

ABSTRACT

ANDERSON, ALECIA DANIELLE. Political Stability: A Study of Trust and Legitimacy in South Africa. (Under the direction of Dr. Michael D. Schulman and Dr. Sarah K Bowen).

Since its independence from the tyranny of Apartheid, South Africa has been hailed as a model for peaceful democratic transition. However the legitimacy of the South African state according to the perspectives of its citizens is questionable. In this study, I use Afrobarometer data from 2004 and 2008 to investigate these citizens' perspectives on trust, political approval and representative democratic values in an effort to shed light on the plausibility of future stability in the nation. The results are mixed; however, based on the data, it is clear that ethnic identity continues to account for both general and government trust, approval of political offices and policies, and representative democratic values as well as evaluation of the current democracy in South Africa. Additionally, as suggested by social capital theory, trust does have a significant influence on political approval. Finally, the citizens' support for representative democratic values and evaluation of the current democracy in South Africa are disconcertingly low. Taken together, the results of this study establish several concerns regarding the plausibility of continued stable democracy. Nevertheless, they also illuminate possible avenues for the improvement of trust and legitimacy in the nation which will reassure political stability in the future.

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Political Stability: A Study of Trust and Legitimacy in South Africa

by
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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the many people I met in South Africa who changed my life forever. I am awash with gratitude for the direction and resolve that you have gifted to me.

BIOGRAPHY

Alecia Danielle Anderson was born on September 14, 1980 in Steubenville, Ohio. After graduating from Steubenville High School in 1998, she attended The Ohio State University, where she earned her Bachelor of Arts with a dual degree in African American and African Studies and Sociology. Upon completion of this degree, she remained at The Ohio State University to pursue a Master of Arts degree in African American and African Studies. During the course of pursuing her graduate degree, she was fortunate to study abroad to South Africa, which focused her research interests on the issues facing South Africa's citizens and their effects on political stability. Alecia's ongoing interest in investigating citizen concerns lead her to continue to pursue a doctoral degree at North Carolina State University, where, with the support of many, she completed her Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology in 2013.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Prologue	1
Political Legitimacy	4
Trust	7
Goals and Research Questions.....	8
The Case of South Africa.....	9
Summary of Chapters	11
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE.....	13
Legitimacy	13
Alternative Perspectives from Marx and neo-Marxists	25
Trust	28
Research Problem and Questions.....	38
CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS	41
Introduction.....	41
South African History and Context.....	42
Data.....	49
Key Variables.....	51
Method	70
CHAPTER FOUR: FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE TRUST AMONG SOUTH AFRICANS	74
Introduction.....	74
Hypotheses	75
Methods.....	79
Round 3 Results	86

Round 4 Results	90
Analysis and Discussion	92
Summary and Preliminary Conclusions.....	103
CHAPTER FIVE: INFLUENCES OF TRUST ON POLITICAL APPROVAL	107
Introduction.....	107
Hypotheses	108
Methods.....	113
Round 3 Results	119
Round 4 Results	122
Analysis and Discussion	128
Summary and Preliminary Conclusions.....	142
CHAPTER SIX: REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND THE EVALUATION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRACY.....	149
Introduction.....	149
Hypotheses	150
Methods.....	154
Round 3 Results	159
Round 4 Results	162
Analysis and Discussion	165
Summary and Preliminary Conclusions.....	174
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION	179
Introduction.....	179
Summary of Conclusions	180
Limitations	182
Implications.....	185
Future Research	189
REFERENCES	192
APPENDICES	214

Appendix A.....	215
Appendix B.....	286

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Afrobarometer Round 3 Variables.....	215
Table 3.2: Afrobarometer Round 4 Variables.....	216
Table 3.3: Afrobarometer Round 3 Survey Questions.....	217
Table 3.4: Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey Questions.....	223
Table 3.5: Study 1, Round 3 Descriptive Statistics	230
Table 3.6: Study 2, Round 3 Descriptive Statistics	232
Table 3.7: Study 3, Round 3 Descriptive Statistics	234
Table 3.8: Study 1, Round 4 Descriptive Statistics	236
Table 3.9: Study 2, Round 4 Descriptive Statistics	238
Table 3.10: Study 3, Round 4 Descriptive Statistics	240
Table 3.11: Correlation Matrix Round 3 Study 1	242
Table 3.12: Correlation Matrix Round 4 Study 1	243
Table 3.13: Correlation Matrix Round 3 Study 2	244
Table 3.14: Correlation Matrix Round 4 Study 2	245
Table 3.15: Correlation Matrix Round 3 Study 3	246
Table 3.16: Correlation Matrix Round 4 Study 3	247
Table 4.1: OLS Regression Predicting General Trust Round 3.....	248
Table 4.2: OLS Regression Predicting General Trust Round 3.....	249
Table 4.3A: OLS Regression Predicting General Trust Round 3.....	250
Table 4.3B: OLS Regression Predicting General Trust Round 3	251

Table 4.4: OLS Regression Predicting General Trust Round 3.....	253
Table 4.5: OLS Regression Predicting General Trust Round 3.....	254
Table 4.6: Summary of Significant Indicators of General Trust	255
Table 4.7: Summary of Significant Indicators of Government Trust	256
Table 5.1: OLS Regression Predicting Approval of Offices Round 3.....	257
Table 5.2: OLS Regression Predicting Approval of Offices Round 4.....	259
Table 5.3: OLS Regression Predicting Approval of Economic Policies Round 3.....	261
Table 5.4: OLS Regression Predicting Approval of Economic Policies Round 4.....	263
Table 5.5: OLS Regression Predicting Approval of Social Policies Round 3.....	265
Table 5.6: OLS Regression Predicting Approval of Social Policies Round 4.....	267
Table 5.7: Summary of Significant Indicators of Approval of Offices	270
Table 5.8: Summary of Significant Indicators of Approval of Economic Policies	271
Table 5.9: Summary of Significant Indicators of Approval of Social Policies	272
Table 5.10: Summary of Significant Indicators in Interaction Models	273
Table 6.1: OLS Regression Predicting Elections Round 3	274
Table 6.2: OLS Regression Predicting Elections Round 4	275
Table 6.3: OLS Regression Predicting Lawmakers Round 3	276
Table 6.4: OLS Regression Predicting Lawmakers Round 4	277
Table 6.5: OLS Regression Predicting Laws Round 3	278
Table 6.6: OLS Regression Predicting Laws Round 4	279
Table 6.7: OLS Regression Predicting South African Democracy Round 3	280

Table 6.8: OLS Regression Predicting South African Democracy Round 4.....	281
Table 6.9: OLS Regression Predicting South African Satisfaction Round 3.....	282
Table 6.10: OLS Regression Predicting South African Satisfaction Round 4.....	283
Table 6.11: Summary of Significant Indicators of Representative Democratic Values...	284
Table 6.12: Summary of Significant Indicators of the State of Democracy in SA.....	285

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1: Interaction between Ethnicity and Identity on Government Trust Round 3	286
Figure 4.2: Interaction between Education and Identity on Government Trust Round 3	287
Figure 5.1: Interaction between Ethnicity and General Trust Round 4 on Approval of Offices Round 4.....	288
Figure 5.2: Interaction between Ethnicity and General Trust Round 4 on Approval of Economic Policies Round 4.....	289
Figure 5.3: Interaction between Ethnicity and General Trust Round 4 on Approval of Social Policies Round 4.....	290
Figure 5.4: Interaction between Ethnicity and Government Trust 1 Round 4 on Approval of Social Policies Round 4.....	291

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Prologue

Democratic forms of government are arguably the most beneficial for members of a society because they empower citizens in state processes, ensuring that the collective interests of the people are met (Locke [1690] 2002, Mill [1859] 2007). One of the major challenges facing developing democracies in our current global society is political stability. Scholars have studied the causes of political stability over the centuries and identified many factors that influence the stability of a political system, ranging from economic shifts to cultural and religious turmoil (Bienen and Gersovitz 1985; Marx [1843] 1994; Ross 2001). Political stability has commonly been understood in terms of the absence of violence, the presence of control or the degree of functionality achieved by the state (Margolis 2010). Proponents of this final perspective on political stability argue that a state is stable when it is able to perform its responsibilities – security, opportunity and public services to citizens (Margolis 2010). In accordance with this view of the state, I argue that the determining factor influencing political stability is the degree to which citizens perceive the state as legitimate. If citizens do not view their state as legitimate, the society becomes at risk for military coups, civil wars or other acts of insurgence that threaten peaceful coexistence.

Social contract theorists and classic democratic theorists developed theoretical perspectives on political legitimacy. Later, work by Weber and Marx developed our understanding of what political legitimacy is and how it is both developed and maintained. Political legitimacy is understood by sociologists as the popular acceptance of the authority

of a government (Locke [1690] 2002; Rousseau [1762] 2007; Weber [1947] 2012). When a state fails to maintain its authority, citizens will begin to look to alternatives means of influencing the society (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). When this occurs, a nation can become politically unstable which, in a globalized world, could have reverberating effects and cause political and economic turmoil in many other nations. For example, the massive public uprising and civil wars during the Arab Spring, in which several northern African nations including Tunisia, Egypt and Libya engaged in massive protests. These protests have been violent in some cases and have resulted in substantial losses of lives and public and private property. The international community has taken notice, with the United Nations Security Council stepping in to adopt sanctions on Libya, which was also referred to the International Criminal Court (Grant 2012). In addition, NATO conducted a five month military campaign in order to remove Colonel Qaddafi from power in Libya (Grant 2012).

Globalization further complicates issues of political stability. Our world has become increasingly interconnected through interdependent economies and advanced forms of communication (Robinson 2003; Sassen 2001). While competing in a newly advancing global economy, states must continue to address responsibilities to their citizens. These dual objectives strain the relationship between the state and its constituents. In many cases, the strain leads to political instability which has devastating effects on society, including ethnic genocide, military coups and civil war.¹

¹ Many newly independent sub-Saharan African nations have struggled with these problems, such as the cases of Sudan, Rwanda, and The Democratic Republic of Congo

The roles and responsibilities of the state are constantly changing due to globalization. Citizens expect the state to act on behalf of their needs. At the same time, states must also compete in the global economy in order to prosper by adopting neoliberal policies that disregard the needs and expectation of citizens (Babb 2005). Additionally, states must respond to multinational organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that demand changes in government in order to access loans and credit (Babb 2005; McMichael 2004). Moreover, in some developing democracies, the strains of global capitalism result in government corruption, either actual or perceived (De Sardan 1999; Lodge 1988; Rothstein and Eek 2009).

Furthermore, in multicultural societies, ethnic antagonisms challenge political legitimacy as citizens must trust that the state is not acting in favor of any one ethnic group over others (Valadez 2001). In cases where that assurance did not occur, ethnic genocide has occurred. The most recent occurrence is in the Darfur region of Sudan, where millions of Darfuris continue to suffer at the hands of the state which continues to support nomadic Arab tribes who slaughter African farmers to take control of their land (Editor 2013a).

Social capital theorists and historical institutionalists provide explanations regarding the critical impact that trust has on political legitimacy. In this sense, trust does not just refer to a dyadic relationship between individuals but to one's perception about the future contingent actions of others (Sztompka 1999: 25). When people trust their governing institutions, they tend to be more satisfied with those institutions and support them (Anderson2010; Sztompka 1999).

South Africa is one of several developing democracies that provide us with an excellent case to explore the components of political stability. South Africa has been hailed as a model for ethnic reconciliation, economic development and peaceful democratic transition (Butler 2004; Sparks 2003; Thompson 2000). However, the degree of trust among South Africans for each other and for their government is still questionable. Persistent inequality between white and black South Africans and recent fractioning within the African National Congress (ANC) raise questions about the future of South African democracy (Butler 2004; Hendricks 2003; Moller 2007; Sparks 2003). In this dissertation, I use South Africa as a case study to examine the relationship between the citizens' perceived legitimacy of the state. I argue that states seen as illegitimate would have trouble meeting the challenges of authority, and, as a result be politically unstable and in danger of falling apart.

Political Legitimacy

Many theorists have argued that political legitimacy is an important component for maintaining a stable society. Four macro-level theoretical perspectives inform the discussion of political legitimacy – social contract theory, classical democratic theory, Weber's theory of power and authority, and Marxian theory. While each of these theories addresses political legitimacy and citizen trust of the state, their approaches and emphases differ. Together, the theories provide a comprehensive understanding of political legitimacy and its role in the relationship between states and citizens.

Social contract theorists argue that the role of the state is to develop and maintain civil liberty in place of individual freedom (Hobbes [1651] 2008; Locke [1690] 2002; Rousseau [1762] 2007). The state fosters civil liberty by allocating rights to all citizens equally. Citizens evaluate the legitimacy of the state based on this criterion (Rousseau [1762] 2007). Social contract theory, then, implies that state legitimacy requires trust from citizens (Bendix 2007). Citizens must trust that their leaders and institutions will meet the expectations set forth in the social contract (Abramowitz 1989a). A government that has earned the trust of its citizens because it has fulfilled its promises and met its citizens' expectations can enjoy legitimacy in its position of authority. The state acts to maintain its legitimacy through legislative power ordained by the people.

Classical democratic theorists analyze the relationships between citizens and the state in democratic systems (Locke [1690] 2002; Mill [1859] 2007; Rousseau [1762] 2007). Like social contract theorists, they assume that the role of the state is to ensure civil liberty. They focus on participation as the means of achieving this goal, as their central argument is that freedom is maintained by individual participation and, in turn, each individual's participation ensures that no one citizen has more or less power than another (Locke [1690] 2002; Mill [1859] 2007; Pateman 1970; Rousseau [1762] 2007). So, like social contract theory, classical democratic theory emphasizes freedom through equality. They also imply that trust plays a role in the function of democratic governments. While participation allows citizens to impact the government, there is no certainty that the state is fulfilling its role and obligation to

distribute power and influence equally. Instead, citizens must trust that their governing bodies are upholding the democratic arrangements to which they agreed.

Weber discusses political legitimacy in terms of power and authority. He argues that there are three ideal types of legitimate authority: rational or legal authority, traditional authority, or charismatic authority (Weber [1947] 2012). In order to translate authority into legitimacy, citizens must trust the legality of a policy, leader or bureaucratic order. The people determine whether the state meets their expectations. In each ideal type of authority described by Weber, the citizens determine if the policies and procedures of the state are consistent with the rationale, traditions or sanctity of the established system (Weber [1947] 2012). Therefore citizen trust is imperative for legitimacy to prevail.

While the social contract theorists, the classical democratic theorists and Weber argue that individuals willingly consent to the authority of the state, Marx and neo-Marxists imply that states rely on coercion to legitimate their actions. Neo-Marxists argue that the state does not strive for legitimacy by meeting the expectations of the masses. Rather, the state is beholden to the wealthy class and tries to legitimize the capital accumulation and substantiate the wealth attained by the upper class (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Frankel 1979; Marx [1843] 1994; Marx and Engels [1843] 1998; Wright 1978). Legitimacy is still necessary for political stability, but it's relegated to manipulative techniques used to subdue what might otherwise become a volatile population. Likewise, rather than evaluating the state as an institution striving to earn the trust of its citizens, Marx and neo-Marxists view the state as an institution that intimidates citizens into abiding by its authority. While citizens may continue to distrust

the state, they are more likely to abide by its authority because they do not believe there is any alternative. According to these perspectives, citizens do not view the state as legitimate because they trust it, but because they are controlled by it (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Liebowitz 1992; Marx [1843] 1994; Marx [1848] 1998; Marx [1867] 1976).

Trust

Trust is critical for political stability because it allows people to function in a democratic fashion via increased sociability, political participation and cooperation. Increased trust among individuals leads society toward a culture of trust, which is necessary for the legitimization of the state, its policies and institutions (Sztompka 1999). Democratic states foster the development of a culture of trust through conducting periodic elections, instituting a system of checks and balances, empowering independent courts and creating other institutions that help to ensure the safety and rights of individual citizens in an equally predictable manner (Anderson 2010; Sztompka 1999).

There are several factors that influence the emergence of trust. Some of these are macro-societal structures, such as the norms of the society or the transparency of social organizations. In addition, there are several factors that are specific to the individual (Sztompka 1999). These include race or ethnic identity, financial or economic position, generation or age, and location, both globally and domestically (Anderson 2010; Davis 1998; Dean 1960; Flora and Flora 2008; Guterbock 1980; Herreros and Criado 2008; Laponce 1967; Mattes 2012; Mozaffar 2002; Nunnally 2012; Opp 2000; Saiderman and Ayres 2000;

Valadez 2001; Zeitlin 1967). These factors can have significant influences on the networks and the interactions that social capital theorists deem necessary for the development of trust (Anderson 2010; Coleman 1988; Flora and Flora 2008; Granovetter 1973; Putnam 2000).

Goals and Research Questions

From the previous theories and research on political legitimacy and trust, we see several important findings. First, political legitimacy and trust are critical to the stability of any society. Second, as argued by social contract theorists, social democratic theorists and Weber, political legitimacy is determined by citizens. Although neo-Marxists provide a counter argument – contending that states use coercive efforts to legitimate the actions of the wealthy class, Marxian approaches emphasize the importance of trust for capitalist democracy, albeit this trust may be based on class-biased processes of coercion.

Third, the key factor present in each of these perspectives on legitimacy is trust. Without trust, citizens might lose patience when anticipating the actions of the state. Therefore, trust must be investigated in order to determine how it is developed and how it might be impacting political legitimacy. Finally, in addition to active participation, there are many structural factors that influence an individual's development of trust. However, there are no studies that specifically investigate the relationships between structural factors, trust and legitimacy. Contemporary scholars have not applied the arguments regarding political legitimacy developed by social contract theory to contemporary democratic states. Likewise, scholars who examine trust relationships have not studied the relationship between trust and

political legitimacy. Therefore the factors that influence trust, legitimacy and ultimately political stability need to be explored.

My investigation of political stability includes an analysis of the structural factors that influence trust, the effects of trust on political approval and the factors that influence democratic values. Therefore, I consider the following research questions regarding political stability in South Africa; Research Question 1: What are the structural factors that influence trust? Research Question 2: How does trust, and the structural factors that influence trust, impact political approval? Research Question 3: What are the structural factors that influence representative democratic values?

The Case of South Africa

South Africa, a developing democracy, presents an ideal setting in which to evaluate sociological questions of legitimacy, trust and political stability. Less than 20 years ago, South Africa transitioned from an authoritarian rule under Apartheid to an inclusive democratic structure for the first time in its history. Apartheid in South Africa encompassed nearly 50 years of overt segregation and oppression. Legislation was imposed to define citizens into racial categories and then to establish a legal racial hierarchy which dictated higher levels of prestige, income, and freedom to the white and lower levels to the black South Africans (Butler 2004; Hendricks 2003; Sparks 2003; Thompson 2000).

Since its independence in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) political party has dominated the South African state (Butler 2004; Herbst 2005; Shubane and Stack 1999;

Silke 2009). The ANC evolved from an Apartheid resistance organization to a national political party with the election of Nelson Mandela. Mandela's peaceful policies of inclusion and forgiveness were well respected and revered, maintaining the popularity of the ANC (Hendricks 2003; Sparks 2003). However, the ANC has had ups and downs since Mandela's retirement from office. His successor, Thabo Mbeki, did not attain the popularity of Mandela. Both his policies and his character were routinely questioned until he was eventually asked to step down amid accusations of corruption (Bearak 2008; Herbst 2005; Hawker 2002; Silke 2009).

Mbeki's early resignation and the election of South Africa's current president, Jacob Zuma, caused a division in the ANC. A group of members defected and created a new political party named the Congress of the People (Cope) (Bearak 2008; Silke 2009). Following the fractioning, Zuma's popularity has plummeted. He has been criticized for his failure to address a failing education system and pervasive unemployment (Dugger 2010). In addition, the ANC, under Zuma's leadership, is now at odds with its youth wing, the ANC Youth League, and concern that the ANC is failing to become a more democratic party is growing (McKaiser 2012; Polgreen 2012a).

It is critical that we pay close attention to the voices of South Africa's citizens during this time. Therefore, this project aims to investigate the structural bases of trust relationships among South Africans in order to provide a better understanding of how trust influences sociopolitical development and the relationships between states and citizens. Studying the

ongoing relationship between South Africa's government and its citizens will flesh out a more detailed understanding of political trust and stability.

Summary of Chapters

In Chapter Two, I begin with an overview of the literature on political legitimacy and trust. This section discusses the four sociological perspectives on political legitimacy; their arguments regarding legitimacy, the relationship between state and citizens and the factors necessary to foster legitimacy. This section also includes a discussion of trust, its relationship with political legitimacy, its role in political attitudes and behaviors and the factors that influence its development.

Chapter Three provides a detailed description of the case of South Africa as well as the data and methods that I use to investigate my research questions. Using Afrobarometer data, I identify several variables that measure possible indicators of trust, political approval and democratic values. This section also includes a brief discussion of the methods I use to investigate the relationships described in my research questions.

The following empirical chapters detail the results and discussion of the research questions. Chapter Four includes the details regarding the analysis of the structural factors that influence trust. I begin with an explanation of the hypotheses I developed to anticipate the structural factors that influence general trust among citizens and government trust. Next, I present the results of regression models. Finally, I discuss the implications and present plausible explanations for the findings.

Chapter Five does the same for the analysis of the relationship between trust and the structural factors that influence trust and political approval. Chapter Six includes an analysis of the structural factors that influence democratic values. The study concludes with a final chapter discussing the implications of the findings and recommendations for further investigation.

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature for this study. I begin with theoretical perspectives that discuss political legitimacy, including social contract theory, classic democratic theory, Weber's theory of power and authority, and Marxist theory. Next, I discuss a key element implied in all of this literature – trust. I provide a summary of two sets of literature that examine the development of trust – the social capital perspective and literature on the structural bases of trust. I then discuss studies that have investigated the relationship between trust and political attitudes and behaviors. Finally, I conclude by synthesizing the literature and outlining my primary research questions.

Legitimacy

Political legitimacy is understood as the popular acceptance of the authority of a government (Locke [1690] 2002; Rousseau [1762] 2007; Weber [1947] 2012), and social scientists argue that it is important for the stability of society. In nations where governments have not maintained legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, political apathy, military coups or ethnic genocide have occurred.² Thus, I argue that legitimacy is important because it is the key to maintaining a peaceful state-citizen relationship.

Three macro-level theoretical perspectives lead the discussion on political legitimacy - social contract theory, classical democratic theory, and Weber's theory of power and authority. These perspectives agree that legitimacy is maintained by states that foster

² Many newly independent sub-Saharan African nations have struggled with military coups or civil wars, such as the cases of Sudan, Rwanda, or The Democratic Republic of Congo.

citizens' consent by meeting those citizens' expectations. A fourth perspective, based on Marxian theory, presents an alternative standpoint, by arguing that states rely on coercion to legitimate their actions, rather than building consensus.

Social contract theorists provided a broad, abstract theory regarding legitimacy in the state-citizen relationships (Hobbes [1651] 2008; Locke [1690] 2002; Rousseau [1762] 2007). Their goal was to remain abstract so that the broader principles of the theory can be applied to any society across space and time, while classical democratic theorists applied their arguments to the specific context of democratic government. Rousseau and Locke contributed to both theoretical paradigms, bridging the more general arguments of social contract theory to the more specific classical democratic theory which contends that citizen participation plays a key role in maintaining legitimacy. Weber and Marx were influenced by these perspectives and contributed their standpoints to the debate. Weber's theorization, which was developed partly in response to Marx, analyzes the inner workings of political legitimacy, the ideal types of legitimacy in society and the means under which it is maintained. Marx expresses a uniquely different interpretation of state-citizen relationships than the social contract theorists, classical democratic theorists or Weber by arguing that legitimacy is only pursued by the state in terms of legitimation of the capitalist system. In this section, I describe the details of each theory's main arguments in regards to legitimacy, the role of the state, legitimacy in state-citizen relationships, and the role that trust plays in those relationships.

Legitimacy through State Obligations to Citizens

Social contract theorists, classical democratic theorists and Weber recognize the importance of legitimacy for political stability. Like social contract theorists, classical democratic theorists argue that the role of the state is to ensure civil liberty in place of individual freedom. Both theories agree that this is achieved by allocating rights to all citizens equally. The classical democratic theorists argue that participation is the means of achieving this goal, as their central argument is that freedom is maintained by individual participation and, in turn, each individual's participation ensures that no one citizen has more or less power than another.

Weber provides us with an understanding of how the state is able to achieve legitimacy through the functions it performs for the citizens. He argues that the most common basis for legitimacy is the belief in legality and suggests that in order for a political order to endure, it must be routinized through bureaucratic order. The bureaucracy is the operative system of the state, and it enjoys legitimacy through legality determined by the citizens. The following three sections include more detailed discussions of the major emphases of social contract theory, classical democratic theory and Weber's theory of power and authority.

Social Contract Theory

Social contract theorists argue that legitimacy between state and citizen is crucial for the stability of a nation (Rousseau [1762] 2007). According to classical social contract

theory, the primary challenge in every society is to manage unification in such a way that would grant each individual access to those resources without impeding on individual freedoms. Rousseau explains the challenge is:

“to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. This is the fundamental problem of which the *Social Contract* provides the solution” (Rousseau [1762] 2007: 32).

The social contract is an agreement between individuals and the state. Society emerges from the individuals involved in the agreement. It is not an agreement between citizens and any one government; rather it is an agreement between the individual and the collective (Hobbes [1651] 2008; Locke [1690] 2002; Rousseau [1762] 2007). It is the collective that is sovereign, and viewing the contract this way allows one to understand Rousseau’s argument that the social contract is something that will be found at work in every legitimate society, regardless of the form of government. The social contract is important, according to Rousseau, because legitimate states exist only by the consent of the people and act only by popular will (Rousseau [1762] 2007).

Hobbes and Rousseau agree that this social contract is necessary because the natural passions of men include individual liberty and domination over others (Hobbes [1651] 2008; Rousseau [1762] 2007). The contract introduces constraints on those individual liberties in exchange for civil liberty developed by means of unification and ensured by the threat of punishment at the hands of the state. According to Hobbes, the only way to create this united, civil liberty is to confer all individual power into one governing body and then for each

individual to feel a connection to that governing power with the expectation that it will act for the common good. This, he says, is not simply an act of consent, but a real unity – a people who say to each other “I authorize and give up my right of governing myself...on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner” (Hobbes [1651] 2008: 114). Once the individuals in the society agree to these terms, they create what Rousseau terms “the sovereign”. The sovereign is the embodiment of the collective of citizens – the unified body in which political power should always reside and which always owns the right to that political power (Rousseau [1762] 2007).

In order to achieve this equal allocation of rights, adherence to the social contract necessitates the development of a government and laws. Government and laws give the social contract “movement and will” (Rousseau [1762] 2007: 40). The government serves as an intermediate body between the sovereign and the individual, created to execute these laws.

Rousseau argues that the state survives because of its legislative power ordained by the sovereign. In order for the sovereign to maintain authority in the state, periodic assemblies of the people, en masse, must be scheduled without danger of repeal or disregard. Without this, citizens run the risk of becoming greedy, cowardly or apathetic. When this happens, the sovereign authority disappears; and the society ceases to exist (Rousseau [1762] 2007). The state should therefore assure its safe foundation by these means in order for it to maintain stability (Rousseau [1762] 2007).

Social contract theorists argue that political legitimacy is determined by the people. Those who are ruled look for a reason why they are in a subordinate position to their rulers,

or conversely, legitimacy for those that rule. Thus, citizens play a major role in determining political stability. They decide if the state is legitimate in its policies and actions, at least concerning domestic affairs (Bendix 2007).

In democratic nations, common unity and identity is tied to national citizenship which embodies the rights and responsibilities of those living under the laws of the state.

Citizenship serves the function of equalizing the people who may otherwise differ in terms of wealth, power, status or achievement (Ramphela 2001). Citizens expect this equality. Its deliverance leads to trust for governing bodies.

A government that has earned the trust of its citizens because it has fulfilled its promises and met its citizens' expectations can enjoy legitimacy in its position of authority (Abramowitz 1989a). Other social scientists have argued that citizens must trust that their leaders and institutions will make good on the promises it has made. As Anderson states, "Our mutual faith in each other is one fundamental essence of democracy" (Anderson 2010: 1). Citizens and states, alike, must have a mutual feeling of trust that each party will adhere to the parameters outlined in the social contract. Specifically, citizens must trust that the system will protect them regardless of the circumstances of the day (Anderson 2010). The existence of this trust allows citizens to endure temporary losses (in elections, policy initiatives, etc.) and resolve differences peacefully and within the confines of the current governing system (Anderson 2010).

Thus, political legitimacy and stability ultimately rests on trust. Yet social contract theorists rarely analyze trust specifically. This is odd considering that in order to maintain a

stable relationship, each citizen, must trust that the state is treating them with equal consideration, bearing his or her best interests in mind (Anderson 2010). Without trust, “only very simple forms of human cooperation which can be transacted on the spot are possible” (Luhmann 1979:88). Therefore, trust must be the key for maintaining a stable and legitimate political system.

Classic Democratic Theory

Classical approaches to democratic theory focus on the equalizing function of participation (Locke [1690] 2002; Mill [1859] 2007; Rousseau [1762] 2007). The central argument of these theorists is that freedom is attained and maintained by individual participation in the political system. This participation allows the individual a degree of control or power over his life and over the structure of his environment (Locke [1690] 2002; Pateman 1970; Rousseau [1762] 2007).

Classical democratic theorists agree that participation is important but diverge in their views regarding the functions and contexts of political participation. Rousseau argued that participation promotes interdependence, so that each citizen is powerless without the cooperation of other citizens. No one individual holds more power than another and therefore real power is attained through cooperation. This power equity ensures that the only policy that will be acceptable to all is one where the benefits and the burdens are equally shared (Rousseau [1762] 2007).

Like Rousseau, Locke viewed the government as an institution developed to ensure the rights of all people. He argued that the government allowed “men” to live in their natural state of “perfect freedom” – to act as they see fit within the bounds of the law of nature (Locke [1690] 2002: 2). Thus government is necessary, as he argues that “where there is no law there is no freedom” (Locke [1690] 2002: 25). Freedom, according to Locke, referred specifically to being free from restraint and violence from others, which is impossible if there is no government (Locke [1690] 2002).

Because the purpose of the government is to ensure freedom, Locke argues that governments can and do include their constituents in its processes (Locke [1690] 2002). As the individual gives up his or her right to exert dominance or power over others, he willingly bestows that power to the state. The state, then, is able to employ his force for the execution of judgments whenever necessary to ensure freedom. These judgments are his own, either being made by the individual himself or his representative. He authorizes the government to create laws for him as required for the public good of society (Locke [1690] 2002). Thus, although Locke does not discuss the psychological effects of participation like Rousseau, he understands that individuals participate in the political process by relinquishing their individual legislative and executive powers to the government to act, through its representatives, in accordance with the public good (Locke [1690] 2002). Individuals participate in their governance through consent, both initially and by the absence of revolt against or withdraw from the commonwealth (Locke [1690] 2002).

Mill echoes these sentiments of interrelationship between individuals expressed by Rousseau and Locke (Locke [1690] 2002; Mill [1859] 2007; Pateman 1970; Rousseau [1762] 2007). He argues that the only legitimate reason why power should be exerted over any citizen is to prevent harm to others (Mill [1859] 2007). Freedom of thought and expression should be maintained without interference from the government or any other individual. The importance of this is to allow for all perspectives to inform society in an effort to improve the common good (Mill [1859] 2007). In addition, he argues that individuals must participate in public affairs in order for his or her capabilities for responsible public action to become developed (Mill [1910] 2012; Pateman 1970).

Representative government, according to Mill, is ideally the best form of government (Mill [1910] 2012). A good government is one that does not include oppression from officers of the state, but rather takes into account the collective interests of the people. In this case, power is vested in the entire aggregate of the society as every citizen has a voice in the exercise of power and is occasionally called on to take part in the government by some form of public function (Mill [1910] 2012).

Accordingly, Mill argues that there are two dangers of representative democracy: the first is a low grade of intelligence within the representative body, and the second is class legislation on the part of the numerical majority. Mill argues that the people must be well informed in regards to their government's duties and policies. In addition, rather than the minority simply acquiescing to the choices of the majority, a medium must be reached. This

is possible when the representatives of the minority share the power with the representatives of the majority (Mill [1910] 2012).

Democracy empowers citizens in state processes; however this is not possible if citizens do not participate. Historical evidence suggests that states are aware of this. Some states, such as the Apartheid state, purposively prevented the participation of particular groups. On the other hand, studies show that discouraged citizens may also elect to refrain from participation (Dean 1960; Guterbock 1980; Opp 2000). In any case, lack of participation from citizens may allow for elites to have more control over the state and thus control the masses without contention.

In order to avoid this tyranny of the majority, Mill argues that suffrage should be extended to all citizens. This ensures representation for everyone, not just the majority. This form of democracy – one which is impartial, composed of representation of the entire society and created by that society, is the only true type of democracy (Mill [1910] 2012). The power of the majority must be checked in this manner and not allowed to solely dictate the course of legislation and administration based on its exclusive interests. This is accomplished through universal suffrage (Mill [1910] 2012). Thus, I argue that the classical democratic theorists argue that universal access to political participation ensures political legitimacy.

Throughout these arguments, I maintain that the classical democratic theorists imply that trust plays a role in the function of democratic governments. They contend that the function of political participation is to ensure that each citizen is able to impact the processes and procedures of the government equally. However, I argue that even in cases where the

government exercises transparency, no citizen can be certain that this system is functioning properly, distributing power and influence evenly. Instead, individuals who adhere to the democratic system trust that their governing bodies are upholding the democratic arrangements to which they agreed. Therefore, while trust is not examined by classical democratic theorists, I argue that it is clearly assumed.

Routinization of Authority

Max Weber also contributes a comprehensive understanding of state power and authority when thinking about the discussion of legitimacy advanced by social contract theorists. He argues that political organizations, including the state, are structures of power that strive for prestige. Prestige of power is generally understood as power over other communities, which is then transformed into the idea of a “nation” (Weber 1946). The concept of nation differs from simple members of a state as it implies solidarity, further solidifying the prestige of the state. The state claims binding authority over its citizens and its territory (Weber [1947] 2012).

According to Weber, the most common basis of legitimacy is the belief in legality, which influences individuals to conform to rules that are formally imposed by previously accepted procedures. Because these accepted procedures rarely require a unanimous approval, legitimacy is largely dependent on the willingness of minorities to give way to the majority. Although, at the same time, it is common for the minority to impose an order which may come to be regarded as legitimate as well. In either case, the willingness to submit or

conform to an order always in some sense implies a belief in the legitimate authority of the source imposing it (Weber [1947] 2012).

Weber recognizes three ideal types of legitimate authority. Rational or legal authority is based on a belief in the legality of normative rules and the right of those who have been placed in position of authority in accordance with those normative rules to issue commands. Traditional authority is based on an established belief in the sanctity of traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority in accordance with those traditions. Charismatic authority is based on devotion to a specific, individual person who has displayed unique heroism, sanctity or exemplary character and the normative patterns ordained by him or her (Weber [1947] 2012).

Maintaining charismatic or traditional authority requires its routinization. This routinization of authority can take many forms, but in most cases it involves appropriating powers to an administrative staff either through the process of traditionalization or legalization. These administrators may then set up norms for recruitment of new leaders, in particular the terms for eligibility (Weber [1947] 2012). Fiscal organization is also necessary in order for the administration to provide for its needs, via raising taxes or other contributions (Weber [1947] 2012).

The state, then, is able to function through bureaucratic authority. Bureaucracy encompasses a hierarchy of offices with corresponding levels of authority, where there is supervision of lower offices. These offices are subscribed official duties, and the authority to delegate commands for these duties is distributed in a stable, methodical way with rules

concerning coercion. Management of these offices is based on written documents or files. With these bureaucratic parameters in place, official, public administration activities are separated from the sphere of private life (Weber 1946).

Public officials who hold these offices are legally granted authority to order by decree. The elected official derives his position from below; the people who elect him/her determine the future of his/her career (Weber 1946). Therefore, it is imperative that he/she perform in a manner that meets the expectations of his electors. In other words, the electors or citizens determine if the office and the person holding office is legitimate.

Although Weber does not discuss authority in terms of trust relationships, I argue that a basic level of trust in the legality of a policy, leader or bureaucratic order is necessary to translate authority into legitimacy. The people determine whether the state meets their expectations. This stands for legal-rational authority, charismatic authority, and even traditional authority. In each case, the citizens determine if the policies and procedures of the state are consistent with the rationale, traditions or sanctity of the established system.

Alternative Perspectives from Marx and neo-Marxists

In contrast to the notion that states seek legitimacy in the eyes of citizens, an alternative view provided by neo-Marxist perspectives, advanced by Baran and Sweezy (1966), Scott (1998), and Wright (1978), among others, argues that the state does not earn authority through legitimacy and trust. Rather, the state dominates the masses through a system of social controls (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Frankel 1979; Marx [1843] 1994; Marx

and Engels [1843] 1998). Central to this argument is that the modern capitalist state operates as a bourgeois democracy (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Frankel 1979; Wright 1978). These assertions provide a useful alternative to the arguments of the above theories by introducing a critical view of the state and its relationship to its constituents. They point out the dysfunctions of the state, particularly in the context of a capitalist political-economy.

Throughout his works, Marx discusses the role of the state in maintaining the political economy; describing it as the institutionalization of class relations around production processes (Robinson 2003). He offers many examples of state intervention in labor processes, market expansion and system maintenance, and points out that this role of generating capital is essential to the state because it is dependent on the functioning capacity of the economy for its legitimacy and financial support. In turn, the people hold the state accountable for the economy (Marx [1867] 1976; Marx [1843] 1994; Marx [1848] 1998).

Marx, however, saw this as a distortion of the state. He argues that the state should be the guardian of the general interests of society and that “a state that is not the realization of rational freedom is a bad state” (Marx and Engels [1843] 1998:100). Only in a “true democracy”, which Marx argued did not exist, would a state cease to be abstract and the division between the political state and civil society overcome (Miliband 1983). Instead, the state functions in the interests of the bourgeois class only, controlling the masses in an effort to maintain the bureaucratic order of bourgeois hegemony (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Frankel 1979; Marx [1843] 1994; Marx and Engels [1843] 1998).

When viewing the state in this sense, it is easy to see how its efforts toward political stability could be understood in terms of oppression or coercion. Some of these tactics may not be obvious to a member of modern society. However, various processes, including the standardization of weights and measures, language and legal discourse, as well as the establishment of freehold tenure and the design of cities help the state to record and monitor the actions and interactions between citizens (Scott 1998). And in many historical cases, attempts of oppression by state bureaucrats have been overt. For example, contemporary voter identification laws, in addition to Jim Crow laws of the old South, are aimed at suppressing the vote of marginalized groups (New York Times 2012). Similarly, Apartheid laws restricted African political rights to the homelands, ensuring that national elections would be dominated by the National Party and thus would maintain the Apartheid system (Butler 2004). Here, it is clear that widespread participation is not encouraged by the state. Instead, as Pateman argues, “the level of participation by the majority should not rise much above the minimum necessary to keep the democratic method...any increase in participation by the apathetic would weaken the consensus on the norms of the democratic method” (Pateman 1970: 14).

The distortion of the state into the manager of the economy is the factor that sets the Marxist perspective apart from those of the social contract theorists, Weber and the classical democratic theorists. While they all agree that a truly legitimate democratic state is one that operates without bias, protecting the rights and interests of the people equally, Marx maintains that this has not and will not happen in a political economy because

interdependence between the state and economic elites interferes with the state's responsibility to the masses (Liebowitz 1992).

For scholars following the Marxist perspective, trust is not the glue that brings stability to the citizen-state relationship. Instead, the state uses its powers of coercion, education and class division to dominate (particularly lower class) citizens. Despite mistrust and potential disdain, lower classes may continue to support the state because they cannot envision a plausible alternative (Liebowitz 1992; Marx [1843] 1994). Rather than full out revolution against the state, working class citizens are more likely to work within the political economy for change even if they distrust political authority. In some cases, this may result in gains for individual groups. However it will not alleviate the underlying cause of inequalities posed by the capitalist system (Liebowitz 1992). This is because the state is an invention of the political economy, created with the purpose of preserving and advancing capital accumulation (Liebowitz 1992; Marx [1843] 1994; Marx [1867] 1976; Marx [1848] 1998). Therefore state-sponsored dialogue regarding trust and consensus are illusions that are simply masking the coercive power of the capitalist state. Accordingly, investigating socioeconomic differences in trust is an important issue for the Marxist perspective.

Trust

As the social contract theorists, Weber, and the classical democratic theorists investigate state legitimacy determined by the people, they imply a critical element that must be present in order for this relationship to function – trust. Trust is “a bet about the future

contingent actions of others” (Sztompka 1999: 25) and, in this way, acts as a strategy for handling the freedoms of other human agents and agencies (Dunn 1988; Sztompka 1999). I argue that citizens must trust that their governing bodies are operating to allocate rights equally, comply with legal doctrine and incorporate the voices and the power of the people. However, these theorists do not focus their arguments on trust directly. Instead, explicit theoretical discussions of trust are found in the works of more contemporary social capital theorists and historical institutionalists. In addition, many empirical studies investigate the influence of trust on political attitudes.

Factors that Influence Trust

Two primary bodies of literature discuss the factors that influence the development of democracy as an effect of trust – social capital theory and historical institutionalism. These theoretical paradigms disagree on one very distinct point. Social capital theorists argue that trust is the key to democratic development whereas historical institutionalists contend that the lack of trust in pre-democratic societies moved citizens to adopt democratic values. In addition, each argues that trust is developed by different means. Social capital theorists argue that trust is developed through interaction and networking while historical institutionalists imply that structural factors of individuals and societies influence the development of trust. I argue that both perspectives contribute valuable arguments to the discussion on the development of trust.

Social Capital Theory

For purposes of this research social capital theory is important because it provides us with a paradigm to discuss and evaluate trust among people. Social capital theory argues that people must trust each other in order to achieve political development and stability. The social capital perspective explores the resources that individuals gain through interaction with others in the form of social networks and also the networks themselves (Anderson 2010; Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1973; Lin 2001; Putnam 2000). Eventually, interactions translate into the basic faith in each other that is necessary for society to resolve differences peacefully, make compromises and agreements, and ultimately to function in a democratic fashion (Anderson 2010). Likewise, the development of trust leads to increased sociability, participation in associations, increased interactions and greater intimacy of interpersonal contacts (Sztompka 1999).

A central argument of social capital theorists is that interaction is necessary in order for trust to grow (Anderson 2010; Coleman 1988; Flora and Flora 2008; Granovetter 1973; Putnam 2000). It develops over time based on past interactions and experiences (Anderson 2010). When trust becomes routinized into a normative role for both the trusters and trustees, society begins to develop a culture of trust (Sztompka 1999). This normative climate of trust makes each “bet” of trust more easy (Sztompka 1999: 120). The culture of trust emerges with steady and increasing positive experiences of confirmed trust (Sztompka 1999).

Tocqueville (1956) argues that action within social associations was the key to American democracy, emphasizing the role of political associations specifically in

contributing to successful democratic consolidation (Anderson 2010; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). As social capital develops over time, democracy also develops because members of a society previously joined and worked together in associations. This connection between past and present introduces the notion of learning. Those who learned to interact in the past are better equipped to make democracy work (Anderson 2010). This means that historical context is critical to evaluating trust and democratic outcomes for a given society. For example, in a multi-ethnic society with a history of racial and ethnic antagonism, ethnicity may be an important indicator of separation that would impede the development of trust, according to the social capital theorists.

Structural Bases of Trust and Political Behavior

Scholars who support the institutionalist perspective, such as Theda Skocpol, critique the social capitalist perspective on trust as being neo-Durkheimian. They argue that social capital theorists, to their detriment, focus too much on socializing individuals into cooperative behavior (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). Instead, proponents of the institutionalist perspective argue that democracy grew out of struggles among social groups and between authorities and their subjects (Moore 1964; Portes 1998; Skocpol and Fiorina 1999). They analyze institutional and organizational evidence to determine the causal factors influencing civic engagement and argue that competition among political groups, representative institutions and competitive elections is conducive to the emergence of democratic collaborations (Brown 1973; Skocpol 1999). Therefore, I argue that this perspective implies

that there are structural factors influencing democratic values and the interactions that lead to the development of trust.

In accordance with the social capital theorists, I agree that the culture of trust is developed through social interaction. However, I also agree with the institutionalists' argument that we must pay attention to the factors that influence those interactions and ultimately, the level of trust that develops. A person's income, level of education and level of job prestige have been found to impact his or her level of trust toward the government and other institutions (Sztompka 1999). Studies in the U.S. and Europe suggest that lower social class is correlated with lower voter turnout and lack of interest in politics (Guterbock 1980; Laponce 1967; Opp 2000). These socioeconomic indicators are often influenced by other structural factors, such as race or ethnicity (Butler 2004; Cox 1959; Hendricks 2003; Oliver and Shapiro 2006).

In racially stratified societies, intergenerational influences of families of different races affect the economic outcomes of offspring. This is a result of the lack of social capital available to individuals that belong to races that have been economically oppressed historically. Such an argument adds an important point to the discourse on racial inequality – hindrances to socioeconomic advancement do not immediately dissipate with the advent of socioeconomic freedoms. Instead, the legacy of disenfranchisement impacts the trajectory of later generations (Feagin 2001; Loury 1977). Political apathy and distrust, then, can surface in later generations of disenfranchised groups.

Black Americans, for instance, have a heightened sense of distrust in interracial relations. This is because people judge one another based on race, and, in turn, distrust decision-making based on the perception that people will express favor toward members of their racial group and ill-will toward those who are not in their racial group. This relationship between race, inequality and risk leads to racial distrust. The experiences of black Americans have reduced their trust in others, making them one of the least trusting groups in America (Nunnally 2012). Racial and ethnic divisions have impacted political relations throughout history. As Seymour Lipset pointed out, radical politics and “leftist voting” are an expression of political discontent (Zeitlin 1967). Racial and ethnic minorities in various parts of the world align with radical politics or socialist and communist parties (Anderson 2010; Davis 1998; Zeitlin 1967).

In addition to race and ethnicity, traditional notions of community interactions such as those described by social capital theorists suggest that locale is an important factor in developing trust relationships (Flora and Flora 2008; Luloff and Bridger 2003; Putnam 2000; Tolbert 2005; Tonnies [1887] 1957; Wirth 1938). However, there is a growing number of scholars who argue that “sense of community”, defined by affect, loyalty, or common values and centered on identity, can be achieved in realms other than those based on locale (Bell 1992; Brint 2001; Chavez 2005; Cohen 1985; Flora and Flora 2008; Sampson 2008; Selznick 1992). So, we must investigate the interactions between location and identity to determine how they together affect people’s ability to form associations and networks and subsequently to trust each other and their government.

A person's age also affects political attitudes and participation. Common experiences during youth create a common worldview through which individuals of the same age group will tend to view their political experiences (Zeitlin 1967). In fact, a study done by Lau and Redlawsk (2008), found that, of the variables included in their study, age had the most pervasive effects on political cognition. Additionally, studies show that the political attitudes and behaviors of young people vary from those who are in later stages of adulthood (Breakwell, Fife-Schaw and Devereux 1989; Mattes 2012). These differences include political approval, participation in politics, interest in politics and participation in civil disobedience (Watts 1999).

Furthermore, historical events can create discontinuities between generations (Putnam 2000; Zeitlin 1967). For example, Zeitlin (1967) points out that the varying generations in Cuba held distinctly different forms of consciousness which resulted in significantly different responses to the Castro revolution. This effect of generation on political attitudes has also been observed in the U.S. and China (Fisher 2008; Jennings and Zhang 2005). Research suggests that people who live in less developed economic and democratic nations will use retrospective economic assessments rather than prospective assessments used by those in highly developed societies. This is attributed to higher levels of uncertainty in lesser developed nations (Cohen 2004). As the previous literature suggests, it appears that the structural factors most likely to influence political attitudes and behaviors are social class, race/ethnic relations, age and location.

Impact of Trust on Political Attitudes

A society's political system is embedded in its culture of trust (Abramowitz 1989b; Rousseau [1762] 2007). Trust is the prerequisite for political order: "Without trust it cannot stimulate supportive activities in situations of uncertainty or risk" (Luhmann 1979:103). Democracy is perceived to be the political design most conducive to the emergence of trust (Sztompka 1999). Trust is produced by democracy and also helps to sustain democracy. This is because democracy provides a rich context of accountability, and through its emphasis on constitution, creates the context of pre-commitment (Sztompka 1999). The emphasis on accountability and pre-commitment means that trust in a democratic society is attributable to "the institutionalization of distrust in the architecture of democracy" (Sztompka 1999:140). The fundamental premise of democracy is suspicion of all authority, or as the social contract theorists argue, that all power must be legitimized. Only when authority is proven to come from the popular will and when the elected representatives realize the interests of the people, will the government achieve legitimacy (Sztompka 1999, Weber [1947] 2012).

In order for a democratic government to achieve and maintain legitimacy through trust, it must insure its citizens against breaches of trust. Therefore, a democracy must meet several conditions, including periodic elections and terms of office, division of power or checks and balances, independent courts, constitutionalism and judicial review, due process, civil rights, law enforcement, open communication and community politics – mass involvement and activism of citizens through voluntary associations, civic organizations and

local power (Sztompka 1999). This last point of community politics is the one most heralded by social capital theorists (Anderson 2010; Putnam 2000).

The culture of trust helps sustain democracy. Democracy requires communication among citizens through exchange of opinions. Democracy also requires tolerance between different peoples, replaces conflict and struggle with compromise, and demands some level of civility in public disputes. In addition, democracy requires participation – active citizens engaged in democratic institutions as well as associations and organization. Finally, democracy requires educated citizens. Effective democratic participation demands a considerable amount of knowledge and information (Sztompka 1999). Therefore, political stability in democratic societies is dependent on trust. The following section describes how trust affects political attitudes and behaviors in democratic societies.

There are several factors that influence political attitudes that we can view through assessing public opinion. Public opinion refers to the political view held by the majority of the people (Gonzalez-Bailon, Banchs and Kaltenbrunner 2012). It is a proxy for the way citizens perceive and react to political issues. Public opinion impacts the political process by means of electoral accountability and media manipulation. Citizens can then use public opinion to convey their perspectives. Likewise, political leaders use public opinion to construct their discourse with their constituents (Gonzalez-Bailon et al 2012).

Trust helps determine political support or satisfaction in both specific and diffuse terms. Hetherington (1998) defines political trust as “a basic evaluative orientation toward the government founded on how well the government is operating according to people’s

normative expectations” (Hetherington 1998: 791). As I argue earlier in this chapter, Hetherington’s definition expresses the relationship between trust and expectations. The government must meet the expectations of the citizens in order for trust to develop. And, because trust influences political support, consistently low levels of trust ultimately challenge political legitimacy (Hetherington 1998).

Many scholars argue that social mobility affects political attitudes of citizens in different countries (Blau and Duncan 1967; Lipset and Bendix 1959; Turner 1992). However, recent studies show that class status rather than mobility between classes shapes a citizen’s political attitudes and loyalties (Turner 1992). An individual’s social class is attributed to many factors, including education, job prestige and income (Kelley 1992). Kelley’s work on the U.S., Britain and Australia shows that individuals with higher class status tend to support conservative political parties (Kelley 1992). Similar findings were shown in India and Nigeria (Nijhawan 1992; Odetola 1992).

Race, historically, has affected political participation in America (Nunnally 2012). Perceptions of race and zero-sum gains of one racial group at the expense of another, lead people to assess the risks of discrimination based on the race of the person with decision-making power. In addition, underrepresentation and disenfranchisement in America leads to political distrust among black Americans (Nunnally 2012).

Distrust among racial minorities impacts political attitudes (Nunnally 2012). Historical and contemporary racial experiences promote distrust among Americans and distrust in the government. Because of this, trust and democracy does not function in

American politics in the way that was predicted. The environment of racial discrimination thwarts the democratic experience in multi-ethnic societies such as South Africa (Nunnally 2012).

Research Problem and Questions

In this chapter, I have described the prevailing scholarly perspectives on legitimacy and trust. Social contract theorists provide us with a basic model for understanding political legitimacy – an agreement between state and citizens based on mutual expectations (Rousseau [1762] 2007). In accordance with this theoretical perspective, I argue that this contract is contingent on meeting those expectations. Additionally, mutual trust that the state and the citizens will meet each other's expectations keeps the contract viable. Furthermore, as classic democratic theory suggests, in a modern democracy, citizen participation is paramount. Participation allows citizens to actively influence the state to serve the needs of the citizens. Weber describes the operationalization of these interactions through his discussion of bureaucratic organization and processes. Additionally, the Marxist perspective points out the critical importance of economic management and class division in a political economy.

I argue that trust takes multiple forms in a democratic society. Not only do citizens have to trust that their governing institutions will provide the protections of rights discussed by social contract theorists, but they also must trust that their voices will be heard by the bureaucracies that administer those rights. They must trust that the state institutions facilitate

the authority of the people, as Rousseau suggests (Rousseau [1762] 2007), and that they facilitate this authority as is determined by the legal or rational agenda laid out in their constitution (Sztompka 1999, Weber [1947] 2012). If trust is not present, the coercive regime that Marx warns us about can develop. And as he further theorizes, the people might eventually rise up and overthrow it (Marx [1843] 1994; Marx and Engels [1843] 1998). Therefore, if political stability is the goal, trust needs to be developed and maintained. Interactions which are shaped by various social structures foster the development and maintenance of trust.

From previous theories and research, we know that political legitimacy is important for political stability. We also know that trust impacts political attitudes, behaviors and ultimately stability. However, by viewing these two literatures separately, we miss an important understanding of political stability. In order to fill this gap, I have merged these bodies of literature with my central argument that political legitimacy is based on citizen trust. Citizens deem the state legitimate when they trust that the state is operating within the parameters set forth by the society's social contract. As a result, people are able to operate together, peacefully, within the parameters of state-sponsored policies, and the political system remains stable.

South Africa is an ideal context for investigating political legitimacy and trust because it is a newly developing democracy with a history of racial and ethnic separation and antagonism. Recently, the South African state has endeavored to eliminate these antagonisms (Butler 2004; Hendricks 2003; Sparks 2003). However, the development of trust among

citizens in South Africa is unclear. Therefore, in this study, I investigate the following questions:

Do the citizens of South Africa trust each other and their government? Moreover, which structural factors impact that trust? Additionally, the impact of trust and structural factors that impact trust on political attitudes and behaviors have not been determined. Furthermore, in an effort to determine the future viability of the democratic state of South Africa, it is important to understand how the citizens of South Africa understand and abide by democratic values and norms. How do the citizens evaluate the democracy that exists in South Africa? What are their democratic values and aspirations?

CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS

Introduction

In this study, I investigate the following research questions regarding political stability in South Africa. Research Question 1: What are the structural factors that influence trust? Research Question 2: How does trust, and the structural factors that influence trust, impact political approval? Research Question 3: What are the structural factors that influence democratic values?

To answer these research questions, I analyze data from the Afrobarometer surveys and use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression as the primary statistical analysis technique. This study consists of three related empirical analyses. The first investigates the structural factors that impact general trust and government trust. The second examines the relationship between trust and the structural factors that impact trust and the level of approval for government offices and policies. The third investigates the effects of structural factors on democratic values. Taken together, these analyses provide an examination of the social bases of trust and stability of the South African political environment.

South Africa, a developing democracy, presents an ideal setting to evaluate these questions. Less than 20 years ago, the nation transitioned from an authoritarian rule under Apartheid to an inclusive democratic structure for the first time in its history. Scholars have investigated the issues of political legitimacy and trust in many contexts (see Anderson 2010; Sztompka 1999; Valadez 2001; Zeitlin 1967). However, sub-Saharan Africa has been underrepresented in most sociological research. While researchers have found evidence of

declining government trust in places like the United States (Nye 1997; Jones 2007), I argue that the experiences of relatively recent democracies may be different from those in long established democratic states. As Anderson (2010) states, trust in the system itself involves feeling that a loss will only be temporary and that the system will offer protection even when a particular group of people is the temporary loser. This scenario has been tested in well-established democratic nations. However, in a newly developed democracy, temporary losses may lead to insecurity and instability.

Social capital theorists have largely overlooked South Africa. Researchers have conducted studies that focus on trust relationships in that nation, but these are mostly outside of sociological perspectives, focusing largely on economic development (Carter and Castillo 2011). Furthermore, the works of social capital theorists focusing on networks are largely disconnected to those works that focus on trust (Haddad and Maluccio 2003). This fragmentation makes the question of trust promotion particularly difficult to assess. Theory and empirical studies are not available to help determine how a state might foster trust among its constituents. The newly developed South African government is addressing this challenge. Studying the ongoing relationship between South Africa's government and its citizens will illuminate some of the details surrounding political trust and stability.

South African History and Context

In a society with a unique historical context such as South Africa's, marked by decades of racial and ethnic tensions, any discussion of social capital, citizenship or political

legitimacy must take into account both the breadth of ethnic diversity there and the ways in which those race and ethnic groups have interacted historically. South Africa's citizenry is composed of multiple cultures, including a variety of indigenous groups and large amounts of immigrants from various parts of Africa, Asia and Europe (Thompson 2000).

To begin, it is necessary to determine how South Africa's history has influenced its present state. In 1948, nearly 300 years after Europeans had invaded the southern tip of Africa and claimed it for their own, the Nationalist Party, composed of Afrikaners - descendants of Dutch Boers, won the first of many elections under the banner of "Apartheid" (Butler 2004). Black South Africans (the majority) were excluded from all national elections. Apartheid incorporated a labyrinth of separatist legislation.³ People were placed in racial categories and interracial interactions were deemed illegal and harshly punished, thwarting the development of mutual associations (Butler 2004). As a result of the Group Areas Act, countless Africans were forced from their homes and communities to "homelands" at least 20 miles outside of the cities, creating a racially segregated rural poor and a physical barrier to interracial interaction (Butler 2004).

During the early 1990s, South Africa went through a period of economic stagnation, an influx of the urban Black population and international pressures for democracy. The African National Congress (ANC) along with independent Black trade unions formed the Federation (later the Congress) of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) which held the power to bring the economy to a standstill. The economic turmoil, along with ideological

³ The Popular Registration Act, the Immorality Act, the Group Areas Act and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, were among the most notorious (Butler 2004).

shifts among political and economic elites, led to the development of contacts between exiled ANC leaders and South African business leaders (Butler 2004). The ANC, being the leaders of the resistance and capable of employing violent measures to achieve its goals, became a force to be reckoned with. As Fanon says, "...all parties are aware of the power of such violence and that the question is not always to reply to it by a greater violence, but rather to see how to relax the tension" (Fanon 1963: 73). As a result, the National Party was forced to negotiate with the ANC.

Nelson Mandela, elected South Africa's first democratic president in 1994, was a founder and prominent leader of the ANC Youth League. After 27 years of imprisonment, Mandela emerged as a leading negotiator between the ANC and the National Party (Butler 2004). His goal a peaceful transition to a democratic state and a new South Africa in which all South Africans would be considered equal, he preached reconciliation without retaliation. His inauguration speech closed with these remarks: "We enter into a covenant that we shall build a society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity - a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world" (Sparks 2003: 2).

By the early 1990s, all whites had benefited materially from apartheid legislation (Butler 2004; Hendricks 2003; Sparks 2003; Thompson 2000). Prior to 1994, whites had acquired more than 90% of the land area (Hendricks 2003). In 1998, a report for the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality found that 61% of all Africans and only 1% of whites were living in poverty. That same year, the per capita expenditure for pupils at

white schools was R5,400 and about R1,000 for students at black schools and the average annual income was R23,000 for blacks, R103,000 for whites (Hendricks 2003).⁴ This social and economic stratification makes eradication of negative stereotypes difficult (Valadez 2001).

In contrast to the apartheid policies, the new South Africa emerged in 1994 with the goal of a “rainbow nation” – a nation whose multiple cultures could coexist with mutual appreciation, support and consideration in policy creation and resource distribution, as sanctioned by federal laws (Hendricks 2003; Sparks 2003). Policies were initially created to grant more autonomy to local governments in an effort to foster citizen participation in domestic development and civic trust (Baiocchi and Checa 2009). However, concern for grassroots participation and resource redistribution gave way to priorities of achieving “world class status” (Baiocchi and Checa 2009). In addition, racial politics continues to dominate national elections (Fields 1996; Louw 2000; Shubane and Stack 1999; Thompson 2000). In fact, Shubane and Stack (1999) observed South Africa’s 1999 national and province level election results and found that an overwhelming majority of South Africans were continuing to vote based on “racial, ethnic or linguistic terms”.⁵ This is a likely effect of the previous years of racial segregation and antagonism which could also affect trust building between the various ethnic groups. The lack of integrated networks between ethnic groups results in more bonding than bridging capital.

⁴ As of 2013, the conversion from the South African rand to the U.S. dollar is 8.7:1.

⁵ The ANC’s support came mostly from blacks, the Inkatha Freedom Party was supported by mostly Zulu-speaking people, and support for the New National Party was almost exclusively white, Afrikaans-speaking people (Shubane and Stack 1999)

In spite of these variations in ethnic voting, on the national level, the ANC has dominated elections and policy decisions (Butler 2004; Herbst 2005; Shubane and Stack 1999; Silke 2009). After Mandela's presidency ended in 1999, he was succeeded by Thabo Mbeki, the ANC's president elect. Mbeki implemented a strategy of top-down redistribution to narrow financial gaps between whites and blacks in the country that was disappointing to many (Herbst 2005). In addition, scholars, political leaders and media moguls heavily criticized several of his policies, including his response to Zimbabwean President Mugabe's anti-white tactics and his stance on HIV/AIDS treatment (Hawker 2002; Herbst 2005).

Recent political developments indicate that South Africans are growing increasingly dissatisfied with their leadership. The ANC ousted Thabo Mbeki from his presidential position which he had held for nine years and elected Jacob G. Zuma as its new leader. Zuma would have taken over Mbeki's position as president in January 2009; however the ANC provided consistent pressure for Mbeki to step down sooner. In December 2007, Mbeki was asked to step down from the position after accusations of financial scandals. He resigned in September 2008, and Kgalema Molanthe was appointed as interim. Zuma, who had been fired from his position as Deputy President by Mbeki in 2005 over accusations of financial corruption, became president-elect of the ANC (the dominant ruling party), but then was put under investigation for accusations of racketeering and corruption (Wines 2005). His charges were declared "unlawful" (there were rumors that Mbeki had tampered with evidence) and charges were dropped in April 2009 (Bearak 2009; Silke 2009).

Mbeki resigned in September 2008, nearly four months before his legitimate term was set to expire, and some defected members have split and created a new party named the Congress of the People (Cope) (Bearak 2008; Silke 2009). This disregard of normative procedure may be an indication of growing frustration not only from a sect of members of the ANC party, but from the masses of ANC supporters in the nation. The recent turmoil within South Africa's ruling party could have a significant influence on trust in the nation. Dr. Robert B. Mattes, director of social science research at the University of Cape Town, has argued that a growing portion of the population has grown disenchanted with the ANC since the days of Nelson Mandela (Bearak 2008).

Since he has taken office, president Zuma has changed the nation's outlook on the HIV/AIDS epidemic, improving policies for drugs that treat AIDS and preventions for pregnant women (Dugger 2009). Despite the progress on this issue, there are several issues that Zuma has yet to address. Most notable are the failing education system, pervasive unemployment and a widening gap between the rich and the poor.⁶ Many question both his strategy and his capability to find support to tackle these challenges as his traditionalism compels him to focus more on discussion instead of hard action (Dugger 2010). As Allister Sparks commented on Zuma's approach, "Action dies in the process of eternal, everlasting debate" (Dugger 2010).

In addition to the fractioning that led to Cope, the ANC has recently encountered discontent with its youth wing, the ANC Youth League. The Youth League's former leader,

⁶ According to the World Bank, South Africa's Gini Index as of 2009 was 63.1.

Julius Malema, once an avid supporter of Zuma's, was expelled from the ANC Youth League in February 2012 because of growing disconnections between the ANC's political strategy and the Youth League's more communistic, black nationalistic approach (Polgreen 2012a). In 2011, Malema was found guilty of hate speech for singing an Apartheid-era freedom song that included lyrics regarding the shooting of Boers (Cowell 2011). In addition, he called for the overthrow of the government in Botswana, a move that got him suspended from the ANC for five years (Cowell and Eligon 2011). Following his expulsion, Malema fired back, accusing Zuma of becoming a dictator (Polgreen 2012a).

This accusation may not be too far off target as it has become increasingly difficult to criticize Zuma or the policies of the ANC openly. The ANC chooses its candidate for presidency in January 2013, but as of April 2012, no one had come forward to challenge Zuma for the position for fears of the party's disciplinary committee since the ANC has an aversion to open competition for leadership positions – a tactic that began when the ANC was an anti-Apartheid liberation organization (McKaiser 2012). This is one indicator that the party is failing to become a more democratic party and could have adverse effects on the development of a democratic culture in the nation.

These changes in the political and socioeconomic conditions in South Africa in combination with its history of social movements and Apartheid make it an appropriate case to investigate issues of trust and political legitimacy. The continuing economic issues and suspicions of corruption raise issues related to the perceived legitimacy of the SA government. Given the legacy of white racism and the ethnic divisions within the country

created by Apartheid laws, there could be substantial differences in trust among ethnic communities. In addition, the move from the oppressive Apartheid government to an inclusive democracy less than 20 years ago is likely to result in trust attitudes that vary between older and younger South Africans. Further, the prevailing economic divide between rich and poor and the spatial distances established by Apartheid laws could result in significant differences in trust based on both socioeconomic status and locale. In order to investigate these relationships among South Africans, I analyze the structural factors that influence trust and the impact of trust on political approval and democratic values using data from the Afrobarometer surveys.

Data

The Afrobarometer Study is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in thirty-three African countries. The research project is conducted by a collaboration of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Center for Democratic Development in Ghana (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP) and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi. The United States Agency for International Development Regional Center for Southern Africa and USAID South Africa, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Danish International Development Agency, the Canadian International Development Agency and the Department for International Development in the United Kingdom funded the survey.

Data has been collected in South Africa on nine occasions during the period from 1994 -2008. The data were collected by personal interviews and conducted in respondents' homes, achieving an 87% response rate.⁷ Conducting face to face interviews in respondents' homes leads to high response rates and the lowest amount of sampling frame bias; though only 100% cooperation guarantees that the sample will be completely unbiased (Olson 2006). The interview technique also allows for more complex and open-ended questions. This is particularly important when probing respondents for strength of their opinions. However, collecting the data via face to face interviews introduces possible interviewer bias, particularly when dealing with racial or cultural differences (Dohrenwend et al 1968; Hill 2002). To this end, Afrobarometer interviewers attempted to minimize cultural bias by conducting the interviews in the respondent's language of choice. The interviewers were specially trained to accurately translate concepts into local languages (Bratton et al 2008).

Of the five rounds of the Afrobarometer study conducted in South Africa, I use rounds 3 and 4 for the analysis in this study. Round 3 and round 4 were conducted nationwide. Each round includes 2,400 respondents over the age of 18 in a multistage, stratified, area cluster probability sample to represent a cross-section of all voting age citizens in South Africa. Round 3 of the data was conducted in 2004. During this time, Thabo Mbeki was president, and the ANC was in accord. Round 4 was conducted in 2008 during the time that the upheaval in the presidential position began within the ANC due to the election of Jacob Zuma. These rounds provide appropriate data regarding trust issues and

⁷ This information obtained from ICPSR website. No additional information regarding response rate is provided by Afrobarometer.

include many demographic indicators that social scientists readily use in research studies that investigate public opinions (Banum and Groeling 2009; Ha 2010; Henderson et al 1995).

Key Variables

Both Afrobarometer Rounds 3 and 4 contain cross-sectional data. The questions asked in each round are similar. However, the respondents are different in each round. Therefore, I cannot analyze the two rounds of data as a panel study. Instead, I run each analysis using Afrobarometer Round 3 data first; then repeat the analysis using Round 4 data. When possible, I analyze the same measures for consistency. However this was not possible in the case of every variable. This was particularly the case when including measures of the General Trust indices. The questions were asked differently in each round. This makes it difficult to make comparisons between the two rounds of data for these specific measures. The other measures are closer in form. Therefore, some comparisons can be made.

Appendix A includes tables that describe the variables used in the analyses. A list of all dependent and independent variables from Afrobarometer Round 3 included in the analyses is found in Table 3.1, and the dependent and independent variables from Afrobarometer Round 4 are found in Table 3.2. The original survey questions and measures from round 3 for these variables can be found in Table 3.3, and Table 3.4 contains the original survey questions and measures for Round 4. Descriptive statistics for round 3 variables used in the empirical analyses can be found in Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. Descriptive

statistics for Afrobarometer Round 4 variables used in the empirical analyses can be found in Tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10. Each of these tables is found in Appendix A.

Dependent Variable - Trust

The Afrobarometer surveys contain several variables that are used to measure trust, political approval and democratic values. From these, I constructed three indices to measure trust which include measures of general trust, or trust for fellow citizens, and government trust, which measures the level of trust for government officials and entities. I conceptualized each index theoretically and using the results of orthogonal varimax rotation factor analyses. Variables that I included in the final indices all loaded satisfactorily on only one dimension, using a cutoff of .400; and each improved the reliability of the scale, as demonstrated by an increase in Cronbach's alpha (Garson 2010).

General Trust

I combined *Trust for neighbors*, *trust for people in your own ethnic group* and *trust for people in other ethnic groups* to create the ***General Trust Round 3*** variable which is used in the analysis. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked to what degree they trust their neighbors, the people in the respondent's ethnic group and the people in other ethnic groups. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=I trust them somewhat, 3=I trust them a lot). This is the measurement for *Trust for neighbors*, *Trust for people in your own ethnic group* and *Trust*

for people in other ethnic groups that I use in my analysis. The three variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect the assumption that each dimension contributes to general trust in equally important ways. Therefore the index has 10 values ranging from 0-9 where lower values represent lower levels of trust and higher values represent higher levels of trust.

I combined *Trust other people you know*, *Trust for other South Africans* and *Trust for foreigners living in South Africa* to create the **General Trust Round 4** variable which is used in the analysis. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked to what degree they trust other people they know, other South Africans and foreigners living in South Africa. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=I trust them somewhat, 3=I trust them a lot). This is the measurement for *Trust other people you know*, *Trust for other South Africans* and *Trust for foreigners living in South Africa* that I use in my analysis. The variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect the assumption that each dimension contributes to general trust in equally important ways. Therefore the index has 10 values ranging from 0-9 where lower values represent lower levels of trust and higher values represent higher levels of trust.

Government Trust

I combined *Trust for President Mbeki*, *Trust for the National Assembly*, *Trust for the national electoral commission* and *trust for the ANC* to create the **Government Trust Round 3** variable which is used in the analysis. In the original Afrobarometer Round 3 data, *Trust*

for President Mbeki, Trust for the National Assembly, Trust for the national electoral commission and Trust for the ANC are measured on a 4-point Likert Scale as (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot). The responses were skewed, therefore I recoded *Trust for President Mbeki, Trust for the National Assembly, Trust for the national electoral commission and Trust for the ANC* as (0=None, 1= Some, 2= A lot). The variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect the assumption that each dimension contributes to government trust in equally important ways. Therefore the index has nine values ranging from 0-8 where lower values represent lower levels of trust and higher values represent higher levels of trust.

I combined *Trust for President Molanthe, Trust for the National Assembly, trust for the national electoral commission and trust for the ANC* to create the **Government Trust 1 Round 4** variable which is used in the analysis. In the original Afrobarometer Round 4 data, *Trust for President Molanthe, Trust for the National Assembly, Trust for the national electoral commission and Trust for the ANC* are measured on a 4-point Likert Scale as (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot). The responses were skewed, therefore I recoded *Trust for President Molanthe, Trust for the National Assembly, Trust for the national electoral commission and Trust for the ANC* as (0=None, 1= Some, 2= A lot). The variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect the assumption that each dimension contributes to government trust in equally important ways. Therefore the index has nine values ranging from 0-8 where lower values represent lower levels of trust and higher values represent higher levels of trust.

I combined *Trust for President Zuma*, *trust for the National Assembly*, *trust for the national electoral commission* and *trust for the ANC* to create the **Government Trust 2 Round 4** variable which is used in the analysis. In the original Afrobarometer Round 4 data, *Trust for President Zuma*, *Trust for the National Assembly*, *Trust for the national electoral commission* and *Trust for the ANC* are measured on a 3-point Likert Scale as (0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot). In the analysis, I recoded *Trust for President Zuma*, *Trust for the National Assembly*, *Trust for the national electoral commission* and *Trust for the ANC* is (0=None, 1= Some, 2= A lot). The variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect the assumption that each dimension contributes to government trust in equally important ways. Therefore the index has nine values ranging from 0-8 where lower values represent lower levels of trust and higher values represent higher levels of trust.

Dependent Variable – Political Approval

Political approval is divided into indexed measures of approval of government offices, approval of government economic policies and approval of government social policies. I conceptualized each index theoretically and using the results of orthogonal varimax rotation factor analyses. Variables that are included in the final indices all loaded satisfactorily on only one dimension, using a cutoff of .400, and each improved the reliability of the scale, as demonstrated by an increase in Cronbach's alpha.

Approval of Government Offices

I combined *Performance of President Mbeki* and *Performance of the National Assembly representatives* to create the ***Approval of Offices Round 3*** variable which is used in the analysis. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked if they approve or disapprove of the way in which President Mbeki performed his job and the way in which the National Assembly representatives have performed their jobs. For each of the measures, interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve). These are the measurements for *Performance of President Mbeki* and *Performance of the National Assembly Representatives* that I use in my analysis. The variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect the assumption that each dimension contributes to approval in equally important ways. Therefore the index has seven values ranging from 2-8 where lower values represent lower levels of approval and higher values represent higher levels of approval.

I combined *Performance of President Molanthe* and *Performance of the National Assembly representatives* to create the ***Approval of Offices Round 4*** variable which is used in the analysis. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked if they approve or disapprove of the way in which President Molanthe performed his job and the way in which the National Assembly representatives performed their jobs. For each of the measures, interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The

interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve). These are the measurements for *Performance of President Molanthe* and *Performance of the National Assembly representatives* that I use in my analysis. The variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect the assumption that each dimension contributes to approval in equally important ways. Therefore the index has seven values ranging from 2-8 where lower values represent lower levels of approval and higher values represent higher levels of approval.

Approval of Government Economic Policies

I combined *Managing the economy*, *Creating jobs*, *Keeping prices stable*, *Narrowing the income gap*, and *Reducing crime* to create the ***Approval of Government Economic Policies Round 3*** variable used in the analysis. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked if they approve or disapprove of the way in which the current (Mbeki) government was handling managing the economy, keeping prices stable, narrowing the income gap and reducing crime. For each of the measures, interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve). These are the measurements for *Managing the economy*, *Creating jobs*, *Keeping prices stable*, *Narrowing the income gap* and *Reducing crime* that I use in my analysis. The variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect

the assumption that each dimension contributes to approval in equally important ways. Therefore the index has 16 values ranging from 5-20 where lower values represent lower levels of approval and higher values represent higher levels of approval.

I combined *Managing the economy, Creating jobs, Keeping prices stable, Narrowing the income gap, and Reducing crime* to create the ***Approval of Government Economic Policies Round 4*** variable used in the analysis. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked if they approve or disapprove of the way in which the former (Mbeki) government handled managing the economy, creating jobs, keeping prices stable, narrowing the income gap and reducing crime. For each of the measures, interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve). These are the measurements for *Managing the economy, Creating jobs, Keeping prices stable, Narrowing the income gap and Reducing crime* that I use in my analysis. The variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect the assumption that each dimension contributes to approval in equally important ways. Therefore the index has 16 values ranging from 5-20 where lower values represent lower levels of approval and higher values represent higher levels of approval.

Approval of Government Social Policies

I combined *Improving health care, Educational needs, Delivering water, Ensuring enough to eat, Fighting corruption, Combating HIV/AIDS, Uniting South Africa, Welfare*

payments and *Responding to Zimbabwe* to create the ***Approval of Government Social Policies Round 3*** variable used in the analysis. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked if they approve or disapprove of the way in which the current (Mbeki) government was handling improving healthcare, educational needs, delivering water, ensuring enough to eat, fighting corruption, combating HIV/AIDS, uniting South Africa, welfare payments and responding to Zimbabwe. For each of the measures, interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve). These are the measurements for *Improving health care, Educational needs, Delivering water, Ensuring enough to eat, Fighting corruption, Combating HIV/AIDS, Uniting South Africa, Welfare payments* and *Responding to Zimbabwe* that I use in my analysis. The variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect the assumption that each dimension contributes to approval in equally important ways. Therefore the index has 28 values ranging from 9-36 where lower values represent lower levels of approval and higher values represent higher levels of approval.

I combined *Improving health care, Educational needs, Providing water and sanitation, Ensuring enough to eat, Fighting corruption, Combating HIV/AIDS, Uniting South Africa, Welfare payments* and *Responding to Zimbabwe* to create the ***Approval of Government Social Policies Round 4*** variable used in the analysis. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked if they approve or disapprove of the way in

which the former (Mbeki) government handled improving healthcare, educational needs, providing water and sanitation services, ensuring enough to eat, fighting corruption, combating HIV/AIDS, uniting South Africa, welfare payments and responding to Zimbabwe. For each of the measures, interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve). These are the measurements for *Improving health care, Educational needs, Providing water and sanitation, Ensuring enough to eat, Fighting corruption, Combating HIV/AIDS, Uniting South Africa, Welfare payments* and *Responding to Zimbabwe* that I use in my analysis. The variables that I included in the index are weighted equally to reflect the assumption that each dimension contributes to approval in equally important ways. Therefore the index has 28 values ranging from 9-36 where lower values represent lower levels of approval and higher values represent higher levels of approval.

Dependent Variable – Representative Democratic Values

I measure representative democratic values by an assortment of variables that include measures of the roles of citizens and government institutions in a democratic society.

Afrobarometer identifies these variables as “democracy indicators” and used in Mattes and Bratton’s 2007 study on democracy in Africa (Mattes and Bratton 2007, Editor 2009). For round 3, three variables are used to measure the roles of citizens and government institutions: *Elections Round 3*, which asks if leaders should be chosen through elections or other

methods, *Lawmakers Round 3*, which asks if the National Assembly should make laws or the president should make laws, and *Laws Round 3*, which asks if the president should be bound by laws or free to act despite laws of the court. Each of these variables are measured on 4-point Likert scales, ranging from 1-4, where lower values represent democratic values most prevalent and observed in other democratic nations such as the United States. Values at the higher end represent values that do not resemble those in other democratic nations.

For *Elections Round 3*, respondents were asked to choose which of the following statements is closest to their view: “A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections,” or “B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country’s leaders.” Interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very Strongly with B). This is the measurement for *Elections Round 3* that I use in my analysis.

For *Lawmakers Round 3*, respondents were asked to choose which of the following statements is closest to their view: “A: The members of the National Assembly represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree,” or “B: Since the President represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what the National Assembly thinks.” Interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B,

4=Agree Very Strongly with B). This is the measurement for *Lawmakers Round 3* that I use in my analysis.

For *Laws Round 3*, respondents were asked to choose which of the following statements is closest to their view: “A: Since the President was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong,” or “B: The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong.” Interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very Strongly with B). In the analysis, I recoded *Laws Round 3* as (1= Agree Very Strongly with B, 2=Agree with B, 3=Agree with A, 4=Agree Very Strong with A). This is the measurement for *Laws Round 3* that I use in my analysis.

For Round 4, three variables are used to measure the roles of citizens and government institutions: *Q31 Elections Round 4*, which asks if leaders should be chosen through elections or other methods, *Q36 Lawmakers Round 4*, which asks if the National Assembly should make laws or the president should make laws, and *Q37 Laws Round 4*, which asks if the president should be bound by laws or free to act despite laws of the court. Each of these variables are measured on 4-point Likert scales, ranging from 1-4, where lower values represent democratic values most prevalent and observed in other democratic nations such as the United States. Values at the higher end represent values that do not resemble those in other democratic nations.

For *Elections Round 4*, respondents were asked to choose which of the following statements is closest to their view: “A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections,” or “B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country’s leaders.” Interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very Strongly with B). This is the measurement for *Elections Round 4* that I use in my analysis.

For *Lawmakers Round 4*, respondents were asked to choose which of the following statements is closest to their view: “A: The members of the National Assembly represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree,” or “B: Since the President represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what the National Assembly thinks.” Interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very Strongly with B). This is the measurement for *Lawmakers Round 4* that I use in my analysis.

For *Laws Round 4*, respondents were asked to choose which of the following statements is closest to their view: “A: Since the President was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong,” or “B: The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong.”

Interviewers asked the respondents the question and then probed for strength of opinion. The interviewers then recorded their responses on a 4-point Likert scale as (1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very Strongly with B). In the analysis, I recoded *Laws Round 3* as (1= Agree Very Strongly with B, 2=Agree with B, 3=Agree with A, 4=Agree Very Strong with A). This is the measurement for *Laws Round 4* that I use in my analysis.

Dependent Variable – Evaluation of the State of South African Democracy

Two variables are used to measure the respondents' perspectives regarding the state of South African democracy in 2004: *SADemocracy Round 3*, which asks the respondent the degree to which South Africa is a democracy today and *SASatisfaction Round 3*, which asks the respondent the degree to which he or she is satisfied with the way democracy works in South Africa. *SADemocracy Round 3* is measured on 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1-4, where lower values represent low levels of perceived democracy and higher values represent high level of perceived democracy. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked to give their opinion regarding how much of a democracy South Africa is. The interviewers then recorded their responses as (1=Not a democracy, 2=A democracy, with major problems, 3=A democracy, but with minor problems, 4=A full democracy). This is the measurement for *SADemocracy Round 3* that I use in my analysis.

SASatisfaction Round 3 is measured on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1-4, where lower values represent lower levels of satisfaction and higher values represent higher

levels of satisfaction. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked how satisfied they are with the state of democracy in South Africa. The interviewers then recorded their responses as (1=Not at All Satisfied, 2=Not Very Satisfied, 3=Fairly Satisfied, 4=Very Satisfied). This is the measurement for *SASatisfaction Round 3* that I use in my analysis.

Two variables are used to measure the respondents' perspectives regarding the state of South African democracy in 2008: *SADemocracy Round 4*, which asks the respondent how much South Africa is a democracy today and *SASatisfaction Round 4*, which asks the respondent the degree to which he or she is satisfied with the way democracy works in South Africa. Q42a *SADemocracy Round 4* is measured on 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1-4, where lower values represent low levels of perceived democracy and higher values represent high level of perceived democracy. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked to give their opinion regarding how much of a democracy South Africa is. The interviewers then recorded their responses as (1=Not a democracy, 2=A democracy, with major problems, 3=A democracy, but with minor problems, 4=A full democracy). This is the measurement for *SADemocracy Round 4* that I use in my analysis.

SASatisfaction Round 4 is measured on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1-4, where lower values represent lower levels of satisfaction and higher values represent higher levels of satisfaction. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked how satisfied they are with the state of democracy in South Africa. The interviewers then recorded their responses as (1=Not at All Satisfied, 2=Not Very Satisfied, 3=Fairly Satisfied, 4=Very Satisfied). This is the measurement for *SASatisfaction Round 4* that I use in my analysis.

Independent Variables

Based on a review of the literature, I identified several factors that will likely have significant effects on trust, political approval and democratic indicators. These include socioeconomic status, age, race, ethnicity and locale which are likely to have a unique effect on trust in the South African context. Afrobarometer Round 3 and Round 4 include the same questions regarding these structural factors.

Previous studies have determined that socioeconomic status influences political attitudes (Guterbock 1980; Laponce 1967; Muller and Seligson 1987; Opp 2000). For both round 3 and round 4, socioeconomic status is measured by two variables in the data: education level and employment status (Kelley 1992). I recoded Education level into two dummy variables to differentiate respondents who completed high school education and those who did not (0=*No HS*, 1=*HS*). I also recoded Employment status into two categories (0=*Unemployed*, 1=*Employed*).

In addition, citizens who were of age to remember their nation under the previous apartheid system may have particular resistance to trust compared to those who did not experience apartheid. In round 3 and round 4, age is measured as a continuous variable. In the working data set, age was heavily skewed toward younger ages. This is expected since the life expectancy in South Africa throughout the early 2000s was approximately 51 years (World Bank). Therefore, I used the logarithmic transformation of age in the regression analyses as is most appropriate for skewed or kurtotic variables (see York et al. 2003).

Accordingly, an individual's race or ethnicity will likely affect his or her ability to trust other ethnic groups or to have faith in governing bodies (Valadez 2001). Ethnicity was asked as an open-ended question to each respondent, who self-reported the ethnic group that they identified with the most. Therefore, the ethnicity variable was best suited for the analysis (Boehmer et al. 2002). Accordingly, I use the ethnicity variable instead of the race variable in the analysis. For both round 3 and round 4, I recoded the ethnicity variable into nine dummy variables: *Afrikaaner*, *Xhosa*, *Pedi*, *Sesotho*, *Setswana*, *Zulu*, *AfricanOther*, *EuropeanOther*, and *Other*. These ethnic groups vary culturally and politically. I coded the ethnicity variable to represent these nine categories because I want to know how each ethnic group responds to the measures of trust, political approval and democracy.

Finally, location in an urban area post-apartheid may have afforded respondents to develop the mutual associations described by social capital theorists during the past 16 years of democratic rule, whereas those in rural areas may continue to encounter political segregation due to their physical separation (Flora and Flora 2008; Putnam 2000; Tonnies [1887] 1957; Wirth 1938). For both round 3 and round 4 of the data, the interviewer reported locale and coded it as two dummy variables (0= *Urban*, 1= *Rural*).

I anticipate interaction effects between these structural factors and one other variable included in the data: South African identity. If a respondent identifies as South African more so than as a member of any other group, this may influence the relationship between the structural factors and government trust. Citizens who identify more as South African than Zulu, for example, might respond to the questions regarding trust for people in their ethnic

groups and people in other ethnic groups differently than citizens who identify more strongly as Zulu. Therefore the analysis includes an investigation of interaction effects between the structural factors and South African identity. This variable is coded on a five point Likert scale as (1=*I Feel Only (r's group)*), 2=*I Feel More (r's group) than South African*, 3=*I Feel Equally South African and (r's groups)*, 4=*I Feel More South African than (r's groups)*, 5=*I feel only South African*). This is the measurement for *Identity* that I use in my analysis.

Control Variables

The models include two control variables: gender and religion. In a patriarchal society, male dominance creates power differentials between men and women wherein the power imbalance benefits all men (Johnson 1997). Accordingly, the institutions that dominate a patriarchal society, including the state, religion, the education system and the economy, are “gendered institutions” (Acker 1992; Martin 2004). As such, feminists assert that gender is an organizing principle in each of these social institutions and is a formal, bureaucratic status (Lorber 2006). Research suggests that there are significant gender differences in the types and uses of social capital (Wang and Yamagishi 2005). Female networks tend to have more kinship ties (Moore 1990) and more social deficits (Lin 2001) than their male counterparts. According to social capitalist theory, this might account for the lower levels of trust observed in studies in China (Wang and Yamagishi 2005) and the U.S. (Perrin and Smolek 2009). There is also evidence of a relationship between gender and political attitudes and behaviors due to both societal and personal factors (Reed 2006) which

varies within and between nations (Paxton et al 2007). However, unpublished analyses conducted using Afrobarometer data from South Africa have not shown gender to be a significant predictor of political attitudes. Even so, as Judith Butler admits, though contemporary narratives of the transition to democracy in Africa argue that gender is not material to politics, the voices and ambitions of women should not be ignored (Reddy and Butler 2004). Therefore, I include gender in the analyses only as a control variable, coded as (0= *Male*, 1=*Female*).

I found a lack of support for a connection between religion and trust. As Putnam (2000) suggests, religion can lead to more community interaction, but it usually leads to bonding social capital. Still, religion can direct so many facets of one's belief system that it would be negligent not to account for its influence. Additionally, there is significant evidence that suggests that religion impacts political attitudes and behaviors (D'Antonio 2011; Mattis 2001; Patterson 2004; Ross 2001). I recoded Religion into two dummy categories: *Christian* and *Religious Other*. The inclusion of these control variables should minimize bias caused by unmeasured characteristics at each level of analysis.

Omitted Variables

Two variables included in the data set that were considered but excluded from the analyses are political party and race. As the ANC has dominated national elections since 1994, affiliation with that party might influence the level of trust a respondent has for the government. However, the question asked of respondents in each round of data was posed in

terms of “closeness” to a political party rather than membership with the party. As a result, the question does not measure membership with any party and was left out of the analysis.

In each round of the Afrobarometer study, the interviewer recorded the respondents’ racial identities. As Boehmer et al (2002) suggest, observed racial identifications are more likely to be incorrect than self-reported racial or ethnic identification. Therefore, although I ran models that include both the race and ethnicity variables, the models that include only the ethnicity variable are reported in this study.

Method

I used OLS regression analysis to investigate each of the relationships between structural factors, trust, political approval and democratic values. I expected to find a linear relationship between my independent and dependent variables. Also, each of my dependent variables is measured at the ordinal level. Therefore, OLS regression is the most appropriate method for analyzing these relationships. In addition, OLS regression allows for my categorical variables that measure the structural characteristics of the respondents to be easily transformed into dummy variables (McClendon 2002).

All regression analyses were conducted in SAS Enterprise Guide. Prior to running the regression models, I checked the descriptive statistics of each variable. See tables 3.5-3.10 for descriptive statistics of variables used in each analysis. I used listwise deletion to omit any missing data that might bias the results of the study. Listwise deletion of missing data produces reliable estimates in these designs when the sample size is large and the proportion of

missing data is relatively low (Allison 2002; Gibson and Olejnik, 2003). I performed listwise deletion for each round of data in each study separately. Therefore, the sample size for each analysis differs. For example, Study 1, round 3 includes 1710 total cases, while Study 1, Round 4 includes 1053 cases. Although the proportion of missing data is low across the key independent variables, multivariate listwise deletion across all dependent, independent and control variables results in substantial data loss – between 32% and 63% of observations are missing at least one variable in each empirical analysis. As a result, parameter estimates may be biased where substantial data are missing.

Of these missing data, the independent variables appear to be missing at random. In round 3, only 44 of the 2400 cases are missing one of the independent variables. In Round 4, 114 cases are missing one of the independent variables. The measures for political approval in both round 3 and Round 4 result in the majority of missing cases. In round 3, 433 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the political officers to respond to the question asked. Additionally, 295 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the economic policies to respond to the questions asked, and 891 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the social policies to respond to the questions asked. In round 4, 1070 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the political officers to respond to the question asked. Additionally, 140 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the economic policies to respond to the questions asked, and 341 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the social policies to respond to the questions asked. More details regarding sample size and deleted cases for each of the empirical analyses are discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6.

SAS procedures (e.g., PROC MEANS for descriptive statistics and PROC CORR for bivariate correlations) were then performed for both data sets. To construct my indexed variables that measure *general trust*, *government trust*, *approval of government offices*, *approval government economic policies* and *approval of government social policies*, I performed factor analyses to determine which variables load together on the factors. Initially, I included all variables that were available in the data set that appeared applicable to the factor that I was trying to measure. After performing the factor analyses, some variables had to be removed. The variables that are included in the final indices all loaded satisfactorily on only one dimension, using a cutoff of .400, and each improved the reliability of the scale, as demonstrated by an increase in Cronbach's alpha. These variables were then implemented in the OLS regression models.

Although I have taken precaution by conducting the factor analyses, it is possible that the indices I used in the analyses are not capturing the scope of the concepts that I am attempting to measure. Because of a lack of theoretical precedence on measures of trust and political approval, I relied heavily on intuition, data availability and, where available, measures used in previous studies to construct these indices. However, government trust is measured in a variety of ways (Hutchison 2011; Moehler and Singh 2011) and most measures of political approval focus on approval of the president (Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007; Cohen 2004; Gibson 2006).

In spite of the presence of measurement error, the data and statistical techniques employed in these studies help to provide answers to questions of trust and legitimacy in democratic societies. Additional information regarding the analysis for *general trust* and *government trust* can be found in Chapter 4, and the details for the *approval of government*

offices, approval of government economic policies and approval of government social policies is located in Chapter 5. Analysis of the indicators of democratic values is located in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER FOUR: FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE TRUST AMONG SOUTH AFRICANS

Introduction

Trust is an important component of political stability. In order for citizens to view the state as legitimate, they must trust that the members and institutions of the state are working to meet their expectations. In addition, members of a society must trust each other in order for a culture of trust to develop and enable democratic collaboration. Researchers have previously suggested that socioeconomic status (e.g. Anderson 2010; Guterbock 2008; Laponce 1967; Muller and Seligson 1987; Opp 2000; Sztompka 1999), age (e.g. Feagin 2001; Loury 1997; Mattes 2012; Lau and Redlawsk 2008), race and ethnicity (e.g. Davis 1998; Nunnally 2012; Valadez 2001) and location (e.g. Flora and Flora 2008; Tonnies 1957 [1887]; Wirth 1938) influence the development of varying forms of social and political trust (Anderson 2010; Putnam 2000; Sztompka 1999). In this chapter I investigate structural factors by analyzing data relating to the following research question: What structural factors influence trust in South Africa?

In order to empirically examine the drivers of trust among South Africans, I use data from rounds 3 and 4 of the Afrobarometer study conducted in South Africa in 2004 and 2008. Both rounds were conducted nationwide. Each round includes 2,400 respondents over the age of 18 in a multistage, stratified, area cluster probability sample to represent a cross-section of all voting age citizens in South Africa. Round 3 of the data was conducted in 2004.

During this time, Thabo Mbeki was president, and the ANC was unified without turmoil. Round 4 was conducted in 2008 during the time that the upheaval in the presidential position began within the ANC due to the election of Jacob Zuma. These rounds provide data regarding general and government trust and include many of the factors that previous research has found to influence trust, such as race and ethnicity (Banum and Groeling 2009; Ha 2010; Henderson et al 1995) socioeconomic status, age (Banum and Groeling 2009; Henderson et al 1995) and location (Henderson et al 1995).

Hypotheses

In previous studies, researchers have concentrated on the factors that influence general and government trust in developed, democratic nations (Sztompka 1999; Putnam 2000; Flora and Flora 2008). They find that frequent interaction and reciprocal relationships shape patterns of both forms of trust among individuals. Anderson's study attempted to assess the development of general and government trust in nations that are engaged in earlier phases of democratic development, such as Nicaragua and Argentina (Anderson 2010). Therefore, I developed hypotheses that investigate the factors that influence general trust and government trust in the developing democracy of South Africa.

Because of differences in the original Afrobarometer surveys, I created multiple indices of general and government trust, which are measured differently depending on the survey round. For round 3, I created one index for general trust and one for government trust. However, for round 4, I created one index for general trust and two indices for government

trust – one that measures trust for President Molanthe’s administration and one that measures trust for President Zuma’s administration. I identify several testable hypotheses that I use to evaluate the effects of socioeconomic status, age, ethnicity, location and national identity on the dependent variables measuring general trust and government trust.

Previous studies have determined that low socioeconomic status leads to low political interests, participation and trust (Anderson 2010; Guterbock 1980; Laponce 1967; Opp 2000; Putnam 2000; Sztompka 1999). Researchers in Europe and the U.S. found that higher socioeconomic status is correlated with higher levels of general trust (Putnam 2000; Sztompka 1999). Sztompka (1999) explains that people with low socioeconomic status are likely to have encountered situations that lead them towards pessimism and distrust. Furthermore, Anderson’s 2010 study comparing social and political trust in Argentina and Nicaragua suggests that higher levels of education were correlated with higher levels of both social and political trust in Nicaragua. So, it seems, this relationship holds for relatively new democracies as well. In addition, Herreros and Criado’s 2008 cross-national study shows that socioeconomic status affects the development of general trust globally. Both round 3 and round 4 of the Afrobarometer data include two measures of socioeconomic status: education level and employment status (Kelley 1992). Based on the findings from these relevant studies, I test the first hypothesis that:

H₁: Having high socioeconomic status, as measured by high school education as opposed to having less than a high school education, and being employed as opposed to unemployed, will increase both general trust and government trust.

Previous research suggests that a person's age influences political attitudes (Lau and Redlawsk 2008; Zeitlin 1967). However, the particular influences vary in terms of party alliances, political cognition and trust for government in Europe (Breakwell, Fife-Schaw and Devereux 1989; Watts 1999) and South Africa (Mattes 2012). Putnam asserts that younger Americans have expressed a steeper decline in trust than older Americans (Putnam 2000). Previous studies yield mixed findings; on one hand, some find that age does not have a consistent effect on government trust (Avery 2007; Hamano et al 2011; Haniff 1978). On the other hand, other studies find that younger citizens are less likely to trust politicians and have interpersonal trust (Breakwell et al 1989; Clark and Eisenstein 2013; Finkel and Ernst 2005). Thus, the relationship between age and trust warrants further exploration. South African citizens who are old enough to remember their nation under the previous apartheid system may have hesitations for both general and government trust compared to those who did not experience apartheid due to a lack of positive, reciprocal interactions as well as negative experiences with the apartheid government. Conversely, older South Africans may trust the government more because of the longstanding reverence for the ANC as a major resistance to the unjust laws of Apartheid (Butler 2004). The mixed findings on the relationship between age and trust lead to the following exploratory hypothesis:

H₂: Age will have a significant effect on both general trust and government trust.

Accordingly, an individual's race or ethnicity will likely affect his or her ability to trust other ethnic groups or to have faith in governing bodies (Davis 1998; Nunnally 2012; Valadez 2001). For example, Nunnally (2012) found that black Americans have less social

and political trust than white Americans. Additionally, Avery (2007) found that black American's political trust decreased following the Supreme Court's decision of the 2000 election and white American's trust did not. These findings are explained, in part, by the negative experiences that black Americans have endured historically, which are comparable to negative experiences endured by indigenous African ethnic groups during and following Apartheid in South Africa (Butler 2004; Hendricks 2003; Sparks 2003). In general, political trust is particularly challenging for multicultural societies because of concern that the government might favor one ethnic group over another (Valadez 2001). Because of the cultural and political differences between Afrikaaners and the other ethnic group categories in South Africa, I developed Hypothesis 3, which describes the relationship between ethnicity and trust.

H₃: A respondent's ethnic identity as Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu, African Other, European Other or Other will have a significant effect on both general trust and government trust, net of other variables, when compared to the Afrikaaner ethnic group.

Finally, previous studies argue that people who live in a rural area exhibit higher levels of community engagement and stronger reciprocity norms, which results in higher levels of social trust (Flora and Flora 2008; Luloff and Bridger 2003; Putnam 2000; Tonnies 1957 [1887]; Wirth 1938). Yet, legislation during Apartheid, which dispersed people into rural areas and forbade the development of mutual associations, may have thwarted the development of social trust (Butler 2004; Hendricks 2003; Sparks 2003). Migration to urban areas post-apartheid may have allowed respondents to develop the mutual associations

described by social capital theorists (Flora and Flora 2008; Putnam 2000; Sampson 2008) over the past 16 years of democratic rule. This is in contrast to those in rural areas who may continue to encounter political segregation due to their physical separation. The literature above indicates that urban and rural contexts influence trust among individuals. Although the literature suggests that people who live in rural areas would have higher levels of trust, I argue that in the unique context of South Africa, the reciprocity norms and mutual associations would have had a better chance of developing in urban environments. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 describes the anticipated relationship between locale and trust.

H₄: Living in a rural area as opposed to living in an urban area will decrease both general trust and government trust.

In addition to the hypotheses predicting the structural factors that will influence general and government trust, I anticipate that these structural factors will interact with one other variable: South African identity. This is due, in part, to previous literature, which argues that nationalism increases state-level political stability (Brown 2001; Dzur 2002). However, because the impacts of national identity in South Africa are uncertain, I developed the following exploratory hypothesis:

H₅: Identifying as South African, as measured by the identity variable, will lead to higher levels of government trust net of the other independent variables measuring structural factors and will also change relationships through interaction effects with the other independent variables measuring structural factors. To reiterate, South African identity will

lead to higher levels of government trust. Further, the effects of socioeconomic status, age, ethnicity and locale on government trust will be mediated by a South African identity.

Methods

To test these hypotheses, I employed OLS regression techniques for several reasons. First, as was found in previous studies, I expect to find a linear relationship between my independent and dependent variables. Prior research demonstrates the positive, linear relationship between key variables of interest (socioeconomic status, age, race and ethnicity and locale) as possible explanations of the generation of trust among citizens (Breakwell et al 1989; Clark and Eisenstein 2013; Flora and Flora 2008; Guterbock 1980; Laponce 1967; Luloff and Bridger 2003; Nunnally 2012; Opp 2000). Second, each of the dependent variables is measured at the ordinal level. Therefore, the assumption of linearity and the measurement of the outcome variables make OLS regression the appropriate method for analyzing these relationships. Lastly, OLS regression allows for the inclusion of the categorical variables that measure the structural characteristics of the respondents to be easily transformed into dummy variables (McClendon 2002).

I constructed indices to indicate different dimensions of trust, which include measures of general trust, or trust for fellow citizens, and government trust, which gauges the level of trust for government officials and entities. The survey measures of general trust vary between

round 3 and round 4 in the original surveys⁸. However, the survey measures of government trust in the original surveys are more similar. They are identical between rounds 3 and 4, except for the item that measures the level of trust in the president. In round 3, respondents were asked to assess their level of trust for President Mbeki. In round 4, the respondents were asked to assess their level of trust for both interim President Molanthe and President-elect Zuma. Therefore, I constructed three separate indices of government trust to reflect the level of trust for each president's administration. The indicators combined into the indices are cognate measures of the constructs that I aim to capture in my models. Therefore these dimensions are reduced into one indicator under the assumption that they will exhibit similar effects on the outcome, and their disaggregation might lead to Type II errors (Cohen et al 2003). To this end, I operationalized each index using the results of orthogonal varimax rotation factor analyses (Garson 2010). The variables that I included in the final indices all loaded satisfactorily on only one dimension, using a cutoff of .400; and each improved the reliability of the index, as demonstrated by an increase in Cronbach's alpha (Garson 2010).

I created two indices to measure general trust. For round 3, I combined *Trust for neighbors*, *trust for people in your own ethnic group* and *trust for people in other ethnic groups* to create the **General Trust Round 3** variable, which is used in the empirical analyses. For round 4, I combined *Trust other people you know*, *Trust for other South Africans* and *Trust for foreigners living in South Africa* to create the **General Trust Round 4** variable, which is used in the empirical analyses. The three variables that I included in each

⁸ This is an unfortunate common issue with using secondary data. As a secondary investigator, I have no control over the differences between included survey measures between rounds of data collected (Kupek 1999).

index are weighted equally. Therefore each index has 10 values ranging from 0-9 where lower values represent lower levels of trust and higher values represent higher levels of trust.

I created three indices to measure government trust. For round 3, I combined *Trust for President Mbeki*, *Trust for the National Assembly*, *Trust for the national electoral commission* and *trust for the ANC* to create the **Government Trust Round 3** variable, which is used in the empirical analyses. For round 4, I created two separate indices to measure trust for the governments under President Molanthe and President Zuma. I combined *Trust for President Molanthe*, *Trust for the National Assembly*, *trust for the national electoral commission* and *trust for the ANC* to create the **Government Trust 1 Round 4** variable, which is used in the empirical analysis. I combined *Trust for President Zuma*, *trust for the National Assembly*, *trust for the national electoral commission* and *trust for the ANC* to create the **Government Trust 2 Round 4** variable, which is used in the analysis. The variables that I included in each index are weighted equally. Therefore each index has nine values ranging from 0-8 where lower values represent lower levels of trust and higher values represent higher levels of trust. Descriptive statistics for each of the indices are found in Appendix A.

For both round 3 and round 4, socioeconomic status is measured by two variables in the data: education level and employment status (Kelley 1992). I recoded education level into one dummy variable to differentiate respondents who completed high school education and those who did not (0=*No HS*, 1=*HS*) because the distribution suggested that these two categories would allow for sufficient case numbers in each. For the same reason, I also recoded employment status into a dummy variable (0=*Unemployed*, 1=*Employed*). In both

rounds, age is measured as a continuous variable. In the working data sets, age was heavily skewed toward younger ages. This is expected since the life expectancy in South Africa throughout the early 2000s was approximately 51 years (World Bank). Therefore, I used the logarithmic transformation of age in the regression analyses to control for skewness (see York et al. 2003).

In each round of the Afrobarometer study, the respondents' racial identities were recorded by the interviewer. This results in an unknown amount of error because of possible interviewer bias regarding the characteristics that define a person's race (Dohrenwend et al 1968; Hill 2002). However, ethnicity was asked in an open-ended question to each respondent, who self-reported the ethnic group that they identified with the most. Therefore, the ethnicity variable was best suited for the analysis (Boehmer et al. 2002). Accordingly, I use the ethnicity variable instead of the race variable in the analysis.⁹ For both rounds, I recoded the ethnicity variable into nine dummy variables: *Afrikaaner*, *Xhosa*, *Pedi*, *Sesotho*, *Setswana*, *Zulu*, *AfricanOther*, *EuropeanOther*, and *Other*. For both rounds of the data, locale is reported by the interviewer and is coded as a dummy variable (0= *Urban*, 1= *Rural*).

I anticipated interaction effects between each of these structural factors and South African identity. If a respondent identifies as South African more so than as a member of any other group, this may influence the relationship between each of the structural factors and government trust. Therefore the analysis includes an investigation of interaction effects between each of the structural factors and South African identity. This variable is coded on a

⁹ I ran models that include both the race and ethnicity variables. However the models that include only the ethnicity variable are reported in this study.

five point Likert scale as (1=*I Feel Only (r's group)*, 2=*I Feel More (r's group) than South African*, 3=*I Feel Equally South African and (r's groups)*, 4=*I Feel More South African than (r's groups)*, 5=*I feel only South African*). This is the measurement for *Identity* that I use in my analysis.

All of the regression models include two control variables: gender and religion. In a patriarchal society, male dominance creates power differentials between men and women wherein the power imbalance benefits all men (Johnson 1997). Accordingly, the institutions that dominate a patriarchal society, including the state, religion, the education system and the economy, are “gendered institutions” (Acker 1992; Martin 2004). As such, feminists assert that gender is an organizing principle in each of these social institutions and is a formal, bureaucratic status (Lorber 2006). Furthermore, research suggests that there are significant gender differences in the types and uses of social capital (Wang and Yamagishi 2005). Female networks tend to have more kinship ties (Moore 1990) and more social deficits (Lin 2001) than their male counterparts. According to social capitalist theory, this might account for the lower levels of trust among women observed in studies in China (Wang and Yamagishi 2005) and the U.S. (Perrin and Smolek 2009). However, in unpublished analyses using the Afrobarometer data from South Africa, I did not find a relationship between gender and trust. Therefore, I include gender in the analyses only as a control variable, coded as (0=*Male*, 1=*Female*).

I recoded religion into two dummy categories: *Christian* and *Religious Other*¹⁰. I found a lack of evidence to support a connection between religion and trust. However, because religion can direct so many facets of one's belief system that it would be negligent not to account for its influence. Additionally, there is evidence from previous studies that shows that religion impacts political attitudes and behaviors (Mattis 2001, Patterson 2004, Ross 2001, D'Antonio 2011).

I created my OLS regression models to analyze the effects of each of the independent variables on the dependent, indexed variables measuring general trust and government trust from both rounds using SAS Enterprise Guide 4.2. Prior to running the analyses, I used listwise deletion to omit any missing data that might bias the results of the study. Although the proportion of missing data is low across the key independent variables, multivariate listwise deletion across all dependent, independent and control variables results in substantial data loss – between 25% and 52% of observations are missing at least one variable in each empirical analysis. The measure for government trust in Round 4 results in the majority of missing cases. In Round 4, 642 respondents answered that they did not know enough about President Molanthe to respond to the question asked. Additionally, 453 respondents answered that the question regarding South African identity was not applicable or that they did not know the degree to which they feel South African. As a result, parameter estimates may be biased where substantial data are missing. I measured statistical significance of each model $\alpha=.05$

¹⁰ Religion is not a variable of interest, and is only included as a control. Also, the distribution included sufficient cases for the religion variable to be coded as Christian and non-Christian or “Religious Other”. Also, the studies that suggest that religion impacts political attitudes and behaviors can vary in their coding of religions (for example, Catholics and Protestants or Christians and Muslims).

and the statistical significance of each of the parameter estimates of the independent variables at $\alpha=.05$.

Round 3 Results

The analysis for round 3 includes 1792 cases (608 cases were deleted). The deleted cases are similar to the cases included in the analysis in terms of age, South African identity and religion. However, there are some differences between the cases included in the study and those deleted due to missing values. The missing cases have a higher percentage of Afrikaaners and ethnic groups included in the “European Other” category. The missing cases also show a higher percentage of HS graduates, a higher percentage of unemployed respondents, and a higher percentage of respondents living in rural areas.

Table 3.5 reports descriptive statistics for the 1792 cases of round 3 variables included in this study. Each of the indexed dependent variables approximates a normal distribution. On average, the respondents trust each other “somewhat” (mean for *General Trust Round 3* = 4.35). The respondents trust the government “somewhat” (mean for *Government Trust Round 3* = 4.99).

The descriptive statistics reported in Table 3.5 indicate that, of the 1792 cases included in this analysis, approximately 44% of respondents have acquired a high school diploma, 40% of the respondents are employed at least part time and 38% of respondents live in a rural area. The mean age of respondents is approximately 40 years old. The ethnic distribution of the respondents is approximately 8% Afrikaaner, 19% Xhosa, 8% Pedi, 10%

Sesotho, 9% Setswana, and 20% Zulu. Twelve percent of the respondents are members of the Ndebele, Shangaan, Swazi or Venda ethnic groups. Thirteen percent of the respondents are members of the English, Indian, Coloured or Other White/European ethnic groups, and 1% of the respondents are members of a National identity only or reported their ethnic group as “Other” –not specified. On average the respondents feel more South African than their ethnic group (mean for *Identity* = 3.99). Forty-nine percent are female, 57% are Christian, and 43% are not Christian¹¹.

Table 4.1 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *General Trust Round 3* and the control variables. Of the structural indicators that were included in the model, employment status, age and two of the ethnic groups – Pedi and “European Other”, were statistically significant. The model predicts 4% of the variation in general trust for round 3 (adjusted r square = .040).

Table 4.3a reports the regression coefficients for all first-order variables in the analysis of the dependent variable, *Government Trust Round 3*. Model 1 includes each of the structural variables that I anticipated would affect government trust. In this model, age, education level, several of the indicators for ethnicity and religion are statistically significant. Model 2 includes the structural variables and the variable measuring identity as a South African. In this model, the significance of the structural indicators remains the same in addition to the variable measuring South African identity. Of these models for *Government*

¹¹ The respondents characterized as “not Christian” do not believe in any religion or identify as Agnostic or Atheist, Catholic, Evangelical or Mainstream Protestant, Sunni or Shiite Muslim, African Independent, Traditional, Hindu, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon or reported their religion as “Other” – not specified.

Trust Round 3, Model 2 has the highest predictability of government trust at 11.8% (adjusted r square = .118).

There were no significant interactions between employment status, age or locale and the variable measuring identity as a South African. However, I found significant interaction effects between education level and identity as a South African, and also between ethnic group and identity as a South African. South African identity has a moderating effect on the relationship between education and *Government Trust Round 3* and between ethnicity and *Government Trust Round 3*. Significant interaction effects are shown in Models 2 and 3 found in Table 4.3b. These models predict 12.1% and 14.1% of the variability in *Government Trust Round 3* (adjusted r square = .121 and .141 respectively).

When checking the tolerance and variance inflation, I discovered a multicollinearity issue between my product terms and main effects in both models of *Government Trust Round 3*. In an effort to lessen the multicollinearity and increase the tolerance between the product terms, I mean centered the ordinal and continuous variables in my model – Age(logged) and Identity (Cohen et. al. 2003). In addition, I trimmed the ethnicity interaction model to delete the “Other” ethnic group because including this interaction term also resulted in multicollinearity issues. After mean centering these variables, the tolerance levels of all variables in the models are well above .1 and the VIF levels are well below 10, the common guidelines for detecting multicollinearity (Cohen et al 2003; Hair et al 2006)¹².

¹² Acceptable levels of VIF and tolerance are controversial. The levels of acceptability for tolerance and VIF used in these analyses are common but relaxed compared to others used in research (see: O’Brien 2007). For example, Garson (2012) suggests that a VIF>4 indicates that multicollinearity issues may exist.

For the 1792 respondents included in this analysis, I calculated conditional slopes for each of the interactions that were significant at $\alpha=.05$. For those respondents with a high school diploma, the slope of identity as a South African on *Government Trust Round 3* is .53, holding all other variables to their means. Because the South African identity variable is mean-centered, the conditional slope for respondents who do not have a high school diploma is .00 (so essentially no relationship between and identity as a South African and government trust), holding all other variables to their means. The slope of trust and identity among high school graduates indicates that an increase in *Government Trust Round 3* is caused by the increase in national identity among those with high school diplomas.

For the 1792 respondents included in this analysis, the significant interaction terms included the following ethnic groups: Xhosa, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu and those included in the “European Other” dummy category. For the interaction between ethnic group and South African identity, holding all other variables to their means, the conditional slope for Xhosa respondents who identify as South African is 1.03. The conditional slope for Pedi respondents who identify as South African is 1.16. The conditional slope for Sesotho respondents who identify as South African is 1.42. The conditional slope for Setswana respondents is 1.33. The conditional slope for Zulu respondents is .58. The conditional slope for European Other respondents is .05. Each of these slopes indicates increased levels of *Government Trust Round 3* caused by the interaction between ethnic group and identity as a South African.

Round 4 Results

The analysis for Round 4 includes 1142 cases (1258 cases were deleted). The deleted cases are similar to the cases included in the analysis in terms of ethnicity, employment status, locale, South African identity and religion. However, the missing cases have a lower percentage of high school graduates. In general, these results need to be interpreted cautiously due to the large amounts of data that are missing.

Table 3.8 reports descriptive statistics for the 1142 cases of Round 4 variables. Each of the indexed dependent variables approximates a normal distribution. On average, the respondents trust each other “a little” (mean for *General Trust Round 4* = 3.37). The respondents trust the Molanthe government “somewhat” (mean for *Government Trust 1 Round 4* = 3.99).¹³ The respondents trust the Zuma government “somewhat” (mean for *Government Trust 2 Round 4* = 4.0).

The descriptive statistics reported in Table 3.8 indicate that of the 1142 cases included in this analysis, 49% of respondents have acquired a high school diploma, 50% of the respondents are employed at least part time, and 34% of respondents live in a rural area. The mean age of respondents is approximately 40 years old. The ethnic distribution of the respondents is 14% Afrikaaner, 17% Xhosa, 6% Pedi, 7% Sesotho, 11% Setswana, and 17% Zulu. Eleven percent of the respondents are members of the Ndebele, Shangaan, Swazi or Venda ethnic groups. Seventeen percent of the respondents are members of the English,

¹³ Twenty-seven percent of respondents answered that they did not know enough about Molanthe to answer this question. Therefore, these results need to be interpreted cautiously due to the large amounts of data that are missing.

Indian, Coloured or Other White/European ethnic groups, and 1% of the respondents are members of a National identity only or reported their ethnic group as “Other” –not specified. On average, the respondents feel more South African than their ethnic group (mean for *Identity* = 3.98). Forty-nine percent of the respondents are female, 35% are Christian and 65% are not Christian¹⁴.

Table 4.2 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *General Trust Round 4*. Of the structural indicators that were included in the model, location in a rural area and two of the ethnic groups – Zulu and Other, are statistically significant. One of the control variables, Christian religion, was also statistically significant. The model predicts 4.1% of the variability in *General Trust Round 4* (adjusted r square = .041).

Table 4.4 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of *Government Trust 1 Round 4*. Model 1 includes each of the structural variables that I anticipate will affect government trust. In this model, age and ethnic group are statistically significant. Model 2 includes the structural variables and the variable measuring identity as a South African. In this model, *identity* is not significant. There are no significant interactions between the structural variables influencing *Government Trust 1 Round 4* and the variable measuring South African identity. The model for *Government Trust 1 Round 4* with the

¹⁴ The respondents characterized as “not Christian” do not believe in any religion or identify as Agnostic or Atheist, are Catholic, either Evangelical or Mainstream Protestant, Sunni or Shiite Muslim, African Independent, Traditional, Hindu, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon or reported their religion as “Other” – not specified.

highest level of predictability is the one including the structural factors, Model 1, at 8.1% (adjusted r square = .081).

Table 4.5 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of *Government Trust 2 Round 4*. Model 1 includes each of the structural variables that I anticipate will affect government trust. Of the structural indicators included in the model, only the dummy variables measuring ethnic group are statistically significant. Model 3 includes the structural variables and the variable measuring identity as a South African, and again, the variable is not statistically significant. There are no significant interactions between the structural variables influencing *Government Trust 2 Round 4* and the variable measuring South African identity. The model for *Government Trust 2 Round 4* with the variable measuring South African identity predicts the most variability of *Government Trust 2 Round 4* – 10.5% (adjusted r square = .105).

Analysis and Discussion

General Trust - Rounds 3 and 4 Compared

General trust for the public is an important measure of the generation and existence of a culture of trust. According to the data reported in Afrobarometer rounds 3 and 4, South African citizens do not show high levels of trust in each other, and what trust they do have may be decreasing. The average level of general trust in 2004 (round 3) was one point higher on the index scale than the reported levels of general trust in 2008 (round 4). So, in 2004, the 1792 respondents in the analysis trusted each other “somewhat”, while in 2008, the 1142

respondents included in the analysis trusted each other “a little”. Further, the structural variables that influence trust varied between the rounds of data collected. In 2004, being employed and membership with one of the ethnic groups (Pedi) were associated with higher levels of general trust. Increased age and membership with the ethnic groups included in the “European Other” variable were associated with lower levels of general trust. In 2008, location in a rural area and Christian religion decreased general trust. Identifying as Zulu, and membership with the ethnic groups included in the “Other” variable increased general trust.

There are several plausible explanations for why the variables that affected general trust varied between round 3 and round 4. First, my measures of general trust are not consistent between the two rounds. *General Trust Round 3* and *General Trust Round 4* measure trust differently in terms of how the groups relate to the respondents included in the analyses; in round 3, general trust is asked in terms of ethnicity, and in Round 4 it is asked in terms of nationality. People are likely to view trust for ethnic groups other than their own very differently than they might view trust for foreigners living in their country. Xenophobia, then, might be a contributing factor that explains the lower levels of general trust observed in round 4 (Sztompka 1999).

Despite these inconsistencies, there are some congruencies between the two indices; for example, each includes measures of trust for people that the respondent is familiar with and might interact with (or their “in group”) and for people that the respondent might not know personally and therefore not interact with regularly (or their “out group”) (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Also, each index includes a measure of trust for a group that the respondent

might feel a sense of solidarity with and one that the respondent may not feel solidarity. One key difference is that for round 3, “in-group/out-group” categories were based on ethnicity, and for round 4 they were based on national citizenship.¹⁵

The data support this argument. The mean value for the variable measuring identity as a South African remained nearly the same for both rounds. The data show no increase in national identity between 2004 and 2008. Therefore, the use of measures of trust based on ethnicity that are included in the *General Trust Round 3* index seems unwarranted. If people were identifying based on national citizenship, they may have also assessed their perspectives of others based on citizenship and not ethnicity. Therefore, the measures of trust in round 3 may not capture South Africans’ general trust for each other in the same way that round 4 does.

Additionally, the models that were analyzed for round 3 data and round 4 data predicted 4.0% and 4.1%, respectively, of the variation in general trust.¹⁶ What these low adjusted r squares suggest is that in both waves of data, employment status, age and ethnicity had very little influence on general trust. There must be other factors influencing general trust in South Africa or, as mentioned previously, the measures of general trust themselves are problematic. Robert Mattes (2012) found similarly low r square values when conducting

¹⁵ This is a weakness of using secondary data for quantitative analysis. The data available vary between rounds three and four, and, as a result, my measures of general trust vary between rounds. The quantitative analysis is limited in the degree of exact mechanisms that influence social trust in South Africa. However, in spite of these limitations, I am able to reach some general conclusions regarding broad patterns of trust in South Africa.

¹⁶ I use adjusted r^2 to measure the amount of variation described by the independent variables included in the analyses because r^2 can be inflated by both sample size and an increased number of independent variables. The adjusted r^2 is necessarily smaller than r^2 . Shrinkage between r^2 and adjusted r^2 increases as the number of independent variables included in the regression model increases. $R^2 = .047$ for the analysis of *General Trust Round 3* and $.053$ for the analysis of *General Trust Round 4*.

his research on the effects of age on democratic commitment in South Africa using Afrobarometer data.¹⁷

Essentially, because of the low predictability in the variation of general trust for both rounds, the analysis of general trust is not conclusive. While employment status, age, locale and ethnicity may account for some of the variation in general social trust in South Africa, these structural variables account for very little of that variation. Therefore, the factors that influence general social trust in South Africa remain uncertain given the data from these two surveys.

Government Trust – Round 3 and 4 Compared

The mean values for the government trust indices show a small decrease between rounds 3 and 4. The decrease may be accountable to the changes that occurred in the South African government in 2008. In 2008 President Zuma was elected to lead the ANC. His party election was controversial as he had been previously accused of financial corruption and fired from his position as Deputy President in 2005 by Mbeki, who was president at that time (Wines 2005). The ANC pressured Mbeki to step down from his position prior to the end of his term. So, in September 2008, he resigned and Molanthe was appointed as interim president until Zuma officially took office in April 2009. The election of Zuma and forced resignation of Mbeki caused the ANC to split with defecting members creating the Cope political party (Bearak 2009; Silke 2009). With the political upheaval amid frequent

¹⁷ Matte's highest recorded r^2 was .117 and lowest was .003.

accusations of corruption against ANC leaders, it is not surprising that citizens' trust would wane at this time.

The analyses of government trust produced mixed results as well. In 2004 (round 3), the structural variables that influenced government trust were education level, age, ethnicity and religion. However, in 2008 (Round 4), education level and religion no longer influenced the 1142 respondents' trust in their governments. For the respondents included in the analyses, ethnic group is the most consistent indicator of government trust as it is significant in each analysis.

In addition, the level of variability in government trust predicted decreases between rounds 3 and 4, and the variable measuring South African identity was significant in 2004 but not in 2008. Therefore, national identity must have accounted for more of the variation in government trust in 2004 than in 2008. In 2008, other factors not included in the models, including but not limited to the tension among political leadership, may account for government trust.

Discussion of Hypotheses

Table 4.6 includes a summary of the significant indicators of general trust for rounds 3 and 4, and Table 4.7 includes a summary of the significant indicators of government trust for rounds 3 and 4 for the multivariate models. Employment status had a positive significant effect on *General Trust Round 3*, and education level had a negative significant effect on *Government Trust Round 3*. Education level and employment status did not have a

statistically significant effect on either general or government trust in 2008 (Round 4). However, the significant positive regression coefficient for education level in the model predicting *Government Trust Round 3* provides partial support for Hypothesis 1 predicting a significant increase of government trust based on increased socioeconomic status. Support for this hypothesis is consistent with previous literature which suggests that socioeconomic status influences government trust (Anderson 2010; Guterbock 1980; Laponce 1967; Opp 2000), particularly Anderson's 2010 study of political trust in Argentina and Nicaragua.

Hypothesis 2 is also supported. Older respondents included in the analyses reported higher levels of general trust in 2004 (round 3). The models also show that as age increases, *Government Trust Round 3* increases. The analyses for 2008 also show that although age does not have a statistically significant effect on *General Trust Round 4* or *Government Trust 2 Round 4*, it does have a positive statistically significant effect on *Government Trust 1 Round 4*, furthering the support for Hypothesis 2.

Again, this finding is consistent with some of the previous literature. Youth has been associated with low levels of trust in the U.S. (Putnam 2000), Europe (Breakwell et al 1989) and South Africa (Mattes 2012). Based on the analyses in this study, this continues to be the case in South Africa, despite other studies that found not significant relationships between age and trust (Avery 2007; Hamano et al 2011; Haniff 1978). In addition, the significant effect of age on government trust is in line with former assessments of trust and political behaviors conducted by Putnam (2000) and Zeitlin (1967).

As expected, ethnicity has a significant effect on general trust. In 2004 (round 3), of the 1792 respondents included in the analyses, those who are members of the Pedi ethnic group have less trust and European Other ethnic groups have more trust than members of the Afrikaaner ethnic group. In 2008 (round 4), of the 1142 respondents included in the analyses, those who are members of the Zulu or ethnic groups included in the “Other” category had more trust than those in the Afrikaaner ethnic group. The analyses for government trust produce similar results. Respondents included in the analyses who identify as Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu, or the ethnic groups included in the African Other and European Other variables report higher levels of government trust than those who identify as Afrikaaner. This is the case for each index included in the analyses. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported by each measure of general and government trust for both rounds of the data.

The impact of ethnicity on both general and government trust is well supported by the literature on trust (see Nunnally 2012; Ross 2001; Valadez 2001; Zeitlin 1967). South Africa’s history of racial and ethnic division and hostility, fostered by Apartheid policies and supporters, influenced the interactions between various racial and ethnic groups. And, as social capital theorists would argue, feelings of trust are likely to have formed accordingly.

Living in a rural area did correlate with lower levels of general trust in 2008 as anticipated by Hypothesis 4. However, living in a rural area did not have a significant effect on general trust in 2004, nor did it have a significant effect on government trust in any of the analyses from 2004 or 2008. Therefore, I found only partial support for Hypothesis 4.

The lack of support for Hypothesis 4 might be best explained by the debate in literature on community in which some scholars argue that communities are defined by location (Flora and Flora 2008; Putnam 2000; Tonnies 1957[1887]) while others argue that a sense of community can be developed around commonalities that are not tied to location at all (Bell 1992; Brint 2001; Luloff and Bridger 2003; Sampson 2008). Apartheid legislation, which separated geographic areas based on race (Butler 2004), makes residency in urban or rural locale in South Africa uniquely different than other countries where people are not forced to migrate to urban or rural locations by national legislation. In South Africa, then, people may develop their trust attitudes based on commonalities other than their location. Therefore, location in a rural area does not influence attitudes regarding the government, including trust.

South African identity did not have a significant effect on government trust in 2008; however it did have a significant effect in 2004. I also found significant interactions between the South African identity variable and two of the variables influencing *Government Trust Round 3* – ethnicity and education. South African identity moderates the relationship between ethnicity and government trust and the relationship between education and government trust. Identifying as South African significantly increases the level of *Government Trust Round 3*, as determined by the incremental F statistic at $p < .05$.

Figure 4.1 in Appendix B shows the interaction effects between ethnicity and the South African identity variable for *Government Trust Round 3*. As the graph shows, for the portion of the 1792 included respondents who are members of the Sesotho ethnic group, as

South African identity increases, government trust increases the most. This is shown by the line for Sesotho respondents, which has the largest slope at 1.42. For the portion of the 1792 included respondents who are members of the Setswana ethnic group, increase in South African identity results in the second largest increase in the slope of *Government Trust Round 3* at 1.33. For the portion of the 1792 included respondents who are members of the Xhosa ethnic group, increase in South African identity results in the third largest increase in the slope of *Government Trust Round 3* at 1.16. For the portion of the 1792 included respondents who are members of the Xhosa ethnic group, increase in South African identity results in the fourth largest increase in the slope of *Government Trust Round 3* at 1.03. For the portion of the 1792 included respondents who are members of the Zulu ethnic group, increase in South African identity results in the fifth largest increase in the slope of *Government Trust Round 3* at .58. For the portion of the 1792 included respondents who are members of the ethnic groups included in European Other, increase in South African identity results in the sixth largest increase in the slope of *Government Trust Round 3* at .05.¹⁸ Therefore, the effect of the South African Identity variable is moderation (Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan 1990).

In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Xhosa ethnic group is 2.33, and in the interaction model, it is 2.12. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Pedi ethnic group is 1.88 and in the interaction model, it is 1.68. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Sesotho ethnic group is 2.35, and in the interaction

¹⁸ The interactions between the ethnic groups included in the African Other and Other dummy variables and the South African Identity variable were not statistically significant at $\alpha=.05$.

model, it is 2.21. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Setswana ethnic group is 2.12, and in the interaction model, it is 1.91. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Zulu ethnic group is 1.32, and in the interaction model, it is 1.11. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for ethnic groups included in the “African Other” category is 2.01, and in the interaction model, it is 1.76. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the ethnic groups included in the “European Other” category is .788, and in the interaction model, it is .601.

The results for relationships between the ethnic groups and national identity as South African are interesting. The first order effects of being a member of the previously discussed ethnic groups increase *Government Trust Round 3*. In addition, the first order effect of national identity as a South African is an increase in *Government Trust Round 3*. However, when the two effects are combined in an interaction, the parameter estimates for the second order effects are negative (see Table 4.3b), indicating decrease in *Government Trust Round 3*. This means that the ethnicity and South African identity interactions are essentially compensatory effects: either one or the other of the variables will produce an increase in *Government Trust Round 3*, but in combination the effect of one is reduced by the other (Cohen et al 2003). This does not support Hypothesis 5.

These interaction relationships between identity and *Government Trust Round 3* across ethnic groups are consistent with the historical context of ethnic relations in South Africa. Sesotho is an ethnic group consisting of people from Lesotho, the nation whose borders are surrounded by South Africa. Many Sesotho immigrate to South Africa for job

opportunities (McDonald et al 2000). They likely view South Africa favorably because of these opportunities, which would explain why they would report higher levels of *Government Trust Round 3*. Again, while being Sesotho and identifying as South African independently leads to increased *Government Trust Round 3*, the importance of being Sesotho may be lessened by identifying as South African and vice versa. In essence, each is in part a redundant cause of trust relative to the other.

The same can be argued for members of the other ethnic groups. For example, the Xhosa are the second largest ethnic group in South Africa (second to the Zulu) (Editor 2013b). They continue to be dedicated supporters of the ANC, which was established in 1923 as an advocator of rights for black Africans at the onset of Apartheid, continued as a resistance organization throughout the Apartheid period and is now the dominant political party in post-Apartheid South Africa (Editor 2013c). Given their support of the ANC and its Xhosa leaders (of the most notable are Nelson Mandela and Bishop Desmond Tutu), it seems logical that being a member of the Xhosa group would increase government trust. However, although identifying as Xhosa and identifying as South African independently leads to increased *Government Trust Round 3*, the importance of being Xhosa may be lessened by having a strong national identity and vice versa. That is to say, each is partially a redundant cause of trust relative to the other.

Figure 4.2 shows the interaction effect on trust between education and the South African identity variable, which is statistically significant as determined by the incremental F test at $p < .05$. The interaction between education and South African identity shows that an

increase in South African identity increases the level of government trust. Therefore, I conclude that identifying as South African moderates the relationship between education and *Government Trust Round 3* (Jaccard et al 1990). In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for HS education is .321, and in the interaction model it is .319. Further, the interaction between education and identity is synergistic – both predictors have a positive effect on government trust, and together they produce a stronger positive effect on government trust (Cohen et al 2003). Hypothesis 5 is partially supported – identifying as South African leads to higher levels of *Government Trust Round 3* for the portion of the 1792 included respondents who have completed a high school education or higher.

Summary and Preliminary Conclusions

The structural variables that I used in my analysis did not account for much of the variation in general trust for South Africans either in 2004 or 2008 (3.8% and 4.2% respectively). One reason for this could be that my indices for general trust do not account for the complex feelings of social trust among the respondents included in the analyses. Another likely possibility is that the structural indicators that I have included in these analyses do not have as much influence on trust in South Africa as it does in the previous studies on trust, which were conducted in the contexts of Europe and the U.S.¹⁹ However, the models do suggest that ethnicity influenced general trust in both years. Likewise, ethnicity

¹⁹ Additionally, there are likely to be other indicators of general and government trust. For example, I initially intended to include a measure of political party affiliation to these analyses but could not due to measurement error. Better measures of political party affiliation and activity would be helpful in accounting for the structural indicators of trust in South Africa.

influenced government trust for each of the administrations analyzed (under leadership of Mbeki, Molanthe and Zuma). Membership to each of the ethnic groups listed in the analysis resulted in higher levels of government trust than for Afrikaaners in each round of the analysis from 2004 and 2008. However, when looking at general trust, in both 2004 and 2008, only two of the ethnic groups were statistically significant. So, many of the ethnic identities did not show a significant effect on trust when compared to Afrikaaners.. In any case, this study suggests that ethnicity is the indicator that has influenced trust consistently in South Africa – more so than socioeconomic status, age or locale. Additionally, although the parameter estimates suggest that membership to the ethnic groups included in the model was associated with higher levels of government trust and increased national identity was also associated with higher levels of government trust, the parameter estimates for the interaction terms were all negative. This suggests that national identity is a moderator that lessens the effect of those ethnic groups on government trust.

These findings are consistent with previous literature that argues that an individual's racial or ethnic background will likely affect his or her ability to trust other ethnic groups or to have faith in governing bodies (Davis 1998; Nunnally 2012; Valadez 2001). The variation in general trust between the ethnic groups suggests that social trust among ethnic groups shifted between 2004 and 2008. Further investigation of the data shows that Afrikaaners indicated lower levels of general social trust in 2008 than they did in 2004. In fact, twice as many of Afrikaaners (16%) indicated that they do not trust others at all in 2008 as did in 2004 (8%). However, this finding does contradict the idea prevalent in previous research that

historical negative experiences lead to less trust (Davis 1998; Nunnally 2012). Based on this literature, one would expect to find that indigenous African ethnic groups would trust less than European ethnic groups due to the negative influences of Apartheid legislation and practices on indigenous African ethnic groups. However, the data used in this study suggest the opposite.

As Afrikaaners are the minority both in population and in terms of political power in South Africa, their distrust in the government, compared to other ethnic groups is fitting according to previous research that suggests that people might be concerned about governments showing favoritism to some ethnic groups and not others (Valadez 2001). Since the ANC has dominated post-Apartheid governance nationally, it makes sense that Afrikaaners, who largely are members of the National Party – the party most opposed by the ANC, would trust them less. Therefore, the data support previous findings in culturally complex, developing democracies (Valadez 2001).

These findings provide insight into trust relationships in post-colonial societies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. While previous research suggests that many factors, including socioeconomic status (e.g. Anderson 2010; Guterbock 2008; Laponce 1967; Muller and Seligson 1987; Opp 2000; Sztompka 1999), age (e.g. Feagin 2001; Loury 1997; Mattes 2012; Lau and Redlawsk 2008), and location (e.g. Flora and Flora 2008; Tonnies 1957 [1887]; Wirth 1938) influence the development of trust (Anderson 2010; Putnam 2000; Sztompka 1999), my findings suggest that these influences are not as fundamental to the development of trust in multi-racial, post-colonial societies with a history of government

sanctioned racial and ethnic antagonism. Instead, race and ethnicity continue to be the prevailing influences on social and political trust.

The prevalence of race in contemporary social and political affairs in post-colonial nations is not surprising. The polarity of racial categories between whites and Indians has been reinforced in Peru (Wilson 1994). Zimbabwe continues to have ongoing struggles to resolve colonial legacies of racial tensions and inequalities that have manifest themselves in racialized political policies (Muzondidya 2010), and ethnic divisions continue to present themselves in political party alliances in post-colonial Colombia (Sanders 2008).

These findings are important for advancing research on political stability in relatively new democracies. As previous studies have suggested, trust is an important component of political viability (Anderson 2010; Sztompka 1999). Understanding that social and political trust in post-colonial societies are influenced by racial and ethnic identity, more consistently than the other factors that previous research has identified, helps us focus the attention of social scientists and policy makers on the issues that are most important to developing, democratic societies.

CHAPTER FIVE: INFLUENCES OF TRUST ON POLITICAL APPROVAL

Introduction

Trust has important implications for political attitudes and behaviors. Trust is necessary for the legitimization of the state, its institutions and policies (Sztompka 1999). When citizens trust their governing institutions, they tend to be more satisfied with those institutions and support them. This relationship has been observed in studies in Europe and South America (Anderson 2010; Sztompka 1999). The relationship between trust and political approval in South Africa is under-investigated. However, South Africa represents an important case to examine because of its recent transition to inclusive democracy and the unique transition of the indigenous ethnic groups from a state of exploitation and powerlessness to a position in which they have nearly full control of government offices and policies (Butler 2004; Hendricks 2003). In addition, researchers have conducted studies globally that show that various structural stratification indicators such as socioeconomic status (Kelley 1992; Nijhawan 1992; Odetola 1992; Turner 1992), age (Breakwell, Fife-Schaw and Devereux 1989; Mattes 2012; Watts 1999), location (Flora and Flora 2008; Putnam 2000; Wirth 1938) and race or ethnicity (Davis 1998; Nunnally 2012; Ojie 2006; Valadez 2001) influence political attitudes. Therefore, in this chapter, I investigate these relationships in the context of South Africa by analyzing the following research question: How do trust and the structural factors that influence trust, impact political approval?

I use data from rounds 3 and 4 of the Afrobarometer study conducted in South Africa. Round 3 and round 4 were conducted nationwide in 2004 and 2008 respectively. Each round includes 2,400 respondents over the age of 18 in a multistage, stratified, area cluster probability sample to represent a cross-section of all voting age citizens in South Africa. Data from these rounds include several measures of both trust and political attitudes that can be analyzed to provide an understanding of the relationship between trust and political approval in South Africa.

Hypotheses

Previous studies suggest that trust affects political legitimacy and democratic stability (Anderson 2010; Rousseau [1762] 2007; Sztompka 1999). By investigating the political attitudes of citizens, researchers contribute to our understanding of the legitimacy of a governing system. Previous studies indicate that trust increases positive political attitudes and behaviors because any society's political system is embedded in its culture of trust (Abramowitz 1989b) and without trust, the state can not garner support in time of uncertainty (Anderson 2010; Hetherington 1998; Luhmann 1979). These studies were conducted in various parts of the world, including Europe, North America and South America, and I believe that these dynamics hold in South Africa. Therefore, I offer the following hypotheses:

H₁: As general trust increases, political approval will also increase.

H₂: As government trust increases, political approval will also increase.

Several studies show that socioeconomic status influences political attitudes (Kelley 1992; Nijhawan 1992; Odetola 1992; Turner 1992). Studies conducted in various nations show that higher socioeconomic status is associated with support of conservative political parties and policies (Kelley 1992; Nijhawan 1992; Odetola 1992). Researchers such as Zeitlin (1976) analyzed the ways in which socioeconomic status influenced electoral participation in Chile (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1982). Furthermore the influence of socioeconomic status on political attitudes might be linked to the policies that affect socioeconomic attainment (Breiger 1995), so the relationship between socioeconomic status and political attitudes in some ways may be reciprocal. Both round 3 and round 4 of the Afrobarometer data include two measures of socioeconomic status: education level and employment status (Kelley 1992). Although Arce's 1995 study of presidential approval in Peru found that employment status had no effect on presidential approval in the wake of political violence (Arce 1995), I incorporate both of these measures in my analysis leading to the following hypothesis:

H₃: High socioeconomic status measured by having a high school education and being employed, as opposed to having less than a high school education and being unemployed, will increase political approval.

Researchers have previously found that the political attitudes and behaviors of young people vary from those who are in later stages of adulthood (Lau and Redlawsk 2008; Zeitlin 1967). However, the particular influences vary in terms of party alliances, political cognition and trust for government in Europe (Breakwell, Fife-Schaw and Devereux 1989; Watts 1999)

and South Africa (Mattes 2012). I argue that citizens who were of age to remember their nation under the previous apartheid system are likely to express higher levels of approval for the current government. Therefore, I include the following hypothesis:

H₄: As age increases, political approval will also increase.

Location is another variable that is important to this topic. Specifically, location in an urban area post-apartheid may have allowed respondents to develop the mutual associations described by social capital theorists during the past 16 years of democratic rule, whereas those in rural areas may continue to encounter political segregation due to their physical separation (Flora and Flora 2008; Putnam 2000; Quinn et al 2011; Tonnies 1957 [1887]; Wirth 1938). As Reisinger, Miller and Hesli (1995) point out, in any country, citizens who reside in cities are likely to have a disproportionate visibility in public life. Additionally, those who live in urban areas may have more opportunity to interact with government entities, which might lead to greater understanding and approval.

In South Africa, citizens who live in rural areas deal with particular stresses of agricultural production and access to water, which can lead to severe health problems (Quinn et al 2011). Additionally, citizens in South Africa's rural areas have been undergoing household transitions from nuclear or single person households to three-generation linear households in the wake of socio-political changes and the escalating HIV/AIDS epidemic (Wittenberg and Collinson 2007). These unique characteristics of rural social and political life in South Africa arguably lead to less positive experiences with the government which

might then lead to lower levels of approval. Hence, I created Hypothesis 4, which describes the relationship between locale and political approval.

H₅: Living in a rural area as opposed to living in an urban area will decrease political approval.

Because of historical and contemporary antagonisms, race and ethnicity impact the political attitudes of citizens in the U.S. and alter the democratic experience (Davis 1998; Nunnally 2012; Valadez 2001). Additionally, studies show that the influence of ethnicity has not only persisted in African politics, but has intensified (Ojie 2006). For example, Zimbabwe's racial antagonisms have escalated as the government attempts to resolve colonial legacies of racial tensions and inequalities through racialized political policies for land redistribution (Muzondidya 2010). In addition, studies have shown that perceived ethnic competition, particularly sentiments for or against immigration or the presence or absence of xenophobia, lead to divergent political attitudes in Western Europe (Rydgren 2007). However, the nature of the relationship between ethnicity and political approval in contemporary South Africa is not well understood. Therefore and because of the cultural and political differences between Afrikaaners and the other ethnic group categories in South Africa, I include the following exploratory hypothesis:

H₆: A respondent's ethnic identity as Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu, African Other, European Other, or Other, as opposed to Afrikaaner, will have a significant effect on political approval.

Previous studies show that there can be interaction effects among independent variables used in investigating the social bases of political attitudes and beliefs. Because research suggests that trust influences political attitudes (Anderson 2010; Sztompka 1999), I believe that both general trust and government trust will mitigate the relationship between ethnicity and political approval. Avery (2007) discovered a similar interaction between race and partisan identification in his study on government trust during the 2000 election in the U.S. On an international scale, Herreros and Criado (2008) found an interaction between membership in a minority group and the Public Institutions Index.²⁰ Also, Nilson and Nilson (1980) argue that the effect of race on protest behavior is heightened by political participation. Additionally, as shown in Chapter 4, ethnicity has the most consistent influence on both general and government trust in South Africa. Based on these previous studies and because of the previously established relationship between ethnicity and trust, I argue that the ethnicity variable is likely to be the factor that will be moderated by both general and government trust. Therefore, I developed the following exploratory hypotheses:

H₇: General trust will moderate the relationships between ethnic groups and political approval.

H₈: Government trust will moderate the relationships between ethnic groups and political approval.

²⁰ The Public Institutions Index is a measure of the efficacy of state institutions for the 22 countries included in the analyses.

Methods

To test these hypotheses, I employ OLS regression techniques for multiple reasons. First, as was found in previous studies (Anderson 2010; Davis 1998; Kelley 1992; Nunnally; 2012; Odetoa 1992; Valadez 2001), I expect to find a linear relationship between my independent and dependent variables. Second, each of the dependent variables is measured at the ordinal level. Therefore, the assumption of linearity and the measurement of the outcome variables make OLS regression the appropriate method for analyzing these relationships. Lastly, OLS regression allows for the inclusion of the categorical variables that measure the structural characteristics of the respondents to be easily transformed into dummy variables (McClendon 2002).

I constructed three indices to measure political approval. These include approval of government offices, approval of government economic policies, and approval of government social policies. Each has been constructed for both the round 3 data and the round 4 data. The indicators combined into the indices are cognate measures of the constructs that I aim to capture in my models. Therefore these dimensions are reduced into one indicator under the assumption that they will exhibit similar effects on the outcome, and their disaggregation might lead to Type II errors (Cohen et al 2003). The survey measures included in each of these indices are identical in the original surveys, except for the item that measures the level of approval for the president. In round 3, respondents were asked to assess their level of approval for President Mbeki. In round 4, respondents were asked to assess their level of approval for interim President Molanthe. I conceptualized each index theoretically and used

the results of orthogonal varimax rotation factor analyses to operationalize the measures. Variables that are included in the final indices all loaded satisfactorily on only one dimension, using a cutoff of .400, and each improved the reliability of the scale, as demonstrated by an increase in Cronbach's alpha.

For round 3, I combined *Performance of President Mbeki* and *Performance of the National Assembly representatives* to create the ***Approval of Offices Round 3*** variable used in the empirical analysis. For round 4, I combined *Performance of President Molanthe* and *Performance of the National Assembly representatives* to create the ***Approval of Offices Round 4*** variable used in the empirical analysis. The variables that I included in the indices are weighted equally. Therefore each index has seven values ranging from 2-8 where lower values represent lower levels of approval and higher values represent higher levels of approval.

The indices measuring approval of economic policies are identical between rounds. I combined *Managing the economy*, *Creating jobs*, *Keeping prices stable*, *Narrowing the income gap*, and *Reducing crime* to create the ***Approval of Government Economic Policies Round 3*** and ***Approval of Government Economic Policies Round 4*** variable used in the empirical analysis. The variables that I included in the indices are weighted equally. Therefore each index has 16 values ranging from 5-20 where lower values represent lower levels of approval and higher values represent greater levels of approval.

The indices measuring approval of social policies are similar. I combined *Improving health care*, *Educational needs*, *Delivering water*, *Ensuring enough to eat*, *Fighting*

corruption, Combating HIV/AIDS, Uniting South Africa, Welfare payments and Responding to Zimbabwe to create the *Approval of Government Social Policies Round 3* and *Approval of Government Social Policies Round 4* variable used in the empirical analysis.²¹ The variables that I included in the indices are weighted equally. Therefore each index has 28 values ranging from 9-36 where lower values represent lower levels of approval and higher values represent greater levels of approval. Descriptive statistics for each of the indices are found in Appendix A.

To investigate the relationship between trust and political approval, I conducted analyses of the relationships between general trust and approval of offices, approval of economic policies and approval of social policies. I also investigated the relationships between government trust and approval of offices, approval of economic policies and approval of social policies. The measures included in the analysis models are *General Trust Round 3*, *General Trust Round 4*, *Government Trust Round 3*, and *Government Trust Round 4*. These measures of general trust and government trust are identical to those used in the previous study (see Chapter 4, pages 70-71).

For both round 3 and round 4, socioeconomic status is measured by two variables in the data: education level and employment status (Kelley 1992). I recoded education level into two dummy variables to differentiate respondents who completed high school education and

²¹ Only one measure differs between rounds. In round 3, respondents were asked the degree to which they approved or disapproved of the way in which the government was handling delivering household water. In round 4, they were asked the degree to which they approved or disapproved of the way in which the government was handling providing water and sanitation services. Although these questions were worded differently, I treat them similarly as they both pertain to the government's social policy pertaining to providing water to citizens.

those who did not (0=*No HS*, 1=*HS*) because the distribution included sufficient cases for the education variable to be coded into these two categories. For the same reason, I recoded employment status into two categories (0=*Unemployed*, 1=*Employed*). In both rounds, age was measured as a continuous variable. In the working data sets, age was heavily skewed toward younger ages. This is expected since the life expectancy in South Africa throughout the early 2000s was approximately 51 years (World Bank). Therefore, I used the logarithmic transformation of age in the regression analyses (see York et al. 2003).

In each round of the Afrobarometer study, the respondents' racial identities were recorded by the interviewer. This procedure results in an unknown amount of error because of possible interviewer bias regarding the characteristics that define a person's race (Dohrenwend et al 1968; Hill 2002). However, ethnicity was asked in an open-ended question to each respondent, who self-reported the ethnic group that they identified with the most. Therefore, the ethnicity variable was best suited for the analysis (Boehmer et al. 2002). Accordingly, I use the ethnicity variable instead of the race variable in the analysis.²² For both rounds, I recoded the ethnicity variable into nine dummy variables: *Afrikaaner*, *Xhosa*, *Pedi*, *Sesotho*, *Setswana*, *Zulu*, *AfricanOther*, *EuropeanOther*, and *Other*. For both rounds of the data, locale was reported by the interviewer and is coded as a dummy variable (0= *Urban*, 1= *Rural*).

All of the regression models include two control variables: gender and religion. In a patriarchal society, male dominance creates power differentials between men and women

²² I ran models that include both the race and ethnicity variables. However the models that include only the ethnicity variable are reported in this study.

wherein the power imbalance benefits all men (Johnson 1997). Accordingly, the institutions that dominate a patriarchal society, including the state, religion, the education system and the economy, are “gendered institutions” (Acker 1992; Martin 2004). As such, feminists assert that gender is an organizing principle in each of these social institutions and is a formal, bureaucratic status (Lorber 2006). Furthermore, studies show evidence of a relationship between gender and political attitudes and behaviors due to both societal and personal factors (Reed 2006), which varies within and between nations (Paxton et al 2007). It seems plausible that this variable might also affect how a respondent might approve or disapprove of their governing bodies or government policies. Therefore I control for gender in my analysis, coded as a dummy variable (0= *Male*, 1=*Female*).

Religion can direct so many facets of one's belief system that it would be negligent not to account for its influence. Additionally, there is significant evidence that suggests that religion impacts political attitudes and behaviors (Mattis 2001, Patterson 2004, Ross 2001, D'Antonio 2011). I recoded Religion into two dummy categories: *Christian* and *Religious Other*.²³

Prior to running statistical analyses, I used listwise deletion to omit any missing data that might bias the results of the study. Although the proportion of missing data is low across the key independent variables, multivariate listwise deletion across all dependent, independent and control variables results in substantial data loss – between 53% and 69% of

²³ Religion is not a variable of interest, and is only included as a control. Also, the distribution included sufficient cases for the religion variable to be coded as Christian and non-Christian or “Religious Other”. Also, the studies that suggest that religion impacts political attitudes and behaviors can vary in their coding of religions (for example, Catholics and Protestants or Christians and Muslims).

observations are missing at least one variable in each empirical analysis. The measures for political approval in both round 3 and round 4 result in the majority of missing cases. In round 3, 433 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the political officers to respond to the question asked. Additionally, 295 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the economic policies to respond to the questions asked, and 891 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the social policies to respond to the questions asked. In Round 4, 1070 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the political officers to respond to the question asked about approval, and an additional 642 respondents answered that they did not know enough about President Molanthe to respond to the question regarding trust. Additionally, 140 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the economic policies to respond to the questions asked, and 341 respondents answered that they did not know enough about the social policies to respond to the questions asked. As a result, parameter estimates may be biased where substantial data are missing.

I also checked the correlation matrix and found no issues of multicollinearity. I created my OLS regression models to analyze the effects of each of the independent variables on the dependent, indexed variables measuring approval of offices, approval of economic policies and approval of social policies from both rounds using SAS Enterprise Guide 4.2. I measured statistical significance of each model $\alpha=.05$ and the statistical significance of each of the parameter estimates of the independent variables at $\alpha=.05$.

Round 3 Results

The analysis for round 3 includes 1129 cases (1271 cases were deleted). The deleted cases are similar to the cases included in the analysis in terms of age and religion. However, there are some differences between the cases included in the study and those deleted due to missing values. The missing cases have a higher percentage of cases of people who identify as South African only, a higher percentage of HS graduates, a higher percentage of unemployed respondents, and a higher percentage of respondents living in rural areas. In general, these results need to be interpreted cautiously due to the large amounts of data that are missing.

Table 3.6 reports descriptive statistics for the 1129 cases of round 3 variables included in this study. The distribution for *Approval of Offices Round 3* is slightly skewed to the left (-.72). On average, the respondents mildly approve of President Mbeki and the National Assembly (mean = 5.84). The distribution for *Approval of Economic Policies Round 3* approximates a normal distribution. On average, respondents disapprove of the government's economic policies (mean = 11.4). The distribution for *Approval of Social Policies Round 3* is slightly skewed to the left (-.54). On average, respondents approve of the government's social policies (mean = 25.2).

The means reported in Table 3.6 indicate that of the 1129 cases included in this analysis, approximately 47% of the respondents have acquired a high school diploma, 43% of the respondents are employed at least part time and 34% of the respondents live in a rural area. The mean age of respondents is approximately 39 years old. The ethnic distribution of

the respondents included in the analysis is approximately 10% Afrikaaner, 15% Xhosa, 9% Pedi, 13% Sesotho, 10% Setswana, and 20% Zulu. Thirteen percent of the 1129 respondents are members of the Ndebele, Shangaan, Swazi or Venda ethnic groups. Eleven percent of the 1129 respondents are members of the English, Indian, Coloured or Other White/European ethnic groups, and 0% of the respondents is a member of a National identity only or reported their ethnic group as “Other” –not specified. On average, the respondents trust each other “somewhat” (mean for *General Trust Round 3* = 4.32), and on average, the respondents trust the government “somewhat” (mean for *Government Trust Round* = 4.98). Forty-eight percent are female, 60% are Christian, and 40% are not Christian²⁴.

Table 5.1 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of *Approval of Offices Round 3*. Model 1 includes each of the structural factors that I anticipated would affect approval of offices. In this model, several indicators of ethnic group and the variable measuring South African identity are statistically significant. Model 2 includes those structural factors and the index measuring general trust. In this model, all of the indicators for ethnicity and the variable measuring South African identity remain statistically significant in addition to *General Trust Round 3*. Model 3 includes the structural factors and the index measuring government trust. In this model, age, ethnicity and the variable measuring South African identity are statistically significant in addition to *Government Trust Round 3*. Of

²⁴ The respondents characterized as “not Christian” do not believe in any religion or identify as Agnostic or Atheist, are Catholic, either Evangelical or Mainstream Protestant, Sunni or Shiite Muslim, African Independent, Traditional, Hindu, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon or reported their religion as “Other” – not specified. Although these represent a wide range of systems of belief, as noted above, religion is not a central focus of the paper and is only concluded as a control. Therefore the distinction in the analysis is made between those who identify as Christian and all else.

these models, Model 3 has the highest predictability of approval of government offices at 38% (adjusted r square = .380). There were no significant interactions between the structural variables and the variable measuring general trust, nor with the variable measuring government trust.

Table 5.3 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of *Approval of Economic Policies Round 3*. Model 1 includes each of the structural factors that I anticipated would affect approval of economic policies. In this model, several of the indicators for ethnic group and the variable measuring South African identity are statistically significant. Model 2 includes those structural factors and the index measuring general trust. In this model, all of the indicators for ethnicity and the variable measuring South African identity remain statistically significant in addition to *General Trust Round 3*. Model 3 includes the structural factors and the index measuring government trust. In this model, the dummy variables measuring Xhosa and Sesotho ethnicities and the variable measuring South African identity are statistically significant in addition to *Government Trust Round 3*. Of these models, Model 3 has the highest predictability of approval of economic policies at 24% (adjusted r square = .240). There were no significant interactions between the structural variables and the variable measuring general trust, nor with the variable measuring government trust.

Table 5.5 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of *Approval of Social Policies Round 3*. Model 1 includes each of the structural factors that I anticipated would affect approval of social policies. In this model, several of the indicators

for ethnic group are statistically significant. Model 2 includes those structural factors and the index measuring general trust. In this model, all of the indicators for ethnicity remain statistically significant in addition to the variable measuring South African identity and *General Trust Round 3*. Model 3 includes the structural factors and the index measuring government trust. In this model, age, ethnicity, South African identity and the dummy variable indicating Christian religion are statistically significant in addition to *Government Trust Round 3*. Of these models, Model 3 has the highest predictability of approval of social policies at 24% (adjusted r square = .243). Again, there were no significant interactions between the structural variables and the variable measuring general trust or with the variable measuring government trust.

Round 4 Results

The analysis for Round 4 includes 744 cases (1656 cases were deleted). The deleted cases are similar to the cases included in the analysis in terms of employment status, locale and religion. However, there are some differences between the cases included in the study and those deleted due to missing values. The missing cases are older and have a higher percentage of cases of people who identify as South African only. The missing cases also show a lower percentage of HS graduates, and a lower percentage of respondents who identify as a member of the Xhosa and Sesotho ethnic groups. In general, these results need to be interpreted cautiously due to the large amounts of data that are missing.

Table 3.9 reports descriptive statistics for the 744 cases of Round 4 variables included in this study. Each of the indexed dependent variables approximates a normal distribution. On average, the respondents neither approve nor disapprove of President Molanthe and the National Assembly (mean for *Approval of Offices Round 4* = 5.11). On average, respondents disapprove of the government's economic policies (mean for *Approval of Economic Policies Round 4* = 10.5). On average, respondents mildly disapprove of the government's social policies (mean for *Approval of Social Policies Round 4* = 21.8).

The means reported in Table 3.9 indicate that of the 744 cases included in this analysis, approximately 51% of respondents have acquired a high school diploma, 53% of the respondents are employed at least part time and 66% of respondents live in a rural area. The mean age of the 744 respondents is approximately 36 years old. The ethnic distribution of the respondents is approximately 14% Afrikaaner, 17% Xhosa, 6% Pedi, 8% Sesotho, 13% Setswana, and 18% Zulu. Eleven percent of the 744 respondents are members of the Ndebele, Shangaan, Swazi or Venda ethnic groups. Fifteen percent of the respondents are members of the English, Indian, Coloured or Other White/European ethnic groups, and 0% of the respondents is a member of a National identity only or reported their ethnic group as "Other" –not specified. On average, the respondents trust each other just "a little" (mean for *General Trust Round 4* = 3.38). On average, the respondents trust the government

“somewhat” (mean for *Government Trust 1 Round 4* = 4.08). Forty-nine percent of the respondents are female, 34% percent are Christian, and 66% are not Christian²⁵.

Table 5.2 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of *Approval of Offices Round 4*. Model 1 includes each of the structural factors that I anticipated would affect approval of offices. In this model, several of the indicators for ethnic group and the dummy variable indicating Christian religion are statistically significant. Model 2 includes those structural factors and the index measuring general trust. In this model, the indicators for ethnicity and Christian religion remain statistically significant in addition to *General Trust Round 4*. Model 3 includes the structural factors and the index measuring government trust. In this model, only one indicator of ethnicity – Xhosa, is statistically significant in addition to *Government Trust Round 4*. Of these models, Model 3 has the highest predictability of approval of government offices at 26% (adjusted r square = .258).

Table 5.4 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of *Approval of Economic Policies Round 4*. Model 1 includes each of the structural factors that I anticipated would affect approval of economic policies. In this model, employment status, several of the indicators for ethnic group, living in a rural locale and the dummy variable measuring Christian religion are statistically significant. Model 2 includes those structural factors and the index measuring general trust. In this model, employment status, the indicators for ethnicity, living in a rural locale and Christian religion remain statistically

²⁵ The respondents characterized as “not Christian” do not believe in any religion or identify as Agnostic or Atheist, are Catholic, either Evangelical or Mainstream Protestant, Sunni or Shiite Muslim, African Independent, Traditional, Hindu, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon or reported their religion as “Other” – not specified.

significant in addition to *General Trust Round 4*. Model 3 includes the structural factors and the index measuring government trust. In this model, ethnicity, locale and Christian religion are statistically significant in addition to *Government Trust 1 Round 4*. Of these models, Model 2 has the highest predictability of approval of economic policies at 11% (adjusted r square = .113).

Table 5.6 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of *Approval of Social Policies Round 4*. Model 1 includes each of the structural factors that I anticipated would affect approval of offices. In this model, several of the indicators for ethnic group, locale and the dummy variable indicating Christian religion are statistically significant. Model 2 includes those structural factors and the index measuring general trust. In this model, ethnicity, locale, gender and Christian religion are statistically significant in addition to *General Trust Round 4*. Model 3 includes the structural factors and the index measuring government trust. In this model, ethnicity, locale, gender and Christian religion are statistically significant in addition to *Government Trust 1 Round 4*. Of these models, Model 3 has the highest predictability of approval of social policies at 18% (adjusted r square = .180).

I found no statistically significant interactions between ethnicity and government trust on *Approval of Offices 4* or *Approval of Economic Policies 4*. However, I did find significant interactions between ethnicity and general trust on both. In addition, I found statistically significant interactions between both ethnicity and general trust and ethnicity and government trust on *Approval of Social Policies*.

When checking the tolerance and variance inflation, I discovered a multicollinearity issue between my product terms and main effects in both models. In an effort to lessen the multicollinearity and increase the tolerance between the product terms, I mean centered the ordinal and continuous variables in my model – Age (logged) (Cohen et. al. 2003). In addition, I trimmed the interaction models to include only the number of interaction terms that specified the model without causing multicollinearity. After mean centering these variables, the tolerance levels of all variables in the models are well above .1 and the VIF levels are well below 10, the common guidelines for detecting multicollinearity (Cohen et al 2003)²⁶.

Table 5.2 reports the regression coefficients for the model analyzing the effects of interaction between ethnicity and general trust on *Approval of Offices 4*. Model 4 includes the structural factors and the significant interaction terms between ethnic groups (Sesotho, Zulu, and “European Other”) and *General Trust Round 4*. This model predicts 12% of the variation in approval of government of offices (adjusted r square = .120). For the 744 respondents included in this analysis, I calculated conditional slopes for each of the interactions that were significant at $\alpha=.05$. For the interaction between ethnic group and general trust, the conditional slope between Sesotho respondents and general trust is .51, holding all other variables to their means. The conditional slope between Zulu respondents

²⁶ Acceptable levels of VIF and tolerance are controversial. The levels of acceptability for tolerance and VIF used in these analyses are common but relaxed compared to others used in research (see: O’Brien 2007). For example, Garson (2012) suggests that a VIF>4 indicates that multicollinearity issues may exist.

and general trust is .58, holding all other variables to their means. The conditional slope between respondents included in the “European Other” category and general trust is .59.

Table 5.4 reports the regression coefficients for the model analyzing the effects of interaction between ethnicity and general trust on *Approval of Economic Policies 4*. Model 4 includes the structural factors and the significant interaction terms between the Xhosa ethnic group and *General Trust Round 4*. This model predicts 14% of the variation in approval of economic policies (adjusted r square = .144). For the 744 respondents included in the analysis, I calculated conditional slopes for each of the interactions that were significant at $\alpha=.05$. For the interaction between ethnic group and general trust, the conditional slope between Xhosa respondents and general trust is 1.22, holding all other variables to their means.

Table 5.6 reports the regression coefficients for the model analyzing the effects of interaction between ethnicity and general trust on *Approval of Social Policies 4*. Model 4 includes the structural factors and the significant interaction term between Xhosa ethnic group and *General Trust Round 4*. This model predicts 15% of the variation in approval of social policies (adjusted r square = .151). For the 744 respondents included in the analysis, I calculated conditional slopes for each of the interactions that were significant at $\alpha=.05$. The conditional slope between Xhosa respondents and general trust is 3.93, holding all other variables to their means.

Table 5.6 reports the regression coefficients for the model analyzing the effects of interaction between ethnicity and government trust on *Approval of Social Policies 4*. Model 5

includes the structural factors and the significant interaction terms between ethnic groups (Xhosa, Pedi, Setswana, Zulu, and “African Other”) and *Government Trust 1 Round 4*. This model predicts 21% of the variation in approval of social policies (adjusted r square = .208). For the 744 respondents included in the analysis, I calculated conditional slopes for each of the interactions that were significant at $\alpha=.05$. The conditional slope between Xhosa respondents and government trust is 1.61, holding all other variables to their means. The conditional slope between Pedi respondents and government trust is -1.81, holding all other variables to their means. The conditional slope between Setswana respondents and government trust is -.48, holding all other variables to their means. The conditional slope between Zulu respondents and government trust is -1.55, holding all other variables to their means. The conditional slope between respondents included in the “African Other” category and government trust is 1.71.

Analysis and Discussion

Approval of Offices – Rounds 3 and 4 Compared

Investigating political attitudes reveals the public’s assessment of the legitimacy of its government. According to the data provided by Afrobarometer, the 1129 South African respondents included in the analysis neither approved nor disapproved of President Mbeki and the National Assembly in 2004. In 2008, approval of government offices decreased by .73. According to the scale, the 744 respondents included in the analysis neither approved nor

disapproved of President Molanthe and the National Assembly.²⁷ Further, the structural variables that influence the approval of government offices varied between the rounds of data collected. For example, among the 1129 respondents included in the analysis using the data from 2004, increased age decreased the level of approval of government offices. Membership in the Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu ethnic groups and the ethnic groups included in the “African Other” category, higher levels national South African identity, and higher levels of general and government trust increased the level of approval of government offices. This is in contrast to the 744 respondents included in the analysis using the data from 2008, where I found that only one ethnic group – Xhosa, and government trust had a significant effect on approval of government offices. The data suggest that being a member of the Xhosa ethnic group and higher levels of general and government trust lead to increased level of approval of government offices.

The most probable explanation for this decrease in approval of government offices is the political turmoil that took place in 2008. In December 2007, the ANC asked President Thabo Mbeki to step down from the position as he was accused of financial scandals. The following year was tumultuous and lead to Mbeki’s resignation in September 2008. President Molanthe was appointed as interim president until the election of Jacob Zuma (Bearak 2009; Silke 2009). As was discussed in chapter 3, both general and government trust decreased

²⁷ The average for *Approval of Offices Round 3* was 5.84. The average for *Approval of Offices Round 4* was 5.11. On the scale ranging from 2-8, a four is “disapproval” and a six is “approval”. Both means fall in between this range. If the mean for *Approval of Offices Round 3* was rounded up using the laws of math, the score would indicate “approval”. However, the small decrease between rounds is likely to not be significant due to the amount of missing data (Acock 2005).

between 2004 and 2008. Previous researchers have noted the relationship between trust and political approval (Anderson 2010; Sztompka 1999), so it makes sense that citizens who started to distrust their governing offices would also show less approval for them.

It is also not surprising that the only ethnic group that had a positive significant effect on approval of offices in 2008 was Xhosa. As the second largest ethnic group in South Africa (second to the Zulu) (Editor 2013b), they continue to be dedicated supporters of the ANC despite the turmoil. Given their staunch support of the ANC and its Xhosa leaders (of the most notable are Nelson Mandela and Bishop Desmond Tutu), it seems logical that being a member of the Xhosa group would increase government trust.

Approval of Economic Policies – Rounds 3 and 4 Compared

According to the data provided by Afrobarometer, the 1129 respondents included in the analysis disapproved of the government's economic policies in 2004. In 2008, the 744 respondents included in the analysis continued to disapprove of the government's economic policies. Again, the structural variables that influence approval of economic policies differ between rounds of data. For the 1129 respondents included in the analysis using the data from 2004, membership in the Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, and Setswana ethnic groups and the ethnic groups included in the "African Other" category increased the level of approval for economic policies. In addition, higher levels of South African identity and higher levels of both general and government trust increased approval for economic policies. However, for the 744 respondents included in the analysis using the data from 2008, other variables

influenced approval for economic policies. In addition to membership in the Xhosa, Setswana, Zulu ethnic groups and ethnic groups included in “African Other”, being employed and higher levels in both general and government trust increased approval for economic policies. Living in a rural area is also statistically significant in the models using round 4 data, leading to a decrease in approval for economic policies.

The lack of approval for economic policies is not surprising. Since the early 1990s, South Africans have experiencing economic difficulties (Butler 2004; Hendricks 2003; Sparks 2000). Despite its inclusion in the BRICS group of nations and its ranking of as an upper middle-income country (World Bank), South Africa’s outlook is subdued. GDP growth fell .8% in 2012. The unemployment rate is at 25%, and the country is dealing with a growing trade deficit (Lipton 2013).

When Mandela was elected in 1994, he was regarded as a beacon of hope, a living martyr (Sparks 2000). After his presidency ended in 1999, he was succeeded by Thabo Mbeki who implemented a strategy of top-down redistribution to narrow financial gaps between whites and blacks in the country that was disappointing to many (Herbst 2005). Both he and his successor, Jacob Zuma, have been accused of financial corruption and scandals (Wines 2005). In addition, Zuma’s administration has been criticized for their lack of progress on many economic problems, including pervasive unemployment and a widening gap between the rich and the poor (Dugger 2010).²⁸

²⁸ According to the World Bank, South Africa’s Gini Index as of 2009 was 63.1.

Approval of Social Policies – Rounds 3 and 4 Compared

According to the data provided by Afrobarometer, the 1129 South Africans included in the analysis neither approved nor disapproved of social policies in 2004. In 2008, approval of social policies decreased by roughly four points. However, even with the decrease, the 744 respondents included in the analysis remained neutral; neither approving or disapproving of the government's social policies.²⁹

Again, the variables that influence social policies vary between the rounds of data. According to the data from 2004, for the 1129 respondents included in the analysis, being a member of the Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu ethnic groups and the ethnic groups included in the “African Other” and “European Other” categories increased the level of approval for social policies. In addition, being a Christian, higher levels of South African identity and increases in both general and government trust increased approval for social policies. However, for the 1129 respondents, increased age decreased approval for social policies.

In 2008, for the 744 respondents included in the analysis, being a member of the Xhosa, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu ethnic groups and ethnic groups included in the “African Other” category, and higher levels of both general and government trust increased approval

²⁹ The average for *Approval of Social Policies Round 3* was 25.2. The average for *Approval of Social Policies Round 4* was 21.8. On the scale ranging from 9-36, an 18 is “disapproval” and a 27 is “approval”. Both mean values fall in between those ranges indicating neither approval nor disapproval. Again, the small decrease between rounds may not be significant due to the amount of missing data in both rounds (Acock 2005; Beale and Little 1975).

for social policies. However, for the 744 respondents, living in a rural area, being female, and being Christian decreased approval for social policies.

These results show that ethnicity continues to influence social policy approval. However, the more interesting finding here is the influence of religion. In 2004, being Christian increased approval for social policies and in 2008, being Christian decreased approval for social policies. This change of direction implies that Christians, in particular, felt a lack of confidence in the social policies of the government after Mbeki's resignation.

Discussion of Hypotheses

Table 5.7 includes a summary of the significant indicators of approval of government offices for rounds 3 and 4 for the multivariate models. Table 5.8 includes a summary of the significant indicators of approval of economic policies for rounds 3 and 4 for the multivariate models. Table 5.9 includes a summary of the significant indicators of approval of social policies for rounds 3 and 4 for the multivariate models; and Table 5.10 includes a summary of the significant interaction effects for each of the three dependent variables.

General trust is a statistically significant indicator across the variety of measures of political approval – approval of offices, approval of economic policies and approval of social policies in each of the regression models for round 3 and round 4. In each model, the unstandardized regression coefficient for general trust is positive. This direction and significance is present for both round 3 and round 4 of the Afrobarometer data. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is well supported.

The same relationships are present for analyses of the impacts of government trust on political approval. Government trust has a significant positive effect on each measure of political approval. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is also well supported. The support for both Hypotheses 1 and 2 are consistent with previous research and theory regarding the relationship between trust and political attitudes. As argued, political systems are embedded in a culture of trust (Abramowitz 1989b; Sztompka 1999). Therefore trust leads to state support (Anderson 2010; Hetherington 1998; Lumann 1988).

Education level does not have a significant effect on any of the measures of political approval included in this study. Furthermore, employment status is not statistically significant in any of the models using round 3 data. Using round 4 data, employment status only has a positive, statistically significant effect on approval of economic policies. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is only partially supported; respondents included in the analysis who were employed as opposed to unemployed reported increased approval of economic policies in 2008. This finding furthers Arce's study in Peru which found that employment status had no significant effect on presidential approval by showing that it does have an influence on other measures of political approval.

Age has a statistically significant effect on *Approval of Offices Round 3* and *Approval of Social Policies Round 3*. In both cases, an increase in age decreased the level of political approval. Age did not have a significant effect on *Approval of Economic Policies Round 3* and did not significantly affect any of the measures of political approval in 2008. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is not supported by the data. Previous research (see Breakwell, Fife-Schaw and

Devereux 1989; Mattes; 2012; Watts 1999) was inconclusive in terms of the particular effect that age might have on political approval. I chose this direction based on the history of South Africa and the assumption that older citizens would make comparisons between the current inclusive democracy and the previous restrictive system of apartheid. However, my assumption is not supported by the analysis undertaken here. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. Perhaps this is because the older South African citizens had higher expectations for their ANC leaders since the ANC was at the forefront of protest and advocacy during the years of Apartheid (Butler 2004; Editor 2013c; Valadez 2001).

Locale has a statistically significant effect on *Approval of Economic Policies Round 4* and *Approval of Social Policies Round 4*. In both cases, living in a rural area decreased the level of political approval. Living in a rural area did not have significant effect on *Approval of Offices Round 4* and did not statistically have an effect on any of the measures of political approval in 2004. The significant decreasing effects of rural locale on the two measures of political approval in 2008 provide partial support for Hypothesis 5. This finding is supported by previous literature that emphasizes that unique context of rural communities (Flora and Flora 2008; Quinn et al 2011; Tonnies 1957 [1887]). The physical separation of rural communities leads to less positive interactions with the government which may account for the lower evaluations of approval expressed by rural respondents.

Ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on each measure of political approval in both rounds of the data. The statistically significant relationships hold even when measures of general trust and government trust are included in the models. In 2004, of the 1129

respondents included in the analysis, members of the Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu ethnic groups and ethnic groups included in the “African Other” and “European Other” categories reported higher levels of political approval than Afrikaaners. In 2008, of the 744 respondents included in the analysis, members of the Xhosa Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu ethnic groups and the ethnic groups included in the “African Other” category reported higher levels of political approval than Afrikaaners. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is well supported. This finding was expected due to the previous literature which suggests that racial and ethnic antagonisms impact political attitudes in multicultural societies. These relationships have been observed in other African nations (Ojie 2006; Muzondidya 2010) and European nations (Rydgren 2007) as well.

I found significant interactions between general trust and ethnicity for *Approval of Offices Round 4*, *Approval of Economic Policies Round 4*, and *Approval of Social Policies Round 4*, as determined by the incremental F statistic at $p < .05$. In each case, general trust moderates the relationship between ethnicity and political approval. An increase in general trust significantly increases the level of political approval on each measure for round 4. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 is well supported.

Figure 5.1 in Appendix B shows the interaction effects between ethnicity and general trust for the 744 respondents included in the analysis of *Approval of Offices Round 4*. As the graph shows, for the respondents who are members of the Zulu ethnic group, as general trust increases, approval for government offices increases the most. This is shown by the line for Zulu respondents, which has the largest slope at .69. For the respondents who are members of

the ethnic groups included in the “European Other” category (English, Indian, Coloured, Other white/European), increase in general trust results in the second largest increase in the slope for *Approval of Offices 4* at .66. For the respondents who are members of the Sesotho ethnic group, increase in general trust results in the third largest increase in the slope for *Approval of Offices 4* at .62. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Zulu ethnic group is .839, and in the interaction model, it is .898. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for ethnic groups included in the “European Other” category is .472, and in the interaction model, it is .469. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Sesotho ethnic group is .903 and in the interaction model, it is .908.

Figure 5.2 in Appendix B shows the interaction effect between ethnicity and general trust for the 744 respondents included in the analysis of *Approval of Economic Policies Round 4*. As the graph shows, for the respondents who are members of the Xhosa ethnic group, increase in general trust increases the level of *Approval of Economic Policies 4* with a slope of .86. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Xhosa ethnic group is 1.95, and in the interaction model, it is 1.73.

Figure 5.3 in Appendix B shows the interaction effects between ethnicity and general trust for the 744 included respondents in the analysis of *Approval of Social Policies Round 4*. As the graphs shows, for the respondents who are members of the Xhosa ethnic group, increase in general trust increases the level of *Approval of Social Policies Round 4* with a slope of 3.28. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Xhosa ethnic group is 5.01, and in the interaction model, it is 4.65.

The results for the relationships between the ethnic groups and general trust are interesting. For approval of government offices, the first order effects of being a member of the previously discussed ethnic groups increases approval of government offices. In addition, the first order effect of general trust is an increase in approval of government offices. However, when the two effects are combined in an interaction, the parameter estimates for the second order effects for members of the Sesotho and Zulu ethnic groups are negative (see Table 5.2), indicating decrease in approval of government offices. This means that the ethnicity and general trust interactions are essentially compensatory effects: either one or the other of the variables will produce an increase in approval of government offices, but in combination the effect of one is reduced by the other (Cohen et al 2003). However, for the ethnic groups included in the “European Other” category, the parameter estimate for the second order effect is also positive (see Table 5.2), indicating a synergistic interaction – both predictors have a positive effect on approval of government offices, and together they produce a stronger positive effect on approval of government offices (Cohen et al 2003).

For approval of economic policies, the first order effects of being a member of the Xhosa ethnic group increases approval of economic policies. In addition, the first order effect of general trust is an increase in approval of economic policies. However, when the two effects are combined in an interaction, the parameter estimate for the second order effect for members of the Xhosa ethnic group is negative (see Table 5.4), indicating decrease in approval of economic policies. Again, this means that ethnicity and general trust are compensatory effects: either one or the other of the variables will produce an increase in

Approval of Economic Policies 4, but in combination the effect of one is reduced by the other (Cohen et al 2003).

For approval of social policies, the first order effects of being a member of the Xhosa ethnic group increases approval of social policies. In addition, the first order effect of general trust is an increase in approval of social policies. However, when the two effects are combined in an interaction, the parameter estimate for the second order effects for members of the Xhosa ethnic group is negative (see Table 5.6), indicating decrease in approval of social policies. Again this means that ethnicity and general trust are compensatory effects: either one or the other of the variables will produce an increase in *Approval of Social Policies Round 4*, but in combination the effect of one is reduced by the other (Cohen et al 2003).

These interaction relationships suggest several accounts of redundancy between ethnic group variables and general trust. In each case, membership in the statistically significant ethnic groups increases political approval. However, in many cases, the increase of general trust leads to decreased approval. This simply means that the importance of being a member of the ethnic group is being lessened by general trust or vice versa. In one case, however, the synergistic interaction effects suggest that higher levels of general trust among members of the ethnic groups included in the “European Other” category leads to increased approval of government offices.

These findings follow social capital theorists’ arguments that trust increases positive political attitudes. Even in the cases of redundancy (where an increase in trust leads to an increase in political approval and membership with the ethnic group leads to an increase in

political approval but the interaction between the two results in decreased in political approval), general trust does not necessarily lead to less approval. Trust is only less important in the cases where the interaction with the ethnic group is compensatory; or the reverse may be true – the ethnic group is less important in the case of the compensatory interaction.

I also found significant interactions between government trust and ethnicity for *Approval of Social Policies Round 4*, as determined by the incremental F statistic at $p < .05$. In this case, government trust moderates the relationship between ethnicity and political approval. Government trust significantly increases the level of *Approval of Social Policies Round 4*. Hypothesis 8 is supported.

Figure 5.4 shows the interaction effect between ethnicity and government trust for the 744 respondents included in the analysis of *Approval of Social Policies Round 4*. As the graph shows, for the respondents who are members of the ethnic groups included in the “African Other” category (Ndebele, Shangaan, Swazi, Venda), as government trust increases, approval for social policies increases the most. This is shown by the line for “African Other” respondents, which has the largest slope at 1.90. For the respondents who are members of the Xhosa ethnic group, increase in government trust results in the second largest increase in the slope for *Approval of Social Policies Round 4* at 1.44. For the respondents who are members of the Pedi ethnic group, as government trust increases, approval of social policies decreases the most. This is shown by the line for Pedi respondents, which has the largest negative slope at -2.12. For the respondents who are members of the Zulu ethnic group, increase in government trust results in the second largest decrease in the slope for *Approval of Social*

Policies Round 4 at -1.70. For the respondents who are members of the Setswana ethnic group, increase in government trust results in the fourth largest decrease in the slope for *Approval of Social Policies Round 4* at -.45.

In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the “African Other” ethnic group is 4.18, and in the interaction model, it is 3.07. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Xhosa ethnic group is 3.59, and in the interaction model, it is 2.61. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Pedi ethnic group is -.051 and in the interaction model, it is -1.01. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Zulu ethnic group is .871 and in the interaction model, it is .456. In the main effects model, the parameter estimate for the Setswana ethnic group is 1.66 and in the interaction model, it is .801.

The first order effect of government trust is an increase in approval of social policies. In addition, the first order effect of being a member of the Xhosa, Setswana, Zulu, and “African Other” ethnic groups is an increase in approval of social policies. However, when the two effects are combined in an interaction, the parameter estimate for the second order effects for members of each of these ethnic groups are negative (see Table 5.6), indicating decrease in approval of government offices. This means that the ethnicity and government trust interactions are essentially compensatory effects: either one or the other of the variables will produce an increase in approval of social policies, but in combination the effect of one is reduced by the other (Cohen et al 2003). However, the first order effect of being a member of the Pedi ethnic group is a decrease in approval of social policies. The parameter estimate for

the second order effect for members of the Pedi ethnic group is also negative, indicating a buffering interaction—the effect of government trust on approval of social policies is buffered by membership in the Pedi ethnic group (Cohen et al 2003).

Again, these interaction relationships suggest several accounts of redundancy between ethnic group variables and government trust. The first order effect of being a member of the previously discussed ethnic groups increases political approval. However, in many cases, while the escalation of government trust also leads to increased political approval, the interaction between the two leads to decreased political approval. Again, this means that the importance of being a member of the ethnic group is being lessened by government trust or vice versa. However, membership in the Pedi ethnic groups decreases approval of social policies, enough so that it buffers the positive relationship between government trust and approval of social policies, effectively diminishing the relationship.

Summary and Preliminary Conclusions

Between the 2004 and 2008 rounds of data, the predictability of both general trust and government trust vary on each measure of political approval. The predictability of the models measuring the effects of general trust and government trust on approval of offices is higher in 2004 (14.2% and 38.0% respectively) than in 2008 (7.8% and 25.8% respectively). The decrease in predictability suggests that trust was a more important determiner of approval of the offices of president and National Assembly in 2004 than in 2008. Again, the rumors of scandal and corruption between 2004 and 2008 are likely to account for the decrease in trust

overall. And, interestingly, this may have also led to citizens using different modes of accountability by which to judge the government offices. In addition, lack of knowledge regarding the political offices in 2008 might account for the low predictability. In 2008, over 50% of the respondents interviewed responded that they did not know enough about President Molanthe and the National Assembly to say whether they approved or disapproved of them. These cases (1382 total) were deleted prior to running the analysis. Losing this many cases due to missing data is problematic and can lead to reduced statistical significance and affect predictability (Beale and Little 1975; Gupta and Lam 1996).

The data show this decrease in predictability for the models that analyze the relationship between government trust and both approval of economic policies and approval of social policies as well. In 2004, the models including government trust accounted for 24.0% of the variability in approval of economic policies and 24.3% of the variability in approval of social policies, compared to 10.9% and 18.0% respectively in 2008. Again, many cases were deleted due to missing data (approximately 39% total). Therefore, the declining predictability may be due to the loss of cases (Beale and Little 1975; Gupta and Lam 1996). However, the decreases may also be observed here because the citizens trusted the government less in 2008, and they used other means of evaluation for the approval of these policies as well. These might include the applicability of the policies to benefit themselves or their families or perhaps their responses to policies were influence by the media.³⁰ In any

³⁰ Also, I initially intended to include a measure of political party affiliation to these analyses but could not due to measurement error. Better measures of political party affiliation and activity would be helpful in accounting for the structural indicators of political approval in South Africa.

case, we can see that as government trust declined, so did its influence on political approval.³¹

However, the data analyzed in this study suggest that higher levels of trust does increase political approval in South Africa, as suggested by Abramowitz (1989b), Anderson (2010), Hetherington (1998) and Luhmann (1979). In rounds 3 and 4, both general trust and government trust have significant effects across the variety of different measures of political approval – approval of offices, approval of economic policies and approval of social policies. So, the answer to my research question is that higher levels of social and political trust lead to higher levels of approval for the government.

These findings are also consistent with the previous studies that suggest that trust influences political attitudes (Hetherington 1998; Sztopka 1999). As social capital theorists suggest, the increase in trust among citizens for each other and for their government leads to positive political attitudes and stability. Furthermore, the decline in political approval observed using these data correspond with the declining levels of government trust discussed in the previous chapter, indicating that the decline in trust over time leads to a consequent decline in political approval.

Cross-sectional data are limited in their ability to establish a time-sequence of events (dos Santos Silva 1999). Although examining this relationship using cross-sectional data opens up the possibility for the causal relationship to be reversed – that political attitudes

³¹ Another plausible reason for the decrease in predictability for these measures of political approval could be that my indices measuring approval of offices, economic policies and social polices do not accurately account for the complexities of those offices and policies.

could be influencing trust, the previously established theory and research suggests that trust is the causal determiner of political attitudes (Abramowitz 1989b; Anderson 2010; Hetherington 1998; Luhman 1979; Sztompka 1999). In addition, cross-sectional data tend to have a larger unit of analysis and do not have attrition problems like longitudinal and panel data, which lose cases over time (Liu 2008).

In addition to the significant effects of general and government trust, being employed increased approval of economic policies in 2008, and living in a rural area decreased approval of economic and social policies in 2008. The respondents' ethnicity in both 2004 and 2008 influenced each measure of political approval. In each case, the ethnic groups included in the models showed increased levels of political approval when compared to Afrikaaners. Additionally, for the 744 respondents included in the analyses using the round 4 data, general trust moderates the relationships between the ethnic groups and each measure of political approval, and government trust moderates the relationship between ethnicity and approval of social policies.

As was the case in Peru (Arce 1995), this study shows that employment status does not influence presidential approval in South Africa. However, an important contribution of this study is its significant influence on economic policies. Furthermore, locale also does not influence approval of offices, but does have a negative effect on approval of both social and economic policies. This supports previous studies that point out the different circumstances faced by rural citizens in South Africa (Quinn et al 2011; Wittenberg and Collinson 2007), but also adds to the literature by bridging the gap between studies that show these unique

characteristics of rural South Africa and the studies that discuss political attitudes in South Africa (Butler 2004; Mattes 2012; Sparks 2003). Studies conducted in the U.S. also found lack of support for the influence of education and age on political approval (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Malhotra and Krosnick 2007).

As the analysis from Chapter 4 showed, ethnicity had a persistently significant effect on trust in South Africa. That continues to be the case as ethnicity had a significant effect on each measure of political approval for each round of data. Similarly to the U.S., South Africa's history of racial and ethnic division and hostility has influenced the political attitudes of various ethnic groups. This was certainly the circumstance during Apartheid and the racial politics continued into post-Apartheid South Africa (Butler 2004; Shubane and Stack 1999; Thompson 2000). So, it seems that as the previous research from the U.S., Europe, and central and South America suggests (Anderson 2010; Davis 1998; Nunnally 2012; Rydgren 2007; Zeitlin 1967), racial and ethnic identities and antagonisms influence political attitudes and behaviors in the context of South Africa as well.

These findings provide insight into political attitudes in post-colonial, multicultural societies. Previous research and theory suggest that increased trust will lead to positive political attitudes, and this study furthers those arguments. Both general and government trust had a significant positive relationship on each measure of political approval and this was consistent between rounds of data. This is important because social contract theorists argue that political legitimacy hinges on an agreement that is maintained by meeting mutual expectations. Trust, then, is the impetus for preserving the agreement for peaceful and

functional coexistence between the state and its citizens. The citizens included in this study have confirmed this relationship. And as Kimball and Patterson (1997) suggest, restoring public trust will require serious attention to the expectations of citizens.

Not only does trust influence political approval in terms of government offices, economic policies and social policies, but it does so in spite of other factors that have a strong influence on political attitudes – specifically racial or ethnic identity. We can see from this study that even in a nation with a very short history of racial and ethnic equality under the law, the historic and continuing antagonisms between the ethnic groups are not strong enough to diminish the relationship between trust and political approval. A similar finding was presented by Hetherington and Husser (2012) who argue that trusting the government leads to support for more government involvement. In their study of the effects of political trust on political attitudes in post-9/11 U.S., they found that trust did not affect racially directed government programs as it had in the past. Instead, trust affected foreign policy and national defense preferences. But the finding that was most relevant to the one presented in this study is that while political trust had a significant and positive influence on levels of approval for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, race had no significant effect in either statistical model (Hetherington and Husser 2012). While ethnicity continued to have a significant effect on political approval in this study, it did not render the relationship between trust and political approval irrelevant. Furthermore, the effect of ethnicity on political approval was lessened, in many cases, by the interactions with general and government trust.

This finding is important for advancing research on political stability in developing nations. Understanding that both general and government trust influence approval of government offices, economic policies and social policies, controlling for other established influencers of political attitudes, moves us forward in our investigation of the motivators for positive political attitudes. Furthermore, policy makers will benefit from the confirmation that they must appeal to the trust of their citizens in order to develop and maintain positive political attitudes.

CHAPTER SIX: REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND THE EVALUATION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRACY

Introduction

This study analyzes representative democratic values among a sample of South African citizens. While trust is a valuable determiner of political stability, there is danger in associating democratic values with trust. Trust will wax and wane over time, depending on the context of the day. However, democratic values should remain unaffected in order for democracy to prevail in spite of the ebb and flow of political scandals and triumphs (Anderson 2010). As Almond and Verba (1963) argue, democracy is dependent on the democratic political culture with the commitment of citizens to democratic values (Canetti-Nisim 2004). Therefore, this study focuses on structural factors, rather than trust, that might affect representative democratic values and citizen perspectives regarding the state of democracy in South Africa.

As Mill ([1910] 2012) argues, representative democracy is the best form of government because it takes into account the collective interests of the people, and it is successful when all of the voices of the people are heard. Therefore, studying the values that citizens place on representative democracy procedures helps us to understand the viability of the structure of representative democracy in the nation. Sociologists and political scientists consider democratic values to be important, and they have studied them using a variety of methods and data (see Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Canetti-Nisim 2004; Dahl 1971; Fails and

Pierce 2010; Finkel and Ernst 2005; Kartstedt 2006; Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1982; Stack 1978). To add to this literature, this study investigates the structural factors that influence support for the representative democratic values that are specific to the representative form of government – the value of fair and open elections, lawmaking in the hands of the elected lawmaking officials and obedience to the laws that are created.

Hypotheses

While social class has been established as an indicator of democratic participation and success (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1982), there remains an ongoing debate in the literature regarding other indicators of democratic values. Canetti-Nisim's study of democratic values in Israel found no support for the influence of religiosity on democratic values. Instead she found that authoritarianism leads to non-democratic values (Canetti-Nisim 2004). Finkel and Ernst (2005) found that in South Africa, civic education influences democratic values, although in their study, they measure democratic values in terms of civic duty, tolerance for claims of racial superiority and confidence in South African institutions. Other studies measure democratic values in terms of egalitarianism and individualism (Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Karstedt 2006). Furthermore, Fails and Pierce (2010) found that legitimacy attitudes toward democracy are shaped by prior institutionalization of democracy globally.

Studies show that lower classes are less committed to democracy as a political system (measured by voting rates) than middle and upper classes (Lipset 1981). Finkel and Ernst's 2005 finding that civic education increases democratic attitudes furthers support for the

relationship between socioeconomic status and the development of democratic values. The Afrobarometer data include measures of socioeconomic status, including education level, which is a commonly used indicator of social class (Lijphart 1989; Kelley 1992). Therefore, I hypothesize the following:

H₁: Having a high school education as opposed to having less than a high school education will increase representative democratic values.

In his study, Mattes (2012) found that as far as popular demand for democracy goes, South Africans who have come of age post-Apartheid are less committed to democracy than previous older South Africans. Additionally, other researchers have previously found that the political attitudes and behaviors of young people vary from those who are in later stages of adulthood (Lau and Redlawsk 2008; Zeitlin 1967). Therefore, I developed the following hypotheses:

H₂: An increase in age will result in an increase in representative democratic values.

Location is another variable that is important to this topic. As Reisinger, Miller and Hesli (1995) point out, in any country, citizens who reside in cities are likely to have a disproportionate visibility in public life. Additionally, people living in urban areas may have more opportunity to interact with government entities and have access to civic education which leads to democratic values (Finkel and Ernst 2005). Studies on South Africa show that citizens who live in rural areas deal with particular stresses of agricultural production and access to water, which can lead to severe health problems (Quinn et al 2011) and have been undergoing transitions from nuclear or single person households to three-generation linear

households in the wake of socio-political changes and the escalating HIV/AIDS epidemic (Wittenberg and Collinson 2007). These previous studies show that rural locale should be treated as a stratification variable. However, they do not indicate a clear relationship between locale and democratic values. Hence, I offer Hypothesis 4, which describes an exploratory relationship between locale and democratic values.

H₃: Living in a rural area as opposed to living in an urban area will have a significant influence on representative democratic values.

Because of historical and contemporary antagonisms, race and ethnicity impact the political attitudes of citizens in the U.S. and alters the democratic experience (Davis 1998; Nunnally 2012; Valadez 2001). Additionally, studies show that the influence of ethnicity has not only persisted in African politics, but has intensified (Ojie 2006). Furthermore, Janara's 2004 study contends that U.S. democracy is internally structured by inegalitarian relationships between European Americans and non-European Americans. Consequently, the presence of interracial hierarchy prevents the development of the egalitarian democratic value (Janara 2004). However, the nature of the relationship between ethnicity and democratic values in contemporary South Africa is not well understood. As part of their argument, Almond and Verba argue that experiences are crucial in the formation of political attitudes (Almond and Verba 1965), which leads to my hypothesis regarding the relationship between ethnicity and democratic values. Since Afrikaaners were the ethnic group who instilled and facilitated Apartheid, a quasi-democratic system that perverted democratic

practices, such as elections (Butler 2004), I contend that they will be less likely to value an egalitarian form of democracy:

H₄: : A respondent's ethnic identity as Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu, African Other, European Other, or Other as opposed to Afrikaaner will lead to higher levels of democratic values.

In addition to these hypotheses regarding representative democratic values, I have developed several hypotheses that anticipate the structural influences on perspectives regarding the state of democracy in South Africa, measured by variables that indicate the degree to which South Africa is a democracy and the level of satisfaction with South Africa's democracy. These measures are widely used in the literature (Fails and Pirece 2010). For instance, Shin (1999) argued that stable democracies depend on citizens who support the democratic regime and reject authoritarian alternatives. Diamond (1999) also noted how these indicators capture citizens' views on the legitimacy of democracy.

Gilley's 2006 study argues that good governance, democratic rights and welfare gains are among the plausible causes of democratic legitimacy. In addition, research suggests that people assess democratic systems in terms of current economic and political performance (Finkel, Humphries and Opp 2001). Furthermore, previous literature argues that experiences will influence political views (Almond and Verba 1965; Nunnally 2012), and that ethnicity continues to negatively impact the quality of democratic practice in many nations (Ojie 2006). For example, Mueller and Landsman (2004) found that white Americans reported higher levels of legitimacy perceptions. In addition, Mattes' 2012 study argues found that the

“born free” generation³² of South Africans are less committed to democracy than older generations. Therefore, I developed the following hypotheses:

H₅: As age increases, South Africans will be more likely to view South Africa as a democracy.

H₆: As age increases, satisfaction with South African democracy will also increase.

H₇: A respondent’s ethnic identity as Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu, African Other, European Other or Other will be more likely to view South Africa as a democracy, net of other variables, when compared to the Afrikaaner ethnic group.

H₈: A respondent’s ethnic identity as Xhosa, Pedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Zulu, African Other, European Other or Other will result in increased satisfaction with South African democracy, net of other variables, when compared to the Afrikaaner ethnic group.

Methods

To test the hypotheses, I employed OLS regression techniques for several reasons. First, I expect to find a linear relationship between my independent and dependent variables. Second, each of my dependent variables is measured at the ordinal level. Therefore, the assumption of linearity and the measurement of the outcome variables make OLS regression the appropriate method for analyzing these relationships. Lastly, OLS regression allows for my categorical variables that measure the structural characteristics of the respondents to be easily transformed into dummy variables (McClendon 2002).

³² This generation includes South Africans who came of voting age (16-18 yrs) after 1996 in Mattes’ analysis.

I used three different dependent variables to test the relationships between structural indicators and democratic values. These measure the respondents' opinions on the roles of government institutions as they pertain to elections, lawmaking and law abiding.

Afrobarometer identifies these variables as “democracy indicators”, and they are used in Mattes and Bratton's 2007 study on democracy in Africa (Mattes and Bratton 2007, Editor 2009). In addition, I use two dependent variables to evaluate the relationships between structural factors and perspectives on the state of democracy in South Africa: the degree to which South Africa is perceived as a democracy today and the degree to which the respondent is satisfied with the way democracy works in South Africa.

For both rounds of data, three variables are used to measure the democratic roles of citizens and government institutions: *Elections Round 3/4*, which asks if leaders should be chosen through elections or other methods; *Lawmakers Round 3/4*, which asks if the National Assembly should make laws or the president should make laws; and *Laws Round 3/4*, which asks if the president should be bound by laws or free to act despite laws of the court. Each of these variables is measured on 4-point Likert scales, ranging from 1-4, where lower values represent democratic values most prevalent and observed in other democratic nations such as the United States. Values at the higher end represent values that do not resemble those in other democratic nations.

In addition, two variables from each round are used to measure the respondents' perspectives regarding the state of South African democracy: *SADemocracy Round 3/4*, which asks the respondent the degree to which South Africa is a democracy today and

SASatisfaction Round 3/4, which asks the respondent the degree to which he or she is satisfied with the way democracy works in South Africa. *SADemocracy Round 3/4* is measured on 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1-4, where lower values represent low levels of perceived democracy and higher values represent high level of perceived democracy. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked to give their opinion regarding how much of a democracy South Africa is. The interviewers then recorded their responses as (1=Not a democracy, 2=A democracy, with major problems, 3=A democracy, but with minor problems, 4=A full democracy). This is the measurement for *SADemocracy Round 3/4* that I use in my analysis.

SASatisfaction Round 3/4 is measured on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1-4, where lower values represent lower levels of satisfaction and higher values represent higher levels of satisfaction. As part of the Afrobarometer study, respondents were asked how satisfied they are with the state of democracy in South Africa. The interviewers then recorded their responses as (1=Not at All Satisfied, 2=Not Very Satisfied, 3=Fairly Satisfied, 4=Very Satisfied). This is the measurement for *SASatisfaction Round 3/4* that I use in my analysis.

For both round 3 and round 4, socioeconomic status is measured by two variables in the data: education level and employment status (Kelley 1992). I recoded education level into two dummy variables to differentiate respondents who completed high school education and those who did not (0=*No HS*, 1=*HS*) because the distribution included sufficient cases for the education variable to be coded into these two categories. For the same reason, I also recoded employment status into two categories (0=*Unemployed*, 1=*Employed*). In both rounds, age is

measured as a continuous variable. In the working data sets, age was heavily skewed toward younger ages. This is expected since the life expectancy in South Africa throughout the early 2000s was approximately 51 years (World Bank). Therefore, I used the logarithmic transformation of age in the regression analyses (see York et al. 2003).

In each round of the Afrobarometer study, the respondents' racial identities were recorded by the interviewer. This results in an unknown amount of error because of possible interviewer bias regarding the characteristics that define a person's race (Dohrenwend et al 1968; Hill 2002). However, ethnicity was asked in an open-ended question to each respondent, who self-reported the ethnic group that they identified with the most. Therefore, the ethnicity variable was best suited for the analysis (Boehmer et al. 2002). Accordingly, I use the ethnicity variable instead of the race variable in the analysis.³³ For both rounds, I recoded the ethnicity variable into nine dummy variables: *Afrikaaner*, *Xhosa*, *Pedi*, *Sesotho*, *Setswana*, *Zulu*, *AfricanOther*, *EuropeanOther*, and *Other*. For both rounds of the data, locale is reported by the interviewer and is coded as two dummy variables (0= *Urban*, 1= *Rural*).

All of the regression models include two control variables: gender and religion. In a patriarchal society, male dominance creates power differentials between men and women wherein the power imbalance benefits all men (Johnson 1997). Accordingly, the institutions that dominate a patriarchal society, including the state, religion, the education system and the economy, are "gendered institutions" (Acker 1992; Martin 2004). As such, feminists assert that gender is an organizing principle in each of these social institutions and is a formal,

³³ I ran models that include both the race and ethnicity variables. However the models that include only the ethnicity variable are reported in this study.

bureaucratic status (Lorber 2006). While I found no conclusive theoretical evidence that led me to expect significant relationships between gender and trust (see Avery 2007; Herreros and Criado 2008), there is evidence of a relationship between gender and political attitudes (Paxton et al 2007, Reed 2006). It seems plausible that this variable might also affect the development of democratic values or the evaluation of and satisfaction with democracy. Therefore I control for gender in my analysis, coded as two dummy variables (0= *Male*, 1=*Female*).

I recoded Religion into two dummy categories: *Christian* and *Religious Other*. As with gender, there is a lack of evidence that supports a connection between religion and trust (Canetti-Nisim 2004). But religion can direct so many facets of one's belief system that it would be negligent not to account for its influence. Additionally, there is significant evidence that suggests that religion impacts political attitudes and behaviors (Mattis 2001, Patterson 2004, Ross 2001, D'Antonio 2011).³⁴

I created my OLS regression models to analyze the effects of each of the independent variables on the dependent, indexed variables measuring general trust and government trust from both rounds using SAS Enterprise Guide 4.2. Prior to running statistical analyses, I checked the correlation matrix and found no issues of multicollinearity. Although the proportion of missing data is low across the key independent variables, multivariate listwise

³⁴ Religion is not a variable of interest, and is only included as a control. Also, the distribution included sufficient cases for the religion variable to be coded as Christian and non-Christian or "Religious Other". Also, the studies that suggest that religion impacts political attitudes and behaviors can vary in their coding of religions (for example, Catholics and Protestants or Christians and Muslims).

deletion across all dependent, independent and control variables results in substantial data loss – between 37% and 43% of observations are missing at least one variable in each empirical analysis. As a result, parameter estimates may be biased where substantial data are missing. I measured statistical significance of each model $\alpha=.05$ and the statistical significance of each of the parameter estimates of the independent variables at $\alpha=.05$.

Round 3 Results

The analysis for round 3 includes 1508 cases (892 cases were deleted). The deleted cases are similar to the cases included in the analysis in terms of employment status, age, locale and religion. However, there are some differences between the cases included in the study and those deleted due to missing values. The missing cases have a higher percentage of respondents who identify as a member of the Zulu ethnic groups and ethnic groups included in the “Other” category. The missing cases also show a lower percentage of HS graduates.

Table 3.7 reports descriptive statistics for the 1508 cases of round 3 variables included in this study. The distribution for *Elections Round 3* is skewed to the right (1.33). On average respondents agree that the nation’s leaders should be chosen through regular, open and honest elections (mean = 1.63). The distribution for *Lawmakers Round 3* is slightly skewed to the right (.57). On average respondents agree that members of the National Assembly should make laws for the country even if the president does not agree (mean = 2.06). The distribution for *Laws Round 3* approximates and normal distribution. On average respondents neither agree nor disagree that the president must always obey the laws and the

courts even if he thinks they are wrong (mean = 2.15)³⁵. The distribution for *SA Democracy Round 3* is skewed slightly to the left (-.72). On average respondents believe that South Africa is a democracy with minor problems (mean = 2.98). The distribution for *SA Satisfaction Round 3* approximates a normal distribution. On average respondents are almost fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in South Africa (mean = 2.85).

The means reported in Table 3.7 indicate that of the 1508 cases included in this analysis, approximately 46% of respondents have acquired a high school diploma, 41% of the respondents are employed at least part time and 38% of respondents live in a rural area. The mean age of respondents is approximately 39 years old. The ethnic distribution of the respondents is approximately 8% Afrikaaner, 20% Xhosa, 9% Pedi, 9% Sesotho, 10% Setswana, and 20% Zulu. Eleven percent of the respondents are members of the Ndebele, Shangaan, Swazi or Venda ethnic groups. Fourteen percent of the respondents are members of the English, Indian, Coloured or Other White/European ethnic groups, and 0% of the respondents is a member of a National identity only or reported their ethnic group as “Other” –not specified. Fifty-one percent of the respondents are female, 57% are Christian, and 63% are not Christian³⁶.

Table 6.1 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *Elections 3* and the control variables. Of the structural

³⁵ The average for *Laws Round 4* was 2.15. On the scale ranging from 1-4, a 3 is “disagree” and a 2 is “agree”. The mean value falls in between those ranges indicating neither agreement nor disagreement.

³⁶ The respondents characterized as “not Christian” do not believe in any religion or identify as Agnostic or Atheist, are Catholic, either Evangelical or Mainstream Protestant, Sunni or Shiite Muslim, African Independent, Traditional, Hindu, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon or reported their religion as “Other” – not specified.

indicators that were included in the model, only the ethnic groups are statistically significant. The model predicts 1.4% of the variation in perspectives regarding elections for round 3.

Table 6.3 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *Lawmakers 3* and the control variables. Of the structural indicators that were included in the model, only the variable measuring South African identity is statistically significant. The model predicts 1.2% of the variation in perspectives regarding lawmaking for round 3.

Table 6.5 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *Laws 3* and the control variables. Several of the structural indicators that were included in the model, including education, three of the dummy variables representing ethnic groups – Sesotho and Setswana, and the variable measuring South African identity are statistically significant. The model predicts 5.3% of the variation in perspectives regarding obedience to laws for round 3.

Table 6.7 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *SA Democracy 3* and the control variables. Of the structural indicators that were included in the model, each of the dummy variables representing ethnic groups except for “Other”, locale, gender, the dummy variable indicating Christian religion, and the variable measuring South African identity are statistically significant. The model predicts 6.9% of the variation in perspectives regarding perspectives on the state of democracy in South Africa for round 3.

Table 6.9 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *SA Satisfaction 3* and the control variables. Of the structural indicators that were included in the model, education, and each of the dummy variables representing ethnic groups except for “Other”, gender and the variable measuring South African identity are statistically significant. The model predicts 6.4% of the variation in perspectives regarding satisfaction with democracy in South Africa for round 3.

Round 4 Results

The analysis for Round 4 includes 1366 cases (1034 cases were deleted). The deleted cases are similar to the cases included in the analysis in terms of each of the structural variables.³⁷ The variable missing the most cases (339) was *Lawmakers Round 4*. In general, these results need to be interpreted cautiously due to the large amounts of data that are missing.

Table 3.10 reports descriptive statistics for the 1366 cases of Round 4 variables included in this study. The distribution for *Elections Round 4* is slightly skewed to the right (.67). On average respondents agree that the nation’s leaders should be chosen through regular, open and honest elections (mean = 1.94). The distribution for *Lawmakers Round 4* approximates a normal distribution. On average respondents neither agree nor disagree that members of the National Assembly should make laws for the country even if the president

³⁷ These include employment status, education level, age, locale, ethnicity and religion.

does not agree (mean = 2.28)³⁸. The distribution for *Laws Round 4* is slightly skewed to the right (.50). On average respondents neither agree nor disagree that president must always obey the laws and the courts even if thinks they are wrong (mean = 2.13)³⁹. The distribution for *SA Democracy Round 4* approximates a normal distribution. On average respondents believe that South Africa is a democracy with minor problems (mean = 2.86). The distribution for *SA Satisfaction Round 4* approximates a normal distribution. On average respondents are almost fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in South Africa (mean = 2.53)⁴⁰.

The means reported in Table 3.10 indicate that of the 1366 cases included in the analysis, approximately 47% of respondents have acquired a high school diploma, 49% of the respondents are employed at least part time and 33% of respondents live in a rural area. The mean age of respondents is approximately 37 years old. The ethnic distribution of the respondents is approximately 14% Afrikaaner, 16% Xhosa, 6% Pedi, 8% Sesotho, 10% Setswana, and 19% Zulu. Ten percent of the respondents are members of the Ndebele, Shangaan, Swazi or Venda ethnic groups. Seventeen percent of the respondents are members of the English, Indian, Coloured or Other White/European ethnic groups, and 0% of the respondents is a member of a National identity only or reported their ethnic group as “Other”

³⁸ The average for *Lawmakers Round 4* was 2.28. On the scale ranging from 1-4, a 3 is “disagree” and a 2 is “agree”. The mean value falls in between those ranges indicating neither agreement nor disagreement.

³⁹ Again, the average for *Laws Round 4* was 2.13. On the scale ranging from 1-4, a 3 is “disagree” and a 2 is “agree”. The mean value falls in between those ranges indicating neither agreement nor disagreement.

⁴⁰ The average for *SA Satisfaction Round 4* was 2.53. On the scale ranging from 1-4, a 2 is “not very satisfied” and a 3 is “fairly satisfied”. The mean value falls in between those ranges indicating that respondents are almost fairly satisfied with the democracy in South Africa.

–not specified. Fifty percent of the respondents are female, 35% are Christian, and 65% are not Christian⁴¹.

Table 6.2 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *Elections 4* and the control variables. Among the structural indicators of interest that were included in the model, only the Xhosa, Sesotho, Zulu and “European Other” ethnic groups statistically significant. The model predicts 1.6% of the variation in perspectives regarding elections for round 4.

Table 6.4 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *Lawmakers 4* and the control variables. Here we see that among the structural indicators included in the model, only three of the dummy variables indicating ethnic groups – Zulu, African Other and European Other and the variable measuring South African identity are statistically significant. The model predicts 2.1% of the variation in perspectives regarding lawmaking for round 4.

Table 6.6 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *Laws 4* and the control variables. Of the structural indicators included in this model, two of the dummy variables representing ethnic groups – Zulu and African Other, and the dummy variable indicating Christian religion, are statistically significant. The model predicts 1.9% of the variation in perspectives regarding obedience to laws for round 4.

⁴¹ The respondents characterized as “not Christian” do not believe in any religion or identify as Agnostic or Atheist, are Catholic, either Evangelical or Mainstream Protestant, Sunni or Shiite Muslim, African Independent, Traditional, Hindu, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon or reported their religion as “Other” – not specified.

Table 6.8 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *SA Democracy 4* and the control variables. Of the structural indicators that were included in the model, two of the dummy variables representing ethnic groups – Xhosa and European Other, locale, and the variable measuring South African identity are statistically significant. The model predicts 3.4% of the variation in perspectives regarding perspectives on the state of democracy in South Africa for round 4.

Table 6.10 reports the regression coefficients for all variables in the analysis of the structural variables that impact *SA Satisfaction 4* and the control variables. Of the structural indicators that were included in the model, three of the dummy variables representing ethnic groups – Xhosa, Sesotho, and Zulu, and the dummy variable indicating Christian religion are statistically significant. The model predicts 1.6% of the variation in perspectives regarding satisfaction with democracy in South Africa for round 4.

Analysis and Discussion

Elections – Rounds 3 and 4 Compared

According to the data provided by Afrobarometer, in both 2004 and 2008, the respondents included in the analysis agreed that leaders should be chosen through open, honest elections. However, the structural variables that influence the approval of government offices varied between the rounds of data collected. Although the influence of ethnicity was consistent between rounds, the ethnic groups that had significant influences on the variable measuring the value of elections varied. For example, among the 1508 respondents included

in the analysis using the data from 2004, membership in each of the ethnic group categories indicated higher levels of democratic value for elections than Afrikaaners. In 2008, among the 1366 respondents included in the analysis, only members of the Xhosa, Sesotho, Zulu and “European Other” ethnic groups indicated higher levels of democratic value for elections.

These comparisons should be interpreted cautiously. For both rounds of data, the models predict less than 2% of the variation in perspectives on elections. Because of the low predictability, the analysis of citizens’ perspectives on the value of elections is not conclusive. Therefore, the factors that influence the value of elections in South Africa remain uncertain given the data from these two surveys.⁴²

Lawmakers – Rounds 3 and 4 Compared

In 2004, of the 1508 respondents included in the analysis, those that had completed high school indicated higher levels of value for the right of lawmakers in the National Assembly to create laws than those without a high school degree, but respondents who identify as South African indicated lower levels of value for lawmakers. In 2008, of the 1366 respondents included in the analysis, the relationship between South African identity and value for lawmakers remained the same, but the relationship between education and value for lawmakers was no longer significant.

Again, these comparisons should be interpreted cautiously. For both rounds of data, the models predict only a small amount of the variation in perspectives on lawmakers (1.2%

⁴² Robert Mattes (2012) found similarly low r square values when conducting his research on the effects of age on democratic commitment in South Africa using Afrobarometer data.

in 2004 and 2.1% in 2008). Because of the low predictability, the analysis of citizens' perspectives on the value of lawmakers is not conclusive. Therefore, the factors that influence the value of the National Assembly's ability to make laws in South Africa remain uncertain given the data from these two surveys.

Laws – Rounds 3 and 4 Compared

In 2004, of the 1508 respondents included in the analysis, those that had completed high school indicated higher levels of value for the president to obey laws, but members of Sesotho and Setswana ethnic groups and respondents who identify as South African indicated lower levels of value for the president to obey laws. While in 2008, of the 1366 respondents included in the analysis, the relationship between education and value for the president to obey laws and between South African identity and value for the president to obey laws was no longer significant; members of the Zulu and “African Other” ethnic groups reported lower levels of value for the president to obey laws, and Christians indicated higher levels of value for the president to obey laws.

Yet again, these comparisons should be interpreted cautiously because of the low predictability of the models (5.3% in 2004 and 1.9% in 2008). Because of the low predictability, the analysis of citizens' perspectives on the value of laws is not conclusive. Therefore, the factors that influence the value of having the president abide by the laws in South Africa remain uncertain given the data from these two surveys.

Evaluation of the State of South African Democracy – Rounds 3 and 4 Compared

In 2004, of the 1508 respondents included in the analysis, those that live in a rural location, females and Christians were less likely to indicate that South Africa is a democracy than urban, male, non-Christian respondents. Respondents who are members of each of the ethnic groups included in the analysis except for “Other” and respondents who identify as South African were more likely to indicate that South Africa is a democracy than Afrikaaners or people who do not identify as South African. However, in 2008, of the 1366 respondents included in the analysis, the relationship between locale and the state of South African democracy, gender and the state of South African democracy, and religion and South African democracy were no longer significant. Respondents who identify as South African continued to be more likely to indicate that South Africa is a democracy, and rural South Africans continued to be less likely to indicate that South Africa is a democracy. However, members of the Xhosa and “European Other” ethnic groups were less likely to indicate that South Africa is a democracy.

Model predictability also decreases between rounds of data. In 2004, the model predicts 6.9% of the variation in perspectives on the state of democracy in South Africa. This predictability decreases by half (3.4%) in 2008. While both figures are low, a 50% decrease in predictability between rounds might indicate a substantial change in factors that influence citizen perspectives on the state of democracy in South Africa.

Satisfaction with South African Democracy – Rounds 3 and 4 Compared

In 2004, of the 1508 respondents included in the analysis, those who completed high school, members of each of the ethnic groups except for “Other”, and those who identify as South African indicated higher degrees of satisfaction for the way democracy works in South Africa, while female respondents indicated lower degrees of satisfaction for the way democracy works in South Africa. However in 2008, of the 1366 respondents included in the analysis, the relationships between education and satisfaction with South African democracy, gender and satisfaction with South African democracy, and South African identity and satisfaction with South African democracy were no longer significant. Members of the Xhosa, Sesotho and Zulu ethnic groups indicated higher levels of satisfaction with South African democracy, while Christians indicated lower levels of satisfaction with South African democracy.

Again, the predictability of the models had a sharp decrease between rounds of data. In 2004, the model predicts 6.4% of the variation in satisfaction with the state of democracy in South Africa. This predictability decreases dramatically (down to 1.6%) in 2008. While both figures are low, a decrease in predictability of this magnitude between rounds might indicate a substantial change in factors that influence citizen satisfaction with the state of democracy in South Africa.

The decrease in predictability between rounds of data for the variables measuring state of democracy and satisfaction with democracy in South Africa is likely attributable to the historic changes that occurred in 2008. Again, politics on the national level endured a period of turmoil as Mbeki was ousted as president amid accusations of corruption. Zuma,

the president elect, was also investigated for financial corruption prior to his election by the ANC. So, the context of the South African political arena at this time likely had an influence on perceptions of democracy for South Africa's citizens.

Discussion of Hypotheses

Investigating structural influences on democratic values and assessments helps us to understand the viable future of democracy in South Africa. If we can gain an understanding of the indicators for strong versus weak democratic values, then we can better produce policies that encourage the development of those values. Likewise, understanding the citizens' assessments of their democracy helps us understand the legitimacy of the current democratic state.

Table 6.11 includes a summary of the significant indicators of democratic values for rounds 3 and 4 for the multivariate models. Table 6.12 includes a summary of the significant indicators of the state of democracy in South Africa for rounds 3 and 4 for the multivariate models.

Hypothesis 1 is only partially supported. Higher levels of education led to increased democratic values only in round 3 in terms of the lawmaking rights of the National Assembly and the president's duty to obey laws. However, education had no statistically significant effect on democratic values in round 4. The finding for round 3 data is consistent with Finkel and Ernst's 2005 research which suggests a positive relationship between education and the development of democratic values. The lack of significance between the two in 2008

indicates that other factors were more influential in the assessment of democratic values at that time. Again, the political turmoil at that time may account for those influences.

I found no support for Hypothesis 2. Age is not a significant indicator of any of the measures of democratic values. This is the case for both rounds of data. This could be because age is highly skewed in my data sample. Or it could be because although Mattes found a significant relationship between age and democratic values in his 2012 study, he measured age by generation rather than a continuous variable. So, democratic values may vary between generations, but that generational difference might not be captured in the way that I have measured age in this study.

Likewise, I found no support for Hypothesis 3. Living in a rural locale is not a significant indicator of any of the measures of democratic values in either round of data. This finding contradicts previous literature that argues that rural locations are unique spaces with unique political cultures due to political segregation (Reisinger et al 1995).

Hypothesis 4 is partially supported. The models for both rounds of data show significant relationships between ethnic groups and the indicators for democratic values. However, these relationships vary. The models show that the ethnic groups included in the analysis show higher democratic value for open elections and for the lawmaking rights of the National Assembly than Afrikaaners. However, the ethnic groups showing significant relationships indicate lower levels of value for the president to obey laws than Afrikaaners. This finding is supported by previous studies such as Gibson and Caldeira's 2003 study of the effects of race on support for democratic institutions and process. He found that on each

dimension of democratic institutions and processes, African peoples were less supportive than whites in South Africa (Gibson and Caldeira 2003).

Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 are also not supported because age has no significant effect on the respondents' views of South African democracy or their satisfaction with South African democracy. Again, this could be because age is highly skewed in my data sample. Or it could be because everyone in South Africa has a clear understanding and strong reaction to Apartheid. This is likely the case since Apartheid ended less than 20 years ago. In addition, de facto Apartheid persists in South Africa (Harris 1991; Polgreen 2012b); as Hendricks argues that Apartheid lives on "happily" in the unreformed criminal justice system, the urban slums and rural degradation, the workplace, the education system and the hospitals (Hendricks 2003).

Hypothesis 7 is also partially supported. In 2004, all ethnic groups included in the model except for "Other" had a positive, statistically significant effect on perspectives of the state of South African democracy when compared to Afrikaaners. However, in 2008, the only ethnic groups that were statistically significant were Xhosa and "European Other", and their assessment of the state of South African democracy was negative compared to Afrikaaners.

I also found support for Hypothesis 8. In 2004, all of the ethnic groups included in the model except for "Other" had a positive, statistically significant effect on satisfaction with South African democracy when compared to Afrikaaners. In 2008, the ethnic groups that remained statistically significant were the Xhosa, Sesotho and Zulu. The explanations for support for these hypotheses are likely to be the same. Again, these relationships are probable

because the Afrikaanders have lost power and authority in the current democratic government compared to the pseudo-democratic structure that they controlled during Apartheid (Butler 2004; Hendricks 2003; Sparks 2003). By contrast, those ethnic groups that are now enfranchised are likely to understand the new South Africa as a democracy with only minor problems and express satisfaction with the new democracy.

Representative Democratic Values – A Deeper Look

The results of these hypotheses show that South Africans highly value the open access to fair and honest elections. And as classical democratic theorists argue, elections are a critical component of a democracy. In addition, as suspected, ethnicity influences values of elections. Because open elections have curbed the power of Afrikaanders in South Africa, Afrikaanders do not value them as much as other ethnic groups in the nation. However, the fervent dedication to democratic values does not extend to lawmaking and obeying the laws and courts. South Africans are less likely to agree that the lawmaking body of the government should make the laws as opposed to the president making laws and even less likely to agree that the president should obey the laws and the courts when he does not agree with them. In fact, those who identify as Xhosa, Pedi and “African Other” are less likely to agree with the president adhering to laws and courts than are the Afrikaanders.

There are several plausible explanations for why the data show that these ethnic groups are less likely than Afrikaanders to agree with the president adhering to the laws and courts. For one, South Africa’s history of Apartheid laws may lead to distrust or disdain for

laws and lawmakers that have carried over into the new South Africa⁴³. Another related explanation regards reverence for elected leaders. Because of the disdain or distrust for laws, some African ethnic groups might feel a closer connection to a leader that they have elected that looks like them or has endured similar experiences and hardships. This relationship has been observed in mayoral elections (Frederick and Jeffries 2009) and congressional elections in the U.S. (Branton 2009). If this is also the case in South Africa, where Shubane and Stack (1999) observed ethnic voting in the national and provincial elections of 1999, these ethnic groups might be more likely to support the president's entitlement to disobey laws and court rulings that he does not agree with.

Summary and Preliminary Conclusions

In both the 2004 and 2008 rounds of data, the predictability of my measures of democratic values is low. This low predictability is problematic for drawing conclusions.⁴⁴ Even so, we can see that the amount of predictability increases between rounds for elections and lawmakers (1.4% to 1.6% and 1.2% to 2.1% respectively). However, the predictability of the influences on perspectives regarding the president's adhering to laws decreased between rounds (5.3% to 1.9%). The increase in predictability of elections and lawmakers indicates that in 2008, the structural indicators included in the models had more influence on democratic values than they did in 2004. However, the sharp decrease in predictability of the

⁴³ Scholars refer to post-Apartheid South Africa as the "new" South Africa (Butler 2004, Hendricks 2003).

⁴⁴ The models specified are statistically significant, so the following conclusions are based on statistical significance. Still, the conclusions should be interpreted cautiously since these significant indicators of democratic values are only accounting for a small portion of variation in each measure of democratic value.

value of the president's adhering to laws indicates that other factors influenced this particular measure in 2008. Again, the rumors of scandal and corruption in 2008 are likely to heavily influence perspectives regarding the president and his adherence to laws. However, another reason for the decrease could be that round 4 data include less cases (approximately 6% more cases are missing in round 4). Losing cases due to missing data is problematic and can lead to reduced statistical significance and affect predictability (Beale and Little 1975; Gupta and Lam 1996).

I found a similar decrease in predictability of perspectives on South African democracy between rounds as well. In 2004, the structural indicators accounted for 6.9% of the variation in assessment of the current state of democracy in South Africa and 6.4% of the variation in satisfaction with South Africa's democracy. This decreased to 3.4% and 1.6% respectively in 2008. Again, many cases were deleted due to missing data (approximately 39% total). Therefore, the declining predictability may be due to the loss of cases (Beale and Little 1975; Gupta and Lam 1996).⁴⁵ However, the decreases may also be observed here because the citizens used other means of evaluation for the state of democracy in South Africa.

Despite the low predictability, according to the data, South Africans vary in regards to democratic values measured in this study. In both 2004 and 2008, respondents agreed that leaders should be chosen through open elections. However, the other measures show less

⁴⁵ Additionally, there are likely to be other indicators of democracy. For example, I initially intended to include a measure of political party affiliation to these analyses but could not due to measurement error. Better measures of political party affiliation and activity would be helpful in accounting for the structural indicators of democratic ideals in South Africa.

devotion to democratic values. The respondents agreed that the National Assembly make the laws in 2004, but not in 2008. In addition, they did not agree that the president must obey the laws and the courts in either year. The only structural variable included in the models that has a significant influence on all of these democratic values is ethnicity. In the case of elections and lawmaking, the ethnic groups included in the study show higher democratic values than Afrikaaners, but lower levels of democratic value when it comes to the president obeying laws and the courts. In addition, ethnicity influenced the manner in which people evaluate South African democracy.

In 2004, membership with all of the ethnic groups (except “Other”) included in the study yielded a more positive definition of South African democracy when compared to Afrikaaners. However, in 2008, members of the ethnic groups included in the Xhosa and “European Other” categories reported a less positive definition of South African democracy than Afrikaaners, indicating that at least some groups detected some democratic deterioration in the country. Furthermore, the data suggest that South Africans are not very satisfied with the state of democracy in the nation.

This study suggests some very critical issues with the current state of democracy and the future of democratic governance in South Africa. For one, citizens are starting to view their nation as less democratic than they had in the past. Secondly, while they are not very satisfied with the state of South African democracy in either round, the level of satisfaction

also experienced a mild decrease between 2004 and 2008.⁴⁶ In addition, the lack of consistent agreement for lawmakers in the National Assembly to create laws is problematic, and the lack of agreement for the president's requirement to obey laws is frightening. Too often, presidents elected in sub-Saharan Africa have later become dictators (see: Mugabe in Zimbabwe and Taylor in Liberia, among others), amending laws as they see fit to meet their needs (Rotberg 2000). Therefore, the lack of agreement among citizens that the president should follow the law is a finding that should not be taken lightly by any policy managers within or external to South Africa.

These findings are also consistent with previous research on democracy which suggests that social class (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1982; Lipset 1981), education level (Finkel and Ernst 2005), and race and ethnicity (Davis 1998; Janara 2004; Nunnally 2012; Valadez 2001) influences democratic ideals and behaviors. However, they provide a unique perspective on democratic values and democratic evaluation. While these previous studies tend to focus on democracy in terms of voting behaviors (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1982), political party alliances (Davis 1998; Nunally 2012) or egalitarianism (Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Janara 2004; Karstedt 2006), this study pays particular attention to the values of holding open elections, allowing the lawmaking segment of the government to perform its role and holding all citizens accountable for following those laws. These are the aspects of

⁴⁶ The average for *SA Satisfaction Round 3* was 2.85. The average for *SA Satisfaction Round 4* was 2.53. On the scale ranging from 1-4, a 1 is "disapproval" and a 2 is "approval". Both mean values fall in between those ranges indicating neither approval nor disapproval. Again, the small decrease between rounds may not be significant due to the amount of missing data in both rounds (Acock 2005; Beale and Little 1975).

democracy that are clearly the most fundamental to its endurance, particularly in a representative democracy (Mill [1910] 2012).

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Introduction

Democratic government is argued by classical democratic theorists (Locke [1690] 2002, Mill [1859] 2007) to be the best form of governance. However the stability of governance in newly formed democratic nations is questionable. Based on the argument that political stability is, at least in part, a result of state legitimacy (Margolis 2010; Rousseau [1762]2007; Sztompka 1999), this study analyzes trust and legitimacy in South Africa in an attempt to explore the plausibility of political stability in the nation. Social contract theorists argue that the role of the state is to develop and maintain civil liberty in place of individual freedom (Hobbes [1651] 2008; Locke [1690] 2002; Rousseau [1762] 2007), and citizens evaluate the legitimacy of the state based on this criterion (Rousseau [1762] 2007). Previous studies on trust find that increased trust among individuals leads society toward a culture of trust, which is necessary for the legitimization of the state, its policies and institutions (Sztompka 1999) and that there are several factors that are specific to the individual including race or ethnic identity, financial or economic position, generation or age, and location (Anderson 2010; Davis 1998; Flora and Flora 2008; Herreros and Criado 2008; Lau and Redlawsk 2008; Mattes 2012; Mozaffar 2002; Nunnally 1012; Valadez 2001; Zeitlin 1967)

As these previous theories have argued, legitimacy is influenced by trust, and in multicultural societies, it is also influenced by structural factors, including but not limited to,

racial and ethnic antagonisms (Anderson 2010; Hetherington 1998; Sztompka 1999; Nunnally 2012; Valadez 2001). South Africa is an ideal context to investigate these relationships because it is a newly-democratic, multicultural society. Therefore, in this study, I have used Afrobarometer data to explore the structural influences of trust, the impact of trust on political approval and the structural influences on representative democratic values in South Africa to tease out the viability of political stability in that nation and in other post-colonial, newly democratic nations.

Summary of Conclusions

The first outcome of interest of my research is trust. The Afrobarometer data suggest that South Africans do not show high levels of trust for each other or for their government. Not surprisingly, their trust is influenced by many factors, including socioeconomic status, age, locale, ethnicity and religion. However, according to the analyses, ethnicity is the one influence that is significant on both measures of trust in each round of data. In addition, the stronger the national identity, the more likely respondents were to trust the government. Further, national identity influences the relationship between ethnicity and government trust. These findings are in line with the theories and studies of social contract theorists, who have found in previous studies that social and political trust is influenced by socioeconomic status (Herrerros and Criado 2008), age (Lau and Redlawsk 2008; Mattes 2012), locale (Flora and Flora 2008; Luloff and Bridger 2003), ethnicity (Davis 1998; Nunnally 2012) and national identity (Brown 2001; Dzur 2012).

Political approval is also influenced by a variety of factors. Most importantly, the analyses suggest that increased trust in fellow South Africans, as well as increased trust in the South African government, leads to positive assessments of political offices and policies. In addition, membership in ethnic groups other than Afrikaaner increases approval of political leaders and policies. So, we can see that trust and ethnicity are the prevailing influences on political attitudes, as suggested by previous studies (Abaramowitz 1989b; Anderson 2010; Hetherington 1998). This is important because, as I argue, political attitudes are essential indicators for state legitimacy.

The findings also suggest that South Africans vary in terms of their evaluation of democracy in South Africa and in terms of their representative democratic values. While many South Africans describe the South African state as a democracy with minor problems, they are not very satisfied with the state of democracy in the nation, which seems somewhat contradictory. Furthermore, they agree that elections are an important part of the democracy, but waver when it comes to the National Assembly's role of creating laws. Even more alarming is that they do not agree that the president should obey the laws and courts. The only structural variable analyzed in the study that significantly influences both the assessment of South African democracy and representative democratic values is ethnicity. However, the ethnic groups in the analyses reported higher levels of value for representative democratic values open elections and lawmaking rights of the National Assembly, but lower levels of value for the president to obey laws when compared to Afrikaaners.

Although the differences between the two rounds of data used in this study are not directly comparable, they indicate that state-citizen relationships in South Africa may be changing. The data analyzed from 2004 show higher levels of general and government trust than the data analyzed from 2008. Additionally, and perhaps correspondingly, political approval levels in the data are higher in 2004 than they are in 2008. In 2004, South Africans disapproved of economic policies, but approved of their governing offices and social policies. In 2008, they disapproved of both economic and social policies and neither approved or disapproved of the governing offices. Additionally, in 2004, South Africans agreed that leaders should be chosen through elections and that the National Assembly should make the laws for the nation but did not agree that the president should obey the laws and courts. In 2008, they continued to agree that leaders should be chosen through elections, but did not agree that the National Assembly should make laws or that the president should obey the laws and courts. So, it appears that trust, political approval and representative democratic values decreased in the four year period from 2004-2008. However, because the data are cross-sectional, the results between rounds cannot be directly compared. Instead, these discussions of changes between rounds of data are speculative.

Limitations

This study evaluates political stability based on trust, political approval and representative democratic process values. I recognize that there are likely other means of conceptualizing factors that influence political stability. These might include perceived and

actual corruption by government offices and officials (Rothstein and Eek 2009), an ongoing problem throughout sub-Saharan Africa, including South Africa (Bearak 2009; de Sardan 1999, Lodge 1988, Silke 2009). In addition, external factors that constrain the state's ability to satisfy the needs or desires of its citizens may impact the stability of the political structure. There is an abundance of research that examines the impact that the changing global economy has on state autonomy, arguing that the state's power is constrained by global markets (Harvey 2006, McMichael 2004, Robinson 2003, Sklair 2001).

Additionally, the variables that I have used to assess trust, political approval, and representative democratic values are limited by the data available. As a secondary investigator, I have no control over the differences between included survey measures between rounds of data collected (Kupek 1999). In addition, the variables that I use in this study to measure representative democratic values differ from those employed in other studies (see: Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Janara 2004; Karstedt 2006), which were not available to me through Afrobarometer. Also, while I would have liked to include an evaluation of race and of political party affiliation on my measures of trust, political approval and representative democratic values, the Afrobarometer measures of each were flawed and could not be used. These are unfortunate common issues with using secondary data.

Throughout this study, I encountered low adjusted r-squares for my models. My models only accounted for roughly 4% of the variation in general trust. Likewise, the models for the analysis of the value of elections predicted less than 2% of the variation, and the models measuring the variation of the other measures of representative democratic values

and the state of democracy in South Africa only accounted for less than 10% of the variation of each. One reason for the low predictability could be that my measures of trust, representative democratic values and the state of democracy do not account for the complex perspectives among the respondents included in the analyses. Another likely possibility is that the structural indicators that I have included in these analyses do not have as much influence in South Africa as they have in previous studies conducted in other regions of the world. South Africa, like many other sub-Saharan African countries, has had a unique history of colonization, racial and ethnic turmoil and political instability. An additional explanation for the low predictability is that many cases were lost throughout these analyses due to missing data (between 32% and 63% of observations are missing at least one variable in each empirical analysis). Many of the deleted cases were missing responses to the dependent variables included in the analyses; however there was little commonality among the missing cases in terms of the structural indicators. The loss of cases due to missing data is problematic and can lead to reduced statistical significance and affect predictability (Beale and Little 1975; Gupta and Lam 1996). Regardless of the reason, because of the low adjusted r-squares, my results should be interpreted cautiously since these significant indicators of the dependent variables are only accounting for a small portion of variation in each measure.

Cross-sectional data are limited in their ability to establish a time-sequence of events (dos Santos Silva 1999). Although examining these relationships using cross-sectional data opens up the possibility for the causal relationships to be reversed, previously established theory and research suggests that trust is the causal determiner of political attitudes

(Abramowitz 1989b; Anderson 2010; Hetherington 1998; Luhman 1988; Sztompka 1999). In addition, cross-sectional data tend to have a large unit of analysis and do not have attrition problems like longitudinal and panel data, which lose cases over time (Liu 2008).

Additionally, I encountered multicollinearity problems between my second-order variables in my interaction models. Although mean-centering and trimming the models was sufficient for reducing the multicollinearity to within acceptable levels of VIF and tolerance, it is worth noting that acceptable levels of VIF and tolerance are controversial and that the levels used in this analysis are common but relaxed compared to others used by researchers (Garson 2012; O'Brien 2007). If multicollinearity exists, the result would be inflated standard errors and a likelihood to commit Type II error which would result in my mistakenly rejecting hypotheses. Based on the varying limits for tolerance and VIF, it is possible that multicollinearity persists in these analyses and therefore the rejection of hypotheses should be interpreted cautiously.

Implications

Despite its limitations, this study points out the pervasiveness of ethnic influence in South Africa. Of the significant indicators, ethnicity is the only influence that was consistent through both years of data collection. Ethnicity influenced each measure of trust, political approval and democracy. Its effect remained significant even with the inclusion of other variables theorized to impact political attitudes and behaviors. As Davis, Nunnally and Valadez found, an individual's racial or ethnic background did affect his or her ability to trust others and have faith in governing bodies (Davis 1998; Nunnally 2012; Valadez 2001). In

addition, as found in Rydgren (2007) and Zeitlin's (1967) work in central and South America, racial and ethnic identities and antagonisms influenced political attitudes and behaviors in the context of South Africa as well.

Previously, trust had been determined to influence political attitudes and behaviors in the U.S., Europe, and South America (Abramowitz 1989b; Anderson 2010; Hetherington 1998; Hetherington and Husser 2012; Luhmann 1979), and this study extends the geographic regions to include sub-Saharan Africa. These findings also further previous research on democracy which suggests that social class (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1982; Lipset 1981), education level (Finkel and Ernst 2005), and race and ethnicity (Davis 1998; Janara 2004; Nunnally 2012; Valadez 2001) influences democratic ideals and behaviors by extending the measurements of democratic attitudes and behaviors to include the values of holding open elections, allowing the lawmaking segment of the government to perform its role and holding all citizens accountable for following those laws.

The analyses expand the geographical area and types of measures used to investigate the relationships. This is important because extending the scope of information regarding political stability to a new geographic area, sub-Saharan Africa, allows us to understand the social and political similarities and differences between this region and others that have been previously studied. Also, the analyses expand the variety of measures used to investigate the relationships. For example, Davis (1998) and Nunnally's (2012) works focused on the influences of race, while this study investigated the influence of ethnicities specific to South Africa. In addition, while previous studies have investigated democratic values in terms of

voting behaviors (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1982), political party alliances (Davis 1998; Nunally 2012) or egalitarianism (Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Janara 2004; Karstedt 2006), the measures of democratic values in this study speak to the fundamental aspects of democratic stability in a representative democracy (Mill [1910] 2012).

This study contributes to theorization on sociopolitical development and the dynamic relationships between state and citizens. The investigation into state-citizen trust will further academic discussions regarding the social contract and the application of social capital to democratic advancement. Social contract theory provides useful information on traditional state-citizen relationships, and this study updates the theory to accurately discuss the relationship in post-colonial societies. In addition, the importance of social capital on economic mobility is widely acknowledged (Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1973; Lin 2001; Putnam 2000), but its application to the sociopolitical realm is just emerging. The results of this study are consistent with the emphasis that social capital researchers place on the role of trust in maintaining social cohesion. Thus, it furthers the discussion of the influence that trust has on political relationships and democratic stability, particularly in the context of a newly emerging democratic nation. Further, while classical democratic theory focuses on participation as the means of achieving civil liberty (Locke [1690] 2002; Mill [1859] 2007; Pateman 1970; Rousseau [1762] 2007), this study introduces an account of the attitudes of the citizens toward the fundamentals of representative democracy. This is important because as democratic theorists pay attention to the participatory behaviors of citizens, they should

also investigate citizens' perspectives regarding the policies that embody representative democracy.

Social contract theory and classical democratic theory speak directly to issues of political legitimacy, the role of the state and the duties of the citizens. Social capital theory deals with relationships, interactions and the development of trust. This study is designed to integrate each of these theories around my central argument that citizen trust impacts state legitimacy. The convergence of the theories helps us to gain a better understanding of the complicated relationship between states and citizens. Understanding the complexities of these relationships helps us to better evaluate the plausibility of political stability in similar contexts and provides a new base for which future studies can aim to evaluate political legitimacy and stability.

The findings of this study also have policy implications. Understanding the pervasiveness of the influence of racial and ethnic identity on social and political trust in post-colonial societies helps us focus the attention of policy makers on the issues that are most important to varying racial and ethnic groups in newly democratic societies. In addition, policy makers, who are working to maintain political stability, will benefit from the confirmation that they must appeal to the trust of their citizens in order to develop and maintain positive political attitudes. Furthermore, the lack of agreement among citizens that the president should follow the law should not be taken lightly by any policy managers within or external to South Africa.

There are several measures that policy makers could use to reduce racial or ethnic uncertainty. Many of these have already been undertaken as part of the image of the “rainbow nation”, including declaring eleven official national languages and attempts at land redistribution (Henricks 2003; Lahiff 2008; Sparks 2003). The land redistribution policies, decentralized in 2000 (Lahiff 2008), might also encourage community participation and result in the development of the social networks that social capital theorists argue generate trust (Anderson 2010; Coleman 1988; Flora and Flora 2008; Granovetter 1973; Putnam 2000). In addition, education on the processes of representative democracy will help future generations understand the roles of each branch of government and increase democratic attitudes, as Finkel and Ernst (2005) contend. As a result, citizens will learn that laws passed by the National Assembly should be followed by all citizens, including the president. With time, gaining this understanding should help dissuade the likelihood of the development of dictatorship in South Africa.

Future Research

Examining South Africa’s path toward stable social and political development may provide lessons for the many nations that struggle with a similar challenge of competing globally while fostering citizen trust and participation domestically. Future research should play a key part in determining the particular influences of political legitimacy in various nations and developing strategies to create and maintain it. This study establishes trust as an important influence on political approval and ethnicity as a critical influence on trust.

However, future research should investigate the existence of these relationships in other nations that have similar histories of racial and ethnic antagonisms to determine if there are commonalities.

Additionally, future studies should investigate these questions of trust, political approval and representative democratic values through qualitative research in order to tease out distinctions. While this quantitative study illustrates broad relationships between the variables investigated, in-depth interviews would provide a medium to explore the contradictions and tensions involved in trust relationships, political attitudes and democratic ideals. In addition, collecting primary data through qualitative methods would help reduce the aforementioned issues with using secondary data – particularly the problems with limited variables to choose from and missing information.

Furthermore, advanced capitalist society is still in a legitimacy crisis since the state cannot at the same time satisfy the demands of the average citizen and aid the corporation in capitalist profit accumulation (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1982). Previous research supports this assertion by arguing that the changing global economy has an impact on state autonomy (Harvey 2006, McMichael 2004, Robinson 2003, Sklair 2006). Therefore, a critical examination of global capitalism and its effects on political legitimacy is warranted. Future studies should consider how restricted state autonomy is perceived and experienced by citizens.

In conclusion, this study has examined the perspectives of South African citizens in an effort to understand the political viability in that nation and in other post-colonial,

democratic societies. It is clear from this analysis that ethnic identity continues to be a forcible influence on representative democratic values and trust. Trust, in turn, impacts political approval. Therefore, both ethnicity and trust are the foremost factors influencing political legitimacy, and ultimately, political stability.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Table 3.1: Afrobarometer Round 3 Variables

Dependent Variables
General Trust Index
Q84b. Trust neighbors
Q84c. Trust people in your ethnic group
Q84d. Trust people in other ethnic groups
Government Trust Index
Q55a. Trust the President
Q55b. Trust the National Assembly
Q55c. Trust the national electoral commission
Q55e. Trust the ruling party
Approval of Government Offices Index
Q68a. Performance: President
Q68b. Performance: National Assembly rep
Approval of Government Economic Policies Index
Q65a. Handling managing economy
Q65b. Handling creating jobs
Q65c. Handling keeping prices stable
Q65d. Handling narrowing income gap
Q65e. Handling reducing crime
Approval of Government Social Policies Index
Q65f. Handling improving health care
Q65g. Handling educational needs
Q65h. Handling delivering water
Q65i. Handling ensuring enough to eat
Q65j. Handling fighting corruption
Q65k. Handling combatting HIV/AIDS
Q65m_SAF. Handling uniting South Africa
Q65n_SAF. Handling welfare payments
Q65o_SAF. Handling responding to Zimbabwe
Democracy Indicators
Q38. Choose Leaders through elections vs other methods
Q40. National Assembly makes laws vs president does
Q41. President free to act vs obey the laws and courts
Q46. Extent of democracy
Q47. Satisfaction with democracy
Independent Variables
Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit
Q1. Age
Q79. Tribe or ethnic group
Q82. Ethnic or national identity
Q90. Education of respondent
Q91. Religion of respondent
Q94. Employment status
Q101. Gender of respondent
Q102. Race of respondent

Table 3.2 Afrobarometer Round 4 Variables

Dependent Variables
General Trust Index
Q84b. Trust people you know
Q84c. Trust other South Africans
Q84d_saf. Trust foreigners living in South Africa
Government Trust Index
Q49a. Trust President Molanthe
Q49a2_saf. Trust President Zuma
Q49b. Trust the National Assembly
Q49c. Trust the national electoral commission
Q49e. Trust the ruling party
Approval of Government Offices Index
Q70d_saf. Performance: President Molanthe
Q70b. Performance: National Assembly rep
Approval of Government Economic Policies Index
Q57a. Handling managing economy
Q57c. Handling creating jobs
Q57d. Handling keeping prices stable
Q57e. Handling narrowing income gap
Q57f. Handling reducing crime
Approval of Government Social Policies Index
Q57g. Handling improving health care
Q57h. Handling educational needs
Q57i. Handling providing water and sanitation
Q57j. Handling ensuring enough to eat
Q57k. Handling fighting corruption
Q57l. Handling combatting HIV/AIDS
Q57q_SAF. Handling uniting South Africa
Q57r_SAF. Handling welfare payments
Q57s_SAF. Handling responding to Zimbabwe
Democracy Indicators
Q31. Choose Leaders through elections vs other methods
Q36. National Assembly makes laws vs president does
Q37. President free to act vs obey the laws and courts
Q42a. Extent of democracy
Q43. Satisfaction with democracy
Independent Variables
Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit
Q1. Age
Q79. Tribe or ethnic group
Q83. Ethnic or national identity
Q89. Education of respondent
Q90. Religion of respondent
Q94. Employment status
Q101. Gender of respondent
Q102. Race of respondent

Table 3.3: Afrobarometer Round 3 Survey Questions

Variable	Label	Question	Values
urbrur	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	PSU/EA	1=Urban, 2=Rural <i>Note:</i> Answered by interviewer
Q1	Age	How old are you?	18-110, 998=Refused to Answer, 999=Don't Know, -1=Missing Data
Q38	Choose Leaders through elections vs other methods	Let's change the subject. I would like to hear your views about how this country is governed. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. A: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections. B: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.	1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very Strongly with B, 5=Agree with Neither, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data <i>Note:</i> Interviewer probed for strength of opinion asking "Do you agree or agree very strongly?"
Q40	National Assembly makes laws vs president does	Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. A: The members of the National Assembly represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree. B: Since the President represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what the National Assembly thinks.	1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very Strongly with B, 5=Agree with Neither, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data <i>Note:</i> Interviewer probed for strength of opinion asking "Do you agree or agree very strongly?"

Table 3.3 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q41	President free to act vs obey the laws and courts	Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. A: Since the President was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong. B: The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong.	1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very Strongly with B, 5=Agree with Neither, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data <i>Note:</i> Interviewer probed for strength of opinion asking "Do you agree or agree very strongly?"
Q46	Extent of democracy	In your opinion how much of a democracy is South Africa today?	1=Not a democracy, 2=A democracy, with major problems, 3=A democracy, but with minor problems, 4=A full democracy, 8=Do not understand question/democracy, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q47	Satisfaction with democracy	Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa?	0=South Africa is not a democracy, 1=Not at All Satisfied, 2=Not Very Satisfied, 3=Fairly Satisfied, 4=Very Satisfied, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q55a	Trust the President	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The President?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q55b	Trust National Assembly	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The National Assembly?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q55c	Trust nat. electoral commission	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Independent Electoral Commission?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q55e	Trust the ruling party	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Table 3.3 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q65a	Handling managing economy	Now let's speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Managing the economy?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65b	Handling creating jobs	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Creating jobs?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65c	Handling keeping prices stable	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Keeping prices stable?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65d	Handling narrowing income gap	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65f	Handling improving health care	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Improving basic health services?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65g	Handling educational needs	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Addressing educational needs?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65h	Handling delivering water	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Delivering household water?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Table 3.3 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q65i	Handling ensuring enough to eat	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Ensuring everyone has enough to eat?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65j	Handling fighting corruption	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Fighting corruption in government?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65k	Handling combatting HIV/AIDS	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Combating HIV/AIDS?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65m_SAF	Handling uniting South Africa	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Uniting all South Africans into one nation?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65n_SAF	Handling welfare payments	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Distributing welfare payments to those who are entitled to them (such as old age pensions, disability pensions, child maintenance grants)?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q65o_SAF	Handling responding to Zimbabwe	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Responding to the situation in Zimbabwe?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Table 3.3 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q68a	Performance: President	Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: President Mbeki?	1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q68b	Performance: Nat. Assembly rep	Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The representatives to the National Assembly?	1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q79	Tribe or ethnic group	What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group.	100=Afrikaans/Afrikaner/Boer, 101=Ndebele, 102=Xhosa, 103=Pedi/Spedi/North Sotho, 104=Sesotho/Sotho/South Sotho, 105=Setswana/Tswana, 106=Shangaan, 107=Swazi, 108=Venda, 109=Zulu, 110=Other White/European, 111=Coloured, 112=Indian, 113=English, 990=National identity only, 995=Other, 998=Refused to Answer, 999=Don't Know, -1=Missing data
Q82	Ethnic or national identity	Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a South African and being a _____ [respondent's identity group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?	1=I Feel Only (r's group), 2=I Feel More (r's group) than South African, 3=I Feel Equally South African and (r's groups), 4=I Feel More South African than (r's groups), 5=I feel only South African, 7=Not Applicable, 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q84b	Trust neighbors	How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Your neighbors?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=I trust them somewhat, 3=I trust them a lot, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q84c	Trust people in your ethnic group	How much do you trust each of the following types of people: People from your own ethnic group?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=I trust them somewhat, 3=I trust them a lot, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Table 3.3 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q84d	Trust people in other ethnic groups	How much do you trust each of the following types of people: South Africans from other ethnic groups?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=I trust them somewhat, 3=I trust them a lot, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q90	Education of respondent	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary school/ High school, 5=Secondary school completed/High school, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a technical/polytechnic/college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate, 98=Refused to Answer, 99=Don't Know, -1=Missing Data
Q91	Religion of respondent	What is your religion, if any?	0=None, 2=Catholic, 3=Protestant (Mainstream), 4=Protestant (Evangelical/Pentecostal), 5=African Independent Church, 6=Traditional religion, 7=Hindu, 8=Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God), 9=Atheist (Do not believe in a God), 10=Christian (General), 11=Muslim, Sunni, 12=Muslim, Shiite, 13=Jehovah's Witness, 14=Seventh Day Adventist/Mormon, 995=Other, 998=Refused to Answer, 999=Don't Know, -1=Missing Data
Q94	Employment status	Do you have a job that pays a cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)?	0=No (not looking), 1=No (looking), 2=Yes, part time (not looking), 3=Yes, part time (looking), 4=Yes, full time (not looking), 5=Yes, full time (looking), 9=Don't Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q101	Gender of respondent	Respondent's gender	1=Male, 2=Female <i>Note:</i> Answered by interviewer
Q102	Race of respondent	Respondent's race	1=Black/Africa, 2=White/European, 3=Coloured/Mixed race, 4=Arab/Lebanese/North Africa, 5=South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, etc.), 6=East Asian(Chinese, Korean, Indonesian, etc.), Other=95. <i>Note:</i> Answered by interviewer

Table 3.4: Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey Questions

Variable	Label	Question	Values
urbrur	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	PSU/EA	1=Urban, 2=Rural <i>Note:</i> Answered by interviewer
Q1	Age	How old are you?	18-110, 998=Refused to Answer, 999=Don't Know, -1=Missing Data
Q31	Choose Leaders through elections vs other methods	Let's change the subject. I would like to hear your views about how this country is governed. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. 1: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections. 2: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.	1=Agree Very Strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree Very Strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with Neither, 9=Don't Know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data <i>Note:</i> Interviewer probed for strength of opinion asking "Do you agree or agree very strongly?"
Q36	National Assembly makes laws vs president does	Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. 1: The members of the National Assembly represent the people; therefore they should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree. 2: Since the President represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what the National Assembly thinks.	1=Agree Very Strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree Very Strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with Neither, 9=Don't Know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data <i>Note:</i> Interviewer probed for strength of opinion asking "Do you agree or agree very strongly?"

Table 3.4 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q37	President free to act vs obey the laws and courts	Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. 1: Since the President was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong. 2: The President must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong.	1=Agree Very Strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree Very Strongly with Statement 2, 5=Agree with Neither, 9=Don't Know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data <i>Note:</i> Interviewer probed for strength of opinion asking "Do you agree or agree very strongly?"
Q42a	Extent of democracy	In your opinion how much of a democracy is South Africa today?	1=Not a democracy, 2=A democracy, with major problems, 3=A democracy, but with minor problems, 4=A full democracy, 8=Do not understand question/democracy, 9=Don't Know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q43	Satisfaction with democracy	Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa?	0=South Africa is not a democracy, 1=Not at All Satisfied, 2=Not Very Satisfied, 3=Fairly Satisfied, 4=Very Satisfied, 9=Don't Know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q49a	Trust the President	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The new president, Kgalema Molanthe?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q492_saf	Trust the President	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The president of the ANC, Jacob Zuma?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q49b	Trust National Assembly	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The National Assembly?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q49c	Trust nat. electoral commission	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Independent Electoral Commission?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Table 3.4 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q49e	Trust the ruling party	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57a	Handling managing economy	Now let's speak about the performance of the former Mbeki government. How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Managing the economy?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57c	Handling creating jobs	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Creating jobs?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57d	Handling keeping prices stable	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Keeping prices down?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57e	Handling narrowing income gap	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57f	Handling reducing crime	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Reducing crime?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57g	Handling improving health care	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Improving basic health services?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Table 3.4 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q57h	Handling educational needs	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Addressing educational needs?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57i	Handling providing water and sanitation services	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Providing water and sanitation services?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57j	Handling ensuring enough to eat	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Ensuring everyone has enough to eat?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57k	Handling fighting corruption	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Fighting corruption in government?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57l	Handling combatting HIV/AIDS	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Combating HIV/AIDS?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57q_saf	Handling uniting South Africa	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Uniting all South Africans into one nation?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data

Table 3.4 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q57r_saf	Handling welfare payments	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Distributing welfare payments to those who are entitled to them (such as old age pensions, disability pensions, child support grants)?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q57s_saf	Handling responding to Zimbabwe	How well or badly would you say the former Mbeki government was handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Responding to the situation in Zimbabwe?	1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q70d_saf	Performance: President	And do you approve or disapprove of the way that the new President Kgalema Motlanthe has performed his job since taking office in September?	1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q70b	Performance: Nat. Assembly rep	Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The representatives to the National Assembly?	1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve, 9=Don't Know/Haven't heard enough, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q79	Tribe or ethnic group	What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group.	700= English, 701= Afrikaans / Afrikaner / Boer, 702= Ndebele, 703= Xhosa, 704=Pedi/Spedi/North Sotho, 705=Sesotho/ Sotho/South Sotho, 706=Setswana/Tswana, 707=Shangaan, 708=Swazi, 709=Venda, 710=Zulu, 711=White / European, 712=Coloured, 713=Indian, 990=South African only or doesn't think in those terms, 995=Others 998=Refused to answer, 999=Don't know, -1=Missing data

Table 3.4 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q83	Ethnic or national identity	Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a South African and being a _____ [R's Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?	1=I Feel Only (r's ethnic group), 2=I Feel More (r's ethnic group) than South African, 3=I Feel Equally South African and (r's ethnic group), 4=I Feel More South African than (r's ethnic group), 5=I feel only South African, 7=Not Applicable, 9=Don't Know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q84b	Trust other people you know	How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other people you know?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=I trust them somewhat, 3=I trust them a lot, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q84c	Trust other South Africans	How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other South Africans?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=I trust them somewhat, 3=I trust them a lot, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q84d	Trust foreigners living here in SAF	How much do you trust each of the following types of people: And what about foreigners living here in South Africa?	0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=I trust them somewhat, 3=I trust them a lot, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q89	Education of respondent	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some secondary school/ high school, 5=Secondary school completed/high school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate, 99=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data

Table 3.4 Continued

Variable	Label	Question	Values
Q90	Religion of respondent	What is your religion, if any?	0=None, 1=Christian only (i.e., respondents says only “Christian”, without identifying a specific subgroup), 2=Roman Catholic, 3=Orthodox, 4=Coptic, 5=Anglican, 6=Lutheran, 7=Methodist, 8=Presbyterian, 9=Baptist , 10=Quaker/Friends, 11=Mennonite, 12=Evangelical, 13=Pentecostal (e.g., “Born Again” and/or “Saved”), 14=Independent (e.g., “African Independent Church”), 15=Jehovah’s Witness, 16=Seventh Day Adventist, 17=Mormon, 18=Muslim only (i.e., respondents says only “Muslim”, without identifying a specific subgroup), 19=Sunni only (i.e., respondents says only “Sunni Muslim”, without identifying a specific sub-group), 20=Ismaeli, 21=Mouridiya Brotherhood, 22=Tijaniya Brotherhood, 23=Qadiriya Brotherhood, 24=Shia, 25=Traditional/ethnic religion, 26=Hindu, 27=Bahai, 28=Agnostic (Do not know if there is a God) , 29=Atheist (Do not believe in a God), 995=Other, 998=Refused to answer, 999=Don’t know, -1=Missing data
Q94	Employment status	Do you have a job that pays a cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)?	0=No (not looking), 1=No (looking), 2=Yes, part time (not looking), 3=Yes, part time (looking), 4=Yes, full time (not looking), 5=Yes, full time (looking), 9=Don’t Know, 998=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data
Q101	Gender of respondent	Respondent’s gender	1=Male, 2=Female <i>Note:</i> Answered by interviewer
Q102	Race of respondent	Respondent’s race	1=Black/Africa, 2=White/European, 3=Coloured/Mixed race, 4=Arab/Lebanese/North Africa, 5=South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, etc.), 6=East Asian(Chinese, Korean, Indonesian, etc.), Other=95, -1=Missing Data <i>Note:</i> Answered by interviewer

Table 3.5: Study 1, Round 3 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>General Trust Round 3</i>	4.35	2.59	0	9
Trust Neighbors	1.61	1.02	0	3
Trust Ethnic Group	1.54	1.01	0	3
Trust Others	1.20	.977	0	3
<i>Government Trust Round 3</i>	4.99	2.20	0	8
Trust President Mbeki	1.41	.670	0	2
Trust National Assembly	1.14	.638	0	2
Trust Electoral Commission	1.21	.669	0	2
Trust Ruling Party	1.23	.682	0	2
<i>Education</i>				
HS	.438	.496	0	1
No HS	.562	.496	0	1
<i>Employment Status</i>				
Employed	.397	.489	0	1
Unemployed	.603	.489	0	1
<i>Age (logged)</i>	3.60	.384	2.89	4.50
<i>Age</i>	39.6	15.3	18	90
<i>Ethnic Group</i>				
Afrikaaner	.086	.280	0	1
Xhosa	.190	.392	0	1
Pedi	.083	.276	0	1
Sesotho	.103	.304	0	1
Setswana	.090	.287	0	1
Zulu	.198	.398	0	1
African Other	.117	.321	0	1
European Other	.127	.333	0	1
Other	.007	.082	0	1
<i>Locale</i>				
Urban	.621	.485	0	1
Rural	.379	.485	0	1

Table 3.5 Continued

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Gender</i>				
Male	.513	.500	0	1
Female	.487	.500	0	1
<i>Religion</i>				
Christian	.574	.495	0	1
Religious Other	.426	.495	0	1
<i>Identity</i>				
	3.99	1.17	1	5

Note: N= 1792

Table 3.6: Study 2, Round 3 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Approval of Offices Round 3</i>	5.84	1.56	2	8
President Mbeki	3.05	.903	1	4
National Assembly Representative	2.79	.823	1	4
<i>Approval of Economic Policies Round 3</i>	11.4	3.44	5	20
Managing Economy	2.97	.932	1	4
Creating Jobs	1.94	.924	1	4
Keeping Prices Stable	2.33	.908	1	4
Narrowing Income Gaps	2.14	.921	1	4
Reducing Crime	2.18	1.01	1	4
<i>Approval of Social Policies Round 3</i>	25.2	5.85	9	36
Improving Health Services	2.79	.921	1	4
Addressing Educational Needs	2.96	.853	1	4
Delivering Household Water	2.85	.944	1	4
Ensuring Enough to Eat	2.52	.970	1	4
Fighting Corruption	2.45	1.04	1	4
Combating HIV/AIDS	2.70	.999	1	4
Uniting All South Africans	2.97	.920	1	4
Distributing Welfare Payments	3.30	.881	1	4
Responding to Zimbabwe Situation	2.64	.950	1	4
<i>General Trust Round 3</i>	4.32	2.60	0	9
Trust Neighbors	1.59	1.01	0	3
Trust Ethnic Group	1.51	1.02	0	3
Trust Others	1.22	.979	0	3
<i>Government Trust Round 3</i>	4.98	2.19	0	8
Trust President Mbeki	1.39	.677	0	2
Trust National Assembly	1.16	.633	0	2
Trust Electoral Commission	1.21	.671	0	2
Trust Ruling Party	1.22	.676	0	2
<i>Education</i>				
HS	.473	.499	0	1
No HS	.527	.499	0	1

Table 3.6 Continued				
Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Employment Status</i>				
Employed	.431	.495	0	1
Unemployed	.569	.495	0	1
<i>Age (logged)</i>	3.59	.381	2.89	4.50
<i>Age</i>	39.1	15.2	18	90
<i>Ethnic Group</i>				
Afrikaaner	.096	.295	0	1
Xhosa	.151	.358	0	1
Pedi	.092	.289	0	1
Sesotho	.128	.335	0	1
Setswana	.097	.295	0	1
Zulu	.196	.397	0	1
African Other	.126	.332	0	1
European Other	.112	.316	0	1
Other	.003	.052	0	1
<i>Locale</i>				
Urban	.663	.473	0	1
Rural	.337	.473	0	1
<i>Gender</i>				
Male	.523	.500	0	1
Female	.477	.500	0	1
<i>Religion</i>				
Christian	.602	.490	0	1
Religious Other	.398	.490	0	1
<i>Identity</i>	4.07	1.15	1	5

Note: N=1129

Table 3.7: Study 3, Round 3 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Elections Round 3</i>	1.63	.804	1	4
<i>Lawmakers Round 3</i>	2.06	.856	1	4
<i>Laws Round 3</i>	2.15	.930	1	4
<i>SA Democracy Round 3</i>	2.98	.822	1	4
<i>SA Satisfaction Round 3</i>	2.85	.912	1	4
<i>Education</i>				
HS	.464	.499	0	1
No HS	.536	.499	0	1
<i>Employment Status</i>				
Employed	.409	.492	0	1
Unemployed	.591	.492	0	1
<i>Age (logged)</i>	3.59	.378	2.89	4.50
<i>Age</i>	38.9	15.0	18	90
<i>Locale</i>				
Urban	.622	.485	0	1
Rural	.378	.485	0	1
<i>Ethnic Group</i>				
Afrikaaner	.078	.269	0	1
Xhosa	.196	.397	0	1
Pedi	.090	.287	0	1
Sesotho	.088	.284	0	1
Setswana	.096	.295	0	1
Zulu	.196	.397	0	1
African Other	.109	.312	0	1
European Other	.141	.348	0	1
Other	.004	.068	0	1

Table 3.7 Continued

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Gender</i>				
Male	.492	.500	0	1
Female	.508	.500	0	1
<i>Religion</i>				
Christian	.573	.495	0	1
Religion Other	.427	.495	0	1
<i>Identity</i>	4.03	1.16	1	5

Note: N=1508

Table 3.8: Study 1, Round 4 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>General Trust Round 4</i>	3.37	2.16	0	9
Trust Other People	1.53	.899	0	3
Trust Other South Africans	1.23	.900	0	3
Trust Foreigners	.611	.861	0	3
<i>Government Trust 1 Round 4</i>	3.99	1.96	0	8
<i>Government Trust 2 Round 4</i>	4.03	2.02	0	8
Trust President Molanthe	.885	.676	0	2
Trust President Zuma	.926	.796	0	2
Trust National Assembly	.971	.604	0	2
Trust Electoral Commission	1.09	.660	0	2
Trust Ruling Party	1.04	.708	0	2
<i>Education</i>				
HS	.489	.500	0	1
No HS	.511	.500	0	1
<i>Employment Status</i>				
Employed	.504	.500	0	1
Unemployed	.496	.500	0	1
<i>Age (logged)</i>	3.53	.361	2.89	4.57
<i>Age</i>	36.6	13.6	18	97
<i>Ethnic Group</i>				
Afrikaaner	.134	.341	0	1
Xhosa	.166	.373	0	1
Pedi	.056	.230	0	1
Sesotho	.072	.258	0	1
Setswana	.115	.319	0	1
Zulu	.169	.375	0	1
African Other	.109	.312	0	1
European Other	.175	.380	0	1
Other	.004	.059	0	1

Table 3.8 Continued

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Locale</i>				
Urban	.663	.473	0	1
Rural	.337	.473	0	1
<i>Gender</i>				
Male	.508	.500	0	1
<hr/>				
Female	.492	.500	0	1
<i>Religion</i>				
Christian	.354	.478	0	1
Religious Other	.646	.478	0	1
<i>Identity</i>				
	3.96	1.19	1	5

Note: N=1142

Table 3.9: Study 2, Round 4 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Approval of Offices Round 4</i>	5.11	1.52	2	8
President Molanthe	2.56	.929	1	4
National Assembly Representative	2.55	.879	1	4
<i>Approval of Economic Policies Round 4</i>	10.5	3.73	5	20
Managing Economy	2.41	1.00	1	4
Creating Jobs	2.09	.960	1	4
Keeping Prices Stable	1.97	.967	1	4
Narrowing Income Gaps	2.03	.976	1	4
Reducing Crime	2.05	.994	1	4
<i>Approval of Social Policies Round 4</i>	21.8	6.34	9	36
Improving Health Services	2.40	.961	1	4
Addressing Educational Needs	2.57	.979	1	4
Delivering Household Water	2.43	.980	1	4
Ensuring Enough to Eat	2.12	.967	1	4
Fighting Corruption	2.05	1.03	1	4
Combating HIV/AIDS	2.22	1.04	1	4
Uniting All South Africans	2.52	.977	1	4
Distributing Welfare Payments	2.92	1.01	1	4
Responding to Zimbabwe Situation	2.59	1.18	1	4
<i>General Trust Round 4</i>	3.38	2.23	0	9
Trust Other People	1.50	.908	0	3
Trust Other South Africans	1.26	.934	0	3
Trust Foreigners	.626	.894	0	3
<i>Government Trust 1 Round 4</i>	4.08	1.93	0	8
Trust President Molanthe	.926	.667	0	2
Trust National Assembly	.989	.596	0	2
Trust Electoral Commission	1.11	.656	0	2
Trust Ruling Party	1.06	.693	0	2

Table 3.9 Continued

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Gender</i>				
Male	.511	.500	0	1
Female	.489	.500	0	1
<i>Religion</i>				
Christian	.344	.475	0	1
Religion Other	.656	.475	0	1
<i>Education</i>				
HS	.513	.500	0	1
No HS	.487	.500	0	1
<i>Employment Status</i>				
Employed	.530	.499	0	1
Unemployed	.470	.499	0	1
<i>Age (logged)</i>				
	3.53	.352	2.89	4.42
<i>Age</i>				
	36.2	13.1	18	83
<i>Ethnic Group</i>				
Afrikaaner	.136	.343	0	1
Xhosa	.171	.376	0	1
Pedi	.055	.228	0	1
Sesotho	.075	.264	0	1
Setswana	.126	.332	0	1
Zulu	.177	.382	0	1
African Other	.108	.310	0	1
European Other	.149	.357	0	1
Other	.003	.052	0	1
<i>Locale</i>				
Urban	.657	.475	0	1
Rural	.343	.475	0	1
<i>Identity</i>				
	3.97	1.19	1	5

Note: N=744.

Table 3.10: Study 3, Round 4 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Elections Round 4</i>	1.94	1.02	1	4
<i>Lawmakers Round 4</i>	2.28	1.01	1	4
<i>Laws Round 4</i>	2.13	.991	1	4
<i>SA Democracy Round 4</i>	2.86	.892	1	4
<i>SA Satisfaction Round 4</i>	2.53	.960	1	4
<i>Education</i>				
HS	.471	.499	0	1
No HS	.529	.499	0	1
<i>Employment Status</i>				
Employed	.492	.500	0	1
Unemployed	.508	.500	0	1
<i>Age (logged)</i>	3.54	.365	2.89	4.42
<i>Age</i>	37.0	13.8	18	83
<i>Locale</i>				
Urban	.671	.470	0	1
Rural	.329	.470	0	1
<i>Ethnic Group</i>				
Afrikaaner	.143	.351	0	1
Xhosa	.156	.363	0	1
Pedi	.063	.243	0	1
Sesotho	.082	.274	0	1
Setswana	.095	.294	0	1
Zulu	.188	.391	0	1
African Other	.096	.295	0	1
European Other	.173	.379	0	1
Other	.003	.054	0	1

Table 3.10 Continued

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Gender</i>				
Male	.492	.500	0	1
Female	.508	.500	0	1
<i>Religion</i>				
Christian	.352	.478	0	1
Religion Other	.648	.478	0	1
<i>Identity</i>				
	3.97	1.17	1	5

Note: N=1366

Table 3.11 Correlation Matrix Round 3 Study 1

Variable	Age log	Rural	Employ	HS	Female	Christian	Xhosa	Pedi	Sesotho	Setswana	Zulu	African Other	Europe Other	Other	Gen Trust 3	Gov Trust3	Identity
Age (log)	1	0.06	-0.01	-0.22	-0.03	0.06	0	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05	-0.05	0.06	-0.03	0.09	0.03	0.05
rural	0.06	1	-0.11	-0.18	-0.01	-0.09	0.18	0.13	-0.09	0.01	0	0.14	-0.22	-0.02	-0.03	0.08	0.01
Employ	-0.01	-0.11	1	0.26	-0.1	0.07	-0.11	0.02	-0.04	-0.08	-0.01	0.08	0.05	0	-0.06	-0.04	0.01
HS	-0.22	-0.18	0.26	1	-0.01	0.04	-0.14	0.02	-0.04	-0.05	-0.01	0.03	0.08	0.05	-0.05	0	0.04
Female	-0.03	-0.01	-0.1	-0.01	1	0.05	0.01	0.01	0	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01
Christian	0.06	-0.09	0.07	0.04	0.05	1	-0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	-0.13	-0.01	0	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05
Xhosa	0	0.18	-0.11	-0.14	0.01	-0.05	1	-0.15	-0.16	-0.15	-0.24	-0.18	-0.18	-0.04	0.07	0.15	0.01
Pedi	0.03	0.13	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.05	-0.15	1	-0.1	-0.09	-0.15	-0.11	-0.12	-0.03	-0.12	0.02	-0.12
Sesotho	-0.02	-0.09	-0.04	-0.04	0	0.05	-0.16	-0.1	1	-0.11	-0.17	-0.12	-0.13	-0.03	0.06	0.12	0.08
Setswana	-0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.05	-0.01	0.05	-0.15	-0.09	-0.11	1	-0.16	-0.11	-0.12	-0.03	0.01	0.07	0.05
Zulu	-0.05	0	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.13	-0.24	-0.15	-0.17	-0.16	1	-0.18	-0.19	-0.04	-0.07	-0.07	0.03
African Other	-0.05	0.14	0.08	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.18	-0.11	-0.12	-0.11	-0.18	1	-0.14	-0.03	-0.05	0.06	0.03
European Other	0.06	-0.22	0.05	0.08	0.01	0	-0.18	-0.12	-0.13	-0.12	-0.19	-0.14	1	-0.03	0.09	-0.14	-0.01
Other	-0.03	-0.02	0	0.05	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	1	0.03	-0.03	-0.05
GenTrust 3	0.09	-0.03	-0.06	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	0.07	-0.12	0.06	0.01	-0.07	-0.05	0.09	0.03	1	0.27	0.09
GovTrust 3	0.03	0.08	-0.04	0	-0.03	-0.03	0.15	0.02	0.12	0.07	-0.07	0.06	-0.14	-0.03	0.27	1	0.14
Identity	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.04	-0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.12	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.05	0.09	0.14	1

Note: N= 1792.

Table 3.12 Correlation Matrix Round 4 Study 1

Variable	Age Logged	rural	HS	Employ	Female	Xhosa	Pedi	Sesotho	Setswana	Zulu	European Other	African Other	Other	Christian	Identity	Gen Trust4	Gov1 Trust4	Gov2 Trust4
Age Logged	1	-0.08	-0.13	0.08	-0.01	0.06	-0.11	-0.02	-0.05	-0.07	0.13	-0.07	0.04	-0.07	0.05	0.06	0.03	-0.01
rural	-0.08	1	-0.10	-0.09	-0.01	0.05	0.13	-0.06	0.10	0.05	-0.20	0.21	-0.04	-0.06	0.03	-0.08	0.08	0.13
HS	-0.13	-0.10	1	0.23	-0.06	-0.12	0.01	-0.11	-0.01	-0.00	0.06	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.04	-0.02	-0.03
Employ	0.08	-0.08	0.23	1	-0.15	0.02	-0.05	-0.09	-0.04	0.02	0.05	0.02	-0.00	0.03	-0.08	0.04	0.04	0.01
Female	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06	-0.15	1	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03
Xhosa	0.06	0.05	-0.12	0.02	-0.01	1	-0.11	-0.12	-0.16	-0.20	-0.21	-0.16	-0.03	0.00	-0.00	-0.07	0.09	0.05
Pedi	-0.11	0.13	0.01	-0.05	-0.00	-0.11	1	-0.07	-0.09	-0.11	-0.11	-0.09	-0.01	0.04	-0.02	-0.03	0.05	0.06
Sesotho	-0.02	-0.06	-0.11	-0.09	0.01	-0.12	-0.07	1	-0.10	-0.13	-0.13	-0.10	-0.02	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.05	0.04
Setswana	-0.05	0.10	-0.01	-0.04	0.03	-0.16	-0.09	-0.10	1	-0.16	-0.17	-0.13	-0.02	-0.07	-0.01	0.04	0.11	0.08
Zulu	-0.07	0.05	-0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.20	-0.11	-0.13	-0.16	1	-0.21	-0.16	-0.03	-0.09	0.00	0.12	0.11	0.19
European Other	0.13	-0.20	0.06	0.05	0.02	-0.21	-0.11	-0.13	-0.17	-0.21	1	-0.16	-0.03	-0.01	-0.11	-0.00	-0.17	-0.21
African Other	-0.07	0.21	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	-0.16	-0.09	-0.10	-0.13	-0.16	-0.16	1	-0.02	-0.00	0.09	-0.08	-0.04	0.01
Other	0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	1	-0.04	-0.01	0.08	-0.01	-0.02
Christian	-0.07	-0.06	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.004	0.04	0.07	-0.07	-0.09	-0.01	-0.00	-0.04	1	-0.02	-0.12	-0.07	-0.08
Identity	0.05	0.03	0.02	-0.08	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.11	0.09	-0.01	-0.02	1	0.02	0.01	0.05
Gen Trust4	0.06	-0.08	0.04	0.04	-0.00	-0.07	-0.03	0.01	0.04	0.12	-0.00	-0.08	0.08	-0.12	0.02	1	0.17	0.16
Gov1 Trust4	0.03	0.08	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.09	0.05	0.05	0.11	0.11	-0.17	-0.04	-0.01	-0.07	0.01	0.17	1	0.90
Gov2 Trust4	-0.01	0.13	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.08	0.19	-0.21	0.01	-0.02	-0.08	0.05	0.16	0.90	1

Note: N=1142.

Table 3.13 Correlation Matrix Round 3 Study 2

Variable	Gen Trust 3	Gov Trust 3	Age (log)	Rural	Employ	HS	Female	Christian	Xhosa	Pedi	Sesotho	Setswana	Zulu	African Other	Europe Other	Other	Identity	Offices 3	Econ Policy 3	Soc Policy 3
GenTrust3	1	0.27	0.08	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	0.01	0.01	-0.12	0.11	0.01	-0.05	-0.05	0.10	0.03	0.14	0.24	0.20	0.16
GovTrust3	0.27	1	0.04	0.11	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	0.08	0.04	0.11	0.09	-0.04	0.06	-0.11	-0.02	0.17	0.6	0.47	0.46
Age (logged)	0.08	0.04	1	0.07	-0.01	-0.21	-0.03	0.09	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.05	-0.05	0.07	-0.03	0.08	-0.03	0.02	-0.04
Rural	-0.04	0.11	0.07	1	-0.07	-0.14	0	-0.07	0.19	0.11	-0.08	0.01	-0.01	0.15	-0.21	-0.04	0.05	0.06	0.10	0.07
Employ	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	-0.07	1	0.3	-0.07	0.05	-0.08	0.04	-0.08	-0.10	-0.01	0.10	0.04	0.02	0	-0.03	0.01	0.00
HS	-0.03	-0.04	-0.21	-0.14	0.3	1	0.02	0.05	-0.13	0.07	-0.08	-0.09	-0.04	0.07	0.06	0.05	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Female	-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	0	-0.07	0.02	1	0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.00	0	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
Christian	0.01	-0.04	0.09	-0.07	0.05	0.05	0.04	1	-0.05	0.02	0.03	0.03	-0.12	0.01	-0.01	0.04	-0.07	0	-0.04	0.03
Xhosa	0.01	0.08	-0.01	0.19	-0.08	-0.13	-0.03	-0.05	1	-0.13	-0.16	-0.14	-0.21	-0.2	-0.15	-0.02	0.03	0.1	0.12	0.05
Pedi	-0.12	0.04	0.02	0.11	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.02	-0.13	1	-0.12	-0.10	-0.16	-0.12	-0.11	-0.02	-0.1	0.01	0.03	0.00
Sesotho	0.11	0.11	-0.02	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08	0.01	0.03	-0.16	-0.12	1	-0.13	-0.19	-0.15	-0.14	-0.02	0.05	0.14	0.12	0.14
Setswana	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.01	-0.1	-0.09	0	0.03	-0.14	-0.1	-0.13	1	-0.16	-0.12	-0.12	-0.02	0.05	0.07	-0.00	0.00
Zulu	-0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04	0	-0.12	-0.21	-0.16	-0.19	-0.16	1	-0.19	-0.18	-0.03	0.08	-0.06	-0.11	-0.07
African Other	-0.05	0.06	-0.05	0.15	0.1	0.07	-0.03	0.01	-0.16	-0.12	-0.15	-0.12	-0.19	1	-0.1	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.13
European Other	0.1	-0.11	0.07	-0.21	0.04	0.06	0.02	-0.01	-0.15	-0.11	-0.14	-0.12	-0.18	-0.14	1	-0.02	-0.03	-0.08	-0.06	-0.11
Other	0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	1	0	-0.01	-0.05	0.01
Identity	0.14	0.17	0.08	0.05	0	-0.02	-0.04	-0.07	0.03	-0.1	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.02	-0.03	-0	1	0.18	0.14	0.13
Offices3	0.24	0.6	-0.03	0.06	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0	0.1	0.01	0.14	0.07	-0.06	0.03	-0.08	-0.01	0.18	1	0.49	0.52
EcoPolicy3	0.2	0.47	0.03	0.1	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	0.12	0.03	0.12	-0.00	-0.11	0.06	-0.06	-0.05	0.14	0.49	1	0.67
SocPolicy3	0.16	0.46	-0.04	0.07	0	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.05	0	0.14	0.00	-0.07	0.13	-0.11	0.01	0.13	0.52	0.67	1

Note: N=1129.

Table 3.14 Correlation Matrix Round 4 Study 2

Variable	Gen Trust 4	Gov Trust 4	Age Log	Rural	HS	Employ	Fem	Xhosa	Pedi	Sesotho	Setswana	Zulu	Europe Other	African Other	Other	Christian	Identity	App Office 4	App Econ 4	App Soc 4
GenTrust4	1	0.2	0.02	-0.07	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.05	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.12	-0.02	-0.07	0.10	-0.14	-0.01	0.18	0.25	0.17
GovTrust4	0.20	1	0.05	0.08	-0.06	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.08	0.03	0.12	0.11	-0.08	-0.07	-0.02	-0.14	-0.00	0.51	0.26	0.34
AgeLog	0.02	0.05	1	-0.06	-0.15	0.010	-0.00	0.14	-0.05	-0.04	-0.11	-0.06	0.11	-0.09	0.07	-0.08	0.09	0.056	-0.01	-0.03
Rural	-0.07	0.08	-0.06	1	-0.1	-0.12	-0.01	0.08	0.07	-0.08	0.13	0.013	-0.14	0.19	-0.04	-0.05	0.01	0.01	-0.06	0.01
HS	0.01	-0.06	-0.15	-0.10	1	0.24	-0.07	-0.13	0.01	-0.10	0.03	-0.04	0.05	0.01	-0	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.05
Employ	0.02	0.01	0.10	-0.12	0.24	1	-0.13	0.06	-0.06	-0.10	-0.06	0.01	0.05	0.01	-0.06	-0.02	-0.08	0.03	0.09	0.05
Female	0.03	0.02	-0.00	-0.01	-0.07	-0.13	1	-0.01	-0	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	-0.07
Xhosa	-0.05	0.08	0.14	0.08	-0.13	0.06	-0.01	1	-0.11	-0.13	-0.17	-0.21	-0.19	-0.16	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.09	0.09	0.16
Pedi	0.02	0.08	-0.05	0.07	-0.01	-0.06	-0.00	-0.11	1	-0.07	-0.09	-0.11	-0.10	-0.08	-0.01	0.02	-0.05	0.03	-0.003	-0.04
Sesotho	0.01	0.03	-0.04	-0.08	-0.1	-0.1	-0.01	-0.13	-0.07	1	-0.11	-0.13	-0.12	-0.10	-0.01	0.09	0.06	0.03	-0.02	-0.04
Setswana	0.03	0.12	-0.11	0.13	0.03	-0.06	0.02	-0.17	-0.09	-0.11	1	-0.18	-0.16	-0.13	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	0.08	0.1	0.04
Zulu	0.12	0.11	-0.06	0.01	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.21	-0.11	-0.13	-0.18	1	-0.19	-0.16	-0.02	-0.09	-0.03	0.07	0.01	0.001
European Other	-0.02	-0.08	0.11	-0.14	0.05	0.05	0.03	-0.19	-0.1	-0.12	-0.16	-0.19	1	-0.15	-0.02	-0.03	-0.11	-0.04	-0.06	-0.08
African Other	-0.07	-0.07	-0.09	0.19	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.16	-0.08	-0.10	-0.13	-0.16	-0.15	1	-0.02	-0.01	0.08	-0.06	0.01	0.11
Other	0.10	-0.02	0.07	-0.04	-0	-0.06	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	1	-0.04	0.00	-0.02	0.03	0.01
Christian	-0.14	-0.14	-0.08	-0.05	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.09	-0.04	-0.08	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	1	0.00	-0.14	-0.18	-0.17
Identity	-0.01	-0.00	0.09	0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.01	0.03	-0.05	0.06	-0.04	-0.03	-0.11	0.08	0.00	0.00	1	-0.03	-0.06	-0.06
App Office4	0.18	0.51	0.06	0.01	-0.03	0.03	-0.03	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.07	-0.04	-0.06	-0.02	-0.14	-0.03	1	0.39	0.43
App Econ4	0.25	0.26	-0.01	-0.06	-0.01	0.09	-0.04	0.09	-0	-0.02	0.10	0.01	-0.06	0.01	0.03	-0.18	-0.06	0.39	1	0.73
App Soc4	0.17	0.33	-0.03	0.01	-0.05	0.05	-0.07	0.16	-0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.00	-0.08	0.11	0.01	-0.17	-0.06	0.43	0.73	1

Note: N=744.

Table 3.15 Correlation Matrix Round 3 Study 3

Variable	Age Log	rural	Employ	HS	Female	Christian	Xhosa	Pedi	Sesotho	Setswana	Zulu	African Other	European Other	Other	Identity	Elections 3	Lawmakers 3	Laws 3	SA Democracy
Age Log	1	0.09	-0.02	-0.22	0.00	0.067	-0.00	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.05	-0.02	0.05	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03
rural	0.09	1	-0.11	-0.18	-0.02	-0.08	0.18	0.14	-0.09	0.043	0.005	0.112	-0.3	-0.03	0.04	-0.06	0.04	-0.02	0.01
Employ	-0.02	-0.11	1	0.27	-0.12	0.05	-0.11	0.02	-0.01	-0.07	-0.04	0.093	0.07	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04	0.00
HS	-0.22	-0.18	0.27	1	-0.02	0.02	-0.16	0.06	-0.02	-0.05	-0.05	0.078	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.031	-0.06	-0.06	0.03
Female	0.00	-0.02	-0.12	-0.02	1	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.04	-0.07
Christian	0.07	-0.08	0.05	0.02	0.06	1	-0.05	0.04	0.03	0.022	-0.09	0.006	-0.00	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.01	-0	-0.06
Xhosa	0.00	0.18	-0.11	-0.16	0.01	-0.05	1	-0.16	-0.15	-0.16	-0.24	-0.17	-0.20	-0.03	0.05	-0.05	0.01	-0.08	0.05
Pedi	0.02	0.14	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.04	-0.16	1	-0.10	-0.1	-0.16	-0.11	-0.13	-0.02	-0.16	-0.02	-0.06	-0.09	0.03
Sesotho	-0.03	-0.09	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.027	-0.15	-0.1	1	-0.1	-0.15	-0.11	-0.13	-0.02	0.08	0.02	0.05	0.12	0.12
Setswana	-0.02	0.04	-0.07	-0.05	-0.01	0.022	-0.16	-0.1	-0.1	1	-0.16	-0.11	-0.13	-0.02	0.04	-0.03	-0.05	0.12	0.03
Zulu	-0.05	0.01	-0.04	-0.05	-0.01	-0.09	-0.24	-0.16	-0.15	-0.16	1	-0.17	-0.2	-0.03	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.06
African Other	-0.02	0.11	0.09	0.08	-0.02	0.006	-0.17	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.17	1	-0.14	-0.02	0.03	-0.06	0.03	-0.03	0.09
European Other	0.05	-0.25	0.07	0.07	-0	-0.00	-0.20	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13	-0.2	-0.14	1	-0.03	-0.04	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.10
Other	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.05	0.01	0.039	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	1	-0.06	-0.03	0.01	-0.04	-0.01
Identity	0.03	0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.04	0.05	-0.16	0.08	0.042	0.058	0.033	-0.04	-0.06	1	-0.01	0.06	0.14	0.13
Elections Round3	-0.02	-0.06	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.044	-0.06	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	1	0.14	0.03	-0.15
Lawmakers Round3	-0.02	0.04	-0.05	-0.06	0.03	0.009	0.01	-0.06	0.05	-0.05	0.028	0.03	-0.00	0.01	0.06	0.14	1	0.10	0.00
Laws Round3	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	0.04	-0.00	-0.08	-0.09	0.12	0.12	0.033	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	0.14	0.03	0.09	1	0.11
SA Democracy	-0.03	0.01	0	0.03	-0.07	-0.06	0.05	0.03	0.12	0.026	-0.06	0.09	-0.10	-0.01	0.13	-0.15	0.00	0.11	1
SA Democracy Satisfaction	-0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.05	-0.07	-0.00	0.02	0.07	0.13	0.003	-0.08	0.09	-0.08	0.01	0.13	-0.20	-0.01	0.01	0.54

Note: N= 1508.

Table 3.16 Correlation Matrix Round 4 Study 3

Variable	Age Log	rural	HS	Employ	Female	Xhosa	Pedi	Sesotho	Setswana	Zulu	European Other	African Other	Other	Christian	Identity	Elections Round4	Lawmakers Round4	Laws Round4	SADemocracy Round4	SASatisfaction Round4
Age Log	1	-0.1	-0.11	0.08	0.04	0.07	-0.10	-0.03	-0.03	-0.10	0.16	-0.06	0.01	-0.06	0.03	-0.01	0.03	-0.06	-0.03	-0.04
rural	-0.07	1	-0.13	-0.07	-0.02	0.07	0.13	-0.06	0.11	0.05	-0.2	0.19	-0.04	-0.08	0.03	0.04	-0.05	0.04	-0.05	-0.01
HS	-0.11	-0.1	1	0.23	-0.06	-0.10	-0.03	-0.11	-0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.02	-0.02	0.08	0.04	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.031
Employ	0.08	-0.1	0.23	1	-0.16	0.01	-0.07	-0.12	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	-0.03	0.04	-0.04	0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.02	-0.00
Female	0.04	-0	-0.06	-0.16	1	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.03	-0.04	-0.06	0.04	-0.03	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
Xhosa	0.07	0.07	-0.1	0.01	0.01	1	-0.11	-0.13	-0.14	-0.21	-0.2	-0.14	-0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.03	0.05	0.02	-0.04	0.04
Pedi	-0.10	0.13	-0.03	-0.07	-0.02	-0.11	1	-0.08	-0.08	-0.13	-0.12	-0.09	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04	0.04	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.00
Sesotho	-0.03	-0.1	-0.11	-0.12	0.02	-0.13	-0.08	1	-0.01	-0.14	-0.14	-0.10	-0.02	0.04	0.04	-0.07	0.05	-0.01	0.07	0.06
Setswana	-0.03	0.11	-0.02	-0.04	0.02	-0.14	-0.08	-0.10	1	-0.16	-0.15	-0.11	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01	0.04	-0.02	0	-0.03	-0.05
Zulu	-0.10	0.05	-0.02	0.04	-0.02	-0.21	-0.13	-0.14	-0.16	1	-0.22	-0.16	-0.03	-0.12	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.1	0.04	0.05
European Other	0.16	-0.2	0.05	0.04	0.03	-0.20	-0.12	-0.14	-0.15	-0.22	1	-0.15	-0.03	0.00	-0.13	-0.09	-0.10	-0.09	-0.13	-0.08
African Other	-0.06	0.19	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.14	-0.08	-0.10	-0.11	-0.16	-0.15	1	-0.02	-0.02	0.09	0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.05	0.02
Other	0.01	-0	-0.02	-0.03	-0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	1	-0.04	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.00
Christian	-0.06	-0.1	0.08	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	-0.05	-0.12	0.00	-0.02	-0.04	1	-0.00	-0.04	0.00	-0.07	0.00	-0.07
Identity	0.03	0.03	0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.00	-0.04	0.04	-0.01	0.00	-0.13	0.09	0.01	-0.00	1	-0.02	0.10	-0.03	0.12	0.07
Elections Round4	-0.01	0.04	0	0.02	-0.00	-0.03	0.04	-0.07	0.04	0.01	-0.09	0.04	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	1	0.17	0.1	-0.07	-0.11
Lawmakers Round4	0.03	-0	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.05	0.00	0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.1	-0.04	-0.02	0.00	0.09	0.17	1	-0.02	0.03	0.03
Laws Round4	-0.06	0.04	-0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.10	-0.09	0.04	-0.02	-0.07	-0.04	0.10	-0.02	1	0.05	0.09
SADemocracy Round4	-0.03	-0	0	0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01	0.07	-0.03	0.04	-0.13	0.05	-0.01	0.00	0.12	-0.07	0.03	0.05	1	0.32
SASatisfaction Round4	-0.04	-0	0.03	-0	-0.01	0.04	0.00	0.06	-0.05	0.05	-0.08	0.02	-0.00	-0.07	0.07	-0.11	0.03	0.08	0.32	1

Note: N= 1366.

Table 4.1 OLS Regression Predicting General Trust Round 3

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.040
Model F	6.31
Constant	2.47 (.663)
<i>Education</i>	
HS	-.082 (.132)
<i>Employment Status</i>	
Employed	-.266* (.129)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	
	.580* (.162)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>	
Xhosa	.424 (.260)
Pedi	-.965* (.300)
Sesotho	.506 (.282)
Setswana	.104 (.293)
Zulu	-.287 (.253)
African Other	-.195 (.280)
European Other	.671* (.266)
Other	1.10 (.762)
<i>Locale</i>	
Rural	-.101 (.135)
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	-.148 (.121)
<i>Religion</i>	
Christian	-.064 (.124)

Note: N=1792 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05.

Table 4.2: OLS Regression Predicting General Trust Round 4

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.041
Model F	4.49*
Constant	2.11* (.698)
<i>Education</i>	
HS	.188 (.135)
<i>Employment Status</i>	
Employed	.114 (.132)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	
	.333 (.181)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>	
Xhosa	-.104 (.239)
Pedi	.161 (.327)
Sesotho	.383 (.296)
Setswana	.487 (.262)
Zulu	.775* (.238)
African Other	-.154 (.270)
European Other	.067 (.229)
Other	2.78* (1.08)
<i>Locale</i>	
Rural	-.358* (.144)
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	.031 (.127)
<i>Religion</i>	
Christian	-.477* (.134)

Note: N=1142 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05.

Table 4.3a OLS Regressions Predicting Government Trust Round 3

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>Identity</i>
Adjusted R ²	.108	.118
Model F	16.5*	17.0*
Constant	1.82* (.543)	1.29* (.552)
<i>Education</i>		
HS	.360* (.108)	.321* (.108)
<i>Employment Status</i>		
Employed	-.074 (.106)	-.082 (.106)
<i>Age (logged)</i>		
	.399* (.133)	.349* (.133)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>		
Xhosa	2.41* (.214)	2.33* (.213)
Pedi	1.87* (.246)	1.88* (.244)
Sesotho	2.49* (.231)	2.35* (.232)
Setswana	2.24* (.240)	2.12* (.240)
Zulu	1.41* (.208)	1.32* (.207)
African Other	2.10* (.229)	2.01* (.229)
European Other	.853* (.218)	.788* (.217)
Other	.937 (.625)	.996 (.621)
<i>Locale</i>		
Rural	-.009 (.111)	-.015 (.110)
<i>Gender</i>		
Female	-.131 (.099)	-.131 (.098)
<i>Religion</i>		
Christian	-.073* (.102)	-.051* (.101)
<i>Identity</i>		
		.202* (.043)

Note: N=1792 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05.

Table 4.3b OLS Regressions Predicting Government Trust Round 3

Variable	Model 1 <i>Identity</i>	Model 2 <i>Education and Identity Interaction</i>	Model 3 <i>Ethnicity and Identity Interaction</i>
Adjusted R ²	.118	.121	.141
Model F	17.0*	16.4*	14.3*
Constant	3.35* (.209)	3.36* (.209)	3.52* (.210)
<i>Education</i>			
HS	.321* (.108)	.319* (.108)	.292* (.107)
<i>Employment Status</i>			
Employed	-.082 (.106)	-.100 (.106)	-.062 (.104)
<i>Age (logged and centered)</i>			
	.349* (.133)	.338* (.133)	.325* (.131)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>			
Xhosa	2.33* (.213)	2.32* (.213)	2.12* (.214)
Pedi	1.88* (.244)	1.90* (.244)	1.68* (.252)
Sesotho	2.35* (.232)	2.36* (.231)	2.21* (.234)
Setswana	2.12* (.240)	2.11* (.240)	1.91* (.241)
Zulu	1.32* (.207)	1.31* (.207)	1.11* (.209)
African Other	2.01* (.229)	1.99* (.229)	1.76* (.229)
European Other	.788* (.217)	.787* (.217)	.601* (.218)
Other	.996 (.621)	.971 (.620)	1.17 (.614)
<i>Locale</i>			
Rural	-.015 (.110)	-.012 (.110)	.052 (.131)
<i>Gender</i>			
Female	-.131 (.098)	-.131 (.098)	-.118 (.097)

Table 4.3b Continued

Variable	Model 1 <i>Identity</i>	Model 2 <i>Education and Identity Interaction</i>	Model 3 <i>Ethnicity and Identity Interaction</i>
<i>Religion</i>			
Christian	-.051* (.101)	-.052* (.101)	-.044 (.100)
<i>Identity (centered)</i>	.202* (.043)	.116* (.055)	.775* (.126)
<i>Education-Identity Interaction</i>			
HS Identity		.214* (.086)	
<i>Ethnicity-Identity Interaction</i>			
Xhosa Identity			-1.09* (.162)
Pedi Identity			-.524* (.185)
Sesotho Identity			-.786* (.196)
Setswana Identity			-.581* (.197)
Zulu Identity			-.532* (.159)
African Other Identity			-.317 (.176)
European Other Identity			-.555* (.167)

Note: N=1792 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05.

Table 4.4 OLS Regressions Predicting Government Trust 1 Round 4

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>Identity</i>
Adjusted R ²	.081	.080
Model F	8.17*	7.62*
Constant	1.87* (.618)	1.82* (.638)
<i>Education</i>		
HS	.123 (.119)	.121 (.119)
<i>Employment Status</i>		
Employed	.186 (.117)	.190 (.117)
<i>Age (logged)</i>		
	.329* (.160)	.325* (.161)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>		
Xhosa	1.25* (.212)	1.25* (.212)
Pedi	1.37* (.289)	1.38* (.290)
Sesotho	1.36* (.262)	1.34* (.263)
Setswana	1.44* (.232)	1.45* (.232)
Zulu	1.34* (.211)	1.34* (.211)
African Other	.653* (.239)	.650* (.239)
European Other	.102 (.203)	.109 (.204)
Other	.524 (.953)	.530 (.954)
<i>Locale</i>		
Rural	.040 (.128)	.039 (.128)
<i>Gender</i>		
Female	-.010 (.113)	-.010 (.113)
<i>Religion</i>		
Christian	-.203 (.118)	-.202 (.118)
<i>Identity</i>		
		.015 (.048)

Note: N=1142 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05.

Table 4.5: OLS Regressions Predicting Government Trust 2 Round 4

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>Identity</i>
Adjusted R ²	.104	.105
Model F	10.5*	9.94*
Constant	2.36* (.631)	2.12* (.651)
<i>Education</i>		
HS	.074 (.122)	.064 (.122)
<i>Employment Status</i>		
Employed	.088 (.119)	.104 (.120)
<i>Age (logged)</i>		
	.211 (.163)	.194 (.164)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>		
Xhosa	1.07* (.216)	1.09* (.216)
Pedi	1.35* (.295)	1.37* (.295)
Sesotho	1.27* (.268)	1.28* (.268)
Setswana	1.29* (.237)	1.30* (.237)
Zulu	1.73* (.215)	1.74* (.215)
African Other	.873* (.244)	.861* (.244)
European Other	-.027 (.207)	.004 (.208)
Other	.058 (.973)	.086 (.972)
<i>Locale</i>		
Rural	.215 (.130)	.213 (.130)
<i>Gender</i>		
Female	-.069 (.115)	-.067 (.115)
<i>Religion</i>		
Christian	-.201 (.121)	-.197 (.121)
<i>Identity</i>		
		.070 (.049)

Note: N=1142 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05.

Table 4.6 Summary of Significant Indicators of General Trust

	GenTrust3	GenTrust4
Education		
HS	NS	NS
Employment Status		
Employ	S	NS
Age (logged)	S	NS
Ethnic Group		
Xhosa	NS	NS
Pedi	S	NS
Sesotho	S	NS
Setswana	NS	S
Zulu	NS	S
African Other	NS	NS
European Other	S	NS
Other	NS	S
Locale		
Rural	NS	S

Note: S = Statistically significant at $\alpha=.05$. NS = Not statistically significant at $\alpha=.05$.

Table 4.7 Summary of Significant Indicators of Government Trust

	GovtrustRound3	GovTrust1Round4	GovTrust2Round4
Education			
HS	S	NS	NS
Employment Status			
Employ	NS	NS	NS
Age(logged)	S	S	NS
Ethnic Group			
Xhosa	S	S	S
Pedi	S	S	S
Sesotho	S	S	S
Setswana	S	S	S
Zulu	S	S	S
African Other	S	S	S
European Other	S	NS	NS
Other	NS	NS	NS
Locale			
Rural	NS	NS	NS
Identity	S	NS	NS
Education-Identity			
HSIdentity	S		
Ethnicity-Identity			
XhosaIdentity	S		
PediIdentity	S		
SesothoIdentity	S		
SetswanaIdentity	S		
ZuluIdentity	S		
AfricanOtherIdentity	S		
EuropeanOtherIdentity	S		

Note: S = Statistically significant at $\alpha=.05$. NS = Not statistically significant at $\alpha=.05$.

Table 5.1 OLS Regressions Predicting Approval of Offices Round 3

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>
Adjusted R ²	.096	.142	.380
Model F	9.02*	12.6*	44.3*
Constant	4.31* (.495)	4.09* (.483)	3.82* (.410)
<i>Education</i>			
HS	.059 (.098)	.060 (.096)	-.024 (.081)
<i>Employment Status</i>			
Employed	.003 (.095)	.019 (.093)	.036 (.079)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	-.109 (.122)	-.166 (.119)	-.242* (.101)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>			
Xhosa	1.40* (.195)	1.38* (.190)	.600* (.166)
Pedi	1.18* (.210)	1.27* (.205)	.425* (.177)
Sesotho	1.57* (.196)	1.46* (.191)	.668* (.167)
Setswana	1.36* (.210)	1.34* (.205)	.499* (.178)
Zulu	.838* (.183)	.855* (.178)	.281 (.154)
African Other	1.17* (.198)	1.19* (.193)	.399* (.167)
European Other	.742* (.197)	.628* (.192)	.365* (.164)
Other	.788 (.870)	.539 (.849)	.518 (.721)
<i>Locale</i>			
Rural	-.009 (.102)	.003 (.099)	-.063 (.084)

Table 5.1 Continued

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>
<i>Gender</i>			
Female	-.045 (.089)	-.016 (.087)	-.008 (.074)
<i>Religion</i>			
Christian	.085 (.093)	.079 (.090)	.122 (.077)
<i>Identity</i>			
	.203* (.040)	.166* (.039)	.106* (.033)
<i>General Trust Round 3</i>			
		.132* (.017)	
<i>Government Trust Round 3</i>			
			.402* (.018)

Note: N=1129 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates $p < .05$

Table 5.2 OLS Regressions Predicting Approval of Offices Round 4

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>	Model 4 <i>Ethnicity and General Trust Interaction</i>
Adjusted R ²	.056	.078	.258	.120
Model F	3.95*	4.94*	17.2*	5.40*
Constant	3.74* (.637)	3.43* (.633)	3.19* (.566)	4.61* (.193)
<i>Education</i>				
HS	.045 (.117)	.038 (.116)	.047 (.104)	.020 (.113)
<i>Employment Status</i>				
Employed	.075 (.116)	.061 (.115)	.023 (.103)	.073 (.113)
<i>Age (logged)</i>				
	.265 (.163)	.256 (.161)	.125 (.145)	.197 (.158)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>				
Xhosa	.991* (.207)	.974* (.205)	.448* (.188)	.932* (.202)
Pedi	.940* (.281)	.869* (.278)	.234 (.254)	.820* (.274)
Sesotho	.961* (.252)	.903* (.249)	.390 (.227)	.908* (.245)
Setswana	1.07* (.222)	1.01* (.220)	.383 (.203)	.957* (.216)
Zulu	.936* (.203)	.839* (.202)	.322 (.186)	.898* (.200)
African Other	.506* (.233)	.506* (.231)	.192 (.208)	.482* (.228)
European Other	.492* (.207)	.472* (.205)	.196 (.185)	.469* (.201)
Other	-.181 (1.06)	-.635 (1.05)	-.345 (.942)	-.910 (1.08)
<i>Locale</i>				
Rural	-.126 (.123)	-.087 (.122)	-.145 (.109)	-.081 (.120)

Table 5.2 Continued

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>	Model 4 <i>Ethnicity and General Trust Interaction</i>
Gender				
Female	-.102 (.110)	-.117 (.109)	-.130 (.097)	-.162 (.107)
Religion				
Christian	-.362* (.116)	-.300* (.116)	-.210 (.104)	-.283* (.114)
Identity				
	-.033 (.047)	-.032 (.046)	-.042 (.041)	-.040 (.046)
General Trust Round 4		.106* (.025)		.170* (.074)
Government Trust 1 Round 4			.373* (.026)	
Ethnicity General Trust Interaction				
XhosaGentrustRound4				-.168 (.102)
PediGentrustRound4				.011 (.116)
SesothoGentrustRound4				-.355* (.117)
SetswanaGovtrustRound4				.029 (.103)
ZuluGentrustRound4				-.206* (.090)
AfricanOtherGentrustRound4				-.048 (.097)
EuropeanOtherGentrustRound4				.194* (.096)

Note: N=744. Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 5.3 OLS Regressions Predicting Approval of Economic Policies Round 3

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>
Adjusted R ²	.072	.104	.240
Model F	6.85*	9.19*	23.3*
Constant	7.44* (1.10)	7.04* (1.09)	6.61* (1.00)
<i>Education</i>			
HS	.110 (.219)	.111 (.215)	-.031 (.198)
<i>Employment Status</i>			
Employed	.265 (.212)	.296 (.208)	.321 (.192)
<i>Age (logged)</i>			
	.253 (.272)	.145 (.268)	.026 (.246)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>			
Xhosa	2.39* (.436)	2.35* (.429)	1.03* (.404)
Pedi	1.81* (.468)	1.98* (.461)	.523 (.431)
Sesotho	2.55* (.437)	2.35* (.431)	1.03* (.408)
Setswana	1.42* (.469)	1.38* (.461)	-.036 (.434)
Zulu	.618 (.409)	.649 (.402)	-.327 (.375)
African Other	1.92* (.442)	1.96* (.434)	.614 (.409)
European Other	.949* (.439)	.739 (.433)	.310 (.400)
Other	-1.47 (1.94)	-1.93 (1.91)	-1.93 (1.76)
<i>Locale</i>			
Rural	.274 (.227)	.297 (.224)	.183 (.206)

Table 5.3 Continued

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>
<i>Gender</i>			
Female	-.020 (.199)	.035 (.196)	.043 (.180)
<i>Religion</i>			
Christian	-.176 (.207)	-.187 (.203)	-.114 (.187)
<i>Identity</i>	.351* (.088)	.283* (.088)	.188* (.081)
<i>General Trust Round 3</i>		.245* (.038)	
<i>Government Trust Round 3</i>			.682* (.043)

Note: N=1129 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates $p < .05$

Table 5.4: OLS Regressions Predicting Approval of Economic Policies Round 4

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>	Model 4 <i>Ethnicity and General Trust Interaction</i>
Adjusted R ²	.067	.113	.109	.144
Model F	4.56*	6.93*	6.70*	6.43*
Constant	11.3* (1.56)	10.2* (1.53)	10.7* (1.52)	10.1* (.468)
<i>Education</i>				
HS	-.084 (.286)	-.107 (.279)	-.081 (.279)	-.190 (.275)
<i>Employment Status</i>				
Employed	.588* (.283)	.541* (.276)	.529 (.277)	.539* (.273)
<i>Age (logged)</i>				
	-.211 (.399)	-.243 (.389)	-.371 (.390)	-.293 (.383)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>				
Xhosa	2.01* (.506)	1.95* (.493)	1.39* (.505)	1.73* (.489)
Pedi	1.43* (.687)	1.18 (.671)	.628 (.685)	1.02 (.663)
Sesotho	1.20* (.615)	.999 (.601)	.553 (.611)	.957 (.593)
Setswana	2.36* (.542)	2.14* (.529)	1.58* (.545)	1.97* (.524)
Zulu	1.23* (.497)	.893 (.488)	.534 (.500)	.756 (.486)
African Other	1.67* (.571)	1.67* (.556)	1.31* (.561)	1.53* (.553)
European Other	.479 (.506)	.411 (.493)	.143 (.497)	.358 (.487)
Other	2.75 (2.59)	1.16 (2.54)	2.57 (2.54)	.628 (2.61)
<i>Locale</i>				
Rural	-.928* (.300)	-.790* (.294)	-.949* (.294)	-.775* (.291)

Table 5.4 Continued

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>	Model 4 <i>Ethnicity and General Trust Interaction</i>
Gender				
Female	-.270 (.268)	-.323 (.262)	-.303 (.262)	-.389 (.259)
Identity				
	-.164 (.114)	-.163 (.111)	-.174 (.111)	-.191 (.111)
Religion				
Christian	-1.31* (.284)	-1.09* (.279)	-1.14* (.279)	-1.13* (.276)
General Trust Round 4				
		.372* (.060)		.479* (.179)
Government Trust 1 Round 4				
			.425* (.071)	
Ethnicity General Trust Interaction				
XhosaGentrust4				-.867* (.247)
PediGentrust4				.255 (.281)
SesothoGentrust4				-.367 (.284)
SetswanaGentrust4				.285 (.249)
ZuluGentrust4				-.017 (.217)
AfricanOtherGentrust4				-.271 (.235)
EuropeanOtherGentrust4				.075 (.232)

Note: N=744 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 5.5 OLS Regressions Predicting Approval of Social Policies Round 3

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>
Adjusted R ²	.082	.103	.243
Model F	7.68*	9.13*	23.6*
Constant	21.5* (1.87)	20.9* (1.85)	20.1* (1.70)
<i>Education</i>			
HS	-.094 (.370)	-.093 (.366)	-.329 (.336)
<i>Employment Status</i>			
Employed	.317 (.358)	.361 (.354)	.410 (.325)
<i>Age (logged)</i>			
	-.565 (.459)	-.717 (.455)	-.943* (.418)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>			
Xhosa	3.85* (.737)	3.78* (.728)	1.57* (.685)
Pedi	3.40* (.791)	3.64* (.783)	1.26 (.731)
Sesotho	5.25* (.739)	4.97* (.733)	2.71* (.691)
Setswana	3.12* (.792)	3.07* (.783)	.694 (.736)
Zulu	2.32* (.691)	2.36* (.682)	.743 (.635)
African Other	5.12* (.747)	5.16* (.738)	2.93* (.693)
European Other	1.53* (.742)	1.23 (.735)	.467 (.677)
Other	3.97 (.3.28)	3.32 (3.25)	3.21 (2.98)
<i>Locale</i>			
Rural	.058 (.384)	.092 (.380)	-.093 (.349)

Table 5.5 Continued

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>
<i>Gender</i>			
Female	-.092 (.336)	-.015 (.332)	.012 (.305)
<i>Religion</i>			
Christian	.552 (.349)	.537 (.345)	.656* (.317)
<i>Identity</i>			
	.542 (.149)	.446* (.149)	.270* (.137)
<i>General Trust Round 3</i>		.346* (.065)	
<i>Government Trust Round 3</i>			1.14* (.074)

Note: N=1129 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates $p < .05$

Table 5.6 OLS Regressions Predicting Approval of Social Policies Round 4

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>	Model 4 <i>Ethnicity and General Trust Interaction</i>	Model 5 <i>Ethnicity and Government Trust Interaction</i>
Adjusted R ²	.092	.116	.180	.151	.208
Model F	6.02*	7.08*	11.2*	6.73*	9.14*
Constant	24.2* (2.61)	22.9* (2.59)	22.7* (2.48)	20.8* (.791)	22.5* (.812)
<i>Education</i>					
HS	-.408 (.479)	-.436 (.472)	-.400 (.455)	-.549 (.465)	-.294 (.449)
<i>Employment Status</i>					
Employed	.418 (.474)	.361 (.468)	.274 (.451)	.424 (.462)	.401 (.446)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	-.708 (.668)	-.747 (.659)	-1.10 (.636)	-.808 (.648)	-1.11 (.629)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>					
Xhosa	5.09* (.848)	5.01* (.837)	3.59* (.823)	4.65* (.827)	2.61* (.855)
Pedi	1.90 (1.15)	1.60 (1.14)	-.051 (1.12)	1.25 (1.12)	-1.01 (1.16)
Sesotho	2.09* (1.03)	1.84 (1.02)	.509 (.995)	1.78 (1.00)	-.691 (1.02)
Setswana	3.56* (.907)	3.28* (.898)	1.66 (.888)	3.01* (.886)	.801 (.927)
Zulu	2.57* (.833)	2.15* (.827)	.871 (.814)	1.96* (.821)	.456 (.852)
African Other	5.05* (.956)	5.05* (.943)	4.18* (.913)	4.70* (.936)	3.07* (.951)
European Other	1.38 (.847)	1.30 (.836)	.566 (.810)	1.20 (.824)	-.391 (.851)
Other	2.55 (4.35)	.593 (4.31)	2.09 (4.13)	-.190 (4.41)	-.778 (5.81)
<i>Locale</i>					
Rural	-1.05* (.503)	-.885 (.498)	-1.10* (.478)	-.837 (.492)	-1.15* (.473)

Table 5.6 Continued

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>	Model 4 <i>Ethnicity and General Trust Interaction</i>	Model 6 <i>Ethnicity and Government Trust Interaction</i>
Gender					
Female	-.836 (.449)	-.901* (.443)	-.915* (.427)	-.991* (.437)	-.863* (.420)
Identity					
	-.316 (.191)	-.315 (.188)	-.342 (.181)	-.397* (.187)	-.341 (.180)
Religion					
Christian	-2.05* (.475)	-1.79* (.473)	-1.64* (.454)	-1.89* (.467)	-1.36* (.451)
General Trust Round 4					
		.456* (.101)		.616* (.302)	
Government Trust 1 Round 4					
			1.03* (.116)		2.00* (.268)
Ethnicity General Trust Interaction					
XhosaGentrust4				-1.37* (.417)	
PediGentrust4				.771 (.475)	
SesothoGentrust4				-.447 (.480)	
SetswanaGentrust4				.429 (.421)	
ZuluGentrust4				-.087 (.367)	
AfricanOtherGentrust4				-.692 (.397)	
EuropeanOtherGentrust4				.295 (.392)	

Table 5.6 Continued

Variable	Model 1 <i>Structural Factors</i>	Model 2 <i>General Trust</i>	Model 3 <i>Government Trust</i>	Model 4 <i>Ethnicity and General Trust Interaction</i>	Model 6 <i>Ethnicity and Government Trust Interaction</i>
<i>Ethnicity Government Trust Interaction</i>					
XhosaGovtrust4					-1.17* (.408)
PediGovtrust4					-1.11* (.517)
SesothoGovtrust4					-.534 (.570)
SetswanaGovtrust4					-1.25* (.409)
ZuluGovtrust4					-2.16* (.400)
AfricanOtherGovtrust4					-1.17* (.445)
EuropeanOtherGovtrust4					-.566 (.374)
OtherGovtrust4					-4.78 (8.01)

Note: N=886 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates $p < .05$

Table 5.7: Summary of Significant Indicators of Approval of Offices

	AppOffices3	AppOffices4
GenTrust 3	S	
GenTrust 4		S
GovTrust 3	S	
GovTrust 4		S
Education		
HS	NS	NS
Employment Status		
Employ	NS	NS
Age (logged)	S	NS
Locale		
Rural	NS	NS
Ethnic Group		
Xhosa	S	S
Pedi	S	S
Sesotho	S	S
Setswana	S	S
Zulu	S	S
African Other	S	NS
European Other	S	NS
Other	S	NS

Table 5.8: Summary of Significant Indicators of Approval of Economic Policies

	AppEcon3	AppEcon4
GenTrust 3	S	
GenTrust 4		S
GovTrust 3	S	
GovTrust 4		S
Education		
HS	NS	NS
Employment Status		
Employ	NS	S
Age (logged)	NS	NS
Locale		
Rural	NS	S
Ethnic Group		
Xhosa	S	S
Pedi	S	S
Sesotho	S	S
Setswana	S	S
Zulu	S	S
African Other	S	S
European Other	S	NS
Other	NS	NS

Table 5.9: Summary of Significant Indicators of Social Policies

	AppSoc3	AppSoc4
GenTrust 3	S	
GenTrust 4		S
GovTrust 3	S	
GovTrust 4		S
Education		
HS	NS	NS
Employment Status		
Employ	NS	NS
Age (logged)	S	NS
Locale		
Rural	NS	S
Ethnic Group		
Xhosa	S	S
Pedi	S	NS
Sesotho	S	S
Setswana	S	S
Zulu	S	S
African Other	S	S
European Other	S	NS
Other	NS	NS

Table 5.10: Summary of Significant Indicators in Interaction Models

	AppOffice4	AppEcon4	AppSoc4
Ethnicity-General Trust			
XhosaGentrust	NS	S	S
PediGentrust	NS	NS	NS
SesothoGentrust	S	NS	NS
SetswanaGentrust	NS	NS	NS
ZuluGentrust	S	NS	NS
AfricanOtherGentrust	NS	NS	NS
EuropeanOtherGentrust	S	NS	NS
OtherGentrust	NS	NS	NS
Ethnicity-Government Trust			
XhosaGovtrust			S
PediGovtrust			S
SesothoGovtrust			NS
SetswanaGovtrust			S
ZuluGovtrust			S
AfricanOtherGovtrust			S
EuropeanOtherGovtrust			NS
OtherGovtrust			NS

Table 6.1 OLS Regression Predicting Elections Round 3

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.014
Model F	2.40*
Constant	2.15* (.237)
<i>Education</i>	
HS	.040 (.045)
<i>Employment Status</i>	
Employed	-.077 (.044)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	
	-.036 (.057)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>	
Xhosa	-.362* (.092)
Pedi	-.344* (.103)
Sesotho	-.259* (.103)
Setswana	-.357* (.102)
Zulu	-.227* (.090)
African Other	-.406* (.099)
European Other	-.298* (.092)
Other	-.670* (.311)
<i>Locale</i>	
Rural	-.056 (.047)
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	-.029 (.042)
<i>Religion</i>	
Christian	-.049 (.042)
<i>Identity</i>	
	-.005 (.018)

Note: N=1508 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 6.2 OLS Regression Predicting Elections Round 4

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.016
Model F	2.51*
Constant	2.35* (.312)
<i>Education</i>	
HS	-.031 (.058)
<i>Employment Status</i>	
Employed	.040 (.058)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	
	-.009 (.078)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>	
Xhosa	-.343* (.104)
Pedi	-.105 (.136)
Sesotho	-.476* (.123)
Setswana	-.161 (.119)
Zulu	-.247* (.101)
African Other	-.139 (.120)
European Other	-.449* (.100)
Other	-.439 (.513)
<i>Locale</i>	
Rural	.060 (.063)
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	.014 (.056)
<i>Religion</i>	
Christian	-.109 (.059)
<i>Identity</i>	
	-.031 (.024)

Note: N=1366 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates $p < .05$

Table 6.3 OLS Regression Predicting Lawmakers Round 3

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.012
Model F	2.19*
Constant	2.23* (.251)
Education	
HS	-.095* (.048)
Employment Status	
Employed	-.064 (.047)
Age (logged)	
	-.090 (.060)
Ethnic Group	
Xhosa	-.041 (.098)
Pedi	-.171 (.110)
Sesotho	.111 (.110)
Setswana	-.164 (.109)
Zulu	.024 (.096)
African Other	.071 (.106)
European Other	.029 (.098)
Other	.133 (.332)
Locale	
Rural	.084 (.050)
Gender	
Female	.043 (.044)
Religion	
Christian	.101 (.084)
Identity	
	.041* (.020)

Note: N=1508 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 6.4 OLS Regression Predicting Lawmakers Round 4

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.021
Model F	2.92*
Constant	2.02* (.310)
<i>Education</i>	
HS	-.043 (.058)
<i>Employment Status</i>	
Employed	-.039 (.058)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	
	.073 (.078)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>	
Xhosa	-.058 (.104)
Pedi	-.122 (.136)
Sesotho	-.028 (.122)
Setswana	-.203 (.118)
Zulu	-.203* (.100)
African Other	-.271* (.119)
European Other	-.402* (.099)
Other	-.567 (.510)
<i>Locale</i>	
Rural	-.117 (.063)
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	-.044 (.055)
<i>Religion</i>	
Christian	-.023 (.059)
<i>Identity</i>	
	.071* (.024)

Note: N=1366 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 6.5 OLS Regression Predicting Laws Round 3

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.053
Model F	6.60*
Constant	2.18* (.268)
Education	
HS	-.116* (.051)
Employment Status	
Employed	-.027 (.050)
Age (logged)	
	-.117 (.064)
Ethnic Group	
Xhosa	-.160 (.104)
Pedi	-.168 (.117)
Sesotho	.343* (.117)
Setswana	.341* (.116)
Zulu	.065 (.102)
African Other	-.034 (.113)
European Other	.018 (.105)
Other	-.436 (.353)
Locale	
Rural	-.020 (.053)
Gender	
Female	.077 (.047)
Religion	
Christian	.003 (.048)
Identity	
	.097* (.021)

Note: N=1508 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 6.6 OLS Regression Predicting Laws Round 4

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.019
Model F	2.76*
Constant	2.54* (.303)
<i>Education</i>	
HS	-.020 (.057)
<i>Employment Status</i>	
Employed	.092 (.056)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	
	-.116 (.076)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>	
Xhosa	.180 (.102)
Pedi	.239 (.133)
Sesotho	.133 (.120)
Setswana	.138 (.116)
Zulu	.320* (.098)
African Other	.251* (.117)
European Other	-.064 (.097)
Other	-.245 (.498)
<i>Locale</i>	
Rural	-.012 (.061)
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	.008 (.054)
<i>Religion</i>	
Christian	-.112* (.058)
<i>Identity</i>	
	-.034 (.023)

Note: N=1366 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 6.7 OLS Regression Predicting SA Democracy Round 3

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.069
Model F	8.39*
Constant	2.41* (.235)
<i>Education</i>	
HS	.067 (.045)
<i>Employment Status</i>	
Employed	-.007 (.044)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	
	-.013 (.056)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>	
Xhosa	.498* (.091)
Pedi	.544* (.103)
Sesotho	.694* (.102)
Setswana	.464* (.101)
Zulu	.275* (.090)
African Other	.595* (.099)
European Other	.179* (.092)
Other	.333 (.310)
<i>Locale</i>	
Rural	-.099* (.047)
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	-.095* (.041)
<i>Religion</i>	
Christian	-.081* (.042)
<i>Identity</i>	
	.080* (.018)

Note: N=1508 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 6.8 OLS Regression Predicting SA Democracy Round 4

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.034
Model F	4.15*
Constant	2.90* (.271)
<i>Education</i>	
HS	-.036 (.051)
<i>Employment Status</i>	
Employed	.059 (.050)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	
	-.053 (.068)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>	
Xhosa	-.177* (.091)
Pedi	-.089 (.119)
Sesotho	.075 (.107)
Setswana	-.169 (.104)
Zulu	-.038 (.088)
African Other	.037 (.104)
European Other	-.366* (.087)
Other	-.291 (.445)
<i>Locale</i>	
Rural	-.135* (.055)
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	-.018 (.048)
<i>Religion</i>	
Christian	-.023 (.052)
<i>Identity</i>	
	.078* (.021)

Note: N=1366 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 6.9 OLS Regression Predicting SA Satisfaction Round 3

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.064
Model F	7.85*
Constant	2.27* (.261)
<i>Education</i>	
HS	.102* (.050)
<i>Employment Status</i>	
Employed	-.045 (.049)
<i>Age (logged)</i>	
	-.040 (.063)
<i>Ethnic Group</i>	
Xhosa	.419* (.101)
Pedi	.632* (.114)
Sesotho	.721* (.114)
Setswana	.372* (.113)
Zulu	.224* (.100)
African Other	.590* (.110)
European Other	.198* (.102)
Other	.575 (.344)
<i>Locale</i>	
Rural	-.016 (.052)
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	-.115* (.046)
<i>Religion</i>	
Christian	.010 (.047)
<i>Identity</i>	
	.093* (.020)

Note: N=1508 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 6.10 OLS Regression Predicting SA Satisfaction Round 4

Variable	Model 1
Adjusted R ²	.016
Model F	2.43*
Constant	2.47* (.294)
Education	
HS	.091 (.055)
Employment Status	
Employed	-.002 (.055)
Age (logged)	
	-.064 (.074)
Ethnic Group	
Xhosa	.217* (.099)
Pedi	.140 (.129)
Sesotho	.301* (.116)
Setswana	-.017 (.112)
Zulu	.207* (.095)
African Other	.176 (.113)
European Other	-.041 (.094)
Other	.034 (.484)
Locale	
Rural	-.069 (.059)
Gender	
Female	.007 (.053)
Religion	
Christian	-.130* (.056)
Identity	
	.048 (.023)

Note: N=1366 Table entries are unstandardized (metric) regression coefficients (standard errors of estimates are in parentheses). * indicates p<.05

Table 6.11: Summary of Significant Indicators of Representative Democratic Values


	Elections 3	Elections 4	Lawmakers 3	Lawmakers 4	Laws 3	Laws 4
Education						
HS	NS	NS	S	NS	S	NS
Employment Status						
Employ	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Age (logged)	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Locale						
Rural	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Ethnicity						
Xhosa	S	S	NS	NS	NS	NS
Pedi	S	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS
Sesotho	S	S	NS	NS	S	NS
Setswana	S	NS	NS	NS	S	NS
Zulu	S	S	NS	S	NS	S
African Other	S	NS	NS	S	NS	S
European Other	S	S	NS	S	NS	NS
Other	S	NS	NS	NS	NS	NS

Table 6.12: Summary of Significant Indicators of the State of Democracy in South Africa

	SA Democracy 3	SA Democracy 4	SA Satisfaction 3	SA Satisfaction 4
Education				
HS	NS	NS	S	NS
Employment Status				
Employ	NS	NS	NS	NS
Age (logged)	NS	NS	NS	NS
Locale				
Rural	S	S	NS	NS
Ethnicity				
Xhosa	S	S	S	S
Pedi	S	NS	S	NS
Sesotho	S	NS	S	S
Setswana	S	NS	S	NS
Zulu	S	NS	S	S
African Other	S	NS	S	NS
European Other	S	S	S	NS
Other	NS	NS	NS	NS


Appendix B

Figure 4.1: Interaction between Ethnicity and Identity on Government Trust Round 3




Note: Figure shows results of interaction between ethnicity and identity significant at $p < .05$, according to incremental F test. Holding all other variables to their means, slope for Xhosa respondents = 1.03, Pedi = 1.16, Sesotho = 1.42, Setswana = 1.33, Zulu = .58, European Other = .05.

Figure 4.2: Interaction between Education and Identity on Government Trust Round 3




Note: Figure shows results of interaction between education and identity which is significant at $p < .05$, according to incremental F test. Holding all other variables to their means, slope for respondents with HS diploma = .53.

Figure 5.1: Interaction between Ethnicity and General Trust Round 4 on Approval of Offices Round 4




Note: Figure shows results of interaction between ethnicity and General Trust Round 4 significant at $p < .05$, according to incremental F test. Holding all other variables to their means, slope for Sesotho respondents = .62, Zulu = .69, European Other = .66.

Figure 5.2: Interaction between Ethnicity and General Trust Round 4 on Approval of Economic Policies Round 4




Note: Figure shows results of interaction between ethnicity and General Trust Round 4 significant at $p < .05$, according to incremental F test. Holding all other variables to their means, slope for Xhosa respondents = .86.

Figure 5.3: Interaction between Ethnicity and General Trust Round 4 on Approval of Social Policies Round 4



Note: Figure shows results of interaction between ethnicity and General Trust Round 4 significant at $p < .05$, according to incremental F test. Holding all other variables to their means, slope for Xhosa respondents = 3.28.

Figure 5.4: Interaction between Ethnicity and Government Trust 1 Round 4 on Approval of Social Policies Round 4



Note: Figure shows results of interaction between ethnicity and Government Trust 1 Round 4 significant at $p < .05$, according to incremental F test. Holding all other variables to their means, slope for Xhosa respondents = 1.44, Pedi = -2.12, Setswana = -.45, Zulu = -1.7, African Other = 1.9.