ABSTRACT

HOLT, STANLEY K. Organizational Differences in the Implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Programs in North Carolina. (Under the Direction of Dr. Richard Clerkin.)

Homelessness continues to be one of the most challenging social problems across the United States. Data from the 2013 Annual Homeless Assessment Report indicated that nearly 610,000 people were homeless on any given night (Henry, Cortes, & Morris, 2013). In North Carolina, there are 7,300 people who are homeless each night.

Communities across the country have developed homeless service delivery systems. These systems provide services through a diverse group of organizations. Some of the organizations are government organizations and others are nonprofit human service organizations. Despite this system of organizations, there is no research examining the organizational differences in the delivery of these homeless services.

This research bridges that gap and answers the question: Are there differences between government and nonprofit organizations that impact the implementation of services provided to those who are homeless in North Carolina? Using Bozeman’s Theory of Publicness as a framework (Bozeman, 1987), the research examines the impact that each dimension of publicness - ownership, funding and control - has on organizational performance. Organizational performance is characterized by effectiveness, equity, and efficiency as defined by Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011).

The data for the research comes from the implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program, a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. As part of the implementation, North Carolina invested $29 million across the state in 37 different organizations. Twenty-seven of those organizations were private nonprofits and 10 were public organizations. A portion of the funding went directly to entitlement communities, with the remainder going to the State of North Carolina. The State created an implementation process characterized by concrete program strategies that were to be used by those organizations receiving funding.

Based on a combination of publicness theory and literature, it was hypothesized that the private nonprofit organizations would be more effective, less equitable, and more efficient than their public counterparts. Looking at the nonprofit organizations alone, it was
thought that those organizations with a greater portion of their total revenue made from government sources would lead them to behave more like government; they would be less effective, more equitable, and less efficient. Finally, the political control exerted by the State of North Carolina added another layer of government which would result in state funded agencies being less effective, more equitable, and less efficient than their entitlement community counterparts.

The initial quantitative results indicate the following: public organizations had a higher success rate when compared to their nonprofit counterparts; among nonprofit organizations, those who received a higher portion of their organizational revenues from government had higher success rates; state funded programs were more successful than their entitlement counterparts; and public organizations demonstrated greater financial efficiency when compared to their nonprofit counterparts. All of these were exactly the opposite of what was anticipated based on previous research and theory.

Using interviews of state level administrators and program administrators from both nonprofit and public organizations representing both state funded and entitlement communities, more information was gleaned explaining these differences. North Carolina’s tradition of a statewide nonprofit working cooperatively with the State of North Carolina in shaping this program resulted in the State identifying best practices. Through their political control the State ensured a consistency in service delivery and a level of accountability that was not required by the entitlement communities. The capacity for public organizations to rapidly implement and follow government rules and regulations may have played a role in the success of those organizations. This ability also seems to extend to nonprofits with experience in using and adapting to government funding sources.
Organizational Differences in the Implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program in North Carolina

by
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DEDICATION

For 23 years, I have had the privilege of working in nonprofit human service organizations; organizations that are devoted to improving the life of disenfranchised communities. In the last 18 years, homeless individuals and households have shared their stories and shaped my thinking about how we can improve the system of services for these households. This work is dedicated to their stories, both heard and unheard.
BIOGRAPHY

Born and raised in the Ozarks, Stan Holt completed his Bachelor of Science in Communications at Southwest Missouri State University (now known as Missouri State University). He moved to North Carolina in 1987 and attended the University of North Carolina in 1988, completing his Masters in Public Health in the Spring of 1990. He immediately started working in the nonprofit sector as the Executive Director for the North Carolina Lesbian and Gay Health Project at a time when HIV/AIDS was devastating the gay community and prevention and support services for those who were ill were the only options. He honed his skills as a fundraiser when he moved to the Development Director’s position, first at the Institute for Southern Studies, then at the Piedmont Peace Project. In 1996, he became the Executive Director at Genesis Home, a transitional housing program for homeless families, located in Durham, NC. After close to 9 years, he moved to the United Way of the Greater Triangle where he continues to serve as their Vice President of Community Impact. He has also served in a volunteer capacity on Durham County’s Board of Public Health and Durham County’s Department of Social Services Board.
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Martha Are’s commitment to homeless people across North Carolina is one I strive to emulate. Her role in state government has paved the way for implementing some of the best practices that are written about here in this dissertation. She has been a great colleague in this work.

Laura McDuffie at the Carolina Homeless Information Network provided me with the data necessary to do this analysis. Without this data there would be no dissertation.

I want to honor all my committee members. Liz O’Sullivan encouraged me to go back to school and enroll in the Public Administration Department. Her support through the challenges associated with my comprehensive exam process was invaluable. The transitions in my committee structure were made very easy as a result of a Mary Tschirhart’s willingness to step onto the committee after Liz’s retirement, and Rich Clerkin’s willingness to step into the role as the primary chair after Mary moved to Ohio. Branda Nowell’s difficult questions always made me think beyond a superficial level about the issues I was dealing with. Jessica Jameson’s commitment to the practical application of Board Governance Research and her willingness to let me assist with her research project proved to be a key element in thinking about qualitative research methods. I also appreciated our conversations about complexity theory, which will be used in the future. I thank both Mary and Jessica who at crucial times held my feet to the fire in helping me design and meet self-imposed deadlines.
I also want to acknowledge Sue Braken at North Carolina State University and Julie Barroso from Duke University’s School of Nursing. Both instructors helped me understand the complexities, richness, and role qualitative methods play in research.

My friend, colleague, and classmate, Charlene Reiss, gave me great advice and support. Our work together on a proposal for evaluating HPRP helped start the ball rolling on this dissertation.

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CHAPTER 1. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

People living on the streets, in substandard housing, emergency shelters, and transitional housing are all looking for a place to settle, a place they can safely call home. According to the most recent data available, there are close to 610,000 people who are homeless on any given night across the country (Henry, Cortes, & Morris, 2013). More than 1.5 million people spent at least one night in an emergency shelter or transitional housing program in order to stay off the streets during 2010 Cortes, Leopold, Rothschild, Khadduri, Burton, & Culhane, 2011).

In 1996, the Urban Institute completed the National Survey of Homeless Assistance Providers and Clients (Urban Institute, 1999). This study is the last study that looked at organizational characteristics of organizations providing homeless services. It is extremely dated. Yet, millions of dollars have continued to be invested in organizations that provide homeless services without looking at organizational level differences that impact the quality of those services and client level outcomes. These organizational level differences serve as the basic question for this research. Specifically, the research will answer the following question: Are there differences between government and nonprofit organizations that impact the implementation of services provided to those who are homeless in North Carolina.

The Urban Institute study discovered that over 40,000 programs provided services to the homeless across the country. Eighty-five percent of the programs are provided through nonprofit organizations. Among these nonprofits, 51% of all programs are secular and 34% are religious based nonprofit organizations. The government sector runs an additional 14% of these homeless assistance programs, and the for-profit sector only provides 1% of these programs.

The three primary sectors responsible for providing this homeless assistance in the 1996 study operate different programs. Secular nonprofits offer 60% of the actual housing programs, while religious programs offer 55% of the food assistance. Health programs are evenly split between government and nonprofit organizations, with the secular programs more likely to provide these healthcare services.
Funding for these programs varied between the types of organizations in 1996. Twenty percent of all the housing programs were fully supported by the government. Thirty percent of the housing programs received between half and all of their support from the government, while 22% received up to half of their budget from the government. The remaining 23% relied entirely on private funds.

The lack of research over the last two decades on organizational level characteristics for organizations that provide homeless services is disappointing. However, the good news is that in 2001, Congress required the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to collect data about homelessness. According to the Conference Report on the FY 2001 HUD Appropriations Act “…local jurisdictions should be collecting an array of data on homelessness in order to prevent duplicate counting of homeless persons, and to analyze their patterns of use of assistance, including how they enter and exit the homeless assistance system and the effectiveness of the systems” (U.S. Congress, 2000).

Over the last decade, communities across the country implemented Homeless Management Information Systems (HMIS) that collect client level data associated with individuals and families who are homeless and their use of specific services. However, no analysis has been done looking at the impact that different types of organizations have on the client level outcomes. Relying solely on client level data to determine the success of a local system of homelessness is short-sighted and ignores important elements that are necessary to determining the system's effectiveness.

This research is the first of its kind and looks at organizational characteristics in the context of the current homeless services system created by the government and homeless service providers. This research bridges the current gap in knowledge by examining data collected through the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program implemented in North Carolina. Specifically, it will look at differences between the public and nonprofit organizations that provided the services to homeless households across the state. Both types of organizations behave differently as a result of certain ownership, funding, and control variables (G. A. Boyne, 2002). Bozeman’s (1987) publicness theory provides the framework to answer the question: Are there differences between government and nonprofit

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organizations that impact the implementation of services provided to those who are homeless in North Carolina?

From policy design to policy implementation

A system designed to implement policy has many layers between policy design and actual policy implementation. These layers add complexity and can make policy implementation challenging. This multilayered framework is seen in Figure 1. Hasenfeld (2010) describes this framework as Russian nested dolls. The outer shell is the policy design defining the boundaries of the policy to be implemented. The institutional political economy represents the interest groups that see the opportunities and threats in the policy and attempt to influence how the policy is administered. Organizations are the bodies where implementation begins to take place and are the third shell of the framework. Here organizations of differing sizes, with different missions, and from differing sectors will incorporate their structures and practices to the delivery of services. Within the organization are the workers who work directly with the clients, with changes in client outcomes being the policy outcome.

Nonprofit organizations, in 1996 and today, are a vital component in providing homeless services, thereby making them a key element in the growing “hollow state” (Milward & Provan, 2000). The hollow state is the concept that government relies on nonprofits, for-profits, and other government agencies to deliver services and that there is a degree of separation between the government and the services it funds. When you look at the nested circles in Figure 1, you can see the layers between policy design and implementation. The “hollowness” created when the federal government designs a policy and a nonprofit organization implements the policy at a local level is visible.
Figure 1. From policy design to policy outcomes: The organizational context (Hasenfeld, 2010, p. 150)
The concept that nonprofits are key providers of government services through government contracts is also confirmed when looking at the Federal Audit Clearinghouse (Jalandoni, Petrescu, & Green, 2005). Nonprofit social service organizations and nonprofit housing organizations receive the largest number of grants from the federal government. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development are the two largest federal departments providing this support for these contracted human services.

According to Milward and Provan (2000), “The main difference between the hollow state and direct government provision of services lies in the presence of a bureaucratic mechanism” (p. 363). They suggest that there is a desire for public managers to provide a greater breadth of public services without raising costs of those services. The “command and control mechanisms” found in bureaucracies is replaced with greater flexibility to change as service needs change in smaller nonprofit or for profit firms. These differences lead to the growing use of contracts between governments and nonprofit organizations in the provision of human services and housing.

Interestingly enough, there is no one definitive way in which government organizations and nonprofit organizations are compared and contrasted with regard to how they provide human services. The relationship between these two sectors is intertwined in such a way that looking at each sector’s characteristics is dependent upon looking at both of the sectors as they deliver services. It is almost as if you define one sector based on what the other sector is not.

The pattern of interactions between government and nonprofit can be characterized in three different ways (Young, 2006). Sometimes nonprofits supplement the government’s services because of a perceived gap in those government services. Other times the government and nonprofits complement each other, creating a partnership designed to ensure a more comprehensive provision of services to the community. Finally, it is quite possible for nonprofits and the government to be adversaries, particularly as nonprofits try to influence public policy and as governments try to regulate nonprofits.
These relationships help differentiate government and nonprofits. Government will contract out with nonprofits because they are different from themselves. Because of their lack of profit motive, nonprofits are viewed as efficiently providing targeted services that are needed by a specific population without exploiting clients. Governments have requirements of equity and accountability that are bureaucratic and lead to inflexibility (Malloy & Agarwal, 2010). Governments recognize that providing all the necessary services is a heavy economic burden and that nonprofits (and for that matter for-profits), because of their efficiency and responsiveness, are more cost-effective service providers (Schmid, 2004). It is also suggested that employees in government are different from those in nonprofits and are characterized by lower motivation, higher turnover, and performance that is difficult to evaluate (Schmid, 2003). In his work describing the growing public administration profession, Kettl (1990) describes the challenges of a complex bureaucracy in which a number of players engage in games that delay the implementation of the public policy.

In addition to the interrelationships between government and the nonprofit sector in the hollow state, it is also quite possible to look at the similarities and differences of each sector based on the “degree of publicness.” Some of the first work on this notion of publicness created a distinction between public and private organizations based on ownership (Rainey, Backoff, & Levine, 1976). Private organizations are owned by “shareholders” while public agencies are owned by local political communities. This leads to additional distinctions based on where funding is received, fees paid by customers versus taxpayer dollars and control, and market forces versus political forces. Bozeman (1987) combined the notions of funding and control into a “dimensional” model, suggesting that public or private is not a category but a continuum based on funding and political control that shapes organizational behavior.

Some organizational scholars began adding “hybrid” organizations as a means of studying these dimensions and differences, including the use of nonprofit hospitals (Lan & Rainey, 1996). Over time nonprofit scholars have continued to define and characterize nonprofit organizations. Salamon (1995) identifies six characteristics of nonprofit organizations in the United States. These characteristics include:
1. Institutional in form (as opposed to being ad hoc, informal, or temporary), legally recognized, and incorporated
2. Private organizations, and separate from government
3. Not profit-distributing, meaning that all profits must be reinvested into the mission of the organization (as opposed to being distributed to the owners of the organization)
4. Self-governing, and not controlled by outside entities
5. Voluntary in nature, relying on volunteers in the staffing, activities, or governance of the organization
6. In existence to deliver a public service or benefit (Salamon, 1995, pp. 10-11)

Nonprofits exist between public and private agencies. Many, as seen above in the example of homeless services, engage in activities similar to those of government, yet they do not operate within control of the local political system nor are they subject to market control. They are not part of a government personnel system. While some of their funding might come from the government, many operate separate from government funding, but without profits being distributed to stockholders.

Regardless of the type of relationship that exists between governments and nonprofits, they are different. Both have their strengths, and both have their limitations. While both are subject to ownership, funding, and control variables, the differences within these three variables can lead to different organizational behavior (G. A. Boyne, 2002). Subsequently, these differences in organizational behavior impact the actual performance of the organization and the implementation of federal policy. It is important to explore how organizations within these two sectors approach implementing public policy, particularly if we want to determine if an entire system of services is effective. The problem posed in this research concerns the system of homeless services provided within local communities by both nonprofit and public agencies. Unfortunately, research scholars have not looked at organizational differences between nonprofits and government agencies providing homeless services. This paucity of research leads to a key question that will be answered by this study:
Are there differences between government and nonprofit organizations that impact the implementation of services provided to those who are homeless in North Carolina?

This question will be answered in the context of the implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program in the State of North Carolina. This federal program was part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and distributed $1.5 billion across the country to prevent homelessness and rapidly rehouse those who are homeless. This federal policy design represented a fundamental shift in how services would be provided. There was an emphasis on prevention and rapid rehousing that challenged the existing paradigm of service delivery. This shift in public policy required rapid implementation. The State of North Carolina funded both nonprofit and government organizations across the State to implement the work, creating an opportunity to explore the research question presented above.

Bozeman’s (1987) dimensional model of publicness will serve as a theoretical framework. The impact the independent variables of ownership, funding, and control have on three measures of organizational performance will be assessed. These organizational level measures are effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Ultimately, the dimensions of ownership, funding and political control can be used as a means of describing what happens in the “hollow state;” that space between policy design and actual organizational outputs and outcomes.

The next chapter provides a thorough background of the implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program in North Carolina. Chapter 3 discusses the relevant literature to create testable hypotheses that help answer the relevant question. Then the research answering these questions will take place in two phases. Chapter 4 outlines the first set of quantitative research methods, including the source of the data to be analyzed and the operationalization of key independent and dependent variables to be used in answering the research question. It will present qualitative methods to be used in a second phase consisting of interviews that are designed to further interpret the results. Chapters 5 and 6 present the quantitative and qualitative results, respectively. The final chapter
concludes the study with a comprehensive discussion of both phases of the research and includes limitations of the study and areas for future research.
CHAPTER 2. HOMELESS PREVENTION AND RAPID REHOUSING IN NORTH CAROLINA

Changing Homeless Public Policy

The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act was the first legislation to deal with the crisis of homelessness. Adopted in 1987, it consisted of nine separate titles that engage several different administrative departments. The overall goal was to deal with the growing crisis of homelessness that emerged in the 1980’s. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was the chief organization responsible for programs. The Department of Agriculture, Veterans Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Education and Labor, and Federal Emergency Management Agency all had additional roles in helping homeless people. After several amendments, it was reauthorized and renamed the McKinney – Vento Act as part of the No Child Left Behind Act that went into effect in 2002.

In 2000, after over a decade of working with those who were homeless, advocacy organizations began calling for plans to end homelessness. The National Alliance to End Homelessness (2010) issued a blueprint of how the country might end homelessness in ten years. This call to action, coupled with the growing federal interest in ending homelessness, resulted in over 200 communities creating 10 Year Plans to End Homelessness.

As communities began to experiment with new strategies to end homelessness, best practices emerged. It appeared that many people were getting “stuck” in the system of emergency shelters and transitional housing programs because there was a lack of permanent affordable housing. There was a growing emphasis on moving chronic homeless people into permanent supportive housing. Preventing people from becoming homeless was also discussed. A key element to all of the strategies was the need for services to “wrap-around” households in order to support their permanency in stable housing.

With the signing of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), the Obama Administration created the Homelessness Prevention Fund on February 17, 2009. The funded strategies that prevented homelessness and rapidly rehoused those who found themselves living on the streets had emerged as key elements in the growing movement to end homelessness. For the first time these strategies would receive unprecedented funding.
The Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program (HPRP) distributed $1.5 billion across the United States. Funds were distributed based on the formula used for the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Emergency Shelter Grant Program.

Figure 2 below shows a geographic distribution of funding across the State of North Carolina. The darker shaded areas are counties with organizations receiving funding from the State of North Carolina. The middle grade of shading were counties with organizations receiving entitlement funds directly from the federal government. Finally, the very light gray counties had organizations that received both state and entitlement funds.

The primary outcome of HPRP is the housing stability achieved by HPRP participants. HPRP is designed to implement some of the best practices for preventing and ending homelessness. These strategies include Rapid Rehousing and Prevention Services. Rapid Rehousing targets those who are already homeless, while Prevention Services target households that are imminently homeless or at-risk of losing housing. Services provided to all clients fall into two categories: Financial Assistance, and Housing Relocation and Stabilization Services. Financial Assistance includes flexible cash payments for rent assistance, security deposits, utility deposits, utility payments, moving cost assistance, and motel and hotel vouchers. Housing Relocation and Stabilization Services include case
management, outreach and engagement, housing search and placement, legal services, and credit repair.

The HPRP Program is designed to provide services to households that are homeless or at imminent risk of losing their housing, have no appropriate subsequent housing options, and lack financial resources and social support networks necessary to find or remain in stable housing. Case workers in agencies providing HPRP services must determine whether a household would become homeless but for HPRP assistance. Only households that can be stably housed within the time and resource constraints of the program are considered eligible. This determination is made by case workers during in-person interviews. Because funds are limited, individual agencies may have additional criteria for determining which households are enrolled in HPRP.

HPRP presents an opportunity. For the first time in history there is direct funding available on a large scale for these two emerging primary strategies to end homelessness: rapid rehousing and prevention. Prior to this, the majority of funding went to maintaining and expanding emergency shelters and transitional housing, and the development of permanent supportive housing. Furthermore, all agencies participating in HPRP are required to utilize a Homeless Management Information System (HMIS) that tracks all individuals and households enrolled in HPRP, as well as individual services provided by all agencies to their clients. These data provide a wealth of information that will help this specific research in addressing the question of what organizational characteristics impact the housing stability of households as they exit the program.

On May 20, 2009, the McKinney-Vento Act was reauthorized under the new Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act of 2009 (HEARTH Act). The reauthorization consolidated three separate programs into one grant program, revised the Emergency Shelter Grants program and renamed it the Emergency Solutions Grants program, and codified the Continuum of Care (CoC) planning process. The CoC process is one of HUD’s long standing programs designed to coordinate homeless services. The HEARTH Act required HUD to issue regulations for these new programs which were
released on July 31, 2012, and went into effect on August 30, 2012. According to researchers watching the federal changes in public policy,

As part of this reauthorization, the Emergency Shelter Grant program was renamed the Emergency Solutions Grant, and eligible activities under the new program include more prevention and re-housing activities. These two acts represent a fundamental redirection in the nation’s homelessness assistance policies, as the HPRP bypasses the shelter, transitional housing, and other traditional homeless services that have been the mainstay of assistance to the homeless for the past two decades. (Culhane, Metraux, & Byrne, 2011, p. 296)

The changing public policy is showing a definite shift in how services will be delivered. The completion of HPRP in August 2012 comes at an opportune time. There is an opportunity to examine data, reflect on successes and failures, and prepare for the new permanent legislation created by the HEARTH Act. This research is timely and will take advantage of the HPRP data that has been collected over the past three years in North Carolina and provide helpful information to policy makers in the state.

**Divided Philosophies in Providing Homeless Services**

For years the response to homelessness has been one of reacting to, rather than preventing, homelessness. What do we do to compassionately care for those we see living on the streets? Many of the emergency shelters, transitional housing programs, and permanent housing opportunities served as “hoops” that households jump through as they demonstrate the capacity to maintain their housing. Providers believe that households must be ready to live in their own home. Such a paradigm rests on the fact that individual limitations, challenges, or even defects are responsible for the household’s homelessness and that by “fixing” the individual they deserve to have housing.

Systems have been built around this paradigm. Nonprofit and faith-based organizations have ministries designed to help people out of homelessness. They have financed programs based on the needs and images of people, including children, living on the street. In fact, the original McKinney legislation was designed to help homeless people move through a continuum of housing services to prepare homeless households for housing.
HPRP challenges this ideology based on the growing data that demonstrates that permanent housing is therapeutic, that it is a right, and that households can be successful if they have the support they need to find and maintain their housing, regardless of any individual limitations or challenges. HPRP challenges the systems that have been built by charities, congregations, and homeless service providers over the many decades there have been homeless people. This challenge manifests in service providers being divided. Some providers argue that homeless households can live in their own housing with supportive services. Other providers continue to argue that homeless individuals and families are simply not ready to move into housing until they have the capacity to maintain that housing. Large shelters and transitional housing programs with years of support and resources invested in their programs are suddenly being challenged to rethink the infrastructures that created organizational and programmatic success.

The data available for either side of the argument is limited and full of challenges. Simply trying to measure who is homeless is difficult. Definitions of who is homeless have changed over the years. Homeless people living on the streets or in the woods are impossible to find. Diverse household structures and circumstances present challenges in the ability to generalize any data that would suggest appropriate interventions for ending homelessness. Even with the emergence of adequate data, service providers rely on their experiences, interactions, and sometimes their “calling” to work with homeless people to drive how services are provided (Corbett & Fikkert, 2012).

The HPRP program, including the implementation of the program in North Carolina, has presented us with more data about how homelessness can be prevented. Providers receiving HPRP funding were required to enter data into North Carolina’s Homeless Information System (HMIS). This has resulted in a large data set that can be used to determine how prevention and rapid rehousing were implemented in organizations within the State of North Carolina, the overarching research question to be addressed by this study.

**Program Theory Behind Prevention and Rapid Rehousing**

Previous scholars who have studied homelessness have tended to use the traditional public health framework of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention (Rose, 1992).
However, they have taken this a step further and talked about the efficiency and effectiveness of prevention and housing activities. According to Burt, Pearson, and Montgomery (2007), “Effective activities must be capable of stopping someone from becoming homeless (primary prevention) or ending their homelessness quickly (secondary prevention). An efficient system must target well, delivering its effective activities to people who are very likely to become homeless without help” (p. 216).

This effectiveness and efficiency problem was recently explained by Culhane, Metraux, and Byrne (2011). The challenge of efficiency is characterized by this question: “How does a program target assistance to households who would become homeless without the assistance, while minimizing provision of assistance to those with similar characteristics and circumstances who could avoid homelessness without the program’s assistance?” (p. 297). The authors discuss the idea that primary prevention would take place prior to any sort of crisis that would lead to a household’s homelessness, such as true affordable housing, ensuring substance abuse prevention efforts, and living wages in communities. However, the lack of public policy and resources targeting those at-risk of homelessness forces us to provide interventions farther “downstream.” That is to households that are imminently at-risk of homelessness and sliding into secondary prevention efforts by targeting those who have become homeless and moving them back to stable housing as quickly as possible. The effectiveness of prevention and rapid rehousing efforts is related to several different factors. These include the timing of the assistance, the amount of the assistance, the length of time the assistance is provided, and who receives which combination of the previous three factors.

Building upon this theory of prevention, there are two manuals that serve as guides in helping communities design these programs that are recommended by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Instead of theoretical frameworks, they outline a set of principles. The prevention guide identifies the following principles: crisis resolution; client choice, respect, and empowerment; providing the minimum assistance necessary in the shortest time possible; maximizing community resources; and making sure the right resources go to the right people at the right time (Wherley, 2009a). The rapid re-housing guide identifies these principles: moving directly from homelessness to housing; identifying
housing barriers and eliminating or compensating for those barriers; the minimal amount of assistance to create stability; empowering households to make decisions; housing is the focus and other problems are solved as the client desires to address them; identify and use mainstream resources; and landlords are a key valuable resource (Wherley, 2009b).

These principles and the documents served as the basic blueprint for North Carolina’s implementation of the HPRP Program. The program theory for this study acknowledges these prevention and rapid rehousing principles and associated activities that lead to stable housing. This study will go on to assess whether or not there are specific characteristics that influence the organizational behavior as the HPRP program was implemented; including whether or not these organizations stably house program participants as they exit the program.

**North Carolina’s Implementation of HPRP**

North Carolina received a total of $29,078,387 for the HPRP Program. The Office of Economic Recovery and Investment (OERI) received $22,157,468 to distribute to local organizations; eight additional entitlement communities received $6,920,919. There are 37 organizations across the state that received funding. Ten are public agencies and 27 are private nonprofit agencies. The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Interagency Council for Coordinating Homeless Programs (ICCHP) manages the program for OERI with fiscal management provided by the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency (HFA). Organizations receiving funding have been contracted to provide prevention and rapid rehousing services directly or through subcontractors from October 2009 through August 2012.
Figure 3. Visual Flow Chart of North Carolina’s HPRP
The visual flowchart in Figure 3 describes the HPRP process from intake through exit. The initial population comprises households who are homeless or at imminent risk of losing housing. Individuals and households find an HPRP agency providing either homelessness prevention services, rapid rehousing services, or both. An HPRP case worker at the agency determines a household’s eligibility for the program. Households not meeting eligibility criteria are not enrolled. Eligible households may be enrolled or not enrolled. Enrolled households receive financial assistance, housing relocation and stabilization services, or both. Households completing the program exit into stable housing. Some households exit without completing the program and may be stably housed or not stably housed. After one year, households may still be stably housed, not stably housed, or unreachable. Households in unstable housing may be in shelters participating in HMIS or may be in another shelter or other unstable housing.

Agencies receiving HPRP funds provide either rapid rehousing services, homelessness prevention services, or both. An initial screening, by phone or in person, determines whether an individual or household meets the basic criteria for HPRP and whether the agency offers the HPRP service needed by the client. Through intake interviews and information gathering, an HPRP agency case worker determines a household’s eligibility to enter the program. To be eligible for enrollment, a household must have income below 50% of the Area Median Income (AMI); have less than $2000 in assets; be literally homeless, imminently homeless, or precariously housed; and be lacking other adequate support to avoid becoming homeless.

Eligible households are enrolled while the agency is accepting new clients into the program. Agencies may choose not to enroll new clients when their case loads are full, or their HPRP funds have been committed or exhausted, or if the new client does not meet the agency’s priority criteria for HPRP services. Non-eligible households are not enrolled and may be referred to other programs or services.

At enrollment, an agency determines whether a household needs prevention or rehousing services. HPRP has more flexibility to provide cash assistance to clients and therefore differs from other emergency assistance programs. Services that can be provided by
HPRP include payment of rent and utilities, both current and in arrears; rent and utility deposits; moving costs; credit counseling; and hotel or motel costs. Additional non-cash services provided by HPRP agencies include outreach and engagement; case management; housing search and placement; legal services; and credit repair. A household may be enrolled in HPRP up to three years but may only receive each service for a maximum of 18 months.

All households enrolled in HPRP are required to be recertified every three months. This process verifies that the household is still eligible to receive services by meeting the program requirements for enrollment. Households no longer meeting enrollment criteria, not participating in the recertification process, or otherwise not in compliance with program requirements are immediately terminated from HPRP, i.e. exited without completing the program. Households determined to be stabilized and no longer in need of HPRP assistance are exited and considered to have completed the program. At exit, households completing the program are considered to be stably housed. Those households exiting HPRP without completing the program may or may not be stably housed.

It is important to understand that the program theory driving this study is built on the simplicity of taking unstably housed households, either immanently at-risk of homelessness or homeless, and moving them into a stable housing situation, either in the home they currently live in or to a new housing situation. For purposes of this study, housing stability is defined as households who are currently housed and not at risk of losing housing and/or having resources and support networks needed to maintain or obtain housing. This stability was assessed both prior to entering the program and again at the exit of the program. It is the exit housing status that will be used in this study to determine whether the program achieved the specific program outcomes desired.

All agencies participating in HPRP are required to utilize the Homeless Management Information System (HMIS) operated by the Carolina Homeless Information Network (CHIN). The system tracks all individuals and households enrolled in HPRP as well as individual services provided by all agencies to their clients. Agencies must enroll clients in HMIS and enter all services provided in order to receive reimbursement from the NCHFA. Data collected are used to monitor agency performance and to provide quarterly and annual
reports to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). CHIN regularly assesses the data collected and generates reports for ICCHP on data quality. To improve data quality, agencies are only reimbursed for services entered in HMIS.

**Conclusion**

This chapter provides an overview and context of homeless services. Specifically, it discusses the implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing program in the State of North Carolina. The data created through the implementation of this program provides us with a unique opportunity to explore the differences between government organizations and nonprofit organizations who were contracted with, either directly through the federal government or through the State of North Carolina. The original data set was designed to quickly gather information about who is homeless, the interventions they receive, and whether or not they moved into stable housing. With additional information and analysis this research answers the question of whether or not there are differences between government and nonprofit organizations that impact the implementation of services provided to those who are homeless in North Carolina.
CHAPTER 3. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Exploring the nature of public and nonprofit human service providers, their similarities and differences, is discussed in the academic literature. However, as you become more specific in examining these two types of organizations as they relate to providing services to those who are homeless or at-risk of homelessness there is no literature available. This chapter will review the literature and present several hypotheses based on Barry Bozeman’s theory of publicness (Bozeman, 1987).

There are several sections to this chapter. The first section introduces the concept of publicness as it relates to private and public organizations. Ownership and the dimensions of funding and political control are introduced and serve as the independent variables to be analyzed. The second section positions nonprofit organizations within the dimensional publicness framework. The third section introduces the dependent variable of organizational performance and the key aspects of effectiveness, equity, and efficiency. The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections return to each of the independent variables of interest - ownership, funding and control- and presents several hypotheses associated with each independent variable’s impact on the key aspects of organizational performance.

Theory of Publicness

The theoretical concept of organizational publicness has evolved over the years. Early attempts were made to distinguish between private and public organizations by looking at a myriad of differences between these two types of organizations. Rainey, Backoff, and Levine (1976) identified and summarized 25 differences between public and private organizations. The categories of these differences suggest that public organizations are less connected and influenced by external markets, are subject to more layers of legal constraints, are more subject to the influences of the public and political officials; have a wider scope of public influence and subsequently public scrutiny requiring more “fairness”; have more complex, vague, and even conflicting objectives; are led by administrators with less autonomy and flexibility; are slow to innovate and change; have few innovative options to improve performance or efficiency; and attract workers who are less loyal and unsatisfied. Ultimately,
one of the ways to categorize these differences can be based on the questions of who “owns” these organizations, where do they receive their funding, and who has political control.

Who owns a private firm and who owns a public organization? The notion is that private organizations are owned by individuals and/or stakeholders, while public agencies are “owned” by political communities (Rainey et al., 1976). Often called the core approach to publicness, ownership influences organizational behavior as explained by property rights theory and public choice theory. According to these theories, these two types of organizations are distinguishable based upon their connection to market structures, externalities, and the transferability of ownership (Niskanen, 1971). Private firms receive their funding from fees for their products that are paid directly by their customers and public agency revenue is generated through taxes. Finally, because of the political forces controlling the public agency, their behavior is subject to political demands and regulations; whereas, the private organization is controlled by market forces that include customer demand and competition.

According to the Rainey, Backoff, and Levine (1976),
As a source of revenues and resources, it is argued, the market enforces relatively automatic penalties and rewards, and thus provides incentives to cost reduction, operating efficiency, and effective performance. On the other hand, organizations which obtain resources through an appropriations process in a political context are less subject to such influences; cost reductions might be avoided or deemphasized on a number of bases, such as political influences or a number of multiple, vague criteria of a "public interest" nature. Appropriations may be based largely on past levels, thus creating an incentive to use up previous appropriations (Rainey et al., 1976, p. 235).

About a decade later, Bozeman (1984, 1987) took the concept of ownership and built a theory of publicness. Public and private organizations are more than two distinct organizational types. Instead, all organizations are influenced by both external political authority and external economic authority leading to the two dimensions of publicness. Despite the fact that he suggests that all organizations are public, Bozeman (1987) does not suggest that all organizations behave in the same manner. In fact, according to Bozeman,
The causal mechanics of dimensional publicness theory are straightforward: organizations subject to constraints of political authority or dependent on political authority for resources behave differently owing to the “imprint” of public ties. This imprint usually involves a more intensive regulatory environment, increased accountability, and perhaps increased “red tape,” more extensive political oversight, and greater public visibility. Less public organizations tend to be sheltered from these constraints and maintain a higher degree of autonomy in both strategy and action (Bozeman, 2013, pp. 177-178).

These differing constraints enabled Bozeman to create a publicness grid (Figure 4) which illustrates the varying organizational types along the dimensions of publicness and privateness based on level of economic authority and political authority. These differences suggest that there are also differences in organizational behavior based on these dimensions. Ownership, funding (economic authority), and control (political authority) will serve as the independent variables of interest in this research.
Over the years, the concept of publicness theory has continued to be built upon. G. A. Boyne (2002) identifies the theoretical effects of publicness on organizations, particularly as it relates to public and private management. Publicness is related to organizational environments, goals, structures, and management values. Boyne uses these four areas to create 13 hypotheses designed to show how public and private organizations differ. Through a secondary analysis of research conducted by others, Boyne discovers that “public
organizations are more bureaucratic, public managers are less materialistic, and organizational commitment is weaker in the public sector” (p. 116).

Work by organizational scholars has suggested that publicness can be defined as the extent to which organizations express public values and/or provide for public values (Antonsen & Jorgensen, 1997; Bozeman, 2002; Jorgensen & Bozeman, 2007; Moulton, 2009). This so called normative approach to publicness becomes a process whereby public values as inputs result in public values as outcomes (Bozeman, 2007), making certain to understand the relationship between political and economic authority (inputs) and their ability to provide for public value outcomes.

Nonprofit Organizations: Between Public and Private

When examining Bozeman’s publicness grid, one can see that nonprofit organizations lie somewhere in between public and private organizations. Emmert and Crow (1987) label organizations that lie in between public and private as “hybrid” organizations. With nonprofits being in between the public and private ends of the dimensional model it is quite possible that there are differences in these organizations that are likely to result in organizational behavior and outputs that are different from private firms and government organizations.

Anheier (2005) provides an extensive list of characteristic differences in Table 1. In addition to public and private agencies, he adds nonprofit associations and nonprofit service organizations. When examining the differences, you can see that nonprofits have some characteristics similar to private firms, other characteristics similar to government organizations, and unique characteristics. These characteristics are likely to result in different behavior.
Table 1. Ideal-typical Comparisons of Nonprofits, Government Agencies and Businesses (Anheier, 2005, p. 184)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective Function</th>
<th>Business Firm</th>
<th>Government Agency</th>
<th>Member-serving Nonprofit (association)</th>
<th>Public Serving Nonprofit (service provider)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>Private goods</td>
<td>Public/collective good</td>
<td>Club goods</td>
<td>Collective and private goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution Criteria</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Orientation</td>
<td>External, indiscriminate (customers)</td>
<td>External, indiscriminate (public, citizens)</td>
<td>Internal, discriminate (members)</td>
<td>External, discriminate (targeted client group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Specific, clear</td>
<td>Complex, ambiguous</td>
<td>Complex, diffuse</td>
<td>Complex, clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability and control</td>
<td>Owners/shareholders</td>
<td>Voters through elected officials</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making</td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Indirect: Democratic</td>
<td>Direct: Hierarchical</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Quasi-voluntary (economic needs)</td>
<td>Automatic/coercive</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary/quasi-voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Purposive</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Solidarity/purposive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourcing</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>Coercive (taxation)</td>
<td>Donative</td>
<td>Donative/commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Weisbrod (1988), in his book *The Nonprofit Economy*, also looks at differences between nonprofit organizations, public organizations, and private for profit organizations. He suggests that public and nonprofit organizations are designed to focus on complex social problems. According to Weisbrod (1988), “Certain activities are in the public or nonprofit sector largely because of complexity of assessing them. Because these activities are not easily monitored and therefore rewarded (the strength of the private sector), society turns to other sectors to carry them out” (p. 55). Homelessness is one of those issues, characterized by difficult definitions of who and who is not homeless, multiple causes of homelessness, and a wide variety of solutions designed to end and prevent homelessness.

In their analysis of music festival ownership, Anderson and Getz (2009) provide a definition of these three sectors. Public organizations accomplish what is requested of them by public officials, with the organization providing services without revenue from customers. Nonprofits meet the interests of their volunteer members with a tradition of democratic management. Private firms produce services with profit as a goal and business-like relationships with their customers and suppliers.

Nonprofits are different from private for profit organizations and public organizations. However, in order to answer the question of whether the differences between government and nonprofit organizations impact the implementation of services provided to those who are homeless in North Carolina, this research examines the differences between government agencies and nonprofit service agencies along ownership and its two dimensions of funding and control. Choosing to use Bozeman’s theory of publicness allows the comparison of nonprofits and public organizations, as defined by their tax status, to look at the additional dimensions of publicness: political control and funding.

Public agencies are owned by the public through elected officials, while a nonprofit human service organization is owned by its members with operational control vested in a volunteer board of directors. This ownership difference can result in control mechanisms that are very different. Government will rely on regulations that change as political appointments change. It is assumed that nonprofits are controlled more like private firms in that they have
less formalization, more flexible rules, and fewer constraints than government (Eggleston & Zeckhauser, 2002; Hall, 1992).

Funding is an issue that is also very different between nonprofit and government organizations. According to Anheier (2005), “Public agencies are predominantly financed in a coercive manner through the government’s power to tax…Nonprofits, by contrast, ideally or typically rely on donative or philanthropic resources, including gifts and grants, dues, and public subsidies” (p. 182). It is noteworthy to remember that the “hollow state,” where government contracts with nonprofit firms for services, might influence the control mechanisms used within the nonprofit organization that may make it subject to similar rules and regulations as their government counterparts.

Ownership, funding, and political control will serve as the independent variables to be examined in this research. The dependent variable will be organizational performance. Organizational performance, in this context, will be examined through the lenses of effectiveness, equity and efficiency as outlined in the next section of this chapter.

**Publicness and Organizational Performance**

The dependent variable of interest in this research is organizational performance. George Boyne (2002) provided a literature review that identified six components of service performance as it relates to public sector organizations. These include the following dimensions.

- Quantity of outputs (e.g., number of operations performed in hospitals, number of homeless people sheltered, hours of teaching delivered in schools, number of houses built)
- Quality of outputs (e.g., speed and reliability of services, courtesy of staff)
- Efficiency (ratio of outputs to financial inputs)
- Equity (fairness of the distribution of service costs and benefits between different groups)
- Outcomes (e.g., percentage of pupils passing exams, percent of hospital patients treated successfully, percentage of homeless people who find permanent housing)
• Value for money (cost per unit of outcome)
• Consumer satisfaction (which may be a proxy for some or all of the above, depending on the questions posed to service users).

Building on Boyne’s work of organizational performance and coupling it with Bozeman’s dimensional model of publicness, Andrews, Boyne and Walker (2011) propose several models describing the impact ownership, control, and funding have on organizational performance. Figure 5 demonstrates one of the simple versions of the model that is used to guide the theoretical framework for this research. Ownership, control, and funding each influence performance. In the model and their review of the literature, Andrews, Boyne and Walker (2011) use three characteristics to describe and measure organizational performance: efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. According to the authors, “We focus on these performance criteria because much of the argument about changes in publicness is predicated on efficiency savings; effectiveness is concerned with achieving goals, so is central to the study of organizational performance; and equity is often argued to be the major advantage of state rather than private provision of services” (p. 1307).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5. Model of Publicness and Performance** (Andrews et al., 2011, p. 1305)

Andrews, et al. (2011) completed a meta-analysis that examines all three independent variables of interest - ownership, funding, and control - and their respective impacts on
organizational performance as measured by effectiveness, equity, and efficiency. Out of an initial search of 129 articles, the researchers excluded 98 from their review, leaving a total of 31 studies to be examined. Out of all these studies, only two included measures of all three dimensions of publicness. Twenty-nine of them analyzed ownership, six measured funding, and the two that measured all three dimensions of publicness were the only ones that examined political control. When examining each dimension’s impact on organizational performance, the researchers found that 21 studies examined effectiveness, 17 looked at efficiency, and only three cases explored equity as a dependent variable. This research adds to that body of theory by looking at all three of the dimensions of publicness and all three measures of organizational performance.

Political control is at the heart of a theory of publicness, yet only two studies look at that variable making any conclusions only tentative. Likewise, with only six studies focusing on funding and their results mixed in the sense that some studies show a minimal impact of funding on performance while others show no relationship between funding and performance, make any conclusions less than tentative. Ownership, while the most common independent variable examined, presents very ambiguous results. The majority of evidence with regard to effectiveness and efficiency suggest that many findings are insignificant. However, with regard to equity the evidence suggests that there are positive effects related to public organizations, despite the fact that there are only three studies addressing this issue.

The few studies and varied results justify the need for continuing to study publicness and its impact on organizational performance. Building on the research and theoretical model presented by Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011) and applying their model to the implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program in North Carolina, it is possible to create a series of testable hypotheses. For purposes of this study, the same characteristics of organizational performance will be used: effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Effectiveness will be defined as the ability to achieve the results of the HPRP program, in this instance stable housing at program exit, at the organizational level. Equity suggests that regardless of ability to pay, demographics, or complexity in the household situation, a household will receive services if they qualify for the program and that no one
group is favored to receive services. Finally, efficiency reflects some sort of measure of cost per successful outcome at a given unit of analysis. Each of these will serve as a dependent variable in the analysis and will be operationalized in the next chapter.

The next three sections focus on each of the three independent variables: ownership, funding, and control. Each section better defines these variables, discusses the relevant literature associated with the independent variables, and presents testable hypotheses. The three dimensions of publicness are separated because they each have theoretical differences that influence organizational behavior.

By way of introducing the next three sections, it is important to remember that there is no literature that looks at the differences between public and nonprofit organizations providing services to the homeless. This requires the use of other literature that builds on the overall theory of publicness related to factors of organizational performance. An overall summary of the following three sections is that public organizations are likely to take more risks in who they serve by providing greater access to services for more complicated clients (greater equity). Taking higher risk clients could actually reduce overall success rates for those institutions (lower effectiveness) and increase the cost associated with success (lower efficiency). In addition, public bureaucracies, as a result of their regulatory requirements, are perceived to be less efficient than their nonprofit counterparts.

Ownership

Traditional views of the impact of ownership on performance are drawn from the economic theory of property rights. Owners in private organizations are more likely to manage and control organizational behavior because of their direct financial incentive to produce profits. Their compensation packages and salary are likely to be based on the financial success of the firm. On the other hand, public sector property rights suggest that voters and public managers have little incentive to gain from higher performance. As a result, it is believed that public ownership is less efficient (Clarkson, 1972; Demsetz, 1967).

Management practices also influence organizational performance (Boyne, Jenkins, & Poole, 1999). Private organizations are believed to be more innovative and productive. Private sector managers are more likely to adopt their competitor’s strategies if they believe
it will lead to greater success. These organizations are often labeled as “cutting edge” because of the adoption of new management techniques.

Hybrid organizations, like nonprofits who lie in between the public and private sector, were studied by Lan and Rainey (1996). They surveyed public, private, and hybrid organizations in Syracuse, NY. Their results indicated that hybrid managers had the highest mean perceived effectiveness in achieving organizational goals when compared to both public and private organizations.

Kapur and Weisbrod (2000) examined differences in public and nonprofit nursing homes and facilities for the mentally disabled. The study’s authors used customer satisfaction as a measure of quality output. They discovered that for both types of facilities the statistically significant indicators of satisfaction all favored nonprofits. They also discovered that nonprofit institutions in both types of facilities received higher satisfaction ratings when it looked at rooms and furnishings, staff, and social activities.

Andersson and Getz (2009) studied 14 Swedish festivals. The festivals were classified into public, nonprofit, and private organizations. The majority of the study focused on identifying differences amongst the three types of organizations. However, a couple of additional findings are worth noting. The authors discovered that nonprofit festivals focus more on attractive programming and had a higher quality of festival when compared to public festivals.

Based on this summary, we would expect nonprofit homeless service providers to be providing more effective services when compared to public organizations. This leads us to the first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1. Nonprofit organizations receiving HPRP funding will have a greater success rate in stably housing more households at the end of the program than public organizations.

While Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2008) were unable to show differences in effectiveness or quality between public and nonprofit nursing homes, they did hypothesize that nonprofits would not serve as many Medicaid clients. In other words there was a greater equity, regardless of ability to pay, for public nursing homes. According to the authors,
Our study sought to evaluate its effects on service quality and access. Consistent with predictions from the ownership theory literature and the ample empirical research on nursing home quality, we found that for-profit nursing homes have significantly lower care quality compared to public and nonprofit nursing homes. Meanwhile, contrary to our expectation, nonprofit and public facilities were not statistically different. We also found that when compared to nonprofit and, in some cases, for-profit facilities, public nursing homes have a significantly higher share of Medicaid recipients (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2008, p. 345).

When a natural disaster affects a community, it is essential for people to have the access to all the disaster services available. Ensuring that the most people, regardless of who they are or how they are able to pay to get services, results in equity. Chikoto, Sadiq, and Fordyce (2013) hypothesized that nonprofits have fewer disaster mitigation and preparedness activities when compared to public organizations and more compared to private organizations. Two hundred and twenty seven organizations in the Memphis, Tennessee region completed a survey that looked at whether or not the organizations were prepared for disaster. They discovered that nonprofits used more disaster mitigation and preparedness activities than private organizations. While not statistically significant they also saw that public organizations used more disaster mitigation and preparedness activities compared to nonprofit organizations. These results imply that public organizations are more equitable with regard to accessing services when compared to nonprofits.

We would expect nonprofit homeless service providers to also have limited equity when it comes to service provision. The inequity is likely to take the form of less complicated households; households with fewer barrier levels to securing and maintaining stable housing. Nonprofits, for any number of reasons, are likely to provide services to a fairly homogenous group of households, in part because nonprofit providers may segment their services to a particular target population within those households who are homeless. Public organizations may take households with more barrier levels to housing in order to ensure equity and fairness to all that need service.
Hypothesis 2. Nonprofit organizations receiving HPRP funding will provide services to a less diverse group of households compared to public organizations.

Hypotheses 3. Nonprofit organizations will serve households with a lower average barrier level when compared to public organizations.

Research in primary health care begins to demonstrate the impact of ownership on efficiency. Wheeler, Fadel, and D’Aunno (1992) surveyed 575 outpatient substance abuse treatment facilities, stratifying them by private, nonprofit, and public firms. The highlights of the results when comparing just the nonprofit and public facilities across efficiency measures are interesting. The price per individual, group, or family therapy session is cheaper in the public facility. Yet the expenses associated with the cost of the therapy hour, including wages and salaries, is lower in the nonprofit facilities. It is difficult to assess the exact explanation for these differences, yet one could question the efficiency of the public hospital, and that leads us to another two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 4. Nonprofit organizations will on average use less service hours per stably housed household than the public organizations.

Hypotheses 5. Nonprofit organizations will on average use less financial assistance per stably housed household than public organizations.

**Funding**

In his introduction to the dimensions of publicness, Bozeman (1987) focuses on both economic and political authority as motivators of organizational behavior. Economic self-interest, the presence or absence of a profit motive, will drive choices in an organization. While both nonprofit and public organizations are not as concerned with the “bottom line” as private for profit organizations, there are still some implications of economic authority when comparing the two types of organizations.

Emmert and Crow (1987) examine what they label as hybrid organizations, those that are part public, part private. They suggest that Bozeman’s (1987) economic authority is consistent with Pfeffer and Salancik’s Resource Dependency Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and that “differences between public and private organizations lie in the degree of influence external forces exercise over critical managerial practices. When government has
the greatest influence, then the focal organization is more public. When government influence is diminished, the organization is more private” (p. 57).

Funding drives organizational behavior in that if the organization is receiving federal dollars they are more likely to act as government would require them. While all programs received government funding for the implementation of HPRP, some organizations have had more experience with administering government contracts than others. Nonprofit organizations who work with the government are more likely to act like the government, so it will be important to determine if there is a relationship between the percentage of government revenue these organizations receive and the variables associated with effectiveness, equity and efficiency.

As part of their study, Wheeler, Fadel and D’Aunno (1992) examined where an organization receives its funding and organizational performance in substance abuse treatment centers. They demonstrated that for profit centers are largely funded by private revenue sources with little government support (11%). Public facilities receive 80% of their revenue from the government. Nonprofit facilities have a mix of about two-thirds of revenue coming from public sources and one-third coming from private sources.

The way treatment is funded relates to two important issues. First, financing source differences may reflect systematic differences in the types of clients seen by the treatment units, in terms of clients' social and economic resources. Second, each funding source may provide revenue in several ways. The basis upon which units receive revenue—e.g., fee for service, capitation, lump sum grant, etc.—may provide diverse incentives for the organization of treatment (Wheeler et al., 1992, pp. 713-714).

The researchers discovered that about 32% of a public facility’s clients are unable to pay compared to 25% for the nonprofit treatment facility. Public facilities do not turn away anyone; however, nonprofits turn away approximately 2% of their clients seeking services.

Heinrich and Fournier (2004) also studied substance abuse facilities. Among a variety of independent variables, they looked at each facility’s sources of revenue, including the use of Medicaid and Medicare or other federal revenue, and the ability for a client to pay with
private insurance or their inability to pay. There were no statistically significant differences when examining the primary client level outcomes as measured by abstinence, an overall reduction in drug use and a reduction in the number of different drugs used. They also looked at an additional set of client related outcomes that are not directly associated with substance abuse but served as an indicator of potential client success. These outcomes consisted of clients continuing or beginning work, continuing or beginning full time work, and criminal activity. They discovered that as substance abuse facilities saw an increase in the Medicaid and Medicare population, there was a decrease in those continuing or beginning full time work and an increase in criminal activity. As facilities saw an increase in their other federal revenue, there was an increase in those who continued or began full time work. For facilities that saw an increase in those who paid through insurance there was a small increase in those who continued or began some sort of work.

By looking at the results of these two studies, one can begin to frame some hypotheses about funding’s impact on effectiveness. Depending on the funding sources, the public facilities are more likely to reach clients that are harder to serve (greater equity), which could lower their overall performance (lower effectiveness). When you couple this notion with the idea that as nonprofits receive more government funding they behave more like public organizations, the following hypothesis is suggested:

Hypothesis 6. For nonprofit organizations, as the overall percentage of government revenue increases, there is a lower success rate of stably housed households at the end of the program.

Emmert and Crow (1987) looked at hybrid Research and Development (R&D) labs in the context of their resource dependence and their proximity to public or private labs. They discovered that organizational differences with regard to meeting organizational goals, the lab’s products, are different across the categories. Private labs have products that are more proprietary compared to public organizations. It could be argued that the public products are more easily accessed than the private products owned by the private R&D labs (greater equity), with hybrid organizations aligning in the middle along a continuum associated with their public funding. Combining the results of Emmert and Crow (1987), Wheeler, Fadel, and
D’Aunno (1992), and Heinrich and Fournier (2004), hypotheses associated with equity begin to emerge.

Hypothesis 7. For nonprofit organizations, as the overall percentage of government revenue increases, a more diverse group of households receives services.

Hypothesis 8. For nonprofit organizations, as the overall percentage of government revenue increases, those households receiving services will have a greater number of barrier levels to housing.

Emmert and Crow (1987) also looked at administrative costs of the hybrid R&D labs and suggest that administrative costs will be higher in hybrid organizations. They suggest that the administrative costs are associated with the need for hybrid organizations to manage their complex external environment. Administrative costs are sometimes a measure of efficiency in nonprofits (Epstein & McFarlan, 2011). Their results suggest that for profits have very low administrative costs compared to hybrid organizations and public organizations. Even though they discovered that hybrid and public organizations have similar administrative costs, it is still possible to hypothesize that nonprofit organizations who are receiving more government revenue are more likely to behave like government with regard to efficiency measures. In the case of nonprofit organizations receiving HPRP funding, the following hypotheses are considered.

Hypothesis 9. For nonprofit organizations, as the overall percentage of government revenue increases, there will be, on average, an increased level of service hours per stably housed household.

Hypothesis 10. For nonprofit organizations, as the overall percentage of government revenue increases, there will be, on average, an increased level of financial assistance per stably housed household.

**Control**

Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011) draw on Nutt and Backoff (1993) to define control as follows:

Political control is likely to mean that organizations have priorities set for them, that these priorities change with a new ruling party (or a new government minister), and
that the fulfillment of political expectations is monitored and managerial behavior is regulated. Forms of political control in the public sector include audit, inspection, performance reports, the submission of plans, and limits on budgetary autonomy. (Andrews et al., 2011, p. 1304)

They go on to argue that such control may have adverse effects on public organizations because such demands can undermine efficiency and effectiveness. Divergent and sometimes conflicting political interests may prohibit meeting organizational objectives. However, it may be that this control is exactly what results in equitable access to services, suggesting that different measures of performance may be impacted by control. In fact, they go on to use Bozeman’s work to suggest that the impact of ownership and funding may be dependent on political control. Bozeman (1987) argues, “all organizations are public because political authority affects some of the behavior and processes of all organizations…Public pertains to the effects of political authority” (p. 17).

One of the best examples of the implementation of public policy and the use of political control comes with the adoption of welfare reform in the late 1990s. Hasenfield and Powell (2004) discuss the implementation of the Welfare-to-Work (WtW) Grants Program which provided funding to move people off of public benefits and become economically self-sufficient. Their results indicate the impact that political control has on the implementation of these programs.

Our findings suggest that the underlying premises of enlisting non-profit agencies to deliver WtW services to hard-to-employ welfare recipients must be seriously re-examined. The non-profit agencies are assumed to have unique organizational and service configurations that give them a particular advantage over public welfare-to-work programs in serving such a population…However, to capitalize on these advantages, the non-profit agencies need to operate in an institutional and political economy environment that supports and reinforces these attributes. Our findings suggest that the non-profit agencies contracted to deliver WtW services lack such a supportive environment. The elements in their environment that control their WtW funds and their welfare clients set explicit constraints on who they can serve, what
services they can offer and what service outcomes they are expected to attain. In particular, the agencies find that they have to implement a “work-first” program that for many of them stands in conflict with their dominant service ideology. In other words, both the granting organizations and the welfare departments dictate to the agencies a service delivery model that is generally at odds with their own service models. They do so by the evaluation criteria they impose on the agencies, by controlling the flow of clients, and by sanctioning allowable activities (Hasenfeld & Powell, 2004, p. 106).

In North Carolina, one difference in political control is represented by the differences between those communities receiving entitlement funding for HPRP and those communities receiving State funding for HPRP. Entitlement funding is money that came directly from the federal government to the local government for distribution to public organizations and/or private nonprofits, while state funding came to the local communities through the State of North Carolina; thereby adding an additional unique layer of implementation and reporting requirements. The added layer of government for programs funded through the State of North Carolina would predict that organizations receiving state funding would act more like public organizations compared to those organizations receiving federal funding only. Agencies receiving entitlement funding would have more positive outcomes, less equity, and greater efficiency. That leads us to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 11. Organizations receiving entitlement HPRP funding will have a greater success rate in stably housing more households at the end of the program than organizations receiving state HPRP funding.
Hypothesis 12. Organizations receiving entitlement HPRP funding will provide services to a less diverse group of households compared to those receiving state funding.
Hypotheses 13. Organizations receiving entitlement HPRP funding will serve households with a lower average barrier level when compared to those organizations receiving state HPRP funding.
Hypothesis 14. Organizations receiving entitlement HPRP funding will on average use less service hours per stably housed household than those organizations receiving state HPRP funding.

Hypotheses 15. Organizations receiving entitlement HPRP funding will on average use less financial assistance per stably housed household than those organizations receiving state HPRP funding

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided a general overview of the literature currently associated with publicness of organizations and organizational performance. It has presented testable hypotheses to help answer the question as to whether there are differences in public agencies and private nonprofit organizations in the implementation of homeless services in the State of North Carolina. The next chapter will outline the methods used to gather the necessary data to test these hypotheses.
CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODS

To this point the case has been made that public organizations differ from private nonprofit organizations. The theoretical underpinnings that predict how these types of agencies will behave have been outlined in the context of the implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program in North Carolina. This chapter is devoted to describing how the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 are tested.

The chapter consists of three sections. First is a description of the data set that was available and was manipulated for use in this research. The second is a description of phase 1, which focuses on the primary hypotheses to be tested. The third section is a description of a follow up qualitative phase that discusses the perceived role of the State of North Carolina in the implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program.

HPRP Data

The organizations receiving Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing funding in North Carolina were required to enter data into the Carolina Homeless Information Network (CHIN), North Carolina’s centralized homeless management information system. The system collects client-level information over a period of time. The information consists of characteristics, service needs, and services utilization of individuals experiencing homelessness, and it can be aggregated for program and public policy purposes. The data collected meets the specified federal guidelines.

Each client entered into HMIS is assigned a unique Client Identification Number. Households with more than one member enrolled in HPRP are also assigned a unique Service Household Identification Number. The data collected by CHIN in HMIS and associated with each client include basic demographic information such as age, race, ethnicity, gender, presence of a long-term disability, and whether the client is a juvenile parent. CHIN also tracks veteran status, employment status, number in household, annual household income, percentage that income is of county median income, and whether any benefits are received by the client. Additional data in HMIS include the primary reason for homelessness, where the client spent the night before seeking services, whether the client is currently homeless, length of time a client has been homeless, and whether the client is considered chronically
homeless. Based on HPRP definitions, case workers assess each client’s barriers to achieving stable housing and assign a value of 1 to 5 representing the barrier level. Case workers also evaluate whether a client has enough of a support system to achieve stability. Barrier level and whether a support system is present are entered in HMIS. Date of entry, date of exit, reason for exit, and destination on exit are also recorded.

Additional data about each service provided by HPRP agencies are collected on a per unit basis. Financial Assistance payments (e.g. current or back rent, utility deposits) are entered and reimbursed to agencies by exact dollar amounts. Of the Housing Relocation and Stabilization services, case management and housing search are billed and reimbursed based on 15 minute units of time spent by program staff. Credit Repair and Legal Services are billed at the exact dollar amount spent. All service units include the date the service was provided.

Data Conversion

There are 13,560 individuals who were entered into CHIN. Family members were eliminated so that data contained information about households: single individuals and heads of households. This distinction is consistent with how HUD captures data on homeless individuals and families. Pivot tables were created in Microsoft Excel to capture data at the organization level. Some organizations who received HPRP funding were fiscal agents where funding was passed through, so only organizations who entered client level data were included in the analysis.

There are 37 organizations in the database; 27 nonprofits and 10 public organizations. The public organizations included 6 departments of social services and 3 Local Management Entities (LMEs), the management agency responsible for ensuring mental health services across the state of North Carolina, and one housing department. Of the 37 organizations, 25 received funding through the State of North Carolina, and 10 received funding through their local community’s entitlement process directly from the federal government.

Two nonprofit organizations received funding from both the State and the local community entitlement program. Reporting required the agencies to divide who they served and how they tracked those served between entitlement and state funded systems in order to
ensure that households were not receiving support from both funding sources. For purposes of this research, when examining ownership and funding, the organizations were both classified as a nonprofit organizations. However, when examining political control, the organizations were removed from the data set in order to get a truer sense of the impact of entitlement and state funding.

**Dependent Variables of Interest Operationalized**

Based on the proposed model and hypotheses, the key dependent variable is associated with organizational performance. Organizational performance will be viewed through the lens of three distinct dependent variables: effectiveness, efficiency, and equity, consistent with the dependent variables suggested by Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011). In their review of 31 studies, the researchers found studies that measure effectiveness based on programs achieving service outcomes. This is also consistent with other nonprofit management scholars who suggest that program outcomes are a measure of effectiveness (Epstein & McFarlan, 2011). Building on these definitions, this research defines effectiveness as the average success rate of the HPRP program at the organizational level.

**Success rate**

Household status was measured at both program entrance and program exit. Households were classified as literally homeless, imminently homeless (usually based on the issuance of an eviction notice), unstably housed and at risk of losing housing, stably housed, and, in some instances, the housing status is unknown. Those households who were classified as stably housed at exit were considered a success. This was divided by the total number of households served by an organization to determine the overall success rate. This success rate will result in a continuous variable for each organization.

**Efficiency**

Efficiency implies some sort of cost per benefit achieved. Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011) share studies that look at organizational efficiency from a variety of perspectives, including costs per unit of measure such as kilometer or hour, employee productivity, and the efficiency in fee collection. Nonprofit organizational scholars have also measured efficiency in a number of ways, including administrative expenses as a percentage
of total expenses, program expenses as a portion of total expenses, number of output units divided by program expenses, etc. (Epstein & McFarlan, 2011). In the available dataset, there are two measures of efficiency assessed. The total hours of services provided by an organization can result when case management hours, outreach hours, and housing stabilization hours are added together. These total hours of service can be divided by the total number of stably housed households at the end of the program to determine the hours of service per stably housed household. A second metric combines the rental and utility assistance with rental and utility deposits, for a total amount of financial assistance provided by the organization. When divided by the total number of stably housed households at the end of the program, the resulting variable is the financial assistance per stably housed household. These ratios result in a continuous variable that can be used as dependent variables.

**Equity**

Equity as a measure of organizational performance related to ownership, funding and control is found in only 3 of the 31 studies reported on by Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011) and is typically associated with access to services. Within this dataset, barrier levels to housing are assessed for each household and each household receives a ranking of 1 - 5 based on their particular barrier level. One represents few barriers to housing, while 5 represents multiple barriers making stable housing unlikely. Table 2 describes each of the barrier levels assessed for each household eligible for HPRP assistance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Barriers to Getting Housing</th>
<th>Barriers to Sustaining Housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1. The household will need minimal assistance to obtain and retain housing. Other community resources may be available to meet the needs of these households. Consider using existing emergency assistance funds in designing program.</td>
<td>Criminal History: none Rental History: An established local rental history. No evictions, landlord references are good to fair. Credit History: Good, with the exception of a few late utility and credit card payments</td>
<td>No significant barriers except financial. Financial: very low income, insufficient emergency reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2—The household will need routine assistance to obtain and retain housing.</td>
<td>Criminal History: Household has no serious criminal history, but may have a few minor offenses such as moving violations, a DUI, or a misdemeanor Rental History: Limited or out-of-state. May have 1-2 explainable evictions for nonpayment. Prior landlords may report a problem with timely rent. Credit History: Shows pattern of late or missed payments</td>
<td>Financial: very low income, may have inconsistent employment, poor budgeting skills. Mental/Chemical Health: No serious mental illness or chemical dependency that affects housing retention. May have some level of depression or anxiety or problems responding to conflict. Basic Household Skills: May lack awareness of landlord-tenant rights/responsibilities. May have minor problems meeting basic household care/cleaning. Previous Episodes of Homelessness: May have been homeless once before.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3—The household will need more intensive and/or longer assistance to obtain and retain housing.</td>
<td>Criminal History: Household may have some criminal history, but none involving drugs or serious crimes against persons or property Rental History: Includes up to 3 evictions for nonpayment. Prior landlord references fair to poor. Credit History: Shows pattern of late or missed payments</td>
<td>Financial: Household is very low income, has periods of unemployment, no emergency reserves, lacks budgeting skills Mental/Chemical Health: Problems with mental health or alcohol/substance use that somewhat impacts compliance with tenancy requirements. Basic Household Skills: May have deficits in care of apartment, landlord tenant rights/responsibilities, communications skills with landlord and/or other tenants Conflict may exist in household Previous Episodes of Homelessness: May have lost housing and been homeless several times in past</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 4—The household will need more intensive and longer assistance to obtain and retain housing.</th>
<th>Criminal History: Violations may include drug offense or crime against persons or property Rental History: Includes up to five evictions for non-payment and/or lease violations. Landlord references poor. Security deposit may have been kept due to damage to unit. Credit History: Poor, late payments, may include judgment for debt to a landlord, closed accounts</th>
<th>Financial: Extremely low income, no emergency reserves, bank accounts closed, lacks budgeting skills. Mental/Chemical Health: May be using drugs/alcohol and/or has mental health problems. Basic Household Skills: May have conflict with child/ren or partner. May lack ability to care for apartment or communicate appropriately with landlord and other tenants. Previous Episodes of Homelessness: Has likely been homeless multiple times or for more extended periods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 5—Household needs longer or more intensive services; may need staff with more professional training. HPRP program refers household to appropriate program, such as intensive case management, permanent supportive housing or other local resources. Household may be enrolled in HPRP if there is a secure plan for permanent housing at or before 18-months.</td>
<td>Criminal History: Extensive criminal background Rental History: Extremely poor rental history, multiple evictions, serious damage to apartment, complaints Credit History: Includes multiple judgments, unpaid debts to landlords, closed accounts</td>
<td>Financial: Extremely low income, no emergency reserves, bank accounts closed, lacks budgeting skills. Mental/Chemical: Active and serious chemical dependency or mental illness Basic Household Skills: Unable to comply with lease requirements or interact positively with landlord/tenants; poor apartment management skills, out-of-control behaviors by adult or child/ren Previous Episodes of Homelessness: May have experienced chronic homelessness (multiple and/or extended periods of homelessness)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Equity is based on the barrier levels to housing and whether or not there is diversity in the distribution of the housing barrier levels served by the organization. This will be measured by the Simpson Index of Diversity (Simpson, 1949). Originating in the biological sciences, the Simpson Index of Diversity assesses both richness and evenness of species within a given habitat. It represents the probability that two individuals randomly selected from a sample will belong to different species. This index assesses the diversity of housing barrier levels served by the organization. A greater score on the index means there was a greater client mix. A lower score of diversity implies that the organization may have had a particular preference for a given type of client. Simpson’s Index of Diversity is represented by the simple equation of $1-D$, where $D=\sum n(n-10)/N(N-1)$. In this equation, $n$ is the total number of individuals with the particular barrier level and $N$ is the total number of barrier levels available. In this research there are five barrier levels. The Index of Diversity is a continuous variable assessed for each organization.

In addition, an average barrier level for each organization is computed. This is a simple ratio adding the barrier levels and dividing them by the total number of households served.

Table 3 summarizes the dependent variables and how they are being operationalized for this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Success rate Number of households stably housed at the end of; the program divided by the total number of households served</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Average Barrier Level Addition of all the barrier levels divided by the number of households served</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simpson Index $1-D$, where $D=\sum n(n-10)/N(N-1)$; $n$ = the total number of households with a particular barrier level; $N$ = total number of barrier levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Service hours per success The total number of service hours provided by the agency divided by the number of successfully exited households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dollars per success The total dollar value of all financial assistance provided divided by the number of successfully exited households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Independent Variables of Interest

The independent variables to be examined include ownership which is placed into two categories; public organizations and organizations that are private nonprofits. A series of hypotheses (1-5) predicts that public organizations and private organizations differ when it comes to measures of organizational performance. Simple means comparison tests to determine any differences in organizational performance by public or private organization are used (Wonnacott & Wonnacott, 1990). The same simple statistical t-test comparing means is used for the series of hypotheses associated with the impact of political control on measures of organizational performance (11-15). These hypotheses predict that those receiving state funds differ in performance from those organizations receiving direct entitlement funds from the federal government.

The third series of hypotheses (6-10) predict that private nonprofit organizations that receive more government funding will behave more like public organizations. The independent variable in this situation is determined by reviewing IRS form 990's for the year 2010 (one organization only had 2011 available). Section 9, line 1e contains the amount of government funding received by the organization. This is then compared to the total revenue found in Section 9, line 12. Unfortunately, only 21 of the nonprofits have available 990s, in part because some organizations are under the umbrella of larger affiliations/federations, i.e., Salvation Army or United Way. Despite this limitation, the resulting percentage of government revenue to total revenue creates a continuous variable that enables us to determine through a correlation if there is a relationship between the percentage of government revenue each agency receives and the outcome variables around efficiency, equity, and effectiveness (Warner, 2008; Wonnacott & Wonnacott, 1990).

It is quite possible that an agency’s overall budget could serve as a confounding variable that might have a similar impact on the measures of effectiveness, equity, and efficiency. As a result, the total agency revenue will be used as a separate control variable for analysis in the correlation. If any correlations between either of the independent variables and the dependent variables are statistically significant, an additional regression will be carried out in order to determine the potential confounding nature of total agency budget as it might influence the percentage of the budget that comes from government funding. Regression can
be used to control for the effect of the overall organizational budget (Warner, 2008) on the dependent variable.

Table 4 summarizes the independent variables of interest for this study.

Table 4. Independent Variable Operationalized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>501 (c)(3) or public organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>The amount of government revenue an organization receives divided by the total organizational revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Organization either received its funding from the State or from the Federal Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Improving Validity**

The quantitative analysis described above provides us with some answers to the research question. However, given the research question, the limited number of organizations, and the uniqueness of how HPRP is implemented, the proposed research could benefit from a mixed methods approach. According to Jose Molino-Azorin (2011), “The overall purpose and central premise of mixed methods studies is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination may provide a better understanding of research problems and complex phenomena than either approach alone, incorporating the strengths of both methodologies and reducing some of the problems associated with singular methods” (pp. 8-9).

Specifically, the mixed methods approach will be of a complementary research design. Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) identify five purposes for using a mixed methods research design. For this research, the approach will use mixed methods for complementarity purposes. According to the authors, “In a complementarity mixed-method study, qualitative and quantitative methods are used to measure overlapping but also different facets of a phenomenon, yielding an enriched, elaborated understanding of that phenomenon. This differs from the triangulation intent in that the logic of convergence requires that the different methods assess the same conceptual phenomenon” (p. 258).
While the theoretical framework provides support for hypothesized relationships between the independent and dependent variables, the uniqueness of the implementation of HPRP in North Carolina and the small sample size warrants the use of additional methods to explain the behavior of public and nonprofit organizations. Interviews of state personnel who implemented the program and program administrators of selected recipient organizations help make sense of the quantitative results. The state personnel interview has two parts. The first part is open ended questions that help create an understanding about the choice of agencies receiving HPRP funding. Questions include, but are not be limited to: Was there a deliberate choice in the types of organizations? Did they see or experience differences as state administrators of the program between the nonprofit and public organizations. What influence did they as the state leaders have with regard to the implementation that impacted the success rate, the diversity of clients receiving services, and the average cost of each successful rehousing? The second part of the state personnel interview shares the results of the quantitative analysis and asks them to share their impressions of these results. The full interview guide can be found in Appendix A.

The program administrators were randomly chosen from one of the following four categories: a public organization receiving entitlement funding directly from the federal government, a private nonprofit organization receiving entitlement funding directly from the federal government, a public organization receiving state funds, and a private nonprofit organization receiving state funds. The process of contacting interviewees, the informed consent process, and the recording of the interviews is described in detail in Appendix A.

The interview for the program administrators is also in two parts. First, general perceptions about the implementation process of HPRP were asked. Such questions include but are not limited to: Who did they receive training from? How did they implement the program in their agency? What did they perceive their success rate to be? Second, the quantitative results are shared with the providers and perceptions of these results are explored. In addition, they were asked about the influence of the state personnel in implementing the program. The complete interview guide for program administrators can be found in Appendix A.
Transcribed interviews were analyzed. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that “qualitative data are useful when one needs to supplement, validate, explain, illuminate, or reinterpret quantitative data gathered from the same setting” (p. 10). To that end the analysis of the interviews have two primary objectives. First, to improve the overall understanding of how exactly HPRP was implemented, beyond the programmatic theory driving the implementation. Second, the qualitative interviews were examined for explanations providing insight into the quantitative results. Specifically, the interviews were examined for either supporting or alternative explanations of the quantitative results.

Conclusion

This chapter presented the research methods used to collect the data necessary to test the proposed hypotheses found in Chapter 3. These hypotheses help us answer the research question of whether there is a difference between government and nonprofit organizations that impact the implementation of services provided to those who are homeless in North Carolina. Chapter 5 presents the actual results of the quantitative data based on the proposed theoretical framework. Chapter 6 reports the results of the qualitative data collected. The final chapter includes a discussion of both Chapters 5 and 6, an assessment of strengths and limitations in the research, identifies areas for future research, and presents a conclusion to the study.
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS

The preceding chapters have provided a program description of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program, the underlying theory behind the research and testable hypotheses, and the data collection methods for this study. This chapter outlines the results of the research conducted and will consist of three parts. The first section will review the results associated with ownership differences, examining the hypotheses generated about the differences between public and nonprofit organizations. The second section will look at funding and the impact that government funding has on the implementation of the HPRP program in private nonprofit organizations. The third section will look at political control by examining hypothesized differences between programs funded through the state and programs funded as a result of their community's entitlement funding from the federal government.

Ownership

For purposes of this research, ownership was determined based on the fact that organizations are either nonprofits and have their own 501(c)(3) tax exempt status or are under the federated umbrella of another 501(c)(3) organization and government run public agencies. Only organizations that had client level data that could be used to determine organizational level outcomes were used in this study. Table 5 shows a cross tabulation of all the organizations that have entered data into the Carolina Homeless Information Network system, and reflects the number of public and nonprofit organizations compared to where they received their HPRP funding.

Table 5. Nonprofit and Public Organizations Funded Through HPRP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Entitlement Funded</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonprofits</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Orgs</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are a total of 37 organizations: 27 nonprofits and 10 public agencies, who participated in the HPRP program and entered data into the Carolina Homeless Information Network, North Carolina’s Homeless Management Information System. In some ways this represents the entire population of organizations who serve clients through the HPRP program. Many would argue that it is unnecessary to do statistical analysis on the entire population. However, there are two things that led to the decision to continue using statistical testing. First, organizations in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, were like any other entitlement community. They did not participate in the Carolina Homeless Information Network and did not collect and record the same data as the rest of the North Carolina agencies participating in HPRP. Because their program requirements were the same as any of the other entitlement communities, we have to assume that this is a sample of all the organizations receiving HPRP funding throughout the entire state of North Carolina. The ongoing nature of organizations participating in the federal Continuum of Care process and the Emergency Solutions Grant program, both of which use strategies of prevention and rapid rehousing, suggests that this is a very unique sample of organizations likely to use prevention and rapid rehousing strategies in the future. Finally, there is a potential for some measurement error to occur between organization level analysis and client level data, and statistical testing allows us to have a measure of more confidence in conclusions drawn regarding this unique sample.

Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for this portion of the analysis as it looks at ownership in the form of the two types of organizations. The two independent categorical variables of nonprofit and public organizations are examined in relationship to the dependent variables. The dependent variables of interest reflected in Table 6 are defined as follows:

- **Success Rate** - The number of households who exited the program stably housed over the total number of households served.
- **Avg Barrier Lvl** – The average barrier level is an assessment of barriers to housing (1 = no barriers to housing – 5 = very difficult to house) and a measure of equity in that it reflects the type of households accessing services. This data point reflects the average barrier level of all the clients served by a particular agency.
Simpson Index – A measure of equity on a scale between 0, a homogenous group of households, and 1, an extremely diverse group of households. This index reflects the spread of the barrier levels to housing of each household served by the agency and captures both the richness and evenness of the households served within the five barrier levels.

Service Hrs per Stable Hshld – A measure of efficiency that is built on the total number of service hours provided by an agency divided by the number of successful households.

Financial Asst per Stable Hshld – A second measure of efficiency that takes the total amount of financial assistance provided by each agency and divides it by the number of successful households who are stably housed at the end of the program.

Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Nonprofit vs. Public Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success Rate</td>
<td>Nonprofit</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg Barrier Lvl</td>
<td>Nonprofit</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpson Index</td>
<td>Nonprofit</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Hrs per Stable Hshld</td>
<td>Nonprofit</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28.82</td>
<td>53.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17.99</td>
<td>15.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Asst per Stable Hshld</td>
<td>Nonprofit</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5464.46</td>
<td>3168.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3014.99</td>
<td>1545.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The success rate in nonprofit organizations indicates that 63% of those who were served were stably housed at the end of the program, while the public sector had a higher success rate at 81%. Based on the data found in Table 6 we can see that the mean Simpson Index for nonprofits is .59 and for public organizations is .65. The average barrier level is 2.3 and 2.4 (on a scale of 1 to 5) in nonprofit and public organizations, respectively. The Simpson Index score is between 0 and 1 and is a measure of the diversity of the clients served based on the barrier levels. While different, it does seem that both nonprofit and
public organizations are serving an equally diverse mix of households. Nonprofits averaged close to 29 hours per household in order to ensure they were stably housed and spent an average of nearly $5,400. Public organizations spent an average of 18 hours and $3,000 in order to ensure that households were stably housed at the end of the program.

The next step is to determine if, in fact, any of these differences are statistically significant. An independent sample means test was run with results shown in Table 7. When interpreting Levene’s Test, an F ratio is generated to determine which t-statistic to use in order to determine significance. An F ratio that is not significant allows us to assume that the variances are equal between groups and our analysis uses that t-statistic. However, if an F ratio is significant, we do not assume equal variances between the two groups and use that particular t-statistic to determine if there are significant mean differences between the two groups (Warner, 2008).

Based on this analysis, the F statistic for success rate is the only significant F ratio. The F statistic of 6.05 is significant (p < .05). This significance suggests that we take a more conservative approach and examine the t-test reported when equal variances are not assumed (Warner, 2008). Based on this analysis, the difference in success rates between the two organization types is statistically significant, t=-3.3, p<.05, with public organizations having a higher success rate (M = .81, SD = .12) compared to nonprofit organizations (M = .63, SD = .21).

When looking at the remaining dependent variables, based on the F ratio, we can assume that all variances are equal. The only dependent variable that is significant is the financial assistance provided for each household stably housed. The difference in financial assistance provided to households between nonprofits and public organizations is statistically significant, t=2.21, p<.05, with public organizations providing less assistance per client (M = 3,014.99, SD = 1545.48) compared to nonprofit organizations (M = 5464.46, SD = 3168.77).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Success rate</th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Levene's F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Success rate</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>-3.32</td>
<td>28.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Average Barrier Level</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>14.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Service Hours per Stably Housed Household</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>-.93</td>
<td>32.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Assistance per Stably Housed Household</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>28.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The initial screening of data for this section consisted of examining box plots for the means of the five outcome variables to be examined and the two categories associated with organizational type; private nonprofit and public organizations. There were two outliers that appeared in two of the five measures of the dependent variables. Each of those were removed and subsequent tests comparing the means was completed. There were no changes in significance levels.

In applying this to our testable hypotheses about ownership, it seems that all hypotheses are rejected. Hypothesis 1, which says that nonprofit organizations receiving HPRP funding will have a greater success rate in stably housing more households at the end of the program than public organizations, is not only rejected but the alternative hypothesis of public organizations receiving HPRP funding will have a greater success rate in stably housing more households at the end of the program compared to nonprofit organizations is accepted. Similarly, the alternative hypothesis to Hypotheses 5 is also accepted. This indicates that public organizations on average use less financial assistance per stably housed household than nonprofit organizations.

**Funding**

For purposes of this research funding, was determined based on the amount of government revenue a nonprofit organization receives divided by the total revenue. Initial data analysis included the descriptive statistics found in Table 8 for all continuous variables that will be used in this part of the analysis, including the control variable of total organizational revenue. There were only 21 out of the 27 nonprofits that had available 990s in order to collect this data. Correlations were run to look for preliminary relationships and are found in Table 9.
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Funding Related Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success rate</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Barrier Level</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpsons Index</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hrs/Success</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>157.18</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>33.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$/Success</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1716.56</td>
<td>10711.08</td>
<td>5288.19</td>
<td>2426.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% budget gov</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Revenue</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>63397</td>
<td>50019492</td>
<td>5776863.71</td>
<td>11073641.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 One organization failed to report government revenue on their 2010 IRS 990 form, despite having HPRP results, and was kept in the sample.

The Pearson Correlations were run to explore the relationship between the percentage of government revenue and the other outcome variables. These outcome variables which measure effectiveness, equity, and efficiency are the same variables used when examining organizational ownership. They include average barrier levels, Simpson Index, success rate, average number of service hours per stably housed household, and average financial assistance provided per stably housed household.

There are some interesting correlations identified among the five dependent variables of interest which will be discussed in Chapter 7 in the section focusing on additional research. However, there are two correlations associated with the percent of government revenue, the independent variable of interest. First, the correlation between percent of government funding and success rate is statistically significant, r = .499, p < .05 (one tailed). Second, the correlation between percent of government funding and financial assistance per stably housed household is also statistically significant, r = -.440, p < .05 (one tailed). Hypotheses 7 – 9 are rejected; the increase in percentage of government funding does not have a relationship on average barrier level, the Simpson Index of diversity, and the number of hours of service provided per stably housed exit.
Table 9. Correlations for Funding Variables of Interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Success rate</th>
<th>Average Barrier Level</th>
<th>Simpsons Index</th>
<th>Hrs/Success</th>
<th>$/Success</th>
<th>% budget government</th>
<th>Total Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Success rate</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Average Barrier Level</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.491</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simpsons Index</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.353</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Hrs/Success</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.678</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.509</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$/Success</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.516</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.305</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.431</td>
<td>.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
<td>% budget government</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.345</td>
<td>-.440</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>-.164</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>.457</td>
<td>.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variable</td>
<td>Total Revenue</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>-.087</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (1-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.456</td>
<td>-.167</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>.372</td>
<td>.360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
However, prior to failing to reject the proposed Hypothesis 6 and Hypothesis 10, it is essential that we look at the potential impact of the organization’s total budget, the control variable, on the nature of the relationship. A simple regression was done for both the dependent variables of interest, success rate, and the financial assistance provided for each stably housed household. The results can be found in Tables 10 and 11.

Table 10 indicates that the success rate’s relationship with government funding is positive and significant. As an organization’s percentage of government revenue goes up, the success rate goes up. While the $r^2$ is only .26, indicating a low predictive value of the percent of government revenue on success rate, it does lead us to reject our hypothesis because the predicted relationship was negative; the more government revenue a nonprofit organization had the greater likelihood they would act like government and have a lower success rate. This statistically significant positive relationship is consistent with the success rates seen in the previous analysis associated with ownership and supports the alternative hypothesis. This analysis suggests that acting more like government improves success.

Table 10. Regression Analysis with Success Rate as the Dependent Variable Controlling for Total Revenue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>.445</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>5.412</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% budget government</td>
<td>.355</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>.506</td>
<td>2.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Revenue</td>
<td>1.342E-9</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11 indicates that the relationship between financial assistance provided for every stably housed household and government funding is negative. However, when we include the organization’s total revenue as a control variable, the relationship is not significant. This leads us to reject Hypothesis 10 because the predicted relationship was positive; the more government revenue a nonprofit organization had the greater likelihood they would act like government and provide more financial assistance per successfully stable household. Despite
the lack of significance, this relationship appears to be consistent with the relationship seen in public organizations and nonprofit organizations with greater portions of government funding and the success rate of housing unstable households.

Table 11. Regression Analysis with Financial Assistance per Stably Housed Household as the Dependent Variable Controlling for Total Revenue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>6885.729</td>
<td>1059.749</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% budget government</td>
<td>-3618.877</td>
<td>1822.467</td>
<td>-.432</td>
<td>-1.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Revenue</td>
<td>1.908E-5</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control

The last series of quantitative results focuses on political control, which was defined as the difference between organizations who received entitlement funding from the federal government and those organizations that received state funding, an additional layer of government bureaucracy which is predicted to result in behaviors comparable to public organizations as a whole. Initially, a simple cross tabulation was done to show the number of agencies receiving the types of support. This is found in Table 12 below. It is important to remember that two organizations received both entitlement and state funding. Initially, they were treated as separate organizations. However, for the purpose of the final analysis they were removed resulting in 35 organizations.
Table 12. Number of State Funded and Entitlement Funded Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Level</th>
<th>State Funded</th>
<th>Entitlement Community</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonprofit</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the data found in Table 13, we can see that the mean Simpson Index for state funded programs is .62 and for entitlement programs is .59. The Simpson Index score is between 0 and 1 and is a measure of the diversity of the clients served based on the barrier levels. Only slightly different, it seems that both sources of government control result in an equally diverse mix of households being served.

Table 13. Political Level Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Level</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success rate</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entitlement</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Barrier Level</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entitlement</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpsons Index</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entitlement</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours per stably housed</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23.41</td>
<td>32.09</td>
<td>6.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entitlement</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35.78</td>
<td>78.74</td>
<td>26.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollars per stably housed</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5274.78</td>
<td>3235.38</td>
<td>660.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entitlement</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3827.56</td>
<td>2328.60</td>
<td>776.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both state funded and entitlement communities have an average barrier level of 2.3. The success rate in state funded organizations indicates that 72% of those who were served were stably housed at the end of the program, while the entitlement communities had a lower
success rate at 57%. Programs funded through the state averaged close to 23 hours per household in order to ensure they were stably housed and spent an average of nearly $5,300. Entitlement organizations tended to spend more time with their clients by spending an average of 36 hours and $3,800 in order to ensure that households were stably housed at the end of the program.

The next step is to determine if, in fact, any of these differences are statistically significant. An independent sample means test was run with the inclusion of the two organizations that received both entitlement and state funding. Those results are seen in Table 14. All of the Levenes’ Tests are not significant and indicate that the variances between state funded organizations and entitlement organizations are equal which is the assumption to be used for the subsequent t-test results (Warner, 2008). Based on the t-test results, there were no significant differences between the political control exhibited by the state compared to the organizations receiving funding from the federal government.

However, when you exclude the two organizations receiving both entitlement and state funding, the success rate appears to be statistically different, which can be seen in Table 15. Based on this analysis, the F statistic still allows us to assume that the variances between the state funded and entitlement communities is equal. The resulting t-test demonstrates that the difference in success rates between the state funded and entitlement communities is statistically significant, t=-2.11, p<.05, with state funded organizations having a higher success rate (M = .72, SD = .18) compared to entitlement funded organizations (M = .57, SD = .22).
Table 14. Independent Means Test of the Dependent Variables of Interest for State and Entitlement Communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness Success rate</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>18.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity Average Barrier Level</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>16.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpson Index</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>34.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency Hrs/Success</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>11.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$/Success</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>19.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15. Independent Means Test of the Dependent Variables of Interest for State and Entitlement Communities with Two Organizations Removed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success rate</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>13.95</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Barrier Level</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.19</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>13.36</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpson's Index</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>25.64</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hrs/Success</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.65</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>-.46</td>
<td>9.02</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$/Success</td>
<td>.22</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>20.11</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In applying this to our testable hypotheses about political control, it seems that all hypotheses are rejected. However, once again, it appears that the implied alternative to Hypothesis 11 is relevant and should be explored.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has presented the results of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3. None of the hypotheses were supported. In fact, in four instances the implied alternative hypotheses were supported. Hypothesis 1 suggested that nonprofit organizations receiving HPRP funding will have a greater success rate in stably housing more households at the end of the program than public organizations. However, the analysis indicates that public organizations have a better success rate. Consistent with this was the finding that nonprofit organizations with a greater portion of their organizational revenue comprised of public funding had a greater success rate, which is the exact opposite of Hypothesis 6. It appears that the alternative to Hypothesis 5 is supported, indicating that public organizations had greater efficiency by providing less financial assistance per successful household when compared to nonprofit organizations. Finally, it would seem that state funded organizations more successfully housed program participants when compared to entitlement communities, which is the opposite of our Hypothesis 11.

The use of qualitative interviews to complement this information becomes crucial when trying to make sense of these results. The following chapter explores alternative reasons for these results based on the qualitative interviews that were completed.
CHAPTER 6. QUALITATIVE RESULTS

When determining an answer to the question as to whether there are differences between government and nonprofit organizations that impact the implementation of services provided to those who are homeless in North Carolina, the answer appears to be yes. The analysis in the previous chapter did not support the original hypotheses built around Bozeman’s (1987) publicness theory. Yet, four of the implied alternative hypotheses turned out to be statistically significant suggesting that there are differences in the organizations, just not in the predicted manner.

The quantitative analysis demonstrates that government organizations implementing HPRP had a higher success rate than private nonprofits. Public organizations provided less financial assistance per successful household when compared to nonprofits. When looking at the nonprofits who implemented the program, those nonprofits who receive a higher portion of their organizational revenue from government funding, regardless of their total budget, had a greater success rate. Finally, when examining political control, organizations that had the added layer of state involvement had higher success rates when compared to entitlement communities.

These results challenge the original assumptions that public organizations are less effective and less efficient when compared to nonprofit organizations, and that political control would result in lower success rates. This chapter explores the rationale for the previous results by providing an overview of the qualitative data that was collected through 7 interviews. Adding a series of qualitative interviews, as described in Chapter 4, creates the opportunity to make sense of the results found in Chapter 5.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides an in-depth context for the process of the State’s implementation of HPRP. The information was gleaned from the interviews and provides a rich description of the process used in identifying organizations across the State who received HPRP funding. This context has some implications for results, which are discussed in that section.

The second, third, and fourth sections are all associated with the independent variables of ownership, funding, and political authority and their respective impact on the
dependent variables of effectiveness, equity, and efficiency. Each of these sections presents results of the analysis of the interviews, analysis that focused on looking for themes that helped us reject or fail to reject the study’s hypotheses and help explain these results. The interviews focused on each interviewee’s initial responses to the quantitative results found in Chapter 5. The analysis looked for explanations that either confirm or contradict the original hypotheses. The evidence is then used to begin looking at alternative explanations that might explain the quantitative results.

As the results are presented, it is important to maintain as much confidentiality as possible for the 7 people interviewed. In order to accomplish this, the interviewees will be labeled as either individuals who represent the state perspective or individuals who represent the provider perspective, either government or nonprofit organizations actually implementing HPRP in their communities.

Context Created with the Early Implementation of HPRP
Prior to the implementation of the ARRA across the country, the HEARTH legislation (a reauthorization of the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act) was being designed. In the proposed legislation, the traditional Emergency Shelter Grant program would add prevention and rapid rehousing to the list of services a community could provide that would be supported with federal funding. Leadership from the North Carolina Coalition to End Homelessness (NCCEH), a statewide nonprofit education and advocacy organization, supported other advocates and stakeholders from across the country in shaping that legislation. With the authorization of the ARRA, the HEARTH language regarding rapid rehousing and prevention created the program elements for the ARRA’s HPRP program.

Shortly after the signing of the legislation, the North Carolina Coalition to End Homelessness hosted trainings on the rapid rehousing and prevention aspects of the legislation for the entitlement communities. The Executive Director for the North Carolina Coalition to End Homelessness is part of a capacity building network sponsored by the National Alliance to End Homelessness which assisted the NCCEH in providing the training to entitlement community leaders. While not all the details of the program had been released, the NCCEH’s interactions with other advocacy groups and programs from across the country
enabled the information to be shared early across the state of North Carolina. Entitlement communities already received federal funding for homeless services based on a formula, they were largely urban based, and the HPRP program was going to distribute funding to entitlement communities with the same formula. It is important to note that these trainings only provided information about the HPRP program, the desired results and the primary strategies being funded. The trainings did not go into depth in how to provide case management services. Ultimately, it was left to the local entitlement community to implement the program.

It was unclear early on how the remainder of the state would access and distribute these program dollars. State administrators wanted HPRP recipient organizations not receiving entitlement funding to be successful. The State of North Carolina issued Requests for Proposals from organizations across the State, including a small number of applicants who already received entitlement funding. Successful applicants met with State officials as part of the process to determine whether they would actually receive funding to provide the housing stabilization services and financial assistance. One of the primary factors in this site visit was to determine if the potential recipient organizations of the HPRP funding would have the capacity to implement the project in a timely manner. The largest concern specified by the State personnel interviewed for this research was adherence to what the State believed to be best practices in these new program services, including the ability to adapt current organizational programs to the government requirements and regulations. According to one of the State administrators, “We still weren't sure that all of them really understood what they were signing up for, and in particular, we weren't convinced that all of them understood that they were signing up to implement a HUD program rather than asking for HUD money to continue doing their own program.”

State personnel were very concerned about organizations providing financial assistance and housing stabilization services to households that, in the long run, would not be successful. Prior to the use of HPRP funding there was little experience in communities with successful prevention and rapid rehousing activities. Traditional models of services delivered through emergency shelters, transitional housing programs, and permanent supportive
housing programs were not eligible for this funding. According to one of the State administrators,

We knew that housing stability was the goal. We knew that it would require a different approach than what most agencies had done. We recognized that many of the homeless programs that were part of the applications, that many of them did traditional homeless case management, which is, in many cases, very controlling and paternalistic and where you hang the housing over somebody's head to get them to comply, and so the case management can be extremely intensive and cover all kinds of stuff, and then on the other hand, we knew we'd have some DSS's applying where their Medicaid case manager has 800-something clients and so for them, it's just pushing paper from one to the other. So we knew that we were going to have to introduce a new type of case management, the housing stability case management, and help define the roles of that and how it was different from what other folks had been doing historically.

A great example of the concerns about the challenge in shifting program requirements was shared during one of the interviews. One of the state administrators who reviewed applications said,

When we talked about that you cannot terminate somebody from the program for noncompliance, I mean you could eventually in some ways, but not in the traditional way. One of the guys we were interviewing said, ‘Oh, yeah, yeah, we don't do that unless, of course, they cuss. And so if they cuss at our staff, then yeah, we terminate them. That would be allowable, right?’ And I said, ‘No.’ ‘Well, you know, if they turn down a job that's been offered to them, then they have to leave then. That'd be okay, right?’ No. And so there was a lot of -- we really had to define our terms and make sure people understood because there were a lot of buzz words and people just say they know them and they agree with them without any consistency of what that means. So basically we knew that that program would probably not get as good outcomes because we knew that that particular guy was going to have a really hard time embracing the paradigm.
Once organizations received their state funding awards, all state recipients were required to go through training. Training was two-full days and reviewed the federal program requirements and the State’s requirements for documentation associated with homelessness, barrier level assessment, eligibility determination, financial documentation requirements, case note requirements, and the process for reimbursement for services and financial assistance delivered, including entering all data in the Homeless Management Information System. Training was delivered several times during the first 18 months of the three year project. It was required of all State grantees and simply offered to entitlement communities who, generally speaking, did not take advantage of this particular training. However, many of the entitlement communities adopted many of the states’ assessment tools.

Organizations in the entitlement communities were selected through various methods. The two interviews from entitlement organizations revealed that the government jurisdictions receiving the entitlement funds used differing approaches. One used an application process that took the most competitive applications and created a program using the strengths of two different organizations. The other jurisdiction gathered a variety of providers and determined through a community conversation who could and would be able to deliver these services. Two different organizations were selected within this particular entitlement community. Based on interviews with the NCCEH leadership, entitlement communities used a wide variety of methods in distributing this funding throughout their local jurisdiction.

It is important to note that local government jurisdictions were the initial recipients of entitlement funding. However, unlike the State of North Carolina which prescribed specific program activities, the local jurisdictions served as fiscal agents, passing funds through their organizations to organizations delivering the direct program services. These local jurisdictions had monitoring requirements regarding fiscal accountability, but no program direction was provided to the organizations receiving entitlement funding.

**Ownership**

Organizational performance was measured by five different indicators in the three overarching categories of effectiveness, equity and efficiency. The selection process used by
the State and entitlement communities did not really consider whether the organization was public or a private nonprofit.

**Effectiveness**

Success rate, the only indicator used to measure effectiveness, was impacted by the nature of the organization. Public organizations had higher success rates than private nonprofits. When asked about the possible explanations for the difference in success rates between the two types of organizations, a couple of interesting suggestions emerged during the interviews for this research. One of the alternative explanations is that the public organizations provide a variety of other services that may have proven helpful to those seeking HPRP assistance. Two of the organizations interviewed were local Departments of Social Services. One of the public agency administrators said,

The only thing I would say to that is the public agencies I’m presuming had other resources to put behind them to assist families. I would say maybe a lot of the other – maybe the public agencies have a wealth of knowledge and understanding of the community and so even if they couldn’t help internally, maybe they knew where to reach out resourcewise to help. Maybe that’s sort of a corollary to what I’m saying but I think that may be part of it.

Based on this assessment, it is quite possible the local public organizations were able to refer eligible households to additional services such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and other means tested federal assistance programs. Unfortunately, the available data does not allow us to say for certain this was the reason for the difference in success rates between nonprofits and public organizations.

One of the nonprofits that received federal entitlement funding suggested that the additional credit counseling services their organization provided helped with success. The local program administrator said,

I brought a little bit of a different perspective because not only did I run the housing program, but I ran the credit counseling. So, I had access to classes and everything for our folks, and that’s something that we had always done. It’s great. You get the case management, and you have to do two of these credit and budgeting classes while your
get financial assistance. This counted as your participation, right, and I think it really helps.

Both State and local interviewees mentioned turnover as a potential challenge for differences in success rates. State personnel mentioned specific organizations that had challenges in staff turnover. The state administrator said,

Some of our nonprofits -- there were /sic/ turnover in all of our organizations, I think. I think there were like two organizations that had the very same people doing the program at the end as the beginning, but the public organizations transferred the information better than the private nonprofits. I remember us several times saying, ‘Oh, you lost your staff person, and now you’re not doing things right anymore and you needed more training, and we’ll provide it because we want this to be a success.’ I don’t remember that for the public organizations I’m thinking of. I don’t remember quite that level of our involvement in the retraining.

One of the local public organizations that received state funding felt as if some of the nonprofits were actually not staying true to their initial mission. Trying to provide new services that were outside their original organizational scope of services compromised the success rates. This was also verified by the State interviews, even though during site visits the State made attempts to discourage what might be labeled mission creep for the purposes of revenue.

**Equity**

Equity was measured by the average barrier level and the Simpson Diversity Index. There were no organizational differences in the type of households served. In training, all organizations, both public and private nonprofit organizations alike, were encouraged to work with those who were going to be successful. The trainers urged organizations to not take households with multiple housing barriers that would not succeed.

One of the State administrators believed that public organizations may, in fact, find it easier to refuse services to the more difficult to serve as opposed to the nonprofits, in part because nonprofits have less experience turning clients down for services. Another State administrator believed that because public organizations were used to following government
rules and regulations, that the request by the state to serve those who were most likely to be successful influenced the fact that they served folks with fewer barrier levels. However, the quantitative data did not reflect this prediction.

Lower barrier levels did not always result in stable housing because of landlord related issues. One of the interviewees from a public organization, a Department of Social Services funded by the State, shared the example that some of the single men with multiple challenges could have scored a 3 or 4 and been eligible for the program, but when it came to the landlords allowing them to rent, they were excluded because of their criminal history.

Efficiency

It is interesting to notice that nonprofits used more service hours and provided more financial assistance than their public counterparts. However, only financial assistance was statistically significant, indicating that the public organizations had a lower financial investment per successfully exited household than the nonprofits. Some might believe that the client population served might be different, yet the barrier levels presented upon assessment by the households were comparable between the two types of organizations. There were no specific comments about this efficiency metric available in the interviews because this result was discovered after the interviews had taken place, a limitation of the study discussed in Chapter 7.

Funding

In the previous chapter we discovered that nonprofit organizations that received a greater percentage of their revenue from government funding had similar results to public organizations. Specifically, these nonprofit organizations had a higher success rate. This relationship, while consistent with the findings associated with organizational ownership, were inconsistent with the predicted theory about the role funding plays in organizational performance.

When asked about this series of results, State level and program level administrators had relatively few comments and thoughts that were different from those captured and reflected in the previous section on organizational ownership differences. One of the program administrators reiterated the fact that she experienced some of the nonprofits moving away
from their mission to secure additional funding for their program and that this in the long run would reduce the success rate of the households served. According to this local program administrator,

I think the nonprofits that have a stronger revenue, multiple grant opportunities are invested in what they’re doing. The smaller just starting up nonprofits sometimes follow the grant funding and then design the program, instead of being invested in ‘this is our mission, this is our vision’… Let’s just be real. There are some that create the nonprofit and have a broad vision of what they want to do, but then follow where the money is. Honestly, I see that, and I see that even in our own community. But I think the ones that have multiple grants and a higher revenue and a strong board made up of leaders from our city and county, realtors, bankers, they’re strong, very, very strong. Their mission and vision is pretty straightforward. They don’t create this new program because there’s funding over there.

One of the State administrators was surprised by the positive relationship between success rate and percent of government revenue. The state administrator expected that government funding would not necessarily result in success, which is consistent with the predicted hypothesis but inconsistent with the results found in the previous chapter. According to the administrator,

It seems reasonable for -- well this is just a disturbing statement about government in general, but it seem reasonable that the more share of their money that is government that the higher the share of the money that is government, the better they would do at making me happy at the state with my bureaucratic hurdles. It doesn’t -- I’m surprised at this, I’m surprised that it’s actually successful at the end of the day with the clients. I kind of want there to be a distinction between how well you handle paperwork and how well you serve people, but it seems like everything that you’ve talked about indicates they are pretty connected.”

While originally thinking that the ability to meet the bureaucratic requirements would lead to inefficiency and poor success, the administrator acknowledged that the results are showing something different.
**Political Authority**

It was hypothesized that organizations that had an extra layer of government as represented by the State funding, when compared to those who received direct entitlement funding, would perform similarly to public organizations. State funded organizations would be less effective, more equitable, and less efficient. Entitlement funded communities, on the other hand, would perform similar to the private nonprofits. These entitlement organizations would be more effective, less equitable, and more efficient than their state counterparts. However, none of the organizational performance variables of effectiveness, equity, and efficiency supported these notions. In fact, the success rate was the exact opposite of what was hypothesized. The success rate was highest in the state funded programs when compared to the entitlement programs.

During the interviews both state and local program administrators acknowledged that the state had a significant amount of influence over the programs receiving state funding. One of the local entitlement programs interviewed actually talked about the differences they had with the state. According to the entitlement funded program administrator,

The state made all their forms. We initially made all our own forms for the entitlement funding, and then some of them we had the option to use the state forms if we wanted to, and on a lot of them I did because they were decent forms….The risk assessment form that we all used, I didn’t find it very helpful, but I, of course it’s data that somebody’s going to want someday, so we certainly did it.

The State’s control did not necessarily translate into the entitlement communities using the program structure proposed by the State of North Carolina. One of the state level administrators explained this as follows:

So I actually did a tour where I went across the state and met with each entitlement jurisdiction and met with whoever the grant administrator was. Usually it was a couple of people, and I was on an information tour where I would explain the program, this is going to come, here’s some materials, and then we created a dialogue group with those leaders so they could learn from each other. We also encouraged the state to make sure whatever the state was creating that they would push it out to entitlements so everybody didn’t have to reinvent the wheel. So most, -- I mean
everybody did it differently. Entitlements did it differently, but many entitlements ended up following the state model or at least using some of the same forms.

State administrators had actually thought that entitlement communities might be more effective because of the greater resources in the more urban communities; citing more available housing and less conflict of interest in terms of households being served, i.e. the funded program serving family and friends who qualified for the program, as reasons for the predicted success of entitlement communities. However, it seems that the consistency in the program strategies and accountability created by the state helped differentiate the state funded program’s success rate.

Based on the interviews and a greater understanding of the implementation of HPRP in North Carolina, there are some additional explanations for the lack of differences seen between entitlement and state funded programs when it comes to equity and efficiency. There are two statewide entities that work with the local jurisdictions on homelessness, the North Carolina Interagency Council for Coordinating Homeless Programs (ICCHP) and the North Carolina Coalition to End Homelessness (NCCEH). The ICCHP is an official state body providing coordination to state-level activities dealing with homelessness and assisting city/county governments in developing plans and policy responses. The NCCEH is a statewide non-profit organization focusing on homeless issues and serving as a liaison with the ICCHP and the state legislature. In addition to providing information and lobbying the legislature, the NCCEH is active in helping local jurisdictions secure SOAR training so that the homeless and other disabled individuals can qualify for social security disability payments in a timely manner as well as developing a statewide Homeless Management Information System. They provide technical assistance, research, and support the Continuum of Care Balance of State application designed to secure federal funding for homeless activities.

As a result of the work of these two entities, there are 12 Ten Year Plans to End Homelessness across the State of North Carolina. These plans have been created since the early 2000s when ten year plans were being developed across the country as a response to the growing challenges of housing those who are homeless. Thompson and Scavo (2009) in an
unpublished conference paper discuss the work of these two organizations in building the 10 year plans across the State. Developing the plans had common processes. The researchers describe the planning processes and their similarities across the state. Many communities across the state used the same process of engaging broad community participation. According to the researchers,

All of the planning processes also relied on coalitions of city and county government bodies and staff, local non-profits representing such groups as the local United Way, faith based groups, shelter providers, soup kitchens providers, and other social service agencies. In addition, they all sought to include law enforcement representatives and local members of the business community…In addition, all of the planning efforts sought input from an even broader array of community members by holding public forums, informational sessions, and focus groups…The broader efforts were focused on involving members of the community in the development of the plans overall objectives as opposed to the actual report writing and scheduling of events. In a very real sense, these efforts represent good examples of collaborative networking.


Thompson and Scavo (2009) also discussed how the same federal and state leaders were present at all the initial planning meetings, both of whom encouraged plans to use what other plans had created. In addition, the ICCHP and NCCEH promoted the cross fertilization of strategies across the State of North Carolina as communities developed ten year plans to end homelessness. Finally, it is noteworthy that many of the plans are quite similar in content and included definitions of homelessness, assessments of current services and gaps, cost estimates for homelessness, and recommendations associated with increasing affordable housing and services available for the homeless.

Despite these common elements, each community implemented its 10 year plan differently. Depending on infrastructure and funding each community started ending homelessness in a different manner. For example, in one community the United Way has served as the primary agency leading the effort. In another community this function has been placed within the city’s Community Development Department. A third community created a
separate nonprofit organization whose sole purpose is to coordinate the activities identified in the planning process. Each of these examples demonstrate the difference that can occur as a community implements a similar plan.

The NCCEH played a unique and limited role that might provide further explanations as to the differences in the success rate. According to one of the state level administrators, I think the coalition was really involved like in the beginning setting it up. They were the first ones kind of saying, hey this is coming, provided base knowledge, helped with the curriculum and the program design. At some point the NCCEH really backed off because it wasn’t their implementation, and didn’t have control of how they, the state and entitlement communities, were going to implement it.

This points out the fact that entitlement communities had information about the best practices and the intent of HPRP without any ongoing oversight or influence from an external monitor. They took responsibility to implement the program on their own. The State on the other hand controlled the process being used by its funded agencies. The State defined the best practices, created the forms and tracking mechanisms, and trained case workers on their new roles and responsibilities in this model. This consistent control plays a role in the differences in success rates. In some ways the desire for this consistency and political authority stems from what one of the State administrators characterized as communities not understanding “that they were signing up to implement a HUD program rather than asking for HUD money to continue doing their own program.”

**Conclusion**

This chapter has presented results from the qualitative interviews completed as part of this research. It provides greater context for the implementation of HPRP in the State of North Carolina and begins to make sense of the results that were presented in Chapter 5. The next and final chapter will integrate and summarize these results in order to explain why many of the hypotheses presented were rejected.
This research started by looking at one of the most challenging social problems facing the US today, the problem of homelessness. Despite the many different types of agencies providing services to those who are homeless and the growing data that is available at the client level, there has been no systematic examination of the organizations providing those services in the context of a community’s response to homelessness. Through this research we have explored the implementation of the federal Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program in the State of North Carolina. As the program unfolded and took shape across the State both public and private nonprofit organizations provided services. This opportunity enabled the researcher to examine potential differences between these two types of organizations. This chapter discusses the results seen in Chapters 5 and 6 based on the dependent variables of interest; success, equity, and efficiency. There is a specific discussion of political control and its role in publicness theory. The remaining sections present limitations of the current research, make recommendations for future research, and offer a final conclusion.

Discussion of Results

The research question for this study is: Are there differences between government and nonprofit organizations that impact the implementation of services provided to those who are homeless in North Carolina? The theoretical framework used to answer this question is Barry Bozeman’s publicness theory (Bozeman, 1984, 1987). Publicness theory suggests that public and nonprofit organizations are more than two simple types of organizations. In addition, public and private nonprofit organizations are influenced by funding (economic authority) and control (political authority). The simple model of ownership, funding, and political control’s impact on organizational performance (see Figure 5 in Chapter 3) used in this research came from the study by Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011). Using the dimensions of publicness as independent variables and three measures of organizational performance (effectiveness, equity, and efficiency), the answer to the research question is yes, there are differences in public and nonprofit organizations that impact the services provided to those who are homeless in North Carolina. Unfortunately, the answer is more complex because the
hypotheses built based on the publicness theory are all rejected, implying that there is no
difference between nonprofits and governments. However, four of the implied alternative
hypotheses were supported and the qualitative data adds further explanations for these
findings.

It was expected that public organizations are likely to take more risks in who they
serve by providing greater access to services for more complicated clients (greater equity). In
turn, these higher risk clients could actually reduce overall success rates for those institutions
(lower effectiveness) and increase the cost associated with success (lower efficiency). It was
also expected that nonprofits because of their lack of bureaucratic control would be flexible,
meet the needs of those they serve, and do so more cost effectively. In fact, these are many of
the reasons that government chooses to contract with nonprofits to provide human services in
the first place. However, the results did not support any of these assumptions. In fact, some
of the data actually contradicts these hypotheses.

The rest of this section will discuss these results and it will be organized in a slightly
different manner than previous chapters. Instead of organizing the discussion based on the
independent variables of ownership, funding, and control, the discussion will focus on the
dependent variables of success, equity, and efficiency. Embedded within these sections will
be discussions of the independent variables of ownership, funding, and control as
appropriate.

**Success**

Based on the quantitative results in Chapter 5, public organizations are more
successful than their nonprofit counterparts in stabilizing those who are homeless or at-risk
of homelessness. Furthermore, nonprofits with larger portions of their organizational revenue
made up of government funding had greater success rates. Success rates also varied between
entitlement communities and state funded communities, with the state funded communities
being more successful at stabilizing households. All of these results are exactly the opposite
of what was originally hypothesized based on theory.

North Carolina state level administrators exerted influence in the use of a new
housing stability case management model (as opposed to a transitional housing model) that,
when coupled with the household type that it was intended for based on barrier levels, could result in success. While there is no clear definition of these two distinct case management models, the differences were discussed by the state administrators as crucial in determining who received funding for the implementation of the HPRP program.

Chapter 2 discussed the divided philosophies in providing homeless services: those who believe that homelessness is caused by a problem that needs to be fixed in order to obtain and maintain housing and those who believe that housing is stability and supporting households to move into and maintain that permanency leads to success. Based on the qualitative explanation from several interviewees at both the program and state level, the suggestion is that those who were able to implement the paradigm shifting best practices of prevention and rehousing activities, without regard to familiarity with these strategies, received funding. It also suggests the capacity of local organizations, either public or private nonprofit, that have experience with and can adapt to this level of political control were successful at stabilizing households.

Organizational capacity was a key element in selecting organizations that were to be successful. The State of North Carolina in its desire for agency success looked for the capacity to implement this program. According to one of the interviewees with a state perspective,

I think there were capacity issues. There’s always nonprofit capacity stuff, but sometimes it’s easier to give money to public, to government units because you know they have the capacity, and some of the areas, and we see this in the Balance of State Continuum of Care, mostly although you probably see it in urban areas, too, people really want to help, and they really want to follow their heart, and they’re called to do this work, but they don’t really have a board, or they don’t have the financial capacity or even the professionalism. So I think there was a lot of screening for that; is this a viable organization that can take a government grant and use it responsibly? So I think that was definitely one of them, and then I’m trying to think like what was the other, -- I mean some of the stuff was just basic like did they apply for stuff that was eligible. Do they seem to have gotten the gist of the program? Do we think that
they’re going to, -- this is a different program than we’ve done before. Do we think that they’re going to be able to adapt to it?

Perhaps this concept of capacity confounds the results of the overall study, particularly as it relates to success. Perhaps it creates a selection bias in the research when looking at this population of agencies. That is likely to be the case. However, the data set did not have indicators of organizational capacity, aside from experience in working under government funding. The qualitative interviews did not uncover any particular capacity related criteria by which agencies were selected, with the exception of being able to understand and implement the new model. The consistency of looking for capacity and selecting specific agencies that could do the work may actually represent political control when viewed through the lens of publicness theory. If that is the case, then it benefits the government to be able to deliberately differentiate capacity and select those organizations that are going to succeed.

Having bureaucratic processes in place seemed to serve organizations well. The experience of complying with the requirements of government funding, including a new program model, seemed to be one of the elements leading to that success in both public and nonprofit organizations. The bureaucratic process of ensuring that staff turnover does not impede the achievement of program goals was another explanation for the success of certain organizations, particularly government organizations. Finally, the ability for public agencies to easily access additional services, particularly other means tested federal programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly known as Food Stamps) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, seems to be important in ensuring that households become stably housed. While total budget was controlled for in the analysis of nonprofit organizations, the exact number and types of complementary services these nonprofits had within their agency is unknown. It is possible that nonprofits with more complementary services, even services such as the example of budgeting, may have influenced the success rates within nonprofits.
Equity

As a result of the state program’s political control and influence, the potential differences in equity between public and nonprofit organizations may have actually been minimized. The state program emphasized the importance of households succeeding. They encouraged organizations to work with those whom they knew would succeed and discouraged taking clients with multiple barrier levels. This is reflected by the average barrier level of 2.3 out of a scale of 1 (minimal housing barriers) to 5 (large number of housing barriers) and no differences in diversity between the organizations as measured by the Simpson Index. These results were similar regardless of the amount of government funding received by nonprofits and regardless of whether the programs were located in entitlement communities or state funded communities.

In the long run it would seem that if a community’s system of homeless services were really meeting the needs of diverse households who are homeless or at-risk of homelessness there would be differences between the types of households served and the organizations providing services. Some organizations may be better in working with those who have barrier levels of 1 or 2, while others may have strengths in serving those with barrier levels assessed at 4 or 5. This can only be accomplished by the system using a tool similar to the barrier levels assessment instrument used in this program. It would require that the inter-rater reliability of the case managers using the barrier assessment is high and that the data is collected and recorded in HMIS.

With the implementation of the ongoing HEARTH legislation, communities across the country are being judged on their overall system of homeless services through their Continuum of Care application. In fact, some communities will be able to receive designation as a “high performing CoC.” One of the key elements in becoming a high performing CoC is to have a centralized intake/coordinated assessment where households receive one assessment to enter the array of homeless services. Using a standardized housing barrier assessment challenges the current prevailing practice where organizations and their programs within a community assess households based on their program entrance requirements. Will the client succeed in my program? This research demonstrates how important the barrier
assessment tool is in being able to standardize the assessment of each household’s unique circumstances in a way that allows researchers to compare households regardless of the organization and its program priorities and requirements. A standardized assessment tool also enables communities to develop a household typology that can be used to identify the appropriate housing program based on the client’s needs as opposed to the program entrance requirements.

**Efficiency**

Efficiency was measured with two indicators: the average number of service hours per stabilized household and the average amount of financial assistance per stabilized household. Based on the quantitative analysis of Chapter 5, public organizations are more efficient. They provide lower amounts of financial assistance to households that had similar barriers to those receiving similar amounts of services from nonprofit organizations. While not significant, the negative relationship between the percentage of government funding and the amount of financial assistance provided found in the nonprofits is consistent with the idea that governments are more efficient than their nonprofit counterparts. In other words, nonprofits with a greater percentage of government revenue act more like government than organizations with a smaller portion of their revenue made up of government support.

It would be prudent to be cautious about simply accepting these results. If a household was eligible for and received additional services, such as SNAP, TANF, or even budget counseling services from another program, then the true number of service hours and financial assistance may be underestimated. The same argument could be made for the administrative costs associated with program implementation. Each organization, along with the State of North Carolina, had administrative costs in the implementation of the program that if added to the true cost may increase the overall costs and subsequently the efficiency of the organizational outcomes. However, if we take the perspective that this efficiency is about appropriately targeting program dollars to the clients that are intended to receive the services, then perhaps these costs are appropriate. If that is the case, it emphasizes the importance of being able to assess household barriers in a way that is coordinated and comprehensive so that the right households can easily be moved into the right program services as opposed to
assessments that screen for participation in a single program where appropriate referrals may or may not be made.

There was some concern expressed in the qualitative interviews about the lack of difference in efficiency measures between the State of North Carolina and the entitlement communities. The concern stemmed from the fact that the administrative funding taken by the State of North Carolina was not considered in the costs and that it seems that adding these costs might increase the inefficiency of the state funded projects. There are two important things to note given this concern. First, administrative costs were not considered for any of the organizations. Second, given the nature of the implementation and the cooperation seen between the NCCEH and the State of North Carolina, including the training components provided by both entities to both entitlement and state funded projects and the subsequent use of some of the State’s processes by entitlement communities, it is reasonable to assume that similar behaviors would occur in organizations across the state regardless of their location or their source of HPRP funding.

**Political Authority and Control**

The original hypotheses associated with political control assumed that the extra layer of government intervention represented by the State of North Carolina would encourage organizational behaviors leading to outcomes more similar to government when compared to nonprofits. Entitlement communities did not have the same government control as State funded programs and it was predicted that organizational behavior would result in outcomes more similar to the nonprofit organizations - they would be more effective, have less equity, and be more efficient. There were no statistical differences between entitlement communities and state funded communities with regard to equity or effectiveness. However, state funded communities were more successful than their entitlement counterparts.

Based on the qualitative interviews, it became clear that the combined efforts of the North Carolina Coalition to End Homelessness and the State of North Carolina led to a more consistent understanding of the program across the state. Staff from NCCEH helped train entitlement communities on the prevention and rapid rehousing strategies that were being used in other parts of the country and were the key program elements of the HPRP program.
Yet entitlement communities each implemented HPRP in their own unique way. The same NCCEH staff worked closely with the State of North Carolina to design key program elements for implementation at the state level and at that point there was a divergence in how the state and entitlement communities behaved differently.

The State was able to create rules, systems of accountability, and participation requirements, including the use of the housing barrier assessment and HMIS data entry, as requirements for reimbursements. While not required to participate with the State some of the entitlement communities, as a result of the influence of the NCCEH, used similar processes and procedures as the State program and others did not. In fact, one entitlement community did not enter data into the Carolina Homeless Information System, the one system used by all other entitlement and state funded agencies.

However, the consistency created by the combined influence of both the NCCEH and the State of North Carolina understanding of the HPRP program was not sustained beyond the early stages of implementation, and this lack of consistency seemed to impact the success of the programs. The state’s political control was exercised when selecting agencies, regardless of the type of agency, that understood and had the capacity to deliver a specific set of interventions. These interventions were optional for entitlement communities and it is uncertain how these agencies were selected from community to community. The selection process could have been different depending on the community. This political control continued as training was required by the State of North Carolina for its grantees and their case management staffs. Again, these trainings were optional for entitlement communities. The lack of consistent oversight and accountability led to the differing success rates between entitlement and state communities.

It is important to note the complementary nature of the nonprofit and government in what resulted in the overall political authority or control of the implementation of HPRP in the State of North Carolina regardless of whether or not funding was received from the federal government or the State of North Carolina. Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011) presented a couple of additional models based on publicness theory that suggested that 1) political control has an interactive effect on organizational performance, and 2)
organizational characteristics can moderate organizational performance. Specifically, they go back to Bozeman’s original argument that all organizations are public and suggest this notion implies that ownership and funding have weak effects on performance. According to the authors “Public organizations that pursue the narrow objectives of senior bureaucrats rather than those of politicians and citizens are ‘out of control’ and unlikely to perform efficiently, equitably, or effectively. Similarly, the impact of private ownership and funding on performance may be wiped out by tight government regulation of organizational strategy, processes, and products” (Andrews et al., 2011, p. 1305).

This research also suggests that political control has an interactive effect on ownership and funding but it is quite different from how Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011) describe this political control. Government was more successful and seemingly more efficient with regard to financial assistance compared to nonprofits. Based on barrier levels, the government and nonprofits served similar clients and provided the same level of services. Nonprofits with larger portions of their revenue coming from government acted more like government, including more success, when compared to nonprofits with minimal government funding as part of their revenue stream. State funded organizations, which had an additional layer of bureaucracy, were also more successful than the entitlement communities.

In the literature review, one of the newer aspects of publicness theory mentioned was what publicness scholars have labeled the “normative approach” to publicness (Bozeman, 2007). According to Stephanie Molton (2009), the normative approach

… operationalizes publicness through public values, defining publicness as the extent to which organizations express attachment to public values and/or provide for public values. In contrast to descriptive measures of publicness, public value operationalizations of publicness are not limited to influences from government, but include external and internal influences that both embody public values and may constrain an organization to provide for public values (Moulton, 2009, p. 890).

Molton (2009) goes on to define a framework that combines the dimensional approach to publicness with the normative approach. Her framework could be an approach to future research that helps in situations where you see a strong nonprofit, in this case the
NCCEH, working closely with government organizations. Her framework focuses on the initial public values created by legislation, the public value institutions involved in implementing the program, the strategies used through policies and management practices, and the subsequent realized publicness as demonstrated by both outputs and outcomes. The key research questions become: What role do the public value institutions, such as NCCEH and the State of North Carolina, play in creating public outcomes? What role do implementing organizations, such as those contracted by the state or federal government, play in the creation of the public values expressed in the original intent of the legislation?

**Limitations**

The first limitation to this study is the inability to secure interviews from the initial randomly selected entitlement and state funded nonprofit program administrators. Despite trying four different state funded agencies, no state funded agency was interviewed for this study. Attempts to contact these agencies were made via both email and telephone over a period of four months, including engaging the assistance from a primary State administrator in helping identify and contact additional agencies. It is unclear whether or not additional incentives for participation would have made a difference in the participation of these organizations.

While an entitlement nonprofit was secured, it was not originally identified through the random selection process. Again because the two original agencies did not return phone calls or emails, alternative options were created. The nonprofit funded through the entitlement process was located in the Triangle area of North Carolina. Both the entitlement funded public agency and entitlement funded nonprofit agency were located in the Triangle region. These two agencies were located in different counties in the region and were the only agencies receiving funding in the county.

It is curious that the nonprofits were more difficult to engage in participating in this study when compared to the public organizations. It makes one continue to question a nonprofit’s capacity to participate in activities that are beyond the scope of their service provision priorities.
Another limitation of the study was discovered after the interviews were completed. As a result of a mistake in data analysis, the statistically significant difference in financial assistance provided for each stable household between the nonprofits and public organizations was not presented to the interview participants. However, many of the explanations that for issues of success rate still hold true for this dependent variable. If households were eligible for and received additional funding through other mainstream programs within public organizations, it is quite possible the cost of housing assistance was lower.

This same challenge occurred after it was recommended to exclude the two agencies that received both entitlement and state funding. This occurred late in the research process and resulted in uncovering a statistically significant finding: state funded organizations were more successful than their entitlement community counterparts. The interviewees did not have a chance to respond directly to these results.

Another limitation was the inability to control for external factors that might impact the success of households. The number and availability of affordable rental units is difficult to assess in different communities. Landlord behavior, as was mentioned in Chapter 6, can undermine the success of a household, and there is no way of assessing individual landlord behavior. We do not know the degree to which the skills, ability, and qualifications of case managers influenced the outcomes. Finally, it was impossible to know the additional types of services that were available to any of the participants across each of the different communities and which, if any of those services, might have contributed to the additional success of the household.

While the whole HPRP program presented a great opportunity to investigate the implementation phase of a program, it is limited by its temporary nature. The program was approved, designed, implemented, and completed within a period of three years. It is difficult to say whether or not the lessons learned during a short project period are generalizable to programs that are longer in length. It is also difficult to translate the lessons from the implementation here in North Carolina to other states as states tended to implement the
program differently. Finally, we do not know what the long term success of households is after they exit the program. What happens 6 or 12 months after they have left the program?

**Additional research**

This research has created an opportunity for even more research in the area of homeless services. First and foremost it would be important to look into greater depth at some of the statistically significant correlations associated with the service delivery hours per success rate that were presented in Chapter 4. The service delivery hours per success were negatively correlated with success rate, implying that as service hours went up, success rates went down. However, when you couple the relationship with success rate with the positive correlation associated with average barrier level (which implies that as the barrier levels increase, service hours per successful household increase) and the negative correlation associated with the Simpson Index (implying that the more diversity seen in household barrier levels, service hours per successful client decreases), there is an interesting story about the impact of services on the success rate. When you couple the significant negative correlation associated with service hours per successful client with the significant negative correlation between financial assistance provided per successful client, one can begin to question the value of the services and financial assistance. Perhaps who you choose is more important than the type and amount of assistance provided. Both of these are compelling research questions.

In fact, one of the local program administrators suggested that financial assistance may not be the real reason for success. According to the local program administrator,

*It’s never the money. Really. Because what I think I learned from that whole experience was people can be successful with that $1,000, and they can be successful with $10,000, but it’s how motivated they are and how willing they are to dig in, right? It’s not easy. It’s never easy to find housing when you have crappy credit and criminal history, but there are landlords out there. One of the things you can’t do is you can’t do it for people because it doesn’t help them feel better, right. If they have a vested interest in finding that housing, I think it’s a huge self-esteem thing, and so we guided, but we never did for them. You know what I mean? You could go with them*
and look at places, but you helped them find places at the same time, and then it’s kind of staying in there, and I think that a big focus on budget is huge. So we budgeted every time they got paid we budgeted, and that was just a requirement, right, because life happens.

In Chapter 1, Hasenfield’s (2010) picture of “nested eggs” (see Figure 1 in Chapter 1) that describe the many layers between policy design and policy outcome help us identify even more opportunities for research. It suggests that between the organizational level and the actual client outcome, or policy outcome, there are important aspects associated with the street level workers, or case managers in this example, and the relationship between the case manager and client. Do the case managers understand the differences associated with the new model of housing stability case management? Do they all have the same educational background? Where do they fall in the housing debate? Do they believe that homeless households need to be fixed or do they see the benefits of moving quickly into permanent housing? Do they all administer the barrier level assessments in the same way? All of these are questions that remain unanswered and play a role in the actual policy outcome.

The available qualitative data could be used to do more front end theory building, particularly as it relates to the implementation of public policy from the program administrator and case manager perspective. For this research, the qualitative interviews were a valuable methodological tool to help explain the results that disagreed with the original theoretical perspective presented. Redesigning the program administrator questionnaire and adding questions targeting front line case workers that focus more on their direct experiences with the clients they served and the way they provided those services could help explain those particular layers between policy design to policy outcome (Hasenfeld, 2010).

Other qualitative methods, particularly case studies comparing organizations, particularly any sort of outliers, would provide additional information. It would be possible to explore and compare organizations that have high success rates with organizations that have low success rates. One could examine in-depth what led to the high or low success rates. Perhaps comparing agencies serving highly diverse households with low levels of diversity could provide information on how households are chosen by case workers. Once
that in-depth qualitative research was completed, it might even be possible to review the additional quantitative data to see if there any changes or additional explanations for differences between the organizations and within the group of organizations of the same type. The implementation of HPRP provides many opportunities to study the movement from policy design to policy implementation.

Implications for Theory and Research

This research has been built around the theory of publicness that continues to be used for research in public administration, policy implementation, and organizational studies (Bozeman, 2013). However, the traditional differences between public, nonprofit, and private organizations that the theory tries to explain are proving to be elusive when it comes to the actual evidence supporting those explanations. This study attempted to answer some of the same questions, with similar results and answers.

The implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program that was part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided an unprecedented opportunity to study the rapid design and implementation of a federal program. This opportunity also provides us with many lessons. Some of these lessons are described in this section.

The cooperative nature between a statewide nonprofit, whose role is advocacy and education, and state government is crucial in understanding how to design an effective
program. To have an awareness of both best practices and the direction of federal policy design enabled North Carolina to disseminate information quickly and as accurately as was possible at the beginning of the program. Anticipating the challenges between traditional case management practices that have been used by practitioners and the nuances of a new service delivery model and addressing those in the design process helps avoid future problems. The ongoing training provided by the State of North Carolina ensured the success of the model’s implementation. It is easy to wonder if the State had not provided consistent training and oversight whether their success rate would have been different from entitlement communities.

Entitlement communities may not know best. Entitlement communities received their funding based on a predetermined formula and were left to design and implement their program. Assumptions about capacity, local resources, large populations in need, and knowledge of best practices do not necessarily result in successful outcomes.

Building the capacity for states and communities to understand these social problems from a systems level perspective will be key to solving these problems. It is important to examine not only client level success, but case worker knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes, organizational capacity and policy design elements and best practices, All of these are part of the system for changing the outcomes for those who are unstably housed.

Systems thinking helps communities understand the value of an instrument such as the barriers assessment tool used in this program. While not perfect, it is an example of how valuable this common assessment tool can be in appropriately placing diverse households in the diverse programs within a community. It can also help each community get a true sense of the needs seen in the community.

**Conclusion**

This research has been the first of its kind to look at organizations that make up a system comprised of government and nonprofit organizations who work to prevent and end homelessness. The implementation of the Homeless Prevention and Rapid Rehousing Program across the State of North Carolina provided an opportunity to examine how a federal public policy is implemented and results in a public outcome, in this instance stably
housed households. The results from this research challenge the theoretical framework that leads us to hypothesize that public organizations are more equitable, less efficient, and less successful.

In the preface of their book, *Nonprofits and Government: Collaboration and Conflict*, Boris and Steuerle (2006) say,

Nonprofit organizations and government try to address many of the same societal problems, but not always in the same ways. Their relationship has long been both symbiotic and adversarial, with events and opportunities continually coloring or governing their interactions. The sectors can cooperate on one issue while butting heads on another, continuously prodding the other to do more and do it better (Boris & Steuerle, 2006, p. xi)

The implementation of the HPRP program across North Carolina demonstrates an example of where a state-wide nonprofit and state government can cooperate and quickly implement a program that meets the expected policy outcomes by bringing each of their strengths to the table. The statewide nonprofit helped identify and encourage the use of the innovative prevention and rapid rehousing strategies. State government was able to create the rules, paperwork, and accountability procedures to ensure the successful implementation of these strategies through their funding process. It seems essential that in moving forward that government and nonprofit organizations systematically identify their unique strengths and abilities in order to prevent and end homelessness.
REFERENCES


Interview Guide for the State Level Program Administrators

I'm doing a study examining organizational performance. I want to understand how organizational characteristics can impact the implementation of the HPRP program.

How did you choose organizations to receive funding for the HPRP Program? What was success, in your mind? What did you believe would result in success for the organizations you chose? Was the type of organization that you considered important? Particularly the difference between public and private nonprofit. Did you anticipate any differences in success based on organizational type? Access? Efficiency? Did you believe that the type of organization mattered in terms of access to services? Why or why not? What did you anticipate about the impact of barrier levels in terms of people receiving services? What influence did you as the state administrators have on the success, access, and efficiency of the programs that were funded, if any? How did that influence manifest? Trainings? Site visits? Did you have to stop funding? What was your role with the entitlement communities, if any? Were they required to come to your statewide training? Were you responsible for monitoring them? Do you have any sense that entitlement communities influenced state funded communities or vice versa in the implementation of HPRP? If so, what?

So, I've seen some interesting results from some initial analysis and I want your impressions of this work.

I defined success as those who exited the program stably housed compared to the total number of households served. Based on a division between organizations who were public and those that were private nonprofits, the public organizations had a higher success rate.

- What are your impressions or thoughts on that?
- Do you think there is an explanation?

What is also interesting is that I looked at the ratio of government funding/total revenue and those private nonprofits who had a higher ratio of government funding tended to have higher success rates.

- Any thoughts on that?

I looked at barrier levels as a way to determine access. What was interesting was that the average barrier level was 2.3 across all programs/households.
• Does that mean anything to you?
• There were no differences in this for any of the organizations – public/nonprofit or entitlement/state. We often hear that different types of households lead to different results, yet there were common households (in terms of barrier levels) but yet different success rates between private and nonprofits. What might be another explanation?

I had two measures of efficiency: Service hours per household and financial assistance/household. There were no differences again between the organizational type and their impact on these measures of efficiency.

1. Any impressions of that?

Furthermore, I tried to see if these two results influenced the success rate and found no relationship there. Again, our assumptions are that services and financial assistance matter, and yet, the quantitative differences we see are based on the public/nonprofit split.

1. What are your impressions?
2. What might be an alternative explanation?

That concludes my questions.

Do you have any additional thoughts about the implementation of HPRP in the State of North Carolina that you think would be important for me to understand?

**Interview Guide for the Program Directors**

I'm doing a study examining the implementation of the HPRP program.

I'm interviewing four program directors from across the State that were randomly selected from the following four pools

1. Public organization receiving entitlement funding
2. Private nonprofit organization receiving entitlement funding
3. Public organization receiving state funds
4. Private nonprofit organization receiving state funds.

So here are my questions:

1. What was your experience of implementing HPRP for your organization?
   1. Were you already in the organization? Were you hired with the funding?
   2. What training did you receive? From whom?
   3. Based on your own experience, what worked and what didn't?
4. Do you believe you were successful? Why or why not?
2. Think of the households you served. How would you characterize them? Were there specific issues associated with your assessments of barrier levels that you remember most?
3. Ultimately, your program made choices of who received funding and who didn't. How did you determine that?
4. Were you funded by the State or through the Entitlement process?
5. The state hosted trainings for those who were receiving state funds. Did you attend those? Was it required of you? What do you remember about those trainings?
6. What influence, if any, do you believe the State office had on the implementation of the HPRP program across the State? How did that look? What did you hear from State staff? Did they monitor you? How did they monitor you? Site visits? Reviewing paperwork?
7. As an entitlement funded project, did what the State require matter to you?
8. Do you believe there was any difference in the implementation between those of you who received money from the State and those that received entitlement funding? Why or why not?

So, I've seen some interesting results from some initial analysis and I want your impressions of this work.

I defined success as those who exited the program stably housed compared to the total number of households served. Based on a division between organizations who were public and those that were private nonprofits, the public organizations had a higher success rate.

- What are your impressions or thoughts on that?
- Do you think there is an explanation?

What is also interesting is that I looked at the ratio of government funding/total revenue and those private nonprofits who had a higher ratio of government funding tended to have higher success rates.

1. Any thoughts on that?

I looked at barrier levels as a way to determine access. What was interesting was that the average barrier level was 2.3 across all programs/households.

2. Does that mean anything to you?
3. There were no differences in this for any of the organizations – public/nonprofit or entitlement/state. We often hear that different types of households lead to different results, yet there were common households (in terms of barrier levels) but different success rates between private and nonprofits. What might be another explanation?

I had two measures of efficiency: Service hours per household and financial
assistance/household. There were no differences again between the organizational type, or state vs. entitlement organizations, and their impact on these measures of efficiency.

1. Any impressions of that?

Furthermore, I tried to see if these two results influenced the success rate and found no relationship there. Again, our assumptions are that services and financial assistance matter, and yet, the quantitative differences, in success rate only, we see are based on the public/nonprofit split.

1. What are your impressions?
   1. What might be an alternative explanation?

That concludes my questions.

Do you have any additional thoughts about the implementation of HPRP in the State of North Carolina that you think would be important for me to understand?