

ABSTRACT

LEHMANN, CAROLIN. Experimental Framing Effects regarding Immigration and Integrated Threat among Germans and Americans (Under the direction of Dr. Ryan Hurley).

Research on news framing consistently has shown media messages' potential to influence the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of those exposed; however, few studies to date have examined the effects of news framing of refugees and still fewer have considered this issue internationally. Understanding how news messages impact people's beliefs about refugees seems imperative given the current American and European refugee and migrant crises, especially considering that the most common way citizens learn about such issues is via the news media. Therefore, a 2 x 3 between-subjects experiment was designed to measure the impact of exposure to *refugee* versus *migrant* news frames on integrated threat theory's concepts of perceived realistic threat and symbolic threat. Participants in the control group took a questionnaire while those in the treatment groups were asked to read a short newspaper article exposing them to either the refugee or the migrant frame before completing the same questionnaire as the control group. German ($n = 142$) and American ($n = 131$) participants were recruited for an international comparison, with each group completing the study in their respective languages. These data suggest that different frames did evoke different threat perceptions in some cases. Findings suggest that Germans experienced generally higher threat perceptions when exposed to either frame, while Americans reported significantly higher levels of symbolic threat when exposed to the migrant frame, $t(68) = -4.18, p = .00, d = 1.0$. This is a first step towards understanding international news framing of refugees; however, because it measured only one-time exposure to these frames and did so in only two

countries there are limitations to these data. Future research should expand on the findings herein with longitudinal examinations of a larger number of countries worldwide.

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Experimental Framing Effects regarding Immigration and Integrated Threat among Germans
and Americans

by
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A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
North Carolina State University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science

Communication

Raleigh, North Carolina

2017

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DEDICATION

Für Mama, Papa, und Claudi.

BIOGRAPHY

Originally born and raised in Germany Carolin Lehmann is a Graduate Assistant and Public Speaking Instructor of Record in the Department of Communication at North Carolina State University in Raleigh, NC. She is pursuing her master's degree in communication at North Carolina State University. She earned her B.A. in American Studies with a minor in International Relations and International Organizations from University of Groningen in Groningen, the Netherlands.

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Her academic interests range from gender and racial studies to media effects, specifically Lehmann is interesting in framing theory and how new media can influence and shape current events.

Her undergraduate thesis "From Shonda Rhimes to Olivia Pope – How Scandal Response to a Backlash Against Black Feminism" centered around black feminism and black epistemology in the era of social media.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Ryan Hurley of the Communication Faculty at North Carolina State University. Dr. Hurley continuously supported me throughout this process and gave me necessary advice whenever it was needed. Thank you, Ryan, for making me a better researcher, especially when it comes to quantitative research methods.

I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew Binder and Dr. Melissa Johnson for their feedback, valuable insight, and attention to detail.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for support and encouragement.

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Despite the existence of official definitions of terms like refugee, migrant, and immigrant, research has shown that many immigration-related terms are used interchangeably, sparking debate about the correct and incorrect usage of these terms (Thorbjørnsrud, 2015; Berry, Garcia-Blanco, & More, 2015; Polson & Kahle, 2010; Taylor, 2015; Marsh, 2015). Research regarding framing has demonstrated how different news frames, or word choices made by journalists that characterize and interpret the facts within an article, can influence readers' attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). If this connection holds up in the context of immigration, then journalists' choice of the word *migrant* over the word *refugee* could impact the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of native citizens regarding people who have either legally or illegally relocated to their country. Framing research has provided great insight regarding media depictions of welfare and poverty (Iyengar, 1990), racial stereotyping (Entman, 1992), and support of racist groups (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). In spite of framing research's history of addressing underserved populations, it has rarely been considered in conjunction with integrated threat theory (ITT), which could provide concepts relevant to a study of framing and immigration (see e.g. Johnson, 2012).

Immigration-related news is prevalent in both the U.S. and non-U.S. populations. Driven by civil war, poverty, terrorism, and corruption, millions of people have left their home countries in search of a better future ("Figures at a glance," n.d.). Europe, especially Germany, has been a dream destination for many as it is estimated that Germany welcomed

more than one million people in 2015 (Donahue & Delfs, 2016). Considering that the majority of these newcomers are of Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi nationality (“Migrant Crisis,” n.d.), the recent executive order signed by President Donald Trump in January 2017 has sparked conversations worldwide about the legitimacy of this policy (Baker, 2017; “Merkel lehnt Trumps Einreiseverbot ab,” 2017; Flores, 2017). Considering the impact of the current migration wave on countries like Germany and the U.S., it seems both imperative and timely to better understand both Germany’s as well as American’s media content’s ability to activate negative beliefs about migrants and/or refugees within current citizens. Therefore, an experiment was designed to study the effects word choice (e.g., migrant versus refugee) within immigration news as related to integrated threat theory’s concepts of symbolic threat and perceived realistic threat. Furthermore, using an international sample of German and American participants to study such issues, important and new cross-cultural comparison can be made furthering our understanding of immigration-related media effects as experienced in different countries and languages.

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review

Immigration and Communication

Carefully defined terminology allows for effective communication and common understanding (Suter, et al., 2009). When definitions become fuzzy or terms become improperly interchangeable, miscommunication is bound to happen; and, research has noted that the terms *refugee* and *migrant* are commonly used interchangeably (Berry et al., 2015).

Simply put, the terms refugee and migrant do not mean the same thing. According to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

In other words, since 1951, refugees have been recognized and are protected by the highest legal entity, international law through the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The principle of non-refoulement “prohibits the return of a refugee to a territory where his or her life or freedom is threatened” (UNHCR, 2011). Once classified as refugee, a person is under the jurisdiction of international law and cannot, by definition, be accused of being *illegal*.

Migrants, as opposed to refugees, lack any international recognition and only enjoy state jurisdiction. They are defined as people who “choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons” (Edwards, 2015). There is no non-refoulement provision for those classified as migrants. Consequently, a migrant’s legal status is regulated through temporary visas, such as work visa, issued by a host country. A migrant *can* become illegal if he/she violates the permissions of such temporary visa.

As should be apparent, the interchangeable usage of these terms could result in problematic effects experienced by those exposed to the improper usage. For instance, falsely labeling a person who is officially classified as refugee as migrant not only downplays that person’s circumstances, but could also raise concerns about her/his legal status. Generally, interchangeable usage could lead to a connection between legal refugees, illegality, and threats to the current population.

Immigration and Media Effects

Immigration has been studied in a multitude of different academic fields, including political science (e.g., McMahon & Ebrary, 2015), sociology (e.g., Morawska, 2009), and psychology (e.g., Berry, 2001). In the field of communication, researchers have examined immigration-related media content (e.g., Gorp, 2005) and media’s influence on public opinion, effects on identity, and consequences for immigration policies. For example, Gorp (2005) conducted a content analysis focusing on the news coverage of asylum-seekers to Belgium and found evidence for the portrayal of newcomers as intruders. Furthermore, Seate

and Mastro (2015) used intergroup emotions theory and found that in-group identification increased when exposed to a news story about immigration that could potentially harm the reader economically or politically. For this reason, it seems that in-group and out-group status might be related to beliefs about immigration.

Framing Theory

The origin of framing theory can be traced back into two main fields, psychology and sociology (Cacciato, Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2016). As Cacciato et al. (2016) note, literature around framing theory stemming from psychology is concerned with *how* information is presented rather than *what* information is given, or *equivalency framing*. On the other hand, framing research rooted in a sociological background tends to be interested in *emphasis framing* and investigates *what* information is given rather than *how* such information is presented (Cacciato et al., 2016). The two most prominent sub-categories of emphasis framing include thematic framing, or placing an issue in its wider general context, and episodic framing, which focuses on coverage of one specific issue (Iyengar, 1991). One of the main differences between equivalency and emphasis framing is that emphasis framing triggers existing schemas in a person exposed to a frame rather than trying to change that person's attitudes about a certain issue at hand. In this research study, equivalency framing will be used.

Generally, framing theory investigates the overall theme, called frame, of a message (Hurley, Jensen, Weaver, & Dixon, 2015). Word choice and overall tone are powerful means to frame an issue which can sway the reader's opinion about the specific matter (Abril,

Binder, Nan, Nevar, & Rojas, 2014). Since “frames are devices that build [...] associations between concepts,” they function “to suggest how audiences can interpret an issue or event” (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009, p. 19). In other words, frames “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). As a result, studies on framing theory have shown correlations between the use of frames and behavioral changes when measuring peoples’ immediate reactions (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009); however, for frames to have a significant long-term effect, cumulative exposure is likely required (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011). Nevertheless, the media’s potential ability to influence and maintain viewers’ attitudes about many issues, including minority groups like refugees, should not be underestimated (Hurley et al., 2015).

Framing refugees and migrants in news media. Some framing research has addressed issues of immigration (Polson & Kahle, 2010). For example, Esses, Medianu, and Lawson (2013) discovered that over one-third of Norwegian news coverage centered on immigration was profoundly negative. Similarly, when examining Australian newspaper articles and government press releases, Klocker and Dunn (2003) discovered that 90% of the terms used to describe asylum seekers were negative. Descriptive terms like *illegitimate*, *illegal*, and *threatening* were prevalent. These studies well-demonstrate a connection between negative terms and immigrants in media messages (Esses et al., 2013).

In a recent content analysis of European news coverage, significant differences regarding the use of terminology and the overall use of news frames were found (Berry et al.,

2015). While Germany and Sweden used the term refugee most prominently (German: flüchtling, Swedish: flykting), Italy and the UK most frequently employed the term migrant (Italian: migrante). Interestingly, Spain employed neither term, but instead used the word immigrant to describe those relocating to another country (Spanish: inmigrante). Overall this study confirmed the interchangeable use of the terms *refugee*, *migrant*, *asylum seeker*, and *immigrant* (Berry et al., 2015).

Terminology discrepancies were not the only differences researchers noticed. News frame differences were also prominent. Frames linking immigration with threats to personal welfare and crime were highest in British articles; whereas, frames discussing post-arrival integration were most prominent in German articles (Berry et al., 2015). Such difference could be a result of national politics, as UK official government statements have been more reluctant towards refugees and migrants, whereas German policies have been in favor of integration and resettlement (“Infografiken,” n.d.). Regardless of the reason for interchangeable word usage, the impact of such choices warrants investigation.

Within a U.S. context, a substantial amount of research has been conducted regarding news framing centered around *illegal* immigration. For example, Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes (2013) found variations in the use of adjectives (illegal, undocumented, and unauthorized) to describe immigrants. Yet, in 2013, the U.S. Associated Press decided to do away with the adjective illegal to describe a person (Colford, 2013). Nevertheless, existing literature on immigration still emphasizes that U.S. news coverage of the issue is largely negative (e.g., Carter, Thomas, & Ross, 2011; Kim, Carvalho, Davis, & Mullins, 2011;

Johnson, 2012). One content analysis of U.S. and European newspaper coverage revealed how the terms are not only used interchangeably, but in a European context are also in direct connection with the notion of illegality (Berry et al., 2015).

These studies confirm the basic premises of emphasis framing, i.e. “a method by which individuals apply interpretive schemas to both classify and interpret the information [...] they encounter” (Cacciatore et al., 2016, p. 10). For example, research has shown that the “default image of an ‘illegal immigrant’ in the minds of U.S. voters is a Mexican immigrant” (Merolla et al., 2013, p. 800). Consequently, it seems plausible for the term migrant to trigger a connection to the notion of illegality and negative opinions toward people classified migrants even if they are relocating legally.

Effects of news framing. To investigate the effects of news framing, Anderson and Antalíková (2014) measured differences in participants’ responses when the target (i.e., a picture of a neutral face) was either framed as an immigrant or as a Muslim. The focus of this study was to investigate attitudes towards Muslims and immigrants held by Christians and Atheists. Anderson and Antalíková (2014) concluded that negative attitudes towards both groups prevailed; however, Atheists perceived a neutral face more negatively when it was framed as Muslim when compared to the immigrant frame. Christians showed the opposite behavior and responded more positively towards Muslims than towards immigrants. Both findings demonstrate that word choice can make a substantial difference in the way people are perceived. Similarly, Lecheler, Bos, and Vliegenthart’s (2015) examined differences in emotional responses and concluded that participants showed positive emotional responses

when assigned a positively framed news frame; whereas, those assigned a negative frame exhibited more negative emotional responses.

One potential but understudied effect related to immigration and framing might be different perceived *threats* to individuals currently residing in a country. For example, Esses et al. (2013) reported that:

[O]ver the course of the past 10 to 15 years, portrayals of immigrants and refugees in many Western countries have become increasingly negative, with the media focusing on the threats that immigrants and refugees pose to members of host societies. (p. 520)

Consequently, integrated threat theory, a theory that deals with these very concepts, might provide insight into a potential immigration-related framing effect.

Integrated Threat Theory

Integrated threat theory (ITT) combines elements of sociology and psychology (Stephan & Stephan, 1993, 1996). Within the literature of integrated threat theory, Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman (1999) conducted a wide range of studies to predict perceived threats held by a host population towards newcomers. Most importantly, Stephan and colleagues' (1999) research discovered that anticipation of threat was directly related to prejudice. Numerous studies have since applied ITT to various situations and have demonstrated significant correlations between prejudice towards newcomers and five critical concepts, each of which is particularly relevant to this investigation. ITT's concepts of *realistic threat*,

symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety, negative stereotype, and attitudes towards out-groups

will be discussed further below.

Realistic threat refers to a threatened political and economic existence of the dominant group in any given society (Stephan et al. 1999). For example, it is not uncommon for politicians or to blame immigrant groups for economic problems such as rising unemployment rates or for political programs such as increasing crime rates. Croucher (2013) concluded that such a rhetoric can have serious consequences as it can lead to increased suspicion towards immigrant groups.

Symbolic threat is another element of ITT but differs from realistic threat in that symbolic threat refers to perceived differences in “morals, values, norms, standards beliefs, and attitudes” by the dominant group about the worldview of the minority group (Stephan et al. 1999, p. 2222). Such perceived differences are experienced by the dominant group whenever they believe that their “system of values is being undermined” by a minority group (Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998, p. 561). For example, the rise of populism in the U.S. and in Europe not only highlights realistic threat, or the fear of foreigners exploiting one’s country economically and politically, but it also primarily emphasizes symbolic threat and the fear of one’s values and morals being undermined by others (Shuster, n.d.; Roth, n.d.; Taub, 2016). For instance, France’s 2011 law banning Muslim women from wearing Islamic face veils in public places is a direct consequence of symbolic threat posed to the predominantly Christian French population by Muslim women (Chrisafis, 2011; Mullen, 2014). A third critical concept within ITT is intergroup anxiety,

which is a fear people might have when interacting with out-group members (Croucher, 2013). Although the word anxiety might have a negative connotation, intergroup anxiety simply refers to any feelings – positive and negative - experienced by both in-group as well as out-group members when interacting with one another. Studies have shown that intergroup anxiety is also likely to be experienced by the out-group as the anticipation of any negative outcomes can be higher than that of the in-group (Stephan, et al., 2002).

ITT also discusses connections associated with negative stereotypes, which can take on many forms. For example, in instances when anticipated character traits are not met, negative stereotypes can arise and ignite conflict between the out-group and the in-group, further complicating future relationships between the two parties (Stephan et al., 1999). According to ITT, it is possible for negative stereotypes about an out-group to be used by an in-group to justify discriminatory behavior against them (Stephan et al., 1998).

Attitudes towards out-groups is another crucial concept from ITT and is related to the four previously mentioned concepts. For example, Stephan et al. (1999) documented significant correlations between symbolic threats and intergroup anxiety which evoked increased feelings of negative attitudes towards an out-group; however, Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, and Poppe (2008) highlighted that it is not clear what type of threat (symbolic or realistic) is likely to be caused by such negative attitudes. For example, research by Bizman and Yinon (2001) found realistic threat to be a significant factor causing negative attitudes, while McLaren (2003), and Tausch, Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, and Cairns (2007) found that symbolic threat was more likely to elicit negative feelings. Consequently,

more research needs to be conducted to understand the relationship among symbolic threat, realistic threat, and attitudes toward outgroups.

ITT offers useful concepts for investigating news framing effects and makes connections between previously unrelated bodies of theoretical research, making this particular study of unique importance to the field of communication. Previous research has identified how the media has framed immigration as threats to one's well-being (e.g. Esses et al., 2013; Bleicker, Campbell, Hutchison, & Nicholson, 2013; Thorbjørnsrud, 2015; Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007). Literature on ITT has conceptualized several different critical concepts related to immigration and linked them to threat perceptions in the dominant population (Stephan et al., 1998). Bringing ITT's concepts into media effects and framing research allows for researchers to study how news frames might activate preexisting negative connections between those relocating to a country and that country's current population. Specifically, this study will examine if words that are currently being used interchangeably in the news by journalists (e.g., English: refugee/migrant and German: flüchtling/migrant) will activate negative beliefs and attitudes toward immigrants as related to ITT's concepts of perceived threat and symbolic threat. For intercultural comparison purposes, Americans and Germans will be dealt with separately in these hypotheses.

H1a: Americans who receive the term migrant, the term refugee, and/or the control condition will differ in their perception of symbolic threat.

H1b: Germans who receive the term migrant, the term refugee, and/or the control condition will differ in their perception of symbolic threat.

H2a: Americans who receive the term migrant, the term refugee, and/or the control condition will differ in their perception of realistic threat.

H2b: Germans who receive the term migrant, the term refugee, and/or the control condition will differ in their perception of realistic threat.

ITT also considers notions of intergroup anxiety, suggesting that attitudes towards outgroups might be correlated with negative threat perceptions. This connection is tested herein as well, again separating Americans and Germans for comparison purposes.

H3a: Attitudes towards out-group members will be related to symbolic threat.

H3b: Attitudes towards out-group members will be related to realistic threat.

Little work has examined media effects making international comparisons within the same study. Issues of immigration and its representation in the media are of a global nature; therefore, understanding similarities and differences in an international sample seems warranted. There is some reason to suspect that Germans and Americans represent two distinct cultures and might, as a result, demonstrate different effects regarding issues of framing and immigration.

Cultural Differences – Hofstede’s Six Cultural Dimensions

De Mooij and Hofstede (2010) defined culture as “the collective mental programming [...] part of our conditioning that we share with other members of our nation, region or group but not with members of other nations, regions, or groups” (p. 67). Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) have conceptualized national culture through six unique dimensions, i.e. power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation, and

indulgence. Originally, Hofstede et al.'s (2010) primary goal was to find out "how values in the workplace are influenced by culture," and gathered data in corporation with IBM; however, this research study has been replicated numerous times to include non-IBM employees, suggesting not only that the concept of Hofstede's six cultural dimensions is relevant today but can also be applied to other fields (Rinne, Steel, & Fairweather, 2012).

First, the Power distance index (PDI) refers to the degree to which a government and its people accept a hierarchical order. For example, countries that score low on the power distance index attempt to distribute power equally among all its members of society, whereas those countries with a high score are more likely to have a hierarchical, unequal power distribution.

Next, individualism indicates the general set-up of a society. For example, unlike collectivist societies that value family and membership, societies individualistic in nature prioritize the "I" over the "we."

A third dimension is the masculinity index which describes the competitiveness of a society. In other words, societies with a higher masculinity score are said to be more assertive and strive towards material status symbols, whereas those societies with a lower score are said to be more feminine, i.e. caring.

The fourth dimension as described by Hofstede et al. (2010) is uncertainty avoidance. This index refers to the degree to which members of a society deal with the unknown future. While Hofstede et al. (2010) state that some try to make the future as less unpredictable as

possible, others “maintain a more relaxed attitude in which practice counts more than principles.”

A fifth cultural dimension covers long term orientation (LTO). Societies with low scores are said to honor traditions while those with a high score are said to be associated with thrift and perseverance.

Finally, indulgence completes Hofstede et al.’s (2010) six cultural dimensions. Indulgence is the opposite of restraint and refers to the extent to which members of society are free-spirited and able to fulfill their social needs. Restraint on the other hand, “suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social norms” (Hofstede et al., 2010).

Cultural and geographic differences between Germany and the U.S. Regarding this study’s comparison between German and American participants, cultural and geographic differences need to be acknowledged and taken into consideration when analyzing the results. Using Hofstede et al.’s (2010) dimensions to contrast Germans and Americans, substantial differences regarding their scores of individualism, indulgence, long term orientation, and uncertainty avoidance can be observed. It is worth pointing out that while both countries are categorized as individualistic societies, the U.S. scores 91/100 which is well above Germany’s score (67/100). In simpler terms, Americans might be more self-driven and less compassionate than Germans which might affect interpretations of these data. Additionally, Americans (68/100) score slightly higher on the indulgence index (Germany: 40/100) but score lower on the long-term orientation and the uncertainty avoidance index. Both Germany’s long term orientation (83/100) and uncertainty avoidance (65/100) scores

are much higher than those of the U.S. (long term orientation: 26/100; uncertainty avoidance: 46/100). These findings might indicate crucial differences how Germans and Americans approach a crisis situation, such as the influx of foreigners, that could shape their countries for decades to come.

It is also important to point out crucial geographical differences between Germany and the U.S. For instance, unlike the United States, Germany is directly affected by the Syrian migrant crisis due to its geographic proximity. In 2015 alone, an estimate of over 1.1 million people classified as asylum seekers and migrants entered Germany (“Germany revising 2015 refugee figures,” 2016). While Germany received 540 asylum applications per 100.000 people in living Germany in 2015, a relatively low number in comparison to Hungary’s 1.700 (per 100.000 people), Germany is still the most popular destination as the “highest annual number ever received by a European country over the past 30 years” had been recorded in 2015 (Conner, 2016). Geographic size and population density also play a crucial role. In 2015, there were 616 Germans living in one square mile compared to 92 Americans (“Population density,” n.d.).

Considering these key differences, research questions were posited to better understand cultural differences between Americans and Germans in the context of media effects and immigration.

RQ1a: Will there be significant differences between German and American participants in regards to symbolic threat when confronted with the term refugee/flüchtling?

RQ1b: Will there be significant differences between German and American participants in regards to symbolic threat when confronted with the term migrant/migrant?

RQ2a: Will there be significant differences between German and American participants in regards to realistic threat when confronted with the term refugee/flüchtling?

RQ2b: Will there be significant differences between German and American participants in regards to realistic threat when confronted with the term migrant/migrant?

CHAPTER 3: Method

To examine questions regarding the impact of word choice within an immigration article upon German and American citizens, an experiment was developed and conducted. This section gives an in-depth description of the sampling techniques and characteristics, followed by the procedures and measurement techniques. After the results, a discussion of each major finding offers more interpretation to the data collected.

Recruitment and Sampling

A recruitment announcement with the link to the study's questionnaires, informed consent form, and exclusion criteria (participants had to be 18 years or older and either German or American nationals) were shared through Facebook. As an incentive to partake in this experiment, participants could win one out of six \$10 Amazon gift cards. This effort resulted in a total sample of 273 participants (German: $n = 142$, U.S. $n = 131$). The majority of the participants were female ($n = 185$) with three people choosing not to reply.

Participants' ages range from 18 to 84 years (German: $M = 27.51$, $SD = 10.03$, U.S.: $M = 28.12$, $SD = 11.22$, Total: $M = 27.80$, $SD = 10.60$) and most participants were full-time students ($n = 91$). The majority of American Americans indicated to have a Bachelor's degree (43.5 %), 26.7 % some college but no degree, and 19.8% graduated with a Master's degree. Similar, 43% of German participants indicated to have a high school degree, 33.8 % a Diplom (a now outdated combination between a Bachelor's and a Master's degree), and 10.6 % graduated with a Master's degree. The majority of participants identified as moderate with slightly liberal tendencies when asked to state their political affiliation on a 7-point scale

(Total: $M = 3.09$, $SD = 1.45$). Finally, most Americans identified as white ($n = 114$). Due to historical sensitivity, the question of ethnicity was omitted from the German questionnaire.

Procedures

A 2 x 3 between-subjects experiment was designed to capture German and American citizens' responses to two treatment messages and one control message. All participants were randomly assigned to one of three different conditions and completed the experiment in their respective languages. To test H1a and H2a, participants read an article containing the term *refugee* (German: *flüchtlings*). To test H1b and H2b, participants read the same article containing the term *migrant* (German: migrant). Participants in the control condition were sent directly to the questionnaire and received no news message. The translations of the news article and the questionnaire were done by a linguist; however, despite all best efforts to translate the original English article into German, it should be noted that a perfect 1:1 translation is impossible due to syntax differences between languages.

Stimuli

The news article featured in this study was originally published online in *The Guardian* and described the 2015 decrease in refugee and migrant numbers arriving in Greece through the Mediterranean Sea route, and gives reasons for such decline in migration. The article was made more neutral by eliminating strongly opinionated adjectives like *illegal*, *stricter*, and *significant* to achieve a more neutral tone and any featured visuals and links to related news articles were removed. To accommodate American participants, the *The Guardian* layout was changed to resemble that of *USA TODAY* which is the most circulated

newspaper in the United States (“Top 10 US Daily Newspapers,” 2016). Similarly, the layout of *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*; the second most read German newspaper (Schröder, 2016) was selected. *Die Bild*, Germany’s highest circulated newspaper was purposefully excluded from this experiment, since *Die Bild* is a tabloid magazine (“Top German tabloid,” 2015). Generally, both questionnaire versions utilized the neutral connotation “people relocating to another country” (German: “Menschen, die in ein anderes Land umsiedeln”) to describe either refugees or migrants in an attempt to minimize a potential questionnaire effect.

Dependent Variables

All scales were modified to measure participants’ perceptions of “people relocating to another country” again in an attempt to minimize a potential questionnaire effect.

Realistic threat. Realistic threats constitute “threats to the very existence of the in-group” which are primarily of political and economic concern (Stephan et al. 1999, p. 2222). An adapted 7-item scale using 10-point items by Stephan et al. (1999) was used to account for realistic threat ($\alpha = .75$).

Symbolic threat. Symbolic threats comprise “threats to the in-group’s worldview” such as “differences in morals, values, norms, standards beliefs, and attitudes” (Stephan et al. 1999, p. 2222). To measure this variable, Stephan et al.’s (1999) adapted 8-item scale of 10-point items was employed ($\alpha = .39$). To increase the internal consistency of the symbolic threat scale, the decision was made to remove item 3 from the original scale. The new 7-item scale yielded an α of .65 (which is still low but was the highest achievable score with these data) and was used for all analyses.

Intergroup anxiety. Intergroup anxiety has been conceptualized by Stephan and Stephan's (1985) model of intergroup anxiety, which describes anxiety experienced by both the in-group as well as the out-group "before interacting with people from a different culture" (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Likewise, Stephen et al.'s (1999) 12-item scale of 10-point items to evaluate intergroup anxiety was adapted. However, originally Stephen et al. (1999) asked "participants how they would feel when interacting with members of the respective immigrant group" (p. 2225). This wording was changed to "When I see [people relocating to another country] on the street, I usually feel [X]" taken from Van Zomeren, Fischer, and Spears (2007; $\alpha = .65$).

Negative stereotypes. Negative stereotypes "lead to avoidance of out-group members, provide negative trait attributions to explain their behavior, and justify discrimination against them" (Stephan et al., 1999, p. 2223). Although negative stereotypes do not comprise any threats to the in-group, when anticipated stereotypes are not met, conflict between the in-group and the out-group can arise (Stephan et al., 1998). In this study, stereotypes were measured through an 8-item scale of 5-point items by Gonzalez, et al. (2008; $\alpha = .83$).

Attitudes towards out-groups. Attitudes have been conceptualized by Stephan and Stephan's (1993) parallel network model of stereotypes and prejudice. Accordingly, stereotypes and attitudes are connected through group associations of labels and characteristics linked to them. In this research study, attitudes were measure through Stephan et al.'s (1998) 12-item scale of 10-point items ($\alpha = .72$).

CHAPTER 4: Results and Analysis

H1a and H2a stated that Americans who are confronted with either the treatment or control message experience a higher realistic and symbolic threat. An ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of framing (word choice) on threat perception; however, no significant effect was found for symbolic threat or realistic threat (American/symbolic = $F(2, 126) = .23, p = .8$, American/realistic = $F(1, 128) = .57, p = .57$), disconfirming H1a and H2a. Americans means for this analysis demonstrated no clear pattern for threat scores by condition. For realistic threat, Americans in the refugee condition demonstrated the highest mean ($n = 38, M = 4.28, SD = 1.26$), followed by those in the migrant condition ($n = 62, M = 5.14, SD = 1.32$), and the baseline/no news message group demonstrated the lowest realistic threat scores ($n = 62, M = 5.14, SD = 1.32$). That pattern is completely reversed for symbolic threat, with the baseline group scoring highest on symbolic threat ($n = 58, M = 3.48, SD = 1.88$), followed by the migrant condition ($n = 34, M = 3.4, SD = 1.73$), and the refugee condition had the lowest mean score in this combination ($n = 37, M = 3.22, SD = 1.77$). Though not significantly different, the changing pattern of these means is interesting.

Likewise, H1b and H2b claimed that German participants confronted with either treatment or control message experience a higher realistic and symbolic threat; however, no significant effect of framing on realistic and symbolic threat was found for this ANOVA either (German/realistic: $F(2, 136) = 1.26, p = .29$, German/symbolic: $F(2, 133) = 4.31, p = .65$). Thus, H1b and H2b were not supported. Mean scores showed the same pattern regarding realistic and symbolic threat in German participants. Germans in the migrant-

wording condition had the highest mean scores (realistic $n = 37, M = 5.56, SD = 1.28$; symbolic $n = 36, M = 4.62, SD = 1.08$), followed by those in the refugee condition (realistic $n = 40, M = 5.24, SD = 1.29$; symbolic $n = 41, M = 4.44, SD = 1.03$), with those in baseline/no news article condition showing the lowest mean threat scores (realistic $n = 62, M = 5.14, SD = 1.32$; symbolic $n = 59, M = 4.43, SD = 1.04$). Again, none of these means were significantly different, but the pattern was the same for both dependent variables in Germans.

Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted to test H3a and H3b which stated that participants' attitudes towards out-group members are related to symbolic threat (H3a) and realistic threat (H3b). For H3a, there was a moderate, negative correlation between attitudes towards out-group members and symbolic threat, which was statistically significant, $r = -.47, n = 265, p = .00$. H3b yielded similar results as a negative, strong relationship between attitudes towards out-group members and realistic threat showed statistically significance, $r = -.51, n = 262, p = .00$. In other words, the more positive attitudes someone had about out-group members, the less threat these individuals posed to them; and the less positive attitudes participants had about out-group members, the more threatened they felt.

Lastly, independent-samples t -tests were conducted to compare Americans and Germans regarding symbolic and realistic threats. For RQ1a, Germans experienced significantly more symbolic threat ($n = 41, M = 4.44, SD = 1.03$) than Americans ($n = 37, M = 3.23, SD = 1.67$) did when confronted with the term refugee, $t(76) = -3.9, p = .01, d = 0.87$. RQ2a yielded similar results as Germans ($n = 40, M = 5.24, SD = 1.29$) confronted with the term refugee experienced higher levels realistic threat than Americans ($n = 38, M = 4.28,$

$SD = 1.26$, $t(76) = -3.30$, $p = .00$, $d = 0.75$. Examining participants' symbolic and realistic threat in combination with the word migrant produced comparable results. For RQ1b significant differences between German ($n = 36$, $M = 4.62$, $SD = 1.08$) and American ($n = 34$, $M = 3.4$, $SD = 1.73$) symbolic threat when confronted with the term migrant were found, $t(68) = -3.56$, $p = .00$, $d = .85$. RQ2b yielded similar results as significant differences between Germans ($n = 37$, $M = 5.56$, $SD = 1.28$) and Americans ($n = 35$, $M = 4.2$, $SD = 1.41$) in their realistic threat when confronted with the term migrant, $t(70) = -4.29$, $p = .00$, $d = 1.01$. In general, Germans scored higher than Americans across all threat scores and categories.

CHAPTER 5: Discussion, Limitations, and Future Research

The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between German and American participants' view of refugees and migrants and the level of threat perception associated with either term after reading a news article that was worded differently in each condition. The following discussion will present possible explanations and implications of this study's findings.

Threat Perception and Framing Effects

Hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a, and H2b were not supported through this study's findings. In other words, there was no difference in threat perception experienced by German and American participants when confronted with either the term refugee, migrant, or the baseline group. However, these null findings could indeed be the result of an interchangeable use of the terms. For example, Merolla et al.'s (2013) study found no differences in framing immigrants as undocumented, illegal, or unauthorized. They concluded arguing that individuals already possessed strong images of what an immigrant is supposed to look like and "invoking different terms might make little difference in terms of the considerations that shape their expressed opinions" (Merolla et al., 2013, p. 800). Likewise, this study's null findings can be interpreted similarly by emphasizing that previous research has shown clear evidence of an interchangeable use between different immigration terms (migrant versus refugee). Thus, it might not have made a difference for the study participants what specific term was used to describe people relocating to another country because of the way the media has been using them interchangeably.

Threat Perception and Attitudes towards out-group Members

This study found negative correlations between threat perception and attitudes about out-group members. In other words, negative attitudes about out-group members were linked to higher threat perceptions. This finding is in accordance with previous literature and supports previous connects demonstrated by proponents of ITT (Stephan et al. 1999; Gonzales et al., 2008). In this particular study, negative attitudes towards out-group members were more likely to trigger realistic threat, a finding confirmed by Bizman and Yinon (2001), McLaren (2003), and Tausch and colleagues (2007).

Cultural Differences, Threat Perception, Framing Effects

The remaining data comparing German and American participants does suggest a relationship between word choice and associated threat perception. First, Germans experienced more realistic and symbolic threat compared to American participants after exposure to each frame. This could be a result of geo-political differences between Germany and the United States. For example, while an influx of 1.1 million people represents an increase of 1.34 % to the total German population of 81 million, an increase of 1.1 million people to the total U.S. population of 318 million accounts for less than one percent (0.34 %). Consequently, it is more likely for Germans to have had direct contact with newcomers than for Americans. Stressing the significance of these factors when examining the data, Germany is impacted significantly different than the United States, resulting in generally higher threat perceptions reported by German participants in this study.

Second, the data shows an interesting finding, i.e. Americans exposed to the refugee frame reported the *least* threat perception. American participants reported slightly higher (but not significant) symbolic threat when exposed to the migrant frame than when exposed to the refugee frame. This is interesting considering President Trump's recent executive order regarding seven primarily-Muslim countries from entering the U.S. (The White House, 2017) and campaign rhetoric depicting refugees as "terrorist [blaming] them, incorrectly, for violent attacks in America" ("For refugees and advocates," 2016). Although Croucher (2013) states that "such rhetoric leads to increased distrust of minority/immigrant groups" (p. 48), it was unexpected to find that the refugee frame triggered more realistic threat perception in American participants, especially considering that the data for this study was collected *after* Election Day but before the executive order (data collected from November 14 to December 12, 2016). More research is necessary to understand the complexity of these erratic mean threat scores.

Third, Germans exposed to the migrant frame reported by far the *most* realistic threat perception among all participants. This finding might be attributed to German government action, led by chancellor Angela Merkel, that has been predominately outspoken in favor of an integration of refugees ("Germany set to pass first-ever bill to integrate refugees," 2016; "Merkel: 'I have no plan B,'" 2016); whereas, migrants, especially those from the Balkan regions, have increasingly been sent home, deported, or left Germany voluntarily as they are highly unlikely to receive asylum (Arapi, 2016; "Germany to start deporting asylum seekers," 2015). This finding confirms research by Merolla et al. (2013) who found that "the ways that immigration policies are framed can have a significant effect on opinion" (p. 800).

Thus, Germany's immigration policies might account for the differences in threat perception among German and American participants when exposed to either the refugee or the migrant frame. In summary, the study's findings show that Germans reported higher threat perception regardless of the immigrant frame. Thus, it is likely that Germans do not explicitly differentiate between refugees and migrants *per se* but instead simply feel threatened by others relocating to Germany.

Generally, this study's findings contribute to the overall field of framing research by showing the impact of geographic proximity and local policies to a crisis. This cross-cultural comparison between Germany and the United States exposes differences in how a crisis is portrayed and perceived which adds to expanding field of framing literature. There are three main concluding points. First, it confirms research by Lecheler et al. (2015) arguing that the use of frames without any racial or emotional cues can still trigger distinct associations. This generally confirms equivalency framing as "a means of understanding how people construct meaning and make sense of the everyday world" (Cacciato et al., 2016, p. 10). Second, the comparison between the two Westernized countries, Germany and the United States, furthers our understanding how geography and culture can affect different interpretation of the very same frames. Third, this research study has opened the doors for other scholars to examine to what extent integrated threat theory influences the way immigration related news are framed in the media. Are the elements of integrated threat (e.g. high levels of negative attitudes towards a minority group) actively shaping local or national news coverage or vice versa?

More research needs to be conducted to confidently explicitly link elements of ITT to current news framing.

That being said, this study has several limitations. First, this study attempted to measure framing effects through a one-time framing exposure. This is a crucial limitation to any study concerning framing theory as it questions its internal validity and overall reliability. For example, rapid policy changes on immigration at the global level impact people's opinion about the issue at hand, making studies of this nature challenging. Consequently, Kinder (2007) questions the relevance of framing experiments for "real life" application and thinks of the isolation of an attitude to reveal causalities between public opinion and frame exposure as unnatural; whereas, Chong and Druckman (2007) do stress the importance of framing in a communication context to provide "meaning to an unfolding strip of events" (p. 106). While questions of validity are known and important, the relationship between framing, ITT, and immigration issues are meaningfully advanced through this work, and provide grounds for new theoretical works in the area.

Second, it is important to note that one item had to be removed from the symbolic threat scale due to its low internal consistency, and several other concepts received low reliability scores. Item 3 in the original symbolic threat scale read "People relocating to the United States/Germany have increased the tax burdens on Americans/Germans," but had to be removed to increase its scale's α to that of .65 instead of .39. According to Keyton (2014), a Cronbach's Alpha of .70 or greater "means that in most cases, respondents gave the same responses or a similar response to most items" (p. 108). In other words, study participants

responded differently to this particular item. This finding warrants additional research to find out why people had such different opinions. Generally, calculating the respected Cronbach alpha's coefficient for each of this study's scales, yielded rather low numbers. Such scores could be the result of translating an original English scale into German, which might have resulted into translations that yielded slightly different interpretations. Or, cultural differences between Germans and Americans might mean that this scale is not as interculturally relevant as researchers might like it to be. Nevertheless, by translating the original ITT scales into German, this research study has immensely contributed to expand this theory to an international audience.

In summary, this study focused on the relationship between immigration frames and integrated threat theory. Despite cultural differences between Germany and the United States, this study attempted to make a cross-national comparison to enrich the literature of both framing research and integrated threat theory. Therefore, this study's findings might also be of interest to those outside of either discipline as communication is inherited to many other research fields.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Original Newspaper Article

Refugees and migrants arriving in Greece from Turkey down 90 per cent, says border agency
The drop in numbers follows an agreement between Turkey and the European Union to send
back illegal migrants arriving in Greece

The number of migrants arriving on Greek islands from Turkey dropped by 90 per cent in April compared to the previous month, according to the European Union border agency.

Frontex, which co-ordinates European border management, said 2,700 people arrived in Greece in April, the majority of whom were originally from Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri described the drop in numbers as “dramatic”.

“The total for all of April is well below the number of people we often saw reaching just the island of Lesbos on a daily basis during last year’s peak months,” he said.

The drop in numbers is said to be a result of several factors, including the EU-Turkey agreement to control traffic, as well as stricter border policies applied at the Greek-Macedonian border.

Under the EU’s agreement with Turkey, all migrants and refugees who cross into Greece illegally – including Syrians – are sent back.

In return, the EU has said it will take in thousands of Syrian refugees directly from Turkey, rewarding the country with more money, early visa-free travel and faster progress in EU membership talks.

Due to the significant drop in arrivals to the Aegean islands, the number of migrants reaching Italy exceeded the totals for Greece for the first time since June 2015.

According to the borders agency, 8,370 migrants arrived in Italy through the longer, central Mediterranean route from north Africa. Eritreans, Egyptians and Nigerians accounted for the majority of these migrants.

Frontex said there was no sign that migrants were shifting from the route to Greece along the central Mediterranean route instead, since the number of people arriving in Italy had also reduced, by 13 per cent since March and down by half since April last year.

The Norwegian Refugee Council have contested this statement, however, after Italian coastguards helped rescue another 801 people from north African boats on Thursday.

“This might be a first sign of Syrian refugees now choosing the much more dangerous route across the Mediterranean from Northern Africa to Italy, in search of protection in Europe,” said Edouard Rodier, Europe director at the Norwegian humanitarian agency.

“If this continues, the EU-Turkey deal is not only a failure, but may also result in more deaths at sea,” he said in a statement.

Appendix B

Stimuli Article in English

Refugees/migrants arriving in Greece from Turkey down 90 percent -- The drop in numbers follows an agreement between **Turkey** and the European Union to send back **migrants/refugees** arriving in Greece

The number of **migrants/refugees** arriving on Greek islands from Turkey dropped by 90 per cent in April compared to the previous month, according to the European Union border agency.

Frontex, which co-ordinates European border management, said 2,700 people arrived in Greece in April, the majority of whom were originally from Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq.

“The total for all of April is well below the number of people we often saw reaching just the island of Lesbos on a daily basis during last year’s peak months,” Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri said.

The drop in numbers is said to be a result of several factors, including the EU-Turkey agreement, as well as border policies applied at the Greek-Macedonian border.

Under the EU’s agreement with Turkey, all **migrants/refugees** who cross into Greece—including Syrians – are sent back.

In return, the EU has said it will take in thousands of Syrian **refugees/migrants** directly from Turkey, rewarding the country with more money, early visa-free travel and faster progress in EU membership talks.

Due to the drop in arrivals to the Aegean islands, the number of **migrants/refugees** reaching Italy exceeded the totals for Greece for the first time since June 2015.

According to the borders agency, 8,370 **migrants/refugees** arrived in Italy through the longer, central Mediterranean route from north Africa. Eritreans, Egyptians and Nigerians accounted for the majority of these migrants/refugees.

Frontex said there was no sign that **migrants/refugees** were shifting from the route to Greece along the central Mediterranean route instead, since the number of people arriving in Italy had also reduced, by 13 per cent since March and down by half since April last year.

“This might be a first sign of Syrian refugees/refugees now choosing the route across the Mediterranean from Northern Africa to Italy, in search of protection in Europe,” said Edouard Rodier, Europe director at the Norwegian humanitarian agency.

Appendix C

Stimuli Article in German

Die Zahl der aus der Türkei ankommenden Flüchtlinge/Migranten in Griechenland ist um 90 Prozent gesunken – Dieser Rückgang ist auf ein Abkommen zwischen der Türkei und der EU zurückzuführen, durch das die in Griechenland ankommenden Flüchtlinge/Migranten wieder in die Türkei zurückgeschickt werden.

Die Zahl der Flüchtlinge/Migranten, die von der Türkei aus die griechischen Inseln erreichten, sank im April um 90 Prozent gegenüber dem Vormonat, berichtete die europäische Grenzschutzagentur (Frontex).

Frontex, zuständig für die Organisation der Außengrenzen der EU, zählte im April 2.700 Menschen, die in Griechenland ankamen. Die Mehrheit dieser Menschen stammt aus Syrien, Pakistan, Afghanistan und dem Irak.

„Die Gesamtzahl an Ankommenden in Griechenland für den Monat April liegt deutlich unter den Durchschnittswerten. Im Vergleich zu den Spitzenmonaten des vergangenen Jahres, erreichten täglich so viele Menschen allein die Insel Lesbos wie jetzt in einem gesamten Monat“, sagte Frontex-Geschäftsführer Fabrice Leggeri.

Der Rückgang lässt sich auf mehrere Faktoren zurückführen, u.a. durch das Abkommen zwischen der EU und der Türkei sowie Kontrollen an der griechisch-mazedonischen Grenze.

Im Rahmen des Abkommens zwischen der EU und der Türkei sollen alle Flüchtlinge/Migranten, die Griechenland erreichen – einschließlich Syrer – wieder zurückgeschickt werden.

Als Gegenleistung hat die EU der Türkei die Aufnahme von tausenden syrischen Flüchtlingen direkt aus der Türkei zugesagt. Dafür wurde der Türkei mehr finanzielle Unterstützung, visumfreies Reisen und schnellere Fortschritte bei den EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen versprochen.

Aufgrund des Rückgangs der Ankünfte von Flüchtlingen/Migranten auf den Ägäischen Inseln übersteigt die Anzahl der in Italien ankommenden Flüchtlinge/Migranten zum ersten Mal die Gesamtzahl aller Ankommenden in Griechenland seit Juni 2015.

Nach Angaben der Grenzschutzagentur erreichten 8.370 Flüchtlinge/Migranten Italien durch die längere, zentrale Mittelmeerroute aus Nordafrika. Die Mehrheit stammte aus Eritrea, Ägypten und Nigeria.

Appendix D



Figure 1: Graphic of the manipulated English newspaper (migrant frame) using the *USA TODAY* layout.



Figure 2: Graphic of the manipulated English newspaper (refugee frame) using the *USA Today* layout.



*Figure 3: Graphic of the manipulated German article (migrant frame) using the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* layout.*



*Figure 4: Graphic of the manipulated German article (refugee frame) using the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* layout.*

Appendix E

Adapted scales used in this research study for the English questionnaire (in English).

Realistic Threat: 10-point Likert-type scale (*1 = strongly agree, 10 = strongly disagree*), adapted from Stephen et al. (1999)

1. People relocating to the U.S. should learn to conform to the rules and norms of American society as soon as possible after they arrive.
2. People relocating to the U.S. are undermining American culture.
3. The values and beliefs of people relocating to the U.S. regarding work are basically quite similar to those of most Americans.
4. The values and beliefs of people relocating to the U.S. regarding moral and religious issues are *not* compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.
5. The values and beliefs of people relocating to the U.S. regarding family issues and socializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans.
6. The values and beliefs of people relocating to the U.S. regarding social relations are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.
7. People relocating to the U.S. should not have to accept American ways.

Symbolic Threat: 10-point Likert-type scale (*1 = strongly agree, 10 = strongly disagree*), adapted from Stephen et al. (1999)

1. People relocating to the U.S. get more from this country than they contribute.
2. The children of people relocating to the U.S. should have the same right to attend public schools in the U.S. as Americans do.
3. People relocating to the U.S. have increased the tax burdens on Americans.
4. People relocating to the U.S. are not displacing American workers from their jobs.
5. People relocating to the U.S. should be eligible for the same health-care benefits
6. Social services have become less available to Americans because of people relocating to the U.S.
7. The quality of social services available to Americans has remained the same, despite people relocating to the U.S.
8. People relocating to the U.S. are as entitled to subsidized housing or subsidized utilities (water, sewage, electricity) as poor Americans are.

Stereotypes: 5-point Likert-type scale (*1 = no, absolutely not, 5 = yes certainly*), adapted from Gonzales et al. (2008)

People relocating to the U.S. are

1. Violent
2. Dishonest
3. Unintelligent
4. Friendly
5. Arrogant
6. Kind
7. Avaricious
8. Inferior

Attitudes towards out-groups: 10 point Likert-type scale (*0 = no; 9 = extreme*), adapted from Stephen et al. (1998)

Please indicate if you feel the following emotions towards people relocating to the U.S.

1. Hostility
2. Dislike
3. Disregard
4. Rejection
5. Hatred
6. Superiority
7. Acceptance
8. Approval
9. Warmth
10. Admiration
11. Affection
12. Sympathy

Intergroup anxiety, 12 items, 10-point Likert-type scale (*1 = not at all; 10 = extremely*), adapted from Stephan et al. (1999). The wording used for this question was taken from Van Zomeren et al. (2007)

When I see a person I believe to have relocated to the U.S. on the street, I usually feel...

1. apprehensive
2. uncertain
3. worried
4. awkward
5. anxious
6. threatened
7. trusting
8. friendly
9. comfortable
10. confident
11. safe
12. at ease

Appendix F

Adapted scales used in this research study for the German questionnaire (in German).

Realistic Threat: 10-point Likert-type scale (*1 = strongly agree, 10 = strongly disagree*), adapted from Stephen et al. (1999)

1. Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, sollten sich nach ihrer Ankunft so schnell wie möglich an die Regeln und Werte der deutschen Gesellschaft anpassen.
2. Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, schwächen die deutsche Kultur.
3. Die Einstellung von Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, ist in Bezug auf die Arbeitsmoral im Grunde ganz ähnlich wie die der meisten Deutschen.
4. Die Einstellungen von Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, sind in Bezug auf moralische und religiöse Fragen nicht kompatibel mit den Werten der meisten Deutschen.
5. Die Einstellungen von Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, sind in Bezug auf Familienfragen und Kinder im Grunde ganz ähnlich wie die der meisten Deutschen.
6. Die Werte und Ansichten von Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, sind in Bezug auf die sozialen Beziehungen nicht kompatibel mit denen der meisten Deutschen.
7. Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, sollten nicht gezwungen werden, die deutsche Gesellschaft zu akzeptieren.

Symbolic Threat: 10-point Likert-type scale (*1 = strongly agree, 10 = strongly disagree*), adapted from Stephen et al. (1999)

1. Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, bekommen mehr vom deutschen Staat als sie zurückgeben.
2. Die Kinder von Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, sollten das Recht haben, Schulen in Deutschland zu besuchen wie deutsche Kinder.
3. Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, haben die Steuerlast für Deutsche erhöht.
4. Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, verdrängen Deutsche nicht von ihren Arbeitsplätzen.
5. Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, sollten, wie auch Deutsche, die gleichen Ansprüche auf Gesundheitsleistungen haben.
6. Trotz Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, ist die Qualität der Sozialdienstleistungen für Deutsche gleich geblieben.
7. Wegen Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, haben Sozialdienste weniger Zeit

- für Deutsche.
8. Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, sind wie sozialschwache Deutsche berechtigt Sozialwohnungen oder staatliche Zuschüsse zur Versorgung (Wasser, Abwasser, Strom) in Anspruch zu nehmen.

Stereotypes: 5-point Likert-type scale (*1 = no, absolutely not, 5 = yes certainly*), adapted from Gonzales et al. (2008)

Geben Sie bitte Ihre Meinung über Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, sind an.

1. Gewalttätig
2. Verlogen
3. Unintelligent
4. Freundlich
5. Arrogant
6. Nett
7. Gierig
8. Unterlegen

Attitudes towards out-groups: 10 point Likert-type scale (*0 = no; 9 = extreme*), adapted from Stephen et al. (1998)

Geben Sie bitte an, inwiefern Sie die folgenden Gefühle gegenüber Menschen, die nach Deutschland umsiedeln, spüren.

1. Feindschaft
2. Abneigung
3. Missachtung
4. Ablehnung
5. Hass
6. Überlegenheit
7. Akzeptanz
8. Befürwortung
9. Wärme
10. Bewunderung
11. Zuneigung
12. Sympathie

Intergroup anxiety, 12 items, 10-point Likert-type scale (*1 = not at all; 10 = extremely*), adapted from Stephan et al. (1999). The wording used for this question was taken from Van Zomeren et al. (2007)

Wenn ich eine Person auf der Straße sehe, von der ich glaube, dass sie nach Deutschland umgesiedelt ist, fühle ich mich in der Regel ...

1. ängstlich
2. unsicher
3. besorgt
4. berührt
5. beunruhigt
6. bedroht
7. vertrauensvoll
8. freundlich
9. angenehm
10. selbstbewusst
11. sicher
12. gelassen