This dissertation analyzes how surveillance and communication function as tightly interwoven technologies of government. While surveillance studies tends to focus on humans as objects of surveillance, I provide a historically grounded account of how Americans have been cultivated as subjects that carry out surveillant practice. From this perspective, the essential relationship between surveillance and communication comes into clear view: subjects not only carry out surveillance on one another, but that surveillance is typically complemented with various forms of communicative action, such as dialing 9-1-1, contacting authorities, and reaching out to the immoral and the needy with programs of civic persuasion. This dissertation’s chapters include an overview and introduction, an account of the development of citizen-police telecommunications, a history of how the police have used media to crowdsource crime control, an account of how temperance organizations cultivated non-violent activists that carried out surveillance and “moral suasion,” and a history of how Neighborhood Watch and other nonviolent, communicative-surveillant programs developed in American communities that had long thrived on local vigilante justice. Finally, I contextualize these historical developments alongside the current If You See Something Say Something program, emphasizing the identificatory and extra-epistemological significance of these communicative-surveillant programs.
BIOGRAPHY

Joshua Reeves has played, worked, and gone to school. He is alive, and has lived. In the fall, he will begin a job as assistant professor of new media in the Department of Communication at the University of Memphis.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In 2010, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) unveiled a new anti-terrorism initiative called the “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign. Working in cooperation with sports stadiums, hotels, local transportation departments, airports, and Wal-Mart, the DHS installed a series of telescreens that repeatedly broadcast a sixty-second video of the DHS secretary, Janet Napolitano, encouraging citizens to look out for suspicious activity. As shoppers pay for their goods at Wal-Mart’s automated checkout stands, many of them now see Napolitano urging them to do their part in the fight against terror: “Homeland security begins with hometown security. . . . If you see something suspicious in the parking lot or in the store, say something immediately. Report suspicious activity to your local police or sheriff. If you need help, ask a Wal-Mart manager for assistance. Thank you for doing your part to help keep our hometowns safe” (USHomelandSecurity 2011b). The video commercial campaign accompanying the new initiative features seemingly average Americans acting out the “suspicious” activities of potential terrorists, such as leaving one’s backpack unattended, talking nervously on a cell phone, using cash, or repeatedly checking one’s wristwatch.

This nationwide campaign, which was first developed by the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority after 9/11, has encountered a measure of legal resistance: although the “see something” part of the campaign is gaining technological and cultural momentum (see, e.g., Hay and Andrejevic 2006, 334–7), the “say something” part is still mired in legal difficulty. Under ordinary circumstances, if your neighbor saw you having an angry cell
phone conversation and falsely accused you of terrorism, s/he would be vulnerable to libel action. But American civil law is being quickly amended to accommodate the evolving needs of homeland security. The “See Something Say Something Act of 2011,” which will almost certainly pass into law with broad bipartisan support during the 112th US Congress, protects from libel action those who accuse their peers of terrorism. With sharp foresight, one of the bill’s corporate backers predicted that it will promote a “vigilant mindset” amongst citizens. Since September 11, 2001, he argued, “elected leaders have repeatedly called on everyday people to be the eyes and ears looking out for the next potential terrorist act. By this Act, Congress will give weight to that request by providing common-sense protections to citizens who do just that” (NASCO 2011). Indeed, with the “See Something, Say Something” campaign and its accompanying legal amendments, the DHS and other federal agencies are taking action to encourage and facilitate a new vigilance in peer-to-peer monitoring—in making it as easy and natural as possible for lay individuals to be the “eyes and ears” that listen to and watch their neighbors, family members, and fellow shoppers, travelers, and sports fans. What is strikingly absent from this commentary, however, is that these citizens are not only being asked to use their “eyes and ears,” but to use their mouths, as well. In fact, the “See Something Say Something Act of 2011” has less to do with surveillance—with eyes and ears—than with communication. The law is primarily aimed at providing legal protection to those citizens who couple their surveillance with communicative action: to those who take the next step in their citizenship obligations by intervening communicatively in volatile situations or by reporting their suspicions to authorities.

This oversight in public discourse is also largely present in academic discussions of
surveillance studies. While increasing numbers of communication scholars are carrying out surveillance research, very little has been said about the complementarity of communication and surveillance as social practices. In 2007, Kelly Gates and Shoshana Magnet introduced a special issue of *The Communication Review* dealing with the relationship between communication and surveillance. Their article, which remains the most sustained attempt at drawing these two strands of scholarship together, argues that “the relationship between surveillance and communication—especially the media of communication—is an established and growing object of interdisciplinary concern” (2007, 278). They go on to propose a number of potential sites of analysis for studying where surveillance and communication research might intersect: consumer surveillance and new media; digital police surveillance technologies; closed-circuit television (CCTV) and other technologies of visual surveillance; media representations of surveillance; surveillance as a Careyesque ritual of communication; and surveillance and the reproduction of social inequalities. This list, which arises from their contention that, “In many respects, surveillance technologies are media technologies” (2007, 278), introduces many of the most important and popular points of articulation between communication and surveillance. While I would eliminate the qualifier “in many respects” from Gates and Shoshana’s statement, they do an excellent job of setting the stage for future inquiries into the relationship between communication and surveillance. Yet, with their exclusive focus on the surveillance functions of communication technologies—e.g., surveillance cameras, computerized data collection, and mediated representations of surveillance—they have (as they admit) only scratched the surface of this relationship. While few scholars have taken up Gates and Shoshana’s challenge to more fully and explicitly
investigate these intimately related social practices, my dissertation will examine five historical case studies that illustrate new ways to rethink the essential relationship between communication and surveillance.

One of Gates and Shoshana’s crucial oversights is the problem of subjectification in contemporary regimes of surveillance. While they focus on important issues like media representation and the relationship between communication technologies and surveillance, their attention is primarily centered on the human as an object of surveillance. Yet as the work of Mark Andrejevic (e.g., 2005; 2007; also see Larsen and Piché 2010) has most clearly demonstrated, the human as a subject of surveillance labor is an equally rich and promising topic. Andrejevic’s description of “lateral surveillance,” which analyzes how citizens carry out surveillance on one another, places the human subject at the center of the surveillance discussion. However, while Andrejevic’s research carries out the essential work of describing the rise of the surveillant subject, the attendant rise of the communicative-surveillant subject—the subject who, like the DHS’s ideal See Something citizen, carries out very specific practices of surveillance and communication—has yet to be explored. By looking at how communication and surveillance have been articulated together in various historical moments of governmental reason and political practice, this project opens up new possibilities for rethinking the essential relationship between communication and surveillance, particularly as they function as complementary technologies of government today. Moreover, this project extends the historical scope of previous work in lateral surveillance. Although Andrejevic acknowledges that “It is certainly possible to argue that there is nothing new about the strategy of enlisting the contributions of the civilian
population in the name of homeland defense” (2007, 163), his engagement of lateral surveillance practices has been primarily confined to developments of the past several decades. This dissertation, then, will add some needed historical contextualization of contemporary developments in peer-to-peer monitoring.

Expanding on Andrejevic’s analysis of lateral surveillance, I will describe these interwoven activities of lateral surveillance and communication as lateral policing. By giving a historical overview of American lateral policing programs in the twentieth- and twenty-first-centuries, I demonstrate that, in diverse configurations of governmental practice, surveillance and communication are necessary tools in the invention and implementation of various political programs. “See Something, Say Something,” then, is more than a catchy slogan for a domestic security campaign—it is, just as much, a pithy assertion of how two basic, interwoven social practices provide fundamental resources for the conduct of liberal government.

II. Conceptual Overview: the Communicative-Surveillant Subject

Today, surveillance studies is increasingly preoccupied with the evolving worlds of data collection and analysis made possible by digital technologies. These scholars’ analysis tends to suggest that the human is being gradually removed from what Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson (2002) call “the surveillant assemblage.” To take a few examples: consider that surveillance systems on street corners and in public and private buildings capture vast amounts of audiovisual data; web merchants and search engines record details of your web browsing practices; and giant retailers and grocery stores accumulate data based upon your
shopping habits. Computers, however, do not merely capture these data: they also process and analyze them. Human subjects do not review the thousands of hours of video captured by street-corner surveillance cameras: computers, functioning on programmed and emergent algorithms, sift instantly through the data while they mine for anomalies (and issue infractions accordingly). Similarly, humans do not analyze your web browsing habits or shopping bills in order to customize your advertisements and coupons: today this data processing and analysis are being carried out by computers. Human subjects are conspicuously absent from these surveillance processes: according to Haggerty and Ericson, human individuals disappear into data bundles, where they become anonymous bytes in a conglomerating process of mass datafication. In their words, the surveillant assemblage functions by “abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then reassembled into distinct ‘data doubles’” (2002, 606). The surveillant assemblage, which is a modulating accumulation of technologies, senses, and information, appears to render the observing human subject all but superfluous.

Yet if computers are much better at surveillance than humans, then why are we witnessing a rise in the popularity of lateral surveillance campaigns such as the “See Something, Say Something” program? It is true, of course, that humans simply cannot compete with the modern computer’s ability to capture and process masses of data. However, there are a number of advantages that human subjects bring to surveillance regimens. For example, humans are occasionally privy to private details that surveillance devices do not detect; we might consider that expensive, cutting-edge, and intrusive federal US programs
like Total Information Awareness and the Echelon data-processing center failed to prevent the September 11th attacks. Based upon these failures, as Armand Mattelart has recognized, “The exclusively technological approach to intelligence, at the expense of human intelligence, thus revealed its limitations” (Mattelart 2010, 138). Yet it is also important to note that the collection, processing, and analysis of data—primarily to serve the governmental schemes of diverse public and private authorities—form only one function of this mass monitoring that characterizes the rise of what David Lyon popularly calls the “surveillance society” (2001). As Foucault pointed out in the 1970s—and as Georg Simmel argued in his own way much earlier (1950; see Lyon 2007, 50)—the threat of ubiquitous surveillance distributes a disciplinary, deterrent effect throughout society. That is to say, the success of surveillance cannot be measured simply by the amount of data it generates and the success it has in detection and deterrence; one must also consider how it productively checks and recalibrates the behavior of individuals or groups of human subjects. Of course, video cameras and other surveillance technologies play an essential role in disseminating the disciplinary power that is inherent in this omnipresent surveillance potential. In this regard it is useful to point out that panopticism, of course, did not emerge with new technologies of surveillance: according to Lyon, Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon prison—which was designed at the turn of the nineteenth century—was designed “to use uncertainty as a means of subordination. The asymmetrical gaze created uncertainty which in turn produced surrender” (1994, 65). We should also note that this principle of uncertainty is operative in less asymmetrical, more democratized regimes of lateral surveillance: the mobility and nearly ubiquitous public presence of other sensate human subjects has long provided an alternative
technics of panopticism. Yet in addition to the panoptic effect, mass lateral surveillance campaigns serve another essential function: the “responsibilization” of citizens (see Foucault 1978, 105; O’Mally and Palmer 1996; Garland 1996), by which lay individuals become an integral, active element of the security apparatus. From this point of view, the generation of surveillant subjects is more or less an end in itself. Producing active citizen-subjects who take responsible action for themselves and their communities—and who therefore do not require the services of a generous welfare state—is an essential aspect of what Foucault calls “governmentality” (see especially Foucault 2004). So despite whatever knowledge-building or disciplinary task this mass lateral surveillance might serve, one of its constituent functions is its success in activating productive, responsibilized civic practices among citizens.

Because of these core concerns, this dissertation is less interested in the evolving technical landscape of surveillance technologies than in the social impulse to carry out surveillance on one’s peers. While surveillance cameras and computers are certainly worthy of our attention—and, as you will see, they are important to this project in various ways—I am more interested in how the human subject remains central to the surveillance project. The first two chapters of my dissertation, which focus on the role of participatory media in lateral surveillance campaigns, explore the human subject as a locus of biological resources—particularly the capacities to see and to speak—that can be deployed toward various ends as an embodied technology of government. As I argue, media technologies from the primitive trumpet to the iPhone have played an essential role in augmenting and responsibilizing these human subjects to perform certain duties in lateral policing campaigns. And as I show in the third and fourth chapters, rhetoric has likewise played a central role in these campaigns,
particularly as it has functioned as a technology of propaganda and a non-violent other to the violence of the state (which thereby allows the citizen to perform lateral policing duties while nevertheless reinscribing the state’s exclusive privilege of violence). While the rhetorical-surveillant subject is, as I discuss in the first section, addressed as a locus of basic biological capacities, the traditional tension between rhetoric and violence introduces another layer of complexity into my analysis. By examining how speaking civic subjects have been traditionally valued vis-à-vis violent ones, I am able to more fully engage an issue that has been implicit in many of my case studies: the surveillant subject is, in nearly all scenarios, most useful to the extent that s/he is also a communicative subject—to the extent that s/he not only sees and hears, but also complements that sight with tightly circumscribed and nonviolent forms of communication.

This juxtaposition of surveillance and communication, therefore, offers new perspectives on rhetorical theory and media studies. Traditional objects of rhetorical inquiry are important to this project—for example, in chapter four I discuss how public address was used to recruit women into the temperance movement—yet alternative forms of rhetorical inquiry emerge when I analyze the rhetorical subject who “says something” at the behest of Neighborhood Watch or Homeland Security. Undergirding these programs is an explicit call for a special modality of rhetorical subjectivity: Napolitano urges us not only to see something, but also to say something, to report suspicious activities as a central part of our civic duty. The kind of subjectivity promoted here is a tightly circumscribed rhetorical subjectivity, one that has to be disciplined in order to transmit useful information to authorities. Laboratory scientists, too, provide a nontraditional form of rhetorical subject, yet
it is their transcription activities that bring phenomena into the discursive world where they can then be studied, scrutinized, and transformed into actionable data. Because I am considering the complexities of the communicative-surveillant subject—the subject who engages in sometimes simple and mundane processes of seeing something and saying something—I strive to describe previously unexamined or under-examined modalities of the rhetorical subject.

In addition, by putting surveillance studies into play with Heideggerian and Kittlerian media theory, I describe the potential deformation of the communicative-surveillant subject into a sensing/signaling mechanism. Thus while this dissertation is broken into two major parts—the first on participatory media and the second on rhetorical subjects—animating the entire project is an overriding concern with how certain kinds of communicative-surveillant subjects are formed. In this history of lateral policing movements and the seeing/speaking/signaling subjects that compose them, rhetorical subjectivity, technological media, and lateral surveillance are inextricable. Hence from this point of view, CCTV cameras and data logging are less informative than the discourses, rationalities, and techniques that constitute the human subject as a watcher of others (and, moreover, as one who produces discourse about those s/he watches). This project, therefore, considers diverse practices of surveillance carried out by lay citizens under various technical regimes, including the coordinated scrutiny of brothel clientele in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the surveillance protocols of contemporary neighborhood watch volunteers; the pre-disciplinary, public observation of alcoholics in the service of temperance “science”; and the spy schemes of citizen-soldiers (Hay 2007) who, after seeing Secretary
Napolitano’s videos and other propaganda and operations carried out under the aegis of Homeland Security, are eager to ferret out any possible homegrown terrorists in their midst. All of these case studies share a common interest in how seeing and saying—how surveillance and communication—become means of asserting one’s civic identity and responsibility. These communicative-surveillant activities are ritualized products of governmental apparatuses which, in the words of Nikolas Rose, demand “the obligation to continuously and repeatedly evidence one’s citizenship credentials as one recurrently links oneself into the circuits of civility” (2000, 327). Seeing and saying, therefore, have become a cornerstone of our civic obligations, whether we deploy them in the deterrence of crime, the prevention of terrorism, or the rehabilitation of the morally fallen.

In this introductory chapter, I will give a brief overview of the basic conceptual framework that informs the dissertation. This calls for a discussion of five primary areas of research: surveillance and lateral surveillance studies; governmentality studies; rhetorical subjectivity; the dichotomous cultural logic of communication/violence; and biopolitics, identification, and division. I will then provide a chapter-by-chapter overview of the dissertation that engages some of its more important cultural and political implications.

III. Surveillance and Lateral Surveillance

Surveillance is increasingly pervasive in our public and private lives. In the past three decades, advances in communication technologies have fueled a proliferation of new surveillance practices. Once the preserve of prisons, government installations, and high-risk businesses, surveillance cameras now record many, if not most, of our movements in public
spaces. In a number of major cities, cameras record automobiles and passersby at traffic intersections. Most university classrooms, among the safest places in the nation, are equipped with surveillance cameras. And more and more retail businesses are subjecting their customers to the constant scrutiny of video surveillance. Yet video monitoring, of course, is only one aspect of this growing culture of surveillance. Digital media have been especially important in facilitating the capture and circulation of personal data. Whereas myths of the “electronic sublime” (Carey 2005) have many figures celebrating the new forms of revolutionized community that are supposedly coterminous with the digital era, new media have the capacity to capitalize upon our every digital move (see Dyer-Witheford 1999). In the words of Mark Andrejevic, digital interactivity has given rise to a peculiar state of affairs “in which producers have more information about consumers than ever before, and consumers have less knowledge about and control over how this information is being used. Rather than the cozy image of the town cobbler with a custom-made template for every resident’s foot, imagine an electronic village in which an omniscient and invisible shop owner keeps track of every detail of villagers’ lives, storing them in a database to which they have no access, and using it not just to meet their needs, but also to pretty on their anxieties and insecurities and to manipulate their hopes and dreams” (2007, 27). As Andrejevic makes clear, surveillance is not simply a matter of disciplinary control: as much as that, it is a means of gathering information about individuals and collectivities in order to securely facilitate the flow of goods and people and devise commercial and state-sponsored programs to govern individuals’ conduct (see Deflem 1997; Miller and Rose 1990).
Surveillance, therefore, is a mode of political action that functions as a single element within complex and emergent apparatuses of governmental practice. In other words, surveillance is an articulation point for different programs of government, and its significance and form emerge in its conjunctural relationship with other practices. As a primary means for producing knowledge about the habits, proclivities, and other characteristics of individuals and groups, surveillance is central to rationalizing and carrying out the work of governmentality. Workers are placed under the surveillance of their bosses, for example, in order to increase output and discover and establish ideal norms of behavior. Similarly, ex-convicts are surveilled by their parole officers in order to ensure that they are employed, that they are abstaining from drugs, and that they are generally living up to ideals of rehabilitated citizenship; welfare recipients receive similar treatment (see Jones 2005; Maki 2011). Surveillance, in instances like these, is simply one element within broader schemes to govern the conduct of those who are being surveilled (or potentially surveilled).

Yet surveillance, of course, is merely one possible strategy of governance. The factory worker who is conditioned by surveillance to work more quickly and efficiently could be governed through more physically brutal methods of intervention, such as whipping or the administration of stimulant drugs. And we would only have to take a quick glance at recent punitive history to see that convicted criminals have been subjected to more spectacular and painful punishments than the rehabilitative surveillance regimens of contemporary probation and parole systems (see especially Foucault 1977, 3–72). Because of this political versatility, practices and rationalities of surveillance evolve with the systems of governance in which they appear. This is particularly true of lateral surveillance, which is the
conduct of surveillance by lay peers and volunteer organizations rather than by superiors or official policing agencies. Moral watchdog groups, neighborhood watch programs, border enforcement organizations, and DHS civilian initiatives like the See Something Say Something campaign are examples of how everyday citizens carry out lateral surveillance among their peers. As these examples indicate, lateral surveillance is often motivated by concerns like the enforcement of moral norms, the provision of security, the protection of living spaces, and the prevention of crime.

In his analysis of the “work of watching one another” (2005), Mark Andrejevic finds that current lateral surveillance practices have their roots in specifically contemporary phenomena: the emergence of new information technologies, a “postmodern” epistemological skepticism, and an emerging ideology of risk and mutual responsibility. These conditions, he argues, have given rise to a new style of monitoring that complements, if not overshadows, the “top-down” surveillance strategies of the past (e.g., employer-employee surveillance, and state-citizen surveillance). Andrejevic suggests that today we are seeing a growth of new “lateral” surveillance techniques—such as Googling new friends on the Internet, or installing low-cost lie detection devices on our computers—by which lay citizens can effortlessly monitor and assess the behaviors of one another. “With increasing rapidity,” he writes, “technology once restricted to the realm of large corporations and law enforcement organizations is flowing into the hands of individual consumers” (2005, 493). As the public has taken advantage of these technological advances, it has developed a taste for surveillance that complements our society’s pervasive climate of suspicion and its entrepreneurial social imperative of mutual responsibility.
It is difficult to disagree with Andrejevic’s assessment. Technological advances have made it surprisingly simple to listen to, watch, record, and research our friends, our foes, and even our employers and police officers (Mann, Nolan, and Wellman 2003). As these new technologies have become the playthings of a growing segment of our population, the culture of watching one another has gained fresh impetus. Arguably new socialities have emerged, such as those based upon the reciprocality of exhibitionism and lateral surveillance (Andrejevic 2002; Andrejevic 2004; Lyon 2006) so evident in the meteoric rise of Facebook, Twitter, and similar social media. Yet, as Andrejevic clarifies, these technological advances can only be fully understood if analyzed alongside the ideological framework that naturalizes these social behaviors: “The proliferating lateral surveillance cannot be explained simply in terms of technological development. Rather, the dissemination of surveillance tools and practices has to be read alongside a climate of generalized, redoubled risk. The conjunction of risk and responsibility derives from another intersection: that of reflexive skepticism with the participatory promise of the market—the injunction not to trust in discredited social institutions and traditional practices, but to take matters into one’s own hands through the mechanism that has helped corrode them” (2006, 494). As Andrejevic demonstrates, we monitor one another not simply because we have the technological resources to do so, but because in the digital age we have developed an assertive, skeptical self-reliance that has eroded our confidence in mainstream social institutions and popular opinion. Gary T. Marx, too, has made a similar observation: as the state has increased its taste for surveillance, citizens have reciprocated by directing a similar vigilance against their peers: “The state’s power to seek out violations, even without specific grounds for suspicion, has been enhanced.
With this comes a cult and a culture of surveillance that goes beyond government to the private sector and the interaction of individuals” (1988, 2).

But lateral surveillance, of course, is not unique to contemporary American society; it is a historical phenomenon that has repeatedly emerged in different guises and governmental configurations. Thus while some characteristics of lateral surveillance programs are specifically local and contemporary, there is an important history of lateral surveillance that Andrejevic’s work does not directly address. This is particularly apparent if one considers the history of policing: the police force, a sovereign institution endowed with the responsibility for enforcing moral norms, surveilling risky and valuable spaces, and otherwise contributing to the security (and insecurity) of their constituencies, is a relatively recent invention of modernity (see Agamben 2000; Reeves 2012). Under the auspices of lateral surveillance, ordinary citizens have historically filled most of the responsibilities now associated with policing. Thus by viewing lateral surveillance in its historical particularities, it becomes clear that lateral surveillance emerges with a whole host of complementary governmental practices. That is, if we look at lateral surveillance as a single technology that takes shape within diverse apparatuses of government—if we attempt to better understand how it is privileged and practiced vis-à-vis other governmental technologies—then we can better pinpoint its broader significance in shaping the conduct of populations.

Hence while surveillance is an essential aspect of governance, it provides only a partial glimpse of how individuals are mobilized and corrected by themselves and their peers. To explain, surveillance is how the human sciences and institutions build knowledge about human subjects; it is an important mechanism for deterring abnormal behaviors, and it is the
means by which many activist organizations, such as the temperance movement activists I discuss in chapter two, are brought together in common activity as they watch the behaviors of others. Yet another essential, complementary aspect of lateral policing is *communication*: for example, the work of human scientists must not only be observed, but it must also be recorded and transmitted; many people are deterred from acting aberrantly not just because they are being watched, but because of the threat that their peers will share the details of their aberration with others; and, of course, targets of lateral surveillance efforts—such as prostitutes and alcoholics—must be persuaded via communication to abandon their immoral behaviors. As these cases suggest, lateral surveillance commonly gains sociopolitical significance alongside various forms of communication. Surveillance and communication, then, become intertwined at a broader level of governmental rationality, where they work together to empower individuals to police the conduct of their peers. Hence as a social practice and a governmental technology, lateral policing not only includes listening to, watching, and recording the actions of others, but also the activities—such as the discursive rationalization, planning, organization, promotion, and conduct of various peer-to-peer policing practices—that articulate lateral surveillance to social movements, activist initiatives, and governmental programs.

**IV. Governmentality**

Growing out of Foucault’s *College de France* lecture series in the 1970s, the concept of governmentality has become a popular framework for analyzing the microphysical functions and circulations of contemporary power. Foucault’s development of the notion of
governmentality was at once ambivalent and historically deep, presenting us with something of a mixed bag: on the one hand, he develops a history of governmentality that can be traced back to the Hebraic and Hellenistic foundations of Western civilization; on the other, he focuses much of his analysis on the development of governmental practice in contemporary neoliberalism. This has given rise to the pronounced tendency among governmentality scholars to focus on sites of analysis specific to liberal and neoliberal rule. With some important exceptions (e.g., Oestreich 2008), most historical analyses of governmentality have looked at phenomena that characterize Western and Western-inspired (Li 2007) rule under the economic logics of liberalism and neoliberalism.

According to Foucault, governmentality can be understood as “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (2004, 108). In this passage, Foucault is basically concerned with explaining the function of political economy in directing the exercise of rule over modern populations. He argues that governmentality arises from an ideology of classical liberalism that developed upon ideals of political economy (from the utilitarian English tradition) and human rights (from the French radical tradition). Yet, as James Hay (2010) and others have pointed out, we shouldn’t think of liberal political economy in merely negative terms (the lack of state intervention); instead, we have to think about what (neo)liberal government produces in the population, its positive function. Whereas liberalism held that the market signified a basically noumenal realm that could not be effectively addressed by human
interventions, neoliberalism posits that the market is an artificial state of affairs that must be cultivated by governing apparatuses. In neoliberal rule, then, the state’s actions are subordinated to the sustenance and protection of market logics. Consequently, in neoliberalism liberty is taken to be an artifact, not a natural state of affairs; as neoliberal economist Friedrich von Hayek (2011) puts it, civilization leads to freedom, not the other way around. From this point of view, certain governing strategies must be undertaken in order to create the conditions in which “freedom,” under the guise of enterprising self-production, can thrive. Whereas liberalism posits an innate, naturalist rationality to the market and the social with which it is implicated, neoliberalism posits that certain interventions must be put into place in order to govern the ultimate irrationality of individuals toward appropriate self-enterprise.

Perhaps Toby Miller has described governmentality most succinctly: it is the “means of managing the public by having it manage itself” (1993, xiii). Tony Bennett, in an analysis of the governing utility of modern museums, has provided an influential expansion on this theme, defining governmentality as the “forms of social management and regulation which, predicated on the supposition that the citizen possesses a degree of freedom and autonomy . . . , aim to ‘govern at a distance’ by creating frameworks in which individuals will voluntarily regulate their own behavior to achieve specific social ends rather than needing to be subjected to forced direction” (1995, 865). This required, in Bennett’s terms, the civilizing effect of certain cultural forms, as they would “function as instruments of public instruction”: “Rather than embodying an alien and coercive principle of power which aimed to cow the people into submission [a la the ancien regime], the museum—addressing the people as a
public, as citizens—aimed to inveigle the general populace into complicity with power by placing them on this side of a power which it represented to it as its own” (1990, 41; also see Zagacki and Gallagher 2009, 184–9). Museums, therefore, “targeted the popular body as an object for reform” (Bennett 1990, 49), not only providing a reformatory in which manners and tastes could be cultivated, but also setting out to provide a cultural enclosure in which different classes of the population could intermingle and become united. In Bennett’s words, this allowed institutions to “govern at a distance” (also see Miller and Rose 1990), as they provided a cultural space in which citizen-subjects learned how to conduct themselves and reform their values.

Focusing more explicitly on the role of political economy in governmentality, Mitchell Dean writes that “Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite by shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes. . . . Liberalism might be used to denote those forms of rationality and techniques of government that, in recognizing the existence of these processes, sought to use them to limit the government of the state” (2009, 18). What is most interesting about this development, then, is that the governmentalized state does not “take over” these interventions to ameliorate conflict, increase productivity, inculcate norms of conduct, and so on. Instead, it empowers and facilitates certain individuals, bureaucracies, and institutions from the private sector to encourage ideals of conduct. Agencies of the state, therefore, typically function as facilitators
by endowing individuals and private institutions with the capacity and responsibility to
govern the public toward certain productive forms of conduct. Government, then, is a
historically constituted matrix that articulates the wishes of authorities, seeking to change
others’ beliefs and actions by acting on their environment, their will, and their circumstances.
“Authorities” here, of course, does not strictly mean “the state,” its representatives, and its
institutions, but includes a whole host of public and private actors/moral entrepreneurs.

In traditional theories of state sovereignty, Foucault argues, there is a binary logic that posits
an “in” of the state and an “out” of private life. According to Foucault, this overlooks the
mutual implication of the state and the private spheres. Yet the state is not transcendent and
separated from the private/the social, looking down from a position of dominance as it
operates only with specialized sovereign apparatuses; and the population, of course, is not
divorced from productive operations of the state. The state’s actions are implicated in the
subjectivity of private actors, as the domestic domain becomes from the 18th century onward
a realm with which government becomes increasingly occupied. With this shift in
government, therefore, one witnesses growing partnerships between state agencies and
private bureaucracies, organizations, and actors. While significant elements of power
relations have been centralized in the state, these relations are not reducible to it and are
increasingly operating either from without its domain or only with its indirect support. Thus
we see that the liberal state and individual autonomy are co-constitutive; liberal subjectivity
and the modern state are inextricably bound together, in that the critique of state intervention
is a positive technique of government. Sovereign institutions do not merely recede; private
individuals and institutions are empowered to provide for aspects of their own government,
becoming responsibilized toward themselves and certain of their peers (Garland 1996). In this sense, neoliberal governmentality depends on socializing the population to risk and insecurity. Governmentality is thus frequently tied up with public campaigns about the prevention of disease (Foucault 2007), the reproduction of cultural rituals and values (Hunter 1988), the importance of secure mobility (Packer 2008), the rearing and education of children (Donzelot 1997), and, most important for my project, the activation of vigilant subjects in the interest of preventing crime and terrorism (Andrejevic 2007). Given the fact that sovereign power is deeply implicated in the invention and governance of each of these problems, we must keep in mind Mitchell Dean’s description of the relationship between governmentality and the state: although we are inclined to talk about governmentality as being “beyond” sovereign power (see especially Rose and Miller 1992), “that does not preclude the use of sovereign kinds of rule in local contexts that link governing through self-governing and self-becoming with the enforcement of obligations” (Dean 2003, 130).

V. Rhetorical Subjectivity

One primary aim of the second section of this dissertation is to show rhetoric in some of its complexity as a governmental technology. Rhetoric is essential to many procedures and at many stages of governmentality, a fact that has gone largely unexplored by scholars in rhetoric, culture, and communication. Not only does rhetoric appear as public address designed to guide the conduct of audiences (Greene 2006), but it also gives life to certain phenomena by rendering them into discourse (Miller and Rose 1990). Journal articles perform this function, for example, by organizing and crystallizing observed phenomena into
rhetorical form, so that they can then be studied, publicized, and subject to various interventions by public and private actors. To take a prominent contemporary example, climate change as a series of geological phenomena is largely imperceptible to those without specialized education and equipment. Yet over the past several decades, scientists have taken pains to give these phenomena life beyond the laboratory through the largely rhetorical research process that involves things like taking notes, recording observations, and writing research articles. Once coded and represented into discursive form, various strategies for governing climate change are taken up: organizations and institutes are formed, protests are organized, speaking appearances are scheduled, college courses are designed, policy papers are drafted, and so forth. This process exemplifies the centrality of rhetoric to the governance of social problems, as it plays an important role in governmental practice from the discovery and constitution of problems in the laboratory/office to the activism and advocacy that are carried out on their behalf.

These functions of rhetoric illustrate what Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose have recognized as the essential procedures of governmentality: representing and intervening. According to Miller and Rose, “The specificity of governmentality, as it has taken shape in ‘the West’ over the last two centuries, lies in this complex interweaving of procedures for representing and intervening. . . . We suggest that these attempts to instrumentalize government and make it operable also have a kind of ‘technological’ form. . . . If political rationalities render reality into the domain of thought, these ‘technologies of government’ seek to translate thought into the domain of reality, and to establish ‘in the world of persons and things’ spaces and devices for acting upon those entities of which they dream and
scheme.” An essential facet of the governmental process, then, is the set of actions by which various phenomena are represented—in other words, how they are rendered intelligible as problems to be governed. Describing how rhetoric functions in the production of knowledge and thus makes possible governmental activities, Ronald Greene points out that “rhetoric allows for a governing apparatus to make judgments about what it should govern, how it should govern, as well as offering mechanisms for evaluating the success or failure of governing” (1998, 22). Once human tendencies and behaviors are given a stable life in the form of discourse (data, statistics, diagnoses, expert opinions, etc.), their relationship to ideal or deduced norms can be addressed by various interventions—that is, by technologies of governmental correction. As Miller and Rose have pointed out elsewhere, these technologies of government are characterized by “the complex of mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions” (Rose and Miller 1992). As an instrument of representation, rhetoric takes form in discourses—including scientific articles, police reports, and 9/11 calls reporting suspicious activities—and thus sets in motion various governmental responses by health officials, police agencies, non-profit organizations, and so on. Yet as an instrument of intervention, rhetoric has been envisioned as one of many possible governmental strategies to persuade individuals to conduct their lives in accord with various norms of morality and responsibility. For example, as I will show in chapter four, public address has long been used to enlist “moral crusaders” in the temperance cause, as preachers, politicians, and others have encouraged individuals to police the immoral in their midst. Various other forms of deliberative rhetoric—such as publicly distributed pamphlets
and one-on-one conversion efforts—have played a similar role in constituting activist communities and guiding the moral entrepreneurialism of individuals in various sectors of the public. Other rhetorical strategies, such as public confrontations and violent attacks, have also been employed to discourage certain disapproved activities and intimidate the offending individuals into changing their behavior.

In many instances, these two rhetorical styles—one liberal, and the other confrontational—create tensions among and within lateral policing institutions. As I show in chapters four and five, these different forms of being-rhetorical are often a bone of contention within lateral policing groups, as factions disagree on rhetorical strategy. Immigration policing groups, for example, have long been divided into factions of liberals and vigilantes, with the liberals insisting on surveillance and contacting official law enforcement bodies, whereas vigilantes have arrested and abused immigrants and their enablers. This division demonstrates how deeply invested governing bodies are in cultivating certain kinds of rhetorical subjects, and thus how different forms of being-rhetorical are privileged within different configurations of governmental practice. In seeking to transform and engage the conduct of certain activist sectors of the population, some groups have sought to cultivate patient, liberal, non-violent rhetorical subjects who use reasoning to persuade others to change their lives and their communities (see Keith 2008); other groups have encouraged activists to adopt the rhetorical subjectivity of the ax-wielding puritan who threatens pimps and saloon keepers while destroying their wares; and yet other campaigns have sought to create the neighborhood snitch, the rhetorical subject who closely watches his or her neighbors and dials 9-1-1 to report any suspicious activity.
Until the twentieth century it was common for many lateral policing initiatives to be coupled with warrants for violence. Wanted posters advised that the wanted parties were to be apprehended “dead or alive,” placing lateral policing within a given set of appropriate practices organized around the violent potential of individuals to detect, approach, apprehend, and kill one another. Yet when lateral policing is carried out today, as in contemporary neighborhood watch programs, it is often inscribed within a different set of privileged activities. Neighborhood watch activists are warned to never physically intervene in potential criminal activity; instead, they are instructed to immediately contact official police agencies, and are often explicitly prohibited from following suspects and carrying firearms. Much of the debate surrounding the Trayvon Marvin tragedy, in which an armed neighborhood watch volunteer shot and killed an unarmed seventeen-year-old boy, have bemoaned the perpetrator’s “taking the law into his own hands” (see chapter five). Lateral policing programs, therefore, are informed by underlying notions about the relative value of certain kinds of active subjects, and speaking has been promoted as a safe and useful mode of citizen action.

In chapters two and five, I address Ronald Greene’s well-known description of the biopolitical value of rhetorical production. As Greene argues, “the persuasive, aesthetic, and deliberative characteristics of communication (elements associated with the information and cultural content of the commodity as well as the social networks of care) reside in the matrix of bio-political production. From this perspective, rhetorical agency can be remodeled as communicative labor, a form of life-affirming constitutive power that embodies creativity and cooperation. As such, it extends beyond commodity production per se, to include
communication’s role in building social networks of all kinds” (2004, 201). For Greene, human communicative activity can act as a nexus of creative, affirmative, and resistant sociocultural production: it constitutes the means and medium of our sociality and political creativity. Therefore he argues that “the political dimension of communicative labor is built into bio-political production’s attempt to harness and capture the constitutive power of communication” (203). Greene’s wish, above all, is to emphasize our potential to withhold and redirect our rhetorical labor in order to throw a monkey wrench into communicative capitalism’s machinery of capture (also see May 2012, 440–2). Armand Mattelart, too, has voiced sympathies with this view, arguing that we withdraw our communicative labor from the apparatuses of production: “Because communication and speech in these societies have been ‘thoroughly permeated by money—and not by accident but by their very nature,’ the key thing may be to create spaces of non-communication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control” (2010, 184). While Greene and Matthew May turn their attention to a traditional Marxist focus on resistant labor, and Mattelart advocates a Deleuzian withdrawal, I would prefer to parse out a provocative argument that Greene leaves more or less undeveloped: the troubling fact that often “Citizenship captures rhetoric-power and puts it to work for the state” (2006, 91). While we certainly can (and should) discuss the resistance potential inherent in communication-power—a project that has been carried out not only by Greene and May, but also most notably by Hardt and Negri—the tendency for our communication to be put to work for security apparatuses cannot be easily overstated. The impact of this capture, therefore, deserves closer attention, particularly as it separates out that which is politically creative in our communication from that which is merely biological, mechanical,
and de-vivified. To the extent that our communication is thus captured, it is robbed of the potential for social cooperation and democratic empowerment that Greene identifies. Instead, it is shorn to its barest informational quality, where the communicative act then serves the homeland security apparatus as well as the more general machinery of citizen responsibilization (see chapter two).

VI. The Cultural Logic of Communication/Violence

Governing through communicative performance is a central element in the production of liberal citizen-subjects. As Greene and Daryl Hicks have argued, a Foucaultian perspective on communicative production “reveals how power works productively by augmenting the human capacity for speech/communication. . . . [An] under-appreciated aspect of the productive power of cultural governance resides in the generation of subjects who come to understand themselves as speaking subjects willing to regulate and transform their communicative behaviors for the purpose of improving their political, economic, cultural, and affective relationships” (2005, 101). Greene and Hicks point out that the values of deliberative communication comprise an essential aspect of liberal subject production. The authors analyze switch-side debating as a cultural technology of liberal self-governance whereby speakers learn socially conservative values of deracinated, liberal impartiality through disimpassioned rhetorical practice. By placing the rise of switch-side debating within the Cold War, Greene and Hicks show how liberal American values of deliberation and empathy were inculcated specifically as they contrasted with the autocratic values of the Soviet Union. While deliberation, citizen liberty, and communicative entrepreneurship were
purported to dominate the American cultural imagination, the Soviet Union was a place of coercion and severe intellectual homogeneity.

Relatedly, the various technē and programs of liberal government strive to cultivate values of deliberation and communication instead of radicality and violence (see Oksala 2011). This is an important aspect of the regime- and status quo-conserving inertia of contemporary liberal governmentality. However, while liberal citizenship is quite clearly tied to these deliberative-communicative democratic values, the cultural logic that opposes violence with communication far predates liberal government. Since Plato, in fact, we have often heard that philosophy is violence’s other. From Kant and Hegel to Marx and Girard, and into the present with American liberals like Richard Rorty, we have come to define the philosopher’s task as distinct from the rash violence of the politicians, generals, and revolutionaries (see Siebers 1998, 115–30). At the level of philosophical praxis, it must be kept in mind that discourse, of course, is the traditional medium and method of philosophy: to do philosophy simply means to be-rhetorical about philosophy. Philosophy, in other words, is the coming-into-speech of a particular kind of discourse. I say this not to colonize philosophy under the rubric of communication or rhetoric—a position I do not advocate—but instead to illustrate how being-rhetorical, how being a speaking subject, is positioned against other ways of being, in the same way that being philosophical has long been contrasted and defined vis-à-vis its competing ways of being-in-the-world. In other words, being-rhetorical has frequently been endowed with certain political and social value, particularly as rhetorical practices contrast with other ways of being-with-others. The speaking subject is thus a subject who speaks instead of carrying out other acts—the subject who gives a stump speech
instead of starting a riot; the subject who participates in an after-school debate program instead of selling drugs or playing football; the subject who negotiates with his boss rather than tossing a Molotov cocktail through his or her shop window; the wise, mild-mannered subject of today who settles disputes with his mind and mouth instead of with his fists.

Let us say, then, that at a certain level of praxis *communication* is violence’s other. It is this relationship to violence, in fact, that provides communication/rhetoric with much of its cultural currency. We might consider the oft-bemoaned fact—oft-bemoaned in rhetoric’s disciplinary circles, that is—that in public discourse “mere rhetoric” is often contrasted with action. A recent editorial in *The Hill* by Kentucky US Senator Mitch McConnell regurgitated its variation on this theme: “Job Creators Need Action, Not Rhetoric” (McConnell 2011). While many communication and rhetoric scholars would be annoyed to see one of their colleagues repeat this naïve dichotomization, I would like to put aside the ontological status of rhetorical action for a moment in order to point out the rather obvious fact that speech—as a prominent cultural practice—possesses within our liberal democracy a special status among political activities. One of the prerequisites of productive democratic citizenship is practicing speech rather than violence—we must discuss rather than dismantle, we must speak rather than shoot. As the motto of an Atlanta-based urban debate league—whose primary purpose is to enhance urban middle and high school students’ potential by pulling them into debate programs and away from street and gang life—says so succinctly, “Words, Not Weapons.” So while the firm ontological distinction between communicative and violent action is certainly suspect, their polarization in the realm of liberal democratic values is clear: urban
debate leagues, of course, are only one example of how public and private institutions conspire to produce speaking subjects that eschew personal and political violence.

However, this divide between rhetoric and violence is not exclusive to contemporary liberal democracies. In fact, in an important sense this contrast lies at the heart of rhetorical thinking throughout its history. For George Kennedy, rhetoric is not primarily a public activity that developed in and around the democratic institutions of classical Greece; rather, it is a biological capacity that has been hardwired into animals’ genetic makeup throughout most of our evolution on this planet. Kennedy offers the example of male red deer stags competing for the attention of potential mates. Although the stags possess deadly antlers, they do not immediately resort to physical fighting: instead, they approach one another and howl, attempting to intimidate the other into departing the scene. This serves as a fight-or-flight ritual in which the stags attempt to settle their differences with “rhetoric” rather than violence. For Kennedy, “We share a ‘deep’ natural rhetoric” (1998, 13) that finds expression in the stags’ posturing, a rhetoric that is “deep” in the sense that it provides an evolutionary advantage to communities whose members attempt to persuade rather than devour one another: “it seems clear that nature has encouraged the evolution of rhetorical communication as a substitute for physical encounters” (14).

This dichotomization of rhetoric and violence functions toward the ongoing construction of the non-violent liberal subject. As Megan Foley (2013) has argued, we find precedents for this in classical Greek democratic and rhetorical theory: Lysias and Isocrates, for example, claimed that men distinguished themselves from “wild beasts” through civic persuasion. Yet this old rationality of rhetorical practice has assumed a different significance
as the rhetoric/violence dichotomy has come to form a core element of the liberal political project. Contra the democratic portrait that Lysias and Isocrates paint of rhetoric/violence in classical Greece, rhetoric is no longer solely or primarily valued as a means of civic persuasion that is preferable to violent coercion. Rather, in advanced liberalism the bare practice of speech has in many cases reached its depoliticized, biopolitical nadir. That is to say, the material practice of discourse production has become a value in itself, not as a correlate or condition of civic persuasion, but purely as the other of violence. Liberal citizens are speaking subjects, not violent ones; as such, in their everyday conduct they are governed to carry out various discursive practices as an alternative to physical violence. This is perhaps best exemplified in the governance of neighborhood watch volunteers who, perhaps more than any other citizens today, are charged with the ambivalent duty of carrying out a traditionally violent task—a task, moreover, that often directly confronts the violence of others—by strictly nonviolent means. Watch volunteers are governed to carry out the traditional surveillance duties of the police, but rather than carrying out the police’s exclusive violent privileges—such as apprehending, arresting, pepper spraying, tazing, shooting, or otherwise incapacitating suspects—they are given the task of calling 9-1-1, providing standard details, filing reports, testifying, and so forth. Their speech, therefore, is not valuable as a means of enlivening democratic practice, but merely as a material reinscription of the barrier between violent sovereign privilege and the speaking liberal subject (see chapter five).
VII. Biopolitics, Identification, and Immunity

During his 1975–76 lecture series at the College de France, Foucault flipped on its head Carl von Clausewitz’s famous maxim that “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” For Foucault, domestic politics in modernity has become the continuation of war by other means. That is to say, social relations within a given nation are grounded in an abstract notion of immanent peace. However, Foucault writes that “within this ‘civil peace,’ these political struggles, these clashes over or with power, these modifications of relations of force . . . all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. . . . We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions” (2003, 16; 48). Foucault traces this immanent conflict to a modern Western discourse on “race war,” although it is clear that today “racial” conflict is not its only or even primary manifestation. Instead, as Foucault writes, this initial concept of race war made domestic social relations intelligible as a sort of warfare (2003, 19), an analysis that has gradually seeped into our broader political imagination. For Foucault, this implies a simultaneous establishment of two classes of enemy: the enemy within, whose presence in the population threatens the social order; and the enemy without, whose externality supplied a different yet complementary threat. In the words of Jeremy Packer,

the security of the nation state under a rubric of race war was seen to be constantly at risk from both within and without. The health of the state was threatened by biological and social contagion within the borders and by exterior military or biological invasion from outside. By creating a simultaneously interior and exterior enemy, the modern nation state demanded
vigilant war-mindedness, and thus the organization of the governing apparatuses could be legitimately oriented for fighting such multiform wars. In this sense, race war was not precisely a war against other nations or empires (though this, too, resulted) but rather a constant battle against an immanent and pervasive threat that if unchecked could deteriorate the very foundation of the *bios*, the “human” race. (2007, 212)

This establishment of immanent (and imminent) threats to the population coincides with the deployment of governing apparatuses that are designed to secure the population. As I will discuss in chapter four, these apparatuses are fueled by immunological technologies that strive to defang and pacify this animating internal (“racial”) threat.

For Foucault, this race war appears in diverse manifestations, yet it functions to divide the population by setting various sects of the population apart, developing a “set of mechanisms whereby delinquents are controlled, kept track of, punished, and reformed” (2003, 33). To take an example, in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault discusses the physiocrat Guillame Francois Le Trosne, who was a judge at the presidial court of Orléans. In 1764 Le Trosne penned a report on vagabonds, “who live in the midst of society without being members of it, ‘who wage a veritable war on all citizens,’ and who are in the midst of us ‘in that state that one supposes existed before the establishment of civil society.’” Against them, he demanded the most severe penalties . . .; he wanted the police to be reinforced, the mounted constabulary to hunt them down with the help of the population that suffered from their depredations; he demanded that these useless and dangerous people should be ‘acquired by the state and that they should belong to it as slaves to their masters; and if necessary one
should organize collective round-ups in the woods to drive them out, and anyone making a capture should be paid” (1977, 88). According to Foucault, this fight against delinquents, the abnormal, and those otherwise deemed dangerous—a fight, moreover, that demanded total mobilization of the threatened public—provides for the constitutive nature of race war. In the words of Packer, these enemies of the state and the social body are “preconstitutive enemies (in that the constitution of any political body is based upon a set of exclusions)” (2007, 212).

These preconstitutive enemies are sustained and reconstituted via discourses of what Jeremy Engels (2010) calls “enemyship.” According to Engels, the constitution of enemyship functions “as a technique of governing: the art of naming enemies as a means of controlling and containing the will of the people” (2010, 20). Engels identifies three “interlocking rhetorical maneuvers” by which this enemyship is initiated and maintained: naming, estrangement, and escalation. As for naming, “Enemyship produces rhetorics of impersonalization that reduce humans to caricatures, altering reality by changing the orientation of self toward other” (22). With estrangement, on the other hand, “Enemies are enemies not only because they are ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ but because we cannot coexist peacefully or negotiate with them. . . . Enemyship negates the rationality of enemies and denies that conflicts can be managed through diplomacy; in short, it figures the relationship with the enemy as an antagonism that must end in violence” (22). As for escalation, it functions “largely through tropes of imminence and inevitability as rhetors make it appear that the coming crisis is unavoidable, thus forcing the audience to alter their behaviors accordingly. To motivate, rhetors deploy the discourses of fear, paranoia, and anxiety to focus their audience’s thoughts on how best to defend themselves and their families from the enemy,
and how best to exact hurt on the enemy if the chance arises” (22). These three techniques of exclusion identified by Engels—naming, estrangement, and escalation—represent three interwoven discursive stages in the constitution of enemies and enemy “races,” and therefore participate in a biopolitics of identification/division. The constitution of enemyship is an exclusionary process, to be sure, but it is, just as much, a reconstitution and rejuvenation of the domestic body politic (see Doxtader 2008). As Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty have remarked, “The creation of communal identity through declarations of war on enemies is nothing new. That was, for example, the essence of the American Declaration of Independence . . . and has been at the center of American public culture ever since” (1997, 78).

This dialectical process of identification/division is often overlooked in critical commentary on Kenneth Burke and his progenitors (like Freud) and his beneficiaries (like Maurice Charland). Charland’s groundbreaking work on constitutive rhetoric, for example, reads Burke through the lens of Louis Althusser. With Althusser, Charland describes the interpellation of individuals as certain kinds of subjects, ascribing to rhetoric the power to name and thus structure the identity of individuals. Burke allows Charland to take this one step further, by arguing that this structuration of identities is a social process that identifies individuals with others. This dual-process of interpellation and identification culminates in an “ongoing” process of subjectification (1987, 138), according to Charland, that is inherently social in its forging of community. When one is interpellated by the constitutive call—when one is hailed into the opened discursive space of community—one is called into a social collective with those who have been similarly hailed. According to Charland, this “collective
subject” emerges from an “‘ultimate identification’ permitting an overcoming or going beyond of divisive individual or class interests and concerns” (139).

By focusing on the unifying power of “ultimate identification,” however, we risk overlooking what Burke called the “ironic counterpart” of identification, division (1969, 23; also see Wess 1996, 203). Ultimate, indeed, appears to be a rather unusual modifier of identification, if only because, as Burke puts it, “Since identification implies division, [rhetoric involves us] us in matters of socialization and faction” (1969, 45; emphasis mine). Identification sways in dialectical interplay with its antagonist, division, such that one can identify with a collective only to the extent that that collective has certain bounds of exclusion that provide its condition of existence. Burke argues that this exclusion opens up space for the emergence of a scapegoat, of an immanent collective of “outsiders” whose mere presence threatens the integrity of the community but whose existence provides a condition for that community’s coming-together in unity. For Burke, “factional divisions (of class race, nationality, and the like) make for the ironic mixture of identification and dissociation that marks the function of the scapegoat” (1969, 34). The criteria that identify, in other words, also divide. When a collective is constituted on the basis of nationality, for example, it derives the basis for that bond on the exclusion of those deemed outside the nation (whether those criteria are geographic, ethnic, religious, etc.). Yet as Burke points out, this division is likewise constitutive. Those who are negated by this identification—those who are classified as other-than-the-nation—emerge as a negatively unified community. Despite whatever differences they possess, this group is unified by their common exclusion: they are bearers of this preconstitutive enemyship.
An important tendency of this constitution is the establishment of citizenship and enemyship based upon the metaphorical model of the body politic. This metaphor and its co-conspirators in the cultural imagination represent and constitute the polis as a biological organism with certain tendencies, deficiencies, and vulnerabilities. This metaphor is especially evident in chapter four, when I trace how the temperance movement established alcoholics and saloonkeepers as preconstitutive enemies lodged in the gut of the population. Tropes of war dominate temperance discourses, as well as their public performances: the classic song “Onward Christian Soldiers” takes on a provocative biopolitical significance when sung by hundreds of military-clad temperance activists—what Women’s Christian Temperance Union leader Frances Willard called the “citizen soldiery” (Willard 1883, 398)—parading through the Chicago streets in military formation. And what enemies were these citizen-soldiers mobilizing against? What Benjamin Rush, a founder of the American Psychiatric Association, called the “odious disease” (1823, 5) of alcohol abuse. This metaphorical grid of intelligibility provided this preconstitutive enemy with an intense urgency, particularly as it threatened to diffuse into diverse symptoms and infect the rest of the social order. For Rush, alcohol abuse was the key factor in “a numerous train of diseases and vices of the body and mind” (1823, 5). Rush and other influential medical practitioners helped translate this biopolitical threat between the realms of rationality and political strategy, as diverse immunological technologies were deployed to subdue this menacingly interior (yet nevertheless constitutively exterior) threat.
VIII. Chapter Overviews

In chapter two, I begin my history by recounting how crime-reporting media have evolved from telegraphic call boxes housed on street corners to today’s crime-reporting cell phone apps. The chapter starts by setting out the biopolitical groundwork that explains how the human subject is divided into its functional/capitalizable elements and those that are superfluous to communicative-surveillant labor. Various technologies and cultural protocols—such as the crime-reporting app with which one anonymously takes photographs of crimes and dispatches them to nearby police precincts, or the 9/11 call protocols that attempt to denature the communicating subject to its pure data processing value—ultimately serve to transform the human subject into a sensing/signaling mechanism. The human is valuable to police procedures only to the extent that it plays the very regimented and specific games of truth that demand pure information and the erasure of the communicating individual. Drawing principally from Heidegger, Haraway, Agamben, Sloterdijk, and Esposito, I describe the dangers of equating the subject’s value with its mechanical data-processing functions, particularly as this equation threatens to emphasize and accentuate the subject’s biocapital value in such a way that it is increasingly articulated through herding processes of desubjectification. This chapter demonstrates the interrelationship of communication and surveillance based upon their common and reliable biological givenness.

Chapter three continues my exploration of surveillance and communication technologies by providing a history of police crowdsourcing media. Reviewing recent work in crowdsourcing, I use my case studies to make three primary interventions into this literature: first, crowdsourcing is not new; second, it is media-dependent; and third, it can
have troubling consequences. By tracing this trend in crowdsourced policing to its origins in medieval policing cultures, I am able to demonstrate how the crowdsourcing of police work has historically functioned as a mechanism of control, popular mobilization, and resource extraction. In Anglo-Norman England, the Norman elites imposed upon the Anglo-Saxons a lateral policing scheme that held *all* community members financially responsible for crimes committed in their villages. Community members were thus forced to organize their labor into roving patrols in order to prevent being collectively taxed by their Norman colonizers. While there are profound differences between the policing cultures of medieval England and contemporary America, the pressures of neoliberal policing strategies and dwindling resources are contributing to a resurgence of lateral policing programs. While the programs of today include liaising with the local community and deploying remediated Wanted posters through social media like Twitter, Facebook, and Pinterest, medieval lateral policing patrols used oral “hues and cries” and crude horns to responsibilize fellow citizens and organize citizen-officers across time and space. This chapter follows Mitchell Dean in arguing that the sensate human subject contains important data-processing faculties that make it a central element in many complexes of governmental technology. This chapter builds upon the conclusion of the previous chapter, demonstrating how—through the use of crowdsourcing technologies—subjects’ biological makeup is technologized and assembled along with diverse technical and natural resources.

The next chapter, **chapter four**, provides a history of the lateral policing activities of the American temperance movement. The most prominent temperance organizations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—including the Women’s Christian Temperance
Union and the Anti-Saloon League—deployed communication and surveillance as complementary technologies of government. To describe this interrelationship, I use Peter Miller and Nicholas Rose’s identification of representing and intervening as two fundamental procedures of governmentality. Communication and surveillance, I demonstrate, fill both of these functions in diverse ways. For example, the pre-scientific observation of working-class alcoholics in the laboratory of the street allowed temperance activists to record (represent) social problems in a concrete and reproducible form; then, surveillance in rehabilitation clinics provided a means for correcting the offending individuals, as did—more importantly—the intervention of communicative strategies like public address, one-on-one conversations, and public prayers. The tension between communication and violence becomes especially visible in this chapter, as radical activists like Carrie Nation—who lambasted liberal activist groups for their passive, communicative approach to providing salvation for the intemperate—carried out violence against saloon owners and their clientele. To counter Nation’s increasingly popular, bar-busting “hatchetations,” activists in law-abiding, liberal organizations had to denounce Nation and redouble their activist training in citizen-surveillance and “moral suasion.” This chapter demonstrates not only how communication and surveillance were interrelated in pre-disciplinary scientific investigations, but also how they become valued vis-à-vis violence and promoted at its expense.

Chapter five continues this exploration of communication/surveillance and violence by providing a history of American neighborhood watch programs. Although American neighborhood watch programs have their roots in the colonial town watch system, I
demonstrate that the crucial developmental precedent in neighborhood watch history is the
taming of vigilante, “autonomous citizenship” policing movements into ones that practiced
“responsible citizenship” (see Johnston 1996). As the U.S. federal government strove to
impose federal sovereign control over its vast territory, it enforced its monopoly on violence
by cracking down on Wild West justice and vigilante movements (particularly in the South).
Local police departments, however, still relied heavily on citizens to provide intelligence and
coordinate relaxed lateral policing measures. In order to cultivate these responsibilities in
citizen-officers while nevertheless maintaining the state’s monopoly on violence,
neighborhood watch and similar programs relied on strict subjectification processes that
emphasized their volunteers’ role as the “eyes and ears” of the police force. That is, lateral
policing volunteers had to be forbidden from physically engaging offenders and suspects, and
were thus given exclusively communicative-surveillant responsibilities; needless to say, this
was a vast change from the days of citizen justice, and the enculturation programs of
Neighborhood Watch and similar organizations had to strongly emphasize the
responsibilization of citizen-officers within the bounds of the sovereign’s exclusive privilege
of violence. I conclude with the observation that the cultural logic that arbitrarily opposes
communication and violence can, by the logic of exceptional circumstances, result in the
hasty escalation from communication into violence. Again, this chapter demonstrates how
communication and surveillance have functioned as unobtrusive liberal technologies of
government that contrast with their violent counterparts.

Because this project is a history of the present, the concluding chapter, chapter six,
provides a look at the most controversial and pernicious lateral policing programs that
characterize the domestic engagements of the War on Terror. Looking primarily at the “See Something, Say Something” campaign, I describe how the homeland security apparatus governs through terrorism (see Mythen and Walklate 2006). One of the most important governmental evolutions occurring in the War on Terror, I argue, is that, as enemy epistemology becomes more troubled and ambivalent, lateral policing efforts have come to serve an extra-epistemological function. While citizen mobilization has always been an important aspect of lateral policing movements, that has become especially clear as the homeland security apparatus mobilizes citizens to be carry out activities that encourage civic responsibilization and identification with the homeland security apparatus. By decoupling the citizen’s lateral policing responsibilities from geographic spaces (neighborhood watch), aberrant behaviors (the temperance movement), crimes (social media and crime-reporting campaigns), the DHS assures us that terrorists could be anyone, that terrorist attacks could occur anywhere and at anytime, and that the best defense is a generalized vigilance in which citizens remains constantly watchful of their neighbors, co-workers, and any other potential homegrown terrorists. While the first section of the dissertation will focus on the human as a locus of biological resources that could be technologized and cultivated to perform certain actions, and while the second section will focus on how communication and surveillance function as nonviolent, specifically liberal technologies of government in recent and contemporary policing regimes, this concluding chapter will synthesize and expand on these perspectives by reflecting on how the policing of terrorism is shifting the mobilized and extra-epistemological political utility of the neoliberal, seeing/speaking subject. In conclusion, I suggest a number of possibilities for future research.
Chapter 2

The Mechanical Witness: Biopower and the 9-1-1 Paradigm

◆ Loretta Barella Rosa

At 2AM in a southwest Denver neighborhood, forty-four-year-old Loretta Barella Rosa ran across the street to a neighbor’s house, banging on the door and screaming for help. The woman’s husband, Christopher Alex Parea, was following closely behind and yelling for her to get back into the house. When the neighbor came to the door she was frightened and did not know what to do, so she called the police as she watched Parea drag Rosa off her porch and pull her across the street and back into their home. The 9-1-1 dispatcher assured the neighbor that help was on the way; yet as the neighbor waited, no police officers showed up. Forty minutes later, the neighbor called 9-1-1 again. The dispatcher assured her, “We’re trying to get somebody there” (Nicholson 2012). When a police officer finally arrived at 3:10—seventy minutes after the 9-1-1 call—the neighbor stayed inside her house because she wanted to remain anonymous. The officer shined a flashlight into a window of the home that Parea and Rosa shared before he retreated to his car and left the scene. Five hours later, at 8:15 AM, Parea himself called 9-1-1 informing them that he might have killed his wife. This time the officers promptly embarked to the house, where they found Rosa’s dead body. At about 9AM, Parea was finally taken into police custody, where he was held on suspicion of Rosa’s murder (Gurman 2012).
Introduction

Rosa’s experience demonstrates a number of important themes that I will discuss in the next two chapters, both of which deal with the technologization of human subjects in the living labor of lateral policing. For this chapter, the most important lesson illustrated by Rosa is that her communicative action—her dialing of the phone, her speaking with the officer, and her careful obedience to the voice of the sovereign—implicated her in relations of a specific form of biopower in which her most basic capacities as a living being were cultivated in service of the policing apparatus. Like Rosa’s neighbor, at one time or another most of us will have to provide witness to crime. Tragically, in this case calling the cops was the sole object of civic compliance, allowing the witness to anonymously fulfill her moral and civic duties by pushing buttons, providing simple information, and remaining isolated from the violence facing her neighbor. Today, in many cases such communicative action has become the limit action of the citizen-officer, as discourses of communicative responsibility emphasize the role of citizen engagement within the bounds of the sovereign’s exclusive privilege of violence. In other words, good citizens call the police; they don’t fight back. Hence as Loretta Borella Rosa’s case illustrates, the expression of community responsibility materializes in the biomachinic impulse of the sensing/signaling citizen: upon witnessing a crime and initiating police responses through a telecommunication device, the citizen has fulfilled his or her social responsibility and further action is delegated to policing authorities.

Policing institutions and strategies are constantly retooled to accommodate this escalating regime of communicative responsibility: as Gary T. Marx has recognized, “informing is seen as an element of good citizenship, commanding growing institutional and
technical support” (1988, 207). Telecommunication devices such as the telegram “private box,” the telephone call-box, and the mobile phone have historically equipped citizens to assume this informant role under conditions of anonymity. By providing the means for citizens to enact their communicative citizenship, the presence and promotion of these media in the cultural field implicates them in ideals of entrepreneurial citizen conduct. While this reinforces the privileging of communicative action that is common among lateral policing efforts, it also brings to the fore the bare mechanical utility of citizens’ sensory makeup in the fight against crime.

To tease out the significance of these developments, the present chapter will unfold in several stages: first, I will begin by arguing that these citizenship duties exploit the subject’s immaterial labor, particularly its capacities to see and speak. As with Taylorist regimes of physical production, this involves implicating citizens within apparatuses of desubjectification that identify, separate, train, and augment the living body’s useful components. This division has been described by Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito as a separation within the living subject, a separation that divides its bare living components from the subject’s extraneous political being—in other words, these apparatuses of subject production strive to separate out the political and unpredictable bios from the docile, measurable, and reliable zoè. This scenario allows for a new take on the operations of contemporary governance, as the isolation of certain physical components—most importantly, the eyes and mouth—allows for the population to be addressed and unified as a flock based upon their possession of these most basic characteristics. This makes possible pastoral relationships in complex arrangements of government, as the population is
normalized through the regularization of their shared capacities to see, hear, swing, press, and speak. That is, while one-on-one relationships are traditionally integral to the pastoral project, the constitution of a normalized flock allows for its individuals to be addressed as collectivized specimens who share certain basic qualities and tendencies. The momentum of this normalization thus tends toward the cultivation of what Nietzsche referred to as the “thinking, writing, speaking machine”: that is, the flock specimen who is addressed and cultivated as a bearer of machinically uniform and reliable functions. Like Rosa’s neighbor, these subjects are put to a very specific mechanical use: they watch, they dial, they speak. Yet beyond functioning as sensory extensions for the policing apparatus—a mechanical function that more or less all of the specimens of the human flock can fill—their responsibilities are expressly circumscribed. They are, within certain configurations of production, transformed into sensing/signaling devices that cannot be entrusted with responsibilities—such as chasing, intimidating, attacking, or otherwise engaging offenders—that transcend the informational.

To illustrate how police technologies have functioned to convert witnesses into mechanical bearers of raw data, I trace the history of witnessing technologies from the police telegraph box in the 1870s to present crime-reporting smart phone applications. While this “zoopolitical” power is exemplified by many ways in which citizens’ bare biological capacities are put to work by lateral policing protocols, this history of crime-reporting technologies demonstrates the limit case of how citizens are transformed into sensing/signaling devices in the service of the policing apparatus.
II. Biopower and the Liberal Subject

“. . . the body is constituted according to the principle of politics—struggle as the first and final dimension of existence. Struggle outside oneself, toward other bodies, but also within as the unstoppable conflict among its organic components. . . . This is because in its continual instability the body is nothing but the always provisional result of the conflict of forces that constitute it.” –Roberto Esposito (2008, 84)

In the History of Sexuality, Volume I, Foucault introduces the concept of “biopower,” a political form that takes human life as its primary object and terrain. As Foucault developed this concept mostly throughout the later 1970s, he argued that it took two predominant and complementary forms, one of which focused on the characteristics and regularities of collective human groupings while the second focused on the capacities of the individual body. The first, Foucault writes, can be called a “biopolitics of the population”: it “focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary” (1978, 139).

This biopolitics of the population addresses itself to the more general level of the population, which treats the totality of a given group of individuals as a locus of collective biological qualities and processes. In this sense, biopower takes as its primary object the biological life of the human grouping at hand: it studies the population as a living body with death and disease rates, administers that biological life through security apparatuses such as vaccination campaigns, and generally focuses on promoting the overall health of the social body and ensuring its productivity as a collective resource of human capital, or what Nikolas Rose (2007) calls “biocapital.”
The other pole of biopower, however, addresses itself to the living bodies of individual subjects. This “anatomo-political” power, Foucault argues, is “centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the human body” (1978, 139). The individual subject is the specialty of this anatomo-political form of biopower: subjects are formed and articulated through productive activities that “extort” their most basic biological capacities to work, walk, utter, and repeat. In the words of Barry Smart, “The concept of an anatomo-politics of the body refers to those techniques of power which came to be exercised over physical or bodily capabilities in order to maximize their economic utility and political docility” (2013, 90). This anatomo-politics, then, targets the individual as a confluence of biocapital rather than focusing on human collectives at the level of the broader population. It therefore addresses the productive utility of the individual’s physical body, the body-as-machine: its ability to swing hammers, stir sauce, fill out paperwork, and so forth. Thus biopower approaches the individual body as a locus of technological resources—strengths, stabilities, aptitudes, and senses—that together allow the body-machine to carry out various forms of social and economic praxis.

The individual’s eyes, limbs, and mouth are the basic productive elements of this anatomo-machine. It is in this sense that biopower, as Brian Pronger has recognized, represents the “political dispositions towards the body that render it a useful resource” to be deployed toward various economic and/or governmental ends (2002, 103). According to
Foucault, this anatomo-politics is best illustrated by the way in which capital focuses its locus of production on the human body. Capital, Foucault notes, “started by socializing a first object, the body, as a factor of productive force, of labor power. Society’s control over individuals was accomplished not only through consciousness or ideology but also in the body and with the body. For capitalist society, it was biopolitics, the biological, the somatic, the corporal, that mattered more than anything else. The body is a biopolitical reality” (1994a, 137). From the perspective of this biopower, the body becomes “something to be molded, reformed, corrected, something that must acquire aptitudes, receives a certain number of qualities, become qualified as a body capable of working . . . . [This] consists in converting people’s bodies into labor power” (1994d, 82). Approached as a locus of various competencies, the human subject becomes a modulating stock of organic resources that can be fine-tuned, supplemented, trained, and augmented. Thus Foucault points out that this biopower is not a question of “treating the body, en masse, ‘wholesale,’ as if it were an indissociable unity, but of working it ‘retail,’ individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself—movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body. . . . The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down, and rearranges it” (1977, 137–8). In this raw assemblage of biocapital, our simplest processes and habits of life—the movements of our fingers, the activity of our eyes, the vibrations of our vocal cords—are all imbued with extractable political and economic value.

The “breakdowns” and “rearrangements” inherent in this anatomo-political divide represents a tension that Roberto Esposito has recognized as essential to liberal regimes of
subjectification. If biopolitics is invested in determining which population groups shall live and which shall die—that is, by making exclusions at the collective level—then liberal biopower focuses upon the individual as an embodied site of various desirable and undesirable characteristics. Take, for instance, the concentration camps of National Socialist Germany, what Agamben (1998) and Foucault (2003; 2010) have described as the paradigm of modern biopolitics. At the broad level of the German nation, one class of the population—Northern European “Aryans”—was designated as originary and therefore as possessing certain exclusive rights. At this moment of exclusion, the remainder of the population was constituted as something a bit less than human; their lives—particularly those of Jews—became expendable in the great struggle to ensure the life of the privileged German population. This exclusion represents the essential dichotomous logic of biopolitical power: the great separation of an “exposed population” from the “assured population” (Foucault 1988; see also Foucault 1994c, 369). While sometimes this results in a literal physical separation—such as in the Japanese internment camps in the US, or in the concentration camps of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union—sometimes it simply results in the rise of an underclass whose lives are seen as expendable and who are thus left vulnerable to state persecution or the whims of the market. In any case, this biopolitical rupture takes place at the broad level of the population, and it marks as “exposed” entire groupings of individuals.

Yet in liberal regimes based upon the sanctity and sovereignty of the individual, biopower gives rise to a complementary division: one that divides the subject itself. That is, while apparatuses of security address themselves to the population as a whole and divide it at the level of human sub-groupings, Esposito has argued that the individual liberal subject also
becomes a target of hierarchical dissociation. The biopolitical divisions between “assured” and “exposed” populations—or those between pure/impure, human/animal, and so forth—are in liberal regimes reintroduced at the level of the individual, whose characteristics and qualities become the object of divisional apparatuses of subjectification. In a brilliant description of this division, Esposito explains,

> For liberal culture—unlike Nazism—the dividing line between animal and human passes through the individual, and not through a racial hierarchy of peoples. The fact remains, however—actually it becomes even more evident—that the reasoning behind the relationship thus established between body and thing is in any case analogous: if you start from an instrumental conception of life—whether enlisted in the service of the sovereign state or of the individual—the condition of one tends to slide into that of the other. . . .

> To the extent that this language [of the human] identifies, inside the human, an extracorporeal core defined in terms of will and reason, it necessarily ends up thrusting the body into an animal or vegetal dimension, putting it in direct contact with the sphere of things. (2012b, 91).

As an instance of the anatomo-politics that addresses itself to the subject’s biocapital, this liberal iteration of biopower thrives on the cultivation/suppression of various living capacities of the human subject. While National Socialist Germany—a collectivist regime—divided the human and non-human by physically segregating “threatening” individuals from the larger social body, liberal biopower directs this apparatus of segregation at another level: that of the dividuated human subject.\(^1\) Esposito’s translation of anatomo-politics into
discourses of liberal subjectification thus provides a brilliant illustration of how the biopolitical rupture reapportions the dividuated subject into its privileged and superfluous elements.

III. Human Capital: From Bios to Zoê

At this stage, we might recall Foucault’s thoughts on the intersection of anatomo-politics and labor: the body is approached as “something to be molded, reformed, corrected, something that must acquire aptitudes, receives a certain number of qualities, become qualified as a body capable of working” (1994d, 82). Thus the human body encounters “a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down, and rearranges it” (1977, 137–8). The defining element of this anatomo-politics is the isolation of bodily capacities based upon the specific and immediate utility of their labor power. This “instrumental conception of life,” as Esposito would have it, is the crux of a liberal biopower that shatters the living subject into a collection of potentialities that are, at any moment, superfluous or integral to the operation of a given biopolitical apparatus. As Foucault has pointed out, this politicization of the body articulates the multiplicitous subject to various apparatuses of production, where its time and labor are extracted and put to use (see 1980, 105). As Mary Beth Mader has observed, “If human beings in the age of biopower are always chiefly intelligible as living human beings, then [they must be targeted] in terms of this essential feature of being alive, and thus in relation to the continuous supra-categorical reality that is life” (2011, 107). Thus the body’s living competencies are articulated through operations that put its skills to use: while various elements of the body remain operationally dormant, the arm hammers, the finger dials, the
legs pedal, the brain calculates, and the mouth speaks under the command of protocols, orders, and ends. The dividuated subject—as a locus of diverse and momentarily integrated capacities—thus carries out various forms of material and immaterial labor under the pressures of an ongoing, modulating suppression of its superfluous faculties. That is to say, in varying moments of the subject’s articulation, some activities are productive while others are not. What results, then, is less a strict division of a human into its distinct bodily elements—its arms, mouth, and so forth—than a shifting articulation of this human assemblage according to the integrated utility of these elements’ potential to carry out a task or enact the ideal form of a laboring- or citizen-subject. We see with this modulating reintegration and disintegration of the body, then, the material enactment of what Katherine Hayles calls “a distributed cognition located in disparate parts that may be in only tenuous communication with one another” (1999, 3–4).

A given governing apparatus, then, functions through the cultivation and suppression of various human qualities and capacities according to the goals and structural momentum of that apparatus. As Foucault demonstrates, the danger in this basic anatomo-political division is its tendency to produce in increasing scenarios a machinic articulation of the human subject. This subject is valued for its bodily components and potentialities rather than its organic integrity as a living being. From the perspective of capital and the state, then, the calculable labor power of the human is cultivated to increase the body’s output as it is unevenly integrated into apparatuses of production. As Esposito would have it, this “division of man’s nature . . . allows the biopower of the individual to be more easily captured by
either the State or, today, the market through the mediation of the neoliberal subject intent on augmenting his own biopower” (2012b, 77).

Thus the supreme ambition of biopower, as Agamben has observed, “is to produce, in a human body, the absolute separation of the living being and the speaking being, *zoê* and *bios*, the inhuman and the human” (1999, 156). Agamben’s invocation of the oppositional couple *zoê/bios* not only points toward a biopolitical separation at the level of the population, but also to a divide between *zoê* and *bios* that is operable *within an individual subject*, whose bare-biological capacities can be cultivated in the temporary articulation of a particular governmental apparatus. To the extent that biopower functions by “harnessing . . . life’s forces for work” (Lazzarato 2002, 100), in certain relations of biopower the subject finds itself increasingly articulated through practices and relationships that, in the words of Roberto Esposito, are characterized by “the elimination from human life of any transcendence with respect to its immediate biological given” (2012b, 8). That is to say that the liberal subject’s biological capital becomes articulated through a depoliticizing apparatus that addresses itself to the subjects’ most basic functional competencies: the measurable, the quantifiable, the orderly, the predictable, the common. In the words of Mary Beth Mader, this biopower “seeks to control, manage, and optimize life, and to master its random aspects. . . . To be related to one another through the implementation of state policies for the regularization of life is to be related to one another via insensible, but deliberate and directed, technologies of homogenization and standardization” (2011, 106). Accordingly, there rises a power that, in the words of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, thrives by being “increasingly interiorized within the subjects themselves” (2000, 23). The central irony captured by this
perspective is that, amid the desubjectifying apparatuses of modern immaterial labor, biopolitics’ priorities are flipped: zoê, that form of human life which is basic, common, and functional, becomes the ideal of biopolitical production. *Bios*, which Agamben identifies as the privileged form of life within collectivist biopolitical regimes, becomes that which is superfluous, suspect, and exposed (see Agamben 2007, 12–13).

**IV. The Mouth and the Eye: Immaterial Labor and the Flock**

The modulating subject of biocapital thus experiences various articulations that are driven toward “reduc[ing] human life to mere biology” (Esposito 2012a, 18). This subject increasingly finds its most fundamental biological expressions colonized by apparatuses of government. Its limbs, eyes, vocal cords, and mouth are the basic productive elements of this anatomo-machine, giving rise to a division of the labor that each of these organs carries out. Factory workers’ arms and legs, for example, are put-to-a-use: whatever potential they have as assemblages of blood, nerves, bones, and tissue is honed to a mechanical, predictable source of physical output. They carry out certain tasks and not others, and their value is attenuated and reduced to the labor capital demanded by the particular task at hand.

Similarly, the eye becomes that which sees-something-for, that which retains a core functionality to be isolated, extracted, and augmented: it becomes something to be honed, improved, supplemented, and instructed how to see. It not simply an eye, but an eye put to work at something. Speech, accordingly, is also domesticated: the mouth, vocal cords, hand, and other generators of discourse are disciplined by the demands of the communicative labor they are to carry out. As the comrades of the eye, they conspire in the putting-to-work of
speech, and thus play an essential role in the larger transformation of the human subject into an informational being, a sensing/signaling machine.

The role of the eye and the mouth in contemporary regimes of cultural reproduction has often been described in the terms of “immaterial labor.” Inspired by and working from the autonomist tradition, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri observe: “The central role previously occupied by the labor power of mass factor workers in the production of surplus value is today increasingly filled by intellectual, immaterial, and communicative labor power” (2000, 29). What this new situation calls for is the analysis “of the immediately social and communicative dimension of the exploitation of living labor in contemporary capitalist society, and thus poses insistently the problem of the new figures of subjectivity, in both their exploitation and their revolutionary potential. The immediately social dimension of the exploitation of living immaterial labor immerses labor in all the relational elements that define the social” (29). The emergence of this new biopower necessitates a new theory of subjectivity that is sensitive to the primacy of knowledge, communication, and language. According to Hardt and Negri, theorizations of this new biopower tend to analyze labor only in its intellectual and immaterial expressions, overlooking the centrality of embodied productivity and affect to this new economy. Putting aside whether this shift in labor is all that new—it is likely a difference in degree rather than kind—it is instructive to view the components of this immaterial labor posited by Hardt and Negri. Describing this emergent regime of labor, they argue, “Language, as it communicates, produces commodities but moreover creative subjectivities, puts them in relation, and orders them” (2000, 33). To illustrate this, Hardt and Negri trace how communications infrastructures organize the
connections between networks, providing the conditions for new forms of sociality and governance by integrating flows of information, commands, and bodies. Often the function of this new communicative power, they argue, is to legitimate current social relations in the form of “self-validation” (33). What Hardt and Negri ultimately offer is an analysis of communicative labor based upon the materiality of communication networks and the immaterial reproduction of ideology. What this synthesis leaves underdeveloped, however, is how embodied communication, neither as a materialized flow of data nor an immaterial reproduction of ideology, serves as a basic and fundamental exercise of human biopower. That is, how speaking is a raw determination of human life and, as such, serves as a fundamental target and technology of biopower.

Ronald Greene has begun the important work of applying this biopolitical analysis to communicative production, taking up Hardt and Negri’s “proposition that capitalist production is not only extending its global reach, but is intensive, that is, tending toward the biopolitical. Taking Hardt and Negri’s perspective allows rhetorical studies to account for how capitalism continues to capture and colonize, as its very own, the stuff of rhetoric, what Cicero once termed ‘human life and conduct’; a substance increasingly restricted to what Agamben calls bare life and its forms” (2006, 86). Greene provides an innovative means for rethinking the biopolitical capture and colonization of communicative production: our speech, as an activity of our barest biological life, has become deeply implicated in the reproduction of social relations and in the techniques and rationalities of governing entities. As Hardt and Negri have likewise argued, “In the biopolitical sphere, life is made to work for production. . . .The highest function of this power is to invest life through and through, and
its primary task is to administer life” (2000, 32). Yet this “life,” of course, is intimately entangled with communicative production. As such, its appearance as communicative labor finds itself relegated to mechanical, “bare” expressions. In Agamben’s stark description of this divide, “On the one hand, there is the living being, more and more reduced to a purely biological reality and to bare life. On the other hand, there is the speaking being, artificially divided from the former, through a multiplicity of technic-mediatic apparatuses, in an experience of the word that grows ever more vain, for which it is impossible to be responsible and in which anything like a political experience becomes more and more precarious” (2011, 70).

We could supplement Agamben’s insights by turning to Derrida, who argues in his reading of Aristotle’s Politics that the zoon logon echon—the animal with logos—is not simply the animal with speech; it is, more importantly, the animal with politics (Derrida 2009, 461; see Aristotle 1984a, 1.7.1098a 1–8 and Aristotle 1984b, 1253a 1–14). For Aristotle, there are many varieties of phonê (verbal speech) without logos: the howling of animals is an example of such a form (Aristotle 1984b, 1253a 1–19). While Aristotle’s definition of the human is widely misunderstood and rightly controversial, his division of logos and phonê provides us with a key insight into the dissociation of political and functional speech within the realm of communicative labor. While Aristotle’s definition of the zoon logon echon might contain a kernel of anthropocentrism, one can avoid undermining the rich specificity of the human and the animal by exploring this anatomo-political reduction of the human outside the terms of the animal—that is, if one is interested in the role of speech as communicative labor, and hence the desubjectification of that human
capital into its merely biological and depoliticized capacities—then one would do best to avoid the man/animal dissociation introduced by Aristotle and rearticulated by Agamben (see Heidegger 1999, 17). Thus to distance ourselves from the anthropological machine—which functions in part by declaring that some speech (logos) is more human than other forms (mere phonê)—we would be wise to reorient this discussion away from the human/animal divide. The conceptual tradition of anatomo-politics initiated by Foucault provides a more appropriate grid of intelligibility for interrogating the relationship between biopower and communicative production, allowing us to consider Aristotle’s phonê/logos divide while avoiding confining logos to the supplementary characteristic of the human. Again, communicative labor does not so much animalize the human as it isolates phonê—the functional, machinic, and reflexive—from the logos that defines the coming-into-discourse of our political being-together. Thus while I will now speak of zoopolitical power, I will not argue that this power somehow animalizes the human; rather, this power is of a piece with the desubjectifying apparatuses of immaterial labor that cultivate and extract the most basic and functional capacities of a subject’s biological characteristics. This zoopolitical apparatus articulates subjects through activities that render them programmable and calculable, reproducing itself by means of those discourses and zones of practice that cultivate and normalize the de-individualized habits of human subjects. At this point, then, Esposito’s insights about the dividuated liberal subject of biopower can be folded back onto the collective: normalization takes the liberal subject as a modulating source of various integral and superfluous capacities, and at the same time reproduces and routinizes habits and characteristics at the collective level of human communities.
For instance, if because of its unique relationship vis-à-vis logos the human acquires its distinctiveness—both from other humans and from non-human animals—then zoo-political apparatuses will operate to de-vivify the human’s speech-as-logos. Language is thus denatured into an instrument, a simple carrier and exchanger of information. To illustrate the nature and ambition of this denaturing, Heidegger cites Norbert Wiener, the twentieth century’s theorist par excellence of machinic man: “‘that language is not an exclusive attribute of man, but is one he may share to a certain degree with the machines he has constructed.’ Such a sentence is possible under the presupposition that what is peculiar to language is reduced to, i.e., atrophied into, the mere transmission, the reporting, of signals” (1998b, 141). The danger in this technological/informational view of language, Heidegger warns, is that it corresponds with a technological view of the human being: “If in the spirit of the reign of all-determining technology one holds information to be the highest form of language because of its clarity, and the security and speed in the exchange of reports and assignments, then the result of this is also the corresponding conception of the human’s being and of human life” (141). For Heidegger, “the attack of the technological language on what is peculiar to language is at the same time the threat to the human being’s ownmost essence” (141). Whether or not we follow Heidegger in positing the essence of humanity in its relationship to logos, his most relevant insight is that speech can be “atrophied” into an activity of simple informational exchange—or, in his words, the “transformation of language as saying into language as a mere report of signal transmissions” (1998b, 140).

As these forms of immaterial biopower put raw living energy into the service of governing apparatuses, the bodies of citizen-subjects are administered through technologies
that are bound up with—and strive to isolate—the processes and capacities of the living human, including especially its speech and sight (its speech and surveillance power). Just as Heidegger warned that the word in its proper essence is not like a tool—in other words, it is not simply “useful” like the hand but is more deeply connected to who we are as living beings-in-the-world (1999, 12)—he also identified the ongoing technologization of the labor of the eye (1977a). This surveillant labor, in addition to its communicative counterpart, is a crucial aspect of this dividuated articulation of biocapital, as Mark Andrejevic (2005) has pointed out in his analysis of “the work of watching one another.” Likewise, Gavin J.D. Smith points out that, “To a greater or lesser degree, we are all surveillance workers, complicit in the art of monitoring, interpreting and making sense of social reality. Our will to biological and social acceptability requires that we routinely and unremittingly observe, analyze, and organize all manner of everyday social phenomena” (2012, 108). As with the communicative labor pinpointed by Hardt and Negri and Greene, this surveillant labor functions through the “prioritization and expansion of information collection techniques and corollary emergence of a specialized human/non-human labor force tasked with ‘reading,’ categorizing, and deciphering this data” (108). That is to say, sight, as a basic and defining element of our zoological makeup, is put to work in the same way that communication is. The human subject’s capacity to see is transformed into its capitalizable capacity to watch: to notice, to scrutinize, and to collaborate with the mouth in a sensing/signaling assemblage of immaterial labor (see Packer 2013).

This cultivated capacity to watch provides the condition for human subjects to be governed through various media and social configurations dependent upon the visual. To
illustrate how this surveillant biopower functions, let’s look at Ronald Greene’s analysis of the ways that “pastoral power” has been modernized through popular cultural technologies like film (see Foucault 2007). In an analysis of how early twentieth-century YMCA films integrated immigrant workers into the American way of life, Greene argues that the “entertainment-ideological element” of the Y films—their representational content—is only one small element in their overall governmental utility: “To over-emphasize either the narrative or visual elements of the film-text displaces the YMCA’s institutional work to transform the abstract film-audience (spectator) encounter into a concrete Y secretary-worker relationship (intimate)” (2005, 24). While the Y certainly took care developing the content of its films, it also focused on providing its audiences with a social space in which they could come together to develop personal relationships with other workers and with the Y secretary. The Y films, therefore, brought together that immigrant audience as a flock to be formed and guided through their common consumptive experience—through their common conduct in the labor of watching. As such, that event constitutes the flock in the organization of its individuals’ bodies as they partake in the collective activity of film audiencing. As Greene puts it, “what explains the immigrant experience with movies is co-presence, the changing nature of one’s social experience that occurs as one comes to recognize how one shares space with others. . . .[W]hat made Y movies work as a ‘cultural technology’ useful for Americanization was their ability to bring different ‘nationalities’ into proximity with one another as an audience, a situation that allowed the Y secretary to re-name them as ‘American’” (2005, 25, 26).
One of the more important, if unspoken, implications of Greene’s analysis is the insight it provides into the zoopolitical terrain of biopower. In this sense, it is important that this form of pastoral power is exercised on the audience as *watchers*, as those who gather to *see* a film; that is to say, the audience is pulled together as a flock based upon a central capacity that they share, namely, the ability to watch. This is why Greene emphasizes throughout his work that the Y films were a “visual aid” to the voice of the Y secretary, aimed at an audience of “very sophisticated visual consumers” (2005, 27). The Y’s modernized pastoral power is exercisable only insofar as its objects are *sensate* beings for whom the visual is a meaningful mode of experience. Hence while the flock is united abstractly as a social class and materially as audiences of particular films, they also share a more basic and irreducible unity that is derived from their collective biological status as sensing/signaling beings. Thus the pastoral relationship functions as an essentially communicative relationship, one that requires not only the pedagogical voice of the pastor, but also the reciprocal communicative capacities of a flock that watches, listens, and, under certain conditions of performance, speaks. There is, then, a distinctive material normalization of the flock, one that is based not simply upon the collective organization of their bodies or the homogenization of their ideas, but on the regularized activity of their biological life. Greene is right, of course, when he observes that, “For the YMCA, the desire to serve its population was not designed to produce substitutable bits of raw material for the industrial machine of modern capitalism” (2005, 30). Yet perhaps we *can* speak of the zoopolitical dimensions of this pastoral power, which, in normalizing the flock, addresses itself to (and through) the most basic raw expressions of life—a flock that is not ideologically degraded
into conformity, but one that is herded through the common activation of those bare biological capacities that are common to each of its specimens.

V. Sensing/Signaling in the Human Zoo: Technologies of Normalization

Peter Sloterdijk has given us a glimpse at such a biopower that expresses itself toward—and moreover through—the flock’s common biological life. Sloterdijk, through recourse to Nietzsche and Heidegger, decenters the pastor in favor of the flock in his discussions of political technologies. If we were to adopt the vocabulary of the pastoral tradition, the flock, after all, is a herd collectivity: while each specimen is managed individually by the pastor, the individual is intricated within the networked living practice of the flock. The reciprocity of the pastoral relationship—the care of the pastor that is given in return for the obedience of the specimen—necessitates a regime of normalization among the herd under the pastor’s care, as the flock is defined and constituted by the pressures of this mutual obligation. While Foucault is more interested in the individualizing, reciprocal relationship between pastor and flock, Sloterdijk is more interested in the processes of normalization that characterize pastoral and other configurations of “herding” power. Just as Foucault traces pastoral power back to the words of Plato, Sloterdijk argues that in the Republic, Plato finds that “the essence of politics is rendered by the metaphor of the voluntary surveillance over free, rationally capable ‘herds’” (2011, 58–9). This metaphor of “the herd” has turned out to be generative and long-lived, indeed, as it has provided considerable combustion for modern intellectual and political practice. Sloterdijk goes on to argue that this zoo-political power has erupted in the “domicilation of homo sapiens” (58)
under the aegis of a “human zoo.” An important aspect of this domicilation, according to Sloterdijk, is the normalizing energies of the community’s herding apparatuses. The herd is continuously reinvented in its collectivity by a momentum of desubjectification that works to soften the distinctiveness of individual specimens. In the ongoing production of the community and its boundaries, there are, to be sure, processes of responsibilization. Yet as a corollary to this, there is also a desubjectifying reduction of the qualitative distinctions between the herd’s individuals. Following Foucault, Sloterdijk warns that this drive takes form in the care to produce biologically ideal, uniform specimens. To illustrate, Sloterdijk argues that the caretakers of animal flocks—breeders of livestock, for example—“are herders and eo ipso biotechnicians, albeit at a very simple level . . . . They manipulate life processes in a completely coherent way. If we look at this more closely, we notice, on the other hand, that it is not by adopting the attitude of a non-technical supervision that peasant existence assists life processes, but that, in the latter, the decisive role is played by manipulations of life” (2011, 129). The pastor’s care for his flock becomes a manipulation of their biological life, a process that is driven toward a telos of idealized normalization (shorter fur, bluer eyes, diminished susceptibility to disease, etc.). This normalization, however, is most remarkable in that it acts on the herd as a collective whose features are most predictable and homogeneous as a biological species—that is, the specimens’ most basic commonality is the bare biological characteristics of their breed: their eyes, their ears, their mouths, their hooves, their snouts. Indeed, this is the most basic material that any apparatus of normalization can take for granted: despite whatever heterogeneity might characterize an animal or human flock, its specimens are unified, if nowhere else, in their most basic biological constitution as
animals that crawl, see, eat, and so forth. With a human flock, these capacities take on a somewhat broader range, as their capacity for communication becomes a distinctive element in the definition and maintenance of the flock. Not only do humans eat and walk and work, but they also listen, watch, and speak—that is, they are sensing/signaling beings, characteristics that provide challenges and opportunities to their governance. This is why communicative rituals—such as the collective viewing of Y films—provide such a reliable substrate for the cultivation of a human flock.

However, Greene’s emphasis on the pastorate illustrates the normalization inherent in pastoral power and other political configurations of the herd. As we can gather from Greene’s analysis, to the extent that pastoral power still functions in contemporary technological regimes, it cannot and does not always take place at the individual level of the traditional the pastor-flock relationship; many of its micropolitical operations have come to function based upon general characteristics possessed by the flock’s individuals, thus allowing a mediated dispersion of its relationships of care. As Frederick M. Dolan insightfully points out, pastoral power “optimizes the well-being of each member of the community . . . by taking due account of the vagaries of health, morale, enterprise, education, and so on, as they apply differently to different groups and individuals at different moments and in different regions (2005, 373; emphasis added). This shift emphasizes the normalization inherent in this form of contemporary pastoral power: to be operable in a complex regime of governance, pastoral guidance—to the extent that it is still operable—must work upon the individuals to the extent that they are of a flock. Foucault too recognizes this complexity, speaking of how pastoral power is exercised on the flock only to the extent
that they are organized into groups with generalizable characteristics, talents, and abilities:

“Moses was chosen by God to lead the flock of Israel. It was because when Moses was a shepherd in Egypt he knew how to graze his sheep and knew, for example, that when he came to pasture he had to send the youngest sheep first to eat the most tender grass, then those a little older, and then the eldest and most robust who could eat the toughest grass. In this way each category of sheep had the grass it needed and enough to eat” (2007, 127).

Although Foucault repeatedly emphasizes the “individualized” nature of pastoral power, he here argues that the flock, in its collective administration, requires a network of “complex, continuous, and paradoxical relationships” (1994b, 303) that are not in their application simply individualizing. While pastoral power “concerns the lives of individuals” (2007, 307), the central political problem of pastoral power “is that of the relation between the one and the many in the framework of the city and its citizens” (307). That is, the target of pastoral power is the individual in its network of relations with the pastor, as well as with the flock’s other specimens, the point of contact between the one and the many. The individual cared for by the pastor, therefore, is legible and approachable to the extent that it is categorized, grouped, and gathered vis-à-vis the rest of the flock. Pastoral power’s logics and momentum, then, are caught up in the processual if uneven normalization of the flock’s everyday life. As Dolan goes on to argue, pastorship seeks “to operate continuously on the everyday life of a community whose members are at once irreducibly individual and utterly interdependent” (373). Thus to say that this pastoral power thrives by normalization means that it operates by a very specific logic: while, as Foucault (1977) points out, normation operates via supervision and confinement, normalization stabilizes social norms by aiming at the shared
qualities of the population and accenting tendencies and characteristics in such a way that the population collectively brings itself into community based upon these shared qualities.

Therefore, whether we are speaking specifically of a modernized (or even “post-modernized”) pastoral power (a la Greene 2005, 32), or similar technological configurations of contemporary governance, normalization is carried out not only on the body, but also because of it; that is, the body provides a reliable collective terrain for the expression and target of power. Thus with the supercession of disciplinary confinement, biopower allows for the normal to be established based upon other stabilities (particularly the body and its basic mechanical competencies, which are the most reliable units of analysis applicable to an entire flock). Thus as Francois Ewald has recognized, this normalizing power “is equalizing . . . Essentially, we are all alike and, if not altogether interchangeable, at least similar, never different enough from one another to imagine ourselves as entirely apart from the rest” (1990, 154). This regime of normalization thus threatens to sacrifice the potential of individual citizen-subjects to a zoologized flock collectivity. In the face of this desubjectification, Dolan has turned to Hannah Arendt to warn that individual life can be submerged into the over-all life process of the species. The result is “socialized mankind,” a regime in which cooperation grounded in bare biological existence overwhelms “the human condition of plurality that issues in spontaneous action. This post-political world . . . is sustained by an endless number of rules imperatives habits, prohibitions, and customs, all designed to ensure that the individual conforms to the group. Such a regime “demands of its members sheer automatic function” and “acquiescence in a dazed,
‘tranquilized,’ functional type of behavior”. . . [This] society expects from its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to “normalize” its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous or outstanding achievement (2005, 372).

As Dolan points out, the primary danger with this normalization is that it addresses the flock as a zoological collectivity. Inherent in this normalizing process, then, is the articulation of subjects through a desubjectifying apparatus that reproduces norms across individual specimens according to their shared biological tendencies and capacities. In this sense, normalizing the population means bringing individuals’ conducts into accord with an average—“a bandwidth of the acceptable,” as Foucault (2007, 20–1) would have it—thereby normalizing discrete individuals based upon internal divisions common to different subjects. And thus we have a “self-dissolving process,” as Esposito has described it: “the herd, opportunistically domesticated, is already ready to recognize its willing shepherd. . . . ‘the first master who appears’” (2003, 77).

VI. Thinking, Writing, Speaking Machines

This zoologizing process is less an animalization of the human—as Agamben, with his anthropocentric tendencies, might have it—but instead the introduction of a machinic logic into apparatuses of subjectification. That is to say, humans are not really animalized—whatever that would mean—by being reduced to the motions of their biological being, but their living praxis is continuously exposed to the pressures of a desubjectification that cultivates, captures, and colonizes the shifting resources of their labor power. With this
emergent and ongoing shift in immaterial labor, the desubjectification process is thus increasingly preoccupied with the communicative-surveillance subject—that is, the subject whose biocapital resides in its capacity to see something and say something. The emergence of immaterial labor as a reorganization of biocapital, then, signals the ongoing capture of the human subject as an informational being. At the conceptual level, at least, this transformation is nothing new. As I have already discussed, Foucault’s notion of nineteenth-century anatomo-politics described the conversion of the human into a laboring machine under the pressures of the tasks and technologies to which s/he was articulated. However, as Katherine Hayles has recognized, throughout the past century—during which we have witnessed the acceleration of a process that has been at work throughout modernity—laboring human-machines have been increasingly reconfigured as “a set of informational processes” (1999, 4). We can recognize this ongoing transformation occurring especially at the level of lateral surveillance and discourse production, as citizens are put to work as machinic subjects that capture, store, process, and transmit information.

Hayles offers a story of how this informational being was gradually born, arguing that during the twentieth century there arises with cybernetics and complementary intellectual movements “a new way of looking at human beings. Henceforth, humans were to be seen primarily as information-processing entities who are essentially similar to intelligent machines” (1999, 7). Hayles reminds us that Norbert Wiener, in a statement that stretched Mettrian ontology to its most radically deformed potential, “proposed it was theoretically possible to telegraph a human being” (1). Humans are thus re-envisioned as bearers of information, and the humans’ defining qualities are reinterpreted through the grid of the
machine. For instance intelligence, Hayles writes, “becomes a property of the formal manipulation of symbols rather than enaction in the human lifeworld” (xi). According to Hayles, information theorists like Wiener and his comrade Claude Shannon are at the forefront of integrating machinic logics into discourses of the human, reformulating human subjects as neutral media for the processing of data: “From this formulation, it was a small step to think of information as a kind of bodiless fluid that could flow between different substrates without loss of meaning or form” (1999, xi). This discourse, of course, has been echoed by many others, perhaps most poignantly by Friedrich Kittler. For Kittler, we might best reconceive the human as a thinking, writing, and speaking machine. Copping a Lacanian vocabulary, Kittler refers to “Man’s delusion of possessing a ‘quality’ called ‘consciousness,’ which identifies him as something other than better than a ‘calculating machine.’ For both people and computers are ‘subject to the appeal of the signifier’: that is, they are both run by programs. ‘Are these humans,’ Nietzsche already asked himself in 1874, eight years before buying a typewriter, ‘or perhaps only thinking, writing, and speaking machines?’” (1999, 17).

Our everyday reliance on communication technologies has only accelerated this process of machinization. In 1962, Heidegger warned that, just as language is the house of being—and thus, just as language speaks us as speaking beings—communication technologies that constrain and determine our language use have a profound ontological effect. For Heidegger, is “from the technological possibilities of the machine that the instruction is set out as to how language can and shall still be language. The kind and character of language are determined according to the technological possibilities of the
formal signal transmissions which execute a sequence of continual yes-no decisions with the highest possible speed” (1998b, 140). Like Heidegger says of the typewriter, it removes the hand—the wellspring of individuality in written communication—and replaces it with a de-individualizing script that could have originated with any specimen in the flock. “The typewriter,” according to Heidegger, “veils the essence of writing and of the script. It withdraws from man the essential rank of the hand. . . . In the typewriter the machine appears, i.e., technology appears, in an almost quotidian and hence unnoticed and hence signless relation to writing, i.e., to the word, i.e., the distinguishing essence of man” (1998a, 86–7). When we speak through machines, therefore, our actions, possibilities, and thinking are constrained by artificial protocols. As Kittler has urged us to recognize, “Only the typewriter provides writing as a selection from the finite and arranged stock of its keyboard. . . . In contrast to the flow of handwriting, we now have discrete elements separate by spaces” (1999, 16)—a scenario contributing, according to Kittler, in the “fabrication of so-called Man,” whose “essence escapes into apparatuses” (16). On this point, Heidegger and Kittler are in agreement: we are witnessing the transformation of our essence into “calculating,” technologized, and deracinated “language machines” (Heidegger 1998b; also see Gregory 1998). Language, in this sense, threatens to “disappear” into information (see Kellner 1989, 7).

At the core of this machinological transformation is an instrumental view of communication, which, as Hayles has described, “presumes a conception of information as a (disembodied) entity that can flow between carbon-based organic components and silicon-based electronic components to make protein and silicon operate as a single system” (1999,
2). As these disembodied words have come to pervade our being-with-others, we are witnessing the ongoing recession of an affirmative politics: thus when Agamben speaks of “the media devices that control and manipulate public speech,” he warns that “the space we once upon a time called politics is ever more scaled-down and tiny” (2004a). Accordingly, this denaturing transformation of language, of course, is a process of communicative normalization in which the body and its communicative production are subjected to the guiding and depoliticizing pressures of the normal. As Ladelle McWhorter declares, “[I am] time incarnate, a functioning organism, an evolutionary outcome, a metabolizing, mitosizing, luteinizing locus of biotic interface. Or, well, that’s what my body is. And, likewise, my neurological functions, including my ability to process information, manipulate symbols, and reproduce patterns in response to appropriate stimuli. All of these processes are normed . . .” (1999, 157). As we have seen especially in the digital age, as specimens are increasingly spoken through communication technologies, protocols, and other pressures of desubjectifying apparatuses, their integrity as a flock is intensified. Language is standardized, denatured, and informationalized: in the words of Francois Ewald, the “normalization of vocabulary extends even to systems for notation and writing: the signs and locutions that characterize common usage are less than ideal for the purpose of precise technical expression. Words are soon joined by numbers and drawings that are themselves normalized . . . . Normalization begins with vocabulary. . . . This artificial language serves to prevent ambiguities. It is a language of precision and certainty, a language without puns, stylistic figures, or interference—the language of perfect communication” (1990, 150–1).
VII. Telecommunications and the Technologized Citizen

This machinological renovation of the human subject is readily apparent in how telecommunications media have been used in the lateral policing of crime. As I will describe in this and the following chapter, innovations in media—such as the evolution from orality to media like the horn—have traditionally revolutionized the way that patrols are organized and citizens are recruited into lateral policing roles. The advent of telecommunications profoundly reoriented the nature of lateral policing, as citizens and police professionals could communicate with one another without needing to be within earshot of a whistle, rattle, or yell. Further, the constraints of these media have generated a lasting bias into lateral policing technologies, as the anonymizing distance and brevity that define telecommunications have fostered a de-individualizing, mechanical response to crime and citizen responsibilization.

This history stretches back to the 1870s, when the telegraph became an important witnessing technology in major urban areas like Chicago. In its earliest days, telegraphs were locked away in private boxes and keys were only distributed to police officers and a few trusted citizens. If a crime occurred or was underway, it was these citizens’ duty to dispatch to the nearest “private box” and contact police headquarters. Once they unlocked the private box, they were confronted with a strange device outfitted with a pointer that could be aligned with any one of eleven choices: arson, theft, forgery, rioting, drunkenness, murder, accidents, ordinance violation, fighting, test line, and fire. The citizen would then pigeonhole the crime into one of these categories, align the pointer, and pull a handle, thus sending a standard message to the local police headquarters that contained Morse coded information about the crime and the box’s location. While the witness reported crimes using an indexical system—
that is, by fitting the witnessed crime into the private box’s pre-set classificatory scheme—the message s/he transmitted was simply a series of dots and blips, and it was decoded as such by an operator at police headquarters (Chu 2001, 171).8

The trusted citizen’s telegraph experience is paradigmatic of citizen-police communication protocols. After the invention of the telephone, call-boxes replaced the telegraphic “private box.” The city of Albany, New York installed the first police telephone box in 1877, and urban jurisdictions like New York City, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles soon followed. These boxes, which were topped with lights that would flash upon activation, allowed for citizens to send cryptic messages as well as draw the attention of any neighbors and police officers in the area. These boxes provided the primary point of mediated contact between citizens and the police until telephones became a staple in American homes in the 1950s, when citizens were empowered to contact switchboard operators, and later police dispatchers, directly from their homes. In 1968, 9-1-1 became a national emergency number, and callers were rerouted to local police dispatchers directly through their telecommunications provider. “Dispatcher,” of course, is a fitting title for the intermediary in a communicative protocol derived from the telegraphic box: callers do not talk to police, but instead speak to dispatchers who are specially trained in extracting very specific information from callers and then passing along that raw information to police professionals. When you call 9-1-1, of course, you don’t “call the police”—you call an intermediary whose profession revolves around extracting and giving basic, standardized information: What is your name?, Where are you located?, Do you need an ambulance?, Stay on the line., Do not approach or attempt to apprehend the offender., The police are on their way., and so on. Their job, in
other words, is simply to remind you of legal regulations and to extract information from you. A standard report is generated and filed. The whole event materializes into a hard drive, where it disappears into bytes among hundreds or thousands of other reports exactly like it. Depending on the case, the data may later be accessed by investigators or prosecutors who come to learn the witness’s experience on a screen or, less commonly, through inked pages which, were it not for their alphanumeric organization, would be basically indistinguishable from the rest.

The witness is valuable to the police primarily as a biomechanical device: s/he is a bearer of data that must be transmitted as legibly and quickly as possible so that police agencies can carry out their work of reconstructing the past and locating suspects. In large degree this has been a by-product of telecommunications (see Carey 1992), a lineage of policing technologies that has increasingly isolated the human as a confluence of the requisite biocapital to store, process, and transmit data about crimes and suspects. Since the 1960s, when the telecommunications industry began to automatically determine the location of incoming calls to 9-1-1 (i.e., “automatic location identification”), human communication is not even required to set in motion a police response: protocols require dispatchers to send officers to a home or business that has dialed 9-1-1, even if no human on the other end provides any information (and even if they admit that they dialed 9-1-1 by mistake). This has been the case with cell phones since 1996, when providers were required to grant direct-access 9-1-1 capabilities along with GPS tracking of all incoming 9-1-1 calls. Now that ninety percent of American adults own cell phones (CBS News 2012), all callers need to do is dial 9-1-1- and push “Send” in order to initiate a GPS-coordinated police response. By the
end of 2013, the Federal Communications Commission projects that their “Text-to-911” program, which allows for a similar routing of text messages to appropriate police agencies, will be available to users across the country (Federal Communications Commission 2013).

This historical process has its present telos in the crime-reporting cellular phone application and similar products designed to help citizens transmit these de-individualized—and sometimes even anonymous—data streams. A new iPhone application, iWitness, is a good case in point. Greg Heuss, the application’s designer, promotes his product by lauding the mechanical ease with which consumers can capture and transmit data: “Any time the user feels endangered, the user simply touches the screen of their phone. At that point, the phone begins capturing video and audio of the scene . . . a steady light is emitted from the phone, and the user’s GPS coordinates are recorded. If a ‘threat’ feels imminent, the user touches the screen again, [and] 911 is called” (Cook 2012). One touch of the screen activates the phone’s video and audio recording software, and another touch dials 9-1-1. Importantly, these data streamline the messy witnessing process, removing the human and its language as much as possible: “[Heuss] added that law enforcement like the fact that the app records video and audio file of the perpetrator—something he said was ‘much better than a vague description that most victims give to the police now’” (Cook 2012). In a similar Smartphone application, “Crimepush,” users are given a touch-screen with small icons depicting nine basic categories of crime. As with the private box, users push the icon that represents the appropriate crime, and a bundle of data—including location of the call, photo, video, and audio—is sent to local law enforcement. Because the application offers the option of anonymity, a Forbes magazine report observes that it allows “users to report crime
anonymously so that they may continue with their busy lives knowing that with a push of a button, police will know and have everything to pursue the criminal. Ordinary users become the eyes and ears of authorities” (Hossain 2012).

This goal of converting the public into the “eyes and ears” of authorities—which, as we will see, serves as the animating logic of many technological developments in lateral policing—is reaching a troubling stage of fulfillment with digital applications that allow citizens to transmit anonymously generated video and audio data to law enforcement authorities. These efforts are becoming increasingly localized, as police agencies reach out to different sectors of the population in order to tie digital witnessing to an ethos of community responsibility. In Somerset, Kentucky, for example, the local police department has initiated the aptly named “See-Hear-Report” program, an initiative that calls on primary and secondary school students to use anonymous text messages to report their peers for criminal or delinquent behavior. Somerset Police Chief Doug Nelson says these initiatives are the natural next-step of law enforcement in a digital culture: "Students today are growing up in a digital age . . . Therefore, it's important for the law enforcement community and our police department to offer different ways to interact with our youth" (Tomlinson 2013). Yet in lieu of “interacting” with the local youth, the Somerset Police Department has simply provided them with anonymity and the technical resources to effortlessly police their peers. According to Chief Nelson,

Text messaging is a common communication method for them these days and we want to make it easy for them to pass information to us that could save lives. [Because] students may be apprehensive about divulging sensitive
information to an officer face-to-face. . . . The tips go through different 
computer servers that strip away personal information and give the sender a 
unique identifying code as an alias name. . . . That alias and the tip is the only 
information the police officers receive. . . . Likewise, the alias would be the 
only name officers would know should a reward be offered for certain 
information." (Tomlinson 2013)

This small-town “See-Hear-Report” program, as Chief Nelson claims, might occasionally 
“save lives.” Yet it is likely that this program will have other consequences, either intended 
or unintended. It is certain to encourage petty snitching practices among students living in 
this low-crime recreational community of little more than 11,000 residents, particularly with 
the introduction of cash rewards. The anonymity made possible by digital technologies 
allows citizens to assume a superficial prosthetic identity comprised solely of their machinic 
capacities to transmit data. The authorities that experience this identity come to know it only 
as the bearer of raw information, as the provider of geographic coordinates, suspect 
descriptions, and similar bare details. This, in fact, is a paradigmatic expression of the 
digitized subject whose apparatuses of citizen production have transformed him/her into the 
raw, depersonalized data gathered, processed, and transmitted by his/her senses and 
mechanical hands.

VIII. Conclusion

At this juncture of technological development and lateral policing, then, we have two 
primary and interrelated dangers: first, the leveling power of communication technologies to
de-individualize the flock through the undermining of that which is distinctive among its specimens; and second, the corresponding and more basic technologization of the human, who is articulated as citizen through the most basic procedures of receiving, processing, and transmitting signals. Thus to the extent that technologies more intensively normalize the flock’s expressive and interpretive capacities, they reproduce larger and larger zones of practice in which human subjects carry out an increasingly biological and undifferentiating existence. In the words of Agamben, this is a process of “separating all life from itself” (1999, 156), of “the isolation of survival from life” (1999, 157)—a zoopolitics that thrives on the production of normalized, undifferentiated procedures of survival. Hence, as Jana Sawicki has observed, “Modern technologies do not control the body by conquering it . . . but by simultaneously rendering it more useful and docile” (2003, 62). The rise of new technologies has helped to mobilize the docile, seeing/speaking body, extracting its immaterial labor in the service of hometown and homeland security. This tendency is visible in programs all throughout the US. For example, citizen responsibilization efforts like Los Angeles’s “iWatch LA” program asks citizens to lend their senses to the policing apparatus. As iWatch LA’s outreach urges, “Trust Your Instincts: We rely on our senses every day of our lives. If a behavior or activity makes you feel uncomfortable, report it! . . . If it doesn’t LOOK right, report it. . . . If it doesn’t SMELL right, report it. . . . If it doesn’t sound right, report it” (iWatchLA 2012). With the iWatch LA program and its companion efforts across the country, citizens’ eyes and ears are captured and put to use as mechanisms of lateral surveillance; their mouths are transformed into instruments for reporting crimes and suspicious activities; and now, with the advent of multimedia mobile devices, their dialing-
typing hands become tools for transmitting data—such as photographs of criminals and text messages with tips—to various authorities. In many of the activities that constitute the lateral policing of crime today, the technologized citizen finds itself reduced to its barest biotechnical utility.

As Sloterdijk’s analysis of the “human zoo” points out, living human subjects have become the targets of a unique form of anthropotechnics: while humans may not be selectively bred to improve their eyesight and voice, the utility of their senses is continuously engaged and enhanced by extra-genetic means, particularly by new media of communication and cultural technologies that teach us how to most effectively see and speak.

Communication, stripped to its barest utility (in the figure of phone), finds itself coupled with sight as the fundamental basis of the governable and governing human specimen. These basic biological capacities serve in many instances as both the target and the technology of government, as they comprise the common characteristics of the self-governing citizen body. Thus to the extent that the human is a sensing/signaling machine—a being defined by its communicative-surveillant capacities to store, process, and transmit data—it acts as the subject of labor, the medium and mechanism of production. While subjects are articulated through communicative and surveillant labor, therefore, their basic capacities for communication and sight make them governable. As Foucault has recognized, “They [individuals] are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. . . . The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle” (1980, 98). There thus arises a
desubjectifying process whereby citizens perform the work of governing one another by watching and communicating, two of the most reliably basic biological capacities of citizen-subjects. In this sense citizens increasingly find themselves articulated through a normalizing apparatus that cultivates these bare faculties in the service of lateral policing initiatives. This technologization gives rise to a situation that Torin Monahan has eloquently described: “By reducing people to instrumental objects, which are seen either as pawns to be manipulated or as receptacles of information that must be extracted, humanity is excised from the object and the subject, the interrogated and the interrogator. Paradoxically, such practices are done in the name of preserving their opposite: civil society, human rights, political accountability, and democratic processes” (2011, 29). Transforming the citizen-subject into an instrument of broader political rationalities is not only disempowering to those who are promised freedom through responsibilization—it also threatens the bedrock of social and political values to which that responsibilization appeals.
Chapter 3
Crowdsourcing Hometown Security

“Now is the time for all good men to come to the aid of their neighbor! Repeat! Now is the
time for all good men to come to the aid of their neighbor!”
–Deputy Barney Fife

◆ Richard Ramirez

On August 24, 1985, Richard Ramirez broke into the home of Bill Carns and Inez Erickson, a couple in their twenties that had recently gotten engaged. After pulling out a pistol and shooting Bill in the head, Ramirez tied up Inez and sexually assaulted her. As Ramirez was fleeing the scene of the crime, Inez pulled herself up to her bedroom window, where she caught a glimpse of Ramirez driving away in an orange Toyota station wagon. Because Inez was able to provide police with a description of the car and a partial license plate number, the California State Police began scouring the state for the orange Toyota. When it was found abandoned four days later, police were able to pull a fingerprint from the car, which they then traced to convicted thief and drug addict Richard Ramirez. Because Ramirez had a mug shot on file with the Los Angeles Police Department, detectives confirmed that Ramirez fit the physical description that Inez and other robbery and sexual assault survivors in the area had given. On August 30, Ramirez’s mug shot was hysterically emblazoned on television screens and newspapers, where he was identified as the notorious “Night Stalker” who had carried out more than a dozen home invasion-murders in the preceding three months. Unaware that he had suddenly become a local celebrity, on August 30 Ramirez injected some cocaine in a public bathroom before walking into a liquor store. When the storeowner recognized Ramirez from a photograph on the front of a newspaper, he
repeatedly screamed “El Matador!” (“The Killer!”) as Ramirez ran out into the street. Surrounded by photographs of himself, Ramirez fled from the neighborhood, now trailed by a small mob of citizen-officers who were shouting that he was the Night Stalker. As Ramirez tried to escape, he ran across a highway into an East Los Angeles neighborhood, where he attempted to steal a car. But he had no such luck: a large mob of citizens converged on him, where they subdued him until cops arrived on the scene and put him in handcuffs. Ramirez’s photograph had been released to the public only a few hours earlier.

I. Introduction

The Ramirez case illustrates the central role that media have come to play in crowdsourcing manhunts in order to make their surveillance reach more extensive. These media have a long history that includes the Wanted poster, the Rogues’ Gallery, police gazettes, and popular television shows like America’s Most Wanted, all of which are aimed at constructing what Rachel Hall calls the “vigilant viewer” (2007, 6). With the now familiar rhetoric of sensory responsibility, John Walsh, host of America’s Most Wanted, sums up the crowdsourcing rationality that drives this contemporary lateral policing project: “A police department is only as good as the people it serves. That’s why the good cops working the streets . . . need your eyes, your ears, and every ounce of support you can give them. It’s a partnership” (Scranton Police Department, 2001). Crowdsourcing technologies like Walsh’s America’s Most Wanted recruit citizen-officers by promoting suspicion, vigilance, and enterprising self-responsibility among the public at large.
While one might be tempted to follow Marshall McLuhan (1994) in declaring these media to function as “extensions of police man” that allow officers to govern at a distance, I would provide a Kittlerian corrective to this “anthropocentric illusion” (see Gane 2006, 39). As Nicholas Gane has described, in Kittler’s approach “there is no attempt to prioritize embodiment, first, because the boundaries between bodies and machines are no longer clear (if they ever were). . . . And second, even if the human body continues to exist, it, together with the very idea of humanness, is taken to be a construction or effect of technology rather than an agentic force in its own right” (2005, 38). For Kittler, “The age of media . . . renders indistinguishable what is human and what is machine . . . What remains of people is what media can store and communicate” (Kittler 2007; 146, xl). Elsewhere, he assures us, “Technical media don’t arise out of human needs, as their current interpretation in terms of bodily prostheses has it, they follow each other in a rhythm of escalating strategic answers” (1997, 121). That is to say, media technologies are constitutive of human subjects and their worlds; to argue that media function as “extensions” of man implies that humans retain an impossible degree of exteriority from and control over the machines that have come to define them. Media, then, should not be described as extensions of some anonymous officer or police bureaucrat—or even less, of a unitary sovereign—but as technologies that provide the material conditions for the citizen-officer to function as a sensory extension of the policing apparatus.

Kittler’s deflation of the anthropocentric illusion allows us to see the specifically technological function that human characteristics and habits fill in the practice of government. Synthesizing the work of Heidegger and Foucault, Mitchell Dean has identified
the human as simply one technology of government among others. According to Dean, “what
distinguishes technology is that it assembles . . . human, technical, and natural beings as
resources in the generation of powers that can be unlocked, stored, transported, and
distributed. Heidegger speaks of this as a ‘gathering-together’” (1996, 60). Dean refers to the
classic Heideggerian critique that identifies technology as a worldview that is symptomatic of
subjectivist modernity. Technology leads us to see our surroundings as an “enframed” world
picture—as something for us, a collection of Bestand (“standing reserve”) to be manipulated,
controlled, enjoyed, and otherwise used by human subjects (see Heidegger 1977a; 1977b).
By synthesizing this critique of technology with Foucault’s analysis of governmentality,
Dean describes how diverse “resources”—human, technical, natural, etc.—are viewed as a
diverse field of elements whose interrelationships must be continuously re-coordinated in
order to shape the conduct of citizen-subjects:

From a technological orientation, human action is not simply something to be
problematised so that it can be turned to specific ends. It becomes an element
of the “standing-reserve,” something to be gathered-together, so that the
powers of its combination and assemblage may be unlocked, extracted, stored,
transported and distributed. Technologies of government are precisely the
multiform instrumentation of the constitution of particular locales as powerful
or authoritative ones, ones that can unlock, harness and store certain powers
and capacities, and that enable authorities and agencies to act over time and
space and to co-ordinate with the activities of other locales. (1996, 60)
Dean identifies the human and the technical as interlocking resources in the government of subjects. This synthesis of Heidegger’s techno-critique and Foucaultian governmentality is especially insightful because it recognizes the relative coequality of human and technical resources within apparatuses of government. As Marx (1961) describes in chapter fifteen of *Capital*, at a certain level of displacement the human ceases to be the master of “his” technical instruments and is instead transformed into just another complementary technological resource (also see Marx 1973; Raunig 2005).

Human subjects and their social relationships, therefore, are frequently transformed into raw resources for the policing apparatus. Various communication technologies, in particular, have facilitated this transformation, creating the conditions for the development of what Nikolas Rose calls “prudential partnerships” between authorities and citizen-subjects (2000, 328). Rose has argued: “New modes of neighbourhood participation, local empowerment, and engagement of residents in decisions over their own lives will, it is thought, reactivate self-motivation, self-responsibility, and self-reliance in the form of active citizenship within a self-governing community. . . . Government of security here operates through the activation of individual commitments, energies, and choices, through personal morality within a community setting. Community is not simply the territory within which crime is to be controlled, it is itself a means of government” (329). Because community acts as a technology of government—that is, because community is a network of human relationships that provide an affective substrate and material domain for localized moral entrepreneurship—the habits and moral life of a community’s individuals can be cultivated to create the conditions in which relations of mutual responsibility generate self-reproducing
realms of autonomous governance. Thus diverse authorities, as Nikolas Rose notes, “take responsibility for generating an array of technologies of government that would ‘social-ize’ both individual citizenship and economic life in the name of collective security” (1996, 48). These technologies of government, Rose continues, illustrate “two axes of this new formula of government—one inclusive and solidaristic, one individualizing and responsibilizing. . . . Within this new regime of the actively responsible self, individuals are to fulfill their national obligations . . . through seeking to fulfill themselves within a variety of micro-moral domains or ‘communities’—families, workplaces, schools, leisure associations, neighborhoods. Hence the problem is to find means by which individuals may be made responsible through their individual choices for themselves and those to whom they owe allegiance” (1996, 48, 57). As discourses of mutual responsibility and self-enterprise provide the moral foundation for this power, the local relations they foster provide its practical terrain. Citizens thus fulfill their civic obligations by conducting various rituals of entrepreneurial local responsibility—e.g., by staying informed of local security issues, joining neighborhood watch programs, calling the police to report criminal and suspicious activities, and so forth. In this regard the concerns registered by David Lyon are most certainly pertinent: “there is evidence that small-scale communities know fairly intimately about each other’s lives and that such knowledge may be turned to regulatory purpose” (2007, 77).

In this chapter I will provide a history of the role that crowdsourcing technologies have played in the lateral policing of crime, paying special attention to their contemporary digital iterations. Scholars looking into crowdsourcing have, in general, accepted it as a more or less new and positive phenomenon that helps businesses and organizations quickly solve
problems (e.g., Brabham 2008). This chapter, however, will use the medium theory sketched above to rethink a number of the assumptions that define this literature. I will make three basic arguments about media and crowdsourcing: first, that crowdsourcing is anything but new; second, that it is media-dependent; and third, that it can have negative social impacts that go beyond diminished data quality and exploitive labor arrangements (Paolacci et al. 2010). By facilitating a broader implication of citizens’ everyday lives into the policing apparatus of the state, these media in effect flip McLuhan’s anthropocentric thesis: technologies are not extensions of man, but man is rather a sensory extension of the technologies and apparatuses that define and articulate him. I begin by giving a broad historical overview of the technological conditions that have allowed for varying modes of police crowdsourcing—the horn, the printed hue and cry notice, and the police gazette, among other technologies, each receive attention. Next I trace how these crowdsourcing technologies have taken shape in the digital age, in particular as social media have become a popular means of distributing policing responsibilities to the public. I conclude by revisiting a theme that is present throughout my analysis: we must remain critical of the potential for this responsibilization to fracture the social by transforming communal bonds into technologies of surveillance power, thereby subsuming social responsibility into the operations of hometown security.

II. From Vill to Vill: Crowdsourcing Crime Control Before Print

Today our notions of policing are dominated by its contemporary form as a sovereign institution, complete with salaried officers, specialized technologies, and distinct privileges.
Yet the modern police force is peculiar to certain logics of institutional sovereign governance (Agamben 2000; Foucault 1979). This sort of professional policing is a historical anomaly that has only been prominent for about two hundred years. In fact, in Europe and North America lateral policing provided the dominant manifestation of law enforcement until the rise of the modern forces of the late 18th and early 19th centuries (Godfrey and Lawrence 2005; Zedner 2006). To better understand the development of American community-based policing programs, it is instructive to dig deeper into policing history. As police historians Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux have argued, to understand America’s law enforcement tradition requires an excursion into British policing history (1990, 43). We might begin this history, then, with the roots of British policing as practiced by the tribal societies of the Anglo-Saxons. As the Anglo-Saxons conquered and settled Roman Britain between the fifth and seventh centuries, they carried with them an ancient Germanic system of tribal government and law enforcement. This system was organized around the local community, the “hundred,” each of which comprised a district of roughly one hundred households. The leader of each hundred, its “elder,” was responsible for judging disputes and pursuing criminal justice. Since court was only held once each season, most parties, too impatient or independent to wait for official justice, would pursue criminals themselves. At this time in English history, community members were still permitted to seek justice without appealing to an elder, so law enforcement was a decidedly local affair. In lieu of an organized police force, neighbors would frequently band together, pursuing criminals and dispensing punishment without the approval of a governing official. Without a written legal code or a centralized nation-state, there was no stable “law” to enforce; traditional community
standards of justice and morality prevailed (see, e.g., Seebohm 1883).

After the Norman Conquest, the Anglo-Saxons’ mutual responsibility was fragmented by the intervention of a loyalty-extracting state apparatus. In the early years of the Conquest William I implemented a community policing system that manipulated the Anglo-Saxons’ feudal community justice organizations, solidifying his social control over them by extending community culpability to the entire village or hundred (Morris 1910, 1–8). For a number of reasons, among them to prevent the assassination of Norman officials, the Normans leveled severe, community-wide penalties for criminal acts. This new system of laws and deprivations transformed the traditional rationalities of Anglo-Saxon lateral surveillance and policing, addressing two principal goals of the Norman ruling class: first, their own financial enrichment, and second—and more importantly, for our purposes—the more or less seamless integration of the conquered Anglo-Saxons into the machinery of their own control. Michel Foucault recounts a plausible historical account of how, even when the Anglo-Saxon population would attempt to dampen the powers of the Norman regime, they were able to react only within the narrow political parameters erected by their colonizers; thus the only palpable “change” that resulted was that the Anglo-Saxons themselves became actively integrated into the enforcement of Norman rule: “those elements the [Saxon] parliamentarians claimed would restrict Norman right—even the Magna Carta, Parliament, and the practice of the courts—are all basically part of the Norman system of exactions. The only difference is that part of the population now helps to run it” (2003, 108). This strategy of governance was especially visible in the community policing system that the Normans used to maintain order and exact restitution from the Anglo-Saxons. The thinly spread
Norman ruling class, which lacked the manpower and social structure to deploy teams of professional officers of the peace (Thomas 2008, 143), required the conquered Anglo-Saxons to police themselves. This early integration of policing into citizens’ everyday lives reflects a long trend in the self-disciplining and responsibilization of local populations via peer-to-peer policing, signaling for early policing historian William Alfred Morris a significant moment in “the union of police and mutual responsibility” (1910, 2). Yet this union, of course, is quite different from more ideal, altruistic forms of mutual responsibility; what we see instead is the transformation of communal bonds into a technology of networked surveillance power that is activated at the pleasure of the new sovereign.

One of the harsher aspects of this responsibilization was the *frankpledge* system. By imposing community-wide financial responsibility for the apprehension of criminals and the recovery of stolen goods, the *frankpledge* effectively conscripted the entire English populace into a policing and lateral surveillance apparatus. And no longer was punishment distributed merely between the members of a tithing—all members of a village were held responsible for the criminal acts of their neighbors. According to Eric H. Monkkonen, this was a crucial development in the responsibilization of the Anglo-Saxon population: *frankpledge*, described by its historian as a “system of compulsory collective bail fixed for individuals, not after their arrest for a crime, but as a safeguard in anticipation of it,” forced the community to accept responsibility for the behavior of its individual members, to produce offenders for trial, or, if unable to discover the offender, to pay the fines (1981, 33). Lacking the means to centrally organize and deploy this new surveillance-policing network, in the 13th century Edward I officially sanctioned the verbal “hue and cry” method of crime response and patrol
organization, a method that would survive well into the nineteenth century. Once an individual witnessed a crime, he was required to chase the perpetrator with a loud, accusatory “hue and cry” which would ring out through the community. (Women would typically produce their cries from within their homes.) As these shouts alerted other citizens who would join the manhunt, the ad-hoc crew would chase the criminal until they apprehended him and returned him to a constable for internment, thereby releasing the collective bail imposed upon their community (Fisher and Lab 2010, 198–9). However, if the criminal eluded the posse and ran to a neighboring village, the citizens of both villages—now facing the threat of defaulting on their frankpledge—would gather to apprehend the fleer, forming an ever-larger mob of civilian police (Roth and Olson 2001, 63).

Various media facilitated the hue and cry: in addition to oral shouts, horns, rattles, and other technologies were used to immediately deputize local citizens and allow for the reorganization of their bodies across time and space. In the hue and cry policing configuration, the limits of oral response are obvious: an oral hue and cry can only be heard by those in earshot; the commotion it stirs can only be seen by those who witness the chase unfold; and, one can perhaps imagine the smell of torch fire as citizens roamed the streets in search of suspects. The limitations of the oral hue and cry are the immediate limitations of the human senses, thus one must constantly redistribute the commotion across space and time. From household to household, and from community to community, the patrol had to repeat the call as they rallied on foot; and because of the sparse population of medieval Europe—not to mention the king’s decree that all adult males must concomitantly pursue the criminal until he is apprehended—citizens could not orally transmit a warning to their
neighbors and then retire back to their homes. According to the frankpledge system, local citizens were forced to patrol from house to house in search of both new recruits and the criminal suspect. This vocal medium facilitated policing patrols that were decentralized, evolving, responsive amalgams that were unable to anticipate the objects of their hunt; they could merely band together and spread the word after an observable offense, until their size proved too ubiquitous for the suspect to elude.

Mobile aural technologies transformed oral hue and cry and watch-and-ward patrols, allowing for improved communications between households and even between previously isolated communities. Sir Frederick Pollock, who served as England and Wales’ chief law enforcement officer, described how the horn, which was first introduced into English patrols in the fourteenth century, long occupied a central role in lateral policing: when a hue and cry was raised, neighbors would “turn out with the bows, arrows, knives, that they are bound to keep, and besides much shouting, there will be horn-blowing; the ‘hue’ will be horned from vill to vill” (Pollock and Maitland 1895, 577). All citizens, as potential deputies, were required to own a variety of weapons that could help them serve in their capacity as lateral police officers. As important as the weapons, however, was the medium of the hue, the horn. The horn, as Pollock describes, allowed for calls to spread “from vill to vill,” vastly improving upon the limited range of the human voice. In 1785, English historian and justice of the peace, Richard Burn, explored the etymologies of hue and cry, concluding that hue originally signified horn blowing while cry signified cries of the human voice. Burn traces this distinction as far back as 696 A.D., when Wihtred King of Kent decreed that “if a stranger go out of the road, and neither shout nor blow a horn, he shall be taken for a thief”
(1785, 553). Burn suggests that, while in some instances it is best to summon a constable when a crime is committed, “by the frame of the statutes, it is by no means necessary, nor is it always convenient; for the felon may escape before the warrant be obtained; . . . and hue and cry was part of the law, before justices of the peace were first instituted” (554).

Thus the horn—as the “hue” in hue and cry—can be traced in the English policing tradition at least as far back the Middle Ages; and we do know, moreover, that the horn, which has long been used to herd flocks, was used by the Romans as a method of patrol and troop coordination (Baines 1993, 37–66). Calling the early horn a “signifying tool,” as opposed to a musical tool (many of these horns could only play one “note”), Raymond Monelle writes about the unique personnel organization that the horn made possible:

During the course of hunting, personnel and hounds could become dispersed over a wide area, and it was often necessary to communicate certain messages. The first sight of the quarry, the loss of the scent, the plunging of the quarry into water, the release of “relays” (relais, small teams of huntsmen and hounds posted along the probably route of the hunt), the stag at bay, the stag killed, and many other important steps in the process of hunting needed to be broadcast to the various members of the hunting party. (Monelle 2006, 39).

The horn provided important new capacities for managing people’s behavior across space, making a significant impact on the organization of roving police patrols. As we see in Monelle’s account, patterns of repetition, tone, and emphasis allowed patrols in disparate communities to announce a criminal’s presence and direct the dispersal of a number of civilian patrols. As early as 1302, horns were employed to alert neighboring towns of a
criminal’s movement during hue and cry campaigns. During the following century horns were given to England’s night watchman, who would patrol the town on foot. These watchmen, however, were soon moved to bell towers, where they could (either with trumpets or bells) customize their alerts based upon the threat posed to the community (Fosbroke 1825, 472).

Equipped with these technologies, the Anglo-Saxons organized their labor into mobile lateral surveillance teams. Communities began to employ what is known as the “watch-and-ward,” which was a civilian surveillance network that deployed groups of day wardens and night watchmen to immediately raise a loud “hue and cry” following a criminal act. These groups would work in shifts, sometimes occupying watchtowers in order to initiate a hue-and-cry as soon as an offense was committed. But because the frankpledge indebted all members of a community—not just those who were designated watchmen when the offense occurred—those who refused to put down their work and follow the criminal were themselves arrested and tried for the fugitive’s crimes (Critchley 1967: 2–6). The colonialist deprivations of the frankpledge system thus forced the conquered Anglo-Saxons to remain watchful of their peers, each of whom threatened to disrupt the delicate stability that kept the new Norman elites at bay. Watchmen statutes reinforced the medieval model of lateral policing. In a move that, as we will see, has numerous analogs throughout the history of law enforcement, state authorities were careful to ensure that local citizens, rather than “outsiders” or a specially equipped occupational class, were keeping watch over one another. This medieval policing apparatus—which enforced loyalty to the state’s security objectives via threats of various punitive reprisals—was a defining expression of English sovereignty in
its pre-institutional condition. Unassisted by the institutional competencies that would later characterize sovereign governance—e.g., the modern police force—Norman control required coordinated, distributed programs of lateral surveillance. In Norman England, the mindset of a pre-institutional sovereignty revolutionized the logics of Anglo-Saxon mutual responsibility. Because individuals were made to remain watchful of everyone in the village, not only did the threats of crime and its response become ubiquitous, but the community’s sociality was now forced to revolve around disciplined rituals of mutual suspicion.13

III. Print and the Dissemination of Vigilance

As sovereign powers began to capitalize on the crowdsourcing potential of print technologies, ad-hoc watch and ward patrols—which would band together after crimes in order to capture suspects and release their collective frankpledge—found their responsibilization abstracted from its roots in organic community response. In the fourteenth century, print-based hue and cry declarations—which listed the name and description of the accused, along with a command for lay citizens to arrest the criminal as soon as s/he was seen—began to be posted in villages.14 As urban populations became more and more likely to have at least a few literate citizens who could spread the word to their pre-literate peers, the Crown relied on these laymen to spread notice of the physical characteristics and habits of wanted individuals. In the case of hue and cry declarations, the tradition of compulsory enlistment popular after the Norman Conquest was kept alive: once a declaration notice had been posted in high-traffic, public areas, the entire male citizenry—not just those who were
encountered on a hue and cry campaign—was, according to Ronald F. Becker, immediately “shackled with the responsibilities of a police officer” (Becker 2009, 20).

Whereas oral-based lateral policing depended on direct communicative interactions between community members, the advent of print declarations allowed representatives of the state to more easily engage the behavior of citizens as individual subjects. That is to say, in the days of oral patrol, criminals were identified by citizens who observed them taking part in a criminal act. However, the durable, print-based dictation of suspects by a state authority—such as in the Wanted poster and the printed hue and cry—radically altered the community’s jurisdiction and thus the nature of its response to crime. In the days of oral law enforcement, when citizens were in pursuit of a suspect the chain of community patrol had its foundation in an identifiable, specific act of local criminality. Yet when print Wanted and hue and cry posters began to appear, not only were policing efforts separated from their roots in direct public response, but citizens could be mobilized to respond to alleged crimes that occurred at earlier times and/or outside their communities.¹⁵ Once criminal justice ceased to be a local affair adjudicated between and by neighbors, crime was abstracted from personal or communal experience and reconstituted as an act not against specific citizens, but against the sovereign (see Foucault 2003, 82). Print allowed central authorities to redescribe crime as disloyalty to the Crown, whereas oral hue and cry campaigns could only respond organically to palpable criminal acts perpetrated against neighbors. This change was paralleled and supplemented by the Magna Carta, or common law, which, though passed in 1215, was virtually impossible to implement throughout largely oral Britain. The advent of print, however, finally facilitated the accumulation of a truly national common law that would
eventually supplant local customs of law enforcement and community justice (Havelock 1988, 144). This loss of local independence aided the abstraction of criminal justice from its long-standing foundation in communal observation and response, making possible new means of asserting the reach of sovereign power over the citizenry.

As new cultures of communication and transport evolved between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, England’s national common law slowly replaced local and regional oral law traditions, resulting in all crime being redefined as crime against the state’s authorities. In other words, theft was no longer an offense against a specific victim; it became an offense against the state, and therefore the jurisdiction of private citizens and local constables was subordinated to the precedents of the homogenized national law. Once the English Crown had established total juridical sovereignty within its realm, it strove to nationalize every aspect of criminal justice. As a result, the offended parties and their fellow citizens suddenly lost jurisdiction over crime management and law enforcement. Though locals were still conscripted in manhunts, their duties were now delegated by a representative of the Crown, who would ride to town, adjudicate trials, and sentence criminals based upon the precedents of printed legal records. This process has been eloquently described by historians Anne Reiber DeWindt and Edwin Brezette DeWindt, and I can do no better than to cite them at length:

The ongoing expansion of royal legal institutions and control over the countryside from the twelfth century had, by the late fourteenth century, reached a point where it became clear that responsibility for pursuit of wrongdoers would have to be narrowed and more clearly defined. . . . Over
time, widely dispersed public responsibilities were consolidated into the hands of a class of officials, . . . [and] public functions were taken out of the hands of the public at large and placed into those of local authorities who, in turn, were answerable to higher authorities representing the Crown. After 1735, any person expecting his hundred to be liable for losses due to theft had to notify local officials of the details of his case in writing. A once vigorous, boisterous, sometimes reckless and potentially dangerous, fundamentally oral and face-to-face institution, with collective responsibility assumed for its success, had, by the eighteenth century, been tamed, bureaucratized, depersonalized, and reduced to a routine of composing and filing a memorandum. (DeWindt and DeWindt 2006, 75)

As DeWindt and DeWindt describe, the history of policing provides a revealing glimpse into how sovereign power gradually embedded itself into the logics that governed the sociability of Early Modern English communities. Thus the standardization of law, the rise of a print culture, and the growth of transportation networks all served to further implicate lateral policing into the security and revenue objectives of the state.

This print-oriented sovereignty asserted a disseminative bias into the circulation of lateral policing responsibilities. The emergence of print technology made a lasting transformation in the responsibilization of citizen-officers, a transformation that was absorbed by England’s American colonies. We see this, for example, in the hue and cry decree released against American “traitor” Patrick Henry. Distributed by the British colonial
authorities in town centers throughout Virginia, the printed notices remind the Crown’s subjects of their duty to incarcerate and surrender Henry:

I have thought proper, with the advice of Sir Majesty’s council, and in Sir Majesty’s name, to issue this my proclamation, strictly charging all persons, upon their allegiance, not to aid, abet, or give countenance to the said Patrick Henry, or any other persons concerned in such unwarrantable combinations; but on the contrary, to oppose them, and their designs, by every means, which designs must otherwise involve the whole country in the most direful calamity, as they will call for the vengeance of offended majesty, and the insulted laws, to be exerted here, to vindicate the constitutional authority of government. (Wirt 1903, 147)

Even after the fall of British authority in the American colonies, these print-based crowdsourcing strategies continued to dominate responsibilization efforts on both sides of the Atlantic as the earliest police bureaucracies used media to deputize local populations in the hunt for suspects. In a practice that has continued to the present day, police agencies would communicate rewards, crimes, stolen goods, and potential threats via newspapers, handbills, professional police gazettes, and strategically distributed Wanted posters. For example, in the 1770s the *Weekly Hue and Cry*, a police gazette devoted to publicizing the habits, presumed whereabouts, and physical characteristics of criminals, deserters, and the mentally disabled, entered circulation in London. In order to broaden the gaze against theft, the gazettes also allowed citizens to advertise rewards for stolen goods (Colquhoun 1796, 210). It several
decades for this project to become successful throughout England and the United States, where it eventually caught on in several urban areas in the middle of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{18}

The Wanted poster is perhaps the iconic manifestation of crowdsourcing police technologies. Along with the Rogues’ Gallery, these media became the primary means of democratizing and redistributing policing practices in the nineteenth century. As Thomas Byrnes, head of the New York police Department, said in his praise of the Rogues’ Gallery, “Look through the pictures in the Rogues’ Gallery and see how many rascals you find there who resemble the best people in the country. Why, you can find some of them, I dare say, sufficiently like personal acquaintances to admit of mistaking one for the other. . . . In fact, it is a bad thing to judge by appearances, and it is not always safe to judge against them. Experience of men is always needed to place them right” (1886, 55). Contra Francis Galton and other advocates of eugenics and the measurability of criminal “types,” Byrnes cautions against theorizing a criminal class based upon physical features. This recognition gave Byrnes a different set of concerns, as criminal identification was a matter with which non-specialists could assist. The photographs in the gallery, then, functioned as constitutive police media by which lay individuals could be recruited into the policing apparatus. Like printed police gazettes and Wanted posters, the rogues’ galleries worked to deter crime by spontaneous recruitment and hence the threat of publicly distributed, ubiquitous surveillance.\textsuperscript{19} Throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, these technologies played a predominant role in recruiting citizens into the policing apparatus. Rachel Hall has documented the rise of a number of these technologies, including the Wanted poster, the Rogues’ Gallery, fugitive slave notices, Pinkerton detective agency
posters, and “televisual community policing” programs like America’s Most Wanted (Hall 2007, 111). These media possess a popularity and generic stability that has generated a wide range of contemporary police crowdsourcing strategies. Yet while Hall locates these technologies in a lineage of visual media, I would like to broaden their historical purview to include any representational media that have served to disseminate policing responsibilities to the public. While Hall is certainly correct that print and television have played an inestimably important role in diffusing policing responsibilities during the past several centuries, their emergence as such—that is, their appearance as visual media—can be attributed to a particular techno-cultural moment in which visual-print technologies were predominant. These media’s lineage within a larger network of representational recruitment media is especially apparent in the digital age, as crowdsourcing police technologies have in many cases shed their formerly visual bias. Thus if we draw a historical thread from medieval hue and cry declarations to Wanted posters, Rogues’ Galleries, missing children’s photos on milk cartons, America’s Most Wanted, Crime Stoppers media outreach programs (see Carriere and Ericson 1989), rape whistles, and AMBER Alert text messages warning us of a criminal in our neighborhood, we begin to recognize that these technologies’ most important unifying feature is not necessarily their visuality, but is instead their general basis in publicizing representations of suspects’ physical characteristics, possible whereabouts, and other related information.

As such, their capacity for abstracting crime from its immediate vicinity should not be underestimated. This has innumerable effects that are potentially disastrous, especially the mobilization of suspicion and the activation of a more or less abstract vigilance that can lead
to the persecution of the falsely accused. When *America’s Most Wanted* promotes its success in finding fugitives, it is more reticent about when the vigilance it stirs results in false arrest. In September 1993, a number of *America’s Most Wanted* viewers reported that their neighbor, Edward Fisher, was the man appearing on their television screens. Although Fisher had for years lived in a small town in northern Pennsylvania, one of his neighbors reported to the police that s/he was “99 percent sure” that Fisher was the man in question. Acting on this information, the police arrested Fisher for murder, holding him until he was eventually released when fingerprint evidence exonerated him of the crime (Rotstein 1993, 10). While this case illustrates the danger of mistaken identities, it also demonstrates the intense vigilance that crowdsourcing media can stir: despite the tremendous unlikelihood that Fisher would be the perpetrator of murders more than 1,000 miles away from his home, several of his neighbors called the *America’s Most Wanted* tip line to accuse him of being the murderer. This unfortunate scenario calls to mind the stark assessment of urban suspicion and alienation put forward by criminologists Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley: “In our often anomic urban society the transcendent identity of many city dwellers is that of crime victim. Their neighbours may be the very people they fear” (Skolnick and Bayley 1986, 214).20

In these circumstances, lateral policing initiatives “can facilitate, even create, a sense of community where one either did not previously exist or was faintly imprinted” (Skolnick and Bayley 1986, 214). As the governance of crime takes shape through neoliberal logics of self-entrepreneurialism, individuals identify with their communities and their sovereign institutions by conducting themselves toward ideals of responsibilized citizenship. This
ethopolitics, as Nikolas Rose (2001) calls it, operates on an entrepreneurial desire that finds its ultimate fulfillment in the climaxing action of “doing something” in the face of perceived threats to self and society (see Johnston 1996, 232). For Rose, this ethopolitics thrives “by binding individuals into shared moral norms and values: governing through the self-steering forces of honor and shame, of propriety, obligation, trust, fidelity, and commitment to others” (Rose 2000, 324). Crowdsourcing police media operate upon these binding, responsibilizing moral logics that construct the social value and normative procedures of lateral policing. While conducting surveillance is an essential element of this responsibilized self-production, it is communicative labor—the sharing of one’s observations and the subsequent validation of one’s suspicion via an official police response—that provides the telos and fulfillment of the lateral policing act.

IV. Current Trends in Responsibilization: Crowdsourcing with Social Media

"Social media is like community policing on steroids. It's a force multiplier."

– Lauri Stevens (Martínez-Cabrera 2010)

In 1996, nine-year-old Amber Hagerman was kidnapped while she rode her bike in her Arlington, TX neighborhood. When Amber’s body was found four days later, members of the Arlington community devised the AMBER alert system—America’s Missing: Broadcasting Emergency Response—a media outreach strategy that would alert local citizens when children had gone missing. When a child was reported missing, the Emergency Alert System would interrupt the radio airwaves with a description of the child and the suspected abductor; local television channels would feature a small alert across the bottom of the
screen; and electronic highway signs would provide drivers with a description of the suspect’s vehicle. The states of New York, Florida, Nebraska, and West Virginia took the creative step of printing AMBER alert information on lottery tickets, and local businesses sometimes use their marquees to publicize this information (Krainik 2002). In the digital age, Facebook and Google have gotten into the action: Facebook users can sign up for notifications if their state releases an AMBER Alert, and Google appends an alert to the top of a page when a user searches for the city in which an alert has been activated (Glenn 2012).

As Colonel Steven Flaherty, Superintendent of the Virginia State Police, remarked, "The social media enables law enforcement to reach way beyond our normal footprint. . . . I can only imagine and dream what we'll be able to accomplish with this new tool in our toolbox” (Office of Juvenile Justice 2011). Starting in February 2013, mobile phone companies, too, have enhanced the reach of AMBER alerts by partnering with the FCC and FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) to send a standard SMS message to their customers when an alert has been issued in their communities (Associated Press 2013). Thus amid the popularity of the AMBER program, a familiar discourse has come to surround their efforts: according to the organization’s pamphlet, “when ordinary citizens become the eyes and ears of law enforcement, precious lives can be saved” (AMBER Alert 2005). The AMBER program, therefore, reinscribed the defining biomachinic discourse of contemporary police crowdsourcing: as countless PSAs, neighborhood watch brochures, and related policing partnership discourses remind us, we are expected to function as the “eyes and ears” of the police apparatus (see Andrejevic 2006, 177).
The most important innovation made by the AMBER alert system is its activation of citizenship through social media and mobile devices. Since the explosion of Facebook, Twitter, and other social media in 2008 and 2009, police agencies have developed diverse strategies for exploiting online social networks. As of August 2012, a national survey conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police found that more than ninety-two percent of American police agencies use some sort of social media (IACP 2012); and many of these agencies, of course, are using social media to conduct warrantless investigations (Silverberg 2013). In a growing number of cases, police officers are assigned to monitor suspects’ social media accounts and infiltrate their networks. Detectives have been known to create fake Facebook profiles in order to gain access to a suspect’s personal information, and they have also applied pressure to existing “friends” of Facebook users in order to gain information about the contents of suspects’ profiles (see Kelly 2012). This invasion of privacy in the legally ambiguous frontier space of social media has reached staggering proportions in the US. In 2012, Twitter released a report showing that the U.S. federal government leads the world in official requests for information on citizens; the report states that in the first half of 2012, U.S. law enforcement agencies made more information requests than they did in all of 2011 (Twitter Transparency Report 2012). Some police departments, like those in Montgomery County, Texas, have even begun tweeting the names of DUI suspects—not convicts—in a spectacle of public shaming. As Assistant District Attorney for Montgomery County, Diepraam, put it: “Ligon has recognized that DWI is our most frequently committed crime in Montgomery County. . . . The message he's sending is:
'If you're going to commit an offense of DWI in Montgomery County, we're coming after you.' We're hoping it has a deterrent effect on individuals” (Lee 2010).

While these cases are certainly alarming, we should also be concerned that these technologies are becoming the next frontier of mass-responsibilization efforts, as police agencies ally with community partners to crowdsourcethe fight against crime. For example, the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) prides itself on its social media presence, which is primarily invested in Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The push to update the PPD’s web presence began on Halloween 2007, when PPD officer Charles Cassidy was shot during a robbery at a Dunkin’ Donuts. Even though the murder was caught on the store’s video camera in DVR format, the PPD was not equipped to access or share that video format: they had to send the disc to FBI headquarters, where it was then processed and sent back to the PPD in an accessible and transmissible format. PPD Lieutenant Raymond J. Evers remarked, "We had to waste 36 hours to process a video. It showed a glaring problem. It should not take 36 hours to get info from a DVR. That was the impetus” (Master 2012). Armed with grants from the federal government, the PPD launched websites and hired developers and strategists. Remarking on these developments in crowdsourcing media, PPD Commissioner Charles H. Ramsey asserted that the department’s top priority is "making it easy and as comfortable as possible for people to reach out to us” (Master 2012).22

But the PPD didn’t stop there. In 2010 they launched a Facebook page, which now has over 50,000 subscribers and is the most popular police profile page in the US. Peppered with pictures of police officers reaching out to the community, the page is updated several times a day with photographs and videos of criminal suspects. The PPD also uses Facebook
to announce rewards—such as “Reward Increased to $80,000 in Abduction Case,” which will be followed by a video or photograph of the crime or wanted criminal—and also to feature missing person cases. Citizen participation, however, is strictly limited: the only input from users is the occasional “Now we just need to get more of these scumbags off the streets!,” as citizens cheer on the police and express their solidarity with local policing efforts. (Citizens, however, are not allowed to announce crimes or add additional details about suspects.)

The PPD’s Twitter account functions in a similar way: since 2009, the PPD’s Media Relations Unit has gained 5,300 followers to its Twitter feed. The PPD’s tweets are aimed at recruiting its more than 16,000 followers into the fight against crime. In 2010, the PPD began turning to YouTube to crowdsource policing responsibilities: with more than 2.8 million hits, the PPD’s YouTube page has been credited with increasing the city’s violent crime clearance rate (although not reducing its violent crime). Amid this success in capturing suspects, the department has developed a Digital Imaging Video Response Team (DIVRT) equipped with officers who have been specially trained to extract video from crime scenes and rapidly disseminate them through social media channels (Domizio 2012). As Lieutenant Ramsey remarked, “It's absolutely amazing that since we began posting video online, people watch it . . . . Not only do they watch it. If they recognize someone, they pass along the tip” (Master 2012).

While social media have brought the PPD a degree of success in catching suspects, we should be critical about how these technologies are being deployed in lateral policing efforts. First, these media have shown little ability to halt violent crime: in Philadelphia in 2012, despite the growing presence of surveillance cameras, police social media, and
responsibilized citizen-soldiers who process these data, murders will have risen for the third straight year (Graham 2013). We should also keep in mind that social media are not primarily used to capture murderers and rapists, but are most often employed to publicize petty crimes and misdemeanors such as drug possession, driving under the influence, and probation violation. Outside high-crime urban environments like Philadelphia, where social media often encourage the lateral policing of violent crime, police departments have a tendency to put these media in the service of collecting fines and enforcing petty violations. A good case in point is Pottstown, Pennsylvania, which is a small town of about 22,000 located thirty miles northwest of Philadelphia. Without the technological resources of the Philadelphia Police Department, Pottstown police officials—working in concert with the local newspaper, the Pottstown Mercury—primarily employ Pinterest as their social networking site of choice (Pottstown Police Department 2013). Seen as a gendered medium—80% of Pinterest users are reportedly female—Pinterest is a way to involve women in lateral policing. Lauri Stevens, a social media consultant for law enforcement, lauds Pinterest as the new frontier in lateral policing media: “Facebook is awesome because there are a billion people on it. There aren't a billion people on Pinterest yet, but there are a lot. And the people on there are mostly women, who just really want to put bad guys behind bars” (Government Technology 2013). Continuing, Stevens remarked: “This is a way to get all of those people out there all the time in front of more people” (Jacobs 2012). Because full responsibilization is the telos of crowdsourcing policing programs, Pinterest is seen as a key piece of the lateral policing puzzle. By targeting this gendered medium, the police are striving to responsibilize this
untapped and apparently vigilant population resource which, without Pinterest, might not get into the lateral policing game.

On its Pinterest page, the Pottstown PD posts mug shots of suspects who have been arrested and have missed court dates—or, alternatively, of individuals suspected of crimes—in addition to listing suspects’ last known addresses. Citizens, of course, are urged to contact the department with any information about their whereabouts. The Pottstown PD’s Pinterest page, which is updated weekly or bi-weekly, typically posts about twenty-five suspects at a time: the most prominent offense advertised by the Pinterest page is, unsurprisingly, drug possession. For those suspects uploaded to the page on January 31, 2013, drug offenses, conspiracy to theft, forgery, theft, simple assault, receiving stolen property, driving under the influence, and other relatively minor crimes dominated the profiles. None of these suspects were wanted for violent felonies. Still, the Pottstown PD has received national recognition and media attention for its Pinterest crowdsourcing program. Remarking on what he finds to be the program’s success, Pottstown PD police captain Richard Drumheller reported that "We've actually seen a 57 percent increase in our warrant services, and we actually got more people based on our tips and our calls. . . . For us it's like, 'Yes,' because it's very enjoyable in police work when the public helps you" (Jacobs 2012). One should notice in Captain Drumheller’s statement that, while Philadelphia police officials are struggling to contain violence in their neighborhoods, Pinterest is most helpful in Pottstown as a way to improve the statistics of their township’s “warrant services” (arrests). When violent crime is not at stake, social media threaten to become a technology for revenue generation as police implicate community bonds in networks of surveillance power. Citizens—whether idle,
female, or otherwise—are transformed into surveillance and communication devices for the policing apparatus that has come to thrive on this cost-effective method for increasing revenue, improving arrest statistics, and identifying with the public through coordinated action.

The extension of citizens’ attention to their peers’ petty crimes is not the only risk of social-media policing. Again, as a symptom of these media’s tendency to uproot crime response from its immediate environment, social media can easily lend to mistakes of identification and false arrests. For example, after a riot following the San Francisco Giants’ World Series win in October 2012, a group of concerned citizens posted to Facebook a photograph of a man hurling a street sign into a bus window. This responsibilization effort “went viral,” in the words of Wired journalist Roberto Baldwin, as the photo was retweeted thousands of times among San Francisco residents. Reddit, the popular international forum network, even devoted a thread to finding the culprit. Amid all this buzz, local San Franciscan Tony Lukewicz thought that the bus vandal looked like himself, so he made the by-then notorious image his Facebook photo. Not getting the joke, someone took a screen shot of Lukewicz’s profile photograph and posted it to Twitter along with his name. A few hours later the photograph ended up on the Facebook page of a local nightclub, where commenters began posting Lukewicz’s phone number, address, and other personal details about him and even his family. Soon Lukewicz was receiving text messages threatening his life (Baldwin 2012).

In an interview with Wired magazine, Lukewicz made an insightful remark about his misfortune: “Anyone who knows me knows I’m not even like that” (Baldwin 2012). This, of
course, is a primary danger with crowdsourcing technologies: they can easily lead vigilant citizens to mobilize against false or even imagined enemies. One such social media hoax almost resulted in the killing of a Philadelphia man who was falsely accused of murdering a number of local girls. When a Philadelphia neighborhood was stricken with a series of murders and sexual assaults in the fall of 2010, a Facebook page emerged identifying local man Triz Jefferies as the “Kensington Strangler.” The Facebook group page, titled “Catch the Kensington Strangler, Before He Catches Someone You Love,” featured the twenty-four-year-old’s name, photograph, address, and phone number. A group of vigilantes converged on Jefferies’ home, where he had to be rescued by police officers who took him to a police station and conducted DNA tests that exonerated him of the crime. Police Sergeant Ray Evers pinpointed the danger behind this method of responsibilization: “It’s very unfortunate. . . . What if we didn’t get to this guy first . . . and he was just walking down the street? It could have been a whole different story” (Murtha 2010). When community vigilance is networked—as it can be in the age of Facebook and other social media—all it takes is one malicious node to reorient the community’s vigilance around an innocent target. And, as Sergeant Evers points out, the results of this have the potential to turn tragic.

This mediated abstraction of law enforcement from its roots in direct communal response carries a number of dangers: as we have seen, one of these dangers is misplaced vigilance as social media lead to the false persecution—intentional or otherwise—of individuals that have nothing to do with the crime in question. Yet there are other dangers inherent to crowdsourced policing in the digital age. Foremost among them is an ancient one: that citizens-officers’ identification with the policing apparatus leads them to fulfill these
policing-oriented obligations of citizenship above honoring any bonds of community.

Philadelphia Police Commissioner Ramsey emphasized the importance of this identificatory process: his department is “using social media to build trust in our communities, and that's the best possible outcome—these channels, they bring people closer to the department, they build trust over time, people get to know us and our communities become safer (Mulholland 2012). Mark Andrejevic has warned of this identificatory relationship, arguing: “Thanks to the promise of interactive participation in the policing process, the authorities can exploit the free labor of selected members of the community. The wager, of course, is that entrusting members of the populace with access to surveillance technology will encourage them to internalize the norms of state surveillance and policing: they will identify the problem the same way the police do, thanks, at least in part, to having been accorded the role of an agent of the state. . . .a strategy that enlists the appeal of participation as a shared responsibility” (2007, 178). In places like Pottstown, this identification with the raw activity of law enforcement disproportionately leads to individuals reporting their neighbors, coworkers, and even family members for petty infractions. In this regime of responsibilization, citizen action is centered on and filtered through sovereign obligations, such that one’s duty to one’s community is overshadowed by—and often redefined as—duty to the state. As Gary Marx described in his landmark study of American undercover policing, the promotion of a drug hotline in Boston schools led to authorities receiving twelve calls a day from kids turning in their parents for misdemeanor drug possession (1988, 207). While one should not dismiss the very real dangers that some children face in homes where there is serious drug abuse, this case illustrates how identification with law enforcement endangers community and even
familial bonds, as citizens are turned against one another in their function as sensory
extensions of the policing apparatus. Such problems are inherent in police crowdsourcing and
will continue with—or, very likely, will be exacerbated by—the increased use of social
media as recruitment technologies.

V. Conclusion

“In an electric information environment . . . . [t]oo many people know too much about each
other. Our new environment compels commitment and participation. We have become
irrevocably involved with, and responsible for, each other.”
Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore (1967, 24)

As this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, the technologization of the citizen and
the capture of its corporal and social resources is an old process that has undergone many
mutations. With discourses of mutual responsibility and self-empowerment, police agencies
have been able to convert humans into raw resources for the expansion of surveillance
networks. Thus structures of social responsibility and community responsibility are captured
and subsumed under loyalty to state objectives like hometown and homeland security. While
the periodic success of these responsibilization efforts cannot be denied—one might consider
the Richard Ramirez case with which this chapter began, or the success claimed by the
America’s Most Wanted television program—the capacity for this power to be abused and
misapplied should not be overlooked, especially as digital technologies such as crime
mapping (e.g., www.crimemapping.com), electronic crime notifications (e-mail alerts, for
example), virtual neighborhood watch (see Jones 2007), and other responsibilization efforts
proliferate. As Andrejevic has argued, “If new media technologies promise more democratic
access to the mode of information, the result has not been power sharing, but the injunction to embrace strategies of law enforcement and marketing at a microlevel. . . . In an era in which everyone is to be considered potentially suspect, we are invited to become spies—for our own good” (2006, 406). The “democratizing” utility of new media allows for a broader extension of the policing apparatus into our own habits, responsibilities, and bodies, as crowdsourcing technologies tap into the sensory resources of the public. Therefore these media not only impact us ideologically as texts to be consumed, but, as Hardt and Negri have described, they function as “anthropological mutation[s] both in individual terms and in terms of collective social life” (2000, 217). These anthropological mutations impact the way in which we carry out our lives and how we live-toward-others, restructuring the social just as surely as it restructures the rhythm of our daily lives.

Arguing for a turn in media studies that focuses on these social restructurations, Jeremy Packer has argued that “the question of communications policy and governance shouldn’t be so narrowly focused as to take into account merely the content of such a medium or who might be able to own it. The more elaborate question is, what types of governance of the population does it conform and allow? This type of approach emphasizes the essential place that communications plays in governance” (2008, 163). Packer goes on to argue that this approach captures the way in which these media are able to “activate subjects without being overly intrusive or coercive; which is to say, [to] act according to the most basic tenet of liberal government. . . . It is a form of governance built upon allowing and encouraging—one might even say fostering—very particular forms of freedom that lead to, and are derived by, the maxim that government rules best when ruling least” (163). While we can view these
kinds of media textually—an analysis that Rachel Hall has carried out in her important work on the vigilante viewer—we would encounter only one element of how they provide the material resources for reorganizing bodies across space, democratizing responsibilization efforts via multi-channel technologies, and—as we saw with the opening example of the hue and cry—exploiting citizens by “fostering” their participation in the security operations of the state.
Chapter 4
The Good Fight: Moral Warfare in the American Temperance Crusade

“And just as we owe a debt of gratitude . . . to the physician who does not wait to cure us of some disease, but who goes to stamp it out at its breeding place, so we owe a debt of gratitude to these moral physicians of the Commonwealth, who do not wait . . . until the appearance of this evil, widespread throughout the body politic, has alarmed and shocked us all, but who are ever on the watch to stamp out the breeding places of it”

I. Introduction: Represent and Intervene

In the nineteenth century and the early days of the twentieth, the American temperance movement set out with a broad range of strategies for reforming drinkers of alcohol. Some groups agitated for prohibition legislation, while others advocated for the development of a “temperance science.” Some acted as scouts who reported public drunkenness, policed indecency, and identified illegal saloons, while others took to the streets with petitions (see Zaeske 2003, 23, 43), pamphlets, songs (Hurner 2006), marches (Southard 2011, 44–6), and even acts of intimidation and violence. Despite these diverse tactics, however, the movement was basically united in a common goal: as Katharine Lent Stevenson, an activist in the prominent Women’s Christian Temperance Union, avowed: “we declare our purpose to educate the young; to form a better public sentiment; to reform, so far as possible, by religious, ethical and scientific means, the drinking classes” (Stevenson 1907, 106).

This overarching purpose within the temperance movement gave rise to a lateral policing strategy relied on the dual procedures of governmentality described by Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (1990), representing and intervening. To explain, in the nineteenth century “alcohol abuse”—as a broad range of phenomena with diverse appearances and effects—was
transformed into an intelligible, stabilizing discourse through its *representation* in various communications media. As such, representation is a process of discovery and discursive stabilization, and it includes a number of interlocking practices of surveillance and rhetoric that serve to render certain phenomena legible. These microsites of knowledge-building, Foucault argues, are “the point[s] where the networks of power culminate. . . . It is the actual instruments that form and accumulate knowledge, the observational methods, the recording techniques, the investigative research procedures, the verification mechanisms. That is, the delicate mechanisms of power cannot function unless knowledge, or rather knowledge apparatuses, are formed, organized, and put into circulation” (2003, 33–4). For example, let us imagine that a human scientist who wishes to investigate the physical effects of alcohol withdrawal brings human subjects into a laboratory so that they can be studied. But these individuals are not brought into the laboratory for the purpose of correcting their behavior; they are most valuable as surveillance objects because they allow their observers to build knowledge about alcohol and its effects. That is, the researchers study human specimens to observe and record their symptoms, which helps the researchers discern a certain generalizable “bandwidth” of commonality between specimens. These behaviors and symptoms—such as how much the subjects sweated and when, and the extent to which their faces flushed, and the amount of food they were able to ingest at what times—will be observed and recorded with various instruments and media (see Latour and Woolgar 1986). This process of *representation*—of giving life to phenomena through the sustaining power of discourse—is primarily aimed at producing knowledge rather than enforcing certain norms of behavior, although it obviously has heterogeneous applications and effects. As Peter and
Miller Rose have argued, “The government of a population, a national economy, an enterprise, a family, a child, or even oneself becomes possible only through discursive mechanisms that represent the domain to be governed as an intelligible field with its limits, characteristics whose component parts are linked together in some more or less systematic manner” (1990, 6). Representation, then, includes surveillance-based knowledge enterprises such as the scientific study of human subjects and the discursive reports of that knowledge, including notes, data collection and storage, and even professional scientific articles. It would also include, therefore, the surveillance-based investigative practices of journalists and activists and the preliminary notes that help them record the phenomena they observe; in other words, it includes the practices by which a phenomenal domain is given discursive unity and is thus rendered intelligible and governable. Through these fundamental practices of surveillance (observation) and rhetoric (the production of discourse), representation entails the observation and recording of phenomena for the sake of determining the most appropriate technologies for governing the problem at hand.

*Intervention*, however, carries out different yet complementary procedures of governmentality. Whereas representation focuses on observing and discursively organizing phenomena into governable problems, intervention is the means by which individuals, institutions, and authorities attempt to correct these problematized phenomena. Thus while a scientific article about alcoholism primarily serves as a technology of representation insofar as its main function is the collection of specialized knowledge, those same data can become a technology of intervention when they are translated into a pamphlet or textbook for the direct purpose of discouraging alcohol abuse among the public. Moreover, when human subjects
are gathered in the laboratory for the purpose of research, that surveillance primarily serves the purpose of representation; yet when individuals are placed in artificial living environments in order to change their behavior—to put them in regimented living quarters like the New York Christian Home of Intemperate Men, for example, in order to subject them to constant oversight and alter their habits of life (Crothers 1896, 51–55)—that surveillance functions primarily as a means of intervention. The most traditional practices of rhetoric, therefore, often function as governmental interventions: public address, personal conversions, newspaper editorials, protests, and public confrontations each intervene into the domain of everyday conduct, governing individuals and enforcing a bandwidth of acceptable variation in accordance with moral principles and/or scientifically deduced norms of behavior.

This framework of representation and intervention demonstrates the interlocking versatility of rhetoric and surveillance as complementary technologies of government. In this chapter I begin by introducing the influential principles set forth by American pioneer Benjamin Rush—who invented the discourse of alcoholism—to govern the late nineteenth-century moral panic of alcohol abuse. Then I recount the construction of a temperance science that relied not only on the surveillance of human subjects, but also the production of private, professional, and public discourses about health and morality. Next, I look at how temperance organizations used surveillance in the streets in order to build knowledge about the genesis and tendencies of alcohol abuse and to locate individuals in need of correction. Then I compare two styles of governmental intervention: one of which took a deliberative, communicative-surveillant approach to correcting the behavior of alcoholics, what activists
popularly referred to as “moral suasion”; the other style operated on a more radical logic of violent and coercive correction. This chapter aims to give a historical demonstration of the utility of surveillance and rhetoric in the governmental strategy of temperance activists—a strategy that was perhaps best summarized by Watch and Ward Society activist Samuel Capen when he applauded “the ceaseless vigilance they show in finding out . . . where the greatest evil is and then training their batteries in that particular direction” (1905, 20). Moreover, this chapter aims to demonstrate how different forms of being-rhetorical are privileged within different configurations of governmental practice, as moral policing movements aim to cultivate certain kinds of rhetorical subjects. In conclusion I describe how logics of war and immunity shaped the temperance movement’s lateral policing practices, promoting the conditions in which an internal moral enemy demanded a vigilant reaction from the citizenry.

II. Benjamin Rush and the Foundations of the American Temperance Movement

“. . . I consider it is possible to convert men into republican machines. This must be done, if we expect them to perform their parts properly, in the great machine of the government of the state.” –Benjamin Rush (1806, 14–5)

In its earliest days, the temperance movement was primarily the brainchild of prominent American Protestants like Benjamin Rush, the founder of the American Psychiatric Association. Rush, a Founding Father who was a pioneer in the diagnosis and treatment of alcoholism, held that alcohol use was a moral problem as much as it was a medical problem. In his highly influential 1793 work, An Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent
Spirits upon the Human Body and Mind, Rush warned that alcohol was a corrupting force that threatened the moral fabric of American society. For Rush and other evangelical founders of the temperance movement, alcohol was the key node in a broad network of social ills, including prostitution, gambling, pornography, unemployment, fighting, public corruption, and murder: in Rush’s words, alcohol abuse is tied up with “a numerous train of diseases and vices of the body and mind” (1823, 5; also see Valverde 1998, 2–4). In fact, it was this potential to diffuse into diverse symptoms of immorality that made alcohol such a threat. According to Rush, alcoholism was an “odious disease” (1823, 5) that threatened to infect the entire community with poverty, corruption, and, most of all, the “subversion of public order and happiness” (12). Rush, of course, was not the only colonial American to treat immorality as a contagious disease—a tropological grid that remains popular today (Black 1970; Sontag 1989)—and this concern for the spread of alcoholism and its cousin sins contributed to and was reflective of public fears of rampant immorality. These kinds of moral panics, as Stanley Cohen has pointed out, have a tendency to disperse into a “seamless web of social anxieties” (2002, xxxvi; also see Hall et al. 1978, 3–18).

By establishing intemperance as a communicable disease—one that, as he put it, “resembles certain hereditary, family, and contagious diseases” (1823, 8)—Rush and other prominent physicians and politicians established an urgency to alcohol abuse that called for the collective vigilance of the public. To fight against this internal threat, Rush advocated a number of immunological technologies that would activate the reactionary vigilance of the community. These technologies established a scientific and moral foundation from which communities could identify and then neutralize the immanent threat of alcohol abuse. By
means of these immunological technologies, then, communities were empowered to reassert their own unity through the reformation—and then, if necessary, the political and social purgation—of the dangerous interior element that threatened to infect their whole social body. Rush’s immunological regimen—which demanded the construction of a temperance science and the developments of investigative and rehabilitative practices—provided a moral and political impetus for local citizens to band together to “save [their] fellowmen from being destroyed by the great destroyer of their lives and souls” (1823, 26).

Temperance science was a natural choice for Dr. Rush: as a physician, he advocated the construction of knowledge-building enterprises that could provide, in his words, “an account of the means of preventing, and of the remedies for curing,” alcohol’s effects (1823). These preventive and curative measures were strategies to preserve the social order via the ethical reorientation of marginal subjects, what Foucault has called the “correction” of the dangerous individual (2003, 57). The “individual to be corrected,” according to Foucault, is placed within diverse environmental structures of moral reformation. Because the strictures of family and professional life have failed to hamper his or her temptations, the individual to be corrected must be subject to more extensive pressures of external policing. For the early temperance movement, this reorientation involved a number of steps, including teaching individuals to find salvation in labor (Rush 1823, 34). In addition, their speaking and travel habits were to be forcibly modified: the reformer must find a new “subject of conversation for drunkards at the usual times in which they have been accustomed to drink,” and should also restrain them “from those places and companions which suggested to them the idea of
ardent spirits” (34). These efforts at correction were ultimately aimed at providing drinkers with “counter passions” that could reorient them toward productive citizenship.

To supplement this correction, Rush also prescribed a rational outreach campaign, urging prominent members of the community to employ public address for the temperance cause. He encouraged ministers, for example, “to employ the same wise modes of instruction, which you use in your attempts to prevent their destruction by other vices. You expose the evils of covetousness, in order to prevent theft; you point out the sinfulness of impure desires, in order to prevent adultery . . . . In like manner, denounce, by your preaching, conversation, and examples, the seducing influence of toddy and grog” (1823, 26–7). Yet in addition to this rhetorical instruction, Rush also argued that disfranchisement and public dishonor could serve as deterrents: he threatened “to inflict a mark of disgrace, or a temporary abridgment of some civil right, upon every man convicted of drunkenness” (28). If this preventive rhetoric failed to take hold, drunks were to be confined until they sobered up, at which time their captors would subject them to campaigns of fear and shame and force them to swear an oath of temperance: (35). Rush also argued that, until drunks were corrected of their inebriety, they should be deprived of certain rights of democratic citizenship, such as the rights to vote and testify in a court of law (11).

While these rational campaigns promoted values of citizenship and threatened drinkers with various forms of civic punishment, the early temperance movement also resorted to less liberal means of persuasion. In Rush’s rehabilitation program, surveillance and moral persuasion were prescribed alongside whipping, poisoning, and other violent methods of behavior correction. In fact, Rush recommended implementing eight bodily cures
upon the drunk, including shoving a feather down the offender’s throat, giving him or her a “severe whipping,” and bloodletting. For those drinkers who persisted in their habits, Rush advocated a violent imposition into their mental habits. One possible reform strategy, Rush offered, was to appeal “to that operation of the human mind, which obliges it to associate ideas, accidentally or otherwise combined, for the cure of vice” (1823, 33). Perhaps the most effective of such appeals, Rush asserts, was spiking liquor with debilitating poisons that would bring the drinker near death. When combined with (quotes, whipping, etc.), the offender would eventually associate terror and pain with alcoholic drinks. Thus the individual, despite his devilish urges, would be physiologically prevented from taking a drink.

III. Temperance and the Foundations of Moral Government

Following Rush’s lead, the American temperance movement began as a scattered, disorganized mass of local groups that sought to stamp out alcohol consumption and related moral problems. After Rush’s 1785 pamphlet helped galvanize the temperance cause, during the nineteenth century hundreds of local temperance organizations popped up throughout America. The movement, however, lacked central organization; but by the 1830s, a dedicated team of traveling orator-organizers was able to unify many of these groups and bring them under the banner of the United States Temperance Union (USTU). Although the temperance cause was popular and the USTU quickly registered over a million members, women—who made up the bulk of the movement’s activists—were not eligible for leadership positions within the USTU. Even Susan B. Anthony, who was a prominent temperance activist and
leader of the USTU affiliate Daughters of Temperance, was famously prevented from speaking at a temperance convention in 1852: “the sisters,” she was informed, “were not invited there to speak but to listen and learn” (see Catt 2004, 22). In traditional temperance organizations that were dominated by men, women found themselves surrounded by speech yet unable to speak. Thus as the USTU began to gravitate more and more toward lobbying and legislative efforts, women became increasingly alienated. For a number of reasons—especially because women were not eligible to vote in U.S. elections—many women decided that other strategies suited them better than electoral politics. As Ruth Rosen describes, for many women temperance activists, the demand for legally regulating alcohol consumption and prostitution was a pernicious form of “masculine thinking” (Rosen 1982, 12). Thus the pulpit, the march, the scientific journal, the public confrontation, and even the hatchet were decided to be better activist technologies than the voting booth. According to Judith Walkowitz, these campaigns owed much of their success to the fact that they “successfully aroused female anger, stimulated grass-roots organizations, and mobilized women not previously brought into the political arena” (1980, 123).

A number of these female temperance activists decided to found their own organizations in which they could exercise their speech power and institute these strategic changes that would allow them to take a more participatory role. As a turn away from the male-dominated electoralism of the USTU, a number of women founded the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) in 1870. The WCTU, which was formed to carry out “moral surveillance duties” (Bolt 1993, 227), held its first national convention in Cleveland on November 18, 1874. All in all, more than 300 visitors from sixteen states travelled to
Cleveland for this inaugural conference. Men, although allowed to attend meetings, were deemed “guests” of the WCTU and were not invited to vote, run for office, or participate in official WCTU debates. By choosing to act beyond the reach of civic authority—and by excluding men, a decision that in effect foreclosed the possibility of participating directly in electoral politics—the WCTU became active in the grassroots faction in the temperance cause. During the early conventions of the WCTU, many members demanded referenda about the utility of the ballot; but during the oral votes they were drowned out by hundreds of activist singing hymns (Blocker 1995, 463).

While many of their male counterparts were creating the Prohibition Party and infiltrating local civic organizations, groups like the WCTU focused on public demonstrations and outreach in the homes, the churches, and the streets. Many of these early temperance activists declared their desire to operate outside the confines of state power, identifying their efforts with cautious, persistent civic persuasion rather than electoral politics or legal advocacy. As early temperance activist Samuel Kirkland Lothrop declared in 1831: “Our object is a great moral reform. . . . In the further prosecution of this enterprise [the temperance movement], we must rely on moral means, and not on the arm of the law or the authority of the civil power” (1835, 28–9). Even though a number of local governments were actively policing vice—outlawing the mailing of pornography and lewd materials, for example, and restricting the operations of bars and saloons—the WCTU and other citizens’ movements formed in order to take direct action against immorality in their communities. So while the WCTU and other grassroots organizations lobbied legislatures and police agencies to surveil saloons and brothels and prosecute their owners, most of their work focused on
constructing a scientific temperance discourse, cultivating a lateral policing sensibility among their volunteers and the public at large, and creating the conditions in which moral offenders could change their lifestyles.\textsuperscript{24} With much of this attention directed toward saloon culture, the temperance movement was, in an important sense, a mobile and diverse assemblage of technologies for reforming the working class. In 1911, Emma Goldman observed this struggle for class governance at the heart of the temperance movement, describing the “American hypocrisy and bigotry” that “keeps vigilant watch on the only place left to the poor man” (1996, 197). Indeed, Rush took pains to describe “the different employments, situations, and conditions of the body and mind, which predispose to the love of those liquors, and to accompany them with directions to prevent persons being ignorantly and undesignedly seduced into the habitual and destructive use of them” (1823, 20). Whereas alcohol made the worker unpredictable, slow, violent, and rash, Rush laid out a diet that was “happily calculated to obviate the debility induced upon the body by constant labour” and “impart[ed] durable strength to every part of the system” (21). The saloon provided the temperance movement with a laboratory in which to target its largely working class clientele with diverse corrective methods, a strategy that Colin Gordon describes as an effort to quell “the danger represented by the indiscipline” and “asocial autonomy” of the working class: “Urgent efforts are addressed to the reconstruction of the population of the poor according to a model of collective economic citizenship: the social incorporation of the working class as an element of the body politic” (1991, 31; also see Bennett 1998, 87–155).

The WCTU and its temperance comrades policed the dangerous elements of the working class by complementing surveillance with various methods of corrective outreach, a
strategy that was clearly laid out in the 1888 annual president’s address given by Mary Torrans Lathrap. Describing her vision for the work of the WCTU, she began: “In the old days of Switzerland, sentinels were stationed along the mountain tops to watch the approach of enemies, and when danger was near, to light the beacon fires. When these flashed out from peak to peak, the brave Switzers went forth to the defense of their country . . . . Sisters, the enemy is at our door, light the beacon and keep it aglow” (1895, 367–8). Lathrap urged her sisters in the WCTU to adopt this vigilance in their fight against the alcohol peddlers, drunks, and prostitutes who threatened the moral fabric of their communities. According to Lathrap, the women of the WCTU were to act as sentinels keeping an eye out for enemies at the gates. Yet their task was not limited to surveillance: for her, surveillance is simply a single element in an overall strategy of moral government. Many contemporary moral policing groups, like the Anti-Saloon League (ASL), followed Lathrap and the WCTU by adopting strategies that encompassed these two primary activities: everywhere the ASL was active, it kept one local resident responsible for “agitation” and another responsible for gathering information about immoralities (Kerr 1980, 44). Thus while on the one hand the temperance movement developed surveillance-based policing methods for the discovery, analysis, and suppression of vice, on the other hand it carried out various practices to govern the conduct of immoral individuals—i.e., the working class—including citizenship instruction, face-to-face recruitment, moral instruction, demonstrations and marches, and other rhetorical action, some of it deliberative and some of it based in violence. As this diversity suggests, there was little consensus as to how the immoral were to be governed: factions within the temperance movement arose, as leaders were divided over which of Rush’s strategies to follow. While
some preferred his liberal methods of “moral suasion,” others decided that his more aggressive methods were the answer to interlocking moral threats like alcoholism, prostitution, and the disfranchisement of women. These competing formations of persuasion and governance—with one faction emphasizing the virtue of patient moral instruction, and the other insisting on strategies of shock, intimidation, and violence—would structure the ups and downs of American temperance activism throughout the nineteenth century.

IV. Surveillance, Rhetoric, and Science

“Now one and then another of the ancient wrongs and uncouth customs which have been so long familiar as to seem inevitable, rise to the moral consciousness of a passing generation; first for uneasy contemplation and then for gallant correction” (Jane Addams 1912, 218–9).

“The first task of the doctor is therefore political: the struggle against disease must begin with a war against bad government. Man will be totally and definitively cured only if he is first liberated.”

Michel Foucault (1975, 33)

“A normalizing society needs its dangerous others against whom to mobilize.”

Halit Mustafa Tagma (2009, 429)

Despite this division over how alcohol abuse should be morally governed, the temperance movement was largely united in its foundation in scientific temperance. Of course, scientific knowledge has long provided a cornerstone for the governance of morality. Following Foucault in emphasizing the co-constitutive relationship of the epistemological and the political, Colin Gordon has described what he refers to as the “mutual enwrapping,
interaction and interdependence of power and knowledge” (1990, 233). In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault sets out to analyze political technologies and the human sciences as a “single process of ‘epistemologico-juridical’ formation” (1977, 23). In the case of penal history, Foucault writes that the exercise of punitive power is tightly intertwined with penal rationalities that are developed with expert discourses: “A corpus of knowledge, techniques, ‘scientific’ discourses is formed and becomes entangled with the practice of the power to punish” (1977, 23). For Foucault, then, power/knowledge is an inextricable series that emphasizes the “entangled” relationship of the human sciences, governmental rationalities, and the fields of practice through which this knowledge finds political expression. The characteristics of a population, therefore, are isolated, studied, described, and rendered into information: a population’s birthrates, susceptibilities to disease, and so on are quantified and generalized. That information is then made governable through various political interventions. For example, alcohol abuse will be observed for its genesis and physical effects; once those characteristics have been isolated, moral interventions aimed at decreasing alcohol abuse will be devised and carried out.

The creation of this science lay at the heart of the temperance cause, as WCTU leader Mary H. Hunt declared in her Congressional testimony of 1898: “There is no such thing as moral question without a basis of fact that is the science of the question. These are not the days of dogmatic morality. Modern morality teaches the reasons for the right, shows why, and thus ‘strengthens the moral nature’” (Hunt 1898, 738). The governance of alcohol abuse, therefore, required much more than simple appeals to morality. From its outset, the temperance movement relied on the construction of scientific knowledges that validated and
fueled the moral imagination of its advocates As Ronald Greene has recognized, liberal
governmentality “necessitated the circulation of expert knowledge . . . so that populations
might govern themselves with limited state intervention” (2005, 31). Accordingly, the
WCTU’s “Do Everything” motto and its networked organization encouraged the building
and circulation of knowledge: in addition to developing special divisions to address
prisoners, foreign workers, southerners, young women, kindergartners, and soldiers and
sailors, the WCTU created the division of “Scientific Instruction.” This division, in fact, was
an essential part of the WCTU’s policing effort, as it provided a basis in knowledge that
allowed its volunteers to reach out to prostitutes, alcoholics, and other impressionable or at-
risk groups from the working class. In this sense, the scientific discourse of the temperance
movement formed a rhetoric of the dangerous individual: it materialized the alcohol abuser
as a danger, defined his features, categorized him vis-à-vis normal individuals, and
articulated his deviance to a matrix of kindred immoralities. In 1885 this scientific instruction
work was such a priority for the WCTU that, in the minutes for its national meeting in
Philadelphia, twenty-six pages were devoted to recording the plans and accomplishments of
the Scientific Instruction division. This was far more than the organizations’ other divisions
received. The second most-discussed divisions—the Juvenile Work and Young Woman’s
Work divisions—each earned only nine pages (1885, 13–4). Indeed, the WCTU put such
emphasis on temperance instruction because, according to the division’s official history, the
“personal prohibition of the mass of people . . . . can be most easily and universally
accomplished by teaching the children of our land through the schools the truth about the
nature of these substances and the peril of beginning to use them at all” (Hunt 1892, v).
Scientific temperance instruction, then, was based upon the dual procedures of representing and intervening, as it required knowledge-building and knowledge activism.

Using laboratory science and street investigations, the WCTU and its allies in the temperance cause began to earnestly construct this temperance science in the late nineteenth century. A number of turn-of-the-century research physicians, including John Harvey Kellogg and John James Ridge, were pioneers in this work and provided the WCTU and other temperance advocates with a foundation in contemporary science. The temperance movement was very energetic in its production and promotion of this research: not only did they publish school textbooks to supply the temperance curriculum that they succeeded in introducing to schools, in 1876 they founded an academic journal, the Quarterly Journal of Inebriety, that provided a professional foundation for their theories of alcohol’s effects and its ties to immorality. The practice of this pre-disciplinary temperance science provides a compelling occasion for rethinking the relationship between surveillance and rhetoric. While research in the human sciences has long been based primarily on the surveillance of human subjects in the laboratory and other settings, the pre-disciplinary observations of WCTU’s activists and researchers show how a mix of specialized and undisciplined methods of lateral surveillance were used to build knowledge about the physical and social effects of alcohol use. This knowledge was then disseminated through academic and popular channels in order to govern the lives of diverse sectors of the population, including alcoholics, students, saloon keepers, mothers, teachers, and WCTU activists.

Rush’s classic work does not show clear evidence that he carried out clinical examinations of patients. Much of his evidence, in fact, appears to be derived from amateur
lateral surveillance, as he reports to have “seen” various physical reactions and cures to alcohol use. This form of pre-disciplinary medical surveillance remained important to the construction of temperance science, as schoolteacher Mary L. Hunt, superintendent of the WCTU in the 1880s, describes in her work on the WCTU’s Scientific Instruction division. In addition to being a “close and careful student” of scientific reports on alcohol’s effects, in 1892 Hunt wrote that her “constant pilgrimages to all parts of the country furnished the opportunity to observe all classes and study the popular fallacies and bad hygienic living underlying the drink habits as they exist among our varied populations” (1892, 10). Upon viewing those habits, Hunt would record her observations in order to report them to her colleagues in an attempt to better refine their understanding of alcohol: “In numerous notebooks these fallacies and errors were recorded with the statement against each, —‘Get the truth about this put into the textbooks’” (Hunt 1892, 10). For the WCTU, this sort of lateral surveillance became an essential method of their governmental program, as it allowed for lay activists to observe and record the behaviors that surrounded them on the streets.

At about this same time, other pioneers in temperance science, like Sir Benjamin Ward Richardson, resorted to the methods of surveillance that were becoming prominent in the human sciences. For example, in the 1870s and 80s, Richardson gathered human subjects in a laboratory space, watching them after they inhaled and drank various forms of alcohol, including wine, absinthe, and liquors. He made extensive notes, closely watching the change in their skin coloration, their growing need for alcohol after months of consumption, and how they physically deteriorate over time (see Richardson 1880). Yet Richardson—like most other scientists who were studying alcohol in the later nineteenth century—was not a
temperance activist, and he did not enter into any political or moral debates about alcohol use. It remained for the WCTU, then, to use the disciplinary observations of the scientific community to intervene in the conduct of American communities. Much of the work accomplished by the WCTU’s Scientific Instruction Division, in fact, was tracing out the moral consequences of this alcohol science. The *Quarterly Journal of Inebriety (QJI)*, which provided the WCTU’s own politically grounded scientific research, was filled with articles that possessed a moralizing flair. The *QJI* of January 1905, for example, featured articles entitled: “Alcohol as a Factor in Rendering Mothers Incapable of Nursing Their Children,” “Either or Neither? A Note on the Treatment of Inebriety,” “Things that Make Inebriates,” and “The Reformation of Inebriates.” This governmental, moralizing sensibility brings to mind the observations of Dr. Rush, who lamented that alcohol use could lead to “certain immodest actions” in women. This immodesty, according to Rush, “sometimes appears in women, who, when sober, are uniformly remarkable for chaste and decent manners” (1823, 6). Temperance science, even at this early stage of representation, was infused with a political imperative that impacted the problems to be examined, the intelligibility of observed phenomena, and the articulation of these phenomena to fields of moral praxis. The political tinge of this research of this research, in fact, became one of its distinctive characteristics: as the above article titles suggest, much of the research carried out in *QJI* endeavored to discover the moral in the medical.25 Through these institutionalized processes of representation, the WCTU marked a threshold of abnormality that constituted the legitimate space of moral praxis. Those who lay outside the bounds of that moral community were thus rendered necessary objects of intervention.
The information covered in *QJI*, therefore, was imagined to be useful beyond the bounds of the scientific community. The movement was developing a science, they argued, that would educate the population to make informed decisions about the impact of alcohol on the bodies and social habits of citizens. The WCTU thus recognized the political utility of this knowledge, and they focused on disseminating it in broader public venues. Much of this effort centered on promoting temperance instruction among vulnerable populations—children, especially, were targets of the WCTU’s scientific outreach (see Erickson 1988). The WCTU produced their own textbooks and worked to have these books distributed to schools throughout the nation. This was one of the WCTU’s most successful campaigns: by 1889, twenty-seven states had adopted their temperance curricula; by 1901, twenty-two million American children were using them (McClary 1984, 19). To ensure that publishers complied, they sent them a list of the “articles of faith” of the WCTU’s Scientific Instruction division: “Children should have the latest science concerning the dangerous and hurtful qualities of alcohol used in any degree, and the peril of forming the habit of its use.” This essential work, Hunt argued, will ensure the reproduction of the temperance cause: “temperance children will make temperance parents” (1892, 8).

These reproductive logics appear to have won out in educational policy. As Clayton J. Mosher and Scott Akins (2007) point out, the WCTU’s efforts seeped into American public school tradition, as formal federal programs like DARE evince. The Watch and Ward Society, a later New England organization which—like the WCTU—was dedicated to fighting alcohol, prostitution, pornography, and other immoralities, found that immunological interventions like widespread temperance instruction could prevent the
spread of unwanted activities. In its 1906 Annual Report, the Watch and Ward Society demonstrated its faith in the intimate governmental relationship between knowledge-building and political praxis, between representation and intervention. Proposing a strategy that combined scientific research with public outreach, the Watch and Ward Society reflected:

Now, in preventive medicine one great means of improvement has been registration of diseases, registration of births and deaths, the public reporting of diseases. . . . This public reporting and registration of disease is one of the great improvements of the day, partly procured by the forces of preventive medicine and largely used by them. We want similar help with regard to the moral evils with which this Society deals. We want publicity, just like the publicity which the Massachusetts Board of Health gives to epidemics or sporadic cases of diseases. Publicity, public discussion are necessary to the cure. . . . There is no case in the world of a fundamental cure of any moral evil or public sin which was not preceded by public discussion and the creation of a public sentiment that the sin ought to be prevented. (1911, 41)

For the Watch and Ward Society as well as other temperance organizations like the WCTU, knowledge-building had to be supplemented with public interventions—representation had to be coupled with intervention. For these groups, not only should statistics and conclusions be recorded, but they should be communicated as widely as possible to the public. Thus the success of government, as Davi Johnson argues, is partially conditioned and carried out by a growing “literacy” and fluency”—“habits of intelligibility that are fostered across a diffuse social network” (2008, 346). Publicity gives these representations a material life, as citizens
come to reflect on and correct themselves and others vis-à-vis that knowledge forged by the complementary technologies of rhetoric and surveillance. This basis in knowledge was crucial to the temperance cause, foremost because it was essential to the invention of the alcohol problem in the first place. When tracing the genealogies of these morally charged phenomena and their basis in knowledge enterprises, we should be careful to ask a number of questions about their broader political utility. As Jeremy Packer has urged, “When one critically approaches any social problem, a number of potential questions need to be answered. For instance: What is the problem? How do we know it exists? Who is telling us it exists? Who is trying to solve the problem and in what ways? The question at hand essentially concerns power/knowledge relationships” (2008, 236). This critical awareness, as Packer points out, reveals the role of moral entrepreneurs in animating and stabilizing the relationship between political rationalities, governmental technologies, and knowledge enterprises.

V. “Interesting Ourselves in What Others Do”: Lateral Surveillance

“How shall we keep temperance prominent? . . . [By] interesting ourselves in what others do, and thus interesting them in what we do.”

–Esther T. Housh, President of the Vermont WCTU (1891, 26)

The temperance movement’s drive to morally police the population spawned a whole series of surveillance tasks, most of which were carried out for reasons other than scientific observation. As Alison Marie Parker points out, “WCTU members kept a close watch on all new cultural developments” (1997, 11). This included a number of surveillance activities: for
example, the WCTU would carry out theater surveillance, whereby activists would attend shows to ensure that acting troupes were abiding by obscenity standards. Local fairs were also targets of WCTU moral policing, where activists would roam the crowds and enforce public drunkenness statutes. Temperance activists also made a habit of watching picnics where young men and women intermingled, dance houses, and even vacation homes and lake houses where youth would gather without chaperones (Connelly 2011, 17). “The crusade”—how WCTU members and their opponents referred to their policing activities—was even brought into shady and dangerous parts of the community: as Jan MacKell writes, “The WCTU . . . had actually been striking terror in the hearts of gamblers, prostitutes, and drinking men for some time. . . . Their members made it their mission to make it ‘hot’ for gamblers and saloon owners until the latter gave in and either quit their antics or left town” (2003, 144). Indeed, the turn of the century temperance movement brought heat to many of its enemies, carrying out a surveillance regimen that included the investigation of risky public spaces; the oversight of schools, businesses, and legislatures; and the following and surveillance of target individuals as they carried out their everyday lives.

One of the WCTU’s most essential tactics was its surveillance of bars and saloons. The WCTU scoured select neighborhoods to ensure that no bootleggers were selling liquor, and that no one was drunkenly roaming the streets. Their activists would also enter legal drinking establishments in order to ensure that they were obeying regulations—e.g., to make sure that they were not selling on Sundays, that they did not sell after hours, and that they were not selling to children. One of their most provocative tactics was the use of a curfew bell: activists would ring a curfew bell in order to clear the streets, thus making it easier to
detect drinkers at late night saloons (Cook 1995, 134). The WCTU also gathered intelligence at saloons and other public spaces. By monitoring the everyday business of saloons, activists were able to organize strict boycotts against those who patronized or supported them (Stevenson 1907, 8). In addition, the WCTU devised creative surveillance practices aimed at preventing the construction of saloons: activists were dispatched to business licensing agencies, so that they could inform the WCTU leadership of when an alcohol server’s license was being sought. The WCTU would then immediately rent the property in order to preempt its use as a drinking establishment. Schools, too, were a target for temperance surveillance: WCTU activists frequented schools in order to ensure that their scientific instruction measures were being enforced. The surveillance of the WCTU even extended to the courthouse—where activists would take down the names of persons cited for drunk and disorderly behavior (see Cook 1995, 132–3)—and to the legislative chamber, where activists would make note of who refused to stand up against social menaces (Rudy 2011, 72.)

These surveillance tactics, however, were not confined to the movement’s fight against alcohol: temperance activists—such as the WCTU’s Social Purity division, and New England’s Watch and Ward Society—devoted a great deal of time to investigating the identities and habits of local prostitutes and their handlers. The WCTU in particular would assign its members to watch certain locales where women were drawn toward alcohol, sex, and other temptations, and they would approach the offenders and attempt to empower them by teaching them the arts of appropriate feminine citizenship. The WCTU’s ranks thus grew as former prostitutes came to stand beside bourgeois Protestant women as they fulfilled their own citizenship duties by surveilling other women who were wasting their potential to
become responsible feminine subjects. These activists also turned their attention to employment agencies, so that houses of prostitution could not recruit women for what was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries called the “white slave traffic” (see Hunt 1999). To fight this traffic, innumerable organizations flowered across the country to complement the policing efforts of the WCTU: New York City’s legendary Committee of Fifteen, for example, used undercover lateral surveillance to infiltrate vice clubs and break up houses of prostitution, as did other moral policing groups (Fronc 2009, 34–5).

The movement also developed a habit of surveilling military bases and suspected brothels. Jane Addams, the prominent suffragist and temperance activist who was the first American woman to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, described the moral indignations caused by the “glamour which always surrounds the soldier” (1912, 200; also see Pivar 1973, 136). Addams recounts how temperance activists would scout local military bases in order to prevent young women from partying with soldiers. Activists were also dispatched to watch the homes of young girls who were suspected of sneaking out of their houses at night. According to Addams, “A thorough investigation disclosed not only an enormous increase of business in the restricted districts, . . . [but also that] one young girl was seen by an investigator in the late evening hurrying away from the camp. . . . These large bodies of men, deprived of domestic life, have always afforded centres in which contempt for the chastity of women has been fostered” (1912, 200–1).

This moral policing, however, did not make the temperance movement universally appreciated. Just as many contemporary scientists had dismissed temperance science (e.g., see Medical Age 1884), local populations took umbrage at the movement’s heavy-handed
moralizing. The military, for example, complained about the policing of their bases, calling it “civilian interference” (Addams 1912, 201). In fact, WCTU activists were often attacked for their surveillance activities: one was even killed after publicizing the names of local bootleggers (see Kenneth Rose 1996, 182). Yet the temperance community responded to the protests of their detractors, bemoaning the fact that their lateral policing had become so unpopular. One activist complained to his comrades: “Why does a detective become a ‘spotter’ the moment he attempts to convict an illegal rumseller? The word ‘spotter’ is slang, and it has become the slang of mud-slingers. Often it is used for inimical purposes, no doubt, and is itself an appeal to prejudice . . . .We believe that the time will come when either detective work will be banished from society, or else men that try to throw a peculiar odium upon honorable detectives who are using recognized methods in their work to expose a lawbreaking rumseller, will be publicly branded as allies of that rumseller” (Massachusetts Reformatory 1901, 520). The “spotters” and crusaders of the WCTU, however, continued their diversely conducted surveillance mission. For example, the WCTU sent activists into factories and other workplaces, ensuring that bosses were living up to legal standards of wage and working conditions (Bordin 1986, 112). Their prisoner rehabilitation program, also, contributed to the reintegration of offenders. While in jail, prisoners would be sent regular letters by WCTU members, so that the activists could keep apprised of their activities while in jail and their release dates. The WCTU, then, was able to convert letters into surveillance media, and then offered prisoners a watchful eye once released. As a WCTU activist reported during their national meeting in 1885, “a committee of young ladies meets [the prisoners] at the depot, entertains and protects them, and then writes to the YWTCU
[Young Women’s Christian Temperance Union], the WCTU, or some minister at their homes, commending them to their Christian care, and by correspondence keeping watch over them” (Women’s Christian Temperance Union 1885, lxxvi). This Christian care, which provided the impetus behind much of the temperance movement’s surveillance, appeared in many styles of intervention.

VI. “A Quiet, Pervasive, Personal Influence”: Moral Suasion

The WCTU, which by the 1880s had grown to more than 27,000 members in 1,200 local unions—making it the largest women’s movement of its time—demonstrates how Progressive Era moralism found an expression in creative rhetorical politics. As Jed Dannenbaum points out, the early nineteenth-century model of women temperance activists had been dominated by “moral suasion”: “So long as the temperance movement focused on moral suasion, women could play a central role in the reform, yet never engage in activities that society considered inappropriate to their sphere” (1981, 237). The WCTU, however, provides an especially interesting case because it was able to branch out beyond these traditional suasory practices. Lathrap, who was known as an eloquent and energetic orator, outlined this multifaceted strategy by urging WCTU activists to adopt innovative, energetic outreach methods:

“Shoot lower, if you shoot to kill,” was the stifled command in a deadly battle, and the whole line of men dropped on their knees and “shot to kill.” I feel like speaking solemnly the same words to you this hour. We have been aiming at men’s heads, and the temperance reform is brilliant but cold. Let us to your
knocks, dear fellow-workers, and ‘shoot lower,’ till we find the hearts of men.

Bible readings, cottage prayer-meetings, house-to-house visitation among drinking people, jail, prison and poor-house visiting, and evangelistic services of ten days’ or two weeks’ duration, so arranged as to reach the great outlying masses that flee the churches, should be part of the work of every temperance union. It is here we may “shoot to kill.” (1895, 300)

This strategy, she declared, was aimed toward the ultimate goal of empowering men and women to find freedom through temperance: the “individual, self-governed, with brain, blood, and nerves, that are not steeped in poison” (370).

Lathrap’s gun metaphor turned out to be prescient, as the purview of temperance activism began to broaden at the turn of the century. While moral suasion—typified by conversation, stump oratory, and prayer—still formed an important core of temperance strategy in the late 1890s, many WCTU activists adopted rhetorical strategies that employed the unexpected and the uncivil, specializing in acts that converted public space into rhetorical spectacle. While several scholars have argued that the death of the WCTU’s prominent second president, Frances Willard, helped the organization transform from a tame women’s prayer group into a hardnosed activist organization, Ruth Bordin (1986, 63) demonstrates that this is an unfair characterization of Willard and the early WCTU. Although there appears to be a shift toward more engaged and innovative political action after Willard’s death in 1898, Willard’s own activist versatility—and that of her members, who were certainly a diverse lot—should not be underestimated. In any case, this versatility finds varied expressions as the WCTU grows throughout the 1880s and 90s; and as its strategies multiply,
rifts within the organization start to form as activists adopt different approaches to moral reform.

The vast majority of temperance activists, however, chose the path of moral suasion. While at times they resorted to various methods of disciplinary subject correction—such as developing a girls’ reformatory (Lathrap 1895, 299) and grouping drinkers together in close quarters free from temptation (find in document), both examples of what Mariana Valverde has called “pastoral medicine” (1998, 43–67)—the non-violent WCTU activists heavily emphasized the power of the word. This gave rise to a gradualist correction strategy, as leaders like Lathrap urged activists to “work on, ready to see the victory or die before it comes, but work patiently as if we were to be here forever” (1895, 343). They thus adopted the work of “temperance missionaries,” organizing events like prayer meetings, speeches, social evenings, literature distributions, conferences, public prayer-protests, family visitations, saloon knit-ins, and prison evangelism (Chase 1899, 10; Dannenbaum 1891, 242), as well as urging politicians and pastors to give temperance sermons (Brooklyn Temperance Union 1877, 12). As the Union Signal, the WCTU’s national magazine, reported after a successful meeting, “The power of this organization is not in aggressive methods, but in a quiet, pervasive, personal influence.”

One of the most important aspects of this “pervasive, personal influence” was the cultivation of rhetorical skills among temperance activists. As the nation’s largest women’s movement, the WCTU relied on the constitutive and unifying power of public address. Not only did they utilize national publications like the Union Signal and the Quarterly Journal of Inebriety to reinforce the organization’s unity at the national level, they also sent the
representatives across the nation to speak at local WCTU meetings. In 1891, near the height of the WCTU’s influence, President Willard reported that the organization had more than 700 preachers; and during her time as head of the WCTU, Willard herself became one of the most famous women in America largely because of the fact that she gave hundreds of speeches a year (Bordin 1896; Gifford and Slagell 2007, xxiii). This enthusiasm for rhetoric extended to the general membership, as the WCTU took pains to enculturate their activists into the rhetorical apparatus of the organization. As Carol Mattingly has pointed out, the WCTU’s oratorical education “became the largest and most effective organization for teaching women rhetorical skills in the nineteenth century” (1998, 58). Because of the Union’s mission to reach out to the public with thousands of speeches a year, this was a key activist technology for the movement. Eventually the WCTU’s rhetorical training program reached a point of rare excellence: according to Wendy Sharer, it “provided members of the WCTU with a level of expertise in political discourse and negotiation” (2004, 26).

But the tone of this rhetorical instruction suggests that rhetoric was more than a simple tool for building identification with the public: it was, just as much, a means for making up a special kind of activist. That is, instruction in public speaking was used to transform the WCTU’s activist-subjects into better citizens. Public oratory was articulated within a network of citizenship ideals, and thus it was infused with certain values of citizenship. Willard’s instructions to local WCTU leaders included the remarks: “The Holy Spirit seems better pleased to inspire the process of reflection and composition than to atone for what Miss Ophelia called ‘shiftlessness,’ by an eleventh hour inspiration. We want no scattering fire in our public utterances, but the sober second thought of your brightest and
most studious hours. . . Don’t fail to keep your wit, wisdom, and patience well to the front” (Willard 1883, 617, 621). For Willard, public speaking enlivened “the human voice divine” (618), and was thus used to “educate women of out of the silence which has stifled their beautiful gifts so long” (618). This gift of oratory, of becoming a subject who speaks with and for others, allowed women to be “aroused to a sense of responsibility as an individual factor in society, as a citizen” (Willard 1883, 482). This feeling of citizenship was fostered in unity: as Mattingly points out—and as Angela Ray (2007) has described in a different context of women’s rhetoric—these meetings and lectures produced the conditions of community solidarity as the social unity of the WCTU was forged in meetings that brought together the flock (1998, 44–9).

VII. Which Way the Citizen Army? Carrie Nation and the Question of Violence

In 1839 in Clinton, Illinois, a group of women were growing exasperated with a local saloon that refused to stop selling liquor to their alcoholic husbands. One night fifteen of the women, outfitted with axes, traveled to the saloon and began to wreak havoc on its customers and liquor stocks. After threatening the saloon’s owner, they shattered its demijohns and bottles, and smashed every liquor barrel in sight. The fifteen women were arrested and charged with trespassing, and during their day in court a young lawyer named Abraham Lincoln happened to take up their defense. Rising before the court, the future president argued,

The law of self-protection is the law of necessity, as shown when our fathers threw the tea into the Boston harbor, and in asserting their right to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. This is the defense of these women. The man who has persisted in selling whisky has had no regard for their well-being or the welfare of their husbands and sons. . . . These women, finding all moral suasion of no avail with this fellow, obvious to all tender appeal, alike regardless of their prayers and tears, in order to protect their households and promote the welfare of the community, united to suppress the nuisance . . . . They accomplished what otherwise could not have been done. (Potts 1908, 270–1)

As Lincoln’s plea suggests, the violent reaction of these temperance activists was not especially unreasonable or even unpopular in many places in nineteenth-century America. As Alan Hunt has argued, the temperance movement’s moral suasion tradition “was always in danger of lapsing into a coercive response” (1999, 100). With many temperance activists, the appeal to moral suasion survived into the twentieth century as more of a “rhetorical gesture” (100)—that is, it survived as a legitimating discourse that wrapped the sometimes coercive actions of the temperance movement in a veil of non-violence. Even the organization’s prayer-ins began to take on a violent tinge, as their volume and obtrusiveness would make saloons unbearable to customers who would leave not based on any moral reformation, but on the basis of sheer coercion.

Because of this radical undercurrent, the temperance movement was rife with disagreements over strategy. As described earlier, one of the movement’s primary rifts was between those who used electoral politics to advance the cause and those who used some form of moral suasion. While at the turn of the twentieth century the electoralists were
having some success—by 1890, six states had prohibition laws—groups like the WCTU were focusing much of their efforts on alternative politics. Yet beyond this strategic network of tactics, there was serious contention over the value of direct, violent action like that perpetrated by Abraham Lincoln’s clients in Illinois. Because most temperance activists retained the hope that citizens, “when aroused to the truth, would instantly rebel against the social evil in all its phases” (Jane Addams 1912, 7), there was an energetic push to cultivate non-violence in the movement’s activist-subjects. Yet because of the growing influence of radical women—mostly under the inspiration of Carrie Nation—this was a conflict that had to be massaged through strategies of subjectification, as struggles over the direction of the temperance movement were waged in the rhetorical instruction of activists.

The gradualism of the WCTU and other temperance organizations—such as the Anti-Saloon League (ASL)—was seen to be a hindrance by many activists. Indeed, this sentiment was widespread beyond the WCTU: Ernest H. Cherrington, who was a leader of the gradualist ASL, observed that temperance groups "to all appearances possessed a hatred of other similar organizations stronger by far than their hatred of the saloon” (Kerr 1980, 40) Noting this growing divide in the temperance cause, in 1891 prominent temperance activist Reverend Howard Crosby insisted that the two sides “must abandon theory and adopt the practical. They must so act as that they will have the majority of citizens with them. The practical mode is to attack the evils of the saloon rather than the saloon itself. If some say that the two are synonymous, they must remember that others do not think so, and it is these others that we wish to enlist on our side” (Crosby 1891, 114). Advocating the traditional tactics of the nineteenth-century temperance cause, Crosby argued that activists should stick
to educating public sentiment: “Moral suasion is the only weapon for farther advance. . . . This [strategy] will teach public opinion in the right way, and will harmonize public opinion in all rational efforts at destroying the saloon evil” (116). Noting that tens of thousands of eligible voters decline to vote in the most recent New York City elections, Crosby asserted, “Their selfishness is criminal. It is of the utmost importance that these sluggards should be awakened to a sense of their duty and responsibility. With such an army of idle reformers, the cause of reform must always suffer. We cannot have compulsory voting. It would shock our sense of liberty. But we can direct a literature at these loons, and arouse the conscience of some of them, at least, to throw off their lethargy and enter the ranks of honest citizens, who are fighting for good morals and public order” (116–7). Espousing a liberal strategy based in the traditional tactics of electoralism and moral suasion, Crosby represented those in the temperance cause who were alarmed by the more radical women who were willing to carry out the fight by any means necessary.

Despite the efforts of Crosby and other prominent members of the temperance movement, a counter-current of radical activists began committing violence on behalf of the cause. One woman in particular, Carrie Nation, cultivated a group of followers who were attracted to violent outreach methods and were accustomed to getting thrown in jail. As Nation’s “hatchetations” gained national attention, the WCTU’s national office had to defend their gradualist tactics against Nation’s provocative and surprisingly effective methods. After Carry Nation’s first husband died of alcoholism, leaving her with a young daughter, she became active in the temperance cause. In 1892, she joined the WCTU and began participating in their outreach, including prison evangelism and saloon pray-ins. These
traditional means of activism, however, soon frustrated Nation, who recalled in her autobiography that she “could see ‘the wicked waling on every side, and the vilest men exalted’” (1905, 69). Made desperate by this moral climate, in June 1900 Nation fell to her knees in prayer, calling on God to give her a practical vision for the temperance cause:

I threw myself face downward at the foot of my bed and told the Lord to use me any way to suppress the dreadful curse of liquor; that He had ways to do it, that I had done all I knew. . . . The next morning, before I awoke, I heard these words very distinctly: "Go to Kiowa, and. . . I'll stand by you." I did not hear these words as other words; there was no voice, but they seemed to be spoken in my heart. I sprang from my bed as if electrified, and knew this was directions given me, for I understood that it was God's will for me to go to Kiowa to break, or smash the saloons. (1905, 69–70)

This divine inspiration led Nation to begin her “hatchetation” mission, which called her to stamp out saloons across Kansas—a state which, although it was the first to outlaw the distribution of alcohol, still hesitated to enforce prohibition very strictly. Setting out from her house with a satchel full of “smashers”—mostly glass bottles and jagged stones—Nation rode her horse to Kiowa, the location of a saloon she had threatened the previous year.

Walking into the saloon, Nation said:

Mr. Dobson, I told you last spring . . . to close this place, and you didn't do it.
Now I have come with another remonstrance. Get out of the way. I don't want to strike you, but I am going to break tip this den of vice.” I began to throw at the mirror and the bottles below the mirror. Mr. Dobson and his companion jumped
into a corner, seemed very much terrified. From that I went to another saloon, until I had destroyed three, breaking some of the windows in the front of the building. In the last place . . . there was quite a young man behind the bar. I said to him: “Young man, come from behind that bar, your mother did not raise you for such a place.” I threw a brick at the mirror, which was a very heavy one, and it did not break, but the brick fell and broke everything in its way. I began to look around for something that would break it. I was standing by a billiard table on which there was one ball. I said: “Thank God,” and picked it up, threw it, and it made a hole in the mirror. (1905, 71)

After this attack, which would be the first of dozens, Nation mounted her horse and rode out of town. As she left she looked over her shoulder and said, "Peace on earth, good will to men” (72).

Following this successful attack, Nation began smashing saloons all across Kansas. Adding a hatchet to her satchel of smashers, Nation began referring to her saloon raids as “hatchetations.” On December 27 she destroyed a saloon in Wichita, where she was imprisoned until January 17. Four days after she was released, she and two other WCTU activists attacked two additional Wichita saloons before moving to Enterprise to smash a saloon there. On January 28, less than two weeks after she had spent a month in jail for smashing the saloon in Wichita, she managed to procure an audience with the governor of Kansas. When she implored him to enforce the state’s prohibition laws and shut down the saloons, Governor William E. Stanley rebuked her for her “methods” and sent her on her way (American Monthly Review 1901, 260). Governor Stanley, however, was not the only person
who disapproved of Nation’s outreach style: while the WCTU lukewarmly embraced her, inviting her to conventions and allowing her to participate in local chapters, they insisted upon distancing themselves from her hatchetations.

Defending her violent actions, Nation asserted the futility of public address as a political technique: “When I first began my lectures I was not taken seriously by the people. . . . I feel much relieved to get into more definite work, rather than going hither and thither completing nothing substantial” (1905, 133, 172). This “definite work” laid the immediate groundwork for changing people’s lives, in contrast to the electoralists, for example, whose insistence on “respectable” lobbying efforts and moral suasion simply “perpetuate the saloon” (171). Thus when Carrie used her voice, she eschewed the deliberative tactics of her liberal sisters in the WCTU. She recalled, for instance, how during a trip to the House of Representatives in Washington she was forced by the circumstances to use speech rather than the hatchet. In her memoirs Carrie recalled, “I wanted to do some ‘Hatchetation,’ that not being possible, I thought I would do some agitation. I took a position in a lobby near a door. I rose to my feet, and with a volume of voice that was distinctly heard all over the halls I cried aloud: ‘Treason, anarchy and conspiracy! Discuss these!’ I knew that I would be put out, but I selected these three words to call the attention to the fact that these were more necessary to be discussed than any other subjects” (104). When Nation rose to use her voice, she had different assumptions about the utility of deliberative rhetoric and the liberal democratic process. While the congressmen’s use of language served to simply cover over and perpetuate moral evils—as they wasted their language on inconsequential topics—Nation wanted them to face the essential problems lying before them: “Treason, anarchy and
conspiracy! Discuss these!” (136). To bring these things to the attention and rhetorical agenda of the public, the “Nation Brigade,” as they were called in the press, carried out the violent work that simply shortened the temporal promise of social change sought by the WCTU’s liberal faction. While the liberals in the WCTU shared Nation’s goal of an alcohol-free and morally clean America, it was simply their technologies of reform that differed.

These differences in governmental strategy generated a locus of controversy that has continued to this day. Predictably, during her lifetime Nation’s violence was seen to be an exaggerated flaw of her gender: she was frequently dismissed as a hysterical, demented, diseased, and psychotic old woman (see Grace 2001, 6). Some responses to Nation were more sophisticated, placing her “crooked” activism within a genuine struggle over the legitimate means of social change: "We all make mistakes and . . . Sister Nation, we all know, tries to do right, and even if she did some crooked things, all the rest of us do the same thing" (see Nation 1905, 74). Indeed, as Fran Grace has pointed out, “we must . . . reckon with Nation’s claim that she chose violence because she lacked political power; she had tried every other avenue and no one in the ‘establishment’ listened. She threw rocks and swung a hatchet because she was not allowed to vote on a matter for which she felt a definite passion. Exclusion does have consequences. At times these consequences are violent” (2001, xii). But continuing, Grace pays homage to the same hierarchy of privileged citizenship practices that marginalized Nation within the WCTU: “I believe her crusades teach us that self-righteous imposition fractures rather than improves social relationships. Dialogue surely is better than violence” (xii). While Grace and her contemporaries may very well be right—that deliberation is better than violence—this dichotomy provides important insight into the
values that inflect governmental rationalities in liberal democracies, as well as into the ways in which these rationalities serve to reproduce the social conditions in which “acceptable,” liberal forms of lateral policing can thrive. Merely opposing the violence of Carrie Nation on the principle of rhetorical deliberation covered over the structural problems that rendered the “drinking classes”—i.e., the working class—subject to the constant surveillance and deliberative correction by the moral policemen and women of the temperance movement.

VIII. Conclusion: Immunity and the Citizen-Soldier

“We all remember that famous utterance of a great statesman in America who said: ‘Where liberty is, there is my country.’ It is time for a new motto, that shall mean to this age what that did in a struggle now fought out to its inevitable and righteous end. Let us inscribe on our white banner, ‘Wherever the liquor power is marshaled, there is our battlefield.’”

Women’s Christian Temperance Union (1885, 91)

“Citizenship not only requires one to obey the law but must see that others do so also.”

Carrie Nation (1905, 142)

This chapter has looked at the lateral policing of morality during the American temperance movement in order to demonstrate the interrelationship of surveillance and rhetoric as complementary technologies of government. After Dr. Benjamin Rush invented the discourse of alcoholism and set out modes for its governance, the temperance movement advanced a number of the “dreams and schemes” that first colored his imagination. First, they constructed a temperance science that relied on the surveillance of human subjects and the representation of these observations in various rhetorical forms, such as notes, charts, and
publications. Second, they undertook a coordinated strategy of lateral surveillance by which activists gathered intelligence about the habits of their peers. Third, upon this edifice of knowledge, activists carried out two primary forms of rhetorical intervention, moral suasion and violent confrontation. Taken together, these sections of the chapter sought to demonstrate how surveillance and rhetoric form a technological matrix not only for governing risky populations, but also for governing the conduct of the activists who carry out that redemptive work—that is, in certain governmental configurations the citizen-spy becomes an important and valuable modality of citizenship.

Yet thus far I have been unable to trace out an important rationality that animated the development of this lateral policing culture. In seeking to carry out a great moral cleansing, lateral policing groups like the WCTU carried out a biopolitical struggle to eliminate internal enemies that threatened to infect the entire social body if not eradicated. This involved primarily two tactics: constituting the moral threat as an internal enemy that had to be purged by immunological technologies of government, and a militarization of their mission, rationalities, and organization. This bio-politicization of the movement’s moral struggle characterized both of its factions, liberal and radical, providing them with a unity that they lacked in governmental technique. Envisioning the temperance struggle as a biopolitical struggle illustrates how logics of epidemic and immunity fueled (and often continue to fuel) moral policing efforts, as activists are enculturated into various norms of fighting for a radically cleansed moral homogeneity (see Bennett 2009).

I have already suggested how a logic of epidemic fueled early concerns about alcohol abuse. Benjamin Rush and many of his followers in the temperance crusade posited alcohol
as the central node in an expansive network of immoralities, making extraordinary inductive leaps in an attempt to forge logical links across problematized phenomena. Jeffrey Weeks argues that the term “social disease” suggests a widespread anxiety about the social implications of immoralities like prostitution, contributing to a fear that “was becoming part of a general social anxiety” (Weeks 1989, 85). This led the WCTU to adopt its “Do Everything” strategy, which Katharine Lent Stevenson described in this way: “our organization deals with the liquor traffic and kindred evils from the viewpoint of its declared principles—hence its horizon is wide and always widening. Recognizing the interdependence and interaction of all reforms . . ., we realize that the power which works most effectively for righteousness is that which definitely relates itself to the whole field of humanitarian endeavor” (Stevenson 1907, 106). Because contagious disease provided a grid of intelligibility for understanding and fighting these viral immoralities, an urgency of purpose gripped the temperance movement. Such logics of epidemic spread beyond the WCTU, as these vocabularies, immoralities, and objects of suspicion become standardized across lateral policing organizations. This is why there is much to learn from “Do Everything” moral policing movements like the WCTU and the ASL: looking at groups with a narrower crusading focus prevents one from seeing the ways in which the various strands of immorality (primarily prostitution and alcoholism, but also narcotics abuse, gambling, pornography, masturbation, etc.) get tied together as symptoms of a basic socio-moral malady. Carrie Nation, for example, bared this immunological rationality when justifying the violence of her hatchetations: “Today the country is ringing with the cry of political bribery, boodle and official corruption, from the highest to the lowest. The rum traffic is the principal
factor in demoralizing and destroying the dignity, honor and integrity of civic life. It is the
insidious foe that is hatching and nursing crime” (1905, 98). As the mother of vice, poverty,
and corruption, alcohol use was the primary infection of which the social body simply had to
rid itself: “We amputate the arm to save the life. . . . We amputate the diseased limb with a
knife, we pull the aching tooth with an instrument of steel. Why? In order to save. Just so, the
people are asleep, while our precious ones are in danger of being engulfed in ruin. The
smashing is a danger signal, and I kept it up, to prevent the people from relaxing into
indifference” (1905, 128, 113).

Nation’s remarks provide insight into the rationalities that fueled her actions and
those of her sisters and brothers in the movement: their fight against epidemic morality was
also a fight against moral indifference. That is, the fight against this rampant and contagious
immorality demanded the stimulation of a moral immune response—of the constant
recruitment of new souls into the camps of the righteous, into what Fanny Chase called “the
White Ribbon army of the Lord” (Chase 1899, 6). The epidemic nature of the moral threat
required a steady stream of responsibilized activists to bolster the ranks of the “citizen
soldiery” (Willard 1883, 398). The temperance movement, in other words, was characterized
by an urgency to constantly correct the immoral and recruit new citizens into the lateral
policing cause. This rationality gives rise to a militaristic sensibility in the movement’s
material and discursive formations, as the fight to locate and normalize the unfit assumes a
façade of biopolitical warfare for the cleansing and protection of the poisoned social body.

From its inception, the everyday tasks of the WCTU’s were cultivated from a
militaristic sensibility. Willard liked to proclaim that when the WCTU “discovered a woman
with a mission, it laid hold upon her, took her in and straightaway sent her out with a
commission” (Willard 1883, 107). That is, the WCTU organized the passions and practices of
temperance activists into a hierarchical unity that operated and evolved under a militaristic
self-conception. Volunteers thus lost the autonomy of their individual moral missions and
soon found themselves implicated in a cooperative structure that subsumed the designs and
goals of the individual activist. For WCTU leaders like Katharine Lent Stevenson, the
organization’s “Do-Everything” strategy was best understood as a mission to attack the
enemy on all fronts and with all weapons at its disposal: the WCTU “takes and holds every
vantage ground, invades every realm, bombards every fort in possession of the enemy”
(Stevenson 1907, 107). Similarly, Fanny Chase spoke of the importance of imagining the
temperance task as an enterprise of war, particularly for its utility in forging organizational
unity and in maintaining vigilance for the cause: “This story of long forced marches on short
rations; of going into battle with scant supplies of ammunition; of lonely night watches and
the loss of comrades, already encamped upon ‘fame’s eternal camping grounds,’ is of value
to both toil worn veteran and young recruit” (Chase 1899, 6). The “loyal troops” (Willard
1883, 607) of the temperance movement were deposited into a narrative horizon of an
“eternal” and glorious war, as their struggles were given the veneer of a timeless mission
against evil.

The militarization of the temperance movement also included a reorganization of its
activists’ collaborative action, particularly their interpersonal habits and their material
proximity to other activists. WCTU activists found themselves operating within relatively
autonomous “units” or “divisions,” under orders of an autocratic leadership. And like the
military, the “true and loyal knights” (Willard 1883, 383) of the WCTU strove to develop a climate of operational and cultural autonomy from broader society: they developed their own schools, hospitals, and churches, aiming to create an autonomous, interior social collective that would eventually take over the larger social body of which it was a single element. To distinguish themselves from their peers, temperance activists would flaunt their ambivalent externality by wearing pens, badges, medals, ribbons, and uniforms (Sharon Anne Cook 1995, 136). This assertion of their ambivalent and ultimately hostile exteriority was expressed in the frequent organization of temperance marches, in which singing activists would don uniforms and badges, carry flags and banners, and march and cheer through the streets led by a band (Willard 1883, 415). When recounting the deeds of the Illinois WCTU, Willard’s artistically rendered history shows evidence of the militaristic grid of intelligibility that colored the way she envisioned and organized the activist bodies of her temperance army:

In long procession thy legions go marching . . . , those brave, true-hearted warriors of God. . . . See the rallying clans of the reformed men, always our chivalric guard of honor, as they fall into line, with ribbons blue and red, singing “Rally round the flag, boys, rally once again.” See the heavy columns of artillery, the noble legion of editors Christian and editors secular, the Gatling guns of the metropolitan press leading the grand advance! . . . Here, with steps so rapid they can hardly grade them to the company’s music, march the businessmen of Chicago, who provided the sinews of war for our campaign; the Swedes of the Nord Seit; the miners of Streator, the moral
The aristocracy of Peoria. . . . There are ninety thousand women in this procession, the advanced guard of an army which is gathering from every State, and the music of their marching feet is keyed to the tune of “Home Sweet Home.”

(1883, 381–2)

Through marches, songs, and other public action, Willard’s temperance army enacted their militaristic unity before the greater social body that was at once their enemy and their recruiting ground. These activities provided the movement with a material unity of practice that transcended the endless differences that otherwise separated them: their religion, sex, nationality, and language ceased to trump their participation in the movement’s righteous war, which provided the primary condition of their unity.

The temperance movement’s declaration and conduct of widespread moral warfare enacted a militarized fracture of the social body. This fracture offers important lessons about the relationship between citizenship and responsibility in moral policing organizations. The widespread lateral policing that took place in the temperance movement relied on a responsibilization of the citizenry—that is, it aroused a moral responsibility within a network of private individuals, the vast majority of whom were volunteers. A special inclination had to be cultivated in these individuals so that they might conduct themselves in a manner conducive to the goals and strategies of the temperance cause. This required a re-tooling of responsibility structures, such that citizenship became a moral rather than simply a civic enterprise. That is, to the extent that the temperance movement relied on civic loyalties for its recruitment, responsibilization, and sustenance, those loyalties were filtered through a foundational moral imperative from which civic entities derived their legitimacy. Thus
citizenship is deprived of its logics of inheritance—deprived, therefore, of its reliance on national borders, an ethnic or national heritage, or an abstract universalism—and is instead materialized in immunological practice.\textsuperscript{28} The individual fulfills his or her citizenship through the various immunological rituals that constitute and are demanded by this field of practice.

The aspirations of the temperance movement ultimately extended beyond the eradication of drunkenness and its associated moral evils. Its ambitions lay instead in a much grander normalization that transcended the legislative jurisdiction of any nation: according to Katharine Lent Stevenson, the “Christian Citizen” of the temperance movement “will see, as the goal of the ultimate endeavor of all the nations, everywhere, the time when such wrongs shall no longer exist, but when men shall live together as children of a common Father in the ties of a common brotherhood” (World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union 1897, 183). The drive to secure this common brotherhood, this homogeneous familial imaginary, impelled the lateral policing project of the WCTU and many of its kindred organizations. Its redefinition of social responsibility ties, then, suggests the broader utility of citizenship in liberal governmentality. The moral, practice-oriented citizenship forwarded by the WCTU strove to supersede and even fracture civic bonds. Like Carrie Nation, many moral activists feel a great deal of pride in enacting their rituals of citizenship beyond the legal sanction of the state; Nation, like many moral crusaders of her—and our—time, found that the state had abandoned its moral path and therefore no longer demanded the primary loyalty of its citizens. They therefore identified with an extrajudicial conception of citizenship rooted in moral struggle. When Willard lauded the activist who was “aroused to a sense of
responsibility as an individual factor in society, as a citizen” (Willard 1883, 482), she had these demands of active citizenship in mind. Not only was this to be a “wholesome, clean, upstanding, God-fearing, American citizenship that will be capable of self-government, and self-control” (Milliken 1922, 479), but it was to be rooted in a doxa of moral warfare that demanded an immunological vigilance of its citizen-soldiers.
Chapter 5

Trayvon Martin and the Speaking Subjects of Neighborhood Watch

◆ Trayvon Martin

A little before 7PM on February 26, 2012, a seventeen-year-old high school student was returning to his father’s Sanford, Florida home after a trip to a nearby convenience store. The young man, Trayvon Martin, was visiting his father in a crime-plagued gated community called the Retreat at Twin Lakes. After buying some candy and calling his girlfriend from a cell phone, Martin was spotted by neighborhood watch volunteer George Zimmerman, who called the authorities to report a black male who was “up to no good” (see Zehnder 2012). Zimmerman followed Martin while driving his truck around the neighborhood, informing the police operator of Martin’s whereabouts and his “suspicious” behavior. When the operator informed Zimmerman that she was dispatching an officer to the scene, she advised Zimmerman that he did not need to continue following the suspicious boy in a black hoodie. As the call continues, however, it is obvious that Zimmerman proceeds to follow Martin throughout the community—he remarks to the dispatcher, “these assholes always get away” (Zehnder 2013). In fact, Martin eventually manages to ditch Zimmerman, who tells the police operator that he no longer knows Martin’s whereabouts. A few seconds later, at 7:13, Zimmerman ends his call with the police. The events that transpired during the next few minutes have become a matter of national controversy, but the two ended up on the ground shouting at one another and fighting. When the responding police officer pulled into the community at 7:17, he found Zimmerman bloodied and bruised, and Martin lying face down
on the ground, motionless, with a single gunshot wound in his chest. Martin was pronounced dead on the scene at 7:30.

**I. Introduction**

When the Trayvon Martin case exploded onto the national scene, it gave rise to a discourse on the appropriate public function of neighborhood watch and other lateral policing organizations. Michael Thompson, a journalist and former Neighborhood Watch volunteer, remarked: “Whether he is found innocent or guilty in his upcoming trial, George Zimmerman gave Neighborhood Watch a bad name simply by carrying a weapon. To tote a gun violates the basic tenets of Neighborhood Watch.” Reflecting on his own experience as a young watchman in the 1970s, Thompson writes that, contra the actions of Zimmerman, the local police “taught us how to watch one another's homes and what to do, and what to look for as a potential witness in court, when observing a crime or suspicious behavior” (Thompson 2012). Thompson’s observations reflect the moral tone of the public discourse that followed in the wake of the Martin tragedy, much of which focused on the unacceptable violence of Watch volunteers. According to this conventional wisdom, Watch volunteers are to act as basically sensing/signaling machines for the police force: as the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) puts it, “This strategy attempts to provide local law enforcement with additional eyes and ears to watch out for all types of criminal activity and promote neighborhood security” (National Crime Prevention Council 2013). Acting on police instruction, Watch volunteers are educated in the visual semiotics of crime, so they can decipher what behaviors are suspicious. Once they detect this suspicion in their peers’
actions, they are to contact authorities and prepare themselves to record and pass along whatever information would be most useful in a criminal case. So we could add another layer of precision to the NCPC’s statement: Watch volunteers are not only to act as additional eyes and ears for law enforcement agencies, they are also act as their mouths. But in no circumstances are they to physically engage an offender.

The moral and legal codes that constrain neighborhood watch today arise from a peculiar historical juncture in which centuries of community-based policing tradition is being transformed by relatively recent evolutions in sovereign privilege. Upon the foundation of these tensions, certain actions are deemed morally and legally responsible acts of citizenship while others are seen as threats to the social order. Surveillance and communication are the privileged activities of today’s neighborhood watch volunteers—a stark contrast, no doubt, from the days of watch-and-ward patrols and vigilante justice that characterized policing during the colonial era and the settling of the western frontier. Until the early nineteenth century in the eastern United States, most communities organized compulsory watch-and-ward policing patrols that were manned entirely by volunteers; and in the “Wild West” and the vigilante South, of course, citizen justice prevailed throughout much of the nineteenth century, until “Wanted: Dead or Alive” was transformed into “Armed and Dangerous: Do Not Approach—Contact Authorities Immediately.” As sovereign governance spread unevenly throughout the territories of the US, it asserted its right to a monopoly on violence, thereby transforming the practices of community justice that citizens had historically enjoyed vis-à-vis their neighbors.
This sovereign intervention spawned a shift in the legitimate activities of lateral policing actors. While to enforce the law professional police patrols still relied on the eyes, ears, and mouths of community members, these community members would have to be governed toward a new ideal of rhetorical citizenship. They were to fulfill this citizenship not through the capture and judgment of suspects, but instead by watching their neighborhoods and producing highly circumscribed statements about their activities to law enforcement authorities. The duties of the citizen-officer—who for centuries had manned every level of law enforcement and criminal investigation—were integrated into this new governmental arrangement based upon what Foucault calls “the formidable rights of the sovereign” (1977, 47), characterized above all by the sovereign’s claim to the exclusive privileges of violence. As Kevin Stenson has argued, “a major task of the state police [is] to uphold the power of juridical authority, which remains the cement binding governmental strategies together. It also involves the task of regulating the shifting boundaries between legitimate community initiatives and illegitimate vigilanteism” (1993, 385). As a result, the public at large—and particularly lateral policing volunteers, such as those active in Neighborhood Watch—have been endowed with new responsibilities as specifically rhetorical subjects: their new duties include reporting suspicious activities, calling 9/11, filing police reports, and so on. This cultivation of rhetorical citizenship—which reinscribes the citizen officer’s zone of practice within the bounds of the communicative-surveillant—is a rather straightforward illustration of the governmental mechanisms that the liberal order requires in order to keep civil society civil (see Hay and Andrejevic 2006, 335).
Primarily, this chapter gives an answer to Ronald Greene’s (2009) challenge to theorize the conditions that give rise to special modalities of rhetorical citizenship. While Greene’s analysis is basically confined to the training of the traditional subjects of rhetorical production—such as debaters and orators—I propose to push this one step further: evolutions of governance give rise to diverse modalities of the speaking subject. In our current political juncture—in which neoliberal trends in self-empowerment are promoted as the answer to decreased and reoriented public services—crime control has come to increasingly rely on citizens’ communicative-surveillant capacities. Yet this involves paring down citizens’ speech power to its barest mechanical utility, on depoliticizing the domain of speech such that it can circulate only within the narrowest possible parameters of information sharing. Protocols, commands, and anonymizing technologies dominate these citizen-officers’ speech experience, as they carry out the data storage, processing, and transmission functions inherent to their mission as the eyes and ears of the neoliberal police apparatus.

In this chapter, I would like to keep in mind Agamben’s argument that the paradigm of modern political conflict is the distinction between what life is *bios* and what life is *zoon*. To recall the discussion from chapter two, Agamben writes that *bios* characterizes the speaking subject of public and political life, drawing from Aristotle’s (1984, 1.7.1098a 1–8) classic description of man as the *zoon logon echon*—the animal who has speech/logos and is therefore fit for *bios politicos*. *Zoon*, however, is that form of speechless life that lies outside the political space of public culture. As Agamben makes clear, this distinction—which for Aristotle marked the ontological rift between humans and other animals—has given rise to divisions within human communities, as certain individuals’ speech is deprived of its
political potential. Moreover, as Agamben argues, the supreme ambition of biopower “is to produce, in a human body, the absolute separation of the living being and the speaking being, zoë and bios, the inhuman and the human” (1999, 156). The distinction between zoön and bios, then, also applies to a divide within an individual subject, whose bare-biological capacities can be cultivated in the temporary articulation of a particular governmental apparatus. This phenomenon is particularly clear in the responsibilization of Neighborhood Watch’s citizen-officers, whose speech is radically de-politicized and transformed into a basic, biological phenomenon distinct from the public discourse of a zoön legon echon. All of the citizen-officer’s expressions are tightly regimented and controlled: dialing 9-1-1, reporting suspicious activities, filing police reports, and so forth are all rhetorical activities that have been stripped to their barest data-processing function—the US Department of Transportation even maintains a website with a “protocol” for dialing 9-1-1. Thus under the guise of “self-empowerment” and “community safety,” citizens are transformed into the bare eyes, ears, and mouths of their society’s security apparatuses. Inasmuch as they are allowed to participate in their community’s security, they are biological resources valuable primarily as basic sensory extensions of police agencies. Deployed along a different governmental apparatus than Greene’s citizen-orators, these bare rhetorical subjects are, as we might say, a quite different animal.

This chapter will provide a historical overview of neighborhood-watch policing—that is, of policing that involves the energies and responsibilities of local citizens rather than a sovereign professional police force. Then I describe the evolution from bounty justice—in which citizens were empowered to return suspects “dead or alive”—to the emergence of an
exceptional sovereign power that demands for itself the sole right to violence in law enforcement. At this stage the responsibilities of the citizen-officer shift: while still encouraged to participate in the policing apparatus, the citizen-officer is provided with a mandate to carry out surveillance on one’s peers, and then to communicate suspicions to police officials. What we see, then, is the rise of a special modality of rhetorical citizenship—the speaking subject who, deprived by the sovereign of his or her traditional means of community-based justice and law enforcement, now fulfills his or her citizenship through rituals of surveillance and circumscribed communication. Once oriented toward ideals of community protection and justice—however flawed these ideals and their expressions might have been—this citizen-officer now finds him or herself articulated to a governing apparatus that produces very circumscribed acts of surveillance and discourse production.

II. Lateral Policing and Autonomous Citizenship in the US

The colonial town watch system that was prominent in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century North America was an obvious descendant of English watch and ward policing. Like in England, participation in American town watches was compulsory for adult males. Until the nineteenth century watchmen were not paid for their services, and while some constables received a fee, they relied on volunteers to carry out arrests and surveillance duties. As with their British counterparts in the watch and ward tradition, this burden lay equally on all male citizens, who were obliged to perform periodic lateral policing duties. Thus in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, “every colonist was a police man” (Johnson and Wolfe 1996, 79). From New England to Georgia, most of colonial America held fast to these
community-based customs of policing, which were especially effective because of their communities’ small size, homogeneity, and restricted flow (Greenberg 2005, 23–5). Larger cities divided themselves into wards, each under the jurisdiction of a constable; in 1790 Philadelphia, for example, was divided into ten districts in order to accommodate its relatively large population of 28,000 (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990, 46).

This system, however, was soon complicated by the governing logics of sovereign power. The state’s juridical apparatus—which grew along with America’s exploding population—demanded the development of a specialized class of law enforcers that retained an exclusive status vis-à-vis the public. In the colonial United States, the state’s specialized law enforcement institutions slowly supplant the local law enforcement systems that required extensive participation from community members. Salaried constables and judges steadily spread throughout the colonies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and police officers become prominent in urban areas in the middle of the nineteenth century: Philadelphia founded its police force in 1833, followed by Boston in 1838 and New York in 1844. While these professionals do not by any means eliminate lateral policing practices—many forms of the watch and ward system, such as neighborhood watch, remain prominent to this day—these communal activities become subordinated to the goals and programs of sovereign power. What was at its best a truly social development among neighbors thus becomes simply another mechanism by which citizens’ communal bonds are transformed into technologies of surveillance and extraction.

Yet the peculiarities of America’s federal political system led to the development of a layered sovereignty: local and state police officials retained a certain degree of autonomy,
and as a result there are few “national” trends in the early history of American law enforcement. While official police forces began to appear in the 1830s on the East Coast, most American territories were left under the ad-hoc jurisdiction of neighborhood-based lateral policing arrangements. Even those communities policed by sheriffs retained a great deal of autonomy, leading to different standards of law enforcement and the deployment of justice. In particular, because of the scattered nature of territories on the frontier, judges were typically slow to be deployed to the scene of crimes. Sheriffs—who were often volunteers themselves—would have to detain suspects for weeks or even months while they waited for traveling judges to reach their territories and try their prisoners. The slow nature of this justice easily contributed to the vigilante policing culture that was dominant on the western frontier in the nineteenth century. While this system of justice is more or less a variation of age-old lateral policing practices, it was unique in its tendency to integrate surveillance and apprehension with punishment—that is, to circumvent the formal legal procedures of a hearing, a trial, and a judgment, citizens would act as policeman, judge, jury, and executioner, meting out punishments without recourse to established legal procedures or precedents (see Chriss 2010, 55–65).

Vigilante groups have a prominent spot in American lateral policing history, and their presence stretches back at least to the founding of the South Carolina Back Country Regulators in 1767. Over the next 100 years, several hundred American vigilance movements would take root, most of them on the western frontier (Brown 1975, 96). Their primary method was expressive justice: as settlers moved west, they slowly established community-based law enforcement arrangements; yet, owing to the peripatetic lifestyle of the
early frontier, as they continued westward many pioneers felt compelled to show potential criminals that they would not be vulnerable to theft and sabotage. Thus violence came to be associated with many vigilance movements, as they tended to deal harshly with anyone who attempted to rob or attack them during their treks. When vigilance groups would run down a horse thief or a counterfeiter, they would not hesitate to hang the offender on the spot. Using informal communication networks, vigilance movements were able to track suspects and distribute responsibility beyond the immediate vicinity of crimes. In fact, as Les Johnston has emphasized, these distributed practices of lateral surveillance have a deep historical and even etymological significance: “It is not without significance that the Latin derivation of vigilantism, ‘vigil,’ means ‘awake or observant’ (1996, 222).

In the 1840s, as vigilantism spread from the colonial South to the western frontier and major urban areas—especially places like New Orleans, San Francisco, and Los Angeles—vigilante justice began to arouse the disdain of official policing institutions that (at least ostensibly) carried out their work under the constraints and oversight of the American legal tradition. This divide points to an important rift in crime-based lateral policing organizations. As Johnston argues, American lateral policing groups tend to follow one of two distinct modes of citizenship: “responsible” citizenship, or “autonomous” citizenship. For Johnston, responsible citizenship is “a form of citizenship that is both sanctioned and sponsored by the state” (1996, 226). Autonomous citizenship, on the other hand, operates outside the approval or assistance of the agencies of the state. Vigilantism obviously fits the description of autonomous citizenship, which found public expression in the “popular sovereignty” movement of the early 1900s. While sovereign justice prevailed in many areas of the US,
autonomous citizens of the South took law enforcement into their own hands by lynching hundreds of criminal suspects and African-Americans. Vigilantes on the West Coast enacted their autonomous citizenship by lynching ne’er do wells, immigrants, and political opponents. The violence of these vigilante bands was typically justified on grounds of popular sovereignty, a doctrine with which many American settlers and citizens could identify (Abrahams 1998, 3–4). In 1900, Omer F. Hershey, a lawyer and President of the Baltimore Bar Association, expressed the importance of vigilantism as a means of quashing corruption and distributing justice at a time when the state was unable or unwilling to provide what many felt were reasonable standards of security and justice: “the doctrine of vigilance, as of lynch law in general, is based upon the theory that the people have the right to hold perpetual vigil over all their institutions and to correct, where necessary, abuses and corruption which threaten the security of their lives and prosperity” (1900, 433).32

Because vigilance movements set their sights on “abuses and corruption” in addition to petty crimes and immorality, they ran afoul of many politicians and state officials. Being defined by their autonomous citizenship—that is, being defined by their active opposition to sovereign traditions of law enforcement and criminal justice—many vigilantes worked with government officials against the law. Many southern politicians and police officials, for example, were sympathetic to the vigilance of the Ku Klux Klan, either joining with them or refusing to prosecute their notorious lynchings. To take an example, in 1890 New Orleans’ police chief was assassinated, resulting in eleven Mafia members being charged. When they were acquitted due to alleged jury tampering, the Louisiana governor and New Orleans’ new mayor looked the other way as citizens advertised the lynching in a local paper to gather
accomplices before they shot or hanged the men before a crowd of thousands. Also notable is the lynching of an Atlanta pencil factory owner Leo Frank, who was accused of raping and murdering one of his thirteen-year-old employees, Mary Phagan. One day before Frank was to be hanged for the murder, Georgia governor John M. Slaton commuted Frank’s sentence to life imprisonment. Expressing outrage and suspicion that a corrupt bargain had spared the wealthy factory owner, dozens of Georgians—including a former Georgia governor and a number of other prominent politicians and police officials—sprang Frank from jail and hanged him in the woods outside Atlanta.

These and similar events drew outrage from much of the public, particularly from journalists and northern elites. Thus in the early years of the twentieth century, as this rural practice appeared to infect more and more urban spaces—not to mention frontier areas hoping for more settlers—public opinion turned sharply against vigilante justice (see Brown 1975, 162; Karlyn Campbell 2008, 40–8; and Thelen 1986, 95–6). Eventually, federal and state governments began cracking down on vigilante justice and lynching, attempting to transform autonomous vigilant citizens into responsible citizens—that is, attempting to ensure that lateral policing movements respected the procedures and privileges of sovereign power. Between 1900 and 1920, states like Ohio, South Carolina, Indiana, and Alabama attempted to suppress autonomous justice by prosecuting sheriffs who allowed vigilantes to break into their prisons and carry away inmates. This general shift even involved Supreme Court justices, one of whom, David J. Brewer (1903), suggested abolishing the right of appeal in order to eliminate one of the prime rationales for vigilante justice. The answer to vigilantism, therefore, was a matter of (1) reasserting the sovereign’s exclusive privilege to
violence, and (2) enforcing the established processes of sovereign law, such as hearings, jury trials, and so forth. Thus in order to ensure the maintenance of political and juridical norms, autonomous citizenship had to be delegitimized and suppressed: it had to be tamed into appropriate practices of “responsible citizenship,” particularly as citizen’s lateral policing activities were defined upon the boundaries of practice that institutionalized sovereign privilege. The so-called “vigilant era” of American lateral policing, therefore, comes to a gradual end as vigilant South and the Wild West—characterized by its wanton “Dead or Alive” justice—are eventually tamed.

IV. The Turn to Responsible Citizenship: Neighborhood Watch

“Instead of addressing crime in a direct fashion by means of the police, the courts, and the prisons, this approach promotes a new kind of indirect action, in which state agencies activate action by non-state organizations and actors. The intended result is an enhanced network of more or less directed, more or less informal crime control, complementing and extending the formal controls of the criminal justice state. Instead of imagining they can monopolize crime control, or exercising their sovereign powers in complete disregard of the powers of other actors, state agencies now adopt a strategic relation to other forces of social control. They seek to build broader alliances, enlisting the ‘governmental’ powers of private actors, and shaping them to the ends of crime control.”

David Garland (2004, 124)

As state governments attempted to thwart vigilante justice by reasserting its monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, it did not eliminate citizen participation in law enforcement. On the contrary, official police institutions remained highly reliant on lateral policing activities to report suspicious and criminal activities, track suspects, deter crime, provide tips, give testimony, file reports, and carry out other surveillance and rhetorical responsibilities. By prohibiting violence in private policing practices, the state came to sanction surveillance and communication as the primary responsibilities of citizen-
officers: the public’s lateral policing labor, therefore, would have to be closely governed, so that it could retain its public utility without challenging the state’s exclusive privileges. Surveillance and rhetoric thus become the strict purview of new lateral policing agents. As argued earlier, this promotion of circumscribed rhetorical praxis is in effect a sovereign capture of citizen speech, in that it is produced only as the other of a prohibited practice of direct physical engagement. Governing the conduct of these citizen patrols—many of which had carried out haphazard and spectacular violence—thus becomes a matter of cultivating the rhetorical and surveillance practices of the public while preventing their escalation into vigilantism and other acts of direct physical engagement.

In the 1970s sociopolitical exigencies provide an interesting twist to this lateral policing tradition. While diverse forms of lateral policing helped define the American policing project throughout its history, the National Sheriff’s Association organized neighborhood watch in 1972 as part of an emergent neoliberal overhaul of America’s policing order. As resources began to dwindle and efforts to responsibilize the public in law enforcement picked up steam, police departments launched diverse lateral policing initiatives to prepare citizens to fill the departments’ distinctive needs and designs. The Los Angeles Police Department, for example, developed a new position called the “senior lead officer” (SLO) whose responsibility was to coordinate policing efforts with local communities. When the SLO scheduled meetings with his/her assigned community, in addition to taking notes and fielding complaints s/he would also coordinate community-oriented solutions to citizens’ crime concerns. One of these solutions was the “Community Mobilization Project,” which organized citizens into neighborhood watches and other surveillance teams. Malcolm K.
Sparrow, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy (1990), who have carried out extensive research on community policing efforts, recall the activities of one of these ad-hoc public surveillance teams:

One resident and her neighbor kept tabs on a woman living up the street who was wholesaling drugs to the street retailers. “I saw her coming over here in her car delivering drugs, and called Ellen up and say this is what’s happening,” the resident says. “She can watch all the way up in one direction; I can see over on my side. They usually come down here, and turn and go straight over past her house. So Ellen will say, ‘Who is that? Isn’t that so-and-so?’ And I’ll drop the phone, go over here where I can see it. ‘Yep, that’s so-and-so.’ So we know that. Or she’ll get half the license number, I’ll get the other half. I went and got the make of the car; it was a Mitsubishi.” As time went on the neighborhood watches grew increasingly savvy and extraordinarily active. “When the time comes to actually make an arrest, it takes a lot of surveillance,” one member says. “We’re getting tuned in to making sure our information is accurate. … So our people are getting information all the way down to how dealers are traveling over the fences and things like that. Where we can catch them, what they’re wearing today, how they come and go.” (1990, 13)

This neighborhood watch regimen is just one example of how individuals, in communities let down by the police’s inability or unwillingness to respond to crime, join together to achieve total sensory awareness of their neighborhoods. Faced with the prospect of continued crime
and violence in their communities, many citizens have assimilated into their everyday lives a suspicion-driven lateral surveillance.

This development is noteworthy on a number of levels. For one, although the democratization of some policing roles has been a positive development for some communities, the ongoing recession of the police from whole sectors of urban life—and their increasing reliance on community-based surveillance and enforcement initiatives—has been particularly disastrous (Stevens 1998). Moreover, the widespread lateral policing encouraged by programs like Neighborhood Watch is alarming because, while the private lateral surveillance described by Mark Andrejevic (2005, 2006) is insidious enough, the organs of a redistributed and increasingly uninhibited policing apparatus are now being plugged into every computer, camera, and other mobile communication device. As policing responsibilities continue to be dispensed to a tech-savvy populace, we should be mindful that these market-driven surveillance technologies will take on an even more pernicious character as the state increasingly relies on technologized citizens to be the eyes and ears of the post-sovereign police (see Stenson 2008).

According to the US State Department, neighborhood watch is practiced in every state of US. More than 20,000 neighborhood watch programs are listed in the nation’s official registry, and it is estimated that, in addition to these government-recognized programs, there are more than 50,000 others that operate on an unofficial basis (Morse 2009). This growing presence of neighborhood watch programs has coincided with a general, if reluctant, recognition of the inadequacies of sovereign policing. Even police bureaucracies themselves, according to Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, “are rediscovering that ordinary
people and communities are the first line of defense in controlling crime and fear. The police cannot succeed without an effective partnership with the communities they serve. Without the eyes and ears of residents to extend the scope of police surveillance, the reach of police control is pathetically thin” (1990, 46). In many contexts, official police agencies have openly adopted a facilitative role: as Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty argue, “Community policing is a discourse for finding new ways to improve connections with the communications circuitry of other risk institutions, that is, to respond to their knowledge needs in a routine manner, to provide them with expert advice, and to help them manage their risks” (1997, 72). Thus a responsibilization strategy develops “in which responsibility for crime is shifted to other institutions, while police responsibility to help these other institutions broaden to include many risk management responses in addition to crime and its regulation” (72). Yet as the police have increasingly relied on lateral policing teams, once-policed communities have gradually lost faith in the police as a sovereign institution. In many communities this transformation has made inevitable the kind of vigilant lateral policing described above, as citizens form surveillance teams as a means to strive for security.

David Garland (1996) has developed an influential account of this decline of institutional sovereign power, focusing especially on the recession of the traditional police force amid its failures to adequately address crime, discrimination, and poverty. Garland shows that the development of the modern police force was tied to the gradual empowerment of the nation-state: “The notion that a single sovereign power could govern all social life was enhanced in the mid-nineteenth century by the creation of a strong state apparatus, and in
particular, by the development of a public police force which came to be regarded, however inaccurately, as having a professional monopoly over the function of crime control” (1996, 448). The extraordinary societal fissures wrought by late modernity—especially the rising presence of crime and poverty—have made this vision unsustainable as the state’s inability to ensure social tranquility has become more and more apparent (Wouters 1999). With the state having come to fulfill so many of the functions once handled in civil society, it “is now faced with its own inability to deliver the expected levels of control over criminal conduct. Moreover, it now operates in a context where the social control functions of ‘private’ agencies and organizations have been much reduced over a long term, partly through the disorganizing processes associated with late modernity, partly through the monopolizing tendencies of the state apparatus” (Garland 1996, 448–9; see also Coleman 2004, 127–9). This recession of domestic sovereign institutions has left a gulf of responsibility that must be fulfilled by responsibilized citizen-officers (see Burchell 1996; Rose 2000). Therefore, as Ulrich Beck puts it, “The appeal to ‘responsibility’ is the cynicism with which the institutions whitewash their own failure” (2006, 336).

From this perspective of the decline of public resources and the shift in sovereign policing’s objectives, neighborhood watch’s function as a governmental technology is clear: as Kevin Stenson (1993) contends, community-policing programs function as governmental technologies by which lay citizens are trained in self-defense and community responsibility. According to Stenson, this can be traced to the “encouragement of a variety of non-police agencies and community groups as active citizens, to take on greater moral and practical responsibility for the prevention and control of crime” (383). This broad drive to
responsibilize the public has led to a gradual dispersion of practices for which the sovereign police force once took responsibility (Loader 2000). Although police officers have (obviously) not disappeared—in many communities, in fact, their numbers are growing (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009; Travis 2009)—there has been a general discursive shift toward community responsibilization. This is particularly evident in urban centers like Detroit, where, while the decline in public resources is unmistakable, the loss of police officers has not been as dramatic as many have claimed. In 2002, for example, Detroit had nearly 4,000 sworn officers; while during the past ten years that number has shrunk to 2,960 (Faturechi 2010), Detroit’s population has correspondingly dropped by twenty-five percent. Yet whether police officers’ numbers are up and down—a factor that depends on the locale in question—the tasks of police officers have evolved in order to accommodate a new governmental climate, and a general discursive shift has taken place that emphasizes the role of the individual citizen in caring for his or her own security (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Fussey 2004, 257–8; Hinds and Grabosky 2010; Schneider, Chapman, and Schapiro 2009). Once oriented toward definite goals of prosecution, punishment, and criminal justice, the police have recalibrated their duties more toward the vague ideals of prevention, security, “harm-reduction,” “loss-reduction,” and “fear-reduction.” And while, as Garland (2002) notes, “the most prominent measures of crime control policy are increasingly oriented towards punitive segregation and expressive justice, there is, at the same time, a new commitment, especially at the local level, to a quite different strategy that one might call preventive partnerships. Today’s most visible crime control strategies may work by expulsion and exclusion, but they are accompanied by patient, ongoing, low-key efforts to
build up the internal controls of neighbourhoods and to encourage communities to police themselves” (17). In addition to a growing presence of private police professionals (Rigakos 2002), these “preventive partnerships” are the governmental mechanisms by which lateral surveillance responsibilities are being absorbed by the public (see O’Mally and Palmer 1996). As police forces become narrower and more specialized in their practices, community “partners”—like the above Los Angeles citizens who turned into a surprisingly thorough surveillance team in order to “bust” one of their neighbors—are becoming the sensory extensions of the state’s retooled police apparatus.

As such, Watch volunteers and concerned citizens find themselves carrying out a very specific set of lateral policing practices. Inside neighborhood watch circles, this subjectification occurs as Watch volunteers are instructed in their locale’s official norms, regulations, and rituals. At a broader level, activists and everyday citizens are recruited into the practices of this lateral policing apparatus by discourses that circulate among the general public. Public and private institutions carry out campaigns encouraging the public-private partnerships that characterize the organization of official and unofficial Watch groups in most American locales. This process has been described by Garland, who explains that citizens are recruited and instructed by television advertising, mass leafleting campaigns, and similar outreach campaigns that “aim to raise public consciousness, interpolate the citizen as a potential victim, create a sense of duty, connect the population to crime control agencies, and help change the thinking and practices of those involved” (2002, 125). Watch volunteers and potential recruits alike, then, find themselves the target of ongoing processes of
subjectification that seek to responsibilize them into lateral policing habits that are at once vigilant and non-violent.

Neighborhood watch volunteers and prospective recruits undergo a specific training regimen in which they are instructed in the appropriate practices of what Johnston called “responsible citizenship.” Above all, recruits learn how to conduct themselves while walking their community “beats.” Yet this training also teaches volunteers how to interpret and respond to “suspicious” phenomena, and attempts to forge a renovated sense of community by forging a very specific set of activities between neighbors. An official neighborhood watch pamphlet, for example, describes the conditions in which the organization arose: in the 70s, “as society increasingly became more mobile and faster paced” and “more households had both spouses working,” neighborhoods became more vulnerable to burglars and delinquent youth. The pamphlet explains that these conditions eventually destroyed neighborhoods’ sense of community: “Neighbors stopped being concerned about their neighbor’s property and began keeping more to themselves. The unity and cohesion of the traditional neighborhood gradually deteriorated. Neighbors were not looking out for each other. . . . It was also noted that communities able to obtain the assistance of their citizens in observing, recognizing, and reporting suspicious or criminal activities were much better able to keep the burglary rate down” (Sanford Police Department 2012, 2). “Community,” according to this pamphlet and to the neighborhood watch sensibility more generally, is fulfilled through the conduct of various rituals of lateral policing, such as “observing, recognizing, and reporting.”
In information sessions and outreach literature, volunteers and recruits are taught:

“One of the most important aspects of Neighborhood Watch is getting to know your neighbors” (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2010, 7). Indeed, neighborhood sociability is reconstructed as a primarily epistemological project, as neighbors, their habits, and their belongings become reduced to information that must be mastered *in order to protect and preserve the community*. In other words, neighborhood watch makes the conditions of “community” those very rituals of suspicion that do much to undermine any open and promising sense of being-with-others. Neighbors are instead reduced to discrete bits of information that can be remembered, recorded, compared, and profiled—information that becomes valuable only to the extent that it informs surveillance strategy or facilitates the determination of suspicious and unsuspicious activities. We find this sentiment promoted in a Watch activist instruction manual:

[I]t is important that you share information about the composition of your households and activities. By doing so you make it easier for your block members to recognize and respond to any suspicious activities in your area. To ‘profile’ your block, share with each other the following information: Names of household members, address, phone numbers (include work numbers), makes, models, colors, license numbers of family cars, pets, medical problems. . . . Remember, the more information you share with each other, the better protected you will be. The more you know about the activities on your block, the better your chances of preventing a crime in your neighborhood. (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2010, 7)
The sort of sociality prescribed in this pamphlet is purely investigatory: neighbors should get to “know” their neighbors to the extent that that knowledge helps them construct a binary epistemology of suspicious/unsuspicious phenomena. Here we find an instructive illustration of what passes for sociability in what Torin Monahan (2010) calls “the age of insecurity”: the transformation of people and our surroundings into binary data. Yet recruits, however, are warned that the semiotics of suspicion is a tricky business: “Burglars may case an area posing as: joggers, someone looking for an address or a friend, etc.” (Sanford Police Department 2012, 7). Barking dogs, too, may signify an unacceptable state of insecurity.

While some of the listed activities might reasonably connote criminal activity—such as “Someone peering into cars or windows”—most others do not. For example, the pamphlet lists as suspicious the tautological “multiple persons who appear to be working in unison and exhibiting suspicious behavior” (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2010, 21), as well as warning of “persons arriving or leaving from homes or businesses at unusual hours” (21).

Yet this lateral surveillance and epistemological labor is only one half of the watch volunteer’s duty: the other half is communicating one’s observations to authorities. The pamphlet asserts, for example: “one of the keys to a successful Neighborhood Watch program is recognizing the importance of using good observation skills to keep your neighborhood safe. Practice looking at pictures of people to know how to describe them” (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2010, 24). Surveillance and rhetorical practice, in fact, go hand in hand for the Watch participant: not only should one hone one’s “observation skills,” one should also practice rendering these observations into useful language. And above all, of course, recruits are explicitly warned against transgressing the sovereign’s violent privilege:
“Community members only serve as the extra ‘eyes and ears’ of law enforcement. They should report their observations of suspicious activities to law enforcement; however, citizens should never try to take action on those observations. Trained law enforcement should be the only ones ever to take action based on observations of suspicious activities” (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2010, 25). Deprived of some vague “action,” recruits learn that their utility has been reduced to the purely biological: they are merely “the eyes and ears” of law enforcement, allowed simply to “report” their observations. Indeed, the instructions for reporting suspicious behavior seem appropriately robotic: “Dial 9-1-1 and call the police department of sheriff’s office, *Tell the call taker what happened and the exact location, *Provide a detailed description of individuals or vehicles, *Remain on the phone and stay calm, *Be prepared to answer follow-up questions” (2010, 22). Theirs is a rhetorical citizenship, to be sure, but it is a citizenship pared to its most basic biological function, a fact perhaps best attested by the infantile slogan of one the nation’s largest neighborhood watch two-way radio companies: “We talk, we act!”

Yet the governance of non-violent, responsible citizens takes place at numerous points of social contact outside the purview of neighborhood watch. For example, Milwaukee County Sheriff David Clarke recently sparked a national controversy by urging citizens to arm themselves in anticipation of growing violence and crime. In a public service announcement targeted at his constituency, Clarke begins by telling his audience that he wants to talk about their safety: “It’s no longer a spectator sport; I need you in the game, but are you ready? With officers laid-off and furloughed, simply calling 9-1-1 and waiting is no longer your best option. You can beg for mercy from a violent criminal, hide under the bed,
or you can fight back; but are you prepared? Consider taking a certified safety course in handling a firearm so you can defend yourself until we get there. You have a duty to protect yourself and your family. We’re partners now. Can I count on you?” (Clarke 2013). Clarke’s rhetoric about partnership, duty, and preparation are standard neoliberal fare, and this part of his message failed to elicit any public anger. What infuriated Clarke’s critics was that he urged citizens to be willing to transgress the communication/violence boundary in order to protect their homes and communities. Not only did he encourage his constituents to take a firearms safety course, but he also made the provocative suggestion that calling 9-1-1—that communication—is often an unviable option, and that one should be prepared to commit self-defensive physical violence.

Clarke’s statement opened a controversial discursive space in which different actors battled over how the conduct of responsible citizens should be governed. Expectedly, much of the reaction was intensely negative. Milwaukee’s mayor, Tom Barrett, called the ad “irresponsible,” while Jeri Bonavia, an activist with the Wisconsin Anti-Violence Effort, remarked: "I think he did a great disservice to the people of this community. . . . It's encouraging people to take the law into their own hands or to only rely on themselves and not rely on trained law enforcement officers” (Schaper 2013). Continuing, Bonavia made parallels between Clark’s statement and the autonomous citizenship that prevailed in the vigilance era: "What (Clarke's) talking about is this amped up version of vigilantism. . . . I don't know what his motivations are for doing this. But I do know what he's calling for is dangerous and irresponsible and he should be out there saying this is a mistake” (Vielmetti, Schultze, and Walker 2013). Roy Felber, president of the Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’
Association, invoked the sovereign exception in his criticism of Clarke: "That doesn't sound smart . . . That's why society has police officers" (Vielmetti, Schultze, and Walker 2013). In a debate on the CNN evening television program Piers Morgan Tonight, Mayor Barrett’s comments echoed these concerns, emphasizing that it was citizens’ duty to contact authorities rather than take matters into their own hands: “We respond to anything. . . . The 911 calls from homes in the city of Milwaukee are responded to by the Milwaukee Police Department” (Walker 2013). This struggle to rhetorically reassert the sovereign exception demonstrates how diverse actors struggled to counterbalance Sheriff Clarke’s attempt at autonomous responsibilization. In fact, citizens’ responsibility to communicate—as opposed to the sovereign’s privilege of violence—is reinscribed in activist and cultural institutions, legal precedents, and other discursive formations that extend well beyond the purview of the state itself. Thus as we see in the internal efforts of Neighborhood Watch and the public participants in the David Clarke controversy, the fight to govern non-violent, responsible citizens takes place as much in living rooms, editorial pages, and living rooms as it does in state capitols and police departments.

**Conclusion: George Zimmerman and the Logic of Exception**

Despite the careful governance of communicative subjects that I described in this chapter—that is, despite these efforts to cultivate the non-violent yet machinic impulses of Watch volunteers—lateral policing often turns violent. This is due in part to the old cultural logic that binds communication to violence by so strenuously positioning them against one another. To illustrate, let’s look more closely at the Trayvon Martin/George Zimmerman
case. In the wake of the tragedy, public discourse expectedly centered on Zimmerman’s transgression from communication into violence. Even the initial police report noted, "The encounter between George Zimmerman and Trayvon Martin was ultimately avoidable by Zimmerman if Zimmerman had remained in his vehicle and awaited the arrival of law enforcement or conversely if he had identified himself to Martin as a concerned citizen and initiated dialog (sic) in an effort to dispel each party's concern" (Orlando Sentinel 2013). Not alone in condemning Zimmerman for abandoning the “responsible” rhetorical citizenship demanded by the state, Neighborhood Watch’s national office also swiftly distanced itself from Zimmerman’s actions: “The Neighborhood Watch Program fosters collaboration and cooperation with the community and local law enforcement by encouraging citizens to be aware of what is going on in their communities and contact law enforcement if they suspect something—NOT take the law in their own hands. . . . The alleged participant ignored everything the Neighborhood Watch Program stands for and it resulted in a young man losing his life” (National Sheriff’s Association 2012). This tenor also permeated most editorial commentary and other public discourse on the shooting, as Zimmerman was condemned for taking the law into his own hands (or, in the occasional right-wing circle, praised for doing so).

The legal and moral culpability of Zimmerman are implicated within the field of contractual tension that has come to entangle communication and violence among Watch volunteers. Florida’s 2005 “Stand Your Ground” law sanctions the use of deadly force only as a last resort, when one “reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible
felony" (Florida State Legislature 2012). In privileging the immaterial “beliefs” of the legal subject, this Stand Your Ground law gives rise to a scenario in which the res gestae of the case are relevant only to the extent that they contribute to an alleged state of “reasonable belief.” Once this threshold of reasonable belief is met, then Zimmerman’s escalation to murder is justified before the law. The evidence for this reasonable belief relies on a narrative of exhaustion: that is, for Zimmerman to reasonably believe that violence is necessary to protect himself from great bodily harm, he must have exhausted other options—i.e., his communicative attempts to defuse the situation must have failed. Before being arrested and taken into custody, Zimmerman gave his account of what had happened: after following the operator’s suggestion that he stop following Martin, Zimmerman claims that Martin approached him from behind, asking him if he had a problem. The two then had a brief exchange before Martin attacked him and the two fell to the ground, where Martin began beating Zimmerman. At this point, Zimmerman alleges that he was calling out for help, but that no one responded. Because his cries were ignored, Zimmerman explained, he finally resorted to firing his weapon into Martin’s chest. (Park et al. 2012). Much of this case’s controversy, in fact, has settled on the question of whether Martin or Zimmerman was the person yelling for help, with Zimmerman’s advocates arguing that his unanswered pleas initiated a state of exception that allowed him to transcend the norms of moral and legal conduct and thus escape responsibility for his violence. That is to say, his alleged rhetorical action—his pleas for Martin to stop beating him and his calls for help—has been interpreted as a performative deferral of responsibility that permitted Zimmerman, once he had reached the exceptional threshold at which communication seemed unlikely to defuse the situation,
use violent force. According to the Stand Your Ground law, Zimmerman himself crafted that imminent danger simply by calling on Martin and his neighbors, placing the onus on them to disrupt the (logically) inevitable progression of communication into violence. When they failed to abide by the very particular rules of Zimmerman’s game of command, they established the zone of moral and legal exception in which Zimmerman was free, if not obliged, to respond with violence.

This escalation is at least partially rooted in the mendacious dichotomy that places violence and communication in an opposed yet spectral relationship. For this very reason, the rhetoric/violence dichotomy is a highly dangerous construction. By setting up rhetoric as violence’s other, we risk placing them into an etiological relationship, such that rhetoric’s state of exception is necessarily violence. Such is the state of exception in general: if a practice reaches its threshold of exhaustion, then by the very nature of the exception it invokes its other. Thus if speech fails to resolve an issue, violence materializes as its exception. Just as a state of exception within a democracy leads to the suspension of the rights typically enjoyed by the demos, rhetoric’s perceived failure too often—and far too logically—progresses into violence, despite, of course, the myriad activities that could alternatively serve as rhetoric’s exceptional other. Thus Zimmerman can rationalize killing Martin by simply appealing to an alleged failure of communication: despite his oral pleas, Martin continued to beat him and his neighbors refused to help. Because of this failure of communication, Zimmerman claims to have had no other choice but to take the extraordinary next step of murderous “self-defense.” As this case illustrates, although the speech/violence opposition can prevent violence from occurring—which it certainly does, at least in some
circumstances—it also produces the conditions in which speech, if frustrated, can easily escalate into the most unrestrained violence. In an important sense, Trayvon Martin’s murder was in part the expression of an absurd cultural logic that conflates doing *something* with doing *violence*.

The recent case of Tigh Croff, a Detroit resident who shot and killed an unarmed man who was breaking into his home, provides further illustration of how this logic plays out in real-world practice. When Croff returned home after working a shift as a security guard, he found two men breaking his windows in an attempted burglary. After yelling for the men to stop, Croff chased down one of the men—fifty-three-year-old Herbert Silas—and fatally shot him. When rationalizing his behavior to a detective, Croff made a rather profound statement: "I told him he was going to die, and I shot him. . . . I ain't no angel, but I ain't done nothing stupid" (Oosting 2011). Alas, Croff is basically right: he did not do anything stupid, if by “stupid” we mean illogical. Croff merely abided by the cultural logic of the sovereign privilege, the logical game that naturalizes the escalation of rhetoric into violence. In the Croff case, this logic of escalation is exposed in all its ludicrousness; there was nothing innately logical about the movement between (1) the attempted theft, the chase, and the failed attempts to hail the criminal, and (2) the cold-blooded shooting of Herbert Silas. Yet because they are in full accordance with the historical and institutional weight of the rhetoric/violence dichotomy—particularly as that dichotomy is rigged with the logic of exception, in which rhetoric’s performative “failure” escalates immediately into violence—Croff’s actions were perfectly logical. Yet the situation is worse still: today this perverse logic is combined with a failing neoliberal policing project that abandons communities to crime, leaving many citizens
legitimately disfranchised and insecure. This is not to say, of course, that Zimmerman, Croff, and other lateral policemen are not personally culpable for the deaths of the people they kill in “self-defense”—far from it. However, we should be aware of how neoliberal policing policies have endangered citizens like Trayvon Martin by surrendering law enforcement to vigilant and typically frustrated amateurs like George Zimmerman and Tight Croff.

As violence has become an increasingly visible element of policing strategy during the past several decades, amateur lateral policemen and women have become far too comfortable operating within the state of exception that characterizes the bizarre and arbitrary logical leap from rhetoric to violence. This is yet another reason why the attempt to produce non-violent lateral policemen will continue to misfire: citizen-officers play out the drama of law enforcement, and thus identify with the activities of sworn police officers; it is no surprise that they will sometimes slip from surveillance and communication into the exception of violence that is reserved for the police officials who serve as their models. In this regard Natalie Jackson, the attorney representing Trayvon Martin’s family, made a prescient observation: “What made [Zimmerman] shoot was that he was one of them; he felt he was a cop” (Jonsson 2012). Indeed, in his capacity as captain of the Retreat’s neighborhood watch patrol, Zimmerman was reduced to his bare biological capacities as the eyes, ears, and mouth of the sovereign police; so perhaps it should not surprise us when Zimmerman acted out the defining privilege of the police officers with whom he so intimately identified. As rhetoricians and cultural theorists know all too well, despite the best governing efforts of public and private institutions to discourage lateral policemen’s transgression of the sovereign’s violent privilege, subjectification is not a flawless and
immediate effect of a transcendent hail: rather, it is a cumulative, gradual, and imprecise articulation of subjects to numerous and often conflicting governmental apparatuses. As such, the cultivation of the non-violent rhetorical subject of neighborhood watch is bound to occasionally—if not frequently—go awry. This is a failure that will surely result in more tragedies like the death of Trayvon Martin.
Chapter 6

Conclusion: Going Kinetic: Seeing and Saying in the War on Terror

“Make no mistake about it. We got a war here, just like we got a war abroad.”
– George W. Bush

◆ Talal al Rouki

In May 2013, Talal al Rouki, a college student living in Michigan, was invited to a dinner party by a neighbor who lived in his apartment complex. Al Rouki prepared a traditional Saudi dish, kabsah, which is made from basmati rice, vegetables, Middle Eastern spices, and seasoned meats. When al Rouki’s kabsah was finished cooking, he carried it to his friend’s apartment, which was located nearby in the same complex. Two days later, al Rouki was awakened early in the morning to find FBI agents surrounding his apartment block. When they descended on al Rouki’s house and began to question him, al Rouki learned that one of his neighbors had alerted authorities that he might be plotting to carry out a terrorist act. What had aroused his neighbor’s suspicion, the agents informed al Rouki, was the pressure cooker he had carried to his friend’s apartment two nights before. According to the neighbor’s police report, the pressure cooker was “bullet colored” (Jay 2013). After questioning the pudgy college student about his spare time, his political beliefs, and his major, the agents left al Rouki with a word of advice: “You need to be more careful moving around with such things, sir” (Jay 2013).
I. Introduction

Tamal al Rouki’s case illustrates the climate of vigilance and insecurity that has come to characterize American society in the wake of September 11 and subsequent terrorist attacks. To al Rouki’s neighbor, who for several weeks had been treated to nonstop media coverage of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, al Rouki’s pressure cooker was not an everyday household item: it was a potential weapon of mass destruction. Like the Neighborhood Watch volunteers who are instructed in the visual semiotics of criminality, lay citizens of diverse stripes are today thoroughly coached in the semiotics of terror: normally unthreatening items—such as pressure cookers, automobiles (Packer 2006), and toothpaste (Alfano 2009)—are reanimated through this new, widely meshed grid of intelligibility. Citizens are instructed in this semiotics and its attendant methods of vigilant response by an array of public and private authorities who remind them, in the words of a DHS video advertising the See Something Say Something program, that “Homeland security starts with hometown security, and we all have a role to play. Working together, we can all help secure our country. If you see something, say something. Always contact local law enforcement whenever you observe suspicious indicators or behaviors” (Homeland Security 2011a).

The preceding chapters have provided a history of this present, in that they have unearthed a number of precedents for the communicative-surveillant regimes we are now seeing on the domestic front of the War on Terror. While most surveillance research focuses on the post-9/11 moment—with good reason—historical and comparative projects help us ascertain what, if anything, is truly unique about surveillance in the wake of September 11. While reflecting on the evidence gathered in my historical case studies, I will conclude by
describing one central tendency that makes anti-terrorism strategies unique among lateral policing projects, particularly as they are now emerging in the context of what Armand Mattelart has called the “suspicion society” (2010, 198). There are, of course, significant continuities between anti-terrorism efforts and the previous case studies I have analyzed. In an important sense, this project has thus far focused on how populations are governed through crime (chapters two, three, and five; see Simon 2009) and immorality (chapter four). Discourses of crime, for example, have created divisions within the population at large—i.e., the criminal and the non-criminal—and have thus provided the conditions for populations to mobilize against an interior threat. Discourses of immorality, as well, have helped delineate—and then mobilize—the social in such a way that lateral policing emerges as an immunological response. While Americans today are still governed through crime and immorality, they also find themselves “governed through terrorism” (see Mythen and Walklate 2006, 394). That is to say, Americans are immersed in a discourse of imminent terror that structures their possibilities for self-government and being-together. Whereas crime and immorality had more or less stable signifiers—although, as we saw in the previous chapter on Neighborhood Watch, rhetorical ambiguity has served to extend suspicion to relatively innocuous activities—terrorism is by definition looming, spontaneous, and aimed toward the targeting and disruption of everyday life. In the words of Eva Horn, the War on Terror targets “an enemy that operates both nomadically and globally, an enemy that one quite obviously understands all too little to preempt in any effective way” (2003, 81). Because terrorists can be foreign-born or “homegrown,” because terrorism can strike anywhere and anytime, and because its traditional weapons are typically harmless, ordinary
items—such as trucks, airplanes, and pressure cookers—terrorism cannot be easily translated into a coherent local discourse of risk and responsibility (see Beck 2006). Mobilizing citizens against the spontaneous and softly ubiquitous terrorist threat, therefore, relies on a discourse that circulates ambiguous signs and symptoms of terrorism. As Jacqueline Best has put it, those who govern through terrorism must “govern through ambiguity” (2008, 356).

This ambiguity is a defining element of counterterrorist practice in the contemporary moment. As I have argued throughout the dissertation, building knowledge about traditional enemies—prostitutes, immigrants, criminals, and other threats—has always lain at the center of lateral policing efforts. Citizens have been mobilized to carry out surveillance because it allows them to provide valuable knowledge to governing authorities, and we have seen this continued with antiterrorism efforts such as the See Something Say Something initiative, the TIPS program (Andrejevic 2007, 177), and DARPA’s 2002–03 Total Information Awareness project (Mattelart 2010, 143–5). But today, as citizens are being encouraged more than ever to see something and say something, these practices are taking on an additional level of significance that complements their value in the production of knowledge. If we consider the communicative-surveillant subject as simply a mobile, versatile locus of knowledge production technologies, we risk overlooking the full material significance of the political mobilization entailed by lateral policing initiatives. Hinting at this extra-epistemological function, Andrejevic has argued that there is a “subtle logic of interactive participation” in lateral surveillance regimes that “invites unexamined identification with the priorities of those in power” (2007, 44). This identification serves a disciplinary function that is related to what Jamais Cascio (2005) has somewhat redundantly labeled the “participatory
panopticon”: by governing the conduct of others, we come to govern our own conduct, as well. Yet, if we shift our analysis to another level, this identification implies a more general externalization of policing rationalities and norms of practice, manifesting in what Jacques Ellul calls “orthopraxy”: “an action that in itself, and not because of the value judgments of the person who is acting, leads directly to a goal” (1973, 27). By snitching on their neighbors and enacting the surveillance procedures practiced by the security apparatus, citizens come to identify with the rationalities and actors of antiterrorist initiatives. As Janet Chan has observed, “While [antiterrorist] advertising campaigns may reflect that fact that police and government cannot fight the war on terror without citizens’ help, . . . a more important underlying factor of these campaigns may be the necessity to engage the public and turn them into active supporters of the war against terror” (2007, 64). Chan recognizes that cultivating a lateral surveillance ethic among citizens plays an extra-epistemological function in that it (1) identifies citizens with policing authorities, and (2) empowers citizens to police themselves and their peers without the interference of the state. Generating these autonomous realms of self-governance, then, becomes a central feature of state pedagogy in the War on Terror, as citizens are prepared to “partner up” with law enforcement agencies from afar. So while citizen intelligence still plays a central role in governing—and governing through—terrorism, this chapter will explore the extra-epistemological significance of mobilizing communicative-surveillant subjects to fight terror in their communities. Building upon Andrejevic’s general discussion of the “political mobilization” inherent in lateral surveillance projects (2007, 167), I would like to point out that communicative action—snitching, registering suspicion, reporting crimes, sharing terrorism-preparedness tips through social
networks, etc.—plays a central yet unexplored role in this mobilization, allowing authorities to govern at a distance while citizens carry out the dirty work of policing the terrorist threat.

In this concluding chapter, I will begin by describing the troubled significance of knowledge-building in the war on terror. While citizen intelligence is still an animating force behind antiterrorist lateral policing programs, the usefulness of that intelligence is more dubious than ever. As investigative journalist Brian Palmer (2010) observes, the sheer amount of antiterrorism tips received each year—which numbers in the millions—prevents law enforcement agencies from synthesizing that data in a meaningful way. As citizens are encouraged to report innocuous everyday activities that under normal circumstances could never be construed as threats—e.g., walking through a college town apartment complex with a pressure cooker—the tips gleaned are staggering in number and largely dubious in quality. As Andrejevic warns, “Read through the bleak and fractured lens of the terrorist threat, all ‘normal’ activities are redoubled as combat duties, and perpetual threat is in turn normalized” (2007, 181). Thus when citizens carry out surveillance against their peers and report “suspicious” activities to authorities, they are carrying out a form of civic labor that is not strictly or even primarily epistemological in value. Rather, turning subjects into citizen-spies generates identification with the techniques and rationalities of the security apparatus.

In this chapter, therefore, I will consider surveillance and communication not as epistemological technologies, but as technologies of citizenship (see Cruikshank 1999)—that is, as lived practices whose central function is not the gathering or transmission of intelligence, but the simple physical drama of mobilizing with the community in suspicion-driven norms of civic interaction. I will thus focus on the raw governmental utility of
empowering citizens to, in George W. Bush’s words, “go kinetic” in the War on Terror (see Massumi 2007), regardless of whatever other ends that kineticism serves. In conclusion, I will assess the ways in which this identificatory civic labor of seeing and saying can be used to resist regimes of social suspicion and to bring accountability to authorities who abuse that labor.

II. Terror, Ambiguity, and the New Enemy Epistemology

“In the eyes of authority—and maybe rightly so—nothing looks more like a terrorist than the ordinary man.” —Giorgio Agamben (2007, 23)

In the 1970s, several Europe states witnessed a steady stream of strategic political violence, what many considered to be a new method of political action. During this time the Red Army Faction in West Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Irish Republican Army in the UK, and other scattered groups began operating on a more extensive and visible scale, carrying out attacks that were directed at disrupting the everyday lives of civilians. In order to address the unique challenges these groups posed to traditional prosecutorial practices, the G-7 and the European Community’s member states developed the notion of “terrorism” in the late 1970s (see Mattelart 2010, 129–30). As Armand Mattelart points out, “the term was never defined in criminal law. As a result, it served as the heading for a list of new crimes without becoming a legal category itself. Nor is there any legal definition of terrorism under international law” (129).

This legacy of ambiguity has stuck in law as well as in antiterrorist praxis: one of the defining features of the contemporary terrorist threat is its diffuse ambiguity. In the
imaginative words of Jonathan Rutherford, on September 11th the West was struck by a “translucent enemy”: “A new enemy has assailed the Western imagination: al Qaeda. Unknown and un-numbered, devoted to spiritual violence and in love with death” (2005, 632). The fact that the enemy is translucent and deterritorialized presents a number of unique problems; but more than this, in the Western imagination terrorism has been framed as irrational, fanatical, and obsessed with destruction. Not only does the terrorist’s translucency defy standard rational practices of detection, the terrorist itself is an irrational actor driven only by its compulsion to wreak random devastation. In the words of Jeremy Packer, this irrationality has given rise to a domestic situation in which “Knowing where to draw the line between ally and enemy is made problematic” (2007, 212).

The terrorist threat, therefore, has become global in a geographical as well as a semiological sense. When pressure cookers, toothpaste, and Ryder trucks become recast as potential weapons of mass destruction—that is, when a suspicion-driven uncertainty drives the way that we interpret the everyday objects of our surroundings—this new enemy epistemology surfaces in what Barbara Biesecker has called a “cryptology of terror”: “a hermeneutics of unusually intense and deep suspicion. Because nothing is simple or simply itself, the Bush Administration warns Americans—or, rather, all citizens of the world who stand against terrorism—that they can no longer afford to read at the level of the sign” (2007, 159, 158). This cryptological rhetoric of terror, Biesecker argues, trains citizens “to doubt radically some experts’ as well as their own perceptual experience. . . . [W]e are moved by exposure to our own blindness to believe that even—or especially—in circumstances in which we see nothing, something is likely taking place on the other side of a sign that we are
incapable of reading on our own” (159, 161). Citizens are thus instructed that “an enemy as deceptive as it is deadly has infiltrated the homeland, indeed the heartland; nothing and no one anywhere is safe or above suspicion” (162). The fundamental ambiguity and ubiquity of the threat provides a direct challenge to the traditional epistemological potential of lateral policing, which has typically been based on the reliability of citizen intelligence.

This epistemological suspicion has been translated into the world of social praxis through the transformation of governmental programs and rationalities. During the Cold War, Brian Massumi argues, the interface between governmental action and enemy epistemology was based in a logic of “deterrence”: “What began as an epistemological condition (a certainty about what you and your opponent are capable of doing) dynamizes into an ontology or mode of being (a race for dear life). Deterrence thus qualifies as an operative logic, in that it combines its own proprietary epistemology with a unique ontology” (2007, 10). This logic of deterrence, Massumi argues, is based on the calculable epistemology of risk: threats can be minimized through knowledge-building enterprises, and security strategy is therefore anchored in attempts to better understand the enemy. This risk epistemology thus escalates into a broad range of specialized and social practices organized around simultaneously deciphering the truth of the enemy and developing domestic and military strategies for its deterrence—what, according to Massumi, took the form of “a race for dear life” during the Cold War. Relying on foreign and domestic intelligence networks, as well as technical military surveillance systems like SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment), the U.S. and its surrogates carried out extensive knowledge-building exercises that functioned as essentially epistemological labor (see Packer 2013). According to Massumi’s
schema, this epistemological labor was anchored in a teleology of deterrence: the intelligence gathered by diverse sources was aimed at a specifiable, territorialized enemy whose goals and capacities could be known—had to be known—in order to prevent global thermonuclear war.

Yet as Massumi observes, in the age of terror enemy epistemology has acquired a new animating principle, as this logic of deterrence has been challenged and complemented by a logic of “preemption.” For Massumi, this preemptive logic has a number of things in common with deterrence: most importantly, they are both fueled by the unknown futurity of an imminent threat. Their primary difference, however, is that the enemy epistemology of preemption “is unabashedly one of uncertainty, and not due to a simple lack of knowledge. There is uncertainty because the threat has not only not yet fully formed but . . . it has not yet even emerged. In other words, the threat is still indeterminately in potential. This is an ontological premise: the nature of threat cannot be specified. It might in some circumstances involve weapons of mass destruction, but in others it will not” (13). The enemy, moreover, has become “unspecifiable”:

It might come from without, or rise up unexpectedly from within. You might expect the enemy to be a member of a certain ethnic or religious group, an Arab or a Moslem, but you can never be sure. It might turn out be a white Briton wearing sneakers, or a Puerto Rican from the heartland of America . . . . The situation is objectively one in which the only certainty is that threat will emerge where it is least expected. This is because what is ever-present is not a particular threat or set of threats, but the potential for still more threats to
emerge without warning . . . We are in a world that has passed from . . . the "known unknown" (uncertainty that can be analyzed and identified) to the "unknown unknown" (objective uncertainty). (2007 13)

As the enemy shifts from the known-unknown—i.e., an enemy that can be addressed by traditional methods of risk assessment—to the unknown unknown—i.e., an enemy that can be anyone and anywhere, and which can never be expunged because it exists only as a deferred, looming spontaneity—this epistemological shift becomes palpable in evolving forms of governmental praxis.

This strategy is especially visible in the “See Something, Say Something” campaign and other domestic antiterrorism initiatives. The primary public service announcement released by the “See Something, Say Something” campaign provides an excellent example of how these discourses of “categorical suspicion” (see Marx 1988, 227) circulate in federal outreach materials (see also Docobo 2006). The pedagogical voice that narrates this ten-minute video—which was released in a nationwide outreach campaign in 2011—begins by encouraging citizens to report activities that exceed their faculties of interpretation: “It’s not easy to put all the pieces [of an unfolding terrorist threat] together, and we don’t expect you to. That’s the job of law enforcement and intelligence analysts. But homeland security is a shared effort and responsibility for each of us. When you see things that just don’t seem right, that seem somehow out of the ordinary, reporting what you’ve observed can be invaluable to the work of law enforcement and intelligence analysts in this shared effort. Acts of terrorism against the United States can be large or small” (USHomelandSecurity 2011a).

Citizens are thus encouraged to report “unusual” activities—large and small—that defy their
expectations of the ordinary. Illustrating a number of these ostensibly unusual, terrorist-signifying activities, the video presents a European-American man who appears to be in his late teens recording video under an overpass. The video informs citizens that, “before they strike, many terrorists watch and study their targets.” The video then lists a number of supposedly suspicious situations that warrant contacting authorities: warning that terrorists “gather information,” the scene shifts to an outdoors café, where a young, blonde European-American woman is speaking to a cop. According to the video, potential terrorists also “test security” (a middle-aged African-American man in a red sweatshirt leaves something in his pocket as he goes through airport security); “acquire funds and supplies, often through criminal activities” (two white vans are parked next to each other, as two men transfer barely visible items between the vans); and “rehearse their plans” (a middle-aged European-American woman leaves her purse under a bench in a bus station). After this lesson in the semiotics of terror, the narrator instructs the viewer, “Any of what we call these ‘precursor activities’ might be observable and reportable by a vigilant member of the public. You are in the best position to spot these precursor activities as you go about your everyday activities in your community.” Operating on a logic of preemption, virtually anything can be a “precursor” to terrorist acts—as the video shows, taking photographs and speaking with cops can be precursor activities; and now, since the Boston Marathon attacks, walking across a college apartment complex with a pressure cooker has become a precursor activity that warrants the scrutiny of “vigilant members of the public.”

The video’s narrator then reminds us of the preemptive logic that governs antiterrorist outreach strategy: after fostering ambiguity under the guise of a boilerplate anti-
discrimination statement, the video instructs the viewer how to respond to suspicious activities: “it’s important to carefully consider what you observe. Reporting suspicious activity should not be based on a person’s race, religion, or gender, but rather on behaviors that seem suspicious . . . . So if you see something that just isn’t right, report your observations to your state or local authorities” (2011a). While this assertion is standard politically correct fare, it should be identified within the larger trend toward governing through ambiguity. While the logic of deterrence spawned knowledge-building enterprises aimed at understanding, containing, and outsmarting the enemy, the logic of preemption is rooted in a more ambivalent epistemology: it is faced with the relative futility of establishing the truth of the terrorist enemy. Thus while risk assessment practices remain an essential practice of preemption, they are complemented by specialized forms of citizen mobilization whose primary utility is not the generation of practicable knowledge. As the video reminds us, “Homeland security starts with hometown security, and we all have a role to play. Working together, we can all help secure our country. If you see something, say something” (2011a). By cultivating this sense of civic duty, and by mobilizing citizens to operate within its appropriate realms of communicative-surveillant practice, DHS and allied authorities provide citizens with meaningful ways to “go kinetic” in the War on Terror.

III. Mobilization and Civic Identification

“We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path to action. And this nation will act.”—George W. Bush

34
Thus far I have argued that, because the terrorist threat’s essential characteristic is its randomness, it generates new epistemological imperatives. While citizen intelligence is important in constructing information databases and suspicious activity profiles, human subjects are simply not as reliable as digital technologies in the collection and processing of intelligence (see Haggerty and Ericson 2002). And in the middle of a global War on Terror, there is a lot of intelligence to process: during the last several years, local and federal law enforcement agencies have received thousands of tips each day. The FBI’s Internet Tip Line, Tips.FBI.gov, has received about 700 tips a day since it was set up in the wake of the September 11th attacks. When this number is combined with the tips received by U.S. embassies and local and state law enforcement agencies, American antiterrorism personnel receive between 8,000 and 10,000 tips per day. These tips include information about forty alleged terrorist plots—every single day.

Remarking on these overwhelming statistics, investigative journalist Brian Palmer observes, “Government analysts must work quickly to find the sprinkling of serious threats in a sea of innocent misunderstandings and bogus tips” (2010). Of course, this is a very small sprinkling, indeed: despite what has amounted to millions of tips over the course of the twelve years since September 11, 2011, in 2009 FBI director Robert Mueller estimated that the U.S. had thwarted less than a hundred plots in the War on Terror (Associated Press 2009), and he was rather circumspect about what constituted a “plot”; in 2011, the neoconservative Heritage Foundation issued a more modest number: thirty-nine (McNeill, Carafano, and Zuckerman 2011). Most Washington bureaucrats, however, are more circumspect in their assessments: as senior RAND Corporation advisor Brian Michael
Jenkins argued in typically shrewd parlance, “We have thwarted a number of terrorist attacks; exactly how many is hard to say. It is difficult counting events that don’t occur” (2006).

While it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how many terrorist plots have been preempted by antiterrorist intelligence, the number of terrorist attacks carried out on U.S. soil since September 11th stands at eleven, which together have resulted in a total of about thirty-five deaths. As journalist Ronald Bailey (2011) points out, these figures suggest that Americans have a one in twenty million chance of being killed in a domestic terrorist attack, while one in 19,000 will die in car wrecks, one in 800,000 will drown in a bathtub, and 1 in 5,500,000 will die after being struck by lightning. As Bailey argues, “In other words, in the last five years you were four times more likely to be struck by lightning than killed by a terrorist” (2011; also see De Goede 2008, 161). We have a situation, then, in which millions of citizen tips are sifted and synthesized in order to refine knowledge about who terrorists are and where and when their attacks are likely to occur. This tremendous knowledge-creation, however, is generated at the behest of a problem that, given all indications, barely exists and, moreover, is extremely difficult to anticipate.

Given this unusual situation—which rises from the random nature of the threat, the unprecedented accumulation of citizen intelligence, and the miniscule chance of attack success—we must look beyond the knowledge-value of cultivating communicative-surveillance subjects in the war on terror. We have reached a conjuncture in which the “kinetic” function of seeing and saying accords with the preemptive logic that Massumi contrasts with deterrence: in his words, “To avoid the paralysis [of fear and insecurity],
which would make yourself even more of a target and carry the fear to even higher level, you must simply act. In Bush administration parlance, you ‘go kinetic’” (2007, 18). As the terrorists have brought the war into the homeland—that is, as a generalized climate of war has diffused throughout the domestic social order, warranting special security measures and the suspension of previously held rights and responsibilities—citizens are being kinetically articulated through practices whose governmental value is only partially epistemological.

Describing the extra-epistemological significance of cultivating a mass of domestic “citizen soldiers” (Hay 2007), Armand Mattelart has described this diffusion of war as a total strategy of mobilizing the domestic populace. Engaging the career and work of twentieth-century Brazilian General Golbery do Couto e Silva, Mattelart writes, “It was a total strategy because it concerned individuals in all parts of the country, of every race, age, profession, and belief. It erased the longstanding distinction between civilian and military, between interior (homeland) and exterior. It was total because the fronts on which the struggle took place and the weapons it used belonged to every level of individual and collective life and penetrated all its interstices” (2010, 72). As Mattelart points out, in this situation diverse activities in the social order collectively activate the populace in a mobile citizen army, blurring the bounds between peace time and war time, and between peace space and war space. He observes that, in General de Couto e Silva’s mobilization of the populace, “The weapons were of all types. . . . Total war demanded a total response. To meet this requirement, it was necessary to mobilize the lifeblood of the nation, incorporating into the struggle the potential that Golbery called ‘national power’: all the physical and human resources available to each country, all of its spiritual and material capability and the whole
of its economic, political, psycho-social, and military resources” (72). Through this generalization of the state of war, Mattelart adopts the conceptual vocabulary of Carl Schmitt to argue that we are today witnessing a “‘total mobilization’ within the framework of ‘state pedagogy’. . . All these political, economic, cultural, and military efforts demanded that the entire population, who were all subject to the same dangers, agree to the same sacrifices” (72).

In today’s War on Terror, we are witnessing a similar “total mobilization” and physical activation of the citizenry, the synergy of which exceeds whatever epistemological function is being filled by citizen-intelligence. While in the U.S. today we have a great number of citizen-soldiers submitting tips and registering suspicion about terrorist acts, their general mobilization within an activated civic totality—their collective participation in the homeland security apparatus—serves a broader sociopolitical function than simple intelligence provision. Referring to this process as the “militarization” of civic relations, Jordan Crandall argues that “Militarization is a field of articulation that carries its own logic of ordering the world. It runs on a productive economy of fear: the fear of an omnipresent enemy who could be anywhere, strike at any time and who in fact could be ‘among us’. . . It’s a powerful rhetorical frame and machine of territorialization, indoctrination, and recruitment” (Crandall and Armitage 2005, 20). To the extent that the citizen-soldier is articulated through this collective civic struggle, the given product/content of his or her communicative-surveillance labor is overshadowed; it is not especially important that millions of paranoid and bogus tips are generated every year. What is important, however, is that citizens generate active, autonomous realms of security governance in which norms of
suspicion, vigilance, and mutual responsibility are reproduced with mere guidance from the state. What count most, in other words, are the raw activities of seeing and saying that together form a mode of kinetic civic identification.

This kinetic identification, of course, can take diverse forms. Describing the collective mobilization of citizens against crime, Lyn Hinds and Peter Grabosky have observed that “the targets of the state’s responsibilisation strategy are you and I. Its objective is transformative: to encourage us to change the everyday, normal pattern/s of our lives to routinize out crime risk” (2010, 95). Changing the patterns of citizens’ everyday lives helps authorities disrupt criminogenic situations while activating citizen’s identification with the policing apparatus. Torin Monahan, for one, has described how the population is mobilized in ways that are not necessarily communicative-surveillant: “Instead of the state being responsible for ensuring the safety of people, insecurity subjects are charged with regulating their localized territories through consumption. . . . [R]esponsibility for security is being distributed to individual citizens . . . to ensure their own safety through consumption” (2010, 53, 81). Instead of relying on the state to provide for their security, “insecurity subjects” grasp for security by purchasing home security systems, terrorism survival kits, and even homeland security college courses.35

While consumption of security products like cameras and alarm systems obviously serve an epistemological function, Monahan is also interested in the fact that these citizens are fulfilling civic responsibilities through the act of consumption itself. These consumptive practices are an important element of a larger mobilization in which citizens’ sociality and habits of life are modified, intensifying their attachment to the security apparatus. According
to Andrejevic, this is especially manifest in the citizen recruitment practices of security agencies: “In the case of Homeland Security, the invitation to participate in defending the nation against terrorism doubles as an invitation to identify with the administration’s policies and with its definition of the problem: terrorism is an inexplicable force of nature, born of irrational hatred and not amenable to shifts in foreign or domestic policy” (2007, 45). In other words, participation in homeland security objectives fills an identificatory function: when citizens are mobilized to participate in the See Something Say Something program, they are invited to identify with the goals and practices of the security apparatus. By conducting oneself as a mobilized element of that security apparatus, the communicative-survellant subject performs a kind of civic labor whose primary value lies in solidifying bonds of identification between the citizen, the threatened civic community, and the collective security apparatus that preempts the omnipresent terrorist threat.

The cultivated acts of seeing something and saying something, then, come to function as what Barbara Cruikshank calls a “technology of citizenship.” For Cruikshank, a technology of citizenship is “a method for constituting citizens out of subjects and maximizing their political participation. Technologies of citizenship . . . link the subjectivity of citizens to their subject, and link activism to discipline” (1999, 67). Subjects are thus cultivated into citizens by being articulated through various forms of appropriate civic action. Technologies of citizenship, as Cruikshank has pointed out, are the activities by which citizens are empowered to fulfill this civic virtue: “Technologies of citizenship are the means by which government works through rather than against the subjectivities of citizens. The logic of empowerment targets the capacities of the ‘powerless,’ measures and seeks to
maximize their actions, motivations, interests, and economic and political involvements” (69). Discourses of civic responsibility—such as If You See Something, Say Something—are discourses of empowerment that instruct citizens to take charge and be active rather than be powerless and vulnerable: they articulate subjects through technologies of citizenship by which they fulfill mobilized acts of civic identification (see Hay 2007, 219). As Biesecker has pointed out, these acts materialize “as a series of technologies of governance that incited citizens to ‘see’ as/for the State. . . The most notorious of these technologies, “Operation TIPS” (Terrorism Information and Prevention System) . . . make reporting something that citizens see (but about which they are incapable of making sense) into a civic responsibility” (2006, 162). Referring to the TIPS program—an important forerunner to the See Something, Say Something program—Biesecker recognizes the ironic futility of antiterrorist lateral surveillance programs. Citizens are instructed to vigilantly watch over and report on one another, but, in Biesecker’s words, they are incapable of making sense of the cryptological semiotics of terrorism. While they might be deaf and dumb—hermeneutically speaking—to the signs of terrorist activity, they are nonetheless mobilized by technologies of citizenship through which they identify with their ostensibly threatened communities and the homeland security apparatus.

IV. Conclusion

Of course, the two main engines of this materialized, identificatory labor are seeing and saying, surveillance and speech. We are instructed by homeland security discourses and policing rituals that, because the War on Terror is centered on the home front, Americans
should always be watchful (and, likewise, are always potentially being watched). While, as this dissertation has shown, lateral policing programs are nothing new, the War on Terror’s logics of engagement have overhauled the traditional methods and rationalities of lateral policing. Because of the diffuseness of the terrorist threat, the call to spy on one’s peers is always active. We are witnessing the rise of a situation quite reminiscent of how Foucault described the eighteenth-century German police state: this “power had to be given the instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as long as it could itself remain invisible. It had to be like a faceless gaze that transformed the whole social body into a field of perception: thousands of eyes posted everywhere, mobile attentions ever on the alert” (1977, 214). As it is practiced today in the age of terror, this ubiquitous surveillance threatens to transform the citizen-subject into a watchman, a suspect, and an everyday citizen whose de-differentiation and territorial fluidity circulates an almost ubiquitous surveillance potential. As Andrejevic has warned, this scenario risks giving rise to a tendency “to pit all against all in a manner that undermines a sense of the social and threatens to replace community with a variant of hypersuspicious survivalist individualism” (2006, 43–4). Today’s security discourses and citizen action programs cultivate a surveillance and snitching ethic that contributes not only to widespread suspicion and ambivalence among communities, but also to the insinuation of the techniques and mentalities of policing into citizens’ everyday lives. “See Something, Say Something,” therefore, is not just an isolated campaign by which Americans are being persuaded to watch one another; it is also a pithy statement of the lateral policing demands of a society riven by rituals of preemption and categorical suspicion. In other words, because the post-9/11 logic
of preemption has led to all citizens being declared potential walking/driving/flying bombs, this vigilance against terror translates into vigilance against one another (Packer 2006). The secrecy and potential ubiquity of terrorists, argues Jeremy Packer, “creates a situation in which . . . everyone will be policed as if they are potential terrorists. At the same time, all citizens are asked to join in the war on terror as part of DHS initiatives” (2008, 273).

There are some, like Lucia Zedner, who are optimistic about DHS and other agencies inviting citizens to join in the war on terror. Zedner argues that, while the governmentalized state apparatus can no longer claim a monopoly over policing practices, it can play a positive role in upholding reasonable standards of civility, ensuring a more equitable distribution of public resources, and protecting marginalized groups. According to Zedner, “Defending policing as a public good accords strongly with the eighteenth-century neoclassical belief in policing as an integral aspect of civic virtue and a necessary precondition of liberty. According to this ideal, active engagement in the maintenance of liberty was a duty laid upon every citizen. Contemporary calls for ‘community engagement,’ ‘active civic participation,’ and ‘local capacity building’ might just signal a renaissance of this classical notion of civic virtue” (2006, 92–3). I agree with Zedner that these initiatives do have a certain democratic veneer, and that the state could possibly play a positive role in reinforcing positive values of citizenship. Yet I would like to conclude by suggesting that we remain cautious in the face of the governmental shifts that Zedner is applauding. I think it is clear that, as Andrejevic, Packer, and others have recognized, the DHS’s rhetoric of “community engagement” and “active participation” has not produced an engaged, altruistic citizen, but has rather tended to cultivate the citizen-spy. Neoliberal policing strategies and the rhetoric of “community
engagement,” in fact, too often rationalize the state’s abandonment of communities plagued by crime (Hall 2011, 726–8), just as discourses of “participation” often have the effect of identifying citizens with the policing imperatives of the state. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that lay citizens are undeterred by legal restraints and other judicial obstacles that somewhat hinder official state surveillance efforts. Unlike official police officers and antiterrorism officials, co-workers and neighbors do not need a warrant to monitor and record your activities, deem them “suspicious,” and then submit their findings to local law enforcement agencies. In fact, as I described in the introduction to this dissertation, the US Congress is working to legally protect those citizens who recklessly spy and snitch on their neighbors.

Although many of these developments are quite alarming, I do not mean to argue that the growth of preemptive logics and lateral surveillance programs do not allow for productive avenues of resistance and counter-surveillance. There are ways in which the technologization of the citizenry can be used to actively counter the abuses of the state and individuals in positions of power. New trends in “sousveillance”—the methods by which individuals carry out bottom-up surveillance, typically through new mobile technologies—have freed citizens to turn their gaze against the state, allowing them to capture and publicize police brutality and other offenses (Mann, Nolan, and Wellman 2003). In fact, the widespread popularity of mobile surveillance devices has empowered citizens while it has simultaneously disciplined their conduct: nowadays everyone, including police officers, are under threat of constant surveillance by mobile phones and other devices equipped with video recording software (see Wilson and Serisier 2010). In this sense, the rise of preemptive
surveillance practices has a dialogical impact on the police officer as well as the lay civilian, although it must be admitted that legal biases render citizens far more vulnerable under police surveillance than the converse. For this and other reasons, discussions of the liberatory potential of digital/mobile surveillance devices should take a cautious route.

In an age of periodic and unpredictable terrorist attacks, we will be increasingly expected to police one another using the communication and surveillance technologies that we have on hand. To be sure, there is liberatory potential inherent in this crisis of governance. But we should avoid buying into the climate of pervasive suspicion to which the “See Something, Say Something” campaign relies on one’s consensual agreement to govern oneself and others (see Hall et al. 1978, 202). As Cruikshank reminds us, “citizens must be made—which says to me that citizens can be remade, and that the social construction of citizenship is both a promise and a constraint upon the will to empower” (Cruikshank 1999, 123). Keeping in mind the positive valence of the empowerment by which citizens are governed through terrorism, we can, at the very least, resist those hyper-suspicious activities that identify us with the rationalities and techniques of an antagonistic apparatus of preemption. Better still: we can use our technologized bodies to bring accountability to the public agents of an aggressive and increasingly audacious homeland security apparatus.

V. Future Research

There is much work that could be done to further the research conducted in this dissertation. While I have presented a new conceptual justification for treating surveillance and communication as interlocking cultural and political technologies, this is only one early
and relatively brief excursion into their multifaceted relationship. More research from scholars in governmentality studies, rhetoric, media and technology, and surveillance could continue this work in interesting ways, particularly as the relationship between surveillance and communication has surfaced historically. In this project I chose the rather arbitrary period spanning the late nineteenth to the early twenty-first centuries in America; but this history runs much deeper and can be found across cultures. There is evidence that suggests that lateral policing was practiced among the Ancient Judeans from the Early Bronze Age through the Roman period of the early Common Era (Yekutieli 2006). Slave lateral surveillance has been important in a number of cultures, including that of ancient Greece (Morris and Papadopoulos 2005), where lateral policing systems targeting women were also put into place (Johnstone 2003). The Roman Empire (Sabnis 2011) and medieval and early modern Europe (see chapter three) also maintained extensive and diverse lateral policing cultures. And America of the twentieth- and twenty-first-centuries also saw the rise of a number of lateral policing programs that warrant further attention: the so-called “Brown Scare,” in which citizens were urged to carry out surveillance against German-Americans during the First World War, is one such example (see Mastrangelo 2009). The Red Scare, although it has already received extensive scholarly attention (see, e.g., Darsey 1995 and Whitfield 1996), provides another opportunity for scholars examining lateral policing movements. The history of American immigration enforcement, which would include a genealogy of today’s citizen patrols like the Minutemen, would also be a worthy project (see Hasian and McHendry 2012). And the airport, which has become a microcosm of lateral policing practices, deserves further attention in this vein, particularly as “chat-down”
procedures—by which TSA ask passengers random questions in order to establish the truth of their intent and indeed their being—create spectacles of security (see Hall 2007a) that citizens anticipate and consume as they wait for their own time on stage.
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1 In this tradition, according to Esposito, “‘person’ qualifies that which, in a human being, is other than and beyond body” (2012b, 76). According to this configuration, therefore, the human subject becomes a person by fighting against that which is animalistic in him- or herself (see Esposito 2012b, 111, on Kojève). This discourse has produced a portrait of the divided human subject: from Aristotle’s identification of three souls—the vegetative, the animal, and the rational, to Descartes’ identification of the animalistic with the machinic (Peters 1999, 231) through his division of res extensa and res cogitans, to the utilitarian thought of Bentham and Mill, and especially into the discourse of twentieth-century cybernetics, the human has been introduced into a dissociation that has exalted it as the bearer of a more or less supplemental quality that divides him from the machinic/animalistic. That is, the human is granted a transcendent quality that identifies it as an animal with logos. We might also consider those discourses which, from stoicism and monasticism to Cartesianism, have functioned as what Agamben (2004, 37) calls “the anthropological machine”: that is, they have continuously reproduced a discourse that divides the human into an animalistic/machinic body and a properly human essence, typically a soul.

2 Qtd. in Birmingam (2011, 126).

3 For their part, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have argued that biopower should be investigated vis-à-vis the dynamic immanence of social production. Although I think they exaggerate the extent to which Foucault’s “structuralist epistemology” causes him to overlook the “the real dynamics of production in biopolitical society” (2000, 28), their central point is well taken and widely acknowledged: Foucault’s embryotic notion of
biopower opened up a clearing that has hardly begun to be foraged. Hardt and Negri set out to broaden Foucault’s notion of biopower by synthesizing his insights with those of Deleuze and Guattari and those of a number of Italian Autonomist intellectuals (including Mario Tronti, Negri, and Maurizio Lazzarato). According to Hardt and Negri, Deleuze and Guattari “focus our attention clearly on the ontological substance of social production . . . (creative production, production of values, social relations, affects, becomings)” (2008, 28), making us sensitive to the shifting ontology of social reproduction. The Autonomists supplement this, however, by insisting on a grand and ongoing transformation of the terrain and materiality of labor.

4 As Gadamer (1998) notes, however, Aristotle himself does not exactly put the problem in this way. “Zoon logon echon” is Heidegger’s personal interpretation of the above-cited passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* in which Aristotle claims that man is the animal with rationality. This approximate translation forwarded by Heidegger has been picked up and reproduced by a number of scholars working today, most notably Agamben (1998).


6 The historical crux of this project, of course, has been directed toward dividing humans from animals by virtue of their speech: that is to say, a human is a human to the extent that it a speaking animal. Accordingly, since Aristotle we have come to respect speech as something much more than the simple exchange of information. For Aristotle, of course,
the human is the *zoon logon echon*—the animal that is defined by its relationship to speech. As Stuart Elden recognizes, “to say that the human is the animal or being that has language is not to say that humans merely possess it, but that they are, at the same time possessed by it. . . . Language is a fundamental determination of human being-in-the-world; it is what separates us from the animals’ way of being-in-the-world” (2005, 290–1). Providing his own history of the anthropological machine, Heidegger writes, “From ancient times on, there has been the doctrine that humans, in contradistinction with plants and animals, are the beings that have the faculty of speech. This sentence not only means that humans possess, along with other faculties, also that one which enables them to speak. The sentence wants to say: only language enables humans to be those living beings which they are as humans. As the one who speaks, the human being is: the human being” (1998b, 138). While other animals might howl and cajole and cooperate, the human is a human only insofar as it possesses and is possessed by logos. Our status as the animal with logos, therefore, implies much more than a capacity to pass along information to others of our kind. Our relationship to speech is much more basic and essential, and it is thus our being-in-language that makes us—as *zoon logon echon*—distinct from the bare biological life that surrounds us. The relationship, therefore, is not simply supplemental—we are not simply animals who can also speak—we are, instead, speaking-beings in our essence, which makes the human/animal dichotomy a dangerous and simplistic mischaracterization. Accordingly, Timothy C. Campbell has called this process “the separation within man between the human and the animal” (2011, 53).
For a different take on this phenomenon, which treats the informational conception of language as being based in a tendency to look *through* language instead of looking *at* language, see Lanham (2007, 42–64; also see Kellner 1995, 1–2, 12).

Even before the telegraph, citizens were confronted with witnessing protocols that cultivated machinic engagement and communicative uniformity. For example, in the early days of the nineteenth century police intelligence was procured by requiring business owners to develop vast systems of bookkeeping: lodge houses were made to register their guests, and horse coachmen were required to keep track of their passengers’ travels. Whereas businesses routinely kept transaction records for financial reasons, Jeremy Bentham, the utilitarian philosopher and police theorist, emphasized that the information procured for policing authorities should be much broader than the “pecuniary economy usually regarded as the sole object of bookkeeping. . . . Every significant transaction should be recorded” (Bentham 1843, 392; qtd. in Hume 1981, 114). Record books were thus re-envisioned as witnessing practices rather than means to document financial transactions, as fledgling police agencies used record books to attest to the flows in and out of criminogenic spaces.

Yet beyond these specialty occupations, the value and aim of citizen-police communications was hotly debated. While it is well known that Bentham advocated a free press and a more or less unrestricted line of communication between subjects and sovereign, one of the reasons he did so was because it integrated citizens into the governmental operations of the sovereign. Arguing that citizen informants facilitated an appropriate communicative relationship between sovereign and subject, Bentham advised: “The people
may be called canaille, populace, or what you will, but the prince who refuses to hear the
lowest individual of that populace, so far from augmenting his power by doing so, in fact,
diminishes it” (1840, 251–2). Citizen participation in policing minimized corruption by
bringing to the sovereign’s attention any abuses of power, as well any local crimes that might
be overlooked by corrupt administrators. Yet as L.J. Hume points out, to the extent that
“Bentham proposed that members of the public should be allowed and encouraged to send
information and petitions to the relevant authorities. . . . [h]e was thus far viewing the people
as agents of the sovereign, and as means of enhancing the power over its own servants”
(1981, 100). According to Bentham, who was a highly important influence on the
development of the modern Anglo-American police force, open communications could
implicate citizens in the dissemination of sovereign power. Thus the sovereign’s
communication-surveillance apparatus extended its reach through the sensory and
communicative capacities of its citizens.

9 Qtd in Gane (2005, 38).

10 This is not to romanticize Anglo-Saxon modes of governance, however. While the
“Norman Yoke” legend—which idealized feudal, Anglo-Saxon England as a classless
utopia—is typically acknowledged to be mythical fuel for English nationalism, it is
nonetheless important to recognize the real social shifts instituted by the Norman ruling class
(see Chibnall 1999 and Hill 1997).
11 Thomas (1926) describes one such campaign that took place in London in 1302, and DeWindt and DeWindt (2006) assume that this is among the earliest uses of the horn for policing purposes.

12 Other aural technologies were available in medieval England, though it is not clear if they were frequently used in crime prevention or law enforcement. Though there is evidence that hunting whistles had long been used in Europe (Nilsson and Lubbock 1868, 80), the whistle appears to have been neglected in police work until the nineteenth century; even then, police administrators feared its potential to fall into the hands of the subversive general public (Fuld 320–2).

13 These old methods of lateral policing were not significantly reoriented until the institutional revolutions of the nineteenth century. In England, the hue and cry lateral policing scheme was not eliminated until just before the foundation of Robert Peel’s modern police force in 1829 (Godfrey and Lawrence 2005). The sovereign police force, which developed amid the trials of industrialization and urbanization, proved somewhat successful in quelling crime during this period of drastic social change. Although these successes proved so apparent that Queen Victoria soon required all jurisdictions to develop a professional class of police officers—a move that, in effect, relieved from the populace an oppressive debt of responsibility to the state—the police nevertheless relied on a large degree of lateral surveillance to bolster their own activities anyway (e.g., informants, spies, and private complainants).
14 While Rachel Hall (2007b) points out that the Wanted poster did not arise until the nineteenth century, it is useful to note that the Wanted poster is a direct relative of the print hue and cry notices that fueled lateral policing in the medieval and early modern periods. While Hall’s focus on visuality and facial representation orients her attention away from these technologies, a broader historical look can demonstrate how print media more generally revolutionized lateral policing responsibilities and the distribution of communal vigilance.

15 Harold A. Innis (1975) describes how print facilitated the expansion and coordination of the Roman Empire. My analysis of the early English state is indebted to this work, especially chapter five, “The Written Tradition and the Roman Empire.”

16 A convergence of technological developments—particularly the proliferation of a print-based legal culture, as well as the large-scale public construction of roads—made possible this transition from an oral legal culture to a print-reliant sovereignty. For national law to displace local law enforcement traditions, the law had to become “common” to all local communities. This “common law,” of course, relied on print records in order to compile and distribute its legacy of legal precedents, establishing the state’s legal tradition as the warden of law enforcement and prosecutorial procedures. And in order for the common law to be practicable, of course, new systems of transportation needed to be developed through which rulings and legal precedents could be distributed to communities throughout England. This process accelerated between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, as a more extensive and practical road system proved necessary in order to circulate food from rural farms to urban centers (Lay 1992, 70). This innovation in agricultural transport, of course, also eased
the travel of state bureaucracies. Centralized, state-appointed justices of the peace—who were the primary citizens learned in the printed legal tradition—would race between communities to debrief local constables. Thus justices of the peace and constables soon found themselves burdened by the evolving and increasingly bureaucratized demands of a nationalized legal code, and therefore their powers, though now “official,” became less independent (Dawson 1999, 139–41).

17 The hue and cry policing method was the foundation of medieval crime response in England. Once a crime was committed, witnesses would raise a “hue and cry”—utilizing their voices, whistles, and whatever else they had on hand—and would trail the criminal until s/he was captured. Thus every male citizen could be deputized into an ad-hoc police force at any moment. For an overview of the hue and cry and other pre-modern policing practices, see Critchley (1967, 1–28), and Lucia Zedner (2006).

18 See Radzinowicz (1957, 47–50). In 1822, J.T. Barber Beaumont—one of England’s chief law enforcement officers in the early nineteenth century—testified before a government committee about how to best overhaul this emerging hue and cry media strategy:

It is true that there is a police newspaper called the “Hue and Cry,” but it is only published ONCE in three weeks, and now that the communication all over the kingdom is so rapid, no one would think of giving three weeks start to a criminal before a hue and cry were raised. That paper is of no use. . . . To produce a really effective “Hue and Cry,” it is therefore proposed for all informations of robberies, frauds, and other great offences in and about the
metropolis, to be taken on oath at the police offices. . . [and] to be abstracted and transmitted every day at noon to a central office. . . . [and] to be immediately inserted in a Police Gazette, published every afternoon and set to every police office. (1822, 131)

Beaumont relates that the central problems facing the early police are the spatiotemporal constraints that limit officers’ abilities to intervene into and prevent criminal activity. The main problem with the *Hue and Cry Gazette* was its infrequency: with innovations in communication and transport, criminals were beating the police at the communication game. Old methods of police-media response were thus totally ineffective at meeting the challenges of the new century, and more effective means of distributing print media would help spread the hue and cry across time and space.

19 This distributive method was hotly debated among nineteenth century police officials. See, for instance, Clarkson and Richardson (1889, 280–85).

20 Qtd. in Ericson and Haggerty (1997, 78).

21 An article in *Police Chief* magazine (Stevens 2010) outlines this protocol for social media development.

22 Also see Police Social Media (2013).

23 For a more thorough account of Rush’s theory of rhetoric, see Williams 2000.

24 As Joseph Gusfield argues, “What is so outstanding about the WCTU in this period (1870–1900) is the union of the diverse strands in social Christianity. Populists and anti-populists, Suffragists and non-Suffragists, pro-Labor and anti-Labor views were all
represented in the WCTU” (1986, 93).

25 See *Medical Age* (1884, 101) for a contemporaneous critique of their claims to scientific knowledge.

26 Qtd. in Joiner (2007, 95, fn. 53).

27 Other temperance organizations followed the WCTU in placing a strong emphasis on moral suasion. Like the WCTU, the Anti-Saloon League, for example, was divided into departments: their Agitation Department distributed propaganda, delivered speeches, and held events like Anti-Saloon Sunday, where local ASL activists would address church members from the pulpits of local churches (see Kerr 1980).

28 The WCTU “promoted a definition of patriotism based on public service, an option increasingly open to women” (see McCarthy 2008, 199–200).

29 Qtd. in Birmingham (2011, 126).


31 Qtd. in Greenberg (2007, 21–2).

32 Qtd in Brown (1975, 153).

33 See http://neighborhoodwatchradio.org/

34 Qtd in Massumi (2007, 1).

35 See, for example, http://www.homeland-security-college.org/.