks, noting that “the hardly hidden hand of key Nazi agents [has taken] an increasing part in directing the correlation of Japanese and German total war efforts” (Hawaii blitz, 1941, p. 9). This continued the condemnation of Japanese character begun shortly after the attack, placing it within the burlesque portion of the complex frame.
Rhetorically, however, the story of the Nazi advisers in Hawaii and Roosevelt’s message to Congress gave earlier rumors and declarations an apparent basis in fact. Roosevelt wrote in his message, “There is the record, for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror and in disgust” (U.S. White paper, 1941, p. 1). The report of the Nazi involvement in the attack was accompanied by the names of specific German officers in China and Southeast Asia, lending the story a certain level of credibility. So, what audiences received as they began to adapt to life as contributors to the war effort were four concurrent stories that each contributed to the complex frame: A burlesque story that illustrated the depravity of the Japanese people, tragic stories of American mistakes and devastating losses, and an epic tale of unwavering heroism. The first three, told within the burlesque and tragic frames, provide the exigence for the emergence of the final story which at the time was merely speculative and used as a way to reassure the public and garner support for the war. As that future played out, however, the epic tale of the inevitable future became a way to frame the entire story of World War II, starting with the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Army photographs and newsreel footage were released along with the Knox Report, including a photograph of the burning USS Arizona that would become iconic of the attack, appearing in advertisements and government posters throughout the war. Interestingly, there is actually less than a minute of footage of the attack, the majority of which made it into newsreels that appeared in theaters across the country. Until photographs and film taken by the Japanese were captured and released after the war, there were very few images of Pearl Harbor during the attack available for circulation. Because of that, a few seconds of film and only a couple of different images were repeated in many newsreels, papers, and magazines,
allowing those images to become central to American collective memory of the attack. The most prominent image is that of the USS Arizona, a still taken from a short clip filmed by an Army photographer during the attack (see Figure 3.2). The image represented American loss, both of life (more than 1,100 sailors were killed on the Arizona) and of a significant portion of the Pacific fleet. As a symbol of American loss and an important piece of the tragic frame, the image of the Arizona represents a bridge between the burlesque, tragic, and epic frames. The epic understanding of the war depends upon a united American people, redeeming themselves for their earlier sins by fighting back against the Japanese. In short, the image of the Arizona functioned as a reminder of why they were fighting.

An advertisement in the December 7, 1942, issue of Life magazine illustrates this point. Accompanying the famous image of the ship, a block of text reminds readers that “Americans everywhere are re-dedicating themselves to total sacrifice for total war.” (Live, drive, work, 1942, p. 5). The advertisement goes on to claim that carelessness and accidents are “[delaying] victory and [hampering] our all-out war effort” (p. 5). It calls for a war against carelessness, connecting the threat that accidents pose to the carelessness of the United States which led to the devastation of Pearl Harbor – of which the reader is reminded by the photograph of the Arizona. In this way, the photo reinforces both the tragic and epic frames and encourages readers to be vigilant, to support the war effort, and, in essence, telling them they can be a “good American” if they just “Live, Drive, [and] Work Safely.”
Returning to the initial release of the Army newsreel footage and photographs, the December 29, 1941, issue of *Life* shared with the public “the first pictures of America’s war” (Attack on Hawaii, 1941, p. 11). The images, described as “death and destruction at [the] American base” were, unsurprisingly, the most dramatic instance of tragic framing to this point. The article claims that the images “impress on Americans” the extent of the battle, more so than Knox’s narratives of heroes in his report. The article concludes by saying

> At Pearl Harbor Americans tasted death and destruction and defeat. The Government made no attempt to veil that defeat. These pictures are galling to view, but Americans should contemplate them well. For whosoever sees them will remember Pearl Harbor always (p. 11).
Such a move to the dramatic appeal to pathos begins to overshadow notions of American mistakes present in verbal accounts of the attack. This is an important move because audiences are reminded of the loss without also being reminded of the possibility of American negligence and responsibility. Many of the photographs are of material damage to buildings, planes, and ships. But also included are photos of the wounded and the dead being removed, including one showing seven dead and bloodied bodies lying in a morgue. Such pictures, with large plumes of black smoke acting as a backdrop for bodies on stretchers, encourage a response that is more visceral than reasoned and may push the epic response more toward anger and vengeance than intended in the message of the united defense of freedom professed by the government (see Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3: Carrying a body from a burning school. This image is actually a still taken from newsreel footage shot after the attack (Attack on Hawaii, 1941, pp. 16-17).

Despite this slight alteration to the tragic framing of the attack, the epic frame of the response is maintained through a summary of the “heroic acts” described in the Knox Report, complete with artistic renderings of the events (Knox report, 1941, p. 28, see Figure 3.4). The drawings amplify the already dramatic construction of the stories. The stories and drawings
may work together in ways that, while they support the complex framing of the attack, may actually be contradictory to the individual frames. If tragic loss is understood as punishment for pride, and epic victory cannot be won with excessive pride, the story of Pearl Harbor as told strictly in images may call the viability of those frames into question.

Figure 3.4: Stranded soldiers climb aboard a ship. Their goal was to continue fighting – just one of the “heroic acts” described in the Knox Report (Knox report, 1941, p. 28).

There is little doubt that images such as Figure 3.3 demonstrate loss. But without additional background or description, the indication that the loss is punishment for some crime is missing, violating the tragic frame. Similarly, the drawings of heroic acts that attempt to encourage pride in American audiences – pride of their country’s ability to withstand attack and fight back, pride in their soldiers and sailors who did not give up – also fail to connect the necessity for maintaining that pride to the potential for punishment or ultimate success in war. While the absence of such a connection may be the case for these
two articles if they are only examined on their own, this is where the rhetorical influence of other representations of the event cannot be ignored. By the time audiences viewed these images, they were likely already familiar with official implications of American mistakes, Knox’s explicit statement of military negligence, and the formation of an investigatory committee. In short, these articles on their own may seems to encourage the very sin warned about in the tragic and epic versions of the Pearl Harbor story, but the story of the attack told in this particular issue of *Life* can only be looked at in relation to other representations that the audience was likely already familiar with.

The release of photographs and film clips from the attacks also gave newsreels of the event more material with which to structure their stories of the bombing. As I have mentioned, some of the images published in *Life* were stills taken from newsreel footage, as was the iconic image of the *Arizona*. Universal Pictures released its “Big News of 1941” reel on December 24, 1941, including a segment on Pearl Harbor. In the newsreel, as in the photographs, hints of American mistakes are absent. The images of damage and of chaos during the raids are accompanied by narration that primarily employs the burlesque frame by mentioning only the Japanese treachery, saying that “Japanese planes, without warning, bring war to America” (McNamee, 1941). The reel also continues the connection between the Japanese and the Nazis that had been made concrete in earlier depictions. Another newsreel, distributed by Castle Films, was available for purchase for home viewing. This reel, advertised as the “First authentic … movies” of the attack (Castle Films, 1942, p. 88), follows much the same pattern as the Universal reel, but with the addition of the epic heroism of the photographs. While there is an emphasis on Americans never forgetting the events of
December 7, the narrator also claims that the Japanese will not be able to forget the attack, presumably because of the destruction coming their way from the American response. The reel boasts that the control tower of the Arizona will be off Japan’s shores in coming days (Castle, 1942), integrating a theme of vengeance into the epic frame, although that theme had been explicitly denied in some earlier versions of the story (see, for example, Roosevelt, 1941b).

While it is likely that a desire for revenge permeated American feelings about the attack and drove many to enlist in the Armed Forces, such an explicit statement was largely left out of the early framing of the story. The elimination of American mistakes and a humble cause for the war represents an increase in the complexity of the frame by shifting parts of the tragic to the grotesque. As the emotional impact of the images began to take precedence over the reasonable qualities of verbal descriptions, subjective judgment of the attack became more prominent. According to Burke (1984), the grotesque is characterized by an emphasis on symbolic imagery, when one thing begins to stand for another. As the images of casualties and burning ships came to stand as illustrations only of Japanese character and to form an emotional battle cry, the “forensic pattern” gave way to “the subjective elements of imagery” (p. 60). In addition, the grotesque takes on the form of incongruity – the disjunction between what one sees and what one believes reality to be. For Burke, comedy works in much the same way, but the grotesque is “incongruity without the laughter. The grotesque is not funny unless you are out of sympathy with it” (p. 58). In other words, images that may otherwise be entertaining become disturbing in the grotesque. For example, one image published by Life shows a sedan marked with bullet holes. The image is similar to an image of Bonnie Parker
and Clyde Barrow’s automobile following their death in an ambush by law officers (see Figure 3.5). While the image of Bonnie and Clyde’s Ford was a source of entertainment published in newspapers across the country, a nearly identical photo taken at Pearl Harbor was grotesque due to its vastly different context.³

![Figure 3.5: Bullet-riddled Cars. Left: Bonnie and Clyde’s car after they were ambushed by police. Right: A car pockmarked by bullets and shrapnel after the attack on Pearl Harbor (Attack on Hawaii, 1941, p. 17)](image)

The grotesque, then, can be added to the tragic and burlesque as frames used to justify and encourage everyday citizens’ contributions to the American war effort. Each focused on a different aspect of the Pearl Harbor story, each providing different reasons for active American involvement in World War II. As the war continued, embedding the story of Pearl Harbor within an epic frame became more important than the maintenance of the other three portions of the complex frame. Put differently, the burlesque, tragic, and grotesque became supporting frames rather than the focus of most representations. This shift was most evident in propaganda posters designed throughout the war years. The posters were largely able to

³ Of course, it is not necessarily likely that audiences in 1941 made any sort of connection between the image published in *Life* and those of Bonnie and Clyde’s car from seven years earlier. In fact, the association of the images here may be viewed as grotesque in light of the differences in the circumstances of the photographs. I simply use them here as an illustration of the fine line between frames.
refer to the epic war effort with only minimal reference to the tragedy that begat that response.

Throughout the war, various departments of the United States government, along with affiliated private companies (e.g., defense contractors) produced and distributed over 2,800 posters containing messages to encourage citizens to support the war effort through various actions such as increasing production at work, conserving resources at home, and purchasing government bonds (World War II posters, 1941-1945). Some of these posters, particularly those dealing with recruitment and the war in the Pacific, make direct references to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Of the 2,829 posters available in the National Archives’ online catalog, 21 of them refer directly to the bombing or the Japanese character implied in the initial framing of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The collection of posters largely mirrors the early framing of the attack as described above while at the same time illustrating its complexity. Rather than provide an analysis of all 21 Pearl Harbor posters, I have chosen to include three that exemplify the epic and tragic/grotesque/burlesque characteristics of the frame.

First, “In Memoriam” (In memoriam, 1941-1945, see Figure 3.6) shows a group of sailors laying wreaths on a set of graves on a beach. The black and white image, simple text, and muted red background remind us not of chaos and burning buildings or ships as the *Life* images or newsreels did, but rather of the loss of life. The audience is asked to remember the heroic fallen rather than the villainous attackers. Such an approach is likely to encourage the audience to recall the sadness of the news and how the loss may have been avoided (or, at least, lessened) had Americans been more wary of the Japanese threat. But it also encourages them to support those still fighting and reminds them that, although they may be contributing
to the war effort themselves, their sacrifice is not as great as that of the heroes whom they are meant to emulate. None of these references are as explicit as in many versions of the Pearl Harbor story, however. The allusion to but absence of a distinct frame allows the audience the chance to remember the tragedy while viewing the attack through the version of the frame that they found most resonant. From a rhetorical standpoint, this may make the poster more likely to achieve its goal of encouraging viewers to purchase war bonds since it does not require them to make a judgment beyond the sadness of the loss. Even the epic frame of the response to the attack is implied rather than evoked – the war can only be won through the contribution of the ordinary citizen, let us remember whose true sacrifice we are emulating through our efforts.

Figure 3.6: In Memoriam Poster (In memoriam, 1941-1945)
“Produce for Victory!” (Produce for victory, 1941-1945, see Figure 3.7) is more clearly embedded within the epic frame. The text connects jobs of ordinary Americans directly to the response to Pearl Harbor. As Americans work to produce goods needed during the war, their very work says “Remember Pearl Harbor!” This poster, unlike the threat made by Castle Films that the Arizona would be off of Japan’s shores, gives no indication that the war is being fought for vengeance. Instead it is a collaborative effort. And, as long as we produce, we will produce victory together as a nation. We must simply keep our motors humming and welders flashing. From that same standpoint, the image includes smoke and fire – but in this case the smoke and fire are the result of positive work, evidence that cooperative production yields victory. This is, of course, in opposition to other images that include smoke and fire in reference to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Smoke and fire produced by treachery bring only tragedy and defeat.

Figure 3.7: Produce for Victory! (Produce for victory, 1941-1945)
“Remember Pearl Harbor, Buy War Bonds” (Remember Pearl Harbor, 1941-1945, see Figure 3.8) demonstrates the burlesque and grotesque elements present within the complex frame. As discussed above, the burlesque frame includes the caricature of the primary players. The exaggeration of Japanese physical traits and supposed deceitful nature is clearly evident in the drawing of the Japanese man and the knife going into the back of Lady Liberty. Liberty herself, however, also acts as a caricature of the United States, implying that Americans are unquestionably fair and open – personifications of the values the Statue of Liberty represents. The grotesque also comes into play in this caricature. Those who may not have been able to receive the benefits of Lady Liberty’s values such as African-
Americans or, more directly relevant, the Japanese-Americans imprisoned in internment camps following the attack on Pearl Harbor, may find the caricature more upsetting than reassuring. The grotesque is also evident in the swastika on the Japanese man’s uniform and the handle of the knife. While the cartoonish quality of the man’s face, combined with the symbol of a nation not likely to accept him as an equal may, on its own, be ironic or amusing, within the context of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States engaged in a two-front war, and the atrocities of the Nazi regime, the image may become unsettling to an American audience. To prevent the loss of liberty, the audience must remember Pearl Harbor and must work together to win through to victory through the purchase of war bonds.

During the war, the United States government, in addition to the war bonds and production posters, commissioned a series of propaganda films to be produced by prominent Hollywood directors. One film, Frank Capra’s Why We Fight: Prelude to War, was given commercial distribution (Engelhardt, 2007). Another, John Ford’s December 7th, also had a commercial release and won an Academy Award for best Documentary Short Subject in 1944 (Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, 2011). In December 7th (Ford, 1943a), the audience is shown reconstructed images of people at Pearl Harbor just before the attack, footage of the attack, narration describing the lives of a number of soldiers killed in the attack, and concludes with a call to a unified fight for victory. The film begins with the observation that there were many warnings of an impending attack, yet “Uncle Sam,” shown as an actual character taking a nap on his Hawaiian lanai, ignored them. This provides some hint of the American mistakes that contributed to the tragic framing of early reports of the attack.
The film also contains scenes of sailors relaxing and playing catch just prior to the attack. Interestingly, these clips of relaxing naval officers also appear in later newsreels depicting the attack. And footage of the bombing, recreated and filmed for December 7th, appears in later documentaries as having been filmed during the bombing. This blurred boundary between fiction and nonfiction makes it difficult to answer questions about Americans’ memory of the event. This boundary blurring, likely a result of the dearth of film and photographs of the attack itself, many of the images we are most commonly shown of Pearl Harbor are not simply representations of the event in the sense that they were photographed while the raid was happening, but rather are entirely fabricated re-creations of the event. This supports Young’s (1988) claim, explored in chapter two, that we do not remember an event, we simply remember earlier memories of it. When this is projected from personal to collective memory, if a re-creation is presented to us as part of a representation expected to be “true” (e.g., a newsreel or History Channel documentary), the event we remember is not what happened, but rather a copy of it.

Ford’s film, originally 82 minutes, was censored by the government due to some difficult questions posed primarily in the first part of the film. Although the long version of the film did not receive public release (it is available to view online; see Ford, 1943b), the excised footage reveals a lot about how the government attempted to frame the attack on Pearl Harbor as it receded into time. The most major cut removed a segment of over 40 minutes from the beginning of the film in which “Uncle Sam” is visited by his conscience, personified by Mr. C. Mr. C explains to Sam that the Japanese arrived in Hawaii to work in the sugar and pineapple fields and they now make up the majority of the Hawaiian
population. Many of them have not, however, given up their Japanese citizenship despite professing their allegiance to the United States. Uncle Sam responds,

So there are many Japanese here and they have their language schools and Shinto temples. And many are hyphenated and some perhaps disloyal. But don’t go getting the impression that I’m entirely unaware of their presence here. My police forces, federal and local, are constantly vigilant and backing them up is the largest naval fortress in the world. As long as the American flag flies over these bastions of military strength, none need sleep uneasily. And let me remind you, it’s a bastion I’m very proud of (Ford, 1943b).

Conscience explains that he has not forgotten Sam’s pride – and neither has the Japanese government. This portion of the film clearly outlines American mistakes that, had Uncle Sam chosen to consider them, could have lessened the effect of the attack on Pearl Harbor. In other words, the uncensored version of Ford’s film places the attack much more firmly within the tragic frame than does the censored version. It also provides evidence of the influence of the didactic in the early framing of Pearl Harbor. According to Burke (1984), the didactic can also be thought of as propaganda and a consciously rhetorical attempt to “coach” the audience’s imagination. The censorship of this portion of Ford’s film demonstrates a clear desire by the American government to rein in certain parts of the complex frame while highlighting others, particularly the burlesque, in which the villainous Japanese are presented as scheming caricatures.

The publicly released version of the film (Ford, 1943a) places the response to the attack firmly within the epic frame. This portion of the “documentary” was not censored by
the government, implying that the epic frame of unification and inevitable triumph was more important to maintain than that of the tragic framing of American mistakes that led to defeat at Pearl Harbor. Near the end of the film, the audience is “introduced” to a number of soldiers and sailors that had been killed in action. These individuals, all speaking with the same disembodied voice over images of people representing their families, remind the audience that there are some who have given the ultimate sacrifice and the best thing they can do is to work as united civilians “in harmony” with the military to win the fight. When the narrator asks the dead soldiers why they all sound alike (a single narrator had provided the voices for all of them), the voice replies “We are all alike. We are all Americans.” This portion of the film not only reinforces the unity necessary to win the war, but also helps to establish the identification necessary for ordinary citizens to recognize their own small part in the larger effort, but still maintain their humility in recognizing that they are not the actual warlike hero.

**Framing and Memory**

In the initial framing of the attack on Pearl Harbor, representations of the events leading to and during the bombing created a complex frame that utilized the burlesque and the tragic, helped along by the didactic, as Americans struggled to come to terms with the meaning of the attack and their new role in the global conflict of World War II. Despite the complexity of the early framing, representations of the American response to the attack on Pearl Harbor – the war as a whole – ultimately come together to tell an epic tale. The complex frame established in the years following the attack on Pearl Harbor provided a guideline for representations of the battle and its aftermath in the months and years following
the bombing. If our collective memory is, as Young (1988) says of individual memory, simply remembrances of previous representations, then the frames established by the media representations discussed in this chapter would become the frames through which future generations would view the events of December 7, 1941. Therefore, the burlesque/tragic/grotesque view of the attack and the epic understanding of the response shaped not just contemporary feelings about the attack – feelings which were, for all intents and purposes, already pieces of Americans’ collective memory – but were instructive as to how others should remember the nature of the attack and the American response. As I have stated previously, collective memory is often said to be more about the present than about the past. This means that our memory evolves as the needs, values, and interests of the collective change. Certain aspects of the past are emphasized over others. Another way to think about this is that the rhetorical frames employed in representations of the past may shift as the needs of both audiences and rhetors change.

Since it is a transitional frame in which cultural instability plays a significant role, it is not surprising that the didactic would emerge as way to look at Pearl Harbor during the attack’s immediate aftermath. The United States was ending a period of isolationism and entering a war on two fronts. Additionally, the nation was dealing with the idea of an attack on American soil, something many had not previously considered. Acknowledging these events is to say nothing about the continuing struggles of the Great Depression and the labor unrest that dominated domestic news coverage. While Americans were dealing with these issues, some versions of the Pearl Harbor story adopted a frame that “[coaches] the imagination in obedience” (Burke, 1984, p. 75). In terms of the didactic’s role in the
construction of collective memory of Pearl Harbor, propaganda posters published throughout World War II depicted the Japanese as inhuman monsters. Many of those representations were not directly related to Pearl Harbor, but by “coaching the imagination” of audiences on the character of the Japanese, they are quite likely to associate those images with Pearl Harbor and to view the bombing through the framing of the didactic rhetoric, which may, of course, contain any combination of the frames. In this way, the didactic is a key component of the complex initial framing of Pearl Harbor.

In the days immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the event was already beginning to find traction in the collective memory of the American people. Those receiving the news reports, speeches, and images were likely looking for some explanation for the attack, some reason for why they had been caught so unaware. As a response to such a need, the raid was depicted as a deceitful act by the Japanese, but at the same time, American mistakes and complacency were blamed. As I have discussed in this chapter, representations focusing on the results of American pride tend toward the tragic, with the American military playing the role of tragic hero, while those focused upon the villainous actions of the Japanese tend toward the burlesque and didactic frames. The depicted hubris of both sides – the Japanese and the Americans – would provide the basis for the second dominant frame of the attack, the epic. Later representations of the attack acted as the catalyst for the type of unity and shared identification necessary to support the war effort. As a symbol of the tragic defeat that can result from a lack of humility and unified effort, Pearl Harbor provided the impetus for embarking on a predetermined course toward an epic victory in World War II.
The tragic mistakes that allowed the attack to be so devastating needed to be avoided at all costs in the future. The cost would be the unified defense of the nation – citizens needed to be vigilant and contribute all they could to support defense efforts. While the people needed understanding, the government needed unification, and the framing of Pearl Harbor in the days following the attack reflected those needs. As the United States became fully engaged in the war, however, those needs began to change. The American people needed a purpose, an enemy to defeat, while the government was in need of support. To meet both of these needs, the framing of the attack began to shift toward the impending epic victory, leaving the tragedy of earlier American mistakes in the past. This is the version of the story that would come to dominate American collective memory of the Japanese attack throughout the war. As evidenced by the changes in the tragic frame following the release of the Knox Report, the propaganda posters used throughout the war, and the government censorship of Ford’s film, the epic response and the treachery of the enemy became the focus. And, as the earlier elements of American mistakes began to disappear from representations of the event, they became more difficult for Americans to recall and associate with the bombing.

If each new depiction is simply a re-presentation of a previous image, then the removal or rejection of certain elements makes it unlikely that they will appear in future representations, effectively removing those elements from the audience’s memory of the event. In the next chapter, I examine how representations of the attack on Pearl Harbor continued to evolve, simplifying over time as elements of certain frames, such as the tragic, become less useful rhetorically due to changing contexts and reasons for telling the story of
Pearl Harbor. In the middle part of the twentieth century, more information about the attack came to light following a number of high-profile investigations and political concerns began to change as World War II faded into the Cold War resulting at first in additional complexity, but eventually bringing about a level of stability and simplicity in the framing of Pearl Harbor.

Stories told from within a frame (such as the tragic or the burlesque) that focuses on who may be blamed for a particular event are likely to end with that event. In other words, representations of the past that seek blame for an event tend to divorce that event from history, removing it from its context and overlooking the complex web of relationships essential to a complete understanding of the past. In this case, the attack on Pearl Harbor serves as the climax of such stories. However, stories that incorporate later events such as the eventual American victory in World War II must necessarily place the attack within a different context, resulting in a different way of framing the attack. Even in some stories in which it is regarded as punishment for American pride, the attack serves as a wake-up call and the beginning of an opportunity for redemption. Redemption, at least in the form of overcoming great adversity, is the primary theme of stories told from within an epic frame. In the epic frame, everyday citizens unite with one another and with the warlike hero in order fulfill a mission against great odds. It is this story – one of unity, strength, and victory – that would help to maintain popular support for the American war effort and, as I will reveal in my analysis throughout the remainder of this dissertation, would come to define American collective memory of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
It has been a tremendously uplifting spiritual experience to me, to see the manliness with which these boys are enduring their sufferings, it has richened and deepened my faith in a form of government that can produce heroes like these.

-Radio Report, *From Here to Eternity* (Jones, 1951, pp. 766-767)

As the President was in complete control of the whole situation, the Army and Navy in Washington were merely obeying orders, and the Hawaiian Commanders were the victims of those orders.

-Admiral Robert Theobald

(Theobald, 1954, p. 189)

On September 1, 1945, President Harry S. Truman addressed the nation via radio to announce the official surrender of the Japanese and the end of the war. His manner of speaking was calm, as if he were simply reading a prepared statement rather than giving a speech to mark victory at the end of a bloody world war. Maybe because the war had essentially been over since the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki on August 9 and the Japanese announcement of surrender on August 15, Truman’s announcement sounded more informational than celebratory. This did not prevent him from reflecting on the previous four years and the attack that initiated American active involvement in the war. Truman describes the day when victory over Japan became official as “a day which we Americans shall always remember as a day of retribution – as we remember that other day, the day of infamy” (Truman, 1945).

Audiences were exposed to this speech much in the same way they had experienced President Roosevelt’s speech the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor – many of them listened to the address on the radio and read the text the next day in the newspaper. However,
over the next 25 years, the radio and newspaper would fade as primary sources of information while television, and its accompanying images, became a fixture in most American homes. Also during this time, color would replace black and white as the most common medium in the film industry, marking those grayscale images as having come from an earlier time. As the media were evolving, a generation too young to remember the attack on Pearl Harbor on their own came of age in an era ushered in by the attack and defined by constant images, threats, and reminders of war. Although Pearl Harbor was rapidly fading into the past, World War II continued to capture Americans’ imaginations in film, print, and television. Depictions of the war in the Pacific were often influenced by the attitudes toward the attack on Pearl Harbor that arose during the war years: the Japanese, once congenial and harmless, were now seen as devious, inhuman monsters. In many popular depictions of the war, though certainly not all, the Japanese were a faceless enemy responsible for untold atrocities. Meanwhile, epic American heroism rolled on. But in this era, that heroism was necessary for counteracting questions and criticisms of American government and military officials in the two events bookending World War II, the attack on Pearl Harbor and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the key changes in the media ecology that characterized the post-war years. I then analyze the evolution of the framing of the attack on Pearl Harbor during the first half of the Cold War, from 1945 to 1970. This era began with three controversial investigative reports into the causes of Pearl Harbor and ended with a film celebrated for its documentary style and realistic depiction of the attack. In between, media representations of Pearl Harbor dealt with sensitive issues raised during investigations by the
Army, Navy, and a Congressional Joint Committee by shifting the frame of their narrative to focus largely on the stories of those who defended Pearl Harbor. Rather than dispute claims of incompetence among high ranking officers, depictions of Pearl Harbor during this time used those claims as evidence of the heroic nature of the everyday American soldier. In contrast to these epic representations of the attack, this period also witnessed a revisionist movement. The revisionists, encouraged by the questions raised in the investigations, painted a much different picture – a grotesque version of the story characterized by secrecy and conspiracy. Most of the stories, both the epic and the grotesque, made claims of authenticity by using or recreating “actual” images from the attack, interviewing witnesses, or claiming to have been written by those who experienced the attack firsthand. Authenticity provided the representations the authority necessary either to support or contradict the less-flattering reports of the official investigations and the revisionist narratives.

I analyze how this shift in framing is evident in popular media representations of the attack. These representations include news reports concerning the results of the Army, Navy, and Congressional investigations, revisionist histories written by journalists and prominent World War II veterans, popular nonfiction representations such as *Day of Infamy* (Lord, 1956, 1957), and fictional works including the novel and film versions of *From Here to Eternity* (Jones, 1951; Zinneman, 1953). Analyzing these works, especially those concerning the investigations and revisionist narratives, also requires the analysis of the social and political contexts of the post-war years, a period colored by the beginning of the Cold War and a conservative backlash against the Roosevelt administration. In my analysis, I ask what social and political forces may have motivated the rise of revisionism and the grotesque.
How did claims of authenticity and a focus on Army regulars minimize the grotesque and emphasize the epic or vice versa? Also important in this chapter is the passage of time. What effect did the benefit of hindsight have on the framing of the Pearl Harbor story? And, lastly, how does the interplay of the frames that dominate this time period provide a basis for American collective memory of the attack moving into the latter part of the twentieth century?

**The Media at Mid-Century**

The middle of the twentieth century witnessed an important shift in the media ecology as radio gave way to television as the most prominent entertainment appliance in American homes, political issues influenced programming decisions, and cultural changes affected the way Americans understood and interacted with the media. During the early years of the Cold War, the media industry first began to rely upon the ratings system, encouraging conservative programming, sensationalism, and an emphasis on entertainment over information in order to appeal to the largest possible audience (Bourdieu, 1999; Demers, 2007).

The 1940s have been considered the “Golden Age” of radio. More than eighty percent of American homes had a radio in 1940. The radio could provide entertainment through musical, dramatic, and comedic programs. And, in contrast to newspapers, the radio could provide immediate news coverage of important or sudden events, such as the attack on Pearl Harbor itself (Demers, 2007). Walter Lord (1957) introduces his comprehensive account of the attack by describing the type of radio programming that was interrupted by the news. In one illustration of the immediate nature of radio news reporting, Lord points out that an
audience listening to a CBS radio broadcast of the New York Philharmonic learned of the attack before those actually attending the concert. Radio’s dominance continued in the immediate post-war years due to a belief that the new medium, television, would appeal only to the wealthy. Additionally, pressure on the FCC from the radio industry led to a number of policies restricting television’s growth and protecting radio’s commercial interests (Briggs & Burke, 2009).

Television, on the other hand, struggled through the 1940s. Due to little production of consumer electronics during the war, only six stations broadcasted to roughly 10,000 sets throughout the duration of the war. Between 1945 and 1948, the number of station licenses grew to 124. However, the FCC had limited the number of channels available and froze new station setups between 1945 and 1949 and new station licenses between 1948 and 1952. These policies were primarily intended to prevent television from encroaching upon commercial territory occupied by radio. By 1952, however, more than a third of Americans owned a television, up from less than one per cent in 1948, and ownership grew to nearly ninety per cent by the end of the decade (Briggs & Burke, 2009; Demers, 2007). In the 1950s, radio could no longer ignore the importance of television nor compete with its growing appeal to audiences. Television could (and did) provide identical programming to radio, with the added benefit of visuals to accompany sounds. As it began to lose its dominance of news and entertainment programming, radio increasingly turned to recorded music to fill air time (Demers, 2007).

In the United States, content for the new medium developed along the same line as radio, utilizing corporate sponsorship for funding the production of most programming. As
Streeter (1996) notes, this was an intentional decision designed to privilege commercial interests over the amateur broadcasters who had dominated the early days of radio and to duplicate the broadcasting system that had been established for the commercialization of the earlier medium. Because of the powerful relationship between radio broadcasters, corporate sponsors, and the FCC, a television network system developed similar to that of the radio industry. It also allowed advertising agencies and large companies to determine what types of programming was produced and which shows were allowed to air. Despite this influence, and the need for programs, as advertisements, to reach the largest audience possible, Gorman and McLean (2009) claim that “Ideological conservatism did not stand in the way of programs” because sponsors “valued the prestige to be gained from association with programs of high quality” (p. 139). Nevertheless, because of the Red Scare of the late 1940s and early 1950s, political pressure from the government’s search for Communist threats often led to an unwillingness to produce news or entertainment programming that was critical of powerful institutions, and the influence of advertisers would not allow for the possibility of alienating large numbers of viewers (Demers, 2007). In this way, the Red Scare affected the television industry by leading to a more politically conservative approach to content.

While much of television’s early content mimicked radio programming and depended on sponsorship, the development of videotape led to a change in the industry’s structure in the middle part of the 1950s. As recorded television became the norm and production costs rose, single sponsorship became joint sponsorship and short advertisements were inserted between programs rather than integrated into the content of the program itself. This gave the networks more control over programming, but concerns over ratings and advertising dollars
still influenced their decisions. A search for high ratings “accentuated the conservative bias of network television” and “reinforced an unwillingness to touch controversial themes” (Briggs & Burke, 2009, p. 141). Because of these factors, television programming supported the hegemony, censoring programs critical of conservative, capitalist political views and largely ignoring the role of women and minorities (Demers, 2007).

It was the film industry that helped television to be an important contributor to the development of American collective memory of World War II, including the attack on Pearl Harbor. In the early part of the 1950s, the film industry was struggling. Despite the increase in prosperity that led to the growth of television, movie audiences had shrunk considerably. Weekly movie attendance per household was at 2.35 in 1946, 1.38 in 1950, and fell all the way to 0.76, less than one visit to the movies per week per household, in 1960. This was due in part to the growth of the suburbs while movie theaters were still concentrated in city centers (Gorman & McLean, 2009). But television posed another problem. As President Eisenhower put it in 1953, “If a citizen has to be bored to death, it is cheaper and more comfortable to sit at home and look at television than it is to go outside and pay a dollar for a ticket” (Briggs & Burke, 2009, p. 212). As a way of recovering from the effects of television, film companies began selling their content, including old feature films and new television programs, to television networks in the mid-1950s. By the end of the decade, these productions made up the majority of primetime programming.

The “old movies” to be shown on television during the 1950s and 60s would primarily have been produced during the 1940s, including the war years. This means that films from that era depicting the Japanese and the war in the Pacific would have become a
major part of the media landscape for a younger generation. They were also viewing these films in a new context: in the home with family and commercial interruptions. This change meant that the films were more integrated into viewers’ daily lives rather than experienced as a special event. As an element of everyday life, it is possible that only the most remarkable elements of the film would stand out. And, in terms of their effect on memory, it is possible that watching the films at home and potentially with parents transformed them into items of nostalgia. We might think of nostalgia as “a yearning for order, constancy, safety, and community – qualities that were last enjoyed in childhood and are retroactively imagined as gracing the whole of the time before one’s birth” (Sante, 1991, p. xi). Not only might the parents have reflected on the “simpler times” of the years before the war, perhaps marking World War II as the end of such times, but the act of watching may have eventually become elements of the children’s own “simpler times.” As elements of nostalgia, then, these representations of war become icons of a better time, not only for those old enough to remember the war years firsthand, but also for those who experienced it on film as a prominent piece of their childhood.

Those coming of age during the television era may have been too young to go to the theater and watch movies that dealt with the aftermath of Pearl Harbor such as 30 Seconds over Tokyo (1944), but the broadcast of such films on television exposed children to an ever-increasing number of media depictions of the war. While only a few of those films would have specifically depicted the attack on Pearl Harbor, they would nonetheless contribute to the texture of memory by influencing our evaluations and understanding of the nature of the Imperial Japanese Army and the heroism of the American military, defenders of freedom. In
other words, a media text does not have to explicitly be “about” a particular event in order to influence our memory of that event. Representations interact with one another, each one informing our thoughts on the other. Therefore, as media consumers of the mid-twentieth century were exposed to representations of Pearl Harbor, as in an episode of the documentary television series *Victory at Sea*, they would be able to link the images of Japanese bombers to other associated images, such as those of Japanese pilots on bombing raids during their assault on Wake Island in the 1942 film of the same name. Since I am concerned with American collective memory of Pearl Harbor, I will be primarily analyzing explicit representations of that attack. But this is not to overlook the importance of these other, related depictions of the war and of the Japanese and American military. Indeed, the very idea of media ecology insists that such texts be taken into account and, when necessary, I will suggest ways in which these other pieces of our memory may have contributed to our understanding of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

As stated above, radio began to decline in influence during this period and film and television developed a synergistic relationship. At the same time, print media maintained a privileged place in American culture, although their viability as a source of profit began to decline. Only one of the five most popular magazines of the 1950s – *Reader’s Digest* – survived the 1970s. Declining advertising revenue (companies were spending their money in television) led to increased specialization and decreased circulation. Despite the decline in circulation, however, approximately 80% of Americans still read a daily newspaper in the 1970s. Meanwhile the book industry continued to earn profits, capitalizing on cheaper production and the popularity of mass market paperbacks and book clubs (Demers, 2007).
So, while newspaper and magazine circulation shrank during this period, print media – especially newspapers – were still looked to as a source of important information.

This chapter’s analysis continues below with a discussion of an important piece of the Pearl Harbor media environment of the post-war period – newspaper summaries of the reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. These reports were publicly available and the hearings that resulted in the Joint Committee report were open to the public, but their size (the latter was nearly 600 pages long and based on 25,000 pages of testimony) and limited distribution made it difficult for people to access them, meaning they had to rely on the interpretations and summaries of the press. These summaries would have great influence over the direction of the framing of representations of Pearl Harbor in the quarter century following the end of the war.

**Investigating and Questioning Pearl Harbor**

Two days before President Truman announced the official end of the war, the results of investigations by the U.S. Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Naval Court of Inquiry were made public. News of the American occupation of Japan and the impending peace agreement accompanied newspaper stories on and summaries of the reports. These investigations were two of eight completed or ongoing inquiries into Pearl Harbor as of the date of their release. Another investigation, conducted by a Congressional Joint Committee, would be widely publicized in the Winter and Spring of 1945-46. The most notable of the earlier investigations were the Knox Investigation of 1941 (see chapter 3) and the Roberts Commission, a 1942 Presidential commission headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. The Roberts Commission found Admiral Kimmel and General Short, those in
charge of operations in Hawaii during the attack, guilty of dereliction of duty. The Army and Navy reports contradicted those findings, setting the scene for a series of controversial public hearings.

According to the summaries provided in the press, the Army and Navy reports place much of the blame on high-ranking military and government officials in Washington. An Associated Press article summarizing the Army report focuses primarily on communication failures by omission, conflicting messages, delay, and confusion (Pearl Harbor summary, 1945). This allows much of the blame to be implicitly placed upon those in charge of communicating important information to those in Hawaii – primarily Secretary of State Hull and Chief of Staff General Marshall. Those stationed in Hawaii are largely forgiven for their failures to be properly prepared for an attack due to a lack of information, particularly in the Army summary’s evaluation of General Short. The Navy report, summarized in the same article, is explicit in its descriptions of the failures of the commanders in Washington: “It is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders, particularly those in distant areas, constantly supplied with information. To fail to meet this obligation is to commit a military error” (p. 6). The Army report is even more specific, mentioning Hull and Marshall by name, criticizing Marshall for failing to keep Short “fully advised” of diplomatic relations with Japan and Hull for “precipitating the attack by his failure to engage the Japanese envoys … in protracted discussion” (Belair, 1945, p. 4).

In his report on the publication of the findings, the New York Times’s Felix Belair (1945) described the reports as “an indictment of the country itself” (p. 1). While this statement is in line with some of the earliest evaluations of the attack, it is somewhat
contradictory to the rhetorical effect of their content. In chapter 3, I discussed how the epic framing of representations of the attack allowed for all Americans, whom we might associate with “the country itself,” to take on the role of the “warlike hero” by “working together” and becoming “vicariously heroic” (Burke, 1984, p. 36). The framing of the attack during the war years allowed for the acknowledgment of mistakes, but the importance of the people’s participation in the war effort overrode a critical examination of those mistakes. The publication of the Army and Navy reports, however, presented the public with a detailed exploration of who, specifically, had made those mistakes and what, exactly, they had been. By drawing attention to the specific mistakes, the reports revealed some deficiencies in the frame, exposing elements of the attack that had largely been overlooked by dominant representations. Burke points out that “the rise of new material,” such as that included in the Army and Navy reports, may “endanger the serviceability of a frame,” making it difficult to maintain (p. 132). He goes on to explain that a frame’s viability can be extended through the use of casuistic stretching, the idea that one can “[introduce] new principles while theoretically remaining faithful to old principles” (p. 229). This form of stretching, applying old assumptions to new information in order to maintain a frame, is what happened with representations of the attack on Pearl Harbor following the addition of the Army and Navy reports’ information at the end of the war.

In order to maintain the initial framing of the attack, responsible individuals (e.g., Hull and Marshall) needed to be separated from those who had “heroically” overcome the mistakes of others. In other words, the reports did not require the “country itself” to consider its own failings, but instead placed the blame upon a select few. The people could then set
those officials aside and instead focus on those with whom they could associate – the soldiers and “warlike heroes” that they had been asked to emulate during the war, those who had not failed in their duties during the war. In this way, the stage was set for the focus upon the regular military personnel that would come to dominate depictions of Pearl Harbor.

Not insignificant in my interpretation of this rhetorical contribution to the way Americans viewed the attack, is the coincidence of the release of the reports and the United States’ ultimate victory over Japan. As Americans reflected on the war that had just ended, they were reminded of how it began, placing the beginning and ending of the war together in their memory of the previous four years. In this way, Pearl Harbor became just one event within the larger narrative of the war, making it easier to adopt an epic frame and focus on the eventual victory and overlook the initial failings. This is in contrast to the tragic or burlesque frames which work primarily by separating Pearl Harbor from what came later in order to focus on the mistakes and failings that led to the attack in the first place.

According to the Army Pearl Harbor Board Report (1944), the board concluded its duties on October 20, 1944, but the report was released to the public only after the United States’ victory was secured and on the same day as other major news concerning the American occupation of Japan. Belair (1945) recognizes the coincidence and describes Truman’s press conference on the reports as “hurriedly called,” indicating that news of the reports may have been intentionally held to coincide with the positive news of the occupation. An editorial (The Pearl Harbor reports, 1945) claims that they were withheld for “military secrecy,” a purpose apparently no longer relevant following the cease fire. The same editorial reminds its readers that “It is comforting for the future to remember that we
did rally and go on from Pearl Harbor to complete victory” (p. 20). Along with reminders of victory, the reports were released along with news of the brutality of the Japanese. Accompanying the reports on Pearl Harbor are a news story on the torture of an American pilot at the hands of the Japanese (American pilot hung by thumbs, 1945) and an editorial on the return of American prisoners of war, who “[gazed] into space and [spoke] haltingly in low tones” (Back from bataan, 1945, p. 20). So, on a day in which the news was largely dominated by the blaming of Americans for the devastation of the attack on Pearl Harbor, readers were reminded of the strength and success of the American response to the attack and the monstrous nature of the enemy that perpetrated it. This juxtaposition allows for the reinforcement of initial frames of the attack, but is not able to avoid the casuistic stretching necessary to overcome the reports’ explicit assignation of blame. In other words, the basic principle of the epic frame – unity leads to victory – is evident in the news of the end of the war, but another important principle – American innocence prior to Pearl Harbor – must be compromised in order to maintain the epic frame. This compromise comes in the form of focusing on the heroism of the everyday soldiers and sailors rather than on the military or government as a whole. Such an adaptation can be considered casuistic stretching because it remains faithful to epic principles, but is still forced to adjust to the new information made available in the reports.

Along with placing explicit blame upon specific American officials, the reports include two additional rhetorical road blocks to maintaining the epic frame of the attack. The first is a lack of consensus and unity on the meaning of the Army’s and Navy’s findings. The Navy interprets a piece of pre-war policy to mean the Army was responsible for the defense
of the island, and lays much of the blame there. In fact, the Navy report claims that their “condition of readiness in effect on the morning of December 7, 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet” (Pearl Harbor summary, 1945, p. 6). The Army, on the other hand, claimed that they were at a level of alert approved by the commanders in Washington and that those commanders were to blame for not providing complete information. Although the Army (U.S. Army Pearl Harbor Board, 1944) acknowledges that Short was responsible for reconnaissance and did not take action “which he could and should have taken” the report is very clear that a message sent to Hawaii on November 27, intended to warn Short of a possible attack, was not clear on the imminence of the threat, especially when compared to the message received by the Navy on the same day (p. 126).¹ The Army message read “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes” while the Navy message clearly stated, “This is a war warning” (p. 230). Those in Washington responded to the Army’s accusations by defending General Marshall and Secretary Hull who had taken most of the blame in the Army report. Both Secretary of War Stimson and President Truman defended Marshall, with Stimson calling the Army’s evaluation of his actions “entirely unjustified” (Shalett, 1945, p. 1). Much of this finger pointing was, of course, defensive. But that does not change the fact that there was a struggle over control of the framing of the attack following the release of the reports.

While struggling over the power to write history is not uncommon, the fact that this particular struggle was so publicly evident is a bit surprising given the fact that the reports

¹ The specific information on Short’s responsibilities is included in the Army report but does not appear in the Associated Press’s summary. Therefore, it was not specifically stated in the news articles. Instead, the question of who was responsible for reconnaissance and defense, difficult to determine even when reading the official reports, is not clearly answered in the summaries that appeared in newspapers.
were ready for months prior to their release, and the date of publication was chosen by high-ranking military and government officials – the very people blamed in the report. It seems that in the intervening time, some agreement could have been reached as to how to present the reports to the public as the government had employed the didactic frame in censoring and directing representations of the attack during the war. Instead, the disunity over the report left the door open for public distrust of the results of the investigations, an opportunity that Congress used as a reason to conduct its own investigation. Many members of Congress “refused, for the most part, to accept as conclusive or final the voluminous record which was spread before the public” (Trussell, 1945, p. 5). Representative Andrew May gave a statement broadcast on the radio in which he declared that he would not “stand for any whitewash of the matter in any respect.” By broadcasting his statement on the radio, May ensured that his sentiments were heard or read by a large part of the population. Rhetorically, his statement, and reports that Congress was looking to hold its own public hearings on the attack, suggest that the Army and Navy reports could not be thought of as accurate portrayals of the event. Instead, the stories of those involved needed to be told directly to the American public who could then interpret them on their own. Exacerbating this issue was the implication by some of those in Congress that there was a potential conspiracy between Marshall, Stimson, and Truman, in which Truman and Stimson defended Marshall because he had protected “others of high rank” (p. 5). Congressman Short called for a court martial of those involved in order to flush out the conspiracy, saying “the American people will not be satisfied until such court-martial is held” (p. 5). Such calls of conspiracy apparently resonated strongly with the authors of revisionist histories of Pearl Harbor that began
appearing shortly after the investigations, many of which saw evidence of a conspiracy to instigate the attack in the first place emanating from the highest levels of the government and military.

These claims of incompleteness and potential conspiracy may have cast a rhetorical shadow of doubt over the findings, encouraging those who would tell the story of the attack to the American people in the years to come to explain their qualifications, to demonstrate their version’s authenticity. Indeed, all of the major media texts examined in the remainder of this chapter, even those classified as fiction, make some claim to the authority of the author and the authenticity of the stories. Rosenzweig and Thelen (1998) found in their study of Americans’ experience with historical narratives that people are more likely to trust eyewitnesses because those witnesses “could use the rich variety of their experiences in interpreting what they’d come through” (p. 92). In other words, people presume that the experience of the event itself provides a more complete and, therefore, authentic understanding of what happened, making such accounts more reliable than those without that experience. Similarly, people also prefer stories from witnesses who do not appear to have any form of political agenda, as well as those from everyday people (e.g., family members) rather than professional historians. In the case of Pearl Harbor, what may have emerged from this preference, especially when audiences were confronted with official disunity and public distrust of the Army and Navy reports, was a search for “authentic” accounts from those who were presumed to not have political interests, meaning those outside of the government or military, as well as a potential desire for counter-narratives, stories that professed to reveal information that other, more “official” sources left out for one reason or another. Indeed, the
period covered in this chapter saw the publication of a large number of counter-narratives about Pearl Harbor.

Many of those counter-narrative came in the form of conspiracy theories, some of which contributed greatly to our collective memory and understanding of the event, and became intertwined with other representations of the era that also utilized authoritative narrators, including a novelist who served in the military and was at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 (Jones, 1951), and stories that had never before been told to the public (Lord, 1957). We might think of this approach to telling the story of Pearl Harbor as largely a response to the disunity evident in the publication of the Army and Navy reports and the skepticism expressed by members of Congress in their response to those reports – a response that would lead to a series of public hearings and one final “official” report on what happened at Pearl Harbor.

Short and Kimmel were relieved of their duties, but neither ever faced a public court-martial. They did, however, get to tell their version of events publicly during the hearings of a Joint Congressional Committee investigating Pearl Harbor. These hearings were reported daily in newspapers and on radio for the duration of the investigation, lasting from November 1945 until May 1946. During the first week, there were reports of the wire services sending over 25,000 words per day reporting on the proceedings (The Pearl Harbor story, 1945). Time magazine described the investigation as “the biggest running congressional story since … 1933” (p. 57). Despite the amount of reporting on the hearings, the public actually had very little access to the information being presented. The hearings would result in over 25,000 pages of testimony and evidence, but, unless they travelled to a major library, people
were only able to make use of what was chosen to be reported on the radio and in newspapers. There was no live, continuous radio or television coverage, and newsreels did not include much, if any, specific information beyond the fact that the hearings were taking place. Instead, audiences relied upon reporters to help them make sense of the volumes of information. *Time’s* report on the hearings acknowledged the complexity of the story and the fact that many of the recollections presented were vague and contradictory. However, “a sizable portion of the U.S. press did little to untangle the story for the man who knew only what he read in the papers” (p. 57). So, due to a lack of easy access to complete testimony (excerpts are likely to have been included in radio news reports) and the complex and conflicting nature of the testimony, the public congressional hearings, declared by some members of Congress as what the American people deserved, are likely to have done very little to counteract the appearance of disunity and distrust of government and military officials that emerged with the release of Army and Navy reports.

Initial news reports of the Congressional hearings revealed much of the same information that had been included in the Army and Navy reports: important information was not passed from those in Washington to the commanders in Hawaii. The hearings also described a number of decoded messages from the Japanese indicating that hostilities were imminent long before the attack, including one that announced negotiations were to be ended as soon as they received Hull’s ultimatum in November (Tokyo saw crisis, 1945; White, 1945c). While none of this information would have been particularly new to audiences, focusing primarily on this part of the story implicitly places much of the blame upon higher ranking military and government officials for not recognizing, not sharing, or not acting upon
information available to them. This view was reinforced in later reports of the hearings, including an article in *Time* that described General Miles, in charge of military intelligence at the time of the attack, as “balding [and] bumbling” (They called it intelligence, 1945, p. 20). The article goes on to report that messages were not decoded due to a lack of personnel and that some messages were not shared with important individuals, including President Roosevelt. The apparent incompetence of the government and military, like the specific assignation of blame, revealed flaws in the logic of the epic frame that encouraged Americans to remember Pearl Harbor as an attack on an innocent United States that led to a well-planned and effective response. Governmental and military competence was not the only portions of the epic frame called into question, however.

One common theme in many of the post-war reports on the attack was the disunity of the American people and government in the months leading up to the attack. While reports in the days immediately following the bombing stressed that disagreements were no longer relevant in a time of war, once the war had ended there were very few pretenses that true unification had ever been achieved. Reston (1945) pointed out in the *New York Times* that the confusion leading up to the attack was “reflecting the views of a divided nation” (p. 1). While the nation may or may not have been more united during the war, the disunity described in the early stories of Pearl Harbor appeared as a major part of the government’s response to the Army and Navy reports and the ensuing Congressional hearings. Partisan disagreements over the procedure of the hearings, the date on which they began, and the motivations of the committee members’ questions made front page news during the early days of the hearings (See, for example, Cruiser involved, 1945; White, 1945a, 1945b). By the time the Joint
Committee’s report was written, disagreements over procedure and motivation gave way to differences in interpretations of the information. Two senators dissented from the majority view that the Roosevelt administration was not to blame. White (1946) described them as “putting Mr. Roosevelt’s name at the top of a list” in their “bitter” dissenting report (p. 1). The dissenting opinion could indeed have been described as bitter as the minority (Senators Brewster and Ferguson) called the majority’s conclusions “illogical and unsupported” (Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 1946, p. 493). They went on to claim that restrictions placed upon committee members implied “that there was a deliberate design to block the search for the truth” (p. 499).

While the content of the disagreements themselves may not have figured into the public’s understanding of what happened at Pearl Harbor, the continual descriptions of arguments and difficulty proceeding may have contributed to a general assumption of incompetence or political motivation (or both) when it came to an evaluation of the role of leaders in Washington in the attack on Pearl Harbor. In other words, the focus on disunity may have contributed to the damaging of the dominant frame of epic victory, making it necessary for many future representations of Pearl Harbor to ignore the part of the story dealing with what happened prior to the attack and focus upon the actions of those responsible for fighting and defending rather than the individuals commanding them. Because unity is an essential piece of the epic frame, no amount of casuistic stretching can bring information illustrating a lack of unity into the frame. Therefore, those portions of the story needed to be ignored in order to maintain the epic frame. That means symbols of that
disunity – high-ranking government and military officials – are largely absent from later representations of the attack.

Not only did the newspaper reports on the Congressional hearings reinforce the implied incompetence and disunity of officials in Washington that had been suggested in the Army and Navy reports, they also more firmly introduced the possibility of a conspiracy or cover-up that had been suggested by members of Congress following the release of the earlier reports. For example, Republican members of the committee “denounced the plan of investigation” and “implied that an attempt was being made to shield the Roosevelt Administration” (White, 1945b, p. 1). According to news reports, much of the questioning directly asked if witnesses felt that information was deliberately withheld or if orders were given with knowledge of the impending attack. Representative Gearhart described a number of orders, such as one shutting down the Hawaiian radar station at 7 AM (approximately one hour prior to the attack), as “strangely significant” (Cruiser involved, 1945, p. 1). Simply put, some congressional investigators implied that there was a conspiracy of some form to allow the Japanese attack to succeed. By focusing their reports on this aspect of the hearings, the press created a frame of the attack which allowed its audience to develop a sense of distrust and disbelief of official versions of the story.

While accusations of responsibility called into question the competence of American military leaders in Washington and reiterated the findings of the Army and Navy, the Congressional hearings also added a new dimension to the story of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The news reports suggested that the Japanese made every effort to avoid war, including the fact that the Japanese fleet headed toward Hawaii set out with the
understanding that they could call off the attack at any time (White, 1945a). The Japanese Envoy, Kurusu, testified that he had been working behind the scenes with a Roosevelt Administration aide, further indicating that the Japanese were not completely set on war. Kurusu also claimed that he felt Roosevelt and Hull were doing their best to avoid war and was disappointed that they were being criticized in the committee testimony (Hidden peace talks, 1945). This is the first indication given that the Japanese might not have been as bent on domination and war as audiences had been led to believe. Interestingly, that information, while prominent in news reports of the hearings, did not appear to have much effect on the committee’s evaluation of blame for the attack. Instead, the committee seems to ignore this information, placing blame for Pearl Harbor primarily on the Japanese.

The Joint Committee’s (1946) report, detailing the majority opinion, begins by saying “On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the United States and Japan were at peace” (p. xi). This statement, while technically true, seems misleading given the status of negotiations between the countries at that time. The introduction to the report is careful to highlight the American losses in the attack, including casualties and material losses. It also, ultimately, lays the blame not on American military leaders in Washington or in Hawaii, but on the Japanese, saying, “The Pyrrhic victory of having executed the attack with surprise, cunning, and deceit belongs to the war lords of Japan whose dreams of conquest were buried in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (p. xi). Such a statement orients the report to be much more in support of the earlier framing of the attack than is present in the Army and Navy reports and news coverage of the investigations in which much (though certainly not all) responsibility is laid upon the miscalculations, miscommunication, and general complacency.
of the American government and high-ranking military officers. While it may be the case that the frame of the Joint Committee Report varied slightly from the news coverage of the hearings, audiences are not likely to have read the final report. Therefore, much of what they learned about Pearl Harbor in the first months following the war was more likely couched in the language of conspiracy and incompetence. This is in part due to the nature of the media through which most Americans learned about the hearings and reports. Radio reports were relatively brief and, therefore, were more likely to focus on the most important or dramatic portions of the story. And although newspapers included more detailed summaries of the hearings and quoted extensively from the reports, they focused primarily on new information such as that from Kurusu’s testimony and what had been learned from the Japanese following the war. Information that simply repeated commonly held assumptions, such as those blaming the Japanese for the attack, were not as prominent (with the exception of sensational stories such as one about an American pilot hung by his thumbs by the Japanese).

This is likely to have weakened the epic frame as it was developed during the war and came to dominate the way Americans looked at and understood Pearl Harbor. Prior to the publication of the Army, Navy, and Congressional reports, the “official” story was simple: the Japanese had “suddenly and deliberately attacked” the United States “without warning.” The American people had all worked together in response to the attack and had won ultimate victory. However, in the first months following the war, that version of the story was repeatedly called into question. Notably, those questions were being presented to audiences as serious, official inquiries into the attack. As a result, future depictions of Pearl Harbor had to reconcile the original epic frame with the new information that had become available after
the end of the war. Most representations within the popular media were able to do this by placing their focus on the regular military personnel, the everyday soldiers and sailors, rather than on those in charge of operations. This allowed them to avoid questions of competency and conspiracy and focus instead on the response to the attack in much the same way as had been done during the war. However, other representations chose to further explore the questions raised by the Army, Navy, and Congressional reports and develop what have been called revisionist counter-narratives, many focusing on a potential conspiracy within the Roosevelt Administration to allow the attack to succeed. While we usually associate conspiracy theories as existing on the fringe of media representations, Pearl Harbor counter-narratives, helped along by the general distrust developed during the Congressional hearings, gained popular purchase and were even given a major platform in the form of a special anniversary issue of the Chicago Tribune in 1966.

**Countering the Dominant Frame**

During the war, the epic frame had emerged as the “official” perspective from which to view Pearl Harbor. However, as the assumptions upon which the frame was based were called into question, other ways of framing the attack began to gain some traction, particularly the grotesque. Burke (1984) explains that the grotesque frame is characterized by a disjunction between what one sees and what one believes to be reality. This frame often arises during times in which a society is in transition, particularly in terms of people’s relationship with authority. As Burke puts it, the grotesque occurs in “periods marked by great confusion of the cultural frame, requiring a radical shift in people’s allegiance to symbols of authority” (pp. 57-58). The period following World War II is one in which
Americans were adapting to their role as a superpower while coming to terms with the implications of the United States’ use of nuclear weapons at the end of the war. As Engelhardt (2007) puts it, the atomic bomb “threatened to undermine the [American] war story in its moment of glory” (p. 57). The bomb figured prominently in post-war popular culture, with nuclear-secret-stealing villains appearing in movies and novels such as Disney’s *The Shaggy Dog* (1959) and the James Bond novel and film *Thunderball* (1961 and 1965 respectively), and atomic bomb tests and simulated attacks being broadcast on television as early as 1952. Additionally, two close allies during the war, China and the Soviet Union, rapidly became enemies following the war. News of Soviet atomic tests, the Communist victory in China in 1949, and uncertainties about the situation in Korea “released new, potentially unbound fears into society,” according to Engelhardt (p. 59). This continued to affect the understanding of Pearl Harbor into the late 1950s. On the fifteenth anniversary of the attack, a *New York Times* editorial (Another December 7, 1956) notes that “we could not possibly have foreseen the variety of changes” that followed the attack and the war (p. 26). The article goes on to say that

There will not be another ‘day of infamy’ if we can help it. But the problems are not yet solved, either in respect to Japan or elsewhere. There is still need to remember, and to add, by our remembrance, to our resolution (p. 26).

Such fears contributed to Americans’ cultural confusion, helping to open the door to counter-narratives which viewed Pearl Harbor through Burke’s grotesque frame.

The beginning of the Cold War was a time at which the United States was transitioning to their new role as a global superpower. There were also shifts in cultural
values and the beginning of a generational clash that would last for two decades. According to Burke (1984), the cultural confusion caused by such changes may “[give] more prominence to the subjective elements of imagery than to the objective, or public, elements” (pp. 59-60), meaning that there is a greater potential for effective rhetorical approaches to history during transitional periods such as that following World War II. Of course, all histories are rhetorical. They are all told from a particular point of view, emphasizing and interpreting certain facts in strategic ways. However, it is during times of cultural confusion that certain versions of history, such as those employing a grotesque frame, become more appealing than they may in other cultural contexts. The grotesque frame may be used in instances where a potential cause of cultural confusion, an agent of change, is depicted as the instigator of confusion. In this way, the grotesque is a primarily conservative frame, representing change as incongruous with the audience’s cultural identity. Fitting with this understanding of the grotesque, Mintz (1985) claims that World War II revisionists, whose frame I am describing as grotesque, “generally subscribed to a right-wing philosophy or at least made certain accommodations to the ideology of American conservatism” (p. 41). In the case of Pearl Harbor counter-narratives, President Roosevelt, viewed by Conservatives as implementing dangerous (if not traitorous) economic policies and frequently circumventing the power of Congress, played the role of agent of change and shouldered most of the blame for the attack. In these alternative representations, confusion over cultural identity may have intersected with confusion over what and who initiated American involvement in the war. Revisionist depictions of Pearl Harbor provided a version of history that attempted to
simplify that confusion by using scapegoating to explain the causes of the attack and, by extension, the cultural upheaval that followed.

The roots of the Pearl Harbor revisionist movement began years before the attack as the depression provided fuel for those interested in isolationism. In an article published in Scribner's in 1935, Beard suggested that the American government would steer the nation toward war as a cure for economic hardship, saying that American “traditions and practices” tell us that “a wider spread of economic calamity will culminate in a foreign war rather than in a drastic reorientation of domestic economy” (as quoted in Mintz, 1985, p. 9). Isolationists, such as Beard, were very vocal and, therefore, supposedly “responsible” for much of the disunity prior to the war. The publication of the Army, Navy, and Congressional reports provided what they saw as evidence to support their claims, reinvigorating their search for the “truth.” The post-war framing of the Pearl Harbor story in the popular media, one that highlighted the incompetence of Washington and gave the impression that important information was being left out of reports, allowed these counter-narratives to gain some traction with large audiences. Some tenets of the revisionists’ claims, such as President Roosevelt’s plan to use war to end the Depression, still receive attention today despite having been disproven (Roberts, 2008).

Quoting pieces of the Army report, Reston (1945) notes that anti-war propaganda prior to Pearl Harbor “raised grave doubts in minds of [military and government leaders] as to whether they would be supported by the people in the necessary actions for our defense by requisite moves against Japan” (p. 7). The portions of the report Reston references do not appear in the AP summaries, but rather in an article listed as “Special to the New York
Times.” Therefore, most Americans, not having read the complete report, might not have been aware of the Army’s evaluation of the potential political motivations of the Roosevelt Administration. The Dissenting Report from the Joint Committee (1946) acknowledges that the testimony given during the hearings was incomplete, largely because President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox had died prior to the investigation. It also decries the hasty and inconsistent nature of the Roberts Commission of 1942, cited as a source throughout the report’s majority opinion. The minority opinion described the incompleteness of the Joint Committee’s investigation, saying “The failure to observe these obvious necessities is almost as tragic to the cause of truth as the attack on Pearl Harbor itself was a tragedy for the nation” (p. 497). Such omissions from the reports of the military, government, and the largest news service in the nation might have drawn the attention of revisionists looking to expose “secret” information.

Two major members of the early revisionist history movement concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor, Charles Beard and Harry Elmer Barnes, attended the Joint Committee hearings. Encouraged by the “new” information available in those hearings, and in the release of the Army and Navy reports, they, along with other conservatives such as the Chicago Tribune’s George Morgenstern, began publishing books, articles, and pamphlets that refuted the “official” claims of the Joint Committee Report. While there had been some earlier work questioning the role of the Roosevelt Administration in allowing the attack, the years immediately following the war and the release of the results of the investigations saw a number of counter-narratives written not just by historians or journalists, but also by individuals who had been a part of the attack, including former Admiral Robert Theobald and
Admiral Husband Kimmel, Naval commander in Hawaii at the time of the attack (Mintz, 1985). Accounts by such figures may have been particularly salient for audiences since the apparent “authenticity” of the experience lent the narratives a level of credibility that might have been seen as lacking in the contentious Joint Committee Report and the potentially incomplete Army Report. In fact, some members of the Joint Committee, the minority report of which was viewed by some as a move toward revisionism (Mintz, 1985), complained during the hearings that the testimony of Army and Navy representatives was “hearsay” since they had not been at Pearl Harbor (White, 1945b). While Kimmel and Short later took the stand, complaints about not being able to question key figures (notably the deceased or ill Roosevelt, Knox, and Stimson) figured prominently in the minority opinion published in the report.

The first substantive revisionist history of Pearl Harbor was published in 1947. George Morgenstern, a journalist for the conservative *Chicago Tribune*, describes Pearl Harbor as “a national embarrassment” because war guilt should be placed entirely upon the defeated party and any non-partisan examination of the facts would reveal that the United States government, particularly President Roosevelt, needed to accept some of that guilt (Morgenstern, 1947). Morgenstern adopted a conspiratorial perspective, claiming that the Roosevelt administration had intentionally created the circumstances necessary for the Japanese actions and had knowingly deprived the Hawaiian commanders of the information necessary to thwart the attack. And, since Roosevelt was the Commander-in-Chief of the military, he was also responsible for the actions of those whom he appointed to military positions, especially Secretaries Hull and Knox and General Marshall. Morgenstern reaches
this conclusion based on “the terms of the Constitution and the laws relative to the chief executive” (p. 321). His use of the constitution to support his claims of Roosevelt’s intentions reflects what Mintz (1985) describes as “the conservative mood of revisionist historiography” during World War II (p. 41). Morgenstern argues that Roosevelt and “the men whose intentions coincided with his” were motivated by the “failure of the administration’s domestic policy” and a “desire for glory and enhanced status” (p. 327). He describes the Roosevelt administration as “[failing] with calculation” to avoid war (p. 329).

Other early revisionists, including historian Harry Elmer Barnes (1972, originally published in 1968) and retired Admirals Theobald (1954) and Kimmel (1955), adopted Morgenstern’s perspective. Theobald asserts that his “sole purpose … is a searching for the truth” and hopes “that the absence of any ulterior motive is apparent throughout” (p. xiv). As mentioned above, an essential piece of his and other revisionists’ argument is an assumption of Roosevelt’s understanding of intelligence gathered before Pearl Harbor and his political motivations in manipulating the use of that intelligence. As Theobald puts it, “the only possible conclusion” is that Roosevelt “did not want [the Hawaiian commanders] to be informed that the war was only hours away” (p. 29). That is not, of course, the only possible conclusion. Theobald’s evidence is taken primarily from the Congressional hearings from which the Joint Committee reached the conclusion that military officials, not Roosevelt, were to blame for the defeat at Pearl Harbor.

Morgenstern (1947) argues that information revealed in the Army and Navy reports exonerates the commanders in Hawaii due to the failure of high-ranking officials, both civil and military, to fully inform them of the situation. Additionally, he ascribes any
responsibility for their actions to the President as Commander-in-Chief of the military. Following Morgenstern’s argument, Theobald (1954) claims that “As the President was in complete control of the whole situation, the Army and Navy in Washington were merely obeying orders, and the Hawaiian Commanders were the victims of those orders.” Therefore, further consideration of any conclusions blaming military personnel (such as those reached by the Joint Committee) would “serve no purpose” (p. 189). His alternative conclusion, shared by other revisionists of the period, is that Roosevelt “forced Japan to war by unrelenting diplomatic-economic pressure, and enticed that country to initiate hostilities with a surprise attack by holding the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii as an invitation to that attack” (p. 192).

Admiral Kimmel (1955) wrote what was probably the most popularly consumed revisionist narrative of the period. As the subject of Pearl Harbor investigations and an essential part of any telling of the story, Kimmel’s name would have been very familiar to audiences in the early 1950s. And, in an uncertain period in which the “truth” of the attack was very much a matter of debate, a story from an individual who was not only present during the attacks but intimately connected to the circumstances would have been appealing. His book, Admiral Kimmel’s Story, was a popular success, appearing on a number of national best-seller lists (Regnery, 1979). Echoing a line of argument that would have already been familiar to revisionists, Kimmel begins his account of the attack by quoting the Constitution: “The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States” (p. 1). He goes on to say that “who or what” prevented Kimmel from receiving important information, including a missing warning message from Secretary Knox on December 6,
“has never been determined but certainly it must have been the result of action by someone in high authority” (p. 3). These two statements form an enthymeme suggesting Roosevelt’s responsibility for the attack – Roosevelt was of the highest authority and someone in high authority must have acted to keep important information from Kimmel. Therefore, it is likely that Roosevelt is responsible for keeping important information a secret.

Roosevelt’s intentional hiding of information from those who could have thwarted the Japanese attack became the primary claim of most counter-narratives. Harry Elmer Barnes (1972) repeats the revisionists’ main tenet in an article published in Left and Right, a libertarian journal, in 1968 and reprinted in book form four years later, saying that it “has become obvious that while Roosevelt was assuring this country of his peaceful aims he was also actually doing all possible … to get us into war as soon as practicable” (p. 15). Barnes adds to this claim, however, by expanding upon an implication present in the reports on the Joint Committee hearings. The AP reported during the hearings that the Japanese diplomatic envoy had been working with Roosevelt’s aides behind the scenes in order to facilitate peace negotiations (Hidden peace talks, 1945). Other testimony had revealed that when the Japanese fleet had departed for the attack on November 26 it was with the understanding that the attack might still be called off (White, 1945a). Barnes (1972) claims that the American government was able to easily intercept and decode Japanese messages because “reading [them] would make it all the more clear to the American officials that Japanese peace efforts were sincere and that the Japanese would go to war if the peace negotiations should fail” (p. 14).
The claims described above, central to counter-narratives of Pearl Harbor in the middle part of the twentieth century, contribute to the grotesque frame prominent in the period. Burke (1984) says that the grotesque involves incongruity – a disjunction between what is real and what one believes. Dominant versions of the Pearl Harbor story had described the attack as a complete surprise, planned by “the war lords of Japan” and their “dreams of empire” (Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 1946, p. 41). Using claims of revealing “the final secret” and debunking the “legends and rhetoric” of Pearl Harbor, the revisionists demonstrated for their audience that what they had come to believe about December 7, 1941, was false. The Japanese had been the ones fighting for peace while Roosevelt was manipulating the military he controlled into a position of great risk. This new interpretation is incongruous with the epic frame that emerged during the war and was reinforced (despite the specific content of the evidence) by the Joint Committee. The grotesque framing of the counter-narratives would also figure into American collective memory of Pearl Harbor as some of the more prominent among them would be widely circulated, becoming a major part of the Pearl Harbor media ecology.

Due to the public nature of his career and loss of command, Admiral Kimmel’s book appeared on a number of bestseller lists and he and his family would continue a public effort to restore his rank of four-star admiral, making many public appearances, including television appearances throughout the 1950s and 1960s. George Morgenstern, author of the first major revisionist history of Pearl Harbor, was a popular journalist for the Chicago Tribune, winning numerous awards for his work on Pearl Harbor and editing a 25th

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2 The campaign to restore Kimmel’s rank was revived in the 1990s. Although Congress voted to exonerate him in 1995, his rank has not been restored.
anniversary edition of the Tribune in 1966 which included a number of revisionist themes. In other words, the counter-narratives were prominent representations of Pearl Harbor that entered into the consciousness of many Americans through multiple media, including newspapers, books, and television. Because of their prominence, they could not be completely ignored by those who had adopted an epic frame.

Dealing with the prominence of the counter-narratives and the introduction of new information from the investigations caused problems for the viability of the epic frame. Burke (1984) tells us that new information that does not fit within a frame endangers the frame. So, the incongruity of the realization that the roles of Roosevelt and the Japanese might have been reversed limits the plausibility of the epic version of events. The casuistic stretching required for the epic frame to account for the new information creates what Burke calls a perspective by incongruity – gauging a situation by applying one way of understanding to another. In the case of the epic and grotesque framings of Pearl Harbor, those viewing the attack through the epic frame must somehow find a way to apply that understanding to the information that is more conducive to a grotesque understanding. This does not necessarily mean, however, that audiences would be put off by or reject the epic frame. A perspective by incongruity is not “demoralizing” because “it is done by the ‘transcendence’ of a new start. It is not negative smuggling, but positive cards-face-up-on-the-table. It is designed to ‘remoralize’ by accurately naming a situation already demoralized by inaccuracy” (p. 309). So, the grotesque frame could potentially encourage those who felt that the dominant frame was an incomplete version of the story and that the public was not aware of the entire truth. This would be particularly relevant for an author such as Admiral
Kimmel who, relieved of his duty, stripped of his rank, and forced into early retirement, could maintain a sense of pride and justice. As for members of the audience, those disturbed by the political, economic and cultural upheavals of the period could be comforted by the simplicity of an intentional conspiracy to initiate active American involvement in the war that created their cultural confusion.

The influence of the grotesque frame on American attitudes toward Pearl Harbor can be found in part by considering the role that the implications of Roosevelt’s supposed guilt played in the political arena of the late 1940s. The controversy was related to a larger dispute concerning “the big-government legacy of the New Deal” and was used as ammunition throughout the presidential campaign in 1948 (Rosenberg, 2003, p. 40). Journalist John T. Flynn, continuing the revisionist tradition of Morgenstern’s Chicago Tribune, sold four million copies of a book criticizing Roosevelt, illustrating the popular appeal of the revisionists. Different ways of framing Pearl Harbor – the grotesque and the epic – became a partisan dividing line and the counter-narratives served as rhetorical ammunition for conservatives. The popular effects can be found in the responses to a New York Times Sunday magazine article by journalist Cabell Phillips (1951) summarizing the Congressional majority opinion and adopting the epic frame. A letter responding to the summary disagreed with that framing, saying that it was “proper to mention a few other facts known by our leaders in Washington at that time,” including their supposed knowledge of an impending attack. The letter goes on to say that the “fact our leaders couldn’t read the handwriting on the wall was an unbelievable failure.” While the letter does not go so far as to say Roosevelt intentionally allowed the attack to occur, it does claim that his interests might “explain much
of the lethargy of our Washington leaders” (Davidson, 1951, p. 181). The grotesque frame of the counter-narratives had an influence upon popular attitudes toward Pearl Harbor, but they were also reflective of a broader trend in the media that we might think of as a turn to the grotesque. Tom Engelhardt (2007) describes the 1950s and 1960s as an “era of reversals,” particularly in the arena of the war film. He argues that movies such as The Green Berets, which employed an epic frame to view World War II, were thought of as “throwbacks to another era” (p. 235). Instead, according to Engelhardt, during the middle part of the twentieth century, likely inspired by the atrocities of Korea and Vietnam, “the war movie crept closer to horror” in which “the Americans … were the rapists, maniacs, and cold-blooded killers” (p. 236).

In summary, the reports released in the summers of 1945 and 1946, and the press coverage of those reports, were precursors to the revisionist histories published over the next twenty years. The reports and the narratives that followed problematized the story of Pearl Harbor that had, to that point, dominated American understanding of what had happened. The conspiratorial version of the Pearl Harbor story emphasized and expanded upon the grotesque framing of events. Therefore, more mainstream depictions, competing with the revisionists’ grotesque frame, needed to rebuild the epic frame in order to either avoid or counteract the issues explored in alternative tellings of the attack. To do this, those who viewed and told stories of Pearl Harbor from within the epic frame, most notably government organizations and major media outlets, tended to emphasize the authenticity of their depictions by focusing on the stories of individuals who had participated in the events at Pearl Harbor while, at the same time, largely avoiding questions of responsibility by
divorcing the attack from history and relating only the portions of the story that happened on December 7, 1941. In short, the epic frame was in need of repair in order to support the hegemonic understanding of American infallibility and righteousness professed in Roosevelt’s address to Congress and throughout World War II.

Rebuilding the Epic Frame

Not all those who read the Army, Navy, and Joint Committee reports evaluated the information to be evidence of a conspiracy or even Roosevelt’s guilt. In fact, most mainstream responses to the reports fit more closely with the initial framing of the event – an acknowledgement of American mistakes, but an emphasis upon the American response. For example, the New York Times published an editorial following the release of the reports reminding readers of the American victory (The Pearl Harbor reports, 1945), and another on the tenth anniversary of the attack framing Pearl Harbor as an opportunity to realize American greatness. Six years after the war had ended, the attack on Pearl Harbor was not being presented as a defeat or a “disaster” as in the Joint Committee report, but instead as the time at which “the American people woke up” (Decade of fame and infamy, 1951, p. 25), meaning that, according prominent epic accounts, the American people recognized their previous complacency and began to realize their destiny to become and assume the responsibility of a global superpower and force for good. Just as the Joint Committee report had claimed it was important to investigate the attacks so that the mistakes would not be repeated, those thinking about the attack in the context of the conflict in Korea and the Cold War insisted that we could not forget Pearl Harbor or relegate it to the past because the world in 1951 was not any more stable than it was in 1941. As the 1951 editorial put it, “As we
commemorate the dead of Pearl Harbor we may hope and pray that no such commemorations of a new Pearl Harbor will be exacted of our descendants or ourselves grown older” (p. 25).

Pearl Harbor was not just the moment at which Americans woke up to their mistakes or the dangerous state of the world, however. They also awoke to the fact that “freedom must be bought and kept at a great price” and that “It was no longer possible, and has not since been possible, for us to deny our historic mission in modern history” (Decade of fame and infamy, 1951, p. 25). This realization was an important piece of the explanation for continuing the war in Korea. Descriptions of a Pearl Harbor commemorative event appeared on the same day as news about peace negotiations in Korea. The juxtaposition of the news would likely have associated the events with one another in people’s minds. And, in case the importance of Pearl Harbor in thinking about Korea was missed, Donald Wilson, Commander of the American Legion, said in a statement released in conjunction with the organization’s commemoration of Pearl Harbor that the proposed peace settlement was “a defeat for America,” and called on Americans to “seek a clear-cut ‘victory’ in Korea with the same ‘irresistible determination’ shown after the Japanese attack on Hawaii” (Korea terms assailed, 1951, p. 4). According to Wilson, we could not allow fear of a war to “[cause] us to lose our sense of responsibility to maintain our courageous history” (p. 4). That history is what Engelhardt (2007) calls the American war story: This epic version of American history “was an inclusive saga of expanding liberties and rights.” War anchors that saga in American consciousness by “expanding the boundaries of that space within which freedom might ‘ring.’” (p. 4).

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3 This was simply the beginning of peace negotiations. The war continued until the final agreement was signed in 1953.
This theme was emphasized in coverage of the American occupation of Japan following World War II. Using the tenth anniversary of Pearl Harbor as an exigence, *Time* magazine reported on the status of “the most benevolent occupation in history” (Martin, 1951, p. 38). Illustrating Engelhardt’s (2007) claim that in the American war story any inequities were excusable in that they existed only to be wiped away, Martin claims that the Americans occupying Japan had “little to apologize for” despite the large economic inequalities between the Americans and Japanese in Japan (Martin, 1951, p. 38). Instead, Americans needed to follow the Japanese lead in moving past the war and recognize the nations’ mutual interest “in the face of a common enemy [Russia]” (p. 40).

Recognizing the anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor in this way has two important rhetorical side effects. First, it reinforces the epic frame by focusing on the eventual American victory and the United States’ role as deliverers of freedom to the world. In the Cold War context of the early 1950s, this meant the defeat of Communism. Second, by insisting we remember Pearl Harbor in terms of contemporary concerns (i.e., as a defeat to be avoided in Korea), these discussions eliminate the need for debate over why the attack occurred or why it was so devastating. In other words, by divorcing Pearl Harbor from its history, an epic approach to the attack avoids the topics of primary concern to the revisionists. In the epic frame, there is no room for the grotesque. This is a form of casuistic stretching, in which a frame is adjusted to maintain previous interpretations of events in spite of the presence of new information. This is not to say that the grotesque frame became irrelevant or disappeared, only that those viewing Pearl Harbor through an epic frame largely ignored the portion of the story that had become complicated by the investigations and
revisionists in order to maintain their perspective and encourage attitudes that supported governmental and military hegemony.

Representations of the attack itself (e.g., descriptions of the Japanese planes dropping bombs in Pearl Harbor as opposed to more generalized discussions of American victory in the war) must also perform this stretching in order to maintain the epic frame. To do so, stories of Pearl Harbor during this period tended to focus on Army regulars (i.e., common soldiers or sailors) rather than commanding officers. Of course, when avoiding the incongruous facts highlighted within the grotesque frame, they can become conspicuous in their absence. Therefore, the few references to officers or government officials tend to acknowledge the counter-narrative versions of those individuals while simultaneously focusing on their actions during and after the attack rather than their policies and actions prior to it.

Another way that the epic frame was adjusted to deal with counter-narratives was to adopt the revisionists’ insistence on authentic accounts of what happened. Early in the Joint Committee hearings, some Congressmen complained that those who had testified for the Army and Navy had not actually been present at the attack and were, therefore, merely “hearsay witnesses.” Perhaps in an attempt to avoid such charges, nearly all accounts of the attack over the following two decades proclaimed that they had either been informed or authored by an “eyewitness.” Even fictional depictions of the attack, such as that in the novel and film versions of From Here to Eternity made such a claim.

From Here to Eternity appeared in novel form in 1951, spending 60 weeks on the New York Times Bestsellers List, including 20 weeks at number one. The story was adapted
for film in 1953, winning the Academy Award for Best Picture in 1954. The novel was written by James Jones (1951), an enlisted member of the Army during World War II who was stationed in Schofield Barracks near Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack (Prescott, 1951). Jones makes sure to mention, in a “Special Note” at the beginning of the novel, that he had first-hand knowledge of and experience with certain situations, most notably prisoner abuse in the Army stockade. Reviews describe Jones’s depiction of Army life in 1941 as “thorough and authoritative,” although that evaluation is limited to Jones’s portrayal of enlisted men and not the officers (Macauley, 1951, p. 528). As one reviewer put it, Jones “invariably” presented officers as “tyrants … or frauds” (Flint, 1952, p. 168). Lending an even greater level of authority to the novel, Jones includes a number of references to non-fiction elements and maintains accuracy. For example, in one section, a character is described as reading a particular issue of The Saturday Evening Post with Jones’s description of the magazine matching the issue published on the date mentioned. The film version of the story (Zinneman, 1953) likewise attempts to give the audience a sense of authenticity, utilizing footage purportedly from the attack interspersed with scenes of the characters preparing for and engaging in battle. In addition, much of the movie was filmed in Hawaii, including at Schofield Barracks. Audiences familiar with Pearl Harbor were likely to have at least recognized the buildings and perhaps would have recalled images seen following the attack (see Figure 4.1). Such small details help to create a story in which the audience can recognize that although the specific narrative is fictional, the setting and situation are true to historical events.
In both versions of *From Here to Eternity*, Private Robert E. Lee Prewitt deals with mental and physical abuse from his superiors (primarily his direct superior, Captain Holmes) throughout most of 1941 while stationed at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The situation frustrates Prewitt to such a level that he acts irrationally in a bar fight and murders an officer. Following the murder, Prewitt goes AWOL until he learns of the attack, at which point he attempts to rejoin his unit on the beach and is killed by the guards on duty. While reviewers may have found Jones’s portrayal of officers lacking in accuracy, such a portrayal acts as Jones’s acknowledgement of the aspects of the story that fit within the grotesque frame. In one scene, repeated in the film version of the novel and reminiscent of a story released as part of the Army report, soldiers are refused entry into ammunition sheds because of orders from commanding officers. Stories like this illustrate the incompetence described in the post-war reports on the attack and assumed in the counter-narratives although in those versions of the story, the incompetence was intentional. Furthering the suggestion of incompetence, one character, an enlisted soldier, decries the attitude of the officers more interested in
themselves than in the Army, saying that a “man like [Captain Holmes] is a goddam disgrace to the goddam uniform he sports around” (p. 159). He goes on to wonder “what Holmes would do if he ever realized his own uselessness and the finicking he hid it with” (p. 169). Throughout the story, the officers are depicted as more concerned with their own interests and potential political gain than they are with the daily operations of the Army. Such characteristics are in stark contrast to the attitudes of the enlisted men. This suggests that the epic frame, in response to the counter-narratives, shifted perspective to support a more ordinary warlike hero. An “everyman” more immediately associable with the everyday citizen expected to identify with him in the version of the epic frame employed during the war (see chapter 3). It also shifts the focus of unity as it had been established in earlier versions of the story. Particularly in the enlisted men versus officers dichotomy present in *From Here to Eternity*, but also evident in the revisionist claims against a government hiding the truth about Pearl Harbor, there is a call for unity of the everyday citizen against authority and tyranny. Interestingly, that includes unity against all tyranny, as evidenced by Prewitt’s excitement to become involved in the war to defeat the Germans and Japanese.

In the epic framing of Pearl Harbor, enlisted men are much as the American people were characterized in earlier presentations of Pearl Harbor discussed in chapter three. In both versions, the men display an unwavering dedication to the Army and their country, despite their distrust of authority. Prewitt is willing to give up things and people he loves because he is dedicated to the army, telling a girlfriend he is not able to see her anymore and has to leave because “there’s a war comin’ in this country. I want to be in on it. … Because I am a soljer [sic]” (Jones, 1951, p. 93). Similarly, following his time having gone AWOL, Prewitt insists
that he must go back to the Army to fight, even if it meant punishment because he was a soldier and always would be. In the film, one of Prewitt’s superiors claims that Prewitt “loved the Army more than any soldier [he] ever knew.” In *From Here to Eternity*, audiences are told that, above all, we must remain loyal to the Army/country, even if mistakes have been made or we have been mistreated. And, importantly, the enlisted men, like all Americans during the war, remained loyal and fought hard. This is a key part of the story’s support of the epic frame. Despite the division between the everyday citizen and authority or the government, we must ultimately set such differences aside for national unity in order to maintain our position as a global force for freedom and democracy.

By telling the story from Prewitt’s perspective, Jones and Zinneman, director of the film version, are able re-establish the element of the epic frame in which “courage and individual sacrifice” enable “the humble man to share the worth of the hero” (Burke, 1984, pp. 35-36). As the character the audience is meant to identify with, Prewitt embodies the flawed heroism of the United States as it had been presented in the initial framing of the Pearl Harbor story. In the initial complex frame, the United States military played the role of the tragic hero. In the post-war frame, that role was stripped down to its most basic part, the enlisted soldier. And during the post-war years, the rhetorical function of that role changed slightly. Rather than calling for Americans to band together and fight, those employing this later epic version of the story, primarily those attempting to protect and promote the “official” Pearl Harbor narrative of American innocence and righteous victory, need to counteract alternative narratives and overcome the damage done by the accusations of conspiracy and ethical questions over the use of the atomic bomb. A radio announcement...
following the description of the attack in *From Here to Eternity* proclaims “the manliness with which [the soldiers endured] their sufferings” is something that “every American” should see. In fact, the way that they fought and endured “richened and deepened [the announcer’s] faith” in the American government (Jones, 1951, pp. 766-767). It is not necessarily that the government is always good or right. It is good enough to produce individuals who are. It is that adjustment that is at the center of the change in the epic framing of Pearl Harbor: although evidence had demonstrated that the American government may not always be benign in its intentions, the quality of the soldiers (and citizens) it produces is enough to make up for potential shortcomings. Those “everymen” justify overlooking the faults that may have brought the attack on in the first place.

During the novel’s description of the battle, no commissioned officers are mentioned – the enlisted men are left to organize and fight for themselves. This is similar to the way Kimmel (1955) claims to have been treated by his commanding officers, saying that “abuse and maltreatment” had been “heaped upon” him “by what appeared to be an organized effort” (p. 2). By beginning his story in this way, Kimmel seems to suggest that his narrative is a response to the way he was treated. Similarly, Jones dedicates his novel, full of depictions of “abuse and maltreatment,” to the Army, also implying that the story was a response to and an indictment of that institution. The primary difference, however, is the way Pearl Harbor is framed: while Kimmel employed the grotesque frame and highlighted the apparent conspiracy leading to the attack, Jones chose to employ the epic frame and focus upon the quality of the everyday soldiers and their valiant response to the attack.
Around the same time *From Here to Eternity* was translated from print to film, television networks began to negotiate programming deals with the film industry, showing old movies and programs developed by Hollywood studios. ABC negotiated deals with Walt Disney and Warner Brothers in 1954 and the film industry as a whole shortly began selling movies to television as a way to use the medium to support an industry that had been damaged by television’s popularity (Briggs & Burke, 2009; Gorman & McLean, 2009). Importantly, this influence from the film industry, in the midst of the hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), would have brought to television a caution in which producers and programmers were unwilling to broadcast content that was critical of the American government. Therefore, the counter-narratives, with their conspiratorial overtones, would not have received much airplay. This is in some ways contrary to the anti-Roosevelt bent of the revisionists. Since the counter-narratives came mostly from a conservative ideology, they would seem to fit within the logic of the Red Scare. Instead, they were classified as not merely anti-Roosevelt, but anti-American. By contradicting the epic frame, these versions of the Pearl Harbor story inherently contested the American war story and sense of righteous destiny. In other words, the grotesque frame questioned more than just Pearl Harbor – it cast doubt upon the basic assumptions of the whole of American history. Because stories that contradicted the epic frame were viewed as anti-American, and presumed anti-American messages were dangerous for media outlets during the Red Scare, stories that reinforced the epic nature of the American war effort would have taken center stage in mainstream media, including television, during the 1950s.
With films from the 1940s being broadcast into a majority of American homes, then, it is very likely that Americans’ attitudes toward Pearl Harbor were influenced not only by narratives of the attack, but also by other representations of the war in the Pacific and the Japanese. Films such as *Wake Island* (Farrow, 1942) and *Bataan* (Garnett, 1943) portray the Japanese in ways that reinforce the stereotype developed during the war. These depictions of the Japanese would have mingled with thoughts of those responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor. It makes it difficult to adopt the revisionist tendency to fault the government for purposefully engaging the enemy when that enemy was as ruthless as the Japanese. Even if they weren’t being shown as monsters, the connections might have been unavoidable. For example, *From Here to Eternity* and the nonfiction book *Day of Infamy* (Lord, 1957) both describe a Japanese pilot at Pearl Harbor waving to individuals below as he flew by. Reading such accounts may have conjured up images of the Japanese from other contexts (See Figure 4.2).

But movies were not the only television content that played a role in the reconstruction of what happened at Pearl Harbor. In 1952 and 1953, NBC aired the World War
II documentary series *Victory at Sea*, a program that it had produced “in cooperation with the United States Navy” (Adams, 1952). The declaration of cooperation aired during the opening credit sequence of every episode of the program, although there is no specification of what that cooperation entailed. Presumably, the Navy provided documentary footage filmed during the war and captured from Japan and Germany in exchange for NBC producing the documentary in such a manner as to present the Navy in as flattering a light as possible. This created a production environment conducive to the reinforcement of the epic frame, a relationship that was beneficial for both parties.

The second episode of the series, “The Pacific Boils Over,” detailed the attack on Pearl Harbor and was broadcast on November 2, 1952 (Adams, 1952). In this episode, the Japanese are distinctly “othered,” their culture described as distinctly different from that of Americans. And, embedded within that difference, was a threat: “The world has learned to recognize aggression. Japan is marching. Techniques she has learned so well from the West but harnessed into ideas cultivated in the East.” Those ideas, according to the episode, involve the code of the warrior and Japan’s desire to bring the entire world together under a single “roof.” Like the description of the Japanese in the Joint Committee report, this understanding of the attackers does not leave room for understanding their motives or for allowing some of the blame to be given to the Americans. Instead, the Americans become innocent victims of those “ideas cultivated in the East.” The episode’s depiction of the battle itself contributes to this understanding of the Americans. No background of individuals is given; the soldiers and sailors seen running, fighting, and dying are given no names. This continues near the end of the episode in which graves for a number “unidentified” dead are
shown. Since the dead are stripped of their identities, they could easily be any American. It thus becomes easier for the audience to place themselves into the story, just as the narrator in Ford’s *December 7th* (see chapter 3) said that the victims of Pearl Harbor were all the same because they were all Americans. Over images of the graves, the narrator in *Victory at Sea* says, “With the dead lies the vision of a shattered fleet, hidden in a pall of fire and smoke and the vengeance of the United States.” The message is clear: the United States fought (and won) to avenge the actions of the Japanese.

*Victory at Sea* is particularly notable for its collection and use of Naval documentary footage. The use of images taken during the battle provided the series, including the episode on Pearl Harbor, with a claim to authority that most accounts of the time could not have, even if they had been written by individuals present at the attack. However, in the case of Pearl Harbor, there is actually very little footage taken during the attack itself. There are only a few seconds of film of the burning USS *Arizona* taken by an amateur photographer. Most other film from that day was taken after the attack as a survey of the damage. As a result, *Victory at Sea*’s documentary of the attack must rely on captured images of Japanese planes taking off along with stock footage and re-creations. The producers also utilized clips from Ford’s *December 7th* to depict American servicemen at the time of the attack. This blurs the line between reality and fiction and makes it difficult for audiences to distinguish between what can be seen about the attack on Pearl Harbor and what was fabricated after the fact.

In many cases, images that were already familiar to audiences were either reproduced or recreated. This repetition provides a sense of continuity and grounding in history. One way that audiences evaluate the credibility of a depiction of the past is determining “how well a
given source [holds] up against their other knowledge” (Rosenzweig & Thelen, 1998, p. 92). Therefore, an image that is familiar to the audience may be thought of as more “authentic” than one which has been newly created, even if it has no more grounding in reality. Because of this, it is easier to reinforce existing attitudes through the repetition of a particular way of framing the past than it is to encourage the acceptance of an entirely new frame. We can find one instance of this in the battle scenes of Victory at Sea. As discussed in chapter 3, an image of the Arizona, burning and beginning to tilt, had been lifted from the limited footage available from the attack and became iconic of the attack during the war, appearing in War Bond advertisements and propaganda posters. Although the narration of “The Pacific Boils Over” does not specifically mention the attack on the Arizona (there is actually no narration during the attack, the images are left to speak for themselves) and the original footage is not used, the episode’s recreation of the bombing of the Arizona is very similar to the famous photograph (See Figure 4.3). So, while the image shown to Victory at Sea’s audience was not the exact image of the Arizona that they were likely to recall, it was similar enough that it could still serve a similar purpose – to evoke the emotions of the attack and remind audiences of sailors trapped within, destined to perish in the ship.

![Figure 4.3: Two versions of the Arizona. Left - Iconic image of the burning USS Arizona. Right - image of an explosion on an unnamed ship in "The Pacific Boils Over" (Adams, 1952).](image-url)
The accounts and images from film and television interacted with one another and are also likely to have been recalled when audiences encountered Walter Lord’s detailed account of the events of December 7, 1941. *Day of Infamy* first appeared as part of *Life* magazine’s observance of the fifteenth anniversary of the attacks. Lord’s account appeared in abbreviated, serial form over three issues in December, 1956. The presentation of *Day of Infamy* in the magazine as well as in book form the following year means that it reached an audience that may have been larger than any other single representation of Pearl Harbor to that point. *Life* magazine was the most popular periodical of the time, and presenting the story in serial format made it very accessible to a large number of readers. When the book was released in the spring of 1957, the audience expanded even further. The book version was a Book-of-the-Month-Club selection and spent 17 weeks on the *New York Times* Bestsellers List, three of them at number one (Hawes Publications, 2011). With such a large audience, *Day of Infamy* is likely to have played a relatively major role in defining collective memory of Pearl Harbor during this period. Because it was a remarkably visible portrayal of the attack, it is likely to have influenced future depictions, including the 1970 film *Tora!*

*Tora! Tora!* As discussed earlier, collective memory is textured – constructed by the continual overlaying of information and remembrances. *Day of Infamy*, with its broad audience and popular appeal, is a particularly thick layer of the collective memory of Pearl Harbor.

The first page of the first serial installment showed a suspicious-looking Japanese soldier walking over a hill with smoking battleships in the water behind him (Lord, 1956, see Figure 4.4). The caption indicates that he is not at Pearl Harbor, but rather a rendezvous point.
prior to the attack and the smoke is apparently fog, but the suggestion of burning ships is unmistakable, as is the soldier’s similarity to the depictions of the Japanese noted above.

Carrying on the now-common tradition of proclaiming the account’s authenticity, the serialized version of *Day of Infamy* is described as “the untold story of Pearl Harbor,” implying, like the revisionist accounts, that there is a version of the story that no one else knew (until it was printed in *Life*, of course). Additionally, as discussed above, since there had been so much reporting on the Army, Navy, and Congressional investigations, there is a subtle implication that those official reports either were not complete or were hiding some additional information. Likewise, the book version describes itself as “the whole story of what *really happened* that day at Pearl Harbor” (Lord, 1957, inside front cover, emphasis added) and includes a blurb from James Michener’s review proclaiming that the book “Stuns the reader with the weight of reality” (back cover). The introduction to the serialized version specifies that it involves “personal recollections” from interviews with “hundreds of survivors, American and Japanese, high and low” (Lord, 1956, p. 164). Here we have the implication of authenticity along with the emphasis on enlisted men as was emphasized in

![Figure 4.4: Suspicious Japanese man from Day of Infamy, Part 1 (Lord, 1956, p. 164).](image-url)
From Here to Eternity. Indeed, in the book version, Lord includes a nine-page list of the names and “vantage points” of the individuals contributing to his account (Lord, 1957, p. 226). Stories of these “ordinary” soldiers help to reassure the audience that not everyone failed in their duties; that the soldiers on the ground also played a role and it is their voices that we need to hear, but have not yet been told. In other words, the stories of the regular soldiers serve a redeeming rhetorical function for the military broadly, which had recently been presented as having failed the nation at the time of the attack.

Lord (1957) also avoids any discussion of potential American blame by ignoring the history of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, including the Japanese invasions in Southeast Asia and the American ultimatum of the Hull note of November 26 discussed in chapter three. Lord’s is the first major nonfiction work to ignore that background information. This removes the attack completely from its historical context, allowing Lord to focus on the epic version of the story while removing information that may be better suited for the grotesque frame. That includes the patriotic praise of those present at the attack. For example, Lord tells of a sailor who spotted the American flag on the USS Nevada as it attempted to depart the harbor near the end of the bombing and said that “he recalled that the ‘Star-Spangled Banner’ was written under similar conditions, and he felt the glow of living the same experience. He understood better the words of Francis Scott Key” (p. 137). Here we have the unquestioning connection to patriotism and national heroism. Our faith in the military restored by narratives of the enlisted men’s efforts, we can be proud once again of what Americans can accomplish, even in defeat. Echoing the earlier editorial claims to Americans’ ability to carry on and fulfill their duty as a shining light of freedom, Lord
begins his final chapter with a reassurance that the United States is a strong nation that can withstand attack, that our way of life cannot be defeated. In a description of evening colors on the afternoon of December 7, Lord says,

The simple ceremony – taking place as always – reminded [the soldier] that the country lived on … that it had survived blows in the past and could do so again.

Nurse Valera Vaubel stood at attention, too, as the flag was lowered at the Navy Hospital. Then she joined some others in a spontaneous cheer. At least this sundown she was still free (p. 200, ellipsis in original).

In addition to being a particularly thick layer in the texture of the collective memory of Pearl Harbor (see Appendix A), Day of Infamy is unique in the time period because it begins from the Japanese perspective. Both the serial and book open with a detailed account of the Japanese planning process and actions in the days prior to the attack. Lord (1956) describes the Japanese as excited for the attack, including one who proclaims “An air attack on Hawaii! A dream come true!” (p. 169). The atmosphere in the days prior to the attack is described as joyous, including Japanese airmen playing games to identify American ships. “The fliers were pampered by everybody. They were allowed daily baths and given special rations of fresh milk and eggs – which they promptly converted to American milkshakes” (p. 170). Stories like these, while they claim to give the Japanese point of view, may also have reinforced views of the Japanese as cold-hearted and ruthless in their excitement to attack Americans.
The Comedy of Tora! Tora! Tora!

It may seem strange to refer to a film depicting the plotting of a military attack and the detailed death and destruction resulting from that attack as a comedy. However, in the terms of Burke’s frames, comedy is not necessarily equated with humor. Burke (1984) explains that there is “an important distinction between comedy and humor” as the latter dwarfs the context of an event, potentially causing those who view the world through humor to “gauge the situation falsely” (p. 43). Instead, the comic frame, when viewed separately from humor, places its emphasis upon what Burke calls “the intervention of fools” (p. 41). By doing so, the comic frame shows audiences that those responsible for tragedy (such as in the case of Pearl Harbor) are not necessarily “vicious,” but rather “mistaken.” Burke tells us,

When you add that people are necessarily mistaken, that all people are exposed to situations in which they must act as fools, that every insight contains its own special kind of blindness, you complete the comic circle, returning again to the lesson of humility that underlies great tragedy (p. 41, emphasis in original).

The comic frame allows the audience to “[see] from two angles at once” because it can “[see] the operation of errors that the characters of the play cannot see” (p. 41). When it comes to the construction of collective memory, audiences are viewing representations of something that happened in the past and are, presumably, familiar with the results. Therefore, they can see the errors that were made as errors. Of course, this requires them to overlook the intentionality established in representations embedded within the grotesque frame and to relieve the principle actors in the story of the responsibility that may have been placed upon them in tragic versions of the story. In short, the success of the comic frame, especially in
regard to Pearl Harbor, depends upon the ability of those employing it to re-evaluate previously established frames. This is not to say that stories cannot be told from within the frame, but that they may need to overcome the audience’s pre-existing attitudes.

One major example of the employment of the comic frame for the depiction of Pearl Harbor is the 1970 film *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (Fleischer, et al., 1970). The film emphasizes the mistakenness of the American actions prior to the attack and the recognition of excessive pride by the Japanese during and following the attack. It is particularly important to note the film’s comic frame during the time period covered in this chapter because it is in stark contrast to the grotesque frame of the revisionist narratives, yet still acknowledges the mistakes revealed in the Army, Navy, and Joint Committee reports. In other words, the comic frame handles the incongruity of those reports differently than both the grotesque and the epic. The comic emphasizes stupidity over crime, mistakenness over viciousness. The revisionists’ presumption to know of the Roosevelt Administration’s intentions has no place within the frame of *Tora! Tora! Tora!* The comic also handles the incongruity differently from the epic. While the epic frame chooses to largely ignore or avoid the new information from the reports, the comic engages that information, presenting a different understanding of what occurred than do representations within the grotesque frame. This is not to say, of course, that there are no elements of the grotesque or even of the epic within the film. As I have noted previously, the frames are not necessarily mutually exclusive and a complex interaction between frames may exist. Nonetheless, the film is unique among representations of the attack to this point because it is embedded primarily within the comic frame, which
Burke (1984) describes as “the most serviceable for the handling of human relationships” (p. 106).

The film’s opening title card explains that “All of the events and characters depicted are true to historical fact.” In keeping with this declaration, the narrative includes very few fictionalized dramatic moments. While this may at times limit the film’s entertainment value, it helps to contribute to the proclaimed accuracy of its content. Nearly every individual story present in earlier accounts of the attack, especially those from *Day of Infamy*, is acknowledged in *Tora! Tora! Tora!* For instance, the Japanese are shown playing a flashcard game to learn the names of American battleships and an American officer in Hawaii, unaware that the island was under attack, threatens to report a (Japanese) pilot for flying dangerously. These stories, originally told by eye witnesses and appearing in *Day of Infamy* (Lord, 1957), give the film a documentary feeling, an anthology of what was “known” to have occurred during the attack. The implication of the film being documentary-like relies upon intertextuality. As I have discussed, the repetition of familiar images and stories is essential to the continual reinforcement of a particular frame. Therefore, in order for a particular account to successfully claim authority through repetition, audiences must necessarily be aware of the intertextual references. This means that a film like *Tora! Tora! Tora!* not only relies upon earlier representations of Pearl Harbor, but also upon the fact that those representations are regularly circulated within the media ecology of which it is a part. And, as a part of the media ecology, it relies upon and references elements of stories that are embedded within other frames, especially the epic.
Unlike the epic versions of the story produced earlier, however, *Tora! Tora! Tora!* does not entirely divorce the attack from history. Instead, it includes some (although not all) of the background that had been presented in the Army and Joint Committee reports. Including information from the reports that indicated that the United States had intercepted a number of important Japanese transmissions requires the filmmakers (the writers, producers, and directors) to deal with the questions posed by those reports and addressed by the revisionists. American military personnel are repeatedly depicted as skeptical of the decisions being made by their superiors. General Short and Admiral Kimmel have a similar response to the information received from Washington, with Kimmel asking “Why can’t Washington give us the full, inside story?” Unlike the reports and the counter-narratives, however, the film leaves the question of why the “full, inside story” was not given to the commanders in Hawaii unanswered, choosing to not posit an explanation or accuse officials of conspiracy. In fact, President Roosevelt does not appear in the film and his influence appears minimal. Instead, audiences are simply shown a string of American mistakes and arrogant dismissals. Military and civilian officers are depicted as truly surprised by the attack, as Secretary Knox replies to a telegram notifying him of the attack by saying “No, no, no, no. This can’t be true. They must mean the Philippines.” Another officer, in Hawaii, who had ordered that nothing be done after a Japanese submarine was fired upon because he had “no confirmation” that it was an actual enemy vessel is told during the attack “You wanted confirmation, Captain? Take a look! There’s your confirmation!”

Of course, evaluations of the actions taken or not taken prior to the attack as mistakes can only be made in hindsight. It is here that the comic frame is most visible, although it is

170
difficult to claim that the filmmakers positively viewed the attack through the frame. Instead, it is the audience’s ability to use their own knowledge, developed over the intervening thirty years since the attack, to recognize those mistakes and view the story from “two angles at once.” The audience, presumably aware of the outcome of the story, may have been able to evaluate the actions as mistakes as they happened in the film, but the high-ranking officers depicted in the film could only recognize them as mistakes after the attack. Since the audience watches the events unfold from the perspective of looking backward from the future (looking at the past from the present), they are able to see that the officers acted in the way they felt was in the best interest of their country. Like the audience, the filmmakers themselves, in writing and producing the film, were also able to look from both angles at once and, therefore, present them as mistakes without blame within the comic frame rather than searching for a scapegoat as in the grotesque or tragic frames.

As I mentioned above, this does not mean that there are no elements of the grotesque or of the epic in the film. While no explicit blame is placed on American officials, the film is clear about who made the mistakes, concentrating primarily on those in Washington. Short and Kimmel, blamed in the Joint Committee report, appear innocent in the film, as they do in the counter-narratives discussed earlier. But, as most of the representations discussed in this chapter, despite the prominence of the comic frame in *Tora! Tora! Tora!*, the epic emerges as the dominant frame when compared to the grotesque. Once the attack begins, the officers, both in Washington and Hawaii, are largely relegated to the background and those doing the majority of the fighting become the focus. However, the entire first half of the film focused solely on the officers. The carnage of the battle is the first time we see any stories of enlisted
men. But the repetition of exploding planes, the nameless men jumping ship or shown lying on the decks with their clothes on fire, turns them into a mass of nameless, faceless victims, much in the vein of the anonymous mob of soldiers and sailors in *Victory at Sea*. At the end of the battle, many of those soldiers and sailors are shown cheering their victory. In this way, the film begins to lean toward the epic frame, even after much of it had been in the comic frame.

Unlike most American representations of the attack, *Tora! Tora! Tora!* provides a Japanese perspective. Although *Day of Infamy* provided some stories from Japanese flyers and sailors involved with the attack, that book’s focus on enlisted men precluded any information from Japanese officials. In *Tora! Tora! Tora!* however, the Japanese leadership is presented in detail and mostly in contrast to the stereotypical depictions of earlier versions of the story. In fact, the Japanese are presented rather sympathetically in the film, most likely due to the influence of two Japanese directors. In the film, the Japanese Emperor and certain members of the Navy do not wish to go to war. This echoes the points made in some of the summaries of the reports, that the Japanese were under orders to potentially turn back if an agreement with the United States could be met. Interestingly, Hull’s note to the Japanese on November 26, viewed by the Japanese (as well as the Army and the revisionists) as an ultimatum, does not appear in the film. Instead, we see Kurusu’s regret over the lack of an agreement and Hull’s disappointment in the outcome of the negotiations. The sympathetic treatment of the Japanese would seem to be in line with the counter-narratives, shifting the blame from them to the Americans, but the removal of Hull’s ultimatum from the story allows room for an epic interpretation as well. The sympathetic portrayal of the Japanese, the
focus on the everyday soldiers and sailors during the battle, and the assumption of mistakenness rather than conspiracy all work together to illustrate how the comic frame of *Tora! Tora! Tora!* functions as a bridge between the grotesque and epic frames, addressing the new information presented in the reports, but providing a redemptive interpretation of that information, leaving room for audiences to accept the information that challenged the epic frame, but still maintain the attitude toward Pearl Harbor that may emerge from such a perspective. Simply put, the film’s comic frame reconciles the grotesque and epic frames as they had been established in the years following World War II.

Following the depiction of attack in *Tora! Tora! Tora!*!, Japanese Admiral Yamamoto informs his staff that he regrets that the formal declaration of war was not delivered prior to the attack. He then tells them, “I can’t imagine anything that would infuriate the Americans more. I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.” The quote appears on screen in text form after Yamamoto is shown walking to the ship’s deck, reiterating it and reinforcing its importance. Following the display of the quotation, the audience is shown images of burning battleships in the harbor as the credits role. This reinforces the epic frame as it foreshadows the war to come and the eventual victory of the United States, viewed in the epic frame as a victorious response to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

**Conclusion**

The construction of Americans’ collective memory of Pearl Harbor reached an important moment at the end of World War II. The release of the Army, Navy, and Joint Committee reports, along with a general questioning of American infallibility after the
dropping of the atomic bombs, opened the door for the “official” epic version of the Pearl Harbor story to be criticized and challenged. While a grotesque frame of conspiracy and blame dominated many revisionist narratives, including the minority opinion of the Joint Committee report, the epic frame remained dominant. But the period of questioning, which peaked with Admiral Kimmel’s memoir in the mid-1950s, had a profound effect on the epic version of the story. Although the grotesque did not come to dominate mainstream Pearl Harbor narratives, those who told the story had to account for that frame’s questions, either by ignoring the causes of the attack or by making a point to provide an interpretation different from that of the revisionists. The questions were also addressed through the use of hindsight to develop a comic frame which was able to act as a bridge between the grotesque and the epic. For that reason, *Tora! Tora! Tora!* represents a significant moment in the construction of American collective memory of Pearl Harbor in that it, for the first time, is able to reconcile the new information of the reports with the pre-existing attitudes of those employing an epic frame. And, unlike earlier attempts at such reconciliation, it is able to do so without engaging in casuistic stretching or ignoring the new information altogether. Later representations of the attack, then, could build upon the frame established at the end of the film, employing a slightly different epic frame than that employed by most major representations of the period covered in this chapter.

Along with the introduction of the comic and the shifting of the epic frame, truth and authenticity were paramount to representations of Pearl Harbor during this period. Authenticity was established through the use of interviews with eyewitnesses as with the reports and *Day of Infamy*. There were also claims to having been present at the attack and,
therefore, being knowledgeable about the events, as with Kimmel’s memoir and *From Here to Eternity*. But perhaps most importantly for the construction of memory, was the reproduction and re-creation of images familiar to the audience and already established as authentic. Because of the integration of film and television through programming agreements, images that had become familiar during the war were recycled and repeated for a new audience. This means that more recent audiences see the old and new narratives as contemporary with one another, potentially making it difficult for new narratives to displace prominent earlier versions. Those who had been too young to see *Bataan* in the theater, for example, were now exposed to such stories on an everyday basis at home. These repetitions are in addition to the adaptation of print to film as in the case of *From Here to Eternity* and the printing of particular versions of the attack (i.e., *Day of Infamy*) in multiple sources such as magazines and books. Therefore, by 1970, the media ecology of Pearl Harbor was rich with well-established and oft-repeated versions of the attack. Each of these versions, familiar to many Americans whether Pearl Harbor was within their living memory or not, added to the texture of American collective memory of Pearl Harbor and figured into their interpretations of each successive narrative. As will become increasingly clear throughout the remainder of this dissertation, this media ecology was and is inescapable. Since we understand the past as a conglomeration of multiple representations, those representations must be referenced and repeated in order for new versions of history to be comprehensible to us. In other words, we cannot understand the past outside of this collection of media texts. This is one way in which frames become hegemonic. Since all texts across all media *must*
make reference to one another, such reference may potentially reinforce the frame of the earlier text and, by extension, the frame through which the audience views it.

Examples of the repetition of images found in multiple text and multiple media include movies filmed at Schofield Barracks, images of which appear in documentaries, newsreels, and still images of the attack, and the reconstruction of explosions of a tilting USS Arizona. The images, regardless of their “authenticity,” become entangled in the audience’s collective memory of the event. They may be able to guess that there were not groups of sailors playing catch on the deck of the Arizona at 7:30 on a Sunday morning as shown by John Ford and Victory at Sea, but they will associate that image with the idea that Americans were entirely unsuspecting and unprepared for the coming attack. In other words, in the construction of collective memory, it is not necessarily the exact content of the event depicted, but the suggested meaning of the collection of images that structures understanding of the past. For those viewing Pearl Harbor through an epic frame, it is important that Americans were taken by surprise yet responded valiantly, whether they were actually playing catch or not makes no difference.

According to Burke (1984), a frame can be “stretched until it breaks” (p. 134), until it can no longer be supported in the face of new information. In the case of Pearl Harbor, the breaking point of the epic frame, thanks in part to the comic framing of Tora! Tora! Tora!, has never quite been reached. Revisionist counter-narratives were unable to reconcile with the American war story, which had been “given away to millions of children” since the founding of the nation (Engelhardt, 2007, p. 4), in the same way that the epic frame was able to do. The epic frame, like Engelhardt’s description of the war story, was “given away” on
television, in the theater, and in print. Audiences of all ages and in multiple media contexts were exposed to depictions of Pearl Harbor that reinforced the epic frame and repeated common themes and stories. Additionally, the counter-narratives mainly involved conspiracy theories, a genre long relegated to the fringe of popular culture. As with most conspiracy theories, no “smoking gun,” no direct claim from Roosevelt of intentionally withholding information, has ever emerged to fully validate the revisionists’ interpretations. At the same time, American victory in World War II and the United States’ ensuing world dominance are difficult to refute, leaving the epic frame intact as seemingly the only viable perspective from which to view the attack.

In the years following *Tora! Tora! Tora!*; Pearl Harbor and World War II faded somewhat into the background of American consciousness. However, as the 50th anniversary of the war approached and American culture began to adapt to the changes that accompanied the end of the Cold War, World War II once again became prominent in popular culture. As Americans approached the end of the century, they found new uses for the past. And, with new uses in a different global environment, it once again became necessary to reframe Pearl Harbor so that it better fit with the needs of a culture nearly sixty years removed from the event. In the next chapter, I explore the shift in the framing of the attack on Pearl Harbor from 1971 until 2001 when another Hollywood production of the attack would dominate theaters.

*World War II is over. It is history. We won. We crushed totalitarianism – and when that was done, we helped our enemies give birth to democracies.*

- President George H.W. Bush,
  Remarks at Pearl Harbor 50th Anniversary Commemoration
  *(Department of Defense, 1991)*

Victory belongs to those who believe in it the most and believe in it the longest. We’re gonna believe. And we’re gonna make America believe, too.

- James Doolittle
  *From the film Pearl Harbor (Bay, 2001)*

Many representations of the attack on Pearl Harbor during the period between the end of the war and 1970 were characterized by claims of authenticity and told by presumed eyewitnesses to history. Even accounts that inserted fictional characters into the story, as was the case with *From Here to Eternity*, proclaimed firsthand knowledge of the attack. In the years that followed, claims of primary knowledge began to diminish, but those of authenticity did not. As Herman Wouk (1971) writes in the foreword to *The Winds of War*, the historical events depicted in the novel are “offered as accurate; the statistics, as reliable; the words and acts of the great personages, as either historical, or derived from accounts of their words and deeds in similar situations” (no page number). So, even his fictional account was intended to be understood as a reliable depiction of history, informing readers while it entertained them. The practice of creating “historical fiction” is quite common, and there is nothing inherently wrong with the concept. However, in terms of the construction of collective memory, readers or viewers are encouraged to create an image of the past that is in line with those that exist within the fictional representations. And, since representations such as Wouk’s novel

178
proclaim historical accuracy, the resulting imaginations of the past become a blended historical environment, existing somewhere between fiction (representations consisting primarily of characters and events that have been entirely fabricated) and nonfiction (representations consisting primarily of documented historical characters acting in documented historical events). This environment includes more than fictional characters existing within depictions of real-life past events; it includes those fictional characters playing major roles in those events and in the lives of historical characters. These blended historical environments become important in the construction of collective memory because they play a major role in defining the past that is honored in official commemorative events. In some ways, those events are commemorations of a blended past. The themes and frames present within representations of the attack are reinforced by the commemorations, and vice versa. During the last three decades of the twentieth century, the fiction, nonfiction, and blended representations of Pearl Harbor combined with an increasing privileging of survivor and eyewitness accounts of the attack to reinforce the epic frame which had become the primary perspective from which the Pearl Harbor story was told.

During the period covered in this chapter, between 1971 and 2001, events were held to commemorate the 30th through 59th anniversaries of the attack on Pearl Harbor, although I focus primarily on the 40th and 50th (the 60th anniversary in 2001 is discussed in the next chapter). These events were, of course, firmly embedded within the political and economic contexts of their times. But they also made direct references to popular representations of the attack that had come before. And, notably, they also emphasized a qualitative difference between the memories of those present during the attack and the memories of those who
relied solely upon mediated versions of what happened (e.g., historians or filmmakers). This is not to say that the survivors’ memories were necessarily unmediated, only that their memories were often differentiated from the broader collective memory because “they were there.” However, by privileging the survivors’ memories over others, the primary story of Pearl Harbor is necessarily limited to what happened on December 7, 1941. The survivors’ histories had two rhetorical effects relevant to this dissertation: first, as mentioned in the previous chapter, limiting the representation of Pearl Harbor to only what happened on December 7 separates the attack from its context and minimizes any potential American responsibility. Second, since the survivors’ descriptions of what they saw and how they felt during the attack were largely based upon immediate reactions, stories that relied on those reactions were often (though not always) reactionary and conservative, maximizing American heroism and Japanese treachery. As these versions of the story became fixtures in American collective memory of Pearl Harbor during the 1980s and 1990s, it was much more difficult for competing frames and counter narratives to find or maintain popular purchase. Instead, the story became more entrenched within the epic frame of the survivors’ histories, bolstered by repetition and connection to contemporary concerns within representations.

In this chapter, I examine the representations of the attack on Pearl Harbor, beginning with Herman Wouk’s novel *The Winds of War* and ending with the Michael Bay (2001) blockbuster film, *Pearl Harbor*. While my analysis is bookended by these two blended fictional versions of the story, this period was dominated by two major anniversaries. Interestingly, the 30th anniversary of the attack, although it was observed, received little popular attention. This is potentially due to general cultural unrest resulting from the political
and military contradictions presented by the war in Vietnam. Because of the relative lack of attention paid to the Pearl Harbor anniversary in 1971, I focus my analysis of commemorative events on those held during 1981 and 1991. These events helped to solidify the epic as the dominant frame for American collective memory of the attack, at least for the period discussed in this chapter. The solidification of the frame was helped along by two developments in media during this period: the rise of the “television event” and the emergence of dedicated news channels. Later improvements in film technology, such as the advent of computer-generated special effects, would contribute to the “reality” of depictions, providing viewers with “access” to images and events that had never before been included in representations of the attack. This contributes to the blending of historical environments, further blurring the line between fiction and nonfiction. When employed as a narrative technique, blended history is a tangible manifestation of the texture of memory. The texture of memory is made up of recollections of previous recollections, each laid on top of one another. Blended history reveals the layers of memory and reflects a postmodern view of history in which there is no single interpretation of the past. Instead, representations can be reused and reappropriated to form new stories. An examination of blended history reveals that underneath every representation of the past are simply more representations, each depending on those which came before it, and all reliant upon some medium for telling their stories.

**Television Events, 24-hour News, and Blockbuster Films**

Between 1941 and 1971 there were a number of changes in the media ecology, many of which have been discussed in previous chapters. However, the period covered in this
chapter, 1971-2001, saw communication technologies evolve at an unprecedented pace. This
is not to say that print necessarily lost its privileged position within the media ecology.
Indeed, newspaper remained a primary source of information concerning current events,
often setting the agenda for television news. By dominating current events, newspapers may
still have had an influence on audiences’ attitude toward the unfolding of history, even if they
no longer played a central role in defining the meaning of events of previous years and
decades. In that sense, the newspaper, while prominent, was primarily a medium of the
present. Likewise, radio was still important for immediate news, but no longer provided
regular dramatic entertainment and would have played little to no role in adding to the
texture of the collective memory of an event from decades earlier such as Pearl Harbor.
Instead, the past fell under the domain of television and its continued reliance on old
programming, not to mention its ability to produce and broadcast stories about the past. In
this way, content from and about the past mingled with current news on television which had
been influenced and informed by current events as described in newspapers. So, many
audiences received much of their information about both the past and the present from
television. In fact, average daily television viewing time in the United States increased from
approximately six hours in 1971 to nearly eight in 2001 (Nielsen Media Research, 2004).
While this does not match the growth from zero hours which happened in prior decades, the
one-third increase in viewing is indicative of the increasing role television played in
American lives even after it had reached saturation in the 1960s.

While the dominant medium remained television throughout much of the period
covered in this chapter, advancements in technology changed the way television was
programmed and the role it played in the homes of most Americans. These advancements meant that certain types of programming, such as the miniseries, would become “appointment viewing,” television events shared with large portions of the population. They also allowed live, continuous coverage of events deemed by media companies as important for the nation, such as the numerous commemorations of the 50th anniversary of World War II. Along with these changes in the television landscape, the rise of digital graphics transformed big budget films into a form of time machine, showing audiences places and events previously only imagined.

On July 20, 1969, the Apollo 11 moon landing was broadcast on television and viewed by 125 million Americans. The landing was a technological achievement for NASA, but its live broadcast was a major media event around the globe (Briggs & Burke, 2009). The audience for that event reached as many as 130 million people in the United States alone, a number nearly as large as the entire population at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor (Dayan & Katz, 1992). The launch of the spacecraft, and the landing’s subsequent broadcast on live television, would not have been possible without communication satellites. These satellites, which for a time received more attention than the computers used to launch them, played a major role in the development and spread of cable television in the 1970s and 1980s (Briggs & Burke, 2009; Gorman & McLean, 2009).

In 1970, approximately 90 percent of prime-time television viewers were tuning into one of the three major networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC). However, by 1980, subscriptions to cable television tripled and would only continue to rise (Demers, 2007). Households subscribing to cable increased from about 5 million (7 percent of the population) to 16
million (18 percent) between 1970 and 1980. By 1990, 53 million households (nearly 52 percent of the population) were connected to cable and the number of networks increased from 28 in 1980 to 79 by 1989 (Bureau of the Census, 1990; NCTA, 2012). The increase in available channels via cable beginning in the 1970s along with federal regulations of prime time network television created increased competition among the networks for viewers and, by extension, advertising dollars (Gorman & McLean, 2009). These developments, brought about by the convergence of cable and satellite transmission of television signals, gave rise to ratings-grabbing innovations in programming including (but certainly not limited to) the “television event,” characterized by the miniseries, and the 24-hour news channel, pioneered by Ted Turner and the Cable News Network (CNN).

The idea of cable television began as early as the 1940s when independent innovators in various places began to develop ways to deliver television signals to locations where over-the-air reception was not possible or ideal. A large antenna was erected at a prime reception spot and the signal sent to homes and businesses via coaxial cable. The system was referred to as Community Antenna Television (CATV) and companies began charging for equipment, setup, and access in the early 1950s. Throughout the 1960s, the FCC began to regulate cable television, ostensibly in the interest of protecting local broadcasters from an influx of distant, better-funded stations (Mullen, 2008). A 1966 FCC order banned the importing of distant signals to the largest 100 markets unless the cable operator could demonstrate that the imports would not threaten the viewership of local broadcast stations (Parsons & Frieden, 1998). These regulations were relaxed in 1972 in order to allow certain stations from large markets to broadcast sports and movies nationwide. These channels were essentially re-
transmissions of broadcast channels, however, and most early cable stations reproduced the broadcast network format with syndicated programming (Mullen, 2008). The re-transmission of broadcast channels limited the appeal of cable – people in large markets with clear reception of broadcast signals had little interest in paying to view channels they could receive over-the-air for free (Parsons & Frieden, 1998).

In addition to the network re-broadcasting, cable companies began to recognize the profit potential in pay-television and premium channels. These began with a series of movie-based channels for which customers purchased plastic punch cards in order to receive programming. These did not last long, however, and were replaced by channels transmitted via microwave broadcasts such as HBO in 1972 (Mullen, 2008). The spread of cable networks meant that programming from distant cities and stations was available to customers nationwide. It also meant that local broadcast stations needed to compete with more than just the other major networks for airtime. By the early 1970s, cable systems were able to carry up to twelve channels (Parsons & Frieden, 1998). However, since many cable stations were limited to re-presentations of old network content and movies, the networks were initially not at significant risk of losing viewers during primetime due to a plethora of new or original content. This would change, however, when HBO began broadcasting via satellite in 1975 (Mullen, 2008). The use of satellites made it easier to distribute original content to a national audience and opened the door for a wide array of programming possibilities.

In 1961, in an event steeped with Cold War significance, the United States responded to the Soviet launch of Sputnik with Telstar. The communication satellite was able to complete an orbit in less than three hours. The British and French contributed ground stations
to the effort (for sending and receiving signals as the satellite passed overhead) and the first television program broadcast by satellite aired in the United States on July 11, 1962. In 1964, a group of nations formed the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) that allowed for international broadcasting and technology sharing (Briggs & Burke, 2009). Geo-stationary satellites, which were able to continuously communicate with a single ground station, were first launched in 1965. This provided media companies greater control over which content could be viewed via satellite within specific regions. The greater a particular satellite’s “terrestrial footprint” (the size of the area that could be reached by a satellite) was, the more valuable the satellite became (p. 253).

With geo-stationary satellites, media companies could not only deliver information faster; they could also provide access to content not available via over-the-air broadcast. Satellite owners used the technology to re-broadcast programs that may not have been otherwise available within their “footprint.” In this way, satellite and cable interests began to converge. Satellites were able to provide a greater variety of channels and programs than local broadcast networks, and it was the cable companies’ utilization of them that led to the first complete and effective use of communication satellite systems for public distribution of media content (Briggs & Burke, 2009).

HBO was the first cable channel to take full advantage of satellites, broadcasting a heavyweight boxing match between Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazier live from Manila on September 30, 1975 (Parsons & Frieden, 1998). Through the use of satellites, cable channels could now rival the geographic reach of the major networks at a far lower cost (Briggs & Burke, 2009). FCC regulations limited HBO’s content to movies of a certain age and
programming that was not available via local broadcast stations. Inspired by HBO’s success, Ted Turner launched WTBS from Atlanta before the end of the year as the United States’ first “superstation,” a broadcast channel specifically designed for a national audience and unaffiliated with any of the major networks (Parsons & Frieden, 1998). Deregulation in 1977 lifted the restrictions on content, allowing all cable channels unrestricted access to all movies and original television series in addition to the syndicated access they already had (Mullen, 2008). This meant that for the first time, due to the convergence of satellite and cable television in the late 1970s, the broadcast networks had to worry about primetime competition for viewers and advertising dollars.

By 1980, the only remaining regulation on cable programming was that of sports-related blackouts meant to protect ticket sales for local teams (Mullen, 2008). Further deregulations of technology in the 1980s led to the rise of direct broadcast satellites via which viewers could receive practically any signal transmitted by satellite. Over 3 million of these units were operating by the mid-1980s (Parsons & Frieden, 1998). As noted above, the number of cable customers likewise grew rapidly, from 5.3 million in 1970 to over 17 million, 23 percent of American television households, in 1985 (Briggs & Burke, 2009). The explosion in customers meant increased opportunities for cable channels and distributors to earn profits through advertising. As a result, the number of available stations grew quickly, each becoming more specialized. Among these new stations was the launch of the 24-hour news channel CNN in 1980 (Parsons & Frieden, 1998).

With increased competition came the need for the major networks to develop new modes of programming and ways to attract large audiences. One way that the networks found
to attract huge percentages of the viewing population was through the development of the television event. Television events may be best exemplified by the spectacle of the Super Bowl and, at least from the 1970s until the 1990s, the “appointment viewing” of the miniseries. The miniseries created “a branding for the television viewer … dedicating the viewing effort to a particular station, day, and time” (Roman, 2005, p. 269). We may think of these as similar to what Dayan and Katz (1992) refer to as media events, long a staple of television programming. Although Dayan and Katz (1992) insist upon media events being limited to live happenings, a pre-recorded television event such as the miniseries, described by James Roman (2005) as “one of the most formidable programming genres created for television” (p. 261), are very similar. Media events are live, planned interruptions of typical content by events believed by the broadcasters to be of national or global importance. These may include presidential debates, state funerals, or royal weddings. The most important aspects are that they interrupt the viewing routine (e.g., normal programming is canceled) and that they happen live. Such events are important, according to Dayan and Katz, because they typically attract large audiences, “as large as 500 million people attending to the same stimulus at the same time, at the moment of its emission” (p. 14). These events help to integrate diverse audiences that may typically be attracted to different types of programming.

Miniseries do indeed interrupt routine viewing and have attracted similarly large audiences. Some have reported nearly 100 million American viewers, not including their international exposure (Gorman & McLean, 2009). The miniseries offered broadcast networks, whose budgets were much larger than many cable channels, a chance to address important historical and cultural themes, including slavery (1977’s Roots) and World War II
(1978’s Holocaust and 1983’s The Winds of War). History became the preferred subject for the miniseries, blurring the line between education and entertainment. As Roman (2005) describes it, the miniseries “created a unique dynamic by integrating historical relevance within a cultural context. … [It] became a valued tool for discussion and dialogue” (p. 265). While placing history on television meant that a larger audience was exposed to a particular representation of the past than would be in, for example, a book, some critics claimed “that television history gave disproportionate attention to a limited range of topics” (Gorman & McLean, 2009, p. 174). Because television is, for the most part, intended to entertain, dramatic historical events such as World War II or the Civil War received far more attention than less glamorous events. And although this selection of topics was not necessarily limited to television, since, as I noted above, television was the only prominent medium that regularly dealt with the past, many audiences came to rely upon television’s limited presentation of American history. So the miniseries, intended to attract large audiences, provided both entertainment and a form of historical education while at the same time limiting which portions of the past were available for audiences.

Media events, given the size of their audience and their objective to unite a diverse audience, are meant to be instructive of what it means to be a part of a united audience (Dayan & Katz, 1992). Likewise, history, as it exists as television entertainment, can be thought of as “a vehicle for collective memory” (Gorman & McLean, 2009, p. 175). In other words, historical narratives, distributed to incredibly large audiences as miniseries, are meant to unify us under a particular vision of the past, providing us with a singular collective memory. For many audience members too young to have lived through the events depicted,
sharing the experience of viewing a particular representation of the past may be as close as they are able to come to sharing the experience of the past itself with one another or with those who have some living memory of the event. In other words, for those too young to remember, media representations of the past (such as those in television miniseries) are likely to be their only experience with the past.

Also accompanying the rise of satellite and cable television was the ability for viewers to share an experience of the present through constant live news coverage. As mentioned above, the 24-hour news channel CNN was founded in 1980 during the rapid increase in cable viewership. Television news had played a large role in world affairs at least since the Vietnam War, but even then images usually took days to be broadcast, well after still images and text had already been reported or printed (MacGregor, 1997). The integration of satellite and cable, however, made it much easier to send live video signals around the world. Therefore, audiences in diverse locations could all share a mediated experience of the same event at the same time, as it happened. CNN’s early news broadcasts consisted primarily of live satellite links rather than edited pieces, giving their presentation of events an air of immediacy and authenticity. Additionally, they were running the channel for 24-hours at nearly one-third of the cost of network news. In response to comparisons and criticisms, the networks cut their budgets and their staffs. In 1996 the three networks had fewer international offices combined than CNN alone (MacGregor, 1997). While the cable network was at first dismissed by the broadcast networks, the channel was taken seriously after it scooped the networks on the start of the Gulf War in 1991 and merged with media giant Time/Warner in 1995 (Briggs & Burke, 2009). And, although the broadcast included no live
pictures or visuals from Baghdad, Newsweek declared CNN’s scoop of the Gulf War as “the
night the networks died” (MacGregor, 1997, p. 145).

The television event and the 24-hour news cycle were not the only developments
during this period that allowed audiences to share an experience of the past or present. The
technological blockbuster film, originating in the 1970s and becoming a fixture of theaters in
the 1980s, provides large audiences with a common media reference point. Blockbuster films
are generally understood as large-scale productions that utilize the latest technological
innovations and are supported by major film studios. Because of their large budgets, huge
ticket sales numbers are essential to the financial success of blockbuster films. Therefore,
they are often the subjects of massive marketing campaigns in print and television along with
product tie-ins, becoming fixtures on the media landscape for weeks or even months prior to
their release. And, given their status as highly visible media texts, those that represent an
actual past event can come to define how the media represent that event, at least for a time.
And for those that have received very little, if any, information about the event and its
historical context, the blockbuster and the immersive experience of watching it in the theater
becomes history. That is to say that the blockbuster’s technological achievements and the
theater’s large screen, dark room, and loud audio may make the representation seem more
“authentic” than other ways of learning about the past (e.g., history textbooks) and even more
“real” than previous media representations that may have been seen on television. And, as is
the case with later films, technology that provides unprecedented “access” to the past gives
the blockbuster an air of being more than what can be learned from history – it includes
information that, in the terms of the Pearl Harbor revisionists, constitutes a secret or untold version of events.

While the term blockbuster is typically associated with large-scale technological productions of “New Hollywood” since the mid-1970s, the term actually dates to the early 1950s (Neale, 2003, p. 47). As discussed in the previous chapter, the film industry suffered in the postwar era as audiences turned to television and other forms of entertainment. Along with anti-trust legislation that required studios to sell off their theater arms, this meant that the industry produced fewer films but was able to provide some of them with considerably larger budgets. As Neale puts it, because the blockbuster helped the studios to

[sustain] profit and [compete] for the leisure dollar, they were able to lavish more money on the films … to invest in new technologies in order to upgrade their product, and in various ways to use the exhibition sector as an enhanced source of income and as a means of upgrading the cinemagoing experience (p. 50).

Put simply, the blockbuster provides the studios with large profits and drives technological innovation which contributes to the evolution of the theater-viewing experience.

The viewing experience is most enhanced by effects that increase what may be considered the perceived “authenticity” of the film. The apparently authentic representation of past events such as war is what separates a “respectable” blockbuster from its more gratuitously violent cousin, the action film (King, 2000). The use of large amounts of physical explosions and the addition of digital effects in postproduction provides the viewer with “an experience something like that of the original combat situation” (p. 120). So, viewing the film in the theater immerses the audience in the experience while special effects
allow audience members to feel as if the experience of the film simulates the lived experience of the past itself. In other words, the blockbuster film may give audiences the impression of having “been there.”

Because of the films’ reliance on innovation and maximizing the audience experience, genres, including war films such as *Pearl Harbor* (Bay, 2001), which allow for the demonstration of special effects and enhanced audio and visual elements, dominate the blockbuster (Neale, 2003). And the pressure for innovation and improved audience experience often means more attention is paid to the development of the visuals and a fast, entertaining pace that discourages reflection (Wasser, 2010). These characteristics became most common following the commercial success of *Jaws* in 1975, which pioneered extensive pre-release marketing and product tie-ins in order to “precipitate a national pop cultural ‘event’” (Gomery, 2003, p. 73). So, just as the miniseries became a media event that large portions of the population experienced together, the technological blockbuster film developed into an event that extended beyond the theater into stores and on television. It is also reasonable to assume that such events became topics of conversation, an active part of public dialogue and audience imagination.

As with the miniseries, blockbusters that deal with history become sources not only for entertainment, but also education. Audiences learn about the past and the images they see become a part of the collective memory – not just their memory of the media “event,” but also intimately associated with their memory of the historical event. Because of their tremendous budgets, blockbuster films need to attract huge audiences. Due to this constraint, history on film is often “a more overtly collective vision” than other media which are cheaper
to produce (Wasser, 2010, p. 165). Film, and especially an “event” film like the blockbuster, not to mention a television event such as the miniseries, creates a consensual history, one that is the most palatable to the most people. To do this, film and television producers often stick to conservative narratives, repeating themes and stories that had proven successful in the past. This is one way in which particular frames or ways of viewing the past are reinforced and helps to illustrate how intertextuality and repetition play a significant role in the construction of collective memory. Additionally, such an effect may be amplified if the film or miniseries is the viewers’ primary source of information about the depicted event.

The media history discussed above helps to explain the rhetorical characteristics and framing of the representations of Pearl Harbor that were most prominent during this period and are analyzed in the remainder of this chapter. These texts include representations that build upon the epic frame as it was established following the publication of the Army, Navy and Congressional reports on the bombing. They also include commemorative events that were held to recognize the 40th and 50th anniversaries of Pearl Harbor, many of which were nationally broadcast live via satellite and cable. First, I examine Herman Wouk’s 1971 novel *The Winds of War* and the television miniseries of the same name (Curtis, 1983). During a period in which most representations of Pearl Harbor were also parts of commemorative events, I examine speeches given about and connections made between Pearl Harbor and contemporary concerns, including the end of the Cold War and a renewed popular interest in World War II. Finally, my analysis concludes with the 2001 blockbuster film *Pearl Harbor* (Bay, 2001) and its utilization of digital effects to provide its audience with an apparently “authentic” and immersive experience of the attack.
**Blended History and a Return to the Epic**

In a brief foreword to his novel *The Winds of War*, Herman Wouk (1971) informs his readers that the novel and most of its characters are fictional. However, he goes on to say that …the history of the war in this romance is offered as accurate; the statistics, as reliable; the words and acts of the great personages, as either historical, or derived from accounts of their words and deeds in similar situations. No work of this scope can be free of error, but readers will discern, it is hoped, an arduous effort to give a true and full picture of a great world battle (no page number).

In this passage, Wouk is, interestingly, establishing the authenticity of his fictional work. While sweeping depictions of events may be relatively accurate, any portions of the story that directly involve Wouk’s fictional characters are fictional by definition, despite Wouk’s claims of the accuracy and reliability of his history and depictions of “great personages.”

This is common in most of what can be called “historical fiction” and creates what I am choosing to call a blended historical environment. A blended history is an intentional blurring of the boundary between fiction and “factual” history such that it can become difficult for audiences to distinguish between the two. I do not mean to imply any intention to deceive the audience. However, such representations may affect the audience’s collective memory of the past by introducing fictional characters, events, and interactions that may be exaggeratedly heroic (or villainous); influencing the audience’s attitude toward the past into which those characters have been inserted. Building upon the previously established insistence on authenticity, the qualities of blended history play a major role in representations of Pearl Harbor during the time period covered by this chapter.
While it is a common approach in historical literature, blended history is more prominent in visual media such as film or television and, potentially, plays a larger role in the construction of collective memory. While it is easy for a reader to remember that Victor Henry, the main protagonist of *The Winds of War* and its sequel, *War and Remembrance* (Wouk, 1978), is a fictional character, when new or reconstructed images are combined with and edited to mimic images from the past it is not always easy for a viewer to know which images are reconstructions and which are actual images of the depicted events. This technique is typical in representations of Pearl Harbor as it is common to see footage filmed by John Ford for his film *December 7th* (1943a) presented alongside newsreel footage of the actual attack and, in later representations such as the *Winds of War* miniseries and television documentaries, newly shot footage is made to look old and also included with original images. So, while the blended historical environment of *The Winds of War* was by no means the first such example, it is one of the most prominent because Wouk’s version of 1941 would come to dominate representations of the attack well into the next decade through the novel, its sequel, and their accompanying miniseries (Curtis, 1983, 1988).

*The Winds of War* is a sweeping, 1047-page novel that follows the fictional Henry family through the late 1930s, concluding with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The novel spent 64 weeks in the top ten of the New York Times Bestsellers List from 1971 to 1973, twenty of them at number one (Hawes Publications, 2011).¹ The 18-hour miniseries version was broadcast on ABC over seven nights from February 6 through 13, 1983 (Internet Movie Database, 2011). An advertisement for the event called the miniseries “Television’s most

¹ Coincidentally, it was another Herman Wouk novel about World War II, *The Caine Mutiny*, that unseated James Jones’s *From Here to Eternity*, discussed in chapter 4, from the top of the bestsellers list.
awesome achievement” (seanmc31076, 2011). Indeed, at the time, the production was the most extravagant in television history, costing approximately $40 million and was seen by 140 million people, the most ever to that date. The final episode, in which the attack on Pearl Harbor served as the dramatic conclusion to the story, received the highest ratings of the miniseries. The episode received a ratings share of 56, meaning that it was watched on 56 percent of televisions in use during the night of the broadcast. The average viewership for the miniseries in its entirety was approximately 32 ratings points, or 32 percent of all American households with televisions (‘Winds of War’, 1983). These numbers illustrate the potential role that the television event, especially the miniseries, may play in the construction of collective memory. It is reasonable to assume that the story told in both versions of The Winds of War reached more Americans at the time of its release than any other representation of Pearl Harbor (although the initial reporting of the attack reached a higher percentage of the population).

The novel and miniseries follow the fictional Henry family, led by Victor, a Navy man recruited by the President to serve as a naval attaché in Germany and Russia in 1940 and 1941. Near the end of the novel, he is awarded a commission to become Captain of the USS California, stationed at Pearl Harbor. Both of his sons, Byron and Warren, are enlisted in the Navy. At the time of the attack, Byron is a submariner stationed in Manila and Warren is a pilot assigned to the USS Enterprise aircraft carrier, stationed at Pearl Harbor. Victor’s youngest child, Madeline, works in radio. Accompanying the story in the novel (but mostly excluded from the miniseries) is a collection of “excerpts” from the memoirs of the fictional German General Armin von Roon, translated and occasionally annotated by Victor Henry.
Most of the story is concerned with events in Europe. However, the last fifth of the book and final episode of the miniseries, taking place in November and December, 1941, focus primarily on increasing tensions between the United States and Japan and give a detailed account of the attack from the perspective of the book’s fictional characters. The build-up and the attack are fixed firmly within the epic frame in both the print and television versions of the story.

Written in the late 1960s and early 1970s, The Winds of War fits alongside the collection of works that responded to the grotesque framing of the counter-narratives discussed in chapter four. Unlike representations such as Day of Infamy (Lord, 1957), however, Wouk does not completely divorce his version of events from history. Instead, he simplifies history with an explicit definition of the Japanese as empire-crazed villains and, in an interesting rhetorical move, associates the claims of many Pearl Harbor revisionists with General von Roon’s memoirs, written while he was imprisoned for war crimes. Although the connection is never specifically stated, by assigning the sentiments of the counter-narratives to the Nazis, Wouk effectively equates those subscribing to the revisionists’ ideals with enemies of the United States. For instance, Roon describes the United States as “an aggressive military dictatorship” and Roosevelt as a “fanatic” (p. 929). And, although he decries conspiracy theories as an “excuse for professional failure” (p. 938), Roon describes the American declaration of war as a result of “Roosevelt’s long-plotted stupendous war program” (p. 934). Statements such as these are clearly reflections of the common revisionist stance that Roosevelt overstepped his authority as President and made a conscious effort to actively engage the United States in the war despite his promise otherwise. When such
claims were made by revisionists, they were most likely motivated by political opposition to Roosevelt’s policies and conservative distrust of his domestic programs.

Although we may think of Roon’s statements, largely aligned with conservative revisionists, as representing the enemy’s point of view, Wouk also uses the German to connect those who criticize the American military to the enemy. In this way, the conservative viewpoint is supported rather than criticized. Roon claims that the American armed forces “let [Roosevelt] down by being surprised” and that the German army would not have done so because “[they] were soldiers” (p. 938). At the time of the novel’s writing, opposition to the war in Vietnam was high and critics of the military were very vocal, especially on the political left. Roon’s statement in this section of his memoirs may be associated with those critics. So, Wouk aligns the enemy with conservatives on one hand, but with liberals on the other. This creates a potentially conflicting frame if we rely on Roon’s memoirs alone and think only of Wouk’s apparent response to counter-narratives and current events. There is more to the novel than Roon’s fictional memoirs, however.

Wouk more firmly establishes the epic frame throughout the novel, but he also relies on Roon for doing so. Speaking of history and memory, Roon writes,

There is no morality in world history. There are only tides of change borne on violence and death. The victors write the history, pass the judgments, and hang or shoot the losers. In truth, history is an endless chain of hegemony shifts, based on the decay of old political structures and the rise of new ones. Wars are the fever crises of those shifts. Wars are inevitable; there will always be wars; and the one war crime is to lose. That is the reality and the rest is sentimental nonsense (p. 1016).
This, like Roon’s earlier statements, is written from the “enemy’s” point of view and, therefore, may potentially be contrary to that of the reader/narrator. If we adhere to my earlier claim that we are not meant to agree with the enemy’s point of view in *The Winds of War*, then Wouk is revealing, by assigning these statements to Roon, that the reader should view the outcome of the war as the most right and just outcome, not just one of many potential outcomes. Additionally, we are not meant to acknowledge the possibility that the Axis countries could be viewed positively. In other words, we are meant to accept the dominant, in this case, American, version of history as the only possible truth. From this perspective, the history of World War II is the history of American victory. As Roon claims, once the United States entered the war, the result was never in doubt – the Americans were destined to overcome their defeat at Pearl Harbor and win through to absolute victory.

General von Roon’s memoirs do not appear in the miniseries version of the story, although Victor briefly interacts with the character. The absence of the memoirs is likely due in part to the different allowances of the media, but it is also relevant to note that the miniseries was broadcast twelve years after the novel was published and the opinions or events to which Wouk may have been responding were no longer as immediate for audiences. This difference does very little to alter the epic framing of the story, however. The support or reasoning for the frame that may have been established through the use of Roon’s memoirs is assumed in the miniseries – once the revisionists’ primary historical moment had passed, the qualification of the epic frame became less important and representations of the attack could be unselfconsciously presented within the epic frame.
The members of the Henry family in *The Winds of War* are humble, “everyday” Americans, while at the same time acting heroically. They are meant to stand in for the entire generation of Americans that fought World War II both on the battlefield and at home. An important aspect of the epic frame is the focus on the efforts of “the humble man,” a heroic character with whom the audience is easily able to identify and develop a “vicarious kinship” (Burke, 1984, p. 36). For example, the Henry children are introduced during a radio broadcast with the claim that “one reason our country remains strong and safe is that we have plenty of Henry families” (Wouk, 1971, p. 829). Here we have the explicit connection between the humble Henry family and everyday Americans. In this way, the story of the Henrys is the story of an entire generation, one worthy of our gratitude and respect for keeping our country “strong and safe” during such trying times. As representatives of their generation, the Henrys and those with whom they interact are the focus of the description of the attack. As with previous versions of the story, the depiction of the attack itself is focused on a variety of generic soldiers and sailors, fighting valiantly. Wouk describes what the scene (may have) looked like to an observer, including the explosion of the *Arizona* and images of unnamed sailors burning on the decks of battleships, as audiences saw in *Tora! Tora! Tora!* The attack scene in the miniseries can be accurately described as chaos. There are very few distinct stories of the fighting men; the attack is made up almost exclusively of general images of explosions and confusion.

We may think of this as establishing distance between the audience and the sailors and soldiers on screen, a dehumanization of the victims of the attack. As noted above, the *Winds of War* miniseries was the most lavish television production to that time, and there
would have been great pressure to illustrate the high production value through the use of special effects and to reward audiences for engaging with the production for nearly eighteen hours with an impressive visual spectacle. Close identification with characters and familiarity with individual soldiers and sailors being killed could potentially detract from the spectacle by introducing the potential for increased emotion. Illustrating the connection between the film and television industries, some of the footage of the attack in the miniseries was lifted from *Tora! Tora! Tora!*, another massive, visually stunning spectacle. The reuse of images from the earlier film once again raises the question of intertextuality. The producers rely upon previously successful depictions of the attack, repeating and reinforcing preexisting themes, frames, and attitudes. And the use of footage from the 1970 film is not the only instance of footage repetition in the miniseries.

Blended history, an important part of the rhetorical structure of Wouk’s novel, is even more prominent in the miniseries. Black and white images of sailors playing catch and attending church services just prior to the bombing were taken from John Ford’s documentary of the attack. These images are reused in multiple representations of the attack, including *Victory at Sea* (see chapter 4) and later in television documentaries of the attack (discussed later in this chapter). Their lack of color identifies the images as artifacts of an earlier time and their repetition provides them an air of authenticity due to their familiarity and perceived accuracy. These features contribute to the blurring of the line between fact and fiction and illustrate why historical “accuracy” is not necessarily an important piece of the construction of memory (collective or otherwise). Adding to the blended nature of the history presented within the miniseries, footage that appears to be from a newsreel accompanies
narration explaining relevant historical events, including the peace negotiations between Japan and the United States. The narrator, speaking with a deep, authoritative voice, describes the Japanese fleet heading east, with newsreel-style images and ominous music. Even the images are ominous, focusing on dangerous storms and weather. As the narration and image shift back to the drama of the film, we see the black and white image of the newsreel slowly fade into the color image of the miniseries. This technique for providing historical context is repeated throughout all seven episodes of the miniseries. The cross-fading of the images allows nonfiction to literally blend into fiction. It is, therefore, difficult for audiences to distinguish what was filmed for the miniseries and what was reused, let alone what is “authentic” and what has been invented.

If the spectacle of the television event dehumanized the victims of the attack and virtually erased the line between fact and fiction, the novel, having a different set of obligations, can maintain the humanity of its characters in battle and blurs the line of history differently. As was the case in *From Here to Eternity*, the attack on Pearl Harbor is depicted within the novel of *The Winds of War* primarily from the point of view of the characters rather than through the wider lens of spectacle. The reader experiences the attack mostly through the experience of Warren Henry and his wife Janice as they travel from their home on Oahu to Pearl Harbor so that Warren, whose plane had already been shot down, could locate a new plane with which to fight back. As one sailor, disobeying his orders in order to ferry Warren to the air field put it: “The important thing is to get those sons of bitches” (Wouk, 1971, p. 980). Burke (1984) tells us that epic heroes “mediate between men and gods, having the qualities of both” (p. 36). Warren Henry, though not specifically described
as having the qualities of a god, is depicted as an almost stereotypical epic hero. After his plane is shot down, he returns home for only a bandage and, on his way back to battle, Janice thinks to herself, “How handsome Warren looked, how competent, how desirable, handling the wheel with a relaxed touch of his unhurt arm, puffing a cigarette in his taut mouth, watching the road through narrow eyes!” (Wouk, 1971, pp. 978-979). The everyday hero, representative of a generation of American men, overcomes the temporary problem of a destroyed plane to return to the fight and emerge victorious, cheering each time “they saw one Japanese plane after another burst into flames and fall” (p. 979).

If Warren is given god-like qualities while fighting, his father, Victor, is meant to literally mediate between men and gods, at least if we think of the Great Men of history as a certain type of deity. Audiences for both the novel and the miniseries are introduced to historical characters including Roosevelt, Hitler, Stalin, and Admiral Kimmel through Victor’s role as a prominent member of the Navy and his position as attaché for a number of diplomatic missions throughout the story. Although the characters are not developed in much detail, especially in the miniseries, they carry with them the implications of their historical actions. Of the famous people Victor meets in his travels, Kimmel is the most relevant to our discussion of Pearl Harbor. As Pacific Naval Commander, Kimmel received much of the blame for the devastation of the attack both immediately following the attack, at which time he was relieved of his duties, and in the Congressional Joint Committee’s report following the conclusion of the war. However, he is very much a sympathetic figure in The Winds of War, described as “an outstanding officer” who was “marked for success all the way and had
gone all the way” (Wouk, 1971, p. 988). In the novel, Kimmel defends himself by placing blame on the Army:

The Army was and is completely responsible for the safety of these islands and of this anchorage … including the definite responsibility of air patrol and radar search. Nothing on God’s earth could be clearer than the way that is spelled out in the islands’ defense instructions. The documents leave no doubt about that, fortunately (p. 988).

Wouk’s defense of Kimmel is clear, and a stance that could be aligned with the revisionists who felt that Kimmel (and General Short) were unfairly made scapegoats for the failures of the Roosevelt administration and higher ranking military officials. However, Wouk does not align himself with the revisionists any further, avoiding any criticisms of Roosevelt. Interestingly, the miniseries somewhat reverses this, largely ignoring Kimmel. Yet one admiral in the miniseries claims that “Washington’s been crying wolf about the Japs for a year” while the “paper-pushers” gave away important military equipment. He complains that he didn’t want to rely on the Army but that he didn’t really have a choice. “President Roosevelt was too damn interested in the wrong enemy. The wrong ocean.” This is different from the revisionists’ blaming of Roosevelt, however. Revisionists viewed the attack through the grotesque frame, in which the role of the villain is played by Roosevelt rather than the Japanese, creating incongruity between the revisionists’ and their audience’s conservative views and what they perceived as the “reality” of the attack.

Wouk and the miniseries’ producers, on the other hand, seem to suggest that Roosevelt was mistaken rather than treacherous in his evaluation of the situation in the
Pacific, indicative of a comic frame such as that through which *Tora! Tora! Tora!* presented the attack. Because Roosevelt plays a relatively small role in the events of the novel, the comic frame does not encompass the entire story, but rather is embedded *within* the epic frame of the larger narrative. By utilizing a comic rather than grotesque frame in his depiction of Roosevelt, Wouk does not need to avoid historical context in order to maintain the epic perspective as Walter Lord did in *Day of Infamy*. Instead, he is able to acknowledge some of the concerns of the revisionists and engage history at least in a limited sense given the constraints of his narrative. One aspect of historical context that Wouk includes in his story is the fact that Pearl Harbor was one of just seven places attacked on December 7, 1941, albeit the most severe. Likewise, a popular nonfiction history of the war contemporary with the novel also included information about the concurrent attacks on Malaya and Singapore, emphasizing that the fleet at Pearl Harbor was meant as a deterrent to the Japanese, but that its destruction made attacks on British and Dutch possessions easier (Heiferman, 1973). Although Wouk (1971) does not engage in such cause-effect descriptions of the attacks, he does provide information about them, allowing Victor Henry (and, by extension, the reader) to witness the destruction on Wake Island and Midway by engaging Henry’s younger son in the attack on the Philippines.

Nonfiction accounts of the attack are more likely to use such historical context in order to employ a particular rhetorical frame such as the comic rather than to support some other frame such as the epic. Historian Ronald Heiferman, whose illustrated coffee table history of World War II went through fourteen editions between 1973 and 1998, provides a summary of the failed peace negotiations between Japan and the United States, but
emphasizes that each nation was mistaken in their negotiations, and, in line with the version of the story told in *Tora! Tora! Tora!*, the Roosevelt administration was aware of an impending attack but mistaken on when and where it would occur (Heiferman, 1973). Heiferman also points out that the United States could be somewhat forgiven for failing to learn of the Japanese approach because of the Japanese fleet’s northern route, far away from established shipping lanes. This is not to say, however, that his popular history of the war excuses either nation. Heiferman claims that peace negotiations “were little more than a façade designed to buy time while both sides prepared for war” (p. 96). He also notes that “there was no possibility that the Roosevelt administration would seriously consider a compromise, there was no way for the Japanese to get out of China and still maintain face” (p. 91).

This version of events implies that both nations were to blame: the Japanese were not necessarily evil, although Heiferman does describe them as “on a mission of destruction” (p. 100) and Roosevelt did not conspire to allow the attack, despite Heiferman’s acknowledgement that the president was desirous of war. This is in contrast to the epic frame, in which Wouk primarily places his narrative, with some small exceptions. Wouk embeds the comic version of the story within the epic frame and largely supports the “official” version of the story, with the exception of his apparent defense of Admiral Kimmel. By only using the comic frame when describing Roosevelt’s role in the Pearl Harbor story, he is able to take the information revealed in the Army and Joint Congressional reports into account without damaging the viability of the epic frame as a dominant
perspective. This also allows Wouk to avoid the revisionist tendency of placing Roosevelt in the role of the scapegoat, instead focusing on the Japanese as the only responsible party.

To establish the Japanese as a clear enemy, Wouk portrays them as fundamentally different from Americans, much in the way they were demonized in the initial framing of the attack. In this way, the Japanese are grouped with other people of Eastern Asian ethnicity, such as Koreans and Vietnamese, which would have been commonly associated with the death of Americans at the time of Wouk’s writing in the late-1960s, illustrating one way in which the present might play a role in the types of stories that are told about the past and the way those stories are framed. In one discussion about the future of the war, Warren Henry explains that “the Krauts may be easier to come to terms with than the Japs. They’re white people” (Wouk, 1971, p. 834). Elsewhere, Victor expresses his belief that the Japanese are driven solely by a desire for expanded empire and the story of the Rape of Nanking is related in detail. War and Remembrance (Wouk, 1978), the sequel for both the novel and the miniseries, begins immediately following the attack. The othering of the Japanese continues as Victor’s wife Rhoda describes the Japanese as “Those horrible little yellow monkeys” (p. 5). And Admiral Spruance, a real-life American Navy Admiral during the war, is quoted as saying that “Australia had to be held for it was a white man’s continent. Its overrunning by nonwhites might trigger a world revolution that could sweep away civilization” (p. 15). Claims such as these clearly define the enemy against whom Americans, embodied by the Henry family, had to rise against and defeat in order to protect themselves, at least as such a fight is understood within the epic frame. However, such statements by actual historical characters once again bring up the issue of blended history.
When historical characters such as Spruance, Kimmel, Stalin, or Roosevelt are depicted as possessing very specific attitudes toward the events in which they were engaged, how is the audience to separate the author’s words from those of the historical figure? As in *The Winds of War*, Wouk (1978) includes a foreword in *War and Remembrance* that proclaims the accuracy of the historical events and characters depicted within, saying “that knowing readers will find it has been presented responsibly and with care” (no page number). The implication is that if we believe ourselves to be “knowing readers” we will be able to tell the difference. Or, since we are “knowing readers,” we will recognize that Wouk has simply written down the documented sentiments of historical figures. Here is an instance in which we can see that, in the construction of memory, factual accuracy is not necessarily as important as perceived accuracy. Instead, knowing and perhaps being encouraged to adopt the attitudes of important historical figures is enough to define the past and assess its relevance in the present.

**Commemorating the Past, Defining the Present**

Determining the relevance of the past in the present is a key component of major commemorative events. Commemorating the past is one way we understand the present and how or why contemporary events fit into our own historical narrative. During the period between 1971 and 2001, Americans recognized three major anniversaries of the Pearl Harbor attack, including an extended fiftieth anniversary of World War II in the early 1990s. Also during this period, popular media representations of the attack were primarily embedded within the epic frame. If commemorative events are meant to place the past within a progressive, triumphant narrative of our nation’s history, then the epic frame of the
representations made it very easy to integrate the story of Pearl Harbor within contemporary cultural contexts. In this section, I explore the way that some commemorative events framed their presentations of the attack.

In the thirty years between 1971 and 2001 the United States experienced the bitter end of a frustrating war in Vietnam and witnessed the growing importance of China and Japan in the American economy. Throughout many of those years, the country was engaged in a Cold War in which it felt that it needed to be constantly vigilant and defend itself against the spread of Communism. The nation also entered into a war with Iraq, a presumably dangerous, aggressive, and decidedly non-Western enemy. Within this cultural environment of fear and suspicion of primarily Asian peoples, Pearl Harbor continued to recede into the past only to be resurrected on its major anniversaries as an example of how Americans had responded to adversity in the past and why they needed to face contemporary uncertainties with the courage of a previous generation. The events of the thirtieth, fortieth, and fiftieth anniversaries of Pearl Harbor largely reinforced the epic framing of the attack and the understanding of American history as a progressive march toward some ultimate victory that would illustrate the United States’ cultural, economic, and political superiority.

There is an important difference between commemorative and representative framing of Pearl Harbor. Representations, as in print descriptions or filmic depictions, are primarily intended for and distributed to a mass audience. Audience members may each engage with and understand the representation differently based on their particular contexts, but practically speaking, they are all exposed to the same version of the story. Commemorative events, on the other hand, are organized for and presented to a relatively small audience. The
majority of the public is exposed to the content of those commemorations primarily through descriptions of them in the news media. As authorship of the story changes, so might the portions of the event that are emphasized or ignored. In other words, there is an extra level of framing – a commemorative event frames the past in a particular way and then reports about the commemoration are in turn framed rhetorically. In this way, smaller commemorative events play a more indirect role in the formation of collective memory than do media representations of the past such as a television miniseries.

However, as mass media evolved during the three decades covered in this chapter, commemorations became more immediately available to audiences through 24-hour news channels that could afford to dedicate significant air-time to the events as well as the prominence of the television event that could draw large audiences to broadcasts of live commemorative events or ceremonies. So, events designed for small audiences could be viewed by a mass audience, giving them an increasingly large space within the evolving texture of memory. Consistent themes within commemorations of Pearl Harbor, then, illustrate how audiences were making use of the attack in understanding the present and demonstrate the overwhelming dominance of the epic frame across multiple sources of information concerning such events.

One important element of the events commemorating major anniversaries of Pearl Harbor is professed importance, validity, and authenticity of the personal recollections of survivors. For instance, in a description of the thirtieth anniversary ceremony, the survivors take it upon themselves to correct professional historians, explaining to them “it was not like that, it was like this” (Herbers, 1971, p. 34). But it was not only American recollections that
were recounted; the stories of Japanese survivors also make occasional appearances. An article published near the thirtieth anniversary told the story of a Japanese pilot involved in the attack. The article points out that the Japanese do not really recognize Pearl Harbor as an important date, most of those interviewed could not connect the date to the start of the war. Instead, Japan is more concerned with the end of the war. One Japanese interviewee states that “to ‘remember Pearl Harbor’ is an American way of feeling” (Stokes, 1981, p. A16). This illustrates presumed differences in culture and attitudes toward the attack that were present during the anniversaries covered by this chapter.

As the attack receded further into the past, the survivors’ memories became even more important. Three articles in the December 7, 1981, edition of the *New York Times* focus on the individual recollections of those who were either present or alive during the attack. One focuses on the remembrances of government leaders such as President Reagan and Vice-President Bush. The article is sure to note the leaders’ military service, particularly those who served during World War II (Hunter, 1981). A similar story recounts a small memorial ceremony held for survivors, recounting a number of their recollections of the attack. Interestingly, the survivors participating in that event imply that to remember is to fulfill some form of patriotic duty. Noting the small number of attendees to the ceremony, one survivor noted that “There are not enough people in this country who are willing to show their patriotism” (Kennedy, 1981, p. A16).

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, in his address during the fiftieth anniversary ceremony, explicitly proclaimed that only the memories of those who were there are reliable, saying,
Only you survivors who were here that day can tell us precisely what it was like. …

The words of those of us who were not present will never be adequate to the task of capturing the emotions of those of you who were (Department of Defense, 1991, p. 4).

Such sentiments echo those found in a *New York Times* article describing survivors’ recollections during the 47th anniversary of the attack three years earlier. In the article, the author claims that the survivors “can remember with almost photographic clarity” the day when “the world changed forever.” He goes on to claim that their memories are superior to those of individuals that were not present at the attack because they are not “abstract,” they recall the event clearly because they were there. “They did not get the news later that day on the radio, or from a newspaper, or from the neighbor down the block. They got it immediately, out of the flashing gun ports of Japanese fighters” (Mott, 1988). As with most individual recollections, however, their accuracy can easily be called into question.

Many, if not most, of our remembrances, especially of large events such as war, are colored by other representations. Even if one were an eyewitness to an event, the repeated stories of others contribute to her or his recollection of that event. This has been discussed at various points in this dissertation as part of what James Young (1993) calls the texture of memory. One place in which we can see this in effect in the survivors’ accounts of their experiences is the repetition of the claim that they could see Japanese pilots smiling as they attacked. This story appears in a number of different recollections of the event, including one that said he “could see the bastards smiling” (Reinhold, 1991b). Another said that he still dreamed about their smiling faces 50 years later (Reinhold, 1991a). While it is possible that
multiple people witnessed smiling Japanese pilots, it is also likely that their memories were influenced by media representations. As discussed in chapter 4, the evil, grinning Japanese soldier was a common figure in World War II media, especially in the war years and immediately after. Stories of grinning pilots appeared in *Day of Infamy* (Lord, 1957) and *From Here to Eternity* (Jones, 1951).

If a survivor were to hear or read other eyewitness accounts that supported the survivor’s own attitudes toward the perpetrators of the attack, it is reasonable to assume that portions of those stories may have been incorporated into the survivor’s own version of events, especially if she or he maintained some level of animosity toward the Japanese. Indeed, the influence of texts such as *From Here to Eternity* is evident in articles detailing survivors’ remembrances. An article reporting on the fortieth anniversary ceremony in 1981 compared Schofield Barracks to the way they were described in the novel (Trumbull, 1981). Ten years later, a commemorative article in *Time Magazine* opened with a quotation from the book, meaning to give some impression of the feelings of those present at the attack (Friedrich & Hopkins, 1991a). This is not intended to discount the recollections of eyewitnesses in the attack – it is possible that multiple people witnessed grinning Japanese pilots. In either case, the precise accuracy of those memories is not as important as the attitude they encourage, in this case a continuing distaste for and distrust of the Japanese.

Such an attitude was present in the thirtieth and fortieth anniversaries, but became more prominent during the fiftieth anniversary, a time at which the Japanese had gained significant economic influence in the United States. In 1971, the description of the Japanese followed a relatively simple us-versus-them pattern, reflecting the need for a clearly defined
enemy within the epic frame. One report of the tour of Pearl Harbor says that the
“presentation was a little less chauvinistic than the spiel of the Confederate guides at
Vicksburg: The Japanese were ‘they,’ the Americans ‘we’ and the story was told exclusively
from the World War II American point of view” (Herbers, 1971, p. 34). By 1991, the rift
between Americans and the Japanese became much more publicly evident. Because the
Japanese refused to issue a formal apology for the attack, no official Japanese guests were
invited to the fiftieth anniversary commemoration ceremonies. Some Japanese insisted that
they should not have to apologize for Pearl Harbor if the United States would not apologize
for their use of nuclear weapons (Reinhold, 1991a). This conflict over apologies allowed
some to escape the epic frame and refuse to completely villainize the Japanese. One editorial,
published in the San Jose Mercury-News, claimed that the American insistence on an apology
was simply a “quest for designation as righteous warrior against Japan.” The author went on
to say, “let those among us who are secure enough to recognize that all humans are fallible
come forward and apologize for their own mistakes” (Hellman, 1991).

The author’s call for everyone to recognize their own fallible nature places that
perspective on responsibility for the attack (and the war) within the comic frame. The comic
frame was not commonly employed, however, as by this time uncertainty and distrust of the
Japanese, partially due to their increasing economic influence in the United States, had left
Americans entrenched within an epic understanding of the attack, one that could provide the
comfort of the knowledge that the Japanese had been defeated before and could be again. As
one survivor proclaimed “We did not invite the Japanese 50 years ago and we don't want
them now.” There is much bitterness revealed in interviews with survivors, including one
widow who was shocked that they would invite “the people who killed [her] husband” to the anniversary ceremonies (Reinhold, 1991a). On December 7, 1991, a Word War II veteran in Georgia held a public ceremony in which he burned a Japanese flag in a grill on the back of his pickup truck “as a way of honoring the American soldiers and sailors killed in the attack” (Smothers, 1991).

As I have discussed, attitudes toward the past are often a reflection of uncertainty in the present. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Japan’s economic influence in the United States grew at a rapid rate, causing discomfort among Americans. A common refrain in discussions of the attack on Pearl Harbor expressed the sentiment that the Japanese had purchased control over Hawaii when they could not win it. As one reporter for the *Seattle Times* put it, “there's no escaping the conclusion that what the Japanese ultimately failed to win with bombs in 1941, they are winning with bucks in 1991” (Raymond, 1991, see also Reinhold, 1991a). In this way, the Japanese are still to be viewed as a threat. Their economic attack is just as sneaky as their military attack as it allows them to stealthily gain influence over the United States.

Another consistent theme in the commemoration of Pearl Harbor is the fear that such an attack could happen again. And, especially immediately following the American defeat in Vietnam, there was less confidence that the United States could respond to such an attack in a way consistent with the epic framing of American history (Engelhardt, 2007). Therefore, protecting against such an attack was paramount, and the story of Pearl Harbor was regularly used as a way to explain or justify contemporary actions taken ostensibly to guard against imminent external threats. For example, an editorial published on the thirtieth anniversary of...
the attack says that the American experience at Pearl Harbor was driving military and nuclear policy in order to avoid a potential “nuclear Pearl Harbor” (Nuclear Pearl Harbor?, 1971, p. 46). The editorial claims that the nation has not been able to shake off its fear of attack since the 1941 bombing. This is an example of how the attitudes that result from a particular understanding of the past can persist even once thoughts about the specific events giving rise to those fears have begun to fade from active memory (i.e., they are no longer actively debated or discussed). In other words, collective memory, if we associate it with attitudes toward the past, goes beyond the remembrance of facts and events. As I have argued, the specific events of the past are not as important as the attitudes that result from the representation of those events. The fear of a surprise attack is essential to an epic perspective exemplified by what Engelhardt (2007) calls the American war story and describes as an essential piece of American identity due to its repetition and common association with major historical events, especially World War II. In that understanding of history, Americans are understood as an essentially just people who only resort to violence when forced into it and, because of their just mission to spread democracy throughout the world, will ultimately win a decisive victory and avenge the violence perpetrated upon them. So, since that fear, as a part of the war story, is an important piece of American identity, Pearl Harbor, after the passage of time and a generation, became just the most prominent recent example of what can result if the nation does not remain vigilant.

This sentiment was repeated twenty years later at the official ceremony commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the attack. Both Secretary of Defense Cheney and President George H. W. Bush emphasized the importance of remaining engaged and
proactive in world events so that another surprise attack might be avoided. Bush declared that “we paid a heavy price for complacency and overconfidence. That … is a lesson we shall never forget” (Department of Defense, 1991, p. 13). Cheney connected the lessons of Pearl Harbor, primarily that of military preparedness, to the first Gulf War. He described great losses in Korea, attributing them to a lack of training following a lapse in preparedness after World War II. He claims that victory in the Gulf War was won because the United States had learned the importance of military preparedness from Pearl Harbor. Cheney went on to stress the importance of continued military funding, saying that “Any signal that we are not ready to defend ourselves will invite aggressors to act. You can depend on it” (p. 5).

Accompanying the perpetual threat to the American way of life is the celebration of the American response to the attack and ultimate victory in the war. That victory is even more important than that the United States was attacked without warning. With the debate over the purpose of the war in Vietnam still fresh in their minds, Americans during the decades included in this chapter needed reassurance that the United States had responded with strength and justice in the past and that they could continue to do so in the future. Surprise attacks should not hinder American progress, but rather bring out her best – at least when they are viewed through an epic frame. As one participant in a fortieth anniversary ceremony noted, the United States’ “role as leader of the free world” was “thrust upon [the nation]” by the attack (Trumbull, 1981, p. B18).

In addition to being constantly on the alert for potential surprise attacks, viewing the unfolding of history (the past and the present) through an epic frame also requires one to believe that victory can and will eventually be won. During these commemorative events,
Pearl Harbor is presented within the epic frame and used as an example of how Americans have in the past and should in the future respond to the inevitable surprise attack. This requires, as with earlier epic versions of the story, a focus not on the mistakes made prior to the attack but on the response to the attack. In an article (Mohs, 1981) published in *Time* magazine recognizing the fortieth anniversary, the author claims that “Pearl Harbor was soon resurrected and the fleet rebuilt. Japan's shaky chance to keep the U.S. out of the war in the Pacific was irretrievably lost and Americans' will to win unquenchably ignited” (p. 28). In a similar vein ten years later, an article in *Time* described the attack, providing a good amount of background and even acknowledging American mistakes (Friedrich & Hopkins, 1991a). But, in the end, the author concludes that “Pearl Harbor united Americans in rage and hatred, and thus united, powerful and determined, they would prove invincible” (p. 43). In this case, the United States is not merely just and sure to emerge victorious, but entirely unable to suffer defeat.

The epic frame, with its images of humble heroes rising as one to win a complete and just victory, does not allow for defeat. Rather the heroes, fallible as they may be, are, in the end, invincible. *Time’s* issue commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor, when taken as a whole, presents an epic version of the story. While the article mentioned above, dealing specifically with the events of Pearl Harbor, claims that the United States became “invincible,” the next article in the magazine provides evidence of that claim, detailing the American recovery and military response to the Japanese attack (Friedrich & Hopkins, 1991b). As I have demonstrated throughout this dissertation, all representations of the attack interact and intersect with one another to reflect and encourage a particular attitude toward
the past. This is the case with commemorative issues of magazines— it is not simply the particular article that describes the attack that plays a role in the audience’s understanding of the past, but rather how all of the articles together form an image of a particular event or set of events. In this case, articles outlining American victories after Pearl Harbor, when combined with those about the attack, contribute to the epic framing of the attack itself.

The presentation of the United States’ victory in the war as a direct response to the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor continued in the “official” commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary (Department of Defense, 1991). The prologue for the “Commemorative Chronicle,” the official publication documenting the anniversary, states that what was most important about Pearl Harbor was that “the shock and anger caused by the attack on Pearl Harbor united a divided nation and was translated into a wholehearted commitment to victory in World War II” (p. 1). The disunity of the population prior to Pearl Harbor is described by President Bush as “diversity,” claiming that “the enemy mistook our diversity … for weakness.” Despite that diversity, according to Bush, Americans were united in purpose, a fact which “made us invincible in war and now makes us secure in peace” (p. 12). Here, Bush makes a direct connection between the time of Pearl Harbor and contemporary concerns. The United States had not simply won World War II; the nation would continue to win because of the security provided by their unity of purpose. For evidence, he compares the recent end of the Cold War to American victories in each of the World Wars, saying, that Americans “now … stand triumphant – for the third time this century” (p. 12).

Almost paradoxically, the insistence upon continual vigilance against attack makes the commemorations discussed above not about remembering Pearl Harbor at all, but rather
the instruction of how to use the lessons learned from Pearl Harbor in contemporary uncertain times. This is the primary role of collective memory – a collection of attitudes that make use of the past to inform our understanding of the present. We are instructed on how to face contemporary concerns by looking at examples from the past.

Because of their unity and vigilance, established and learned in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, Americans were able to work together to achieve victory and peace without engaging in armed conflict. This fits within the epic understanding Americans are meant to have of their own identity, at least as it is presented to them in commemorative events such as those for Pearl Harbor. As a quotation from President Franklin Roosevelt, included in Bush’s proclamation of 1991’s National Pearl Harbor Remembrance Day, puts it, “When we resort to force … we are determined that this force shall be directed toward ultimate good, as well as against immediate evil” (Department of Defense, 1991, p. 2). Similarly, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell echoed the sentiment that Americans died and fought to bring an end to tyranny, to protect the world from evil dictators because the United States “[seeks] no territory. We seek no position of hegemony. We seek no fortune. We seek no empire” (p. 16). This is in stark contrast to the common presentation of the Japanese during the observances of the major anniversaries during the period covered in this chapter in which the Japanese violence and thirst for empire, both territorially and economically, is a major part of their characterization when viewed from an epic perspective. This perspective is encompassing not just of the description of the attack and its aftermath, but also in the physical setting of many of the commemorative events and at the USS Arizona Memorial in Pearl Harbor.
The Arizona Memorial, erected in 1962, is the only American naval memorial associated with a major disaster (Delgado, 1992). The memorial sits astride (but not touching) the visible remains of the ship, within which lie the bodies of many of the 1,177 killed on the Arizona as well as the remains of a number of survivors who had chosen to be interred there.\(^2\) As historian James Delgado describes it, the ship and the memorial have been “transmuted into a symbol of what could happen if the nation were again caught unaware” (p. 77). The memorial came under the control of the National Park Service in 1980 and hosts more than 4,000 visitors per day. National Parks magazine called the memorial “the keystone in our collective memory of the attack on Pearl Harbor” (O’Connell, 2001), describing the slow leak of oil from the ship as tears or blood. Indeed, the memorial is the most common image of the post-war scene at Pearl Harbor and its association with the iconic image of the burning Arizona provides a certain level of emotional impact. The story told in its visitor center and engraved in its walls, however, affects collective memory differently from the widely consumed media artifacts analyzed in this dissertation. When images of the memorial are embedded within those artifacts, however, the memorial’s role as a gravesite, the funerary nature of the commemorative events during which most Americans are exposed to it, and the design of the memorial itself make it a potentially powerful supporting feature of the epic frame.

The memorial’s role as a gravesite supports the National Park Service’s interpretation of the site as sacred ground (Kelly, 1997). An audio recording played for visitors traveling by

\(^2\) Interestingly, the memorial does not touch the remains of the ship in order to preserve the “sanctity” of the ship as a tomb. However, Delgado (1992) points out that, despite that “sanctity,” certain sections of the ship that blocked the construction of the memorial were cut away and placed in a scrap pile on the nearby Waipio Peninsula.
boat to the memorial in the 1990s stated that “The ship is [a] tomb. Please keep conversation
low in volume” (Kelly, 1997, p. 50). Seemingly complying with this request, during the
broadcast of the fiftieth anniversary ceremony in 1991, ABC News anchor Forrest Sawyer
spoke in hushed tones as viewers participated in a moment of silence, watching a ship
approach the memorial at 7:55 Hawaiian time, the approximate moment the attack began
(ABC News, 1991). The importance of the memorial, and its epic design, are explicitly laid
out for the television audience. As correspondent Ken Kashiwahara notes during the
broadcast,

> The centerpiece of this whole ceremony is the Arizona Memorial. The architect
designed it to evoke a sense of serenity. You’ll notice that the roof of the memorial
sags in the center and rises up to the sky on either side. And … that represents the
defeat here at Pearl Harbor and the ultimate victory of the United States.

This is in contrast to those who actually visit the memorial in person, where a pamphlet
explains that “the visitor is left to contemplate his [sic] own personal response, his own
innermost feelings” (Kelly, 1997, p. 50).

Television audiences are instructed on how to interpret the memorial rather than
interpret it on their own. This is possibly a constraint of the medium – although audiences
can see what the memorial looks like, they may be unable to attach emotional meaning to the
images, relying instead on the broadcast’s producers. While Kashiwahara’s explanation of
the memorial may be informed by the architect, it nonetheless limits the potential
interpretations available to the audience. Instead, the audience learns how the memorial fits
within the epic frame that dominates the content of the speeches given during the ceremony,
some of which have been discussed above. In addition to potentially limiting the audience’s interpretation of the memorial, the very fact that the ceremony was broadcast live in place of regular programming draws attention to the singularity of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The broadcast of the ceremony is precisely what Dayan and Katz (1992) are referring to in their discussion of media events – a planned interruption of regular programming for a presumably culturally significant event. In the case of the anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, it is not only the media event that is significant, but also the attack itself. By stressing the importance of the anniversary of an event, one cannot help but imply the importance of the remembered event. The singularity of the attack is a recurrent theme on major anniversaries. This is in part due to the insistence that Americans “never forget” Pearl Harbor, as a lesson in complacency and vigilance. But there is also the implication that the attack is so important that it cannot be forgotten. As one survivor said on the thirtieth anniversary of the attack, there is “something there that won’t let us forget” (Herbers, 1971, p. 34).

But there is more than simply not being able to forget. There is the eternal importance of the day itself. Interestingly, this importance is often revealed through a common misquoting of President Roosevelt’s address to Congress. Roosevelt called December 7, 1941, “a date which will live in infamy,” but this is often repeated as “a day which will live in infamy.” Of course, this has very little effect on the practical application of the phrase, but it does shift the importance from the date (December 7) to what happened on that day. It is not as important to recall specifically when the attack occurred, as long as we remember what occurred. And what occurred, when viewed through the epic frame, was important indeed.
Without an especially dramatic setback, it is difficult for a warlike hero (or heroes) to demonstrate their heroic nature. The attack on Pearl Harbor was, as described in the *Los Angeles Times* near the anniversary of the attack in 1988, “an apocalyptic event” after which “the world changed forever.” The attack came during “another era, when heroism was frequent, courage was commonplace, purposes were clear and war was just” (Mott, 1988). Similarly, an op-ed in the *New York Times* on the fiftieth anniversary in 1991, described the attack as the point at which “The country seemed to have become in an instant true and right” (Baker, 1991, p. 23). This sentiment was also expressed in the official commemoration of the attack.

Official statements on the importance of the attack were prominent during the fiftieth anniversary commemoration ceremonies. Dick Cheney claimed that the day can be viewed as a divider, with everything that came before distinctly different from everything that came after. President Bush described it as a day that Americans lost their innocence (Department of Defense, 1991). These sentiments support the epic frame of the story of the attack, but they also establish similar future events, which, based on the epic understanding of the attack, will inevitably occur, as equally important. The framing of the attack on Pearl Harbor, especially in the official commemorative ceremony, creates a link between that event and future “sneak attacks,” including the association of the attack with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, discussed in the next chapter.

**Pearl Harbor at the Turn of the Century**

The fiftieth anniversary of World War II, and the media events that celebrated it, inspired renewed popular interest in the war, leading to numerous popular representations of
the war, especially in the movie theater. *Saving Private Ryan* became a new benchmark by which to measure the war film while *The Thin Red Line* provided a more cerebral examination of men at war. Accompanying this interest was the rise of The History Channel, which was first broadcast to cable customers in January, 1995 (*Winfrey, 1995*). The cable network became known for its numerous World War II documentaries, broadcasting them for as many as twelve hours per day in the first few years of its existence (*Schone, 1997*). While the Nazis and the European Theatre dominated coverage of World War II, Pearl Harbor still had its place as the momentous event that brought the United States actively into the war. Therefore, it is not surprising that the History Channel has produced no fewer than five documentary programs solely about the attack on Pearl Harbor, all of which are available for purchase on DVD (*A&E Television Networks, 2011*). The most prominent of these, however, is the two-hour documentary *Tora Tora Tora: The Real Story of Pearl Harbor* (*Verklan, 2000*). This documentary is unique among the texts analyzed throughout this dissertation because it places the attack within a larger narrative of cultural differences and reconciliation. The filmmakers’ approach to the story of Pearl Harbor is embedded within the comic frame, but the mistakes – in Burke’s (1984) terms of the nature of actors within a comic frame of history to be mistaken rather than vicious – made by the Americans and Japanese go beyond the causes of the attack. In the documentary, the story of Pearl Harbor did not end in 1941 or 1945, but rather is presented as ongoing as the two nations attempt to reconcile their cultural and historical differences.

The documentary highlights the cultural differences between the Japanese and Americans and says that those differences are what “[drove] the two countries into war.” In
its description of the context of the attack, the film focuses on the military atrocities of the Japanese, including the Rape of Nanking. While this was an example of Japanese brutality, in the film it is placed in contrast to the lives of the American servicemen at Pearl Harbor who are shown hula dancing almost immediately following the story of Nanking. Pearl Harbor is described as a “port of serenity and romance,” in direct conflict with the “Rape of Nanking.” While on its own this may fit the tendency of the epic frame to establish the Japanese as evil villains, the documentary also provides a biography of Admiral Yamamoto, the planner of the attack, emphasizing his Harvard education and understanding of American culture. The film points out that Yamamoto did not want to fight the United States but recognized that he had to, providing a human face to the Japanese. The humanity of the Japanese is further emphasized when a Japanese pilot says in an interview that they had expected that war would have been declared and they were unaware that the declaration was delayed. He says “We felt dishonorable.” Another said “A war has to be fought fairly and honestly.”

The Americans also were not excused for their actions. In a discussion of the American internment of its Japanese citizens, one historian interviewed calls the policy a tragedy, saying, “It’s one of the bad things in American history” and something worth “being ashamed about.” The end of the war is also subject to criticism, as the narrator describes the dropping of the atomic bombs as “a nuclear holocaust.” These actions, like those of the Japanese prior to the war, are not necessarily to be viewed as vicious atrocities, but rather actions that were taken in the midst of a deep cultural divide and military conflict. As one Japanese interviewee states, “If Pearl Harbor hadn’t turned out to be a sneak attack, then perhaps the A-bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki wouldn’t have happened.” In this
way, the History Channel documentary adopts a broad comic frame of the attack – it was just one in a string of mistakes made by both cultures. Importantly, the documentary depicts the efforts of each to reconcile their differences, extending the story of the attack to include later commemorative and memorial efforts.

Perhaps more than any other prominent text on Pearl Harbor from this time period, including the fiftieth anniversary artifacts, the History Channel documentary explores the relationship between the United States and Japan as it pertains to Pearl Harbor. The documentary, through its adoption of a comic perspective and emphasis on the recognition of earlier mistakes caused by cultural differences and misunderstandings, attempts to provide its audience a sense of hope for the future. A representative from the National Park Service describes a commemorative event in 1995 in which 400 Japanese veterans were invited to visit the Arizona Memorial and meet American Pearl Harbor survivors. Although he acknowledges that some, like those mentioned earlier in this chapter, were unable to welcome the Japanese, he says that most were able to put it behind them. In one encounter between a Japanese pilot and an American survivor, the American reportedly said “No. Don’t say sorry, because it was a war between two nations and we were soldiers and it was our duty to fight. There is no need for you or I [sic] to be sorry.” This reflects the attitude of the San Jose Mercury-News editorial discussed above and is an illustration of the comic understanding of the past – everyone makes mistakes, we must learn to move on and forgive. This is the attitude of the History Channel documentary as it concludes with American and Japanese veterans working together to build a monument to peace on one of the Kurile
Islands, where the Japanese attacking fleet originated, hoping that future generations will learn from Pearl Harbor and the horrors of war.

While adopting this extended comic frame for its presentation of Pearl Harbor, the documentary also explicitly rejects the epic, the dominant frame of the period. Lacking in the film, in contrast to other accounts, are individual stories of heroism. These stories are not entirely absent, but are not prominent in the narrative. Even the story of the USS *Nevada*’s attempt to escape the harbor (and the only American ship to get underway during the attack), so celebrated in *Day of Infamy* (Lord, 1956, 1957), is noted instead as a failed, if not hopeless, endeavor. In segments in which the story begins to lean into the epic frame, such as when the narrator says the American response “would be long and relentless” and that “Americans were determined to reclaim victory,” the sentiments were tempered with descriptions of the failures of Kimmel and Short and the insistent need to place blame through eight separate investigations (including the Army and Joint Committee reports). Even the grotesque frame of the revisionists is acknowledged, but challenged in favor of the comic. One interviewee claims that “The American people bear some responsibility for knowing that war was on the horizon on both the European as well as the Asian continents. They think they can get away with doing nothing. So everyone is responsible.”

This dual responsibility is a major piece of the comic framing for the attack. And the extended context of the story as it is presented in *Tora Tora Tora: The Real Story of Pearl Harbor* (Verklan, 2000) allows the documentary to provide a broader understanding of the types of mistakes made by both cultures and how they have attempted to repair them. In this way, the film provides a more complete version of the story than is presented in most
commemorative or fictional accounts of the period. However, as a cable television
documentary, it lacks the popular impact of more widely known and available texts such as
the *Winds of War* saga. Additionally, as a World War II documentary broadcast on a channel
full of similar programs, it is not likely to stand out. While it is regularly repeated (I gained
access to it when it was broadcast in the fall of 2011) and easily available via DVD, it is
likely to attract an audience of primarily those interested in the war. The documentary’s
status as a single show similar to many other shows on one of many cable channels does not
necessarily provide it with the broad appeal of a television event such as the fiftieth
anniversary commemorations on broadcast television or popular blockbuster films such as
the 2001 Michael Bay spectacle, *Pearl Harbor.*

By the time *Pearl Harbor* (Bay, 2001) was released on Memorial Day weekend in
2001, the fiftieth anniversary commemorations of World War II that had dominated much of
the previous decade had ended and the war, including the attack on Pearl Harbor, had faded
into history. As early as 1998 there was little coverage of ceremonies or survivors’ stories
marking the anniversary on the national news and as one commenter put it, “the date that
President Roosevelt said would ‘live in infamy’ … passed into the quiet of history” (Paige,
1999, p. 2). The last widely reported “official” ceremony commemorating the attack
happened on the anniversary of the end of the war in 1995 when President Clinton called the
attack “our darkest dawn” and the moment when “farm boys became sailors and teenagers
grew into men” (Clinton, 1995). Despite the general absence of Pearl Harbor from the
national consciousness as the new century began, the Disney-produced film inspired renewed
interest in the attack and became, especially for younger Americans, a definitive portrayal of what happened on December 7, 1941.

*Pearl Harbor* grossed over $75 million on its opening weekend and was one of the most popular films of the summer of 2001 (Flynn & Nashawaty, 2001). The film was popular despite widespread critical panning and public renunciation of the film’s accuracy. As one historian described it, the film “[used] history as wallpaper” and a review in *Entertainment Weekly* gave the film’s historical accuracy an average score of 2.4 out of 5 (Flynn & Nashawaty, 2001). One screenwriter for the film, Randall Wallace, implied that the film’s version of history was better than the facts, saying, “If it didn’t happen, it should have happened” (Thomas, Foote, Murr, Horn, & Rippel, 2001, p. 46). Some, however, discounted the need for historical accuracy. The film’s star, Ben Affleck, told a reviewer that “This wasn’t The History Channel. There's a lot of interesting stuff that, if the movie turns you on to it, you can follow up on” (Flynn & Nashawaty, 2001). And as another reviewer pointed out, “*Pearl Harbor* does not pretend to be a documentary.” He even suggests that the film can be used as a tool for teachers to “capitalize on the renewed awareness of the events of that period when students return to school this fall” (Peterson, 2001, p. 54). If teachers did indeed use the film in such a manner, they had access to a number of other concurrent representations of the attack. Looking to take advantage of the publicity garnered by the film, National Geographic and Warner Brothers both produced and distributed a number of documentaries on the attack for home video distribution, with a representative from Warner Brothers telling *Billboard* magazine “What we are trying to accomplish – by tying these releases from our partners at the BBC, PBS, and National Geographic to the Disney picture –
is mass visibility” (Peterson, 2001; Sherber, 2001, p. 72). This mass visibility only solidified *Pearl Harbor’s* place at the top of pile when it comes to defining its audience’s collective memory of the attack. While it is possible that audiences, as Affleck suggested, “followed up” on the attack, it is more likely that they let the film’s portrayal speak for itself.

The film is a sweeping spectacle with a running time of nearly three hours. It stars Ben Affleck and Josh Hartnett as young Army pilots Rafe and Danny who have been best friends since childhood. A third major character, Evelyn (played by Kate Beckinsale), is a nurse with whom Rafe falls in love during training on Long Island. The attack on Pearl Harbor is sandwiched between scenes of the Battle of Britain and the Doolittle Raid. Rafe volunteers to join the Royal Air Force and travels to England as a fighter pilot in the spring of 1941. While there, he is shot down and presumed dead. During the summer, Danny and Evelyn, both transferred to Pearl Harbor, begin a love affair that is interrupted when Rafe returns (he had not been killed after all) just a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor. After a bar fight on the night of December 6, the two friends reconcile on the battle field, working together to get their planes into the air and fight back against the Japanese. The two are then recruited by the Army to participate in the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo where Danny is killed by Japanese soldiers encountered after his plane crash lands in China. An epilogue shows Rafe and Evelyn going on to live their lives together after the war.

Danny and Rafe epitomize Burke’s epic hero. As discussed earlier in this dissertation, the epic hero is one with whom the everyday citizen can identify and envision their own efforts to defeat the enemy as on par with the warlike hero (Burke, 1984). Danny and Rafe are clearly intended to represent the “everyday” American. They grew up on farms in
Tennessee; Danny’s father was a veteran of World War I. Once the war begins, the two represent the conflicted attitudes of the American public, with war hawk Rafe volunteering to join the war and isolationist Danny preferring to not look for trouble if he doesn’t have to, although he is willing to fight if provoked. Such identification of the war hero with a perceived “typical American” is by no means unique to *Pearl Harbor*; it is a long established narrative technique. However, such an explicit connection is an essential piece of the establishment of the epic frame. Without this identification it may be difficult for an audience to generalize the heroism of an individual to the greatness of an entire population. The rift that develops between the two friends following Danny’s affair with Evelyn, the woman Rafe loves, provides the filmmakers with an opportunity to further the connection between the characters and the American people. Following the attack, they are able to set aside their differences, becoming unified as a single fighting force determined to strike back at the Japanese and carry the United States to victory.

*Pearl Harbor*’s depiction of the attack is, in some ways, very similar to those in *The Winds of War* and *Tora! Tora! Tora!* Individual stories, with some exceptions including Rafe and Danny, are largely ignored in favor of images of mass chaos. One interesting exception is the images of men burning that were prominent in each of the other two films. The lack of such a detail may be an effect of the filmmakers’ attempts to reach as large of an audience as possible. A review in *Newsweek* pointed out that the film was less bloody than originally imagined, and especially less than previous World War II blockbuster, *Saving Private Ryan*, because Disney wanted to preserve a PG-13 rating. This suggests (not very surprisingly) that children were among the desired audience, a particularly relevant fact given the above
argument that this particular representation of the attack became the primary popular source for information about the attack at the beginning of this century, and was suggested to be used as a teaching tool. Maintaining a lower rating by removing some violent images helped to secure the film’s prominent position in the education of (some members of) the audience on Pearl Harbor.

On one hand, holding such a position draws attention to the historical accuracy of the film. As noted above, Pearl Harbor has been criticized for its lack of accuracy, making it a questionable choice for a tool to teach about the attack. On the other hand, when it comes to the construction of collective memory, the precise accuracy is less important than the attitude embedded within and inspired by a particular account of the past. As a cultural teaching tool, the film’s influence cannot be underestimated. And that influence lies largely in its reinforcement of the epic frame, which by the time of the film’s release and as described thus far in this dissertation, had become the dominant mode of telling the Pearl Harbor story. Pearl Harbor represents the culmination of the epic frame and becomes a reliable depiction of the attack not because it is historically accurate, but because it is culturally accurate – it reinforces not necessarily what audiences know about the attack, but what they feel.

The film reassures audiences that their attitudes toward the attack on Pearl Harbor are appropriate in three ways, including the use of blended history – the apparently seamless integration of actual historical images with those created specifically for a new representation of the past, making it difficult for audiences to distinguish between historical information (in the sense of being documented or factual) and that which has been entirely fabricated. First, Pearl Harbor takes advantage of digital effects to create an “authentic” experience for the
audience—the film provides previously impossible “access” to the battle, placing audience members directly “into the action.” As the description on the back of the film’s 60th Anniversary Commemorative Edition DVD says, “History comes alive” in the film as “astounding visual and audio effects put you at the center of the event that changed the world.” Here, the blockbuster genre becomes perhaps the most important aspect of the film. Airplanes and bullets buzz around the camera and, with digital surround sound effects, they often seem to come from somewhere behind the viewer. Watching the film in a dark theater (or on an advanced home theater system), audience members would be enveloped by the sights and sounds of gunfights and bombing runs. In one scene, through the use of computer-generated visual effects, the camera is attached to a torpedo and the audience follows it as it enters the water and crashes into a ship. Using this same technique, the audience is given a glimpse inside the USS Arizona when it is hit. A cook, to whom the audience had briefly been introduced earlier in the film, is shown peeling potatoes in the galley. The shot then switches to a camera attached to a bomb and the audience falls with it through the deck of the Arizona and into the galley with the cook. He has just a second to recognize what was happening before the bomb explodes, sinking the ship. Later, the camera passes through the deck of the capsized Oklahoma where sailors struggle to stay afloat, hoping that rescuers can get to them in time.

Second, the film adds to its “unprecedented access” to history the repetition of prominent elements of the Pearl Harbor story. Nearly every commonly known story, most of which had been told as pieces of previous epic versions of the narrative, is repeated in Pearl Harbor. This technique reinforces those stories for those who encountered them prior to
seeing the film, but it also may reinforce the cultural reliability of the film if they are encountered after seeing the film. This includes the repetition of initial framing texts such as President Roosevelt’s address to Congress. In the film, the speech is read by the actor portraying Roosevelt (John Voight), and all famous lines are present. Missing from the speech, however, are references to the other attacks of December 7, 1941, leaving Pearl Harbor alone as the single event that changed history. When the attack begins, an announcement is made proclaiming “This is no shit,” a story first related in articles noting the tenth anniversary of the attack in 1951 as a correction of the typically depicted line of “This is no drill!” In a similar repetition, a newsreel photographer picked up by Rafe and Danny as they raced to air field, proclaims that he “didn’t even know [the Japanese] were sore at us,” a line from a sailor reported in Day of Infamy.

Two other repetitions are more famous and more explicitly supportive of the epic frame. The story of Dorie Miller, an African-American cook who grabbed the machine gun of a fallen sailor using it to shoot back at the attacking Japanese planes and who later became the first African-American to receive the Navy Cross, was famous during the war. Miller was widely regarded as a hero, even getting his picture on a propaganda poster (See Figure 5.1). The film provides some background for Miller’s character (played by Cuba Gooding, Jr.) and then repeats his story of using the attack as an opportunity to throw off the bonds of discrimination to fight back and gain ultimate victory. Miller’s story, both historically and in the film is used as an example of the African-American struggle for rights.
Also included in the film is Admiral Yamamoto’s famous declaration that the Japanese had “awakened a sleeping giant” by attacking Pearl Harbor. The story of this supposed quotation demonstrates the influence that a media text can have on our collective memory of the past. Yamamoto never actually said this line, it was written for the end of the film *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (Perry, 2001). It does not appear in *Day of Infamy*, any of Yamamoto’s correspondence, the nonfiction history of the attack, *At Dawn We Slept*, or in Yamamoto’s biography, *The Reluctant Admiral*. The line, although it was never uttered, has come to be a definitive evaluation of the attack and fits well within the epic frame. The image of the United States as a “sleeping giant” illustrates the unprovoked nature of the attack and the threat that the United States represented once it was provoked. The intertextuality of such a quote, and the other repeated stories throughout the film, makes *Pearl Harbor* seem a reliable version of the past. That presumed authenticity is further supported through the presence of blended history.
The film blends history and fiction throughout, beginning with a scene that provides context for the United States’ unwillingness to enter the war. Mirroring the technique of the *Winds of War* miniseries, *Pearl Harbor* shows footage presumably from a newsreel, including the tinny-sounding newsreel announcer. The newsreel eventually blends into color, calling into question how much, if any, of the “newsreel” footage was actually composed of historical images. The filmmakers take this one step further later in the film by presenting some newsreel footage as if the characters were watching it in a movie theater. This may be considered internal blended history – audiences are not only given the impression that the footage is authentic, but the fictional characters are also fully aware of it.

When the attack begins, Danny and Rafe are in their car far from Pearl Harbor. A newsreel photographer is nearby filming the sunrise. He jumps in their car and accompanies them throughout the battle. This may potentially have a dual effect on the audience’s understanding of the past. First, some scenes “filmed” by the photographer are interspersed within the story, signaled by a switch to grainy, black and white images. The transition between the two cameras is smooth because the attack scenes are filmed with a handheld camera, running alongside Danny and Rafe just as some other cameras are attached to planes and bombs, placing the audience within the film’s action. More importantly, however, the presence of the newsreel photographer may suggest that such photographers were present during the attack and that certain images that may have been filmed later, such as those by John Ford discussed throughout this dissertation, may have actually been filmed during the attack. This not only blends history within *Pearl Harbor*, but could also contribute to the blending of history in other artifacts that reuse footage. The attempt to establish *cultural*
reliability in *Pearl Harbor* may inadvertently contribute to the construction of historical reliability in media texts encountered later, even if they were produced earlier as would be the case for someone who chooses to watch the History Channel documentary analyzed in this chapter as a way to “follow up” on the attack after seeing Bay’s film.

*Pearl Harbor* is the culmination of representations of Pearl Harbor. By fitting within the epic frame, repeating stories from previous epic versions of the story, and establishing itself as the primary source of information on the attack, the film represents nearly all of what had emerged from nearly sixty years of popular representations of the attack on Pearl Harbor. As a new century began, it epitomized, at least in a simple, narrative form, American collective memory and understanding of what happened on December 7, 1941. Released in the summer of 2001 and potentially used as a springboard for a deeper examination of the attack, it is likely that the film, and the epic story it tells, was easily recalled by Americans on September 11, 2001, and potentially played a role in defining how they understood and felt they needed to respond to the attacks of that day.

**Conclusion**

The period between 1971 and 2001 witnessed the emergence of a single, dominant frame of the story of Pearl Harbor. While previous years had included prominent examples of the story in the tragic, grotesque, and comic frames, the epic ultimately prevailed as the primary frame through which Americans view the attack. This largely reflects the blending of historical images, constructed shortly after the attack as the country began to unite in the face of war, with contemporary narratives and cultural concerns. Storytellers of Pearl Harbor from 1971 to 2001 responded to contemporary events such as defeat in Vietnam, victory in the
first Gulf War, and the uncertainty of Japanese encroachment into American economics. This is not to say that other frames were entirely absent – I noted above how the comic frame was used in support of the epic – or that the counter-narratives discussed in the previous chapter ceased to exist (see, for example, Stinett, 2001). The fiftieth anniversary of World War II, observed throughout the early 1990s, provided an exigence for holding up the actions of an earlier generation as an example of what can happen if a society becomes complacent and instructions of how good Americans have responded to adversity in the past, and should respond to similar challenges in the present and future. Pearl Harbor survivor James Wire told Newsweek that making a movie about the attack was “great” because it could act as a warning, saying, “Americans have become complacent. They think it can’t happen now. But it can” (Thomas, et al., 2001, p. 44).

The years covered in this chapter also brought about a number of changes to the media landscape. Nearly all of the texts examined were presented to the audience via television and made possible by the spread of satellite and cable technology. More than in any other time, television became the window through which Americans viewed the world and the vehicle through which the past was defined. Commemorative events were broadcast nationally as they happened and television events such as the Winds of War miniseries were broadcast multiple times throughout the 1980s, drawing huge audiences. Broadcast to a population largely made of people without personal recollections of life in 1941, the miniseries was potentially the only prominent representation of the attack some were familiar with outside the classroom.
Despite the impressive audience exposure numbers, television events such as live news coverage of a commemorative ceremony or a massive miniseries, lack repetition (in stark contrast to the seemingly endless repetition of regular television programming), a key component of the construction of collective memory. Although the Winds of War miniseries was rebroadcast and made available on home video (an industry that experienced a large amount of growth in the 1980s), its 18-hour length does not make repeated viewing very practical. The same might be said for the commemorative events discussed in this chapter. Those events were not likely to have been rebroadcast beyond news reports of their happenings, and many were never broadcast at all, they were simply summarized in newspapers. Even a blockbuster film such as Pearl Harbor is likely to attract more viewers over time. Popular films are regularly consumed years after their release via cable television and home video where, unlike the miniseries, they can be watched in a single afternoon or evening.

The impracticality of the miniseries and the ephemerality of the live event are in stark contrast to the simplicity and ubiquity of the image of the listing Arizona, the story of Dorie Miller, and the sound bite of President Roosevelt’s address to Congress – all necessary components of the epic version of the attack. The repetition of these simple stories or images, when taken together across time and media, helps to construct the most basic understanding of Pearl Harbor. The use of these artifacts and the reinforcement of that basic understanding helps to make new versions of the Pearl Harbor story palatable to audiences who come to that new version with preexisting notions of what happened during the attack and what it meant for American history. A story about Pearl Harbor might include any number of fictional
characters and dramas such as those found in *The Winds of War* and *Pearl Harbor*, but they cannot be complete without certain items such as the simple narrative elements mentioned above. In other words, elements that are essential parts of the epic framing of Pearl Harbor are also essential to the Pearl Harbor story itself making it difficult for popular media representations to resist the hegemony of the epic frame.

Of course, media events such as the miniseries or commemoration are not unimportant to the consideration of collective memory. Although people may not be continually reminded of a certain version of the story, that story nonetheless had the potential to reinforce a particular attitude toward history for a significant portion of the population. That attitude then informs future representations of and attitudes toward the past as evidenced by frequent references to the “sleeping giant” quote attributed to Admiral Yamamoto in *Tora! Tora! Tora!* and the high number of intertextual references in *Pearl Harbor*. As I have stated previously, collective memory is much more about feelings and attitudes than about verified facts. So, while television and commemorative events may not specifically be regularly recalled, an examination of them can reveal a sort of snapshot of how collective memory was manifested at the time as well as suggest potential influences for later representations of the same event, or even those that are merely similar.

The artifacts examined in this chapter illustrate the reassertion of the domination of the epic frame in representations and commemorations of Pearl Harbor. If we think of collective memory as an attitude toward the past that is meant to influence actions and understanding in the present, then the epic framing of Pearl Harbor is instructive of how Americans should be constantly vigilant of the threat of a sneak attack and how to
appropriately respond with unity and force should such an attack occur. In the next chapter, I explore the popular association of Pearl Harbor with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the influence of that connection on collective memory of Pearl Harbor in the decade since the attack. The visibility of Pearl Harbor, brought about by the Disney film and the anniversary-inspired interest in World War II, made the comparison, already a somewhat natural connection to make, easy to solidify. Cable and satellite television technology played a large role in linking September 11 to Pearl Harbor as many Americans spent days watching events unfold live on CNN and network news outlets. Additionally, the presence of the Internet changed audiences’ relationship to the news in a way that also affected the way that they remembered Pearl Harbor. The connections were no longer simply present in the media; they were actively constructed by the audience itself. This active construction was also helped along by the growth of the video game industry, exemplified by an increase in the “realism” of the games and the dominance of the first-person-shooter genre which has the potential to allow the player to view a battle from the perspective of an individual directly involved in the action. In the next chapter, in addition to discussing the role that video games play in the framing of Pearl Harbor I examine how two major events of the early twenty-first century, the rise in American use of the Internet and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, both of which played a major role in the continuing construction of Americans’ collective memory of Pearl Harbor.
2001-2011: REVISITING PEARL HARBOR

“I hate to say it, but 9/11 is not December 7. We've got to keep them separate until the final history of the twin towers and Pentagon attacks are written. We don’t know yet how the story will end. We don't know what the history will be.”
- Pearl Harbor Survivor Julius Finnern
(Harper, 2001)

“The spirit Pearl Harbor stirred in Americans does not age, it does not wither and it does not fade. May America always hate injustice and fanaticism and despotism as much as it did 70 years ago, and 10 years ago on 9/11, and today.”
- New York Daily News Editorial
(Remembering the infamy, 2011)

In the spring of 2001, while Hollywood prepared for the release of Pearl Harbor, the proverbial motion picture event of the summer, Pearl Harbor survivor James Wire told Newsweek that the film would remind Americans of the possibility of a sneak attack and make them more vigilant than they had been in recent times (Thomas, et al., 2001). Such a statement assumed, however, that future surprise attacks would fit within the military paradigm of the twentieth century. Wire is not likely to have considered the possibility of an attack on civilians by an organization not affiliated with any national government as the type of attack that needed to be guarded against. Unfortunately, that was the type of attack launched against the United States later that same year, less than four months after the release of the film Wire felt would serve as a warning.

At just before 9 AM on Tuesday, September 11, 2001, a group of Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners and used them as weapons in an attack on the World Trade Center in lower Manhattan and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. One of the planes, whose target was thought to be another government building in Washington, crashed in a
field in rural Pennsylvania. Although the American government had received intelligence suggesting the possibility of an attack in the near future, the country was nonetheless taken by surprise. The surprise of September 11 was likely even more complete than that of Pearl Harbor since the terrorists struck during a time of apparent peace. Compounding the shock of the attack were the live images of the destruction that followed. Many Americans, tuning in after hearing news of the first aircraft crashing into the North tower of the World Trade Center, watched the second aircraft crash into the South tower a few minutes later and, approximately an hour after the second crash, the collapse of the two buildings. Even those only able to listen to the news on the radio were able to hear the sounds and descriptions of the events as they happened. Coverage of the attack would dominate national news and local channels in the coming days and the images of the planes crashing, the buildings burning and collapsing, and people jumping from the upper floors of the towers were virtually inescapable.

Contrast that to the attack on Pearl Harbor nearly sixty years earlier: radio programming was interrupted for a brief announcement made by an individual far from the attack itself. On many stations, regular programs then continued as scheduled. As one man who lived in Chicago at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor reported, he, “like most Americans on December 7, 1941, continued on his daily routine” (Barton, 2001, p. A15). This, of course, was not the case for everybody. One contributor to a collection of Pearl Harbor remembrances said that the concert she was attending was cancelled upon the announcement of the attack (Stannard, 2011). Cancelled shows aside, the media and news landscape changed dramatically between Pearl Harbor and September 11, making the two
attacks very different experiences for American audiences. Despite that difference, the characterization of both attacks as surprises created a distinct associative link between the two events as evidenced by the fact that a search for “9/11” and “Pearl Harbor” on the Lexis-Nexis news database in December, 2011, returned 991 results. This does not include the many articles that may have chosen to not use “9/11” as shorthand for the terrorist attacks. The perceived similarity between the two attacks inevitably led to a number of comparisons, although many people pointed to several key differences. Indeed, one commenter noted in the months following September 11 that “the two events are probably more different than similar” (Hendee, 2001, p. 1A).

There are clearly a number of comparisons that can be made between Pearl Harbor and September 11. But in what way might Americans’ collective memory of Pearl Harbor have influenced their understanding of the terrorist attacks? And how did the comparisons affect their collective memory of Pearl Harbor? As discussed in chapter five, the dominance of the epic frame in representations of Pearl Harbor at the end of the twentieth century was suggestive of how Americans had responded to surprise attacks during peacetime in the past and should respond in the future. The frame also provided reassurance that they could respond to future attacks with similar effect. This framing made Pearl Harbor a valuable historical comparison for Americans struggling to understand and cope with the terrorist attacks of September 11. Put simply, Americans knew how to respond in 2001 in part because of the attitudes embodied within their collective memory of the attack sixty years earlier. Therefore, Pearl Harbor became a valuable teaching tool for those trying to make sense of September 11.
In this chapter, I explore the relationship between September 11 and Americans’ collective memory of Pearl Harbor as that relationship is constructed within popular media discussions of the two events. While that relationship is based on similarities between the two attacks, differences between them introduced new elements to the common framing of Pearl Harbor. Some of those elements, such as the fact that Pearl Harbor was a military base, were not necessary in earlier representations of the attack, but serve to differentiate the two events. Once that information is explicitly inserted into descriptions of Pearl Harbor and then compared to the civilian targets of September 11, it rhetorically trivializes Pearl Harbor, although the epic frame of the American response to that attack is maintained in order to instruct and reassure the public following the terrorist attacks. This introduction of “new” information is a key component in how comparisons of the attacks influenced the collective memory of Pearl Harbor.

There were two major, interrelated developments in the evolution of popular media during the ten years covered in this chapter. The first was the maturity of the Internet and the World Wide Web. The second was the development of the social web in which users collectively contribute content and develop online “communities.” These developments began as early as the 1960s, but did not become major components of the American media landscape until the late 1990s. A third development in the evolution of popular media, the videogame, especially those of the first-person shooter genre, also played a role in building upon American collective memory of Pearl Harbor in the first decade of this century. Through video games, audiences are able to not only watch representations of the past, but to actively participate in the story as it unfolds. In the case of Pearl Harbor, this builds upon the
impression of “unprecedented access” to history discussed regarding the film *Pearl Harbor* in chapter five, providing audiences with a clearer sense of having “been there.” These three developments, when taken together, suggest that the audience may play a central role in the continued construction of collective memory, albeit within the bounds of corporate-controlled and commercially-produced representations of the past. In this chapter, I examine texts that compare Pearl Harbor and September 11 as well as other digital artifacts that involve the audience more directly in their construction. These range from editorials written in the days and weeks following September 11, 2001, to television news coverage of the seventieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 2011.

The texts analyzed in this chapter also include an online Pearl Harbor memorial, the Facebook page of Pacific Historic Parks, an organization associated with the Valor in the Pacific National Monument in Pearl Harbor, and *Rising Sun*, the fifth installment of the immensely popular *Medal of Honor* videogame series. These artifacts, despite the inclusion of the “new” information mentioned above, maintain the epic frame solidified in earlier representations of Pearl Harbor. Since much of the content analyzed in this chapter, including a number of editorials from newspapers across the United States, is created by individuals who might otherwise be considered the audience, the maintenance of the epic illustrates how a single dominant frame can become history and define the way that audiences understand the past. Before analyzing these specific texts, however, I provide a brief overview of the history of the three media developments that play a prominent role in constructing collective memory of Pearl Harbor between September 11, 2001, and December 7, 2011.
The Internet, Videogames, and Audience Participation

In chapter five, I described the rise and convergence of satellite and cable technology that enabled the faster transmission of information and wider dissemination of broadcast signals, especially television. The number of available television channels increased along with audiences’ average viewing time. This trend continued through the first decade of the current century, with daily television viewing increasing from seven hours and forty-seven minutes per household in 2000 to eight hours and twenty-one minutes per day per household in 2009 (Nielsen Company, 2009; Nielsen Media Research, 2004). By the time period covered in this chapter, however, the television was no longer the only source of media entertainment and information in the home. At the same time that television technologies were improving and expanding, the technology that would allow for the Internet to penetrate American homes was also maturing, becoming widely viable in the early 1990s. In this section, I provide a brief overview of the development of the Internet, which media historians Asa Briggs and Peter Burke (2009) describe as “[overshadowing] most other aspects of recent media history” (p. 267), and the social creation of content brought about by the World Wide Web and online social networking sites.

In 1957, at the height of the Cold War, the Department of Defense created the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The agency’s goal was to develop a communications system able to survive a nuclear attack. The result was a decentralized computer network that could continue to function even if some part of the network was damaged. The result was ARPANET, established in 1969 with just four host computers; the number of terminals grew to 213 by 1980 (Gorman & McLean, 2009). The network began
with software written at UCLA and took about two years to become fully operational, with most host computers located within government-supported research sites such as publicly funded universities (Briggs & Burke, 2009; Demers, 2007). ARPANET was connected to other international computer networks and in 1974 Vinton Cerf of Stanford created the term Internet to refer to the network of networks. In 1979, a public Internet, USENET, was developed concurrently with IBM’s BITNET software. These developments included the support of user discussion forums and bulletin boards, increasing the amount and type of information that users could share with one another as well as the ease through which it was accessed. USENET and BITNET would eventually merge with ARPANET, creating the core of the Internet as it exists today. At the time, however, users were mostly limited to researchers and computer experts, a fact that would change with the development of the personal computer in the 1980s (Demers, 2007).

The number of computers connected to the Internet topped 1,000 in 1984, urging lawmakers to put standards and regulations in place including the domain name system (e.g., .com, .edu, and .org). Also during the 1980s, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) became common, providing users relatively cheap access to the Internet via telephone lines. These early ISPs included CompuServe, founded in 1979 and partly owned by Time Warner, and America Online (Briggs & Burke, 2009; Demers, 2007). Despite this relative boom, the Internet did not really gain widespread popular traction. A book published in 1991 by MIT on the future of computing did not mention the Internet at all (Briggs & Burke, 2009). This would change in the early 1990s after Tim Berners-Lee, working in Switzerland for CERN, a physics research institute, created software that allowed for the simple connection and
browsing of Internet sites and called it the World Wide Web (Briggs & Burke, 2009; Demers, 2007). The first graphic interfaced web browser, Mosaic, was released in 1993 from a group at the University of Illinois that would go on to found Netscape Communications (Demers, 2007). The New York Times called Mosaic “the first window into cyberspace” (Briggs & Burke, 2009, pp. 263-264). With the Internet made accessible to a large portion of the American population (although there are some portions of the population that still have very limited access to the Internet today), the number of websites online grew from around 3,000 in 1994 to approximately 110 million in 2006 (Demers, 2007). When the terrorists attacked on September 11, 2001, there were over 300 million Internet users globally, a number that has continued to increase in the decade since, with the number of users in 2007 estimated at 1.3 billion, most of whom live in the United States and Europe (Demers, 2007; Gorman & McLean, 2009).

At least since it began to be widely used in the early 1990s, the Internet has been heralded as a democratic medium due to its decentralized infrastructure and the ability for users to easily upload their own content. The speed at which information can be exchanged via the Internet plays a large role in this characterization as it “helps people achieve their personal and professional goals more efficiently and effectively” by “[reducing] social distance” (Demers, 2007, p. 235). According to some, the Internet “levels the playing field” by allowing individuals to “communicate directly with large numbers of people. They can bypass traditional mass media. They can mass communicate” (p. 236). This assumes, of course, that an individual’s message is able to be easily located by large numbers of people and that the people who would most benefit from the information are able to access the
Internet at all. But as more people gain access to content available via the Internet, they establish communities in which they can share information and opinions, organizing around a common interest or important topic. The Internet, a decentralized network of computers, allows for the decentralization of information. According to media historian David Demers (2007),

In relative terms, traditional mainstream media are losing some of their power to mediate information, news and entertainment. … The printing press stole some power away from political and religious authorities. Now, the mass media are victims of a structural trend that will forever change the way in which people gain knowledge about the world (p. 239).

Audience participation in content creation, beyond the uploading of information related to research, began in the 1970s as the still-developing Internet “offered new and alternative modes of expression” (Gorman & McLean, 2009, p. 239). Virtual communities began to emerge as the Internet’s popularity grew in the 1980s, especially characterized by The Well, founded in 1985. Early online communities led to the creation of social media, simply defined as “Internet-based applications that promote social interaction between participants” (R. E. Page, 2012, p. 5). In addition to the invention of the World Wide Web, major Internet developments that contributed to the development of social media include the bulletin board system developed in 1978, Internet relay chat (IRC) in 1988, wikis in 1995, easy to use blogging software in 1999, and modern social networking sites (e.g., Friendster, MySpace, and Facebook) in 2002. While all of these types of sites allowed users to share information, the standardization of multimedia formats such MP3 in 1994 and Flash
Animation in 1996, allowed for the creation and relatively simple sharing of user-produced audio, animation, and video content, “transforming the Internet from a text-based medium to the richly varied multimodality that is now familiar” (R. E. Page, 2012, p. 7).

This evolution of the Internet contributed to a radical change in the relationship between audiences and the media. Many of the Internet’s most popular sites, including Wikipedia, YouTube, and Facebook, rely on audience participation and user-generated content, leading to continual encouragement of innovation and further development. The importance of social media in the first decade of the twenty-first century was illustrated in 2006 when *Time* magazine declared “You” to be person of the year (Gorman & McLean, 2009). The importance of the audience in building an information community online is also evidenced by the fact that as of 2007, 12 million Americans maintained blogs and, in 2010, there were 145 million registered Twitter users, 500 million active users on Facebook, and over 2 billion daily views of YouTube (Briggs & Burke, 2009; R. E. Page, 2012). And, as of January, 2012, three of the top six most visited sites on the Internet are made up of primarily user-generated content. The other three are search engines, which make the Internet easily accessible to its users (Alexa Internet, 2012).

All of the developments described above made nearly all of the artifacts analyzed in this chapter possible. All of the newspaper articles and editorials comparing Pearl Harbor to September 11 were made easily available to Internet users via search engines, exposing Americans to a wide variety of opinions on the matter in a way that would have been impossible just a few years earlier. Other artifacts, such as an interactive, animated battle map from National Geographic, a personal website, video testimonials of Pearl Harbor
survivors, and messages left on a social networking page would not exist were it not for the development of the Internet. Interestingly in terms of collective memory, what emerges from this collection of sites and artifacts is not a challenge to the dominant framing of Pearl Harbor as established in earlier chapters, but rather the establishment of a community that functions to reinforce a particular frame, whether it is the dominant epic frame or not. I am choosing to describe the individuals involved in the construction of such sites as members of a memory community. A memory community arises when a particular group of people get to know and interact with one another based primarily on a shared interest in some aspect or event of the past (e.g., Pearl Harbor) as well as having access to an environment in which that interest can be expressed and explored (e.g., Facebook). Members of a memory community are able to share their own understanding of the past as well as view that of others. As Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell (2010) found in a study of political blogs, people are more likely to search out information with which they already agree or that supports their own beliefs. It is reasonable to assume that this tendency might also extend to memory communities and, therefore, memory communities are each likely to support a particular way of framing the past. Because they are often focused on a single event or theme and tend to support a narrow range of perspectives, there are necessarily multiple memory communities. So, members of Pearl Harbor memory communities are able to search out others who frame the attack similarly. This means that there are many users, especially those who believe there is a high probability of conspiracy in regards to Pearl Harbor and September 11, who may have created content and web sites dedicated to counter-narratives and alternative frames. However, as I argued in chapter five, the epic frame emerged as the most dominant heading
into the new century. Therefore, for this chapter, I looked to see how that dominant and most popular frame was altered by comparisons to September 11 and the rise of social media.

This is not to say that all representations of Pearl Harbor in the period covered by this chapter were devised within digitally linked social networks. There were also representations developed by mainstream media companies such as National Geographic, but these were often characterized by allowing the audience to interact with and control the flow of information, though not necessarily to produce or edit that information (as would be the case with sites such as Wikipedia). One way this level of interaction is characterized is through the use of videogames as a mode of historical storytelling, as is the case in *Medal of Honor: Rising Sun*, a popular first-person videogame that allows players to “participate” in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Because I will be analyzing that game, I want to add a very brief look at videogames to my history of social media.

We can trace the origins of videogames back even further than the Internet. In the late 1950s, an engineer who had worked on the development of radar and at the Manhattan Project created a device to entertain visitors to the Brookhaven National Laboratory. It was a two-player tennis game, controlled by a button and a knob and displayed on an oscilloscope (Poole, 2004). The invention never left the laboratory and, so, a group of computer scientists at MIT are often credited with creating the first videogame, *Spacewar*, in 1962. The computer program that created the game was shared with other computer scientists across the country and became very popular among them. The first home console gaming system was invented in 1967 and popularized with *Pong* in 1973 (Nielsen, Smith, & Tosca, 2008). A number of systems were sold throughout the 1970s, saturating the market and lowering the
Videogames were thought to be a passing fad until the release of *Space Invaders* in arcades and for home systems in 1978. Over the course of its existence, the game earned over $500 million and demonstrated that videogames could be big business (Poole, 2004).

The first massively successful videogame, *Space Invaders* was based on the simple notion of shooting a series of enemy characters before they killed you. This became the basic premise of a large number of shooting games as the industry continued to mature. Another genre, the racing game, was the first to experiment with the first-person perspective in *Night Driver* in 1976. These two concepts would converge in the early 1990s with the development of the first-person shooter videogames that have since become one of the most popular genres of the medium. The first-person shooter, of which *Medal of Honor: Rising Sun* is an example, allows the player to see the game environment through the eyes of the character, exploring the world and shooting enemies as they appear. The genre began with the 1992 release of *Wolfenstein 3D*, a game in which the player escapes a Nazi castle, shooting untold numbers of German soldiers along the way, and was popularized with the release of *Doom* (similar to *Wolfenstein 3D*, but with aliens) in 1993 (Nielsen, et al., 2008; Poole, 2004).

Following the release of *Space Invaders*, the home videogame industry took off, becoming a major part of the lives of a generation of children, especially young boys. As journalist Steven Poole (2004) puts it, videogames became “part of the cultural furniture” (p. 2). Early computers such as the Commodore series allowed games whose programs were stored on cassette tapes to be played and copied (Poole, 2004). Single-game consoles such as *Pong* were popular, but not as popular as cartridge-based systems such as the Atari 2600 (released in 1977) and the Nintendo Entertainment System (released in 1985). The home
consoles not only contributed to the “cultural furniture,” they also created a very lucrative media market. Atari made approximately $200 million in 1979 (Nielsen, et al., 2008). By the end of the century, Americans were spending more money on videogames than the movies, and individual videogame titles had budgets larger than some films (some projects can cost upwards of $25 million). In 2005, the videogame industry was worth an estimated $7 billion annually and is becoming more and more popular as technology continues to improve (Nielsen, et al., 2008; Poole, 2004).

The popularity and economic importance of videogames are not necessarily enough to warrant serious academic consideration. However, as theorist Ian Bogost (2008) has argued, videogames are built upon a certain set of values that exist external to the game. Therefore, the rules and structure of videogames may act rhetorically in that their “representations of the ordinary world [might] give players new perspectives on the world they inhabit” (p. 122). This creates what Bogost refers to as “procedural rhetoric,” in which completing a structured process such as that which is embedded within a game is a persuasive activity. Procedural rhetoric may be one way that particular ideologies may be reinforced within popular media texts, such as in the 2002 first-person shooter America’s Army: Operations, marketed as a recruitment tool for the United States Army. This was a “major step for the military-entertainment complex,” an illustration of the close relationship between the videogame industry and the military that had existed for a number of years (p. 128). This relationship may be associated with a tendency in the videogame industry to design first-person shooters as realistic war games, with World War II as one of the most popular settings for such games (Nielsen, et al., 2008). World War II may be a popular
historical setting for videogames for a variety of reasons, but one that is particularly relevant to this dissertation is the fact that, due to the epic framing of the war and the positioning of the Allies (especially the United States) as heroic agents of good fighting against an enemy that is unquestionably evil, World War II is not only quite familiar to most audience members, it is also considered relatively unproblematic in terms of its inherent justness and necessity in contrast to the war in Vietnam, for example.

When real-life events such as World War II play a major role in the stories and settings of games such as those in the Medal of Honor series, and we also consider the fact that videogames are “part of the cultural furniture,” it is difficult to deny that they may play a role in the construction of our collective memory of the war, including Pearl Harbor. While games tend more toward representations of fictional events set in the past (a form of interactive historical fiction), major historical battles are occasionally specifically recreated. For instance, in the first two missions of Rising Sun, the attack on Pearl Harbor is explicitly named and players are asked to participate in the defense of the island. In this way, the game can and should be analyzed alongside other, more traditional media artifacts. None of those artifacts, however, can be taken completely on their own.

One major aspect of the videogame console industry since the late 1990s is the consoles’ ability to play other physical media such as DVD and Blu-Ray discs, an approach pioneered by the Playstation 2 in 2000 and continued by most major videogame companies since. Additionally, those consoles are able to connect to the Internet for collaborative gameplay as well as Web browsing and streaming other media such as video or audio (Poole, 2004). This convergence of media technology does not mean that other media are
disappearing or necessarily declining in influence. Indeed, some have pointed out that television and books, in their various forms, are more popular than ever before (Briggs & Burke, 2009). But the technological convergence, not to mention the crossover of content between media through film tie-ins and, in the case of *Rising Sun*, the use of common portions of the Pearl Harbor story, makes it necessary to consider videogames in this analysis. Before discussing the game and other representations of Pearl Harbor from the last decade, however, I want to begin by exploring the relationship between Pearl Harbor and September 11.

**Remembering Shared Sacrifice, Coping with Shared Trauma**

There can be no denial that Pearl Harbor and September 11 were experienced in distinctly different ways by the American people. News of Pearl Harbor arrived slowly, over a matter of days and weeks, with the first images not being published in newspapers and magazines until more than a week after the attack (see chapter 3). September 11, on the other hand, was watched live on television with moving color images and real-time reactions from journalists and analysts. September 11 was an event that many Americans experienced as a national trauma – civilians were attacked and died before their eyes. The immediacy of the media describing the two attacks was not the only difference, however. As has been described as a part of the epic frame of Pearl Harbor discussed throughout this dissertation, Americans banded together following Pearl Harbor, uniting and rising as one to defeat the threat to global democracy and freedom. All Americans, acting as heroically as the sailors and soldiers they were encouraged to emulate, contributed to the war effort. September 11
may have been a shared trauma, but Pearl Harbor resulted in shared sacrifice. This difference lies at the heart of the complex relationship between and comparisons of the two events.

The shared trauma of September 11 affected the mediated construction of Americans’ collective memory of Pearl Harbor and the shared sacrifice of the earlier attack stands as a model for those searching for a lesson on how to live in the post-9/11 world. In this way, those comparing September 11 to Pearl Harbor viewed the 2001 attack through an assumed epic frame. If the two events were as similar as some commenters claimed, then the result would be the same – an ultimate American victory over terrorism achieved through unification toward a common goal. Although the epic frame did not begin to take on a dominant position until well after the end of World War II, the close association between Pearl Harbor and 9/11 meant that it could be adopted almost immediately in regards to the latter attack. There were, however, some more cautious comparisons. One journalist pointed out that Pearl Harbor was significant in American history not because of the attack itself, but rather what came afterward. In order to be able to fully appreciate the significance of an event, we need to take into account what happened next (Gammage, 2003). The prevailing epic frame of September 11, however, does not necessitate waiting. Of course, in the decade since the attack, expectations of “what happened next” have been tempered by reality, calming some of the patriotic fervor of the first few weeks and months.

Those first few weeks and months are the primary focus of my analysis in this section. This is the time at which the most salient connections to Pearl Harbor were made and, therefore, the two events played the largest role in defining how Americans defined each of them. This portion of my analysis differs slightly from that found in the rest of the
dissertation since it involves the comparison of reactions to two events separated by time but inextricably joined in productions of American memory. This portion of my analysis provides a detailed example of a theme that has featured throughout this dissertation – the role of the present in shaping our understanding of the past. As one high school student pointed out in 2001, Pearl Harbor was like 9/11 to an earlier generation, demonstrating how September 11 became a lens through which people understood the earlier attack rather than the other way around (Leonardi, 2011).

Another important element of this analysis is the continued evolution of the newspaper in the Internet era. As discussed above, the Internet made it possible for individuals to access information around the world in a way not previously possible. Many newspapers across the country made their content available online. This means that people searching the Internet for information about September 11 in the days following the attack could have easily encountered opinions from journalists from a number of different sources. To facilitate my analysis of the connection, I began by limiting my search to those articles available via the Lexis-Nexis database that made explicit comparisons between September 11 and Pearl Harbor, avoiding articles whose primary purpose was news reporting. I also eliminated duplicate articles that were syndicated in a number of publications (e.g., Associated Press articles). This left me with 62 articles and transcripts from a variety of sources, 43 of them published or broadcast within one year of the attack. In doing so, I tried to recreate what an Internet user might have encountered when searching news websites for information about the attack and, perhaps, its similarity to Pearl Harbor. However, Internet access is not available to as many people as some older media, a fact that was even more
important in 2001. Therefore, I also included the small number of transcripts of television and radio broadcasts from CBS News, CNN, and National Public Radio (NPR) that were included in the *Lexis-Nexis* search results and met the above criteria. Since I am more concerned about the influence of each attack on the collective understanding and memory of the other and because the specific events of September 11 are not essential to the analysis presented in this dissertation, I did not look for news stories that described the attack, but rather articles written with the purpose of making the comparison or exploring how their subjects understood the two events to be similar or different. My analysis begins with what many of the sources considered to be the similarities of the attacks, but there are also a number of important differences.

Given the apparent similarities between the September 11 and Pearl Harbor attacks – they both occurred without warning at a time when the United States was presumably at peace – and the recent visibility of Pearl Harbor following the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995, the release of *Pearl Harbor* in 2001, as well as the impending sixtieth anniversary commemorations, it is not surprising that Americans turned to the past in order to comprehend the terrorist attacks. A CBS News Poll released on September 12, 2001, found that 60% of Americans felt that comparisons of September 11 and Pearl Harbor were appropriate (98% have been following, 2001). President George W. Bush wrote in his diary on September 11, 2001, “The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today” (Minzesheimer, 2011, p. 1D). The writers of a play performed to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor noted the similarity between the two events. One of them said,
It suddenly seemed as if all the lessons of that former time were aimed directly at the present. The whole program took on a new meaning. It was as if the stories of [Pearl Harbor survivors’] lives became a kind of healing for those of us who are living with 9/11 (Callimachi, 2001, p. C1).

A nationally syndicated columnist wondered if what he was feeling after 9/11 was similar to what people had felt after Pearl Harbor. Interestingly, he makes a point of specifying “The original ‘Pearl Harbor,’ not the movie” while he compares watching the events of September 11 on television to watching a science fiction film, illustrating the way in which we use media representations of all sorts as a way to understand the world around us (C. Page, 2001, p. B5). In a similar statement, a Pearl Harbor survivor interviewed during the sixtieth anniversary in December, 2001, said that his first thought upon seeing the attacks on September 11 was “My God, what’s that? It must be from Hollywood” (Morrison, 2001, p. 10). Statements such as this demonstrate that media artifacts do not only influence the way we understand the world, but that when we are faced with events that we may not be ready to comprehend, the media is the first place many turn for explanations.

Clear connections between the two attacks are made when commenters write statements such as “This is Pearl Harbor for the age of terrorism,” implicitly evoking Americans’ collective memory and understanding of what happened at Pearl Harbor and how the United States responded (C. Page, 2001, p. B5). As I will argue in this section, however, comparisons of the two events are largely superficial and, in fact, may play as large a role in shaping how Americans understand Pearl Harbor as they do September 11. As I mentioned above, American collective memory of Pearl Harbor became instructive of how Americans
should (or would) respond to the attacks of September 11. As one article claimed, the slogan “Remember Pearl Harbor” had rallied Americans together for victory in World War II and “Remember 9/11” would do the same for the younger generations “standing for freedom against terrorism” (Remember 9/11, 2001, p. 16A). One columnist pointed out that those alive during World War II had banded together to win the war and that “We’ve done it before. We can do it again” (C. Page, 2001, p. B5). This application of Pearl Harbor to September 11 establishes the epic frame as the dominant perspective through which to view the terrorist attacks. With the epic framing of Pearl Harbor as the benchmark, and the confidence that victory could once again be achieved, there were few questions as to how to understand September 11. This is different from the epic construction of Americans’ memories of Pearl Harbor because the confidence gained from patriotic references to Pearl Harbor and recollections of World War II precluded some questions about ultimate victory following 9/11. As discussed in chapter three, the epic frame was still very much a part of the initial framing of the attack in 1941, but it did not, and in some ways could not, dominate Pearl Harbor storytelling until after the war had ended and the controversies over who was to blame died down. That was not the case following 9/11 – the epic frame quickly came to dominate American understanding of the attack. It was not until later that the frame was called into question. Illustrative of this, some commenters who compared the two attacks referred to them as “tests” that the United States had faced and had passed or will pass in the future, claiming that Pearl Harbor was a test that Americans were able to pass and wondered if they could do so again (C. Page, 2001).
Just as Americans’ collective memory of Pearl Harbor influenced their understanding of September 11, the comparisons also affected how they understand the attack on Pearl Harbor. As one middle-school student described it during an interview in 2011, Pearl Harbor “was like the 9/11 moment for that generation” (Leonardi, 2011). This shows that, at least for younger Americans, that they specifically use their experience on September 11 to understand Pearl Harbor, rather than vice versa as might be expected given the chronology of the events. Historian Stephen Gillon claimed in an interview with USA Today that 9/11 helped younger generations to better “understand the fear, chaos and uncertainty provoked by Pearl Harbor. All of a sudden, Pearl Harbor is more immediate, more tangible, more relevant” (Minzesheimer, 2011, p. 1D). Along this same line of thought, an editorial published on December 7, 2001, expressed the hope that September 11 would reinforce lessons that were learned at Pearl Harbor, saying,

Perhaps now, as the nation recoils from the shock of Sept. 11, contemporary Americans really appreciate what citizens faced six decades ago after Japanese planes flew out of the blue on a Sunday morning to attack the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor (Remembering Pearl Harbor, 2001, p. A12).

Further evidence of September 11 affecting the way that Americans think of Pearl Harbor can be found in the fact that the sixtieth anniversary in 2001 saw a rise in the number of invitations to speak sent to local Pearl Harbor survivors, whose stories would have contributed to their audiences’ understanding of the event (Harden, 2001). Julius Finnern, a Pearl Harbor survivor, points out that 300 people beyond the military personnel attended an anniversary celebration, a number much larger than it had been in years past, saying “There
were plenty of years where nobody came, nobody called, nobody cared” (Harper, 2001, p. A1). Further illustrating the presumed relevance of 9/11 to understanding Pearl Harbor, the script of a play about Pearl Harbor was rewritten following September 11, especially those portions that used Roosevelt’s words, with the writers choosing pieces of his speech that they felt better represented the feelings following September 11 (Callimachi, 2001). By doing so, the writers attempted to make an explicit link between how audience members thought about Pearl Harbor, September 11, and their similarities. An article about the play claims that Roosevelt’s words – at least those chosen for inclusion in the play – could easily be mistaken for those of President Bush. This illustrates the way that September 11 colored some Americans’ understanding of what Pearl Harbor meant and its role in American history. Within the larger framing of the attacks, September 11 became a lens through which Americans cannot avoid looking when they examine Pearl Harbor. As one article put it, Pearl Harbor gained “added poignancy” following the September 11 attacks (Collinson, 2001). While the epic frame, so dominant at the end of the last chapter, remained largely intact, its importance was minimized by two major differences between the attacks – the greater emotional impact of the terrorist attacks primarily on the civilian population on September 11 as opposed to the military population of Pearl Harbor and the firm knowledge of and how to respond to the Pearl Harbor attackers due to their status as members of a traditional military rather than a loosely affiliated terrorist organization. First, the fact that the Japanese targeted a distant and largely unknown military base in a territory that was not yet a state may have made the attack less traumatic for many Americans than if it had occurred in a major city in the continental United States. Although there were similar casualty numbers
(2,996 killed on 9/11, 2,390 at Pearl Harbor), the majority of those killed on September 11 were civilians rather than military personnel (Stone, 2002). Second, as many articles point out, Pearl Harbor was attacked during a time of war, albeit not in the United States. This means that the attack was not entirely unimaginable and the fact that it was a military attack on a military installation made it seem somehow less severe than the attack on civilians. “This is worse than Pearl Harbor” was a common sentiment among those commenting on the similarities between the two attacks.

An editorial written on September 11 for the Centre Daily Times in State College, Pennsylvania, and reprinted nationally, noted that Americans could then realize what Pearl Harbor “felt like – only much worse.” According to the editorial, the latter attacks were worse because the World Trade Center and Pentagon were the “chambers of America’s heart,” in contrast to the “offshore military base” of Pearl Harbor (A time to unite, 2001). Similar to the sentiment of that article, others claimed that September 11’s “cruel vicious attacks were much more” than Pearl Harbor because they “attacked our heart and soul” (Jamieson, 2001, p. B1). One Pearl Harbor survivor called the terrorist attack “100 times worse” than the Japanese bombing (Magin, 2001, p. A4). Following this line of thought is the important difference between those killed in the attacks. Most Pearl Harbor casualties were military personnel, while most of those killed in 2001 were civilians. As one commenter wrote, “The September attack was not only more devastating in casualties than Pearl Harbor, it took a different psychological toll. It threatened all Americans” (Hendee, 2001, p. A1). Adding to this difference were the erroneous claims that, despite relatively similar death tolls (see above), a significantly larger number of people had died on 9/11. For example, one
article pointed out that the terrorists had targeted over 70,000 people in their attacks and emphasized that no American was safe from attack (Remember 9/11, 2001). Such claims are potentially a result of the sentiment that September 11 was so much worse than Pearl Harbor and, in order for it to be worse, must have had a greater number of casualties.

The claims that September 11 was worse than Pearl Harbor were likely a response to two important factors: the recency of the attacks, placing them within the living memory of everyone writing about them, and the role of live, 24-hour news coverage of the attacks in shaping audiences’ experience of the attacks. These factors, while perfectly valid reasons for feeling that the latter attack was more severe than the previous attack, had two related rhetorical effects: the minimization of the importance of Pearl Harbor and the validation of the severity of the shared trauma of September 11. That validation, in turn, contributed to the solidification of the epic frame. Some commenters explicitly describe a perceived relative lack of influence on American lives in regard to Pearl Harbor. A Gallup Poll taken in December, 2001, found that 72% of Americans believed historians would find September 11 to be more important than Pearl Harbor (Woodruff, 2001a). One article referred to the earlier attack as “remote and unbelievable,” saying that people “didn’t give it much thought” (Barton, 2001, p. A15). As discussed in chapter five, the challenge of Pearl Harbor became a symbol of what Americans of the period had been able to overcome through unity. By establishing September 11 as an even greater challenge than Pearl Harbor, the generation overcoming the latter challenge is rhetorically positioned to be equally as heroic, if not more so, than those who had come before. In other words, the greater the initial defeat, the greater the inevitable victory.
Interestingly, the individuals interviewed in the article about the relative effects of September 11 and Pearl Harbor on daily life were all very young at the time of Pearl Harbor, with some saying that they were playing outside when they heard the news. These members of the population would have been the least likely to understand the implications of the attack and to have their lives affected directly. They then watched the September 11 attacks on television as adults and, therefore, their comparisons come from a completely different perspective, even without regard to the passage of a significant amount of time. This helps to illustrate the slippery nature of memory and the difficulty in understanding how it can be constructed collectively.

Since people tend to find the accounts of those who experienced historical events to be among the most reliable versions of the past (Rosenzweig & Thelen, 1998), we often turn to collections of such accounts to learn not only what happened in the past, but how we should feel about those events. This is particularly evident in relation to Pearl Harbor as those who were alive at the time of the attack began to age. As discussed in chapter five, official commemorations began highlighting the importance of capturing the memories of survivors, a trend that took on added immediacy following September 11 (see, for example, Hadley, 2011). As Michael Ashner, a trustee of the National World War II Museum, wrote in 2011, World War II is moving from living memory to history. We must preserve and pass on the legacy of the Greatest Generation, the details of its experiences in battle and on the home front, its service and sacrifice, so that today's children will know and understand the price of our freedom. Today I urge every American to remember Pearl Harbor (Ashner, 2011, p. A33).
Despite the perceived importance of documenting the stories of survivors, a continuation of an oral history movement that had started as early as the 1980s, some of those old enough to remember Pearl Harbor lament the fact that younger people do not appear to be as concerned about Pearl Harbor, that the attack is “an afterthought in the new generations” (Leonardi, 2011).

In addition to common claims discussed above of September 11 being “worse” than Pearl Harbor, there is a focus on the fact that the United States knew who the enemy was after Pearl Harbor – the Japanese. Terrorism, as an undefinable enemy, was depicted as a much greater threat because there was no nation or clear perpetrator of the attack against whom retaliation could be brought, despite American efforts to the contrary with invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. On one hand, this has the effect of placing Pearl Harbor in an easy-to-define box, simplifying its historical context. The attack becomes divorced from its historical background and the extended disintegration of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan. Instead, it is a seemingly isolated event that started a war, victory in which was neatly secured by the United States. While this view does not explicitly deny the epic frame, it nonetheless ignores the complexity of fighting a two front war, the lack of certainty of outcome at the war’s outset, especially in Europe, the uneasy alliance with the Soviet Union, and the Cold War against Communism that followed World War II – all of which played a role in the epic frame not becoming dominant in framing Pearl Harbor until well after the attack.

The acknowledgement of victory was one way that the epic frame of the Pearl Harbor story was maintained throughout comparisons to September 11, but the denial of the
historical complexity of that victory, the uncertainty of the enemy’s identity, and the
beginning of the War on Terror makes the aftermath of 9/11 seem a more threatening
environment and validates the common assumption of September 11 being “worse” than
Pearl Harbor. However, despite the insistence that Pearl Harbor did not have much of an
immediate negative effect on the lives of most Americans, some returned to the epic notion
of the citizens coming together and rising as one to meet the challenge of World War II and
contrasted that to an apparent lack of shared sacrifice during the War on Terror.

One article suggests that the prolonged trauma of 9/11 is due to a lack of knowing
what to do or how to respond, pointing out conflicting signals from the Bush administration,
who told people to live their normal lives while also looking out for possible terrorist
activity. The article points out that the resulting war on terror was something distant to most
people (D. S. Broder, 2001). This is in contrast to the “shared sacrifice” of Americans
following Pearl Harbor. “Shared sacrifice” became a common way to emphasize the
difference between the two attacks in a way that not only counteracted the minimization of
Pearl Harbor discussed above, but also contributed to the instructive nature of the Pearl
Harbor story in regard to September 11. The repeated reference of the phrase “shared
sacrifice” and claims that the “Greatest Generation” made that sacrifice while post-9/11
Americans did not, rhetorically suggested that they should. As one commenter put it, events
such as Pearl Harbor and 9/11 should “remind us of the importance of national unity”
(Ashner, 2011, p. A33). But, as CNN analyst Bill Schneider pointed out in a special on the
sixtieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor, “public involvement and public sacrifice” were
“missing” from the experience of September 11. He noted that Pearl Harbor meant “less trauma” than September 11, but “greater sacrifice” (Woodruff, 2001b).

The theme of shared sacrifice is continued in a number of media commentaries. A Pearl Harbor survivor interviewed in one article described Pearl Harbor as “more ominous” because of the global threat of the Japanese and Germans and belittles President Bush’s post-9/11 request that Americans go on living their lives, pointing out that the level of sacrifice needed to win World War II made doing that impossible following Pearl Harbor (Parker, 2001, p. A1). As one journalist writing for a newspaper in Tennessee noted,

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, every American knew that our lives had been changed, even those of us who were so young we could hardly grasp the enormity of what had happened. Within a week, we were dealing not just with the first casualty reports but with shortages and impending rationing. Higher taxes were soon to come, and even 12-year-olds like me were recruited to help out on local farms to replace the men who had gone off to war (D. Broder, 2002, p. B6).

Historian Stephen Gillon pointed out in USA Today that “Pearl Harbor inspired a sense of shared sacrifice that impacted the lives of every citizen.” But now, “most of us have gone about our daily lives without interruption, allowing a small group to bear the burden of war” (Minzesheimer, 2011, p. 1D).

Despite only a small group being asked to “bear the burden of war,” some commenters illustrated the instructive nature of our understanding of Pearl Harbor by comparing the patriotic attitudes and actions of Americans following September 11 to those after Pearl Harbor and making an explicit call for unity, making direct references to the
earlier attack and expressing a desire for the response to 9/11 to match that of Pearl Harbor. As one article said, the “mobilization” that followed Pearl Harbor “irrevocably changed the relationship of this nation to its citizens. In that sense, we hope that those who compare the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 to Pearl Harbor are right” (What Pearl Harbor wrought, 2001, p. B6). Hoping that Americans would follow the example of the previous generation was a common sentiment immediately following the terrorist attacks and was acknowledged as late as the seventieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor in 2011.

During the sixtieth anniversary commemoration, Chief of Naval Operations Vern Clark told attendees (and a live, national television audience), that remembering Pearl Harbor gives Americans “strength” during a time in which “we are at war again, our homeland attacked.” He goes on to say that in order “to win, we must show the same dedication, the same fortitude and perseverance that our forefathers displayed during the Second World War. And I have every confidence that we will do so” (Clark, 2001). A number of editorials published in the weeks following September 11 argued that unity was essential to sustaining a long fight against terrorism (see, for example, VanDyk, 2001). This sentiment did not fade ten years after 9/11. Instead, unity became a theme of reassurance that the United States had responded appropriately and successfully to the terrorist threat, once again connecting that response to the unified efforts of those who had come before. As one editorial put it, “the spirit Pearl Harbor stirred in Americans does not age, it does not wither and it does not fade” (Remembering the infamy, 2011, p. 36). This sentiment was echoed in a number of “official” statements on the seventieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor. In a message to a group of Pearl Harbor survivors, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta claimed that the “9/11 generation” is
“this nation’s next greatest generation,” and that “your example inspires those in uniform today, strengthens our nation's moral fiber, and proves that with united resolve our country can surmount any challenge” (Panetta, 2011, para. 6, 7). Similarly, Congressman Eric Cantor (2011) claimed that Americans had “stepped forward” just as they had done after Pearl Harbor while President Barack Obama said in his statement on Pearl Harbor Day, 2011, that today’s Americans carry on the work of the Pearl Harbor and World War II generation who “remind us that no challenge is too great when Americans stand as one” (Obama, 2011, para. 2).

Claims such as these, when compared to statements about an absence of shared sacrifice following September 11, raise the question of what united actions – beyond the heroism of the military – were taken to combat terrorism. Some equated displaying the American flag and donating to charities or relief funds with working in factories or children collecting pennies during World War II (Remembering Pearl Harbor, 2001). Others created a connection that gained popular rhetorical purchase: identifying police and fire personnel as equivalent to military heroes. If Pearl Harbor was to be viewed through the epic frame and held up as a model for post-9/11 Americans, a group of individuals needed to play the role of the soldiers and sailors killed at Pearl Harbor. The rescue workers, over 400 of whom were killed responding to the attacks including 341 firefighters (Grady & Revkin, 2002), take on that role in popular discourse concerning the terrorist attacks. Tom Brokaw, who coined the term “greatest generation,” discusses the firefighters and police in an interview about Pearl Harbor saying, “They’re the real heroes.” The connection between them was made even clearer in a report broadcast on the CBS Evening News on December 6, 2001, in which New
York City Police Chief Joe Pfeiffer claimed he could “understand what they felt … 60 years ago. You know, we lost brothers, husbands, sons and fathers, and the same feeling that they felt 60 years ago, we're feeling now” (Blackstone, 2001). This same sentiment was expressed in a number of articles mentioning Pearl Harbor survivors and September 11 rescue workers together (see, for example, Magin, 2001). It is not only the hard work of these “heroes” that Americans were meant to learn from, however. Americans are also expected to look to the aftermath of Pearl Harbor for instructive social changes and mistakes.

One portion of the Pearl Harbor story that fits within the epic frame is the understanding of December 7, 1941, as a singular point at which the world changed. September 11 was seen similarly, with one survivor saying, “Before December 7 and after December 7, the world stopped and you entered a new world. So you do now” (Swearingen, 2001, p. A1). As one commenter put it after September 11, Pearl Harbor was “the sound and fury of modern America being born” (What Pearl Harbor wrought, 2001, p. B6). The article goes on to applaud advances in gender and race relations during and after World War II. A number of other articles note the entry of women into the workforce during the war (see, for example, Swearingen, 2001).¹

But Pearl Harbor is not only instructive because of perceived positive social changes; it also serves as a warning of actions that need to be avoided. In the years since September 11, a new portion of the Pearl Harbor story has become commonplace – the internment of

¹ While there were a number of articles that mentioned such developments during World War II, none of them mention that many women returned to the home following the war and that full racial integration in American society was decades away. Omitting such information shapes the way that we understand the effect of the war on American society and how we collectively remember postwar culture, but since it is not directly related to Pearl Harbor, I have chosen not to include a detailed analysis of it here.
Japanese, German, and Italian Americans following the attack. Americans were, of course, long aware of the internment camps. However, there had never been a way to fit them into the dominant epic framing of Pearl Harbor without damaging that frame. As the story of Pearl Harbor became more instructive following September 11, however, they became rhetorically useful as a warning as well as an example of how the United States had progressed during the intervening sixty years. After the terrorist attacks, Americans were warned about the dangers of retaliating against all Muslims for the actions of a few, with the subject of the internment camps repeatedly used to illustrate the point.

References to the internment camps were used as warnings as early as September 12. One commenter, who had described the World Trade Center as the heart and soul of the United States, used the camps and stories of police brutality toward Muslims following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as warnings about the dangers of blaming all portions of a particular population (Jamieson, 2001). This was reiterated in a front page story in the San Jose Mercury-News in December which stated,

Pearl Harbor still stands as a guide for a shaken nation on how to proceed through these difficult times. Looking back with dismay at the treatment of Japanese-Americans, for example, serves to inform dealings with those of Middle Eastern descent (Early, 2001, p. 1A).

Stephen Gillon also shared this sentiment, claiming that we had learned from the mistakes of Pearl Harbor how to “[balance] legitimate security interests with unfounded fears” (Minzesheimer, 2011, p. 1D). Emphasizing this portion of the American response to Pearl Harbor deals a minor blow to the credibility of the epic frame, opening the door for potential
criticisms. But the camps’ association with September 11 and the fact that the mistake was not repeated helps to support the epic frame, using it as yet another example of how a united America emerged from the aftermath of Pearl Harbor as a better nation. In other words, the internment camps were not the same kind of logical blow dealt by the revisionists following the revelation of possible American complicity in the attack and it did not endanger the dominance of the epic frame. It does, however, differentiate the Pearl Harbor response from that of September 11 although, in reality, neither can ever be fully understood outside of American memory and understanding of the other.

In summary, the relationship between Pearl Harbor and September 11 explored in this section illustrates and cements the hegemonic position of the epic frame. The frame’s stability allowed for it to be easily adopted after September 11 and that adoption made it more difficult to counter the attitudes encouraged by an epic understanding of Pearl Harbor. Because the epic frame had gained dominance in the closing decades of the previous century, when Americans turned to Pearl Harbor for instruction and reassurance following September 11, it was easy for them to accept the epic frame as a viable way of understanding the latter attack. And, by employing the epic frame for understanding September 11, the frame’s position of dominance was secured because to call the epic frame of Pearl Harbor into question would necessarily call the dominant response to 9/11 into question as well. Therefore, it became nearly impossible for any counter-framing of Pearl Harbor to gain secure footing moving forward through the development of online memory communities, reliant on preexisting attitudes toward the past, as will be discussed in the next section.
Memory Communities and Pearl Harbor Online

In the last decade, it has become nearly impossible to think of Pearl Harbor without some reference to September 11. As discussed in the previous section, the terrorist attacks have colored Americans’ collective memory of the bombing, but they have done little to challenge the dominant position of the epic frame within which the Pearl Harbor story is most often told. In fact, one may consider the epic frame to have gained an even greater hold upon popular representations of Pearl Harbor for at least two reasons. First, explored above, if Pearl Harbor is meant to be instructive of how Americans can and should deal with traumatic events such as 9/11, then challenging the epic frame may call into question Americans’ ability to cope with an event such as September 11. Secondly, as will be discussed in this section, the Internet has given voice to a number of individuals expressly concerned with the preservation of the memory of Pearl Harbor. Most websites dedicated to the subject are presented as online memorials or collections of survivors’ stories. Such sites are often maintained by survivors or veterans groups or other members of “The Greatest Generation,” many of whom view that title as a matter of pride. The epic frame celebrates the achievements of the war-like hero, but it also allows for the hero’s characteristics to be shared among everyday citizens. Therefore, the epic frame allows all Americans who played a role in the war or feel a connection to that earlier generation to embrace their victories and, for the most part, overlook their shortcomings. It should not be surprising, then, that the content those interested in remembering Pearl Harbor create and contribute to online should be embedded within an epic perspective.
There are a large number of websites dedicated to Pearl Harbor on the Internet. A Google search for “Remember Pearl Harbor” returns more than 7.5 million results. Many of these sites are news sites reporting on the recent (at the time of writing) 70th anniversary commemorations. Others are sites developed by large corporate or institutional interests, such as the Pearl Harbor Attack Map from National Geographic (analyzed later in this chapter). Some, however, are personal websites constructed and maintained by individuals. Given the nature of community inherent in the Internet as discussed in my history of its development, I felt that examining some of these personal sites could provide valuable insight into the state of American collective memory of Pearl Harbor at the start of the twenty-first century. Such sites have no obvious political agenda or media market to reach and are, therefore, less obviously rhetorical. Nonetheless, their own understanding of Pearl Harbor has been colored by decades of mediated stories, representations, and recreations and they still view the event through a particular frame, even if that frame is presumably and apparently without ulterior motives. Google’s search system places the most relevant and visited sites near the top of search results, indicating that the site is one of the most frequently visited by those conducting a similar search. Therefore, when conducting my analysis, I looked for personal sites appearing near the top of the Google search results, but only if they included extensive amounts of information about the attack or large collections of survivors’ stories. By doing so, I limited my analysis to sites that are relatively frequently visited by those interested in Pearl Harbor and include enough information to potentially influence the visitors’ attitudes toward the attack. The first site I chose to analyze is Pearl Harbor: Remembered, the first personal site, and the third overall result, of the Google search for
“Remember Pearl Harbor,” placing the site among the most frequently visited Pearl Harbor sites, at least within the community of those interested in maintaining the memory of the attack.

*Pearl Harbor: Remembered* (PHR) is a site “created to honor the survivors of Pearl Harbor, their families and friends and to [sic] those who died during the attack on that Sunday morning in December, 1941” (Schaaf, 2007). This description of the site’s purpose illustrates the importance of honoring the lives of those closely connected to the Pearl Harbor attack. In this way, PHR is emblematic of many personal websites on Pearl Harbor – they are meant as memorials to insure that Pearl Harbor is not forgotten. Most personal sites focus primarily on the American soldiers and sailors present during the attack, ignoring both the Japanese participants and the American government and military officials engaged in diplomatic negotiations and failed intelligence gathering prior to December 7. In other words, a focus on the victims and survivors, like most other examples of the epic frame discussed in this dissertation, largely divorces Pearl Harbor from its complex history. One page within the PHR site, “A Brief Overview of the Attack,” mentions only that the Japanese attacked without warning and then enumerates the loss of ships in the attack. Likewise, the site’s “Timeline of Events” covers only the day of the attack.

While, as is not uncommon, PHR includes nothing about the background of the attack, there is also nearly no mention of the American response to the attack. While the beginning of active American involvement in the war is mentioned and the popularity of the phrase and song “Remember Pearl Harbor” is described, the eventual American victory in the war does not make an appearance on the site, let alone the declaration of that victory as an
inevitable result of any sort of unified will or effort of the American people that would reveal a dominant epic perspective on the attack. Instead, PHR maintains a much subtler respect for the attack itself. It does not include a discussion of mistakes characteristic of a comic frame, it does not villainize the Japanese as might happen within an epic frame (in fact, the site practically ignores them beyond their generic role as attackers), and it does not subscribe to the grotesque framing of conspiracy theories. In these ways, PHR seems almost arhetorical in its listing of facts with one prominent exception – a page of “Survivors’ Remembrances.” On that page, visitors are greeted by the glorification of the actions of a group of heroes that fits with the common epic perspective of most remembrances. The actions of the survivors are displayed and intended to be models of behavior for everyday citizens to emulate.

Of course, even a site constructed in such a way that seems to be without a single, dominant frame such as PHR is never truly arhetorical. Simply by insisting that the “memory” of Pearl Harbor be kept alive, the site is establishing the attack as an important event in history. And, given its focus on American losses during the attack rather than Japanese circumstances prior to the attack, it is an important event particularly in American history. While this does not necessarily match the structure of the epic frame as defined in this dissertation, it nonetheless acknowledges December 7, 1941, as an important date worthy of remembrance. The simple insistence that the attack be remembered implies that it can provide the audience of the present – the time during which the site is visited and the attack is remembered – with valuable insights into how the nation and perhaps the world arrived at this present point in history. This rhetorical effect is amplified by the fact that this is a personal website rather than a corporate or government construction of Pearl Harbor. In this
way, it becomes evidence not just that Pearl Harbor should be remembered, but that everyday citizens are keeping the “memory” alive, even as those old enough to have been alive at the time of the attack are lost. As a CBS News report linking Pearl Harbor to September 11 emphasized, simply remembering Pearl Harbor can be considered a patriotic act because it means that the lessons of that day may continue to guide American thought and action. The pledge to remember is enough, according to the report, to reassure Pearl Harbor veterans that “they'll be leaving the country in good hands” (Blackstone, 2001).

Even though they cannot use it to communicate directly with one another, PHR is a site at which a community dedicated to preserving the memory of Pearl Harbor in American history can “gather” to reiterate the importance of the attack. In this way, it is the existence of PHR and its role in perpetuating a particularly American version of what happened on that morning that contribute to the outward production of collective memory and reveal the level of prominence of the attack in the minds of some Americans. Other sites, however, frame the attack more explicitly while still performing the same functions for the memory community as PHR.

One such site, linked from the PHR homepage, is an online memorial dedicated to the USS Utah, a target ship sunk during the attack on Pearl Harbor (Sumner, 2010). The site was built within, and presents a view through, the epic frame much more obviously than PHR by explicitly connecting Pearl Harbor to September 11. The site declares in red capital letters on its homepage, “Remember Pearl Harbor! Remember 9/11/2001! Two days of infamy!” The construction of the attacks as “two days of infamy” does not allow for the same kinds of differences between the attacks discussed in the previous section. Instead, the two
are presented as nearly identical. In a message from Ed Chappell, president of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the site expresses dismay that the organization had failed to “keep America alert” by perpetuating the memory of Pearl Harbor, overlooking the fact that protection against “another Pearl Harbor” is not likely to have prevented September 11. Along with this close identification of the two attacks, the site’s homepage concludes with the declaration that it is dedicated to “the Armed Forces of the US and our brave allies who are now risking their lives to eradicate the evil face of terrorism from the earth! FREEDOM WILL PREVAIL!” Since the site links the two attacks so closely, victory in World War II, key to understanding Pearl Harbor within an epic frame, is the model by which war on terror is believed to be based. Victory is inevitable, freedom will prevail. Through this connection to September 11, the epic frame becomes the only alternative – if we view Pearl Harbor differently, we will have no choice but to also view September 11 differently, acknowledging the possibility of a different outcome – unfathomable within the site’s worldview where freedom will always emerge victorious against the evil face of terrorism.

In addition to reinforcing the epic frame in this way, the Utah site also attempts to expand the definition of who can be considered as the hero/model for everyday Americans in regard to Pearl Harbor. The Utah site’s stated mission is to “further USS Utah’s Internet presence.” In other words, it is meant to establish a place within the Pearl Harbor memory community, expanding upon the dominant presentation of the attack, such as that included on “official” websites (i.e., the National Park Service’s website on the Valor in the Pacific National Monument, discussed later in this chapter), which tends to focus most of its “remembrance” upon the Arizona. While this is understandable given the enormous loss of
life on the *Arizona*, the *Utah* site is “dedicated” to the 58 men killed on the target ship as well as “our veterans of all wars” and “those of our ranks who have now joined the staff of the ‘Supreme Commander.’” With this dedication, the site mirrors the epic frame in expanding honor to everyone. Just as all Americans are given the credit for victory in the war following Pearl Harbor, the *Utah* site suggests that all those killed at Pearl Harbor deserve individual recognition for their sacrifice.

Interestingly, the site models its “Virtual Monument” after the marble wall within the physical *Arizona* Memorial on which the names of those killed on the more famous ship are carved. While most of the *Utah* site has a solid-color, teal background, the Virtual Monument has a marble-textured background and lists the names of those killed alphabetically in columns. Below the list of names, the lyrics of the Navy Hymn (“Eternal Father, Strong to Save”), often sung at Navy funerals, are printed. This presumably bestows upon the *Utah’s* dead the same honor given to those on the *Arizona*, although this Virtual Monument is lacking the visibility and permanence of the more famous ship. This reveals an important limitation in the effect of a website, and particularly a personal website, on the construction of collective memory. The memory community of which the *Utah* site is a part is limited by those not only with a previous interest in Pearl Harbor, but to those with Internet access and the ability to successfully search for and navigate the site. Therefore, it would be difficult for the *Utah* site to fully integrate those killed on the target ship into the larger story of Pearl Harbor. The story told by those involved with the *Arizona* will always remain dominant, and those sailors, or the entirety of those killed at Pearl Harbor as a nameless group, will always be the ones after whom the everyday Americans that went on to victory will be modeled. In
other words, despite the wide reach possible by a website, its obscurity and relatively limited audience – due primarily to the site’s focus on the Utah and less professional production and promotion – prevent it from being a major contributor to collective memory.

Despite this, a personal website can still provide a space in which the Pearl Harbor memory community can express the perceived importance of that date. And unlike PHR, the Utah site initially facilitated some level of public communal remembering using a guestbook. Unfortunately, the guestbook on the Utah site is no longer active and its entries have been lost. It is reasonable to assume, however, that a portion of the site’s more than 371,000 visitors either read or contributed to the guestbook, possibly sharing stories of their time aboard the Utah or their thoughts on Pearl Harbor more generally. This activity allows those who are actively participating in the production of the memory of Pearl Harbor to build the story of the attack and express the feelings and meanings associated with it publicly, creating a visible memory community and potentially reinforcing not only one another’s “memories” of the attack, but also more dominant, “official” versions of the attack prominent in the media which have unavoidably colored their own thoughts.

Although the guestbook aspect of the Utah site has become inactive, the community effect is still visible on Facebook page of Pacific Historic Parks, an organization associated with the Valor in the Pacific National Monument. Facebook is the most popular online social network in the United States. It allows individuals to connect with people with whom they have something in common, including geographic location, or attendance of the same high school or college. Many people use it as a means of reconnecting with friends from earlier periods in their lives. But individuals may also be introduced to one another online through a
common interest in a certain genre of movies or music. An individual or organization may then start a group within Facebook that anyone may read or contribute to. Users can share their thoughts, links to relevant information on the web, or comment on information posted by others. An online community may then arise in which members become more familiar with one another, potentially developing some form of online relationship. Most relevant to this dissertation are the memory communities that may arise from users with a shared interest in the past and gathered in a group dedicated to that interest. Pacific Historic Parks is an organization that “supports and funds educational materials, museum exhibits, and interpretive programs” for national parks throughout the Pacific (Pacific Historic Parks, 2010). Prior to 2010, the organization was known as the Arizona Memorial Museum Association, indicating its roots and primary focus on the Arizona memorial at Pearl Harbor, the primary attraction within the World War II: Valor in the Pacific National Monument.

While anyone is able to post to the Facebook page, which is “liked” by nearly 600 people, most of the posts are from representatives of Pacific Historic Parks (PHP). These posts are mostly links to articles and news stories that are relevant to Pearl Harbor and World War II, but PHP also uses the page as a way to take and answer questions about the operation of the park (e.g., hours, ticket procedures) as well as to announce events (Pacific Historic Parks, 2011). Included among the shared links and articles are a number of posts dedicated to diversity and inclusion within the World War II story such as a photograph of a naturalization ceremony held in the park, a link to a news story about the 442nd Regimental Combat Team (a group of Japanese-American war heroes, including the future Senator from Hawaii, Daniel Inouye, and the most decorated unit of the war), the internment camps, and
the first black marines in combat early in the war. Stories such as these function as a kind of rhetorical rebuttal to the focus on the internment camps in comparisons to September 11 discussed earlier in this chapter, but they also help to reinforce the epic frame through expansion. Stories such as those listed above demonstrate that people of all races contributed to the American victory in World War II, including the Japanese, and draw attention to the gains in American race relations following the war. In other words, the inclusion of these stories on a group page about Pearl Harbor places social victory within the realm of the epic frame, more obviously prominent on the park’s official website, run by National Park Service.²

The official name of the park in which Pearl Harbor and its associated memorials is located is the World War II: Valor in the Pacific National Monument authorized by President George W. Bush in 2008 (National Park Service, 2011). The entire “monument” includes Pearl Harbor as well as sites in Alaska and California. Most information on the site, however, focuses on the Arizona memorial, differentiating that particular portion of the Pearl Harbor attack as one of the most important events of the Pacific war. The site also emphasizes the importance of survivors’ stories, a keystone of the epic frame since the 1980s, because “the story of Pearl Harbor is alive in the memories of those who witnessed the attack. The Pearl Harbor survivors who volunteer at the USS Arizona Memorial tell their story to the public; they truly are living history” (National Park Service, 2011). A statement such as this limits versions of the story that can or should be accepted as reliable history, marginalizing the

² The Pacific Historic Parks website claims to be the official website of the Pearl Harbor memorial site, but the memorial is run by the National Park Service. Therefore, I have chosen to include the NPS site in my analysis rather than that of PHP.
accounts of historians as well as those who may write narratives counter to the dominant version of the story. As the site says on a page titled “Survivors Relive December 7, 1941,” historians “can give us the details of the event. … But beyond these facts and scholarly interpretations, there is another story. It is the riveting tale of the men who were there” (National Park Service, 2011). Additionally, the site includes a set of links to transcripts of oral history testimonies given by Pearl Harbor survivors. Importantly, this reliance upon eyewitness accounts fails to recognize the reality of memory – even though the survivors were present during the attack, their memories have been just as colored by time and media representations as those who were not. While they may be able to describe how they acted or what they saw, their overall understanding of the attack is not likely to stray very far outside the dominant framing of the bombing.

The dominant framing is obvious within the “story” of the attack, according to the site. On one hand, the story presented on the Valor in the Pacific website integrates the mistakenness of the comic frame, but embeds the story of Pearl Harbor within a larger epic frame. The website embeds the Pearl Harbor story within its historical context. While much of the historical blame is placed on Japan with mention of its invasion of China and setting its mind to war in the summer of 1941, the story does acknowledge that the United States and other countries did nothing to stop the early advances of Japan in the 1930s and that “both countries had taken positions from which they could not retreat without a serious loss of national prestige” (National Park Service, 2011). The website explains some of the mistakes made by the Americans, including the interpretation of radar signals as the incoming B-17s, and ends by explaining that “the American people, previously divided over the issue of U.S.
involvement in World War II, rallied together with a total commitment to victory over Japan and her Axis partners.” So, while we may consider the Pearl Harbor story in this case to be told within a combined epic-comic frame, American history is still essentially an epic tale. Fitting with this story is the description of the attack as “a pivotal event in the great American saga” – Pearl Harbor, within the epic frame, becomes a singular day in history, one to look to for a warning and for guidance.

One thing that differentiates the Valor in the Pacific site from other artifacts analyzed in this dissertation is that one portion of it is explicitly dedicated to the education of children. This is one aspect of the Internet that can reshape the way that we understand media representations of Pearl Harbor. Since an artifact such as a website can include multiple layers and levels of information, setting some information aside for a particular purpose is easy for the site’s creators to do and easy for users to access. For example, a documentary film may include a large amount of information, but it only tells the story in one way. Including anything else would require extending the length of the film or attaching information via a different medium (such as a DVD’s special features). The website as a medium, however, is more like a book in that information may be easily separated and users can choose to only look at some portions of it – however, a website is more easily (and cheaply) available to a larger audience than a book and can be updated or modified with very little additional cost. In terms of the construction of collective memory, this means that users are more in control of how the past might be framed. They can search out elements that better fit within in their own frames or they could simply choose information for a specific purpose such as education. Doing so, however, reinforces the frame within which that information
was assembled and published because other information that may counter or alter that frame is easily ignored or overlooked.

The Valor in the Pacific website includes a section for teachers in which the version of the Pearl Harbor story promoted by the monument can be shared with students. Educators can sign up for videoconferencing sessions in which they hear stories from Pearl Harbor survivors and receive a video tour from a park ranger, including a question and answer portion. In this way, students are exposed directly to the “official” version of the Pearl Harbor story, especially through the stories of survivors. The use of survivors’ stories reinforces the necessity of learning about the past from a piece of “living history,” while the story they are told places the Pearl Harbor story within a larger epic framing of American history. In addition to these online sessions, teachers may also download a copy of the *USS Arizona Memorial Junior Ranger Activity Book* (Arizona Memorial Museum Association, 2003).

The activity book includes a number of activities for children to complete as they learn about Pearl Harbor and is the same book given to children who visit the physical memorial. Those who complete it earn the title of Junior Ranger and are given a corresponding patch. Children, accompanied by Koa, a dolphin Ranger, and Honu, a turtle Guide, are encouraged to “Take this historic journey with us to remember what happened on December 7, 1941,” so that they might “come to understand what it means for all of us today” (p. 2). Here they are not *learning* about Pearl Harbor, but *remembering* Pearl Harbor. This is similar to commemorating, but remembering has a different connotation – recalling something that one already knows. This implies that Pearl Harbor is a part of a past common
to everyone: we do not need to learn, we need to remember. This may preclude questioning or re-evaluating of the information received, especially by children who may not have other versions of the story with which to compare the one found within the activity book.

One major way in which the activity book (Arizona Memorial Museum Association, 2003) helps to reinforce the epic frame is by connecting the Pearl Harbor attack to a series of prominent events in American history. In one activity, children are asked to match national monuments with the person or event that they honor. In the activity, Pearl Harbor is placed among other events determined to be important, such as the Louisiana Purchase (honored by the Gateway Arch in St. Louis). The activity not only connects the attack to other important events, but it necessarily associates Pearl Harbor veterans with other American “heroes” such as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Thomas Jefferson whose memorials are all listed in the activity. Interestingly, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is also included in this activity, associating the war and its veterans with “positive” events, contrary to its typical popular depiction. It is as if the activity is intended to rehabilitate the memory of Vietnam in the same way that it amplifies the importance of Pearl Harbor – through association with other memorials, events, and people (p. 11).

The booklet, online tours, and question and answer sessions aim to give children a feeling of having experienced the memorial. They also provide teachers and students with the opportunity to interact with the Pearl Harbor story, actively participating in the construction of how the event is remembered during their own interactions with the site (they cannot add to the site or have any direct influence on how the story is told to other visitors). This participatory element is an important piece of how the advent of the Internet has changed the
way in which collective memory is constructed and maintained. The importance of the Internet and online social networks in the construction of collective memory is especially evident in the content of the PHP Facebook page mentioned above. Users of the page, PHP’s “friends” in Facebook terminology, primarily use the site as an opportunity to gain information about the park. But, they also use it more in the spirit of the memory community. A few tell their own stories or relate the park to those they knew who served, but mostly emphasize how much they learned while visiting the park or how important it is to learn about the event from the Pearl Harbor survivors who often give tours. As one friend wrote, “Seeing a little speckle of history thru the eyes of our survivors at the USS Arizona Memorial is a true honor.” Another said, “It's wonderful to hear history first hand from a Pearl Harbor Veteran” (Pacific Historic Parks, 2011). Comments like these reflect the level of respect toward military veterans, especially Pearl Harbor survivors, and the amount of credibility assigned to their stories. The comments also illustrate the increasing emphasis placed on the stories of eyewitnesses as those veterans age and the attack passes from the living memory of most Americans, not to mention the increased interest in survivors’ stories following 9/11 discussed earlier in this chapter. As Pearl Harbor remains prominent in Americans’ collective consciousness and survivors’ stories become scarce, they become more valued. In the words of one friend, “This site honors our Greatest Generation... And as time goes on, so do they pass... Let's not forget their courage and sacrifice.” These words of praise and expressions of gratitude demonstrate support for the epic portrayal of the Pearl Harbor story. They also illustrate that members of a memory community are likely to share a common frame when

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3 Posts written by “friends” have only been corrected for spelling.
viewing the past and that the community itself reinforces and solidifies the frame as the proper way to remember the particular event that is the object of the community, in this case the attack on Pearl Harbor.

While some friends share their own photos of ceremonies or of their family members who were present during the attack on Pearl Harbor, there are very few stories of or even comments on the attack itself. For this reason, it is difficult to analyze the page from the perspective of Burke’s frames beyond the fact that the friends’ words of agreement help to reinforce frames which have dominated other stories of the attack. Most of the friends are repeat posters, creating a small community in which most people refer to one another in familiar terms. While it’s difficult to determine if the regular posters know one another offline or if the page is their only connection, this small community illustrates the role of this particular Facebook page in the collective memory of Pearl Harbor. The page does not necessarily contribute to the construction of memory in the same way as other texts analyzed in this dissertation – through recreating or summarizing the attack. Instead, it provides a space in which those interested in preserving the memory of Pearl Harbor, whatever their individual frames or memories may be, can interact with one another based on their shared perception of the importance of the attack and its memory. In other words, Facebook does not necessarily shape collective memory so much as it provides a space for users to remember collectively. This is an important distinction. As I have mentioned, collective memory is a collection of feelings and attitudes toward the past which are evident within media representations of the past or a particular event (such as the attack on Pearl Harbor). Collective memory is not, therefore, simply a collection of individual remembrances.
However, examining a group of these remembrances can provide us with some insight on the state of collective memory at the time of their collection. As discussed in chapter five regarding one-time television news reports on Pearl Harbor, sites such as the PHP Facebook page may not provide a lot of information on how the attack is actively being framed, but it can show us how some users have or have not adopted the dominant frame as their own perspective on or attitude toward the past.

A similar opportunity to “remember collectively” is available to users on YouTube. Users of the site can post videos rather than text or images and other users can typically leave comments. However, a YouTube channel (a collection of videos posted by a single user), can also be limited in the amount of interaction with and feedback from users allowed. The National Park Service has created a YouTube channel for the World War II: Valor in the Pacific National Monument (WWIIValorNPS, 2012). The videos primarily include interviews with American and Japanese veterans or those otherwise involved in World War II. There are also videos concerning the expansion of the monument from the original limited scope of the park from just Pearl Harbor and the Arizona to sites in Alaska and California (How to Recycle a Visitor Center and Our Green Park). Of the 14 videos on the channel, there are only two comments and many of the videos have had comments disabled. Disabling the comments removes the opportunity or temptation for abusive comments, but it also prohibits any public expression of resistive readings of the video or discussion about their meaning. As a result, the Valor in the Pacific YouTube channel is much more obviously an

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4 Rather than include separate citations for each video, I have only included a reference to the main YouTube channel. When referencing individual videos, I simply list their titles without a corresponding entry in the works cited list.
opportunity for further reinforcement of dominant and “official” framing of Pearl Harbor than is the PHP Facebook page.

One consistent aspect of the channel’s videos is to establish the historical credibility of the interviews included within them. One such video, “Witness to History,” includes clips from the NBC Radio news broadcast about the attack and Roosevelt’s address to Congress. Another (Rude Awakening) utilizes a variation on the blended history concept, including a reenactment of the action inside a hospital during the attack. Although the clip is clearly labeled as a “Dramatic Reenactment,” it is nonetheless presented in black and white and intended to show viewers “how it was.” While clips such as these helped to establish the credibility of the interviews, the interviews themselves are the primary way that the channel embeds Pearl Harbor within the epic frame. Most interviewees are survivors, building on the common assumption that those stories are superior to others, but also establishing them as heroes. Even interviews with Japanese veterans make the Americans sound predestined for victory. An interview with a Japanese pilot, whose bombing target was the USS West Virginia, tells the story of how he was surprised to encounter the ship later in the war. He was impressed with the Americans’ ability to get the ship going again. Citing the United States’ superior technology, he says “The worst people for Japan to go to war with was [sic] the Americans. How reckless for Japan to fight the US” (I Sank the West Virginia). Views such as this illustrate the impossibility of defeating the United States in the war, implying that the Americans as a nation were too advanced and too strong for the Japanese to succeed. And, since he is referring to the superior technology and manufacturing power of the United States, the pilot is conferring upon all Americans who contributed to the war effort.
domestically the ability to defend their nation militarily. In other words, in line with the epic frame, everyday Americans were able to contribute just as much as the heroes they were encouraged to emulate and support.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, such sentiments are meant to act as a guide for those who recognize similarities between September 11 and Pearl Harbor. The points made concerning the rhetorical use of Pearl Harbor as a story to reassure and instruct the American people following 9/11 hold true in various clips on the Valor in the Pacific YouTube channel (WWIIValorNPS, 2012). Picking up the theme of discussing the internment of Japanese-Americans during the war, one video, “Pay No Heed,” tells the experience of a young Japanese girl whose home was invaded by American military personnel. Another, “Processing Peace,” includes an interview with an American survivor who is not capable of forgiving the Japanese. His story is contrasted with that of another who claims that he holds no resentment toward them. The implications of these stories are that the American response to the Japanese was wrong and we should be able to forgive the Japanese for the attack just as we expect them to forgive us for our treatment of them during the war. As with the direct comparisons to 9/11, these stories act as a warning for how we should stop to think before reacting following September 11. Following the terrorist attacks, Americans can no longer consider Pearl Harbor without also thinking about 9/11 and the lessons many claim we should have learned.

The ability to comment and remember collectively is not the only way that the Internet allows users to “experience” Pearl Harbor through interaction with facts, videos, and interviews. National Geographic created an interactive timeline and map for elementary and
high school teachers to use as an instructional aid for the sixtieth anniversary and to accompany the release of the film *Pearl Harbor*. The map was created and published online prior to September 11, 2001, but remains active today (National Geographic Education, 2001). Users first read a paragraph providing some historical context for the attack. Afterward, they can view a map of Pearl Harbor and are able to click on various times (e.g., 7:55 AM) and locations (e.g., Schofield Barracks) to learn what happened at that time at that location (See Figure 6.1). Some of the times have more events than others and, therefore, links to more places. Each link includes an audio clip or a text transcript of an interview excerpt. In this way, users can hear stories of what it was like at different times in different locations around Pearl Harbor throughout the attack. This provides them with a more micro-level version of the story than is typical among media representations of Pearl Harbor, but the stories, when taken together, nonetheless fit within the epic frame of the more familiar macro-level stories of the attack.

The map’s introductory paragraph unequivocally portrays the Japanese as dangerous aggressors. It describes Japan as “further expanding its empire” and “emboldened by its alliance with Nazi Germany.” It also says that Japan was “menacing Britain’s Pacific colonies.” While these things are true, from a framing perspective, it paints Japan as a dangerous villain and the United States, which used oil embargoes merely “[hoping] to halt Japan’s advance,” as the innocent victim of Japanese aggression planned in secret during fake diplomatic negotiations. While this does not separate the story from its context as many epic versions of Pearl Harbor do, it nonetheless avoids suggestions of American mistakes or responsibility that may be found within other frames such as the comic or grotesque. In other
words, the introduction sets the story up so that it would be difficult to fit it within any frame other than the epic.

One way in which the epic frame is reinforced throughout the stories told on the interactive map is through the description of those who died as true heroes. Most of the survivors’ stories are harrowing tales of near death, but they are nonetheless humble about their role. As one survivor explains “The real heroes are the ones that are still over there. The Arizona, the Utah. … I say those fellows are the heroes. We’re [the survivors] the lucky ones, that’s all.” Importantly, the stories from the map stress that even when they were damaged, the Americans banded together and fought back against the Japanese. When describing the second wave of the attack, a narrator says that although they were “almost helpless, the dry dock ships [fought] back.” After the attack, one survivor highlights the tenacity of the Americans, saying, “These ships are sitting there in the mud. It’s time to raise
the flag, and there’s the American flag flying. Everything is fine.” In this sentiment, the simple act of flying the flag shows the resilience of the Americans and illustrates their will to fight on. But an important piece of the epic frame is not just that the Americans fought on, but that everyday people took on the role of hero to aid in the war effort. One story, from a nurse, highlights the efforts of everybody banding together, saying that while they weren’t prepared for the number of casualties suffered in the attack, they had “no shortage of blood. Civilians, soldiers, sailors, and marines appeared day and night to give blood.”

The most important part of the epic framing of Pearl Harbor, however, is what happened after the attack – what was the ultimate American response? The final point on the timeline describes the Japanese fleet returning to Japan and points out that

In the 44 months of war that will follow, the U.S. Navy will sink every one of the Japanese aircraft carriers, battleships, and cruisers in [the Pearl Harbor] strike force.

And when Japan signs the surrender document on September 2, 1945, among the U.S. warships in Tokyo Bay will be a victim of the attack, the U.S.S. West Virginia.

Not only did the United States fight back and win through to ultimate victory, but they punished the Japanese, sinking all of the ships involved in Pearl Harbor. From this perspective, World War II becomes a war of vengeance, a war in which the United States proved that it could not be bullied.

While being able to click through the events and locations of the Pearl Harbor attack in any order and at any speed provides some level of interactivity with the attack, videogames provide a more complete immersion within simulated action of the attack. *Medal of Honor*, a popular first-person shooter videogame franchise set during World War II,
released sixteen games between 1999 and 2010. *Rising Sun* (Electronic Arts, 2003) is the seventh of these games and features two missions in which the user controls the game’s main character, the USS *California*’s Sergeant Joe Griffin, as he defends Pearl Harbor against attacking Japanese bombers. One gamer who posted a video of him or herself playing the game to YouTube described *Rising Sun* as “Without a doubt, the most realistic war game I have played so far” (Doctor180185, 2008). The first mission involves running through the bowels of the *California*. During the mission the player sees and hears others on the ship dying, many of them burning. This is reminiscent of the scenes in the film *Pearl Harbor* in which viewers are shown places previously inaccessible through the use of computer animation as well as the images of soldiers and sailors on fire in *Tora! Tora! Tora!* and the *Winds of War* miniseries. Although players may or may not be aware of the intertextual references, these aspects of the game’s action reflect which versions of the Pearl Harbor story played a role in its design. And, by emulating the images of earlier representations of the attack, it is also likely that the game’s designers (purposefully or not) employed the same kind of framing that defined their understanding of the event from those earlier artifacts.

Once reaching the deck (“topside”), the player mans an anti-aircraft gun, shooting down a number of Japanese planes as they stream endlessly from the distance. In this case, facts are overlooked for the sake of gameplay: the mission is completed after many planes have been shot and on-screen text informs the player that her mission has been accomplished and the *California* has been defended. This gives the player the impression that American sailors fought back valiantly against the Japanese, driving them away during the first wave of the attack and saving the ship. This is not true, as the *California* was one of the battleships
sunk during the attack. While the accuracy of the portrayal is not necessarily important, the implications of this particular inaccuracy are – the emphasis is placed more upon the efforts of the Americans to push back against the Japanese despite the surprise of the attack, an element of the epic frame, rather than the actual losses in the attack, information that may damage the viability of the epic frame.

This bit of inaccuracy may be a side effect of the videogame medium in which the player must be able to emerge victorious from difficult gameplay. Such an aspect is necessary for the game to maintain popular appeal. If winning is perceived as either too easy or too difficult, the game will hold little appeal for most players. Therefore, they must be able to defeat the enemy, even if the odds are stacked against them. In this way, the videogame is a natural fit to support the epic frame – the odds will always be long, but through patience and superior skill, the player will always be able to win. The notion of victory despite the odds carries over to the second mission in Rising Sun in which the player zooms around the harbor on a gun ship, once again shooting down Japanese planes. The commander, whose voice keeps appearing in the background, cheers the player on and fills her or him in on what is happening, at one point explaining that the Oklahoma is “going belly up” as the gun boat speeds past underneath the falling mast of a listing battleship. The sinking of the Arizona is also depicted when the player sees a bomb hit a ship, splitting it in two. The background music becomes solemn as one character says “Oh my God! We’ve lost the Arizona!” and another says “God help ‘em. This can’t be happening.” The boat continues to zoom around

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5 Coincidentally, keeping in mind the intertextuality of the game and previous versions of the Pearl Harbor story, the California was also the battleship that the Winds of War’s Pug Henry was to take command of prior to the attack but could not do so because it was too badly damaged.
through black smoke, emerging from the smoke and turning to face a recreation of the famous image of the Arizona as it begins to tilt (see Figure 6.2).

Continuing the mission, the player’s gun ship is then asked to escort the Nevada as it attempts to sortie (the ship, in the game and during the attack, ran aground rather than risk being sunk in the entrance to the harbor). An endless stream of Japanese planes fly overhead, with huge numbers of planes visible in the sky. The player is required to shoot down 20 planes in addition to those downed while still on the deck of the California. This gives the impression not only that many Japanese planes were destroyed, but that the attacking force was impossibly large. The Japanese did indeed send a large number of planes (over 300), but only 29 of them were shot down in total. As a viewer named “goomba25” noted in a
comment on the gamer’s video referenced above, “I know this is a game, but you just shot
down more planes than everyone combined did on December 7.” Another, “stormweak,”
underestimated the number of planes actually involved in the attack, but commented “there
were only 183 planes but this scene makes it look like 2000” (Doctor180185, 2008). While
these comments indicate that Rising Sun’s audience (or, at least those watching videos of the
game being played) does not rely solely on the game for their information about the past, but
rather they recognize the inaccuracies and dramatization of the story for the purposes of the
game. Nonetheless, the large number of planes in the air and shot down may still have a
rhetorical influence on how the audience understands Pearl Harbor. By requiring the player
to down such a large number of planes contributes to the epic frame in the same way as the
defense of the California – by giving the impression that the defense of Pearl Harbor was
much more successful for the United States and damaging for the Japanese than it actually
was. Through the game, the players are given the impression that Americans defeated the
Japanese despite the surprise nature of the attack.

This impression is not tempered by the conclusion of the mission. At the conclusion
of the attack mission, sailors are shown celebrating, with one proclaiming, “They’re turning
tail now!” Another says, “I bet they won’t be back any time soon.” One replies, “You got that
right!” This exchange implies not only that the harbor was successfully defended, but that the
Americans were able to defeat the Japanese and chase them away. This contributes to the
epic frame without having to extend the story of Pearl Harbor to include the rest of the war.
Of course, even though all elements of the epic frame are present during these first two
missions, the player goes on to fight throughout the entire Pacific war and emerge victorious.
So, not only was the defense of Pearl Harbor an epic story of American military skill, but the story was repeated over the course of the next four years.

In the game, however, those four years were not really necessary. Victory was won that morning over a gigantic attacking force seemingly without too much trouble. In this way, and also by failing to provide historical background, the game simplifies the events of December 7, 1941, and enhances the actions of the Americans that day. Tempering the epic nature of the story, however, the commander cuts the celebrating sailors off. While one is saying “That was easier than I thought,” the commander says, as the heroic music begins to swell and images are shown of burning ships (another potential intertextual reference to images shown at the end of *Tora! Tora! Tora!*),

Knock it off! Now you listen up, Marines! You take a good, long look. I hope none of you ever see a day like this again. That nobody will ever know what it was like, except maybe the ones who lived through it. You just be damned sure you don’t forget the ones who didn’t.

While the commander’s speech criticizes those who were cheering, it does not correct the sentiments expressed in that cheering. Instead, it implies that the worst part is over, that victory was indeed achieved. It also reinforces the perspective that Pearl Harbor should stand as a lesson that can only be taught by the survivors, that only those who experienced the attack firsthand can legitimately talk about it. It also reinforces the notion that those who died cannot be forgotten, that we must always remember them and honor them as heroes.

Aside from the commander’s dialogue in the gun ship acting as a form of tour guide, giving the player historical information concerning the attack, players of *Rising Sun* receive
very little historical context. There is no background given, no explanation of the causes of
the war or hint that Americans knew that war was on the horizon. Instead, the game provides
the player with emotion through the experience of the chaotic sounds and images of battle
and the frantic pace at which they must react to defeat the incoming Japanese. In some sense,
we might think of the player as receiving the feeling and attitude present within a story told
by a survivor without also receiving any of the factual information included in such a story.
In this way, *Rising Sun* might be thought of as a direct transference of collective memory as
it has been used in this dissertation – a collection of feelings and attitudes toward the past.
But, while the absence of historical information allows the Pearl Harbor story to be told from
within the epic frame, it entirely precludes questioning of the frame because there is literally
nothing to question. This gets at the concept of procedural rhetoric discussed earlier in this
chapter (Bogost, 2008). There is only one way for a player to proceed through history as
presented within a videogame, only one way to emerge victorious. In other words, there are
no questions to ask a videogame – the version of the story presented within the game is the
only option.

**Preventing the Pearl Harbor of the Future**

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the story of Pearl Harbor became intimately
connected to September 11 as a model of how to respond to such situations, reassurance of
eventual American success in that response, and a warning of what can happen when
mistakes are made. Just as many Americans vowed after Pearl Harbor that such an attack
could never be allowed to happen again, many did the same following September 11. One of
the similarities pointed out concerning the two attacks involved overlooking warning signs
(Siegel & Bowers, 2002), something that led to detailed investigations following both attacks. As Ned Kimmel, who has long fought to restore a four-star ranking for his father, Admiral Husband Kimmel, said, “You look at the system and the system broke down,” suggesting that investigations such as that of the 9/11 commission (and, similarly, the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the Congressional Joint Committee discussed in chapter 4) should not be searching for scapegoats, but finding a way in which the system can be made secure, insuring against mistakes and future attacks (Friedman, 2001, p. 1). An important difference between the attacks, however, is that vigilance to protect against a military strike such as that at Pearl Harbor would not necessarily mean that officials are also being vigilant against terrorist attacks such as those of September 11. Following the rise of increased dependence upon internet technologies, there is a third form of possible attack via computer networks – an attack referred to as a “Digital Pearl Harbor” (Mitchell, 2001).

The phrase “Digital Pearl Harbor” makes an interesting rhetorical move by, despite the greater recency and media influence of September 11, choosing Pearl Harbor as the point of reference in explaining the type of attack that may occur in the future. This demonstrates the prominent place that Pearl Harbor still holds in American consciousness and thought in terms of American vulnerability. Significantly, it also suggests that, if Pearl Harbor is meant to be the model by which we respond to such an attack, an appropriate response to a cyber-attack may be military in nature. In other words, the association with Pearl Harbor turns digital attacks into acts of war. This is not to say that nobody refers to a potential “Cyber 9/11” or something similar, but Pearl Harbor is a much more common reference point. For example, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta claimed during his confirmation hearings in
June, 2011, that “the next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a cyber-attack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our financial systems, our governmental systems” (Quain, 2011, para. 7). A few commenters in the days around the tenth anniversary of September 11 pointed out that American companies and government systems were “less secure” than on September 11. This is likely due in part to increased reliance on networked systems, although security experts also warn against human errors that may allow data to be taken from the system or to overlook the signs of an impending attack – just as in Pearl Harbor and on September 11.

Fears of a potential “Digital Pearl Harbor” ensure that the Japanese attack will remain in American consciousness into the foreseeable future, despite the greater visibility of September 11. We are not likely to abandon the Internet as a source of information or an opportunity to connect with others who share our interests. As more information, public and private, is made available online, the potential for a “Digital Pearl Harbor” continues to grow. But, if the epic frame remains as instructive in the future as it was following September 11, Americans will call for one another to unite together in the face of such an attack just as they have done in the past. Or, at least, as they remember they have done.

Conclusion

The collection of artifacts analyzed in this chapter differs from those in previous chapters in one major way. There is a distinct absence of what I referred to in chapter one as landmark artifacts – single artifacts that received significant attention from audiences, making them very visible elements of the Pearl Harbor media ecology. This is indicative of a more general shift away from “mass” media to a much more fragmented and specialized
audience. Most of the artifacts analyzed in this chapter are most likely to appeal to a relatively small, specialized audience – those who have an existing interest in learning more about Pearl Harbor will seek out the internet sites while the audience for *Rising Sun* is likely limited to those familiar with and an interest in first-person shooter videogames. These smaller audiences contrast with the relatively broad general appeal of popular films, television programs, and books discussed in previous chapters. The multiple and diverse artifacts discussed in this chapter represent side effects of three aspects of the time period covered in this chapter. The first two are the passage of time since the attack and since the most recent landmark artifact, the film *Pearl Harbor* in 2001. As the attack recedes further into the past, it begins to fade from living memory. As fewer people are able to recall a particular event, the audience naturally becomes smaller, often made up of those who remember or have some other interest in the event. Due to a potentially shrinking audience, major motion pictures or television shows about a particular event are going to be less likely to be produced as producers may feel that there is a lack of popular interest in the subject. This is not to say that movies or shows about the past are not produced or not popular, only that the selection of particular events is more careful and limited. Additionally, since the 2001 film was released so recently and still enjoys occasional play on television, there is little need for a new major revision of the Pearl Harbor story.

The third aspect of this time period is the development of the Internet and the expansion of media technology to include seemingly limitless options for consumers as well as the opportunity for audiences to create their own outlets. In other words, media content became diluted in a way during the first decade of the twenty-first century. The Internet
provides users with numerous options to learn about Pearl Harbor and to share their own feelings and attitudes toward the attack and the war that followed. We might think of the Internet as providing a number of small windows looking onto the current state of the collective memory of Pearl Harbor, but there are no large windows looking onto a single artifact that is defining or even necessarily actively constructing that memory.

Many of the artifacts analyzed in this chapter expand the scope of the epic frame through which Pearl Harbor is portrayed to include the whole of American history, rather than only focusing on World War II. Again, this may in part be due to the amount of time that had passed since the attack. As Pearl Harbor fades from living memory, it becomes easier to include it as one of many prominent events in American history or associate those who were there with any number of historical American heroes, such as in the case of the Arizona Junior Ranger Activity Book. Another potential reason for the enlarging of the story included within the frame may be the recency and perceived greater importance of September 11. As the terrorist attacks took a more central place in American consciousness and were popularly compared to the earlier attack, it became more difficult to differentiate Pearl Harbor as a truly unique event. This fact simply reinforces the dilution of Pearl Harbor in the media during this time period. While “Remembering Pearl Harbor” is still presumably important given the continuing Presidential proclamations each year on December 7, the event receives far less attention than it did even twenty years ago.

One result of the decreased attention paid to Pearl Harbor is the lack of questioning of the epic frame which came to dominate American understanding of the attack in the decades prior to September 11. The frame places the attack within a broader context of American
history, acting as just a small example of the epic nature of the American people. This was solidified in the response to September 11 as Americans turned to Pearl Harbor for reassurance that they could, together, defeat the enemy that had attacked without warning. From the perspective of collective memory, turning to the past in this way made any other understanding of Pearl Harbor unfathomable, meaning that American victory will always be assumed to be inevitable. As a result of this slight shift in the collective memory of Pearl Harbor one major aspect of the epic version of the story was no longer necessary – the completion of the World War II story. Although in order for the epic frame to be complete, we must look to what happened after a defeat, artifacts analyzed in this chapter such as *Medal of Honor: Rising Sun* (Electronic Arts, 2003) and the PHP Facebook page are able to reinforce the epic frame without reference to the future victory – that victory is assumed.

This does not necessarily mean that what comes after a significant event is no longer necessary. Although Americans, turning to Pearl Harbor, were reassured that victory would come following September 11, one commenter on the comparison between the two pointed out that they should not fail to remember that the importance of the event will ultimately be judged based on what came next (Gammage, 2003). He goes on to claim that events such as Pearl Harbor and September 11 gain symbolic value as they fade from living memory. This is evident in Pearl Harbor as we struggle to preserve survivors’ stories and turn to them for instruction and reassurance after traumatic events like 9/11. Although, after seven decades, we no longer need to reference World War II in order to match a story of Pearl Harbor with the attitudes implied by the epic frame, we nonetheless need to define for ourselves what happens after contemporary or future attacks. We must learn the lessons from Pearl Harbor
concerning our immediate response (as with the internment camps), and we can be sure that we will win through to victory – but we still need to band together and earn that victory.
CONCLUSION

On December 7, 2011, the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association announced that it would disband at the end of the year. The organization, founded in 1958 with 28,000 members, was down to just 2,700 as of September 1, 2011. A historian for the Arizona memorial expected the attendance by survivors at the 70th anniversary ceremony to be around 125, a significant drop from the 7,000 estimated to be at the 50th anniversary in 1991 (Nagourney, 2011). Pearl Harbor is, as all events eventually do, passing from living memory. One survivor tells the story of giving a talk at a school in 2009. When he mentioned Pearl Harbor, a young girl replied “Who is she?” (p. A1). As the attack and the war that followed recede further into the past, the number of people who are able to share their memories of that period dwindles. As living memory fades, collective memory, as it has been constructed by seven decades of layered media representations, is what remains. And that, too, can fade as other events, such as September 11, capture a society’s imagination and retellings of the story become fewer and farther between.

I began this dissertation by asking how media ecology adds to the texture of memory and contributes to the construction of collective memory. I was hoping that a method that integrated the idea of media ecology with a rhetorical approach to analysis could provide some insight into how the past is framed and how collective memory is built over time. Part of that question involves the way texts created in different media and in different times intersect and interact with one another. How might a film about Pearl Harbor produced in 1943, for example, influence the production of a television documentary about the event broadcast in 2001 and how does the combination of the two influence Americans’ collective
memory of the attack? I have attempted to develop an approach to the study of collective memory that explores how media representations of the past interact and intersect with one another, following different versions of the American story of Pearl Harbor as they have evolved over the last seventy years.

Operating under the assumption that collective memory is made up not of the remembrance of facts but in the adoption of certain sets of feelings about the history of a particular group or society, I have looked at media representations of Pearl Harbor through the lens of Burke’s frames of acceptance, laid out in his book *Attitudes toward History* (1984). These frames provide a way to understand how a society views the past and a rhetorical language for the analysis of manifestations of those views through public enactments of them in speeches or media artifacts. The frames have a reflexive relationship with memory; they define and are defined by our attitudes toward the past. I combined the concept of the frames of acceptance with media ecology, creating what I have called an ecological frame analysis. This form of analysis looks at how the past, as it exists within a particular media ecology, is framed within that ecology. In other words, when all media representations of a particular event are taken together, what attitudes do they reveal or encourage the audience to adopt regarding some past event or even the past more generally? This is not meant to suggest that all media representations share the same frame or even the same understanding of what happened. Instead, multiple frames are employed, struggling against one another to define the past. Over time, however, one frame that is able to adapt to changing conditions and new information or is, potentially, the most easily adaptable by media marketers for a mass audience, may emerge as the dominant way of looking toward
the past, influencing the attitudes of audiences looking through it and playing a large role in defining the way those audiences collectively remember the depicted past event.

In conducting my ecological frame analysis, I explored how media representations of the attack on Pearl Harbor, from December 7, 1941, through December 7, 2011, have combined to form the texture of American collective memory of the attack. These representations include news reports of and popular reactions to the attack, uses of Pearl Harbor in World War II propaganda, and the investigations that resulted from an insistence upon finding a scapegoat for the damage suffered. These investigations gave rise to a number of counter-narratives – stories that called into question the epic official story of American innocence, perseverance, and victory. Such versions of the story painted a grotesque picture of conspiracy at the highest levels of the American government, painting the Roosevelt administration and the American military itself responsible for death of nearly 3,000 soldiers and sailors and the destruction of a significant portion of the Pacific fleet. Other versions of the Pearl Harbor story, especially those told shortly after the attack, viewed it through a more tragic lens, focusing on the vicious criminality of the deceptive Japanese aggressors. Still others, most notably the film *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (Fleischer, et al., 1970), adopted a comic frame in which emphasis was placed not upon intentionality, but on the mistakes humans make and the sometimes unfortunate results of those mistakes.

The epic frame, however, proved to be versatile enough to absorb the new information revealed during the investigations and contradict the claims of the counter-narratives. The frame also tends to present American actions prior to the attack as mistaken rather than criminal, yet still encourages those who look through it to understand the
Japanese as vicious in their deception of an innocent and unsuspecting American nation. In this way, the epic frame of Pearl Harbor was constructed through the integration of information that, on its own, may have been better suited to some other frame. However, the rhetorical versatility of the frame to integrate new and different information while still meeting the needs of the present allowed the epic to become the dominant frame of Pearl Harbor media ecology.

One reason that the epic frame may have become the primary way of understanding the attack is because it was able to simplify the Pearl Harbor story into a form of Burkean melodrama. Desilet and Appel (2011), noting that Burke himself did not frequently use the term melodrama, define it as similar to some other forms of storytelling such as tragedy. They define the term as “[aligning] conflict according to highly polarized, value-weighted extremes consistent with traditionally clear dichotomies” (p. 347). Herbert Simons (2009) describes it similarly, claiming that melodrama is characterized by “excessive simplicity” with good on one side and evil on the other (para. 7). He says melodrama is a form of storytelling used by nations to encourage their citizens to sacrifice for war. Melodrama is one way in which storytellers, such as government propagandists like those creating posters during the war or even John Ford’s 1943 “documentary,” December 7th, generate outrage toward evildoers and “mobilize people for action against Evil and in behalf of the good” (para. 12). Similarly, Gregory Desilet (1989) points out that melodramatic storytelling allows the audience to “[identify] with the hero and [separate] itself from the villain” (p. 76).

Although melodrama is not explicitly a part of Burke’s framework as it has been employed in this dissertation, the rhetorical functions of melodrama are nonetheless fulfilled by an epic
framing of the attack on Pearl Harbor. And, by performing those functions, the epic frame is appealing to audiences due to its simplification of the situation, as evidenced by the typical removal of historical context in epic versions of the story, and helps to unify audience members (i.e., Americans) against a common enemy, specifically, a far Eastern, Asian enemy in the Japanese (and, later, the Koreans and Vietnamese).

By the time a new generation of Americans began to learn about the attack during the Vietnam era, the epic frame had become the primary way the attack was understood and the story of American perseverance at Pearl Harbor and victory in the war that followed became the dominant version of the story. This provides one illustration of how collective memory is based upon responses to the insecurity of contemporary events as the epic, melodramatic version of the Pearl Harbor story re-established the innocence and inherent goodness in the American military and government during a period when many Americans felt betrayed by those institutions.

Following the emergence of the epic as the dominant frame through which Pearl Harbor was viewed, most retellings of the story served to reinforce that frame. The turn to “authentic” stories of the survivors in the 1980s and 1990s, most of which echoed some aspect of the epic version, gave the frame validation. By emphasizing the accuracy of the survivors’ testimonies and describing them as the only “true” stories of the attack (as opposed to those told by historians or in the movies), the epic frame became the hegemonic perspective through which the story was told. The epic was natural because it matched the “true” stories being told by the survivors. And, since most members of audiences during the 1980s and later had no personal recollections about the attack or the war, there was little
ground to question the epic version of events. Additionally, the epic frame is able to offer some satisfaction for audiences. By viewing history through such a frame, they can be reassured of the justness of their actions as a nation and confident in the tidy resolution of the story in the form of the ultimate victory won in World War II. In other words, the melodramatic simplification of the epic frame may be comforting to audiences, potentially superseding questions about the frame’s viability and discouraging adoption of other frames such as the grotesque or tragic that may challenge the attitudes encouraged and espoused by the epic. Therefore, the frame was largely accepted by American audiences who, in the absence of any prominent counter-narratives, consented to the authority of the survivors, the government, and the major media outlets that were the most visible purveyors of the Pearl Harbor story. The epic frame is best illustrated by the technological splendor of the big-budget, Disney-produced blockbuster *Pearl Harbor* (Bay, 2001). The terrorist attacks of the following fall, however, changed how Americans understood the role of Pearl Harbor in their history, forcing the frame to once again find a way to embrace new information while at the same time remaining instructive for how the United States might respond to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

The 9/11 attacks were viewed by many to be similar to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This perceived similarity encouraged Americans to turn to the past for reassurance that such an attack could be overcome. The inevitable victory that plays such a major role in the epic understanding of history became the expected result of the wars that were begun in the wake and in the name of September 11. Themes of unity and the necessity of remembering the past accompanied those reassurances, instructing everyday Americans on
how to act – supportive of the country and of one another, standing steadfastly in defense of an “American way of life.” And, in order to make sure that the united front does not falter or the defenses do not weaken, we must always remember what happened on September 11. Of course, although similar, the two attacks were different in a number of ways and remembering Pearl Harbor, while it served to reassure a nervous public, did nothing to prevent the later attack.

September 11 had almost as much influence on American collective memory of Pearl Harbor as the earlier attack had on our understanding of 9/11. Certain aspects of the Pearl Harbor story that were previously largely ignored by those viewing the past through an epic frame were revived in the aftermath of September 11. For instance, the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II became a warning over the mistreatment of Muslims in the United States. Here, the epic frame was able to incorporate this newly relevant information by presenting the camps as a mistake that could be atoned for by not repeating those earlier actions. And, by not making the mistake, Americans could avoid tragedy by learning the lessons of the epic frame. Therefore, even the mistakes of the earlier era became a lesson – and learning that lesson helped to reinforce the epic frame. By incorporating the camps into the framing of Pearl Harbor, the camps were also integrated into more positive depictions of the attack as an example of the diversity that was such an American strength during the war, according to some, including President George H. W. Bush at the 50th Pearl Harbor anniversary commemoration ceremony (Department of Defense, 1991). The adaptability of the epic frame was an important thread in the story told in this dissertation.
As defined in chapter one, the frames of acceptance, laid out by Kenneth Burke (1984), are perspectives through which we view history. As mentioned above, they have a reflexive relationship with our attitudes toward history: that which is visible through a particular frame influences our attitudes while our attitudes affect what we are capable of seeing when we look to the past. In other words, the frames shape and are shaped by our attitudes toward history – a phrase that I have also adopted as a way of thinking about collective memory. In order for any one frame to become dominant or to maintain its dominance, it must be able to adapt to changing conditions. As other events begin to color our understanding of the past, we search for a frame that is able to incorporate new information while also reinforcing preexisting attitudes, a concept that Burke calls casuistic stretching. This is why counter-narratives often struggle to gain widespread acceptance – they fail to reinforce the attitudes created and supported by previously dominant frames, but it is also why some previously dominant frames lose their privileged status – they are incapable of stretching enough to support the new information.

This dissertation has shown that the occasional stretching of a frame is necessary for its survival. This stretching may occasionally require the integration of other frames, such as was the case with the embedding of the comic frame in *The Winds of War*, allowing Wouk to engage some historical context. When alternative frames are merely acknowledged rather than fully embraced within a particular artifact, the frame incorporates new information, but must inevitably simplify it in order to remain faithful to previous attitudes. In this way, adherence to a single, dominant frame such as the epic naturally lends itself to a shift toward melodrama, as discussed above.
At any rate, new information cannot be ignored and must somehow be made to match prevailing feelings about the past. Frames that either reject widely held beliefs, such as in the grotesque framing of Pearl Harbor, or refuse to include newly relevant information cannot maintain any significant rhetorical power. The adaptability of the frames, their tendency to adjust to new information, is one advantage of the rhetorical framing approach to the study of media ecology utilized in this dissertation. As I have noted repeatedly, collective memory – a group of feelings and attitudes toward a particular past event – is more often based upon a reaction to the present than it is dependent upon the past. Collective memory is put to work as a way of reassuring a society in times of trouble. We turn toward similar past events for instructions on how to act in the present. As the present continually changes, then, so must our collective memory. If we hold that collective memory is constructed by the interaction and intersection of media representations of the past, then examining how those representations incorporate new information and changing conditions while still maintaining a relatively consistent attitude toward the past can help us to better understand the dynamics of the relationship between media, memory, the past, and the present.

A second thread throughout this dissertation is the importance of intertextuality to the development of collective memory. Intertextuality provides texture to collective memory. As James Young (1988, 1993) has argued, we do not necessarily remember the past; we remember previous stories of the past, even if we told those stories ourselves. Each new story is layered on top of those told before it, creating the texture of memory. Every story can make reference to or use of the other stories because together they form a cohesive image of what the past was like. In this way, the media ecology of a particular event becomes a
The first major instance of intertextuality in the Pearl Harbor media ecology is the repetition of images from the John Ford (1943a) documentary, *December 7th*. For the film, Ford shot a number of scenes of sailors lounging, playing catch, and attending church services. In his film, these scenes were inserted immediately before the arrival of Japanese bombers giving audiences the impression that American forces were caught entirely by surprise and had no inkling that an attack, let alone a war, could soon break out. Despite the absurdity of the notion that sailors were playing catch on the deck of a battleship before 8 AM on a Sunday morning, these images appear throughout the seventy year history presented in this dissertation. They are most often included in documentaries about the attack, but they were also inserted into newsreels describing the bombing and explained as newsreel footage from Pearl Harbor.

The reuse of Ford’s footage has two important rhetorical effects. First, it reinforces the epic version of the Pearl Harbor story in which the Americans were innocent victims of an unprovoked attack. Its repetition and placement within media texts that are presented as fact maximizes the innocence of the American government and military despite the fact that the United States had contributed to the diplomatic strain with Japan and that those depicted were military personnel in a military facility, not merely young men relaxing. Second, its
familiarity to audiences lends credibility to later representations of the attack. So, when the History Channel broadcasts a documentary about Pearl Harbor, including clips from Ford’s film provides the audience with a point of reference that verifies and reinforces their previous understanding of what happened on December 7, 1941.

Another instance of intertextuality, Admiral Yamamoto’s line about awakening a sleeping giant in *Tora! Tora! Tora!* (Fleischer, et al., 1970), played an important role in reinforcing the epic notion of a united American people rising up in response to the attack, winning an ultimate victory. Although Yamamoto likely never uttered the famous line, the documentary-style thoroughness of the film suggested that it was accurate. The line became a staple of references to Pearl Harbor after the film’s release in 1970. This repetition made it a favorite of commenters comparing Pearl Harbor to September 11 since it reassured audiences that the United States would not be so easily defeated. The blurring of the boundary between fact and fiction present in each of these examples of intertextuality was also important in a third thread present in this dissertation, an idea I have called blended history.

Blended history, as described in chapter five, occurs when historical media artifacts (e.g., newsreels) are blended with contemporary media by making the latter look and sound similar to the former. This not only blurs the boundary between fact and fiction (a tenuous distinction to begin with), it temporarily eliminates the difference between the two, lending the perceived credibility of historical media to the contemporary text. This is not to say that historical artifacts are necessarily more accurate or correct than their contemporary counterparts, but rather that they provide credibility by their typical association with authenticity. The historical texts have been repeated and referenced over time, and through
that repetition have become familiar to audiences. Their presence in contemporary texts reassures audiences that the message reinforces what they are likely to already believe based on their previous experiences with related media texts. Blending the historical with the contemporary amplifies that effect. Contemporary texts become rhetorically associated with historical texts, seemingly blending the two into a single cohesive representation of the past.

The blended history technique is evident throughout fictional representations of the attack on Pearl Harbor. One prominent example is the splicing of well-known newsreel images from World War II, such as Hitler waving to crowds in the street, with black and white images filmed specifically for the *Winds of War* miniseries (Curtis, 1983). The new footage is indistinguishable from the historical footage until, at the end of the blended segment, the contemporary image fades from black and white to color, revealing itself as part of the film rather than as an artifact of “history.” While audiences are not likely to confuse the entire story as an accurate depiction of what happened, they are nonetheless encouraged to associate the feelings and attitudes present within the historical footage with the newly produced images. And, since collective memory can be understood as the interconnection of attitudes toward the past, blended history allows for the easy incorporation of new versions of the past into the existing memory ecology.

Blended history relies upon, but adds to the concept of, intertextuality. Intertextuality is the reuse of certain historical artifacts while blended history makes the contemporary appear as if it were historical although not necessarily making any explicit claims to authenticity. In other words, the technique calls the difference between fact and fiction into question, but it does not go so far as to claim that the contemporary is *actually* just as
“authentic” as the historical. Instead, it uses the historical as a way to build credibility through association and audience familiarity. This is important to the study of memory and how media texts rhetorically frame the past because it provides one possibility for how frames are perpetuated over time and across multiple media. Through the use of blended history, a media producer can bring, for example, a fictional story about a Navy family in World War II into the audience’s pre-existing frame of reference and use that frame to establish the new text’s credibility. Additionally, although the new text may be a film, the producers might use images of real and imagined newspaper frontpages, splice together newsreel footage with new images, or place the audio of a famous speech over film of an attentive audience that was created for the new text. Or, some artifacts may utilize an implied blended history, such as in the case of the newsreel photographer who accompanies Rafe and Danny throughout the attack in the film *Pearl Harbor*. His character allowed the filmmakers to integrate images that looked like newsreels although they did not actually use any historical media.

Blended history is a versatile and common technique that contributes to the construction of collective memory by reinforcing previous frames, lending credibility to contemporary stories of the past, and making it difficult for audiences to recognize the line between fact and fiction. From a critical standpoint, blended history draws attention to the constructed nature of all history – no one can be sure that what they are seeing is “accurate” – and also gives us insight into the relationship between media and memory ecologies and their role in reinforcing attitudes and constructing collective memory.
The role of the present – the time at which the past is being remembered – in the construction of collective memory is also an important aspect of this dissertation. All media artifacts are created within a specific historical and technological context which informs their content and, if they represent some past event, their understanding of that event. In other words, how we tell a story of the past is informed by previous versions of the story as well as the rhetorical needs of the time at which it is told. As is evident in my analysis, each new artifact makes use of the Pearl Harbor story in a different way, reflecting the changing political needs and climate of an American audience. For instance, the grotesque frame of the counter-narratives was most prevalent at a time, the late 1940s and 1950s, when McCarthyism and the Red Scare were dominating American politics. These versions of the story, mostly written by conservatives, made President Roosevelt, demonized by a perceived connection to Communism and the Left, into a villain who had consciously provoked and allowed the Pearl Harbor attack. Twenty years later, during the Vietnam War and its aftermath, the epic frame came to dominate the Pearl Harbor story, reassuring a nation in turmoil that it was an agent for good. And, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the epic version of the Pearl Harbor story helped to reassure a nervous public that the United States would persevere until ultimate victory was won over the terrorists. Pearl Harbor also provided instruction for how Americans should react to the surprise attack by uniting with one another, facing the coming challenges as one.

The role of the present in the construction of collective memory also draws attention to the role that power relationships play in the definition of the past. Following September 11, the Pearl Harbor story functioned primarily as a means of reassuring the American
public. The story of the United States’ recovery from the attack and eventual victory in World War II encouraged Americans to unite and support the Bush administration’s response to 9/11, which included the war in Afghanistan. It is not that the epic version of the Pearl Harbor story was new or even changed very much, but its prominence over at least the previous three decades had established it as the most acceptable version of the story for most Americans. In other words, it became hegemonic. Its status as the privileged story and its employment following 9/11 helped to reinforce hegemonic structures, leading to widespread support of and consent to Bush’s policies including the war and a number of laws that limited American citizens’ rights and discriminated against non-Americans, as well as some Americans of Muslim and Middle Eastern descent, in the name of unity and security. The use of the epic frame by the popular media industry, in effect, reinforced the hegemonic relationship between that industry, the audience, and the American government both past and present.

This analysis of the collective memory of Pearl Harbor illustrates how the framing of a particular event changes over time. Following a traumatic event such as Pearl Harbor, the initial frame is necessarily complex. A society is forced to evaluate not just the event itself, but the circumstances that created the event and the potential future resulting from it. Therefore, a number of different and potentially conflicting frames are likely to emerge, each explaining a different aspect of the event. In the case of Pearl Harbor, the burlesque explained Japanese treachery while the tragic focused on American weakness prior to the attack. It was not until distance in time from the event is great enough that its effects can be included in evaluation that a coherent frame can emerge. The epic frame did not come to
dominate representations of Pearl Harbor until it could be incorporated into the larger story of American victory in World War II. World War II, when taken as a whole, becomes an ultimate story of good triumphing over evil. And, following the revelations of the full extent of Hitler’s atrocities and Japanese treatment of prisoners of war in Bataan, Americans are likely to have been drawn to an understanding of the past that sharply differentiated them from the enemy. The epic frame, especially when reduced to melodrama, would have done just that, especially in contrast to the primary alternative frame of the period, the grotesque. In the grotesque framing of Pearl Harbor, the United States had consciously brought Pearl Harbor onto itself, making it more difficult to view the war, not to mention its ending through the use of nuclear weapons, as justified. The positive portrayal of American will and character within an epic frame of the past, fully supported following the conclusion of the war, encouraged audiences to consent to and adopt that frame as the primary way of understanding the role of Pearl Harbor in American history and identity.

As noted above, another important aspect of how the framing of the past evolves is a particular frame’s ability to adapt to new or changing information. As time goes on, new events and knowledge will invariably affect the way the past is understood. In order to maintain dominance, as the epic was able to do when challenged by grotesque versions of the Pearl Harbor story, stories within the dominant frame must successfully integrate or discount new information. Once a dominant frame has established itself, all representations must be viewed through it, regardless of their original frame. For instance, we cannot help but look at early burlesque versions of the Pearl Harbor story through the epic frame. The epic understanding of the attack then encourages us to focus on those aspects which support it.
Therefore, when we repeat elements of the story or make intertextual references to earlier representations, we necessarily do so in support of the dominant frame. This simplifies the frame in the sense that competing ways of understanding the past are diluted and incorporated into a single frame. In other words, many frames become one. This is another way in which a frame becomes hegemonic – we consent to the way that it shapes a society’s attitudes toward history and, for the most part, accept that frame’s version of events, even if some minoritarian groups resist the dominant understanding. This hegemony becomes especially important when history, as the cliché claims, appears to repeat itself. Of course, history never actually repeats itself because of continually evolving contexts, but when one event seemingly has many similarities to a previous event, one might expect that we would turn to the hegemonic frame of the earlier event as a way to understand the present in the same way that many turned to Pearl Harbor in order to comprehend September 11. While it may seem as though the earlier event provides enough information to understand the latter, complexity inevitably creeps into the frame until enough time has passed that the event and its aftermath can be more fully examined, resulting once again in a simplification of the frame.

Overall, this dissertation teaches us about how we remember Pearl Harbor and contributes to the study of media, rhetoric, and collective memory more broadly. Pearl Harbor, as the event that triggered active American involvement in World War II, is one of the most significant dates in American history. This is a key assumption of the epic frame – that the event in question is a singular day in history after which nothing was the same. But that assumption does not disappear when the past is viewed through the other frames present
within the Pearl Harbor memory ecology. The revisionists through their grotesque frame or
*Tora! Tora! Tora!* through its comic frame both acknowledge the importance of the attack.
The dominance of the epic frame, however, implies a particular understanding of that
importance. Within that understanding, Pearl Harbor is not necessarily a date which has lived
in infamy. Instead, it is an example of perseverance and might. It is the day that Americans,
in all of their diversity, finally came together as one, fighting for the common cause of
freedom and justice. It is a day that ended the bickering and brought forth a new, powerful
nation. In short, in American collective memory, informed by the epic frame, Pearl Harbor is
merely a prominent step in the inevitable progression of the larger story of American history.

But, as I have shown, such an understanding of the event was not immediate. At the
time of the attack, foreign war on American soil was virtually unknown and unimaginable.
Perhaps because of that uniqueness, or more likely because of the immensity of the events
that followed, Pearl Harbor has been able to capture the attention of four generations of
Americans and the story is continually refreshed and retold in the media. Media technology
and content have evolved and producers and audiences have been influenced by changing
social and political climates. As those influences have changed, so have the stories of Pearl
Harbor. As different needs have arisen, our use of the Pearl Harbor story has changed
accordingly. As one instance of the changing social and political climate, September 11
presents an interesting contrast to the slow evolution of the Pearl Harbor story. Many people
did not view 9/11 as entirely unique, immediately comparing it to Pearl Harbor. Therefore,
they were able to place that later attack within the epic frame more quickly. The supposed
similarities between the two were enough for some to assume the outcome of the American
response and view the terrorist attacks through the same frame, even without knowing what
would come next. Of course, in the ten years since 9/11, that frame has changed as the
ensuing wars have not resulted in the same kind of ultimate victory as World War II. As the
present changes, we frame the past differently. We tell different stories for different
purposes. Just as Pearl Harbor has evolved from a tragic reason to fight to an epic example of
American will, September 11 has changed from an opportunity to reassert American
dominance to an example of how and why we should not overlook our everyday, personal
heroes (see, for example, the recent films Remember Me (Coulter, 2010) and Extremely Loud
& Incredibly Close (Daldry, 2011)).

Because the way that we remember the past evolves over time in response to changing attitudes and new events, the method employed in this dissertation provides a useful tool for scholars looking to trace how collective memory changes. The concept of media ecology, as it is employed in this dissertation, allows critics to examine all media representations of a particular event as they work together to create a single, relatively coherent image of that event. In other words, the idea that all media must be taken together in order to fully understand how they act with one another and the audience helps to illuminate how collective memory is best understood by examining all elements of its construction. Collective memory, as constructed by the conjunction of multiple media representations of the past, is dependent upon the media ecology. By reconstructing the media ecology of a particular event or period, we are able to see the way that certain artifacts fit within a frame or play a role in challenging, expanding, shifting, or changing the dominant frame. It allows us to recognize how artifacts interact with one another in order to create a relatively coherent
picture of the past. Very rarely does a text present a completely new image of history. Instead, each one builds upon those that came before, accepting some portions of the story, rejecting others; bringing some to the forefront while sending some to the background or periphery. An ecological frame analysis allows critics to see shifting attitudes toward and uses of the past, addressing the questions: How has the way collective memory of a particular event or period is enacted through the media changed over time? What later events and periods corresponded with significant changes in stories of the past, implying the need for a different use of such stories?

The framing method used in this dissertation is a way for scholars to trace the evolution of the past by examining how media artifacts potentially influence audiences’ attitudes toward history and rhetorically construct collective memory. Burke’s concept allows for the analysis of which aspects of the past are made more salient for audiences, and also incorporates the concept of attitudes, necessary for the study of collective memory. As I have been using the term, collective memory refers to a collection of attitudes toward the past. If we understand collective memory in such a way, then Burke’s (1984) frames of acceptance provide valuable insight into its construction because they do not merely take which aspect of a story is emphasized or deemphasized, but encompass and define the audience’s attitudes toward the story’s subject, presumably some past event or era. By integrating the concept of attitudes into the study of framing, defined in media studies as selecting particular elements of a story to make that story more salient for audiences, enriches media studies by providing a rhetorical perspective and vocabulary for a more
complete analysis of how a particular topic (such as Pearl Harbor) is framed by media representations.

As with all projects of this size, my analysis is necessarily incomplete. It would not be possible to examine all media artifacts related to Pearl Harbor. Indeed, as of February 2012, Amazon.com lists 1,767 books on the topic, a number that does not include the countless webpages, news reports, speeches, films, and television programs dedicated to the attack. While I conducted my analysis with this limitation in mind, focusing on the most prominent or widely accessible artifacts, I would nonetheless suggest that certain texts or groups of texts be more closely examined using the method employed here or some similar approach. One such group that deserves increased attention is the counter-narratives that emerged in the post-War years and continue to be published today (see, for example, Stinett, 2001; Victor, 2007). The persistence of revisionist histories of Pearl Harbor suggests that they continue to play a significant role in at least some Americans’ understanding of the attack. While I claim that these versions of the story employ a grotesque frame, it is possible that this alternative understanding of the attack has evolved over time just as the dominant version of the story has done. Given the revisionists’ place largely in opposition to dominant and official versions of the Pearl Harbor story, such a study may also provide additional insight into the role that political power and media access play in the construction of collective memory as they illustrate (as well as point out) how those with the power or resources to reach large audiences are better equipped to dominate the conversation concerning the past. Indeed, that point is evident within the artifacts analyzed in this dissertation. The Internet provides the ability for audiences to publicly challenge and resist
dominant narratives, yet as I have pointed out, many of those capabilities are either not employed or are merely superficial in major productions of the Pearl Harbor story. For example, the National Geographic Battle Map allows users to view information out of chronological order, but gives them no outlet for input or feedback. Likewise, the YouTube videos from the Valor in the Pacific National Monument have had public comments disabled, discouraging and preventing feedback or dissent. It may be interesting to analyze artifacts that more fully engage the user contribution potential of the Internet, such as in Wikipedia articles and discussion pages. Such an analysis may reveal a more active resistance to the Pearl Harbor story than is evident in professional and commercial representations of the attack.

This study could also be expanded and improved by a more detailed examination of the role of the media technologies employed in depicting the past. While I traced the technological development of relevant media in each chapter and attempted to demonstrate how that history may have played a role in the construction of collective memory, a study that focused more completely on the role of those technologies may be of some value. As a side effect of the rhetorical perspective on which it is based, the ecological frame analysis employed in this dissertation places a significant emphasis on the content of media texts at the expense of their form. While such an analysis is valuable in that it can help us to learn how the past is framed and how that frame evolves over time, scholars could also benefit from an approach that explores the technical makeup of the media texts and the experience of consuming such texts. This is another aspect of media ecology that may have a profound effect upon our emotional response to and attitudes toward the past as it is depicted in the
media. Such a study could provide scholars with insight into how or why certain texts become more salient than others, taking the analysis beyond those texts’ reinforcement or resistance of a particular way of framing the past.

Henry Wouk (1978) once wrote “The beginning of the end of War lies in Remembrance.” Americans, as they have so often been commanded, have “never forgotten” Pearl Harbor. It is not just the act of remembrance that is necessary for ending war; the way the past is remembered also plays an important role. Indeed, it may be argued that the dominance of the epic frame in representing Pearl Harbor, along with its insistence on a distinct villain and disallowance of space for complete acknowledgement and acceptance of mistakes, defined the post-9/11 American war story. Placing Americans’ collective memory of Pearl Harbor within the epic frame defined their expectations for the future. They had risen above adversity to win an ultimate victory – there was no reason they could not respond to the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the same manner. In this way, remembrance became a way to justify the proliferation of war rather than an understanding of why it should be avoided.
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Appendix A: The Texture of Memory

As I have argued in this dissertation, collective memory emerges from the interplay of multiple representations. At any given time, our understanding of the past is influenced by a collection of representations of the past, each of which depend on those which came before in order to frame and present an image that is coherent to the audience. As James E. Young argues, we do not remember an event – we remember other remembrances of the event. And if we think of each representation of the past as a form of remembrance, then the overlapping and intersecting representations form what Young calls the texture of memory. Some elements are thicker than others, some fade, while some provide support for newer representations.

Below are four snapshots of the texture of memory of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Each image corresponds to a chapter in this dissertation and includes the major artifacts discussed in each chapter. None of the images are entirely complete and some representations (e.g., newspaper reports) are all grouped together. Each color represents a different medium and the more prominent an artifact, the thicker the layer. By examining these images, we can get an idea of the time periods at which Pearl Harbor may have been more salient for audiences because the texture of memory is thicker. For example, there are seven layers in the texture during the late 1950s, but only 2 in 1970 (see Figure A.2). We can also see the role played by different media in contributing to collective memory of Pearl Harbor. For example, in 1941, five different media are prominent (see Figure A.1) while the period between 1971 and 2001 is dominated by film and television (see Figure A.3). Finally, most media and artifacts fade over time, represented in these images by color gradations. But
others remain constant. For example, personal and institutional websites, although their layers are relatively thin, their content may remain relatively unchanged for a long time while still remaining easy to access. For instance, the National Geographic Attack Map has remained available for more than 10 years and the content of “Pearl Harbor: Remembered” has not changed since 2007.

Although these representations are not complete, they provide a visual summary of what I mean when I refer to the texture of memory. And, when taken together, form what may be considered the memory ecology of Pearl Harbor.
Figure A.2: Texture of Memory, 1945-1970

Figure A.3: Texture of Memory, 1971-2001
Figure A.4: Texture of Memory, 2001-2011

- Online Social Networks
- Medal of Honor: Rising Sun
- Institutional Websites (e.g., National Geographic)
- Personal Websites (e.g., Pearl Harbor: Remembered)
- Newspaper Coverage of Commemorations
- Newspaper Coverage of 9/11
- Live Coverage of 9/11

Toral Toral Toral (2001 - History Channel)

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Figure A.4: Texture of Memory, 2001-2011