Global estimates of the total number of human trafficking victims range from 27 million to 40.3 million, though the transnational and hidden nature of human trafficking makes accurate figures difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, the context of human trafficking is intricately complex, involving economic, social, political, local, and global factors. Prior studies have importantly centered on documenting trafficking routes; estimating the scope of the problem; classifying countries as source, transit, or destination; and understanding legal responses to and policies regarding human trafficking. In doing so they have documented the importance of factors such as economic and gender based inequality, globalization, corruption, conflict, and migration. Although existing research has identified the main factors that drive human trafficking, relatively little is known about how these factors may combine in unique and important ways across various geographic locales. Human trafficking also lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework to connect an underdeveloped and fragmented literature. My research fills this gap in two ways. First, I bridge disciplinary explanations to create a unifying theoretical framework of human trafficking. This involves integrating theory from criminology, migration, and feminist literatures; specifically, institutional anomie theory, migration systems theory, and critical global feminism. This framework takes into consideration how global neoliberal economic policies and programs shape nations’ socioeconomic and sociocultural contexts. This includes examining the ways that migration and connected human trafficking victimization are related to blocked opportunities placed within in a larger sociohistorical and sociopolitical context. Second, I use set-theoretic multi-method research (MMR), which combines fuzzy-set
qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) with the comparative historical method of process tracing to identify configurations of conditions which contribute to migration and human trafficking across three geographic regions: Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. Chapter 1 introduces the topic and literature of human trafficking. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework, moving through each theory before concluding with their relevance to the study of human trafficking. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of set-theoretic MMR and the data sources from various international organizations. This includes a review of fsQCA and process tracing. Chapter 4 presents the results of the fsQCA for each outcome: high human trafficking, high migration, and high number of identified victims. Analysis confirms the role of the theoretical framework in illuminating the conditions which are associated with explaining the origin of human trafficking flows. That several solutions leading to high human trafficking were identical or similar to solutions leading to high out migration suggests the importance of examining what conditions may be shared between these outcomes. Chapters 5-7 present the results of process tracing for a country from each geographic region, with each demonstrating how a different pathway to human trafficking can emerge. Chapter 5 focuses on Cambodia, showcasing how a plethora of IMF and World Bank neoliberal economic policies worked to weaken non-economic institutions and deepen inequality. In Chapter 6, Bolivia makes a unique case given its history of social protest against economic measures associated with the IMF and World Bank. Results show however, that the quality of social expenditures on services such as health, education, and employment have not worked to alleviate inequality. Instead, as globalization and an economy centered on neoliberal accommodation has persisted, corruption and inequalities have too. Chapter 7 demonstrates the role of instability in the case of The Gambia, where instability, inequality and corruption intertwine with migration and human
trafficking. Finally, in concluding Chapter 8 the analysis of the three preceding chapters are brought together and compared, with academic and policy implications outlined. Ultimately, my research demonstrates how international financial policies and globalization contribute to combinations of anomic conditions which connect migration with human trafficking flows.

by
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BIOGRAPHY

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE

Introduction

Global estimates of the total number of human trafficking victims range from 27 million (TIP 2013) to 40.3 million (ILO 2017). The transnational and hidden nature of human trafficking makes accurate figures difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, human trafficking is considered by some to be the largest systematic abuse of human rights in the world today, and it is increasingly growing in “scope, sophistication, and invisibility” (Stone 2005:32). However, human trafficking does not merely happen—rather, it is produced. This statement is a twist on one from Pickering (2011:16) who stated: “Migrations do not simply happen—they are produced.” Such is the case for any sociological phenomenon. Whether human trafficking, migration, sentencing disparities, or food consumption, such phenomena cannot be removed from their context. The context of human trafficking is intricately complex, involving economic, social, political, local, and global factors.

Research has not sufficiently explored how the economic, social, and political contexts coalesce to influence human trafficking within geographic locales. Although much is known about the factors that drive human trafficking, such as economic and gender based inequality, the literatures lacks research which demonstrates how these factors may combine in unique and important ways in various geographic locales (Limoncelli 2009). Prior studies have importantly centered on documenting trafficking routes; estimating the scope of the problem; classifying countries as source, transit, or destination; and understanding legal responses to and policies regarding human trafficking. However, studies have yet to fully grapple with the larger social, cultural, and economic contexts in which migration, and relatedly human trafficking, takes place (Karakus and McGarrell 2011). Furthermore, research on human trafficking lacks a
comprehensive theoretical framework within which research is conducted (Gożdziak 2015; Kakar 2017). That is, theorizing around the phenomenon of human trafficking remains underdeveloped and fragmented across disciplines (Limoncelli 2009).

In a 2009 article, human trafficking researcher Limoncelli called for more nuanced research around the topic of human trafficking, highlighting gaps in previous work. In particular Limoncelli (2009:84) called for trafficking research based in what she termed transnational sociology, as it “incorporates an analysis of political, economic, and cultural factors within and across borders and the way that they are related to trafficking; an understanding of trafficking globally as well as in specific geographic locales; and a sociology that views trafficking as a multifaceted social phenomenon, rather than a singular issue of migration, crime, or gender.”

Thus the aim of the present research is twofold. First, I aim to bridge disciplinary explanations to create a unifying theoretical framework of human trafficking. This involves integrating theory from criminology, migration, and feminist literatures. This framework will take into consideration how larger neoliberal global economic shifts shape nations’ economic and social contexts. This includes critically examining the ways that migration and connected human trafficking victimization are connected to blocked opportunities placed within in a larger socio-historical context. Second, I aim to specify configurations of conditions that shape human trafficking across three geographic locales, including Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. These locales are particularly important for studying human trafficking as research has identified them as areas of the emergence of modern human trafficking as well as its shifts over time.

To assess the theoretical framework within these geographic locales, I use set-theoretic multi-method research (MMR), which combines fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
(fsQCA) with process tracing. With the analytic framework of set-theoretic MMR I comparatively identify the causal mechanisms and combinations of mechanisms important to human trafficking through fsQCA, while testing their necessity and sufficiency within cases through process tracing. I pull secondary national-level data from various international organizations including the United Nations, Transparency International, the Fund for Peace, and the Heritage Foundation to be used in the fsQCA. In addition to this macro-level data, I pull historical information from a variety of secondary sources such as the country reports from the International Monetary Fund. Ultimately, this research aims to uncover how policies put in place in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America by these international financial institutions contributed to conditions that increased migration, and concurrently, gave rise to the formation of human trafficking flows.

**Framing Human Trafficking**

The historical roots of human trafficking can be linked to slavery, meaning it is not a new social condition (Farrell and Fahy 2009). Human trafficking as a social problem can be traced back to the late 19th century, meaning that it began to be publicly recognized and problematized as a social issue. At this time in Europe and North America, societal shifts and the growth of industry and urban living caused an increase in migration, and with that, worries about the movement of white women (Outshoorn 2015). Concern revolved largely around trafficking women for the purposes of prostitution and culminated in the 1904 international treaty titled the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Trade (Boris and Berg 2014; Outshoorn 2015). In 1949, similar concerns led the United Nations to pass the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. These early anti-trafficking efforts demonstrated racist and sexist concerns, focusing on the
prostitution of white women regardless of consent (Boris and Berg 2014; Outshoorn 2005, 2015). With no pressure on nations to implement the protocols of the convention, the issue of human trafficking declined in political and public spheres.

A resurgence in awareness of the issue of human trafficking began in the mid-1990s when media and women’s rights organizations began to draw attention to the issue, though they tended to focus exclusively on female victims of sex trafficking (Farrell and Fahy 2009; Hua 2011). The human rights frame of human trafficking, focusing primarily on victims, was the primary frame used leading up to the first piece of federal legislation in the United States dealing with human trafficking in 2000 (Farrell and Fahy 2009). The passing of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000 enhanced public awareness of human trafficking as a criminal offense, prompting the media to take interest in this new crime. As such, the narrative around human trafficking began to focus more on the progression of the act from beginning to end, including the recruitment, harboring, and transportation of individuals, rather than the socio-economic and socio-political conditions which give rise to human trafficking (Lee 2011). This shift in media framing of human trafficking redirected focus from framing human trafficking as a human rights issue to framing it as a crime and criminal justice problem. This change importantly tapped into public attitudes about anti-immigration and transnational crime (Chuang 2006; Farrell and Fahy 2009; Lee 2011).

Although this shift in the framing of human trafficking as a problem of crime and justice helped draw more awareness, support, and funding for anti-trafficking efforts, it has also meant that legislation has evolved within a criminal legal framework (Farrell and Fahy 2009; Hua 2011). This criminal justice framing means that anti-trafficking efforts have focused largely on prosecuting offenders, while protecting victims has received less attention (Chuang 2006; Farrell
and Fahy 2009). Furthermore, the prevention of human trafficking has not received as much attention at the government level. Outside the United States, a similar shift happened globally as international laws were developed around human trafficking (Gallagher 2010; Shelley 2010). The United Nations shifted from framing human trafficking as a human rights issue to a criminal problem with the Trafficking Protocol, part of a larger protocol to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and enforced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Gallagher 2010). Studies have shown how other countries have largely framed their response to human trafficking as an issue of crime and justice, including Ghana (Lawrance 2010), India and Thailand (Sobel 2014), and the United Kingdom (Broad and Turnbull 2018).

With this shift, governments have focused instead on trafficking as a law and order problem. By failing to view human trafficking as a structural problem in a wider perspective, and “as a problem of migration, poverty, discrimination, and gender-based violence,” anti-trafficking strategies have not focused on corresponding measures of prevention (Chuang 2006:138). Instead, prevention efforts have largely been short-sighted, focusing on awareness campaigns. By failing to address the root causes of human trafficking, including global economic policies, social inequalities, and conflicts, anti-trafficking efforts will continue to fall short (Chuang 2006; Farrell and Fahy 2009).

The study of modern human trafficking over time has also been related to specific geographic regions. Malarek (2011) identifies four waves of human trafficking based on the origin country. These waves of trafficking, each of which is comprised primarily of women and girls, include trafficking from: (1) Southeast Asia in the 1970s; (2) Africa in the early 1980s; (3) Latin America in the late 1980s; and (4) formerly Soviet countries in the 1990s. Outshoorn (2015) similarly notes that the first reports of trafficked women emerged from Southeast Asia.
before reports shift to Latin America, the Caribbean, and West Africa in the 1980s and finally Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s. Farr (2004) and Truong (2003) chronicle a similar timeline of sex trafficking beginning with South and Southeast Asia and finally shifting to former Soviet and Soviet dependent states.

**How is Human Trafficking Explained?**

The literature on human trafficking is vast, spanning across disciplines as diverse as criminology, migration, and economics. Within existing sociological and criminological research, there is a focus primarily on sex trafficking and female victims. However, the current study examines macro-level institutional trends, which does not permit fine grained differentiations between sex and labor trafficking, male and female victims, or trafficking within versus across borders. For the purposes of this research, human trafficking is defined as:

> the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation (United Nations 2000).

This definition comes from the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, and is the most internationally recognized definition of human trafficking (Cho 2015). Additionally, this is the definition of human trafficking utilized by the two trafficking related outcomes included in this study.

Research findings across disciplines concerning the factors that inform human trafficking are quite consistent and they generally find that “the problem of trafficking begins not with the traffickers themselves, but with the conditions that caused their victims to migrate under circumstances rendering them vulnerable to exploitation” (Chuang 2006:140). Six overarching themes emerge from the literature on human trafficking, emphasizing causes stemming from
globalization, economic inequality, gendered inequality, corruption, and conflict, as well as their connections with migration. I discuss each in turn.

*Globalization*

With globalization a neoliberal ideology that emphasizes individualism, competiveness, and open marketization ignores and exacerbates structural inequalities associated with exploitation and poverty (Mishra 2015). Neoliberalism is defined as political economic practices which emphasize that individual well-being is advanced through the state’s role in protecting an institutional framework of individual freedom such as private property rights and freedoms associated with markets and trade (Harvey 2005). Globalization, defined here as a set of processes that hinder or facilitate the international flows of individuals, items, and information, influences human trafficking through several main ways (Ritzer 2010).

Under globalization, the industries of local economies are transformed as migration and trading across borders increases. Globalization has created a wide gap of global inequalities between countries, and even within countries there is a widening gap between poor and rich communities (Chuang 2006; Zhang 2007). This gap creates a growing population of individuals who use migration as a means to attain economic gain (Chuang 2006; Surtees 2008). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, inequalities are exacerbated by neoliberal global economic policies found in structural adjustment programs, economic restructuring, and other policies from international economic institutions (Cameron and Newman 2008; Farr 2004; Kara 2010; Lee 2011; Mishra 2015; Shelley 2010; Stone 2005; Truong 2003).

Research has noted how human trafficking is linked to globalization through the strains, inequalities, and movement associated with it (Lee, 2011). Globalization thus also draws attention to the ways in which migration is linked with trafficking, including demand for labor.
and increased hopes (Chuang 2006; Shelley 2010). Considering trafficking within global migratory movement shifts the focus to the pull of unmet labor demands within cities and across borders. That is, restrictive immigration policies may lead individuals to alternative routes, placing them at risk of trafficking victimization (Chuang 2006; Lee 2011; Shelley 2010).

In addition to structural changes, globalization has led to cultural shifts as the spread of global media and the internet allows for communities to receive an influx of messages that promise better chances and opportunities elsewhere (Chuang 2006). Structural inequalities meet with cultural ideals of attainment to foster an environment which encourages and enhances the decision to migrate (Cameron and Newman 2008; Chuang 2006; Mishra 2015). Falsey promised opportunities are promoted alongside the processes of globalization and urbanization. In this way, globalization creates a structural environment which limits the opportunities of some and a cultural environment which contributes to fostering hopes and expectations. Together these may inform individuals’ willingness to migrate, increasing their risk of trafficking (Cameron and Newman 2008; Chuang 2006).

**Economic inequality**

Economic inequalities have been exacerbated by globalization and accompanying international financial policies that harm local economies and shift job opportunities (Kara 2010; Limoncelli 2009). For example, research notes how neoliberal economic policies in the Global South have exacerbated inequality and created vulnerable populations (Farr 2004; Limoncelli 2009; Shelley 2010; Stone 2005; Truong 2003). Pyle (2005:251) demonstrates how the neoliberal “market-determined economic outcomes” pushed by international institutions deepen gender inequalities by increasing demand for women’s labor in informal, underpaying, and often exploitative sectors. Henderson (2005) also analyzed the effect of neoliberal economic and
welfare projects, to show that they increased inequalities transnationally. The weakening of a state’s economic governance and development of growth through “low value-adding services such as retailing or tourism” results from the implementation of such policies and programs (Henderson 2005:231).

Research shows that this governance and growth is associated with increased poverty and inequality (Henderson 2005). In addition, economic restructuring has had a similar effect in Central and Eastern Europe by removing social safety nets and creating economically marginalized groups (Corrin 2005; Hupp Williamson 2017; Kligman and Limoncelli 2005; Limoncelli 2009; Surtees 2008). Risky migration decisions and economic based disparities such as poverty and blocked job or educational opportunities are consistently linked to human trafficking (Bales 2007a; Cameron and Newman 2008; Farr 2004; Jac-Kucharski 2012; Mishra 2015; Outshoorn 2015; Truong 2003; Zhang 2007). These forms of deprivation and insecurity can exacerbate vulnerability and make migration for work or other economic opportunities appear as a viable option (Chuang 2006; Surtees 2008). Traffickers ultimately exploit vulnerable populations by deceiving individuals with promises of jobs or education (Cameron and Newman 2008; Hughes 2000).

**Gendered inequality**

Gender based inequality, including discrimination and violence, has indeed been identified as a causal factor in increasing human trafficking (Chuang 2006; Corrin 2005; Farr 2004; Kara 2010; Lee 2011; Limoncelli 2009). Research has shown that a lack of economic and social rights and opportunities—including property rights, educational access, and political participation—are important factors in the trafficking of women and girls (Shelley 2010). Gender-based inequalities are often connected to the “feminization of poverty,” where existing
social structures do not provide equal opportunities to all genders (Chuang 2006). Research has shown that the feminization of poverty, wherein women and children are disproportionately impoverished in a population, has been exacerbated by globalization and its associated macro-level trends (Chuang 2006). These trends include international economic practices, such as structural adjustment programs and economic restructuring, which have disproportionately impacted women’s opportunities and their access to social safety nets (Corrin 2005; Hughes 2000; Hupp Williamson 2017; Lee 2011).

Structural adjustment and other economic restructuring programs aimed to integrate countries into the global economy through stimulating a country’s economic growth by “restoring balance between (1) government revenues and spending, (2) savings and investments, (3) export and import of goods and services, (4) the flow of foreign capital” (Truong 2006:34). Such programs often came from international economic institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Associated measures put in place could include export processing zones, which allow multinational corporations to exploit local labor, and austerity programs, which reduce or remove government social services. Both have been noted to add additional strains and barriers for women’s double burden—their labor in and outside of the home—leading to migration (Farr 2004).

For example, Nigeria has been studied as a country whose structural adjustment loans and bailouts resulted in significant reductions in social programs and welfare. The result caused an increase in women facing high unemployment, and in seeking work abroad become victimized by traffickers (Shelley 2010). Similar patterns have been observed in countries such as Argentina, Thailand, Zambia, and former Soviet states (Cameron and Newman 2008; Farr 2004; Geisler and Hansen 1994). Ultimately, economic policies associated with these programs and
bailouts disproportionately burdened women, often leading to problems of unemployment, an intensification of both paid and unpaid labor, and disputes over rights such as land rights (Cameron and Newman 2008; Truong 2006). Migration to seek work then results in human trafficking (Farr 2004; Shelley 2010).

The feminization of poverty may also influence women’s decision to migrate for sought after economic opportunities. Here the concept of “feminization of survival” is used to refer to family and community reliance on women to migrate for economic sustenance (Sassen 2002). In short, “women bear the brunt of poverty and seek ways to migrate to more prosperous countries” (Outshoorn 2015:11). Both the feminization of poverty and the feminization of survival demonstrate that globalization is gendered, often leading to the “feminization of irregular migration” (Lee 2011).

Corruption

Prior research has identified a positive relationship between corruption and human trafficking. A country’s level of corruption has been shown to play a role in allowing the offenders of trafficking to continue their crimes, which can erode perceptions of the legitimacy of law enforcement and the law among victims, ultimately undermining anti-trafficking policy and law enforcement within a country (Farr 2004; Jac-Kucharski 2012; Malarek 2011; Surtees 2008). Globalization has created favorable contexts for crime by facilitating corruption, including organized crime groups involvement in transnational human trafficking (Lee 2011; Shelley 2010). Globalization facilitates corruption through a lack of oversight from international structural adjustment and economic financing that allows top political leaders to siphon funds, while international banking systems prevent easy recovery of lost funds (Shelley 2010).
Large-scale and small-scale corruption also enables organized crime groups to operate (Bales 2007a; Farr 2004; Shelley 2010; Zhang 2007). In regard to human trafficking and organized crime groups, demand is high and the supply is available with high profits to be made at relatively low risks. One way risks are made low is through creating a political-criminal nexus or a “symbiosis of crime and politics that is mutually advantageous” (Cameron and Newman 2008:146). The action or inaction of law enforcement and public officials allows the traffickers to continue to exploit individuals (Malarek 2011).

In addition to corruption being influential in traffickers’ ability to evade prosecution for their crimes, the legal framework often works in their favor as well. To date the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol has been ratified by 173 countries; however the protocol lacks formal oversight and enforcement mechanisms. Studies have shown that levels of compliance with anti-trafficking laws vary by country and are impacted by factors such as corruption and the rights of women (Avdeyeva 2012; Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer 2014). Research also shows that countries may be selective in their enforcement, focusing on aspects that reflect economic interests such as border control, rather than the protection of human rights or prosecution of offenders (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012; Hacker 2015).

*Conflict*

Scholars have also emphasized conflict in the form of civil conflict, war, violent militarization, and social unrest as initiating migration and human trafficking flows (Bales 2007a; Cameron and Newman 2008; Lee 2011; Mishra 2015; Shelley 2010). It has been noted that such conflicts create social disorganization and weaken social institutions. Along with militarization and displacement, such conditions are associated with an increase in both the supply and demand of human trafficking (Limoncelli 2009). That is to say, these conditions often
act to drive individuals to seek migration out of the area, placing them at risk of victimization by trafficking. As conflicts erode economic and social institutions, displaced individuals and refugees are populations vulnerable to trafficking through migration and exploitation (Akee et al. 2010). Research demonstrates that measures of conflict and a high presence of displaced persons and refugees in a country are predictive of that country’s likelihood of experiencing human trafficking (Akee et al. 2010).

**Migration**

Human trafficking research identifies a strong relationship between migration and human trafficking victimization, as areas with high migration also reflect high human trafficking flows (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010; Skeldon 2002). What often begins as voluntary migration may shift into human trafficking (Cho 2015b; Chuang 2006; Mo 2018). In fact, Chuang (2006:138) cites that “more often than not, trafficking is labor migration gone horribly wrong in our globalized economy.” This includes the introduction of unexpected risks and exploitation during and after the migration process (Petrunov 2014). Analysis of a survey of 25,000 human trafficking victims by the International Organization for Migration shows that most individuals used personal connections or agencies to initiate their migration (Cho 2015b). Studies show that migration between two countries often generates corresponding human trafficking flows (Akee et al. 2010, 2014).

Explaining this relationship, the factors that have shown to be important to human trafficking have demonstrated importance for promoting migration as well (Aronowitz 2001). This includes many of the factors discussed previously such as economic motivations such as income inequality and job opportunities (Jac-Kucharski 2012; Mo 2018), women’s vulnerable positions (Kligman and Limoncelli 2005; Lee 2011; Outshoorn 2015), and conflicts (Akee et al.
Factors like corruption compound these socioeconomic and sociopolitical conditions to make migrants more vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking (Petrunov 2014; Richards 2004; Surtees 2008). However, because many contributing factors are shared between the two phenomena, the line between migration and human trafficking is not always distinct and is often blurred (Ford, Lyons, and van Schendel 2012; Rao and Presenti 2012; Skeldon 2002).

The literature does demonstrate strong evidence that the drivers of migration and human trafficking are related. A quantitative analysis of 70 variables associated with countries of origin and 63 variables associated with counties of destination are examined cross-nationally to demonstrate that human trafficking is largely driven by economic motivation with poorer countries acting as the “senders” for human trafficking victims (Cho 2015b). Specifically, income levels in both origin and destination countries, institutional quality in origin countries, information flows between countries, and demand for labor in destination countries have important impacts on human trafficking flows (Cho 2015b). Another analysis of 76 variables shows that poverty, governmental corruption, and social conflict are important factors in predicting human trafficking from a country, while economic well-being and demographic factors associated with a demand for labor predict trafficking to a country (Bales 2007b).

The literature on human trafficking ultimately demonstrates a complex relationship between factors such as inequality, globalization, corruption, conflict, and migration. It thus becomes important to address the root socioeconomic and sociopolitical factors at play in human trafficking. This includes taking action through things such as reducing governmental corruption, poverty, and related inequalities (Bales 2007a). Efforts at combating human trafficking will have
only short-term effects if the reasons individuals and groups are exploited, such as their economic and social status, are not fully considered in reform.

**Structure of Dissertation**

This research proceeds as follows. Chapter two details my research questions and the three theoretical frameworks that will be used to address the questions, including institutional anomie theory, migration systems perspectives, and critical global feminism. These will be used to create a unifying framework that answers the question of how global financial programs and policies have contributed to conditions within countries that have created human trafficking flows and how these pathways vary by geographic region. The data sources and methods are explained in chapter three. This includes an examination of issues associated with human trafficking data and a description of the various data sets I use. Set-theoretic multi-method research and the methods of comparative historical analysis and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis are also discussed. Chapter four examines the results of the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, while chapters five through seven each explore a different country using comparative historical analysis. Chapter five examines Southeast Asia with the case of Cambodia; chapter six, South America with Bolivia; and chapter seven, Sub-Saharan Africa through The Gambia. Chapter eight concludes by synthesizing the preceding chapters before ending with a discussion of the academic and policy implications of this study.
CHAPTER TWO: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Introduction

I draw from the theories of institutional anomie, migration systems perspectives, and critical global feminism to explain how international financial institutions and the policies of economic globalization they impose onto nations contributed to the creation of conditions that increased migration, and concurrently, human trafficking. Specifically, these theories will incorporates processes of globalization, socio-economic and socio-political factors, all while remaining sensitive to issues of agency, gender, and culture. Together these theories create a unifying framework that can answer the question of how global financial programs and policies have contributed to conditions within countries that have created human trafficking flows and how these pathways vary by geographic region.

In this chapter, I first review each of the theories and offer an assessment of relevant empirical tests. Next, I outline the relationships between each of the theories in order to demonstrate how they create a unified framework. Here, I also evaluate the applicability of the theoretical frameworks for understanding human trafficking, which is important because research on human trafficking lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework and thus remains fragmented across disciplines. Finally, I conclude by specifying the analytical theoretical framework that will guide the analysis. This includes specifying the mechanisms involved in a causal chain leading to the outcome of human trafficking.

Strain and Anomie Theories

Strain theory draws attention to how blocked opportunity structures play an important role in generating anomie. Merton’s (1938, 1968) strain theory emphasizes the imbalance that
occurs when there is a discrepancy between a society’s culturally defined goals and the legitimate means to achieve these goals. There is an over-emphasis on cultural goals, notably the goal of economic success. At the same time, an under-emphasis on structurally shaped means, or opportunities. Merton (1938) notes that these goals act as common success symbols which transcend class lines, despite the structural organization of society that creates class differentials in the ability to access and achieve these goals. When there is a lack of integration between culturally defined goals and institutionalized means of achieving this goals, anomie can occur. Blocked structural opportunities can then lead individuals to a number of adaptations (Merton 1938).

Drawing from Merton’s work, Messner and Rosenfeld's (2013) institutional anomie theory emphasizes how social structure and culture coalesce in American society to create an environment conducive to crime and deviance. In American society, the culturally defined goals center on achieving monetary success by any means necessary. That is, Americans value economic success to a much greater degree than the use of legitimate means to reach these goals. Messner and Rosenfeld (2013) note that this cultural goal emphasizes values of individualism, achievement, universalism, and the fetishization of money. A cultural emphasis on economic success coupled with structural dominance of the economy then creates an imbalance between culture and structure, producing anomie within society and generating a breeding ground for deviance and crime.

Messner and Rosenfeld (2013) alter the definition of anomie to emphasize these institutional imbalances. They emphasize that institutional anomie leads to the breakdown of social controls, socialization, and regulations. By focusing on how culturally prescribed economic goals are not influenced by non-economic restraints, anomie is conceptualized “not so
much understood as an absence of culture, a deregulation or normlessness, but…as a product of the culture of modern capitalism that transports specific values” (Hövermann et al. 2015:409). Their theory focuses explicitly on the dominance of the economic institution over other institutions that fulfill core functions of control and socialization, including the family, polity, and education. In staking the claim of institutional imbalance, Messner and Rosenfeld (2013) identify three interrelated ways that the dominance of the economic institution manifests itself. First, noneconomic institutions and roles, such as the social functions of education, family, and the government, are devalued. Second, non-economic institutions become increasingly required to accommodate the economic institution’s requirements. Finally, the norms of the economic institution, such as individualism and profit, permeate non-economic institutions. Ultimately, institutional anomie theory argues that an increase in economic dominance can actually increase the pressure to achieve monetary success by any means necessary, resulting in an increase of anomie in the society when other non-economic institutions are weakened (Chamlin and Cochran 2007).

In discussing where economic dominance emerges from, Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008) point to the decreasing ability of both the state and other non-economic institutions to regulate the economy and its associated processes. They note that the aforementioned manifestations of economic dominance including accommodation, devaluation, and permeation, are subsumed under the idea of globalization and have many negative outcomes. These include increasing poverty and inequality that often emerge alongside a move toward more neoliberal social welfare policies (Messner et al. 2008). The resulting economic changes and deepening inequalities associated with globalization are noted as being potentially criminogenic to their societies. Similarly, Passas (2000:18) argues that neoliberalism and globalization contribute to
processes that lead to global anomie by activating criminogenic asymmetries, which are “structural discrepancies and inequalities in the realm of the economy, law, politics, and culture.” By recognizing that the strains, tensions, and contradictions of a culture are tied to the social organization, institutional anomie theory considers the cultural and structural environment when explaining crime (Messner and Rosenfeld 2013).

Macro-level tests of institutional anomie theory have generally found support for economic dominance and concomitant weakened non-economic institutions creating criminogenic conditions. Savolainen (2000) used institutional anomie to explain inequality, the welfare state, and homicide rates across 45 primarily advanced industrialized nations. Findings show that economic is a robust predictor of homicide in nations where non-economic institutions are weak. Hughes, Schaible, and Gibbs (2015) examine 50 countries with a bias toward advanced nations to find that economically dominant principles are found in nations with high homicides. These economically dominant principles included Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2013) concepts of a cultural emphasis on individualism, achievement, universalism, and the fetishization of money.

Such support for institutional anomie has been demonstrated across many types of crime and units of analysis (Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Kim and Pridemore 2005). For example, strong economic institutions have been measured in a variety of ways, including: a decommodification index\(^1\) (Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Savolainen 2000), an economic freedom index (Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Hughes et al. 2015), and measures of economic inequality (Chamlin and Cochran 1995; Maume and Lee 2003; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997;  

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\(^1\) Often used to measure economic dominance relative to the strength of non-economic institutions, (Esping-Andersen 1990) decommodification index measures the degree to which the state protects the social well-being of their citizens from larger market forces.
Savolainen 2000). Measurements for weakened non-economic institutions have more variation in the literature, including: survey responses that operationalize achievement and fetishism of money orientations (Hughes et al. 2015), social welfare expenditures (Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Jensen 2002), public health expenditures (Pratt and Godsey 2003), and measures of family breakdown and education levels (Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Kim and Pridemore 2005).

While institutional anomie theory originated as a macro-level theory, recent tests of the theory have looked at the sub-national or even individual level. At the county level, Maume and Lee (2003) find that the strength of noneconomic institutions work to buffer economic motivations toward instrumental violence in the United States. Specifically, welfare expenditures act to minimize the effect income inequality has on homicide. Muftić (2006) extends institutional anomie to the individual level to find that a high orientation toward economic goals is associated with deviant student behavior in the United States. Students who adhered to cultural values of economic dominance such as universalism and the fetishism of money were more likely to cheat, while students with adherence to non-economic institutions such as the family or polity were less likely to cheat. Hövermann et al. (2015:408) apply institutional anomie at the micro-level in Germany to explain how social prejudices emerge alongside marketization, or the “economizing of the non-economic.” They find support for the individual embrace of marketization and the prejudice against vulnerable groups, including the unemployed, homeless, and immigrants. Such groups are devalued due to being seen as not contributing economically or being an economic burden. A multi-level test of this marketized mentality also showed support for institutional anomie (Hövermann, Groß, and Messner 2016). Here the authors conclude that the marketized mentality varies across 25 European countries in relation to societies’ institutional balance.
Specifically, where economic institutions dominate over non-economic institutions at the macro-level, there is a higher the prevalence of marketized mentality at the individual or micro-level.

Bernburg (2002) argues that, based off Messner and Rosenfeld's (1997) statements of the theory, the anomic cultural ethos is the result of the dominance of the capitalist market economy, rather than a unique aspect of America. Though this theory focuses on the United States in its original application (Messner and Rosenfeld 2013), it can be argued that it may be applied to any country with a capitalist economic structure, as the ethos of the “American Dream” will still be present to some degree. Aspects of the American Dream are inherent in modern capitalist societies, as “the encouragement of high levels of aspiration and ambition corresponds to specific socioeconomic demands and is part of process making for social integration or for discrepancies and contradictions” (Passas 1997:69). The influences of secularization, globalization, affluence, and even mass media have contributed to the promotion of rising expectations in societies around the world. In discussing the globalization of capitalism, Robinson (2011:733) notes that “the culture and ideology of global capitalism – consumerism, individualism and competition” are not so much uniquely Western as they are a product of transnational global capitalism. Likewise, several studies have not found evidence to support the idea that Americans are unique in their emphasis on the pursuit of material success goals compared to other nations (Bernburg 2002; Chamlin and Cochran 2007; Hughes et al. 2015). From these studies we see support for the argument that institutional anomie theory may be applicable cross-nationally, and particularly in the age of globalization, as many nations shift toward a neoliberal capitalist economic structure. This involves a cultural ethos that places high importance on economic success. According to institutional anomie theory, as economic institutions are strengthened, non-economic institutions
and their social policies and programs are often correspondingly weakened, creating environments conducive to crime and deviance.

**Migration Systems Theory**

Theories of migration range in focus, with early theoretical developments stemming from neoclassical functionalist approaches or structural Marxist approaches. Neoclassical functionalism includes classical push-pull approaches to migration. These focus on factors that influence migration from poorer to wealthier nations (Castles, Haas, and Miller 2014). Push-pull theories emphasize the ways structural variables such as economic opportunity or demand for labor play a role in migration. However, these theories do not specify interactions between factors nor do they account for the fact that developed and wealthier nations also experience emigration and internal movement (Castles et al. 2014). Structural Marxist approaches include historical-structural theories that focus on the role of capitalist development in deepening economic inequalities between nations. These theories focus on the connections between migration patterns, relationships of domination, and labor markets (Castles et al. 2014). Both neoclassical functionalist and structural Marxist approaches problematize human agency. Push-pull approaches overemphasize rational actors by viewing migratory decisions as being based on full information and reacted to in a uniform manner, while historical-structural theories have an overreliance on portraying individuals as victims of structural forces (Castles et al. 2014).

To address these shortcomings, migration theories were developed to emphasize the ties, networks, and identities involved in migration that have developed alongside globalization processes (Castles et al. 2014; Kritz and Zlotnik 1992). These various perspectives all share the common thread of considering how migrant’s agency interacts with the socioeconomic and
sociocultural structures to impact migratory processes (Castles et al. 2014). One of these perspectives was migration systems theory.

Migration systems theory accounts for migrant’s agency, while also placing migration itself within the broader framework of development and social change (Castles et al. 2014). The theory synthesizes portions of world systems theory, network theory, institutional theory, and cumulative causation theory to suggest that migration patterns build an international structure over space and time (Massey et al. 1993). Massey et al. (1993) identify several propositions that derive from a migration systems theory framework. These propositions include an emphasis on nations’ political and economic relationships (rather than geographic proximity), the presence of multiple or overlapping migration systems across nations, and an understanding of how socio-economic and socio-political shifts impact migration systems both within and across countries. Ultimately, migration systems theory provides a way to understand the processes involved in both internal and international migration as they are placed within broader processes of social change and economic development (King and Skeldon 2010).

Theoretical applications of migration systems theory are abundant, yet empirical tests of the perspective remain scarce. In development of the theory, Salt (1989) applied a systems framework to explicate the structural context of various regional patterns of migration. Tracing migration trends from 1950 to 1980, they maintain that to understand migration systems, global social and economic forces cannot be separated from more geographically local socioeconomic and sociopolitical contexts. To not do so would be to misconstrue how migration decisions are impacted by both “remote and proximate variables” (Salt 1989:440). Jennissen (2007) extends and clarifies the components that make up the social, political, economic, and demographic context of migration systems theory. An international migration systems theory which accounts
for these contexts would include factors such as income and employment, migration policies, inequality, age and sex compositions, and material linkages between countries.

Empirically, the lack of complete data on international migration flows hinders fully testing migration systems theory (DeWaard, Kim, and Raymer 2012; Zlotnik 1992). By using a harmonization method on available migration flow data, DeWaard et al. (2012) lend empirical support to migration systems theory by finding that there are three primary migration systems in Europe. The flows between countries are categorized as occurring between countries categorized as core European, countries categorized as periphery, and countries categorized as intermediate. These flows are characterized by historical ties between countries as well as shared economic or political memberships, demonstrating the importance of relational and regulatory ties in shaping migration between sending and receiving nations. While unable to show causality, Fazito and Soares (2015) use social network modeling and the theory of migration systems to demonstrate how forces such as the historical impact of travel agencies acting as migration brokers and the cultural role of personal networks shape US-Brazil legal and illegal migration flows. At the micro-level, Cooke and Bélanger (2006) use interviews to identify the political, social/cultural, economic, demographic, and spatial contexts important to migration between Winnipeg and the indigenous First Nations communities. For example, a lack of economic opportunities and political funding for social services is related to migration out of First Nations communities, while discrimination experienced in the city and social or cultural ties are related to migration out of Winnipeg.

A migration systems perspective links the macro to the micro by seeking to understand how macro-level conditions and policies shape individual, micro-level migration decisions. The processes linking the macro and micro “include networks of both institutions and individuals that
assist with the mobilization and recruitment of migrants and with the actual organization of migration” (Kritz and Zlotnik 1992:6). Understanding these networks includes the legal and extra-legal institutions working at the macro-level as well as the networks of individuals operating at the micro-level. Research shows that migration decisions are impacted by factors at multiple levels (Brown 2002). Yang and Guo (1999) show that temporary labor migration in China differs by gender: men’s decisions are shaped more by community-level economic opportunities, while women’s decisions are influenced by individual and household characteristics such as marital status and education level. Similar to these findings, other studies have demonstrated how migration is related to both individual factors such as labor force participation and marital status, as well as neighborhood factors such as community resources, median income, and racial composition (Chi and Voss 2005; Swain and Garasky 2007). Multilevel approaches to understanding migration can thus maintain the agency of the individual while acknowledging that such agency is often structurally constrained (Brown 2002).

Ultimately, migration systems theories seek to place international migration within a historical framework in order to understand how social, political, economic, cultural, and demographic contexts pattern migration (Kritz and Zlotnik 1992). Relevant to my research, the historical-structural focus of this migration perspective points to the important role that larger processes of development and social change play in human trafficking. This includes specifying the role that international economic policies and programs have played in increasing the economic, social, and political globalization of nations and how such shifts filter down to impact individual migration decisions and migration rates.
Critical Global Feminism

Feminist scholarship, which transcends disciplinary borders, has many names, including multicultural, transnational, and global feminism. Feminist perspectives have been critiqued for their tendencies toward ahistoricism and Eurocentricism (Shohat 2001). Addressing these critiques, a critical feminist theoretical framework focuses analysis on the ways in which social differences and inequalities are constructed and function within social structures (Kim 2005). Situated within the global, critical global feminism takes an intersectional approach, situating practices within their geographic, historical, and cultural context. An intersectional approach involves understanding how class, gender, race, nationality, and other social positions intersect, at times creating conflicts and contradictions (Shohat 2001). A critical global feminist approach views various feminist perspectives as interconnected through global capitalism and the ideologies that support it (Kim 2005).

Criminology has also faced criticisms regarding ahistoricism and a Eurocentric focus, as well as additional critiques of androcentrism and an urban emphasis (Carrington 2015; Miller and Mullins 2006). In criminology, feminist inquiry has played a large role in developing a more intersectional framework (Burgess-Proctor 2006; Carrington 2015; Daly 1997). Miller and Mullins (2006) describe five features of a feminist criminology, including viewing gender as a social, cultural, and historical product that patterns institutions and interactions in a manner which leads to the socio-economic and socio-political dominance of men. In order to globalize feminist criminology, Carrington (2015) specifies a framework of transnational feminist intersectionality. This framework examines global inequalities alongside gendered and raced experiences, including those of crime, violence, and victimization. Reflexivity in regard to cultural analysis is also emphasized (Carrington 2015). That is, research that is reflexive
proceeds from the viewpoint that situational experiences must be understood through historical and cultural contexts, including processes of power (Burawoy 1998).

A global feminist framework can be strengthened by joining with the literature on critical globalization studies. Within the social sciences, the critical tradition is an approach that is analytical of the status quo and its coexisting power structures, ultimately seeking to replace power structures with “just and equitable social arrangements” (Robinson 2005:12). Against the backdrop of globalization, such analysis can only be juxtaposed within an understanding of global society and the rise of global capitalism. As globalization processes erode the foundations of nations’ autonomy and ways of life, it becomes increasingly “impossible to address local issues removed from global context” (Robinson 2006:24). Comparing a critical globalization framework to other perspectives on globalization it is:

Unlike economism, [for] it does not underestimate agency, gender, mental frameworks, culture, and the environment. Unlike realism, it is not silent about the social forces and the normative aspects of world order. Unlike neoliberal approaches…it does not focus on cross-border flows, interdependence, or technological advances as managerial problems and without linking them to hierarchic power relations and the structure of global hegemony (Mittleman 2005:27).

Thus one can see the advantage a critical globalization framework offers by covering a broad range of knowledge within the field of globalization and providing a focus on the role of historical social arrangements.

Previous critical globalization studies (CGS) have examined a wide variety of transnational issues including social movements (Chase-Dunn and Gills 2005), the role of race in human rights discourse (Suárez-Krabbe 2013), international migration (Chinchilla 2005), and the connections between the local and the global in conflict (Srnicek 2010). Pertinent to the issue of human trafficking, previous studies have investigated the gendered effects of globalization, including the role of structural adjustment policies and powerful transnational economic
institutions (Pyle 2005). Pyle (2005:251) showed how international institutions push “market-determined economic outcomes” which deepen gender inequalities and lead to an increase in women’s participation in three low-income informal work sectors: sex work, domestic work, and export-oriented production work. Parreñas (2005:245) examined the international division of reproductive labor to find that “the movement of domestic workers is embedded in a gendered system of transnational capitalism.” Demand for domestic labor in industrialized nations causes women to migrate for employment in order to support their families in their country of origin. Henderson (2005) analyzed the effect of neoliberal economic and welfare projects, which have deepened inequalities transnationally. Analysis of South Korea and Malaysia show that the relationship between globalization, economic policy, and inequality is impacted by historical specificities of that country. This includes effective economic governance which addresses anti-poverty and anti-corruption policies (Henderson 2005). Such research ultimately demonstrates how economic globalization is often gendered in its effects and the ways such effects drive migration, placing individuals at risk of human trafficking.

In conclusion, a critical global feminism draws attention to understanding how globalization has deepened inequalities through the prioritization of economic growth over social programs and policies. Pertinent to my research, a critical global feminist framework embeds differential access to resources and blocked opportunities within their larger socio-historical context. This includes specifying the important role that economic and gender based inequalities have in regard to human trafficking.

**A Unified Framework**

The previous sections have discussed the propositions of the theories of institutional anomie, migration perspectives, and global critical feminism. Yet how do these theories
coalesce? In this section I describe the areas of overlap between the three theories to create a unified framework that can be applied to the study of the formation of human trafficking flows. Migration systems theory draws attention to the ways in which international economic policies and programs impact macro-level conditions of countries, influencing migration and human trafficking. Institutional anomie theory and critical global feminism work to further specify these conditions, including increasing economic dominance, corruption, and inequality.

Previous studies have applied both institutional anomie theory and migration systems theory at the macro- and micro-level. Institutional anomie posits that economic dominance increases anomie at the macro-level as non-economic institutions and their associated social safety nets are weakened. Yet studies have also demonstrated how economic globalization also increase strains at the micro-level due to blocked opportunities (Carrington 2015; Passas 1997, 2000). The influences of secularization, globalization, affluence, and even mass media have contributed to the promotion of rising expectations in societies around the world, while inequalities have only deepened. As economic development increases aspirations, migration may also increase. Migration studies have shown how economic development leads to increased migration (Massey 1998). Furthermore, both emphasize the role of institutions. As Jennissen (2007) notes, the international migration systems approach can be seen as an institutional approach. He notes: “the concept of institutions may be used to mirror the structure of the entire social environment in which individuals have to make choices” (Jennissen 2007:432). Such a perspective includes the political, legal, and economic constraints as well as opportunities that are embedded in migration.

Institutional anomie and migration systems theory can thus emphasize macro-level forces and institutions and the consequences they can have for human trafficking. Migration flows can
often be traced back to government or institutional actions (Kritz and Zlotnik 1992). Previous examination of economic institutions have connected increasing crime and migration flows to the transition to a privatized capitalist society (Hupp Williamson 2017; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997) and the imposition of strategic adjustment programs from international financial institutions (Geisler and Hansen 1994; Iyanda and Nwogwugwu 2016; Truong 2006). Research also connects shifts in migration to victimization through human trafficking (Chuang 2006; Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010; Skeldon 2002). Institutional anomie theory calls for analysis of the conflict between the demands of economic institutions over others, such as the family (Rosenfeld and Messner 2013). This links institutional anomie theory to research on the feminization of migration which states that migration for economic opportunity is seen as a way for women to meet the familial financial responsibilities that fall increasingly on women (Mishra 2015; Parreñas 2005; Sassen 2002).

Additionally, recent research demonstrates the role of weak institutions in contributing to individuals’ vulnerability to sex trafficking victimization, particularly when combined with weak social safety nets (Heil and Nichols 2015; Nichols 2016). Weakened institutions include “poor education systems, failure to provide a minimum wage as a living wage…, lack of affordable daycare resources, limited access to mental health or substance abuse rehabilitation, services for those leaving prostitution, misguided criminal justice policy, and conflict-ridden families” (Heil and Nichols 2015:87). Institutional anomie helps explain how social institutions have been weakened with economic dominance, and migration perspectives show how resulting migration flows may be related to trafficking victimization.

Bringing in critical global feminism to both institutional anomie and migration theory brings further nuance to the complexities involved in human trafficking. Aplin and Messner
bring gender into institutional anomie theory to understand the gender gap in offending. They find that “there are gender differentials in interpretation of the American dream, differentials in structural opportunities to achieve the underlying goal of material success, and differential consequences for those unable to realize economic goals.” While this study focused on offending, their work brings attention to the need to recognize that gender is embedded in the structure of societal institutions; including the ways in which the gendering within the economy and family contributes to their cultural devaluation and continued economic institutional dominance. Moreover, a critical global feminism reveals how “global capitalism has eroded the sustainability of many local communities, confiscated traditional lands, accelerated the forced migration of women and the feminization of poverty and created a plethora of anomic spaces where violence reigns” (Carrington 2015:179). Critical global feminism alongside institutional anomie theory thus underscores the ways in which anomic spaces are created globally, and often contribute the vulnerability or victimization of individuals through migration and human trafficking.

A critical global feminist lens also joins well with the migration perspective. Pickering (2011:12) notes the importance of the need to “locate gender at the centre of understandings of new incarnations of the global economic system and the drivers of migratory processes.” This includes attention to the gendered economics of migration as well as the role of gendered violence. A feminist perspective remains inclusive of the role of agency while also attending to forces ranging from the role of the state to marginalized identities (Nichols 2016). Ultimately, a critical global feminist approach can incorporate the political economy approach that is prevalent in migration literature but also bring in a more critical sociological perspective.
Applying this to human trafficking, attention is drawn toward the ways in which the processes of globalization are gendered. This includes studies which have noted the feminization of poverty (Applin and Messner 2015; Chuang 2006; Farr 2004; Limoncelli 2009; Shelley 2010) and the feminization of migration (Lee 2011; Mishra 2015; Outshoorn 2015; Sassen 2002). A criminological approach to human trafficking would do better to view the phenomenon as a manifestation of structural social problems, including those related to labor, exploitation, global power, and internal and cross-national migration (Lee 2011). Merging critical feminist approaches with migration and the study of human trafficking brings attention to the dynamics linking globalization, vulnerability, migration and victimization. In regard to policy, Lee (2011:153) notes that such an approach leads to “a different set of non-enforcement led responses to trafficking that involve debates about resources, priorities, and so on.” This thus serves to move the criminological literature on human trafficking forward and beyond limited views of trafficking as a law-and-order problem (Farrell and Fahy 2009; Lee 2011).

Drawing from my theoretical framework, I hypothesize that these international economic policies and programs influenced conditions such as the economy, globalization, inequality, corruption, and social safety nets. Furthermore, the stability of the state is also important. An analytical model of these macro-level conditions and their relationship to human trafficking is conceptualized in Figure 2.1. The theory which emphasizes each of these conditions is represented in parentheses. I argue that these conditions, spurred on by the imposition of globalized economic policies and programs, created an anomic state where migration increased leading to human trafficking.
Figure 2.1. An Analytical Model of Macro-Level Conditions and the Formation of Human Trafficking Flows.

Conclusion

The unification of the proposed theories—institutional anomie, migration systems perspective, and critical global feminism—allows for a more complex approach to the study of human trafficking. This approach incorporates processes of globalization, socio-economic and socio-political factors, all while remaining sensitive to issues of agency, gender, and culture. Moreover, this theoretical framework allows for the incorporation of a wide range of literature, ranging from criminology to migration.

As the first chapter noted, previous research on human trafficking has emphasized factors relating to economic and gendered inequality, globalization, and corruption or conflict. Additionally, research has also noted the ways in which international financial institutions and the policies of economic globalization they impose onto nations often come with harmful
repercussions on non-economic institutions (Rothe and Friedrichs 2015). Yet the literature thus far has failed to examine how these factors combine in different ways, as well as how these combinations may vary based on geographic region (Limoncelli 2009). Thus, this integrated framework is able to address these shortcomings. Specifically, this research aims to uncover how policies put in place in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America by these international financial institutions contributed to conditions that increased migration, and concurrently, human trafficking flows.
CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS

Introduction

This chapter details the various data sources as well as the analytic framework used for my dissertation analysis. First, I specify the methodological issues that arise in regard to human trafficking data. Following this, I describe the secondary data used to operationalize the conditions relevant to human trafficking, which include national-level statistics and historical information. I then describe my analytic framework. I detail, the methods of comparative historical analysis and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) in order to lay the groundwork for the method I use—set-theoretic multi-method research (MMR).

Data

The data for this research is gathered from a large variety of sources. I pull secondary national-level data from various international organizations to be used in the fsQCA. These include the United Nations, Transparency International, the Fund for Peace, and the Heritage Foundation. In addition to this macro-level data, I gather historical information from a variety of secondary sources, such as the country reports from the International Monetary Fund, for within-case process analysis. I detail the statistical data I will use for comparison purposes in the fsQCA. This includes the date range for each national-level indicator, with the majority beginning in the 1990s. The historical analyses of the case studies selected for this study also begin around that time, when the first structural adjustments began to be implemented. I begin with a discussion of the limitations of human trafficking data before detailing the selected outcome I use. Next, I outline each of the data sources for the processes hypothesized to be important to the causal chain.
Human Trafficking

As with many studies on human trafficking, there are several limitations regarding data. As a severely underreported crime, most cases of human trafficking remain undiscovered. Existing databases are scarce, lack data, and may even be inaccessible to outside researchers (Goździak 2015). Despite a growing literature on human trafficking, available statistics and data are lacking in the documentation of human trafficking and thus few studies are empirically based (Goździak 2015; Laczko and Gramegna 2003). It is not uncommon for country level data on trafficking to be mere estimates, often including data related to smuggling and irregular migration (Laczko and Gramegna 2003). Moreover, combatting the crime of human trafficking is often a low priority so many countries do not strive to collect data on it. Laczko and Gramegna (2003) state that this low prioritization may be tied to inadequate legislation, which hurts the ability of courts to prosecute traffickers, as well as the fact that witnesses and/or victims are often required to testify for the successful conviction of a trafficker, both of which present many roadblocks. Even with new data sources emerging from agencies across the world, often there is the issue that “no single agency acts as a focal point for the collection, collation, or harmonization of statistics on trafficking either at the national or regional levels” (Laczko and Gramegna 2003:184).

For these reasons, two outcome variables are selected. First, data on the effectiveness of government anti-trafficking efforts is obtained from a research database on the 3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index (Cho et al. 2014). This database evaluates countries based on the requirements prescribed by the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2000). A country is given a score from 1-5, with 1 being the worst and 5 the best on three sub-indices: prosecution of traffickers,
prevention of the crime of human trafficking, and protection of trafficking victims. These scores are then summed to an overall index score, with a range from the worst score of 3 to the best score of 15 (Cho et al. 2014). This dataset has scores which cover the period from 2000-2015 and includes 189 countries.

Though this database largely examines countries’ legislation surrounding human trafficking, it does examine numbers of traffickers prosecuted and numbers of victims identified. The coding guideline of the 3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index notes that actual enforcement in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of offenders is examined alongside legislation when forming the basis of the Prosecution score. Likewise, the number of victims identified is examined alongside efforts to protect victims’ rights and provide measures for recovery when forming the basis of the Protection score (Cho et al. 2014). Furthermore, the focus on evaluating effectiveness is important. To receive a high score on each dimension, it is not enough that a country simply have legislation in place that is in accordance with the UN Protocol. Effectiveness is also a component of the scoring, considering policing and prosecutorial efforts, efforts to identify and protect victims, and cooperation with NGO’s.

I argue that strong and effective anti-trafficking efforts will result in low human trafficking levels, while weak and ineffective or nonexistent anti-trafficking efforts will result in high human trafficking levels. As the index takes into account government efforts toward enforcing these policies, it demonstrates how “weak enforcement is a fundamental problem with the increased prevalence of human trafficking” (Cho 2015a:97). Evaluating this enforcement, research shows that many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who are engaged with governments in anti-trafficking work view such policies as being important to being able to achieve their work (Heiss and Kelley 2017). The majority of NGOs in this same study also
reported feeling that both local and national governments were engaged and invested in anti-
trafficking efforts and have seen improvement over time in those efforts (Heiss and Kelley
2017).

To further corroborate this, a second outcome variable is selected. The total number of
detected victims of trafficking by country of citizenship is taken from the Global Report on
Trafficking in Persons (UNODC 2016). Put together by the United Nations Office of Drugs and
Crime, this report examines human trafficking patterns and flows at a country level based on
detected cases of trafficking. The report also uses the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol
definition of trafficking, which states that trafficking in persons refers to:

the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation. (UNODC 2016:14).

To assess the relationship between these outcome measures, a bivariate correlation of the
two indicators is run. The variables selected from 3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index and the
UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons shows a statistically significant positive
relationship at the 0.004 level. As scores increase on a country’s overall policy score, their total
number of detected victims of trafficking increases.

Economic Dominance

Though past research has operationalized economic dominance through an index of
decommodification (Jensen 2002; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Savolainen 2000), the measures
used in this index are often restricted to a limited number of countries and time period. Thus my
research follows recent research extending to a broader sample of cross-national data and over
greater periods of time that has made use of the Index of Economic Freedom (Bjerregaard and
An institutional imbalance of power, or economic dominance, is measured through the Index of Economic Freedom, which is published annually by conservative American think tank The Heritage Foundation in collaboration with The Wall Street Journal. The index began in 1995 and today uses a variety of indicators to measure 12 freedoms in 186 countries. Economic freedom is used by the index to refer to any “state action or government control that interferes with individual autonomy” (Miller and Kim 2018:10). Free market principles and a limited role for government are emphasized, as the index measures indicators broadly grouped into four categories: rule of law (property rights, judicial effectiveness, and government integrity); government size (tax burden, government spending, and fiscal health); regulatory efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, and monetary freedom); and market openness (trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom) (Miller and Kim 2018). Overall scores may range from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating greater economic freedom, or as I am using the variable, greater economic dominance.

Globalization

Information regarding a country’s level of globalization was gathered from the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher 2006). This database evaluates a country’s level of globalization on three main dimensions: economic, social, and political globalization. Economic globalization includes indicators of actual flows and restrictions; social globalization indicators of personal contact, information flows, and cultural proximity; and political globalization indicators on international involvement. Scores range from 0-100, with scores closer to 100 indicating higher levels of globalization (Dreher 2006). A yearly ranking has been produced since 1970.
Inequality

Data on gendered inequalities by country was taken from the Gender Inequality Index (GII) which is generated by the United Nations Development Programme (Human Development Data 2018). The first report that included the GII was published every five years starting in 1995, before becoming an annual publication beginning in 2010. A country’s GII score is based on three dimensions—health, empowerment in education and politics, and the labor market—which each contain several indicators. Scores may range from 0 to 1, with scores closer to one indicating that there is more inequality. Essentially, “the higher the GII value the more disparities between females and males and the more loss to human development” (Gender Inequality Index 2018).

Data on economic inequalities by country was taken from the Human Development Report, a yearly report produced by the United Nations (Human Development Data 2018). The variable selected from the Human Development Report to be used for this study is the IAI, or Inequality-Adjusted Income Index score. This score adjusts the HDI Income Index by accounting for inequality in income distribution. The scale of scores may range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating less income inequality. This dataset has values which cover the period between 2010-2015 and includes 188 countries (Human Development Data 2018).

Corruption

The perception of corruption within a country was obtained from the country’s score on the Corruption Perceptions Index, produced annually since 1995 by Transparency International (Corruption Perceptions Index 2018). Through the opinions of experts and analysts, a country’s perceived corruption within areas of the public sphere (i.e.: education, politics, and businesses) are gauged. Here the scores may range from 0 to 100, with scores closer to 100 indicating lower
levels of perceived corruption (Corruption Perceptions Index 2018). As the scoring system for the Corruption Perceptions Index changed from 0-10 to 0-100, scores have been calculated based on the 0-10 scale for consistency.

**Social Expenditures**

To measure the weakening of non-economic institutions, two measures of social expenditures are used. Public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP and government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP are taken from the United Nations Human Development Data Portal (Human Development Data 2018). This data is available every five years from 1990-2010 and annually from 2010 onward².

**Conflict**

Data on a nation’s vulnerability to conflict or collapse is taken from the Fragile States Index, produced annually since 2006 by the Fund for Peace (Fragile States Index 2018). This variable uses methodological triangulation to score 178 countries on twelve indicators grouped into four broad categories. The categories and their associated indicators include cohesion (security apparatus, factionalized elites, group grievance), economic (economic decline, uneven economic development, human flight and brain drain), political (state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law), and social (demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, external intervention) measures (Fragile States Index 2018). Scores may range from up to 120, with lower scores indicating improved relative stability over time (Fragile States Index 2018).

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² A second fsQCA was run with education expenditures as % GDP also included. The solutions indicate the same core conditions. This measure was ultimately excluded because of large amounts of missing data.
Migration

Finally, migration is measured using the Net Migration Rate. This indicator is also taken from the United Nations Human Development Data Portal. This variable expresses the ratio of the difference between the number of in-migrants and out-migrants from a country to the average population, and is per 1,000 people. The data is available every five years from 1990-2015 for 185 countries (Human Development Data 2018).

Analytic Framework

Comparative Historical Analysis

Comparative historical methods have a long tradition in sociology and have been used to study processes like capitalist development, secularization, and globalization (Lange 2012). Scholars have identified the unique features of comparative historical analysis, including that there is a temporal focus on historical processes, a comparative aspect of cases that may be similar or different, and that together these elements bring to the forefront the identification of causal processes which lead to a given outcome (Lange 2012; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). Along with these unique characteristics, comparative historical research “has successfully developed valid generalizations about many phenomena of great importance without ignoring contextual particularities” (Skocpol 2003:414). Comparative historical analysis means researchers must gather and assess large amounts of data over time (Mahoney 2004) while also attending to the ways in which the macro-level unit of study has been shaped by socio-historical processes (Ebbinghaus 2005).

Comparative historical methods can be differentiated by within-case and comparative methods. Within-case analysis may make use of methods such as narrative analysis, process tracing, or pattern matching while comparative analysis may proceed through use of narrative,
Millian3, Boolean4, or statistical methods of comparison (Lange 2012). These strategies may be combined in various manners depending on the aim of the research, such as theory building or theory testing. It is through this combination that comparative historical methods can offer both ideographic (specific) and nomethic (general) insight: “Within-case methods offer insight into the particular causal processes of individual cases, whereas the comparative methods offer more generalizable insight” (Lange 2012:150). The “methodological pluralism” of comparative historical analysis means that researchers can draw from diverse methodological traditions in order to maximize insight.

Comparative historical analysis most frequently makes use of small-N analyses over large-N or statistical analyses (Lange 2012). As such, the selection of both explanatory variables and cases themselves is dependent on the research question at hand as well as the guidance of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature (Ebbinghaus 2005; Mahoney 2000; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Ragin 1987). Explanatory variables can be viewed in combinations or configurations that “are treated as potential necessary and/or sufficient causes of an outcome” (Mahoney 2000:392). Small-N analyses employing this understanding of causation frequently use Boolean logic (Mahoney 2000, 2004; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Ragin 1987), meaning that important cases and causal conjunctions point the way toward more detail oriented case studies (Ragin 1987). Boolean analysis may be combined with other within-case analysis in order to expand and clarify the comparative findings. As the next section will show, Boolean logic also underlies the methods of fuzzy-set QCA that may be complimented and strengthened by within-case comparative analysis.

3 Millian comparisons focus on variables individually to explore their relationship to the outcome.
4 Boolean comparisons focus on configurations of variables to explore necessity and sufficiency in relation to the outcome.
Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

The techniques of QCA were set forth by Charles Ragin (1987). QCA aims to bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative methods by combining the causal complexity of qualitative work with the generalizability aims of quantitative work. This is accomplished through QCA’s focus on conceptualizing cases as having configurations of conditions which lead to the outcome. As a key component of QCA, configurational thinking is when “a combinatorial causal argument provides explicit guidance regarding what to observe in an empirical case” (Ragin 2008:112). Configurational thinking contributes to an understanding of the causal mechanisms linking the explanatory variables together to the outcome. More specifically, QCA uses Boolean algebra as opposed to linear algebra found in statistical methods. The Boolean method begins with maximum complexity as it allows every possible configuration of causes to be initially considered before being narrowed methodologically (Ragin 1987).

Fuzzy-set QCA extends these principles further by allowing for a case to have degrees of membership in a condition (Lee 2013; Ragin 2008). In the social sciences, it is not uncommon for phenomena to vary by both kind and degree. For example, a country’s economic orientation may be either capitalist or socialist; however within capitalist countries there may be variation by the extent in which capitalist policies freely govern the market. Fuzzy-set QCA is valuable because it allows the researcher to assess both of these qualities by allowing for a qualitative assessment of partial memberships (Ragin 2000, 2008). Fuzzy sets thus involve quantitative assessment of scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 which indicate the qualitative states of full nonmembership and full membership respectively. In order to analyze a fuzzy set, the data must first be calibrated accordingly. This involves the designation of a target set which “not only
structure the calibration of the set but it also provides a direct connection between theoretical discourse and empirical analysis” (Ragin 2008:83).

Once the data is calibrated, the use of truth tables in fsQCA allows for examination of causal complexity. A truth table includes all possible paths leading to the outcome, or $2^k$ configurations of conditions. Truth tables aim to “identify explicit connections between combinations of causal conditions and outcomes…[and] assess the sufficiency of all logically possible combinations of presence/absence conditions that can be constructed from a given set of $k$ causal conditions” (Ragin 2008:125). With all variables calibrated, the truth table reports the number of cases with membership in each condition greater than 0.5. The table also gives the consistency and coverage score of each configuration. Consistency assesses “the degree to which solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome,” and coverage assesses “how much of the outcome is covered (or explained by) each solution term and by the solution as a whole” (Ragin 2008:85). Analysis of the truth table thus shows the consistency of evidence for the causal combinations believed to have a connection to the outcome, as well as the necessity and sufficiency of the causal conditions (Lee 2013; Ragin 2000, 2008). Finally, the asymmetric property of fsQCA means that the negation of the outcome may also be analyzed in order to have a more complete understanding of the outcome under study (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2010).

*Set-Theoretic MMR*

Set-theoretic multi-method research is a relatively new methodological approach that combines QCA at the comparative level and process tracing at the within-case level (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a). Process tracing and QCA are compatible for several reasons. First, fuzzy-set QCA is well matched with cross-national research as it blends the methods of comparative
sociology and case-oriented research. Due to this fuzzy-set QCA is complimented by comparative historical methodology (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Rihoux 2006; Skaaning 2011). Second, both comparative historical analysis and fsQCA require high case knowledge and emphasis that the researcher move between theory and data when selecting cases and specifying variables (Lange 2012; Lee 2013; Ragin 2000; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Finally, the specific method of process tracing provides a way to incorporate temporality when examining causal chains (Rihoux 2006; Williams and Gemperle 2017). As fsQCA has already been described, process tracing as a method is detailed below briefly before discussing the steps involved in a set-theoretic MMR analysis.

Process tracing is a comparative historical method which involves tracing a sequence of events over time in order to evaluate hypotheses about the causal mechanisms leading to an outcome in the case under study (Beach and Pedersen 2013; George and Bennett 2005; Hall 2003; Mahoney 2012). Process tracing differs from other small-N methods such as narrative analysis through its focus on causal inference (Trampusch and Palier 2016). Rather than simply narrate the sequence of events, process tracing case studies, and particularly those focused on theory testing, should “be presented as a stepwise test of each part of a causal mechanism” (Beach and Pedersen 2013:5). Various tests have also been established in order to confirm the necessity and sufficiency of the evaluating causes (Mahoney 2012; Rohlfing 2014). In essence, process tracing “allows for an in-depth and context sensitive analysis in situations where the theory foresees a complex causal process over a lengthy period” (Ulriksen and Dadalauri 2016:229). The use of process tracing has grown in recent year, as researchers are able to use it to provide depth to their cases while also testing theory-derived causal hypotheses (Beach and
Pedersen 2013; George and Bennett 2005; Hall 2008; Trampusch 2014; Trampusch and Palier 2016; Ulriksen and Dadalauri 2016).

The steps involved in a set-theoretic MMR has been extensively outlined by recent scholars (Beach 2018; Rohlfing and Schneider 2018; Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a, 2016). The analytic framework of the method was most clearly laid out by Schneider and Rohlfing (2013a:561). This design presents a “QCA-first design” which proceeds by first, deriving “the truth table from existing, possibly case-based empirical research and theory rather than from process-tracing evidence” (Rohlfing and Schneider 2018:44). The process tracing which then follows the analysis of the truth table serves to examine the sufficiency of causal mechanisms, either through a “typical” or “deviant” case (Rohlfing and Schneider 2018; Schneider and Rohlfing 2013a). If findings do not corroborate the original theory, the QCA may be modifying by adding or removing conditions, recalibration, or considering case selection. The inclusion of fsQCA benefits small-N case studies by allowing for the identification of set-relational patterns. Schneider and Rohlfing (2013a:588) note though that process tracing also benefits QCA by allowing the researcher to “discern the causal mechanisms behind a set-relational pattern and further improve the theory and QCA model.” With the analytic framework of set-theoretic MMR I aim to comparatively identify the causal mechanisms and combinations of mechanisms important to human trafficking through fsQCA, while testing their necessity and sufficiency within cases through process tracing.

**Conclusion**

This chapter introduced the methodological framework and macro-level data sources that will be used in this research. This includes an introduction to fuzzy-set QCA and process tracing, which together comprise the analytic framework of set-theoretic MMR. In addition, this chapter
detailed the secondary data sources that will be used in each fsQCA. The theoretical framework, as conceptualized in Figure 2.1, is recreated below in Figure 3.1 with the indicators that will be used for each concept. The source for each indicator is listed in parentheses.

![Figure 3.1: Indicators for Analytical Framework](image)

**Figure 3.1.** Indicators for Analytical Framework.

Additional historical secondary sources will be used for the process tracing of selected cases in each geographical region, including various international economic policies implemented by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. While not specified here, Chapter 4 will delve more specifically into the methodology and data, including the calibration of data for fsQCA, issues of missing data, and selection of cases for process tracing. Subsequent chapters (5-7) will each focus on a different region and case study through a more detailed historical analysis.
CHAPTER FOUR: FSQCA AND THE PATHWAYS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING FLOWS

Introduction

This chapter will detail the results of the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). I begin by outlining the case selection and calibration of data. I also include information on the three solutions fsQCA provides. I begin by testing the necessity of each condition with each outcome before describing the results of three separate fsQCA models, each testing sufficiency with a different outcome. I conclude by summarizing the causal pathways identified by fsQCA and selecting cases to be used for comparison through process tracing.

Data and Calibration

Case Selection

For this study, I selected the three regions of South America, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa based on their importance within human trafficking scholarship, particularly as source countries (Farr 2004; Malarek 2011; Outshoorn 2015; Truong 2003). As my integrated theoretical framework is focused on the origin of human trafficking flows, it is important to focus on the regions largely classified as source countries within the human trafficking literature. It is also important because prior research has not examined how conditions identified as important to human trafficking combine in unique ways across these geographic regions (Limoncelli 2009). To select countries from these three regions, I use the geoscheme designations from the United Nations. This classification scheme groups countries into geographic regions before further dividing them into sub-regions and intermediary regions. The use of sub-regions and intermediary regions allows for “greater homogeneity in sizes of population, demographic circumstances and accuracy of demographic statistics” (United Nations
Statistical Division 2018). I make use of the sub-region of Sub-Saharan Africa and the intermediary regions of South America and Southeastern Asia. All countries listed by the UN in these regions are included in Table 1 of the Appendix. After gathering data for each of the conditions and outcome used for this study, I eliminated any country that was missing data on one or more indicator. This was done because fsQCA will drop all data cases that have a missing value for any of the conditions or outcomes. This reduced my final sample size from 74 potential countries to 42 countries, listed in Table 4.1. By region the sample consists of 9 countries from South America, 6 from Southeast Asia, and 27 from Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the reduction in sample size due to missing data, these countries still show variation in terms of their ranks on the macro-level data used, which is important for calibration of the conditions and outcomes.

Additionally, there is variation by country in population size, membership or support in international financial institutions, and GDP.

Table 4.1. Countries Included in Final Analysis by Region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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</table>
Data Calibration

Fuzzy sets involve quantitative assessment of scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 indicating the qualitative states of full nonmembership and full membership respectively in your condition or outcome (Ragin 2008). In order to analyze a fuzzy set, the data must first be calibrated accordingly. Calibration entails arraying all data on the 0 to 1 scale for QCA analysis. All indicators for this study were calibrated using the direct method which blends the researcher’s theoretical and substantive case knowledge with external criteria. With the direct method, the “researcher specifies the values of an interval scale that correspond to the three qualitative breakpoints that structure a fuzzy set” (Ragin 2008:85). These three points include full membership (.95), ambiguous membership or the crossover point (.5), and full nonmembership (.05). Values between the crossover point and full membership represent the state of “more in than out,” while values between the crossover point and full nonmembership represent the state of “more out than in.” Calibration of the conditions and outcomes followed close examination of the variation within the sample data as a whole. QCA requires that data be calibrated onto a scale of 0 to 1 for analysis. To transform indicator values onto a 0-1 scale, qualitative breakpoints are designated by the researcher, allowing calibration to be performed by the fsQCA program. For example, countries with a fragile state index score of 90 and above are designated as full members of countries with high state fragility (0.95), countries with scores of 80 as ambiguous members (0.5), and countries with scores of 70 and below as full nonmembers (0.05). The calibration procedure for each outcome and condition is detailed in Table 4.2.

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5 For the outcome high number of identified victims, condition indicators are calibrated differently to represent low economic dominance, low globalization, etc. The purpose of this is detailed more in the results section. Table 2 in the Appendix lists these alternative calibrations.
Table 4.2. Indicator Summaries and Calibrations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Name</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Calibration (Fuzzified Score)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome Indicators</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak and Ineffective Anti-Trafficking Efforts</td>
<td>3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index, EU Project</td>
<td>.7=.05, .65=.5, .45=.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Out Migration</td>
<td>Net Migration Rate, United Nations</td>
<td>-.09=.05, -.45=.5, -1.45=.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Number of Identified Victims</td>
<td>Total Detected Victims of Trafficking in Persons, UNODC</td>
<td>2.5=.05, 35=.5, 67=.95</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Condition Indicators</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>High Economic Dominance</td>
<td>Economic Freedom Index, Heritage Foundation</td>
<td>49.99=.05, 55=.5, 60=.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Globalization</td>
<td>KOF Index of Globalization, Axel Dreher at ETH Zurich</td>
<td>48=.05, 54=.5, 60=.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Economic Inequality</td>
<td>Inequality-Adjusted Income Index, United Nations</td>
<td>.5=.05, .45=.5, .35=.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Gender Inequality</td>
<td>Gender Inequality Index, United Nations</td>
<td>.39=.05, .45=.5, .55=.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Corruption</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International</td>
<td>50=.05, 44.5=.5, 29.5=.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Social Expenditures</td>
<td>Public Health Expenditures as % GDP, United Nations</td>
<td>5.5=.05, 3.4=.5, 2.05=.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High State Fragility</td>
<td>Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace</td>
<td>70=.05, 80=.5, 90=.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following calibration, each fsQCA model proceeds with analysis of a truth table. The use of truth tables in fsQCA allows for examination of causal complexity. A truth table includes all possible paths leading to the outcome, or $2^k$ configurations of conditions. As this study involves a seven-condition recipe, there are 128 possible combinations of causal conditions. Truth tables identify different pathways or causal combinations of conditions and outcomes, while also evaluating their sufficiency (Ragin 2008). This table lays out all the observed configurations of the conditions. With all conditions calibrated, the truth table reports the number of cases with membership in each condition greater than 0.5. The table also gives the consistency score of each configuration. Membership in each outcome is coded according to a more restrictive consistency...
threshold of consistency scores of 0.8 and above and a frequency threshold of 1. Table A3 in the Appendix reports the truth tables used for the fuzzy set analysis of each of the three outcomes.

Solutions

To aid in interpretation of the results, I present additional background on fsQCA and the final solutions that will be presented. A key component of QCA is configurational thinking, which contributes to an understanding of the causal mechanisms linking conditions together to the outcome. Configurational thinking allows for examination of causal complexity, or equifinality. This means that there may be several different combinations of causal conditions that all lead to the outcome under study (Ragin 2008). When a standard analysis of a truth table is performed, it produces three configurational solutions, each of which uses Boolean operators. These solutions include the complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solutions.

The complex solutions allow for maximum complexity, while the parsimonious solutions allow for “the incorporation of any counterfactual combination that contributes to the derivation of a logically simpler solution” (Ragin 2008:201). Conditions identified by the parsimonious solutions are considered to be the “core” causal conditions leading to the selected outcome. Finally, the intermediate solution may be used, which “is obtained by first deriving the most complex solution…and then using only ‘easy’ counterfactuals to produce an intermediate solution…[which] is a subset of the most parsimonious solution and a superset of the most complex solution” (Ragin 2008:203). In other words, the intermediate solutions take the core causal conditions from the parsimonious solutions and include important contributing causal conditions. Whenever I present solutions using Boolean algebra, I use the abbreviated condition indicator name (provided in Table 4.3). When capitalized, the abbreviation indicates an identified core condition (e.g., ED) and when lowercase, an identified contributing condition.
Where possible, the solutions have been simplified for visual purposes using the Boolean or operator (+). Note that the Boolean operator (*) denotes and, while (~) denotes not, or signifies the condition is absent.

Table 4.3. Abbreviated Condition Names.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Economic Dominance</td>
<td>ED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Globalization</td>
<td>GZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income Inequality</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Gender Inequality</td>
<td>GE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Corruption</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Social Expenditure</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Fragile State</td>
<td>FS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to presenting the complex, intermediate, and parsimonious solutions, I also indicate the coverage and consistency scores of both the solution term and the solution as a whole. Consistency assesses “the degree to which solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome,” and coverage assesses “how much of the outcome is covered (or explained by) each solution term and by the solution as a whole” (Ragin 2008:85). Consistency holds parallels to significance, in that high consistency indicates that the researcher’s theory is supported. Coverage on the other hand, may be thought of as a measure indicating the strength of the pathway in explaining the outcome.

Testing Necessity

Before beginning the fsQCA analysis, I test for any necessary conditions among each of the outcomes. Testing for necessary conditions is an important first step as it identifies any condition that must be present for the outcome to be present (Rohlfing and Schneider 2013). Though these conditions may occur without leading to the outcome, where the outcome occurs, the condition must also occur. For example, state breakdown may occur without leading to social revolution. However, social revolutions cannot occur without state breakdown, meaning that in
this example state breakdown is a necessary condition for social revolution (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Any conditions identified as necessary may be excluded from the truth table analysis of sufficiency. The results of the necessity test for each outcome are listed in Table 4.4. It is important to use a more restrictive consistency score for necessity tests as it minimizes the chance of a true logical contradiction (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Using the recommended consistency score of 0.9, none of the conditions meet the necessity criteria for any outcome. High gender inequality and high corruption come closest to being necessary conditions with scores of 0.84 and 0.82 respectively under the outcome of weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts.

Table 4.4. Test of Necessary Conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak and Ineffective Anti-Trafficking Efforts</td>
<td>High Economic Dominance</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Globalization</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Income Inequality</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Gender Inequality</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Corruption</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Social Expenditure</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Fragile State</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Out Migration</td>
<td>High Economic Dominance</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Globalization</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Income Inequality</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Gender Inequality</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Corruption</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Social Expenditure</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Fragile State</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Number of Identified Victims</td>
<td>Low Economic Dominance</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Globalization</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Income Inequality</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Gender Inequality</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Corruption</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Social Expenditure</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Fragile State</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As no condition meets the 0.9 consistency threshold, no indicator alone acts as a necessary condition leading to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts, high out migration, or a high number of identified human trafficking victims. I proceed with tests of sufficiency next, which identify how conditions may combine to create important causal pathways leading to the outcome. Though these conditions are not necessary on their own, the truth table analysis identifies important solutions that are sufficient to lead to the studied outcome.

Testing Sufficiency: Weak and Ineffective Anti-Trafficking Efforts

The first fuzzy-set QCA model uses the outcome from the 3P Anti-Trafficking Policy Index. This outcome is calibrated to measure countries’ membership in weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts. Table 4.5 displays the four intermediate solutions given by this analysis. Overall, one can see themes emerging around the core causal conditions identified by the solutions. Economic dominance, globalization, gender inequality, corruption, and low social expenditures consistently appear in the solutions of countries in the membership of weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts. An important contributing factor includes having high income inequality and being a fragile state. There are 27 countries in this analysis that fall into the outcome of having weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts. The below solutions cover 20 countries, listed in the table. Regionally, this includes 3 countries from South America, 2 from Southeast Asia, and 15 from Sub-Saharan Africa. These results are fairly proportional given the number of countries from each region in the total sample.
Table 4.5. Configurations for Weak and Ineffective Anti-Trafficking Efforts, 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate Solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Economic Dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income Inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Gender Inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Social Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Fragile State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Gabon, Indonesia, Suriname, Venezuela</th>
<th>Bolivia, Liberia, Mauritania, Togo</th>
<th>Benin, Cambodia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Zambia</th>
<th>Gambia, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Coverage</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique Coverage</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution Coverage</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution Consistency</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ● = core causal condition present; ○ = core causal condition absent; ● = contributing causal condition present; ○ = contributing causal condition absent.

When interpreting fsQCA results, the conditions within the solutions are treated as combinations. Unlike statistical techniques, fsQCA treats each case, or country, as a combination of attributes leading to the outcome. Countries defined by the first solution have membership in high gender inequality, high corruption, and low social expenditures, but are not members of fragile states. Countries in the second solution do not have membership in economic dominance, but have membership in high globalization, income inequality, gender inequality, and corruption. The third solution represents countries that have membership in high economic dominance and globalization, high income and gender inequality and low social expenditures. Finally, the fourth
solution contains countries with membership in economic dominance but not globalization, in membership of income and gender inequality, and in membership of corruption state fragility.

All of these solutions contain high gender inequality as an important condition, pointing to the importance of gender inequality in influencing the effectiveness of a country’s anti-trafficking efforts. Appearing in three solutions each, high corruption is another consistent core condition, while income inequality is an important contributing condition. That economic dominance, globalization, and low social expenditures appear in two of the four conditions demonstrates that they are important in shaping the effectiveness of anti-trafficking efforts in distinct ways, though are not always present. Furthermore, with the exception of solution one, all solutions have at least high economic dominance or high globalization as a core condition of their combinations.

The complex and parsimonious solutions are also provided. The parsimonious solutions indicate which conditions are the core causal conditions. The parsimonious solutions indicate that the core conditions include economic dominance and globalization, when present or absent. Also important are gender inequality, corruption, low social expenditures, and not being a fragile state.

$$\text{ED}^* \sim \text{GZ}^* \text{CP}$$
$$\left(\text{ED} + \text{GZ} + \sim \text{FS}\right)^* \text{GI}^* \text{SE}$$
$$\sim \text{ED}^* \text{GZ}^* \text{GI}$$

The complex solutions below demonstrate that there are a variety of complex causal pathways leading to the outcome. Conditions combine in various ways, with conditions appearing in some pathways as present and in others as absent. Fairly consistent across pathways are the presence of high globalization, income inequality, gender inequality, corruption, and low social expenditures.
ED*~GZ*ii*GI*CP*fs
ED*GZ*ii*GI*~CP*SE*~FS
~ED*GZ*ii*GI*CP*~SE*~FS
GZ*ii*GI*CP*SE*fs
~ii*GI*CP*SE*~FS

Overall, the solutions are largely consistent with the theoretical framework, with fsQCA allowing for the illumination of interesting combinations of conditions. Having both gender and income inequality alongside corruption appears important when countries have either economic dominance (solution 4) or globalization (solution 2). When both economic dominance and globalization are present together, income and gender inequality remain important, though corruption is replaced by low social expenditures (solution 3). Solution 1 represents a unique combination, as neither economic dominance nor globalization is present. Instead the solution indicates the combination of gender inequality, corruption, low social expenditures, and interestingly, the absence of state fragility. It should be noted that this is the only solution that does not contain a country from sub-Saharan Africa, perhaps contributing to the lack of state fragility. Solution 4, which is the only solution to contain countries exclusively from sub-Saharan Africa, does point to the importance of state fragility.

**Testing Sufficiency: High Out Migration**

The next fuzzy-set QCA model uses the outcome net migration, which has been calibrated according to country membership in high out migration. Table 4.6 indicates the seven intermediate solutions given by this analysis. While some conditions appear in some solutions when present, and in others when absent, patterns emerge around the core causal conditions. Economic dominance, globalization, income and gender inequality, corruption, and low social expenditures consistently appear in the solutions of countries in the membership of high out migration. Being a fragile state is an important contributing factor. There are 26 countries in the
analysis that fall into the outcome of high out migration. The solutions presented below cover 18 countries. Regionally, this includes 4 countries from South America, 2 from Southeast Asia, and 12 from Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Table 4.6.** Configurations for High Out Migration, 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Bolivia, Lesotho</th>
<th>Laos, Suriname, Venezuela</th>
<th>Bolivia, Liberia, Mauritania, Togo</th>
<th>Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda</th>
<th>Peru, Philippines</th>
<th>Paraguay</th>
<th>Gambia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Economic Dominance</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Globalization</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income Inequality</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Gender Inequality</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Corruption</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Social Expenditure</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Fragile State</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Consistency | 0.97 | 0.90 | 0.83 | 0.79 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.83 |
| Raw Coverage | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.23 |
| Unique Coverage | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.05 |
| Solution Coverage | 0.55 |
| Solution Consistency | 0.84 |

Note: ● = core causal condition present; ○ = core causal condition absent; ● = contributing causal condition present; ○ = contributing causal condition absent.

I do not review all solutions for the outcome of high out migration in-depth, as the project is focused specifically on human trafficking. Human trafficking research identifies a strong
relationship between migration and human trafficking victimization, as areas with high migration also reflect high human trafficking flows (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010; Skeldon 2002).

Explaining this relationship, the factors that have shown to be important to human trafficking have demonstrated importance for promoting migration as well (Aronowitz 2001). This makes it important to examine the conditions leading to high migration, and identify any areas of overlap.

The analyses show a great deal of overlap between the four solutions contributing to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts, and several of the solutions contributing to high out migration. I will focus on the solutions that lead to high out migration.

The second solution suggests that the absence of economic dominance and income inequality, when combined with the presence of gender inequality, corruption, and low social expenditures leads to high out migration. This solution has some overlap with the first anti-trafficking solution, which also had core conditions of the presence of gender inequality, corruption, and low social expenditures. Both Suriname and Venezuela are found in each of these solutions.

The third solution leading to high out migration does not have membership in economic dominance, but does have membership in high globalization, income inequality, gender inequality, and corruption. This solution is identical to the second anti-trafficking solution, with the exception that income inequality is a contributing rather than a core condition. The same four countries are found in each solution: Bolivia, Liberia, Mauritania, and Togo.

Finally, the seventh solution contains countries with membership in economic dominance but not globalization, in membership of income and gender inequality, and in membership of corruption state fragility. Again, with the exception that income inequality is a core rather than contributing condition, this solution is identical to the fourth anti-trafficking solution. The same
six countries have membership in this solution: Gambia, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Uganda. This anti-trafficking solution also shares some overlap with the fourth solution leading to high out migration. Here the solution contains countries again with membership in economic dominance but not globalization, and in membership of income inequality and state fragility. Unique to this fourth solution however, is membership in low social expenditures.

The parsimonious solutions below indicate the importance of all conditions as a core condition in one or multiple manners. Economic dominance when combined with not high globalization and income inequality contributes to high out migration. High globalization or not high income inequality contributes to high out migration when combined with not high economic dominance and gender inequality. Gender inequality is an important core condition alongside not low social expenditures and not high state fragility. Finally, not high gender inequality combines with high corruption and low social expenditures to act as another pathway to high out migration.

ED*~GZ*II
(GZ+~II)*~ED*GI
GI*~SE*~FS
~GI*CP*SE

The complex solutions below demonstrate that there are a variety of complex causal pathways leading to high out migration. All conditions appear in at least one pathway as present and at least once as absent. Fairly consistent across pathways are the presence of income inequality, gender inequality, and corruption. High economic dominance, high globalization, low social expenditures, and high state fragility all appear as present in roughly half of the solutions, and as absent in the other half. In only two solutions however, do both economic dominance and globalization appear as absent at the same time, suggesting that having either high economic dominance or high globalization or both is an important part of the causal pathways.
The pathways to high out migration identified by this analysis indicate that there are a variety of ways causal conditions may combine to lead to the outcome. However, of interest to this research are the pathways that are consistent with the same or similar pathways to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts. As predicted by the theory, conditions of inequality combine with others such as corruption, low health expenditures, and state fragility. Such conditions often appear alongside either high economic dominance or high globalization.

**Testing Sufficiency: High Number of Identified Victims**

The final fuzzy-set QCA model uses the outcome Total Detected Victims of Trafficking in Persons. This is calibrated to represent countries’ membership in high numbers of identified victims. Note that for this analysis, conditions are recalibrated to represent the presence of low economic dominance, low globalization, low income and gender inequality, low corruption, high social expenditures, and low state fragility. This is done for several reasons.

First, I hypothesized that strong and effective anti-trafficking efforts result in low human trafficking levels, while weak and ineffective or nonexistent anti-trafficking efforts result in high human trafficking levels. A high number of identified victims are likely to be found in countries that are funding and enforcing anti-trafficking policies and programs. Simply because a country has low numbers of identified victims does not mean the country has low human trafficking. Instead, low numbers of identified victims could be indicative of weak or ineffective anti-
trafficking enforcement. This would lead to very different predictions. For example, low levels of corruption rather than high levels of corruption are important to identifying victims.

This leads to the second point, that the conditions cannot simply be examined with truth table analysis to see if they are absent. Under the logic of fsQCA, the absence of high corruption does not equate to low corruption; it only indicates not high corruption. Low corruption is a theoretically and empirically distinct concept and must be calibrated as such. For these reasons, all conditions have been recalibrated and are listed in Table 2 of the Appendix.

Table 4.7 visually maps the four intermediate solutions given by this analysis. The presence of low income inequality, low gender inequality, low corruption, and low state fragility appear most frequently in the solutions of countries in the membership of high numbers of identified human trafficking victims. Other factors include conditions such as the presence and absence of low economic dominance, the absence of low globalization, and the presence of high social expenditures. There are 17 countries in this analysis that fall into the outcome of having a high number of identified victims. The below solutions cover 10 countries, listed in the table. Regionally, this includes 4 countries from South America, 3 from Southeast Asia, and 3 from Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 4.7. Configurations for High Number of Identified Victims, 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate Solutions</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Economic Dominance</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Globalization</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Income Inequality</td>
<td>● ●</td>
<td></td>
<td>● ○</td>
<td>○ ○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Gender Inequality</td>
<td></td>
<td>●</td>
<td>○ ○</td>
<td>○ ○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● ●</td>
<td>● ●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Social Expenditure</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Fragile State</td>
<td>● ●</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>● ●</td>
<td>● ●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries
- Ecuador, Vietnam
- Columbia, Philippines
- Indonesia, Paraguay
- Benin, Bolivia, Ghana, South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consistency</th>
<th>Raw Coverage</th>
<th>Unique Coverage</th>
<th>Solution Coverage</th>
<th>Solution Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ● = core causal condition present; ○ = core causal condition absent; ● = contributing causal condition present; ○ = contributing causal condition absent.

Overall, the solutions are largely the opposite of the pathways identified by the previous models. While high income and gender inequality appeared in solutions leading to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts, here low income and gender inequality demonstrates a pathway to identifying human trafficking victims. These conditions are important when combined with low corruption even when there is not low state fragility (solution 2), or with low economic dominance, low state fragility, and high social expenditures (solution 1). Interestingly, the absence of low globalization appears in half of the solutions. When combined with the absence of low economic dominance and the absence of low gender inequality, the presence of low income inequality and low state fragility present one pathway to identifying victims.
(solution 3). Alternatively, when the absence of low globalization is combined with the absence of low income inequality, it is the presence of low corruption and again low state fragility that appear as important (solution 4).

The parsimonious solutions indicate the core conditions sufficient for a country to have membership in high numbers of identified human trafficking victims. The parsimonious solutions below indicate that these core conditions include things such as low economic dominance, low income inequality, and low state fragility. Interestingly, not low globalization appears in several solutions.

\[ \text{LII*LCP*~LFS} \]
\[ \text{LED*LII*HSE} \]
\[ \text{~LGZ*~LII*LFS} \]
\[ \text{~LED*~LGZ*~LGI*LFS} \]

The complex solutions below demonstrate a range of causal pathways leading to countries having a high number of identified victims. Across these pathways the absence of low economic dominance and low globalization consistently appear in the configurations. Also consistent are the presence of low income inequality, low gender inequality, low corruption, and low state fragility. Low social expenditures appear as present in roughly half of the solutions.

\[ \text{~LED*~LGZ*LII*~LGI*~lcp*~LFS} \]
\[ \text{~LED*~LGZ*LII*LGI*LCP*~LFS} \]
\[ \text{~LED*~LGZ*~LII*~LGI*LCP*~hse*LFS} \]
\[ \text{~LED*~LGZ*~LII*LGI*LCP*HSE*LFS} \]
\[ \text{LED*~LGZ*LII*LGI*LCP*HSE*LFS} \]

Ultimately, this solution set has the lowest consistency and coverage scores of all three outcomes. This perhaps indicates that the theoretical framework is better suited to explaining the conditions that give rise to human trafficking rather than the conditions that work to combat it. That is, conditions such as economic dominance, globalization, inequality, corruption, low social
expenditures, and state fragility are better mechanisms for explaining weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts, as well as some solutions of high out migration. These conditions create environments conducive to pathways enabling migration and human trafficking patterns. Future research could determine the theoretical framework and conditions that better explain what environments are important to combatting or addressing human trafficking.

**Conclusion**

In summary, the fsQCA analyses run on each outcome confirm the role of the theoretical framework in illuminating the conditions that explain the origin of human trafficking flows. That several solutions leading to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts are identical or very similar to solutions leading to high out migration suggests the importance of examining the conditions that may be shared between these two outcomes. Conditions of inequality when combined with corruption are consistently shown to be important. Interestingly, while gender inequality appears as a core condition for weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts and high out migration, income inequality does not. Instead income inequality acts as a contributing condition for weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts, suggesting its importance may be different for migration patterns. The presence of state fragility appears as an important contributing condition for both weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts and high out migration. The aforementioned conditions often, though not always, appear alongside either high economic dominance or high globalization. In very few solutions do both high economic dominance and high globalization appear together, suggesting that simply one or the other may be important in the causal configuration.

To extend this analysis, my next step is to proceed with process tracing of selected cases. Case selection for process tracing after a fsQCA proceeds with intention after examining case’s
fuzzy-set membership in both the solution and the outcome (Schneider and Rohlfing 2016). Comparative case process tracing after an fsQCA of sufficiency can proceed in several manners. Here, I take the approach of similar-outcome comparisons, or selecting typical cases within a solution in order to build or test the hypothesis in regard to the causal mechanisms under study (Schneider and Rohlfing 2013b). A “typical case” represents a country that has high fuzzy-set membership scores in both the solution term and the outcome.

I choose three solution terms to select one case each from for my process tracing. The first solution term comes from the third intermediate solution listed in Table 4.5 and is reproduced below. The solution states that high economic dominance, high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, and low social expenditures represent one causal pathway to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts.

$\text{ED}^*\text{GZ}^*\text{ii}^*\text{GI}^*\text{SE}$

From this solution term I select the typical case of Cambodia for process tracing. This solution term is unique to the solutions leading to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts, and shares no overlap with solutions leading to high out migration. Comparatively, my next selected solution terms comes from the second and fourth intermediate solutions listed in Table 4.5. These solutions both share a great deal of overlap with the intermediate solutions leading to high out migration. The second solution term states that not high economic dominance, high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, and high corruption represent a combination of conditions leading to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts. From this solution term I select the typical case of Bolivia for process tracing.

$\sim\text{ED}^*\text{GZ}^*\text{ii}^*\text{GI}^*\text{CP}$
Finally, the fourth solution term states that the combination of high economic dominance, not high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, high corruption, and high state fragility combine in important ways to create a unique pathway for human trafficking. From this solution term I select the typical case of The Gambia for process tracing.

   ED*~GZ*i*GI*CP*fs

Chapter five will begin with Cambodia, chapter six will cover Bolivia, and chapter seven, The Gambia. Finally, the conclusion will summarize these findings in relation to the integrated theoretical framework while also drawing comparisons between these solution terms as they represent three very different pathways to the origin of human trafficking flows.
CHAPTER FIVE: MARKET COLONIALISM AND THE CASE OF CAMBODIA

Introduction

This chapter uses process tracing to analyze one of the solutions in chapter four. Specifically, this chapter presents the results of Cambodia, whose intermediate solution leading to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts is: ED*GZ*ii*GI*SE. The solution indicates that the combination of high economic dominance, high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, and low social expenditures combine in important ways to create a pathway for human trafficking.

Cambodia

A brief history

Located in Southeast Asia between Thailand and Vietnam, the Kingdom of Cambodia gained independence from France in November of 1953 (Chandler 2008). The country was later subjected to heavy aerial bombardments from 1969 to 1973 during the US-Vietnam War (Chandler 2008; Kiernan and Owen 2015). At the same time, a military coup in 1970 overthrew the monarchy, ending Prince Sihanouk’s 15 year rule (Corfield 2009; Dayley and Neher 2013). By 1975, the new Communist government known as Khmer Rouge gained control and changed the official name of the country to the Democratic Kampuchea. The primary leader Pol Pot enforced strict rules and isolated the country from the outside world. Between 1975 and 1979, an estimated 1.7 million people were executed or worked to death (Corfield 2009; Dayley and Neher 2013).

The overthrow of the Khmer Rouge government by Vietnamese troops in 1978 began a ten year occupation by the Vietnamese, under which the country was renamed the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in 1989 coincided with the start
of a peace agreement and the renaming of the country to the State of Cambodia (Chandler 2008; Corfield 2009; Dayley and Neher 2013). The UN-brokered Paris peace agreements were signed in 1991, beginning a short lived period of UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) governing from 1992 to the first free election in 1993. The country eventually returned to its former name, the Kingdom of Cambodia, in 1993 with the restoration of the constitutional monarchy (Chandler 2008; Dayley and Neher 2013).

During the latter period Cambodia entered the global economic market through heavy dependence on foreign aid. While Cambodia shared similarities with other South East Asia countries, it was also unique. As two scholars noted: “The Kingdom of Cambodia, in its most recent incarnation, was born from international assistance. Few countries have had such an intimate history with the broad constellation of the global community’s official and private foreign aid organizations” (Dayley and Neher 2013:155-6). To understand migration and human trafficking patterns in Cambodia necessitates understanding the political and economic legacy of Cambodia’s history and its transition into globalization.

**PRSPs and economic dominance**

Global financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank prove instrumental in shaping economic policy in transitioning and developing countries (Cooke 2004; Stewart and Wang 2006). Lending from global institutions is often tied to the implementation of certain economic reforms and priorities that reflect a neoliberal economic model (Marshall, Woodroffe, and Kjell 2001). In the past, lending was packaged in Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) aimed at integrating countries into the global economy by stimulating a country’s economic growth through “restoring balance between (1) government revenues and spending, (2) savings and investments, (3) export and import of goods and services, (4) the flow of foreign capital”
However, research shows that the financial programs often exacerbated economic and gender based inequalities, while lack of oversight generated corruption among government officials (Cameron and Newman 2008; Farr 2004; Kara 2010; Lee 2011; Mishra 2015; Shelley 2010; Stone 2005; Truong 2003).

Designed to replace SAPs, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) began in 1999. PRSPs are a joint World Bank-IMF initiative with the aim of reducing poverty through economic growth (Cooke 2004; Malaluan and Guttal 2002; Marshall et al. 2001). To be eligible for loans from the IMF, a country must have in place a PRSP with endorsement by the World Bank and the IMF. The IMF and World Bank encourage additional donors to fund aid through the PRSP plan rather than coordinate it independently (Marshall et al. 2001). PRSPs hoped to avoid the same criticisms and issues faced by SAPs by turning over more ownership of the design and implementation of programs and policies to the countries where they would be carried out (Cooke 2004; Stewart and Wang 2006). The extent of participation and ownership within developing countries has been questioned as “countries are reluctant to consider approaches other than those advocated by the Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because they know the limits to the kinds of policies that the international financial institutions are prepared to accept” (Kabeer 2003:210). Because the IMF has the final say in the formation and approval of a country’s PRSP, government officials rely largely on external advisors or even advisors from the Bank itself (Cooke 2004; Kabeer 2003; Stewart and Wang 2006).

PRSPs focus on several tenants that encompass neoliberalism. Primary tenants include an emphasis on trade liberalization, extensive privatization, and tax and other fiscal reforms that work to create open and free markets (Cooke 2004; Malaluan and Guttal 2002; Marshall et al. 2001; Stewart and Wang 2006). Thus, PRSPs ultimately focus on crafting and implementing the
same sorts of policies found in SAPs. PRSPs are largely homogeneous across nations, not attending to the need for policies unique to different countries’ cultural and historical contexts, nor providing the ownership and participation claimed to set them apart from SAPs (Cooke 2004; Kabeer 2003; Malaluan and Guttal 2002).

In Cambodia, the process of opening the country up to globalization and economic dominance involved international groups and donors from the beginning. The Royal Government of Cambodia, with assistance from the UNDP and 11 other groups, created a national Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia. These plans were presented and revised at meetings of the International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia, the first of which was in 1994 (Curtis 1998). Around the same time, the government committed to a three year SAP from 1994 to 1996. The focus was on economic growth through the expansion of the private sector and corresponding limitation of the role of the public sector (Curtis 1998).

To further extend development goals, the government worked with the Asian Development Bank to create a five year plan called the Socio-Economic Development Plan (1996-2000). These plans, guided by external technical assistance, intentionally attracted international donors, though vague language meant that donors could supply aid in the forms that benefitted them the most, without input from Cambodian officials (Curtis 1998). This meant that countries like Japan and France funded development projects in focused areas, often using their language and models to implement them. Key markers of this period were the lack of input and choice from the Cambodian government as well as a lack of prioritization in the targets of development aid (Curtis 1998).

Cambodia began its interim PRSP in 2000, which critics offer lacked concrete solutions and adequate resource allocations (Marshall et al. 2001). Full implementation of the final PRSP
began in March of 2003 (Battaile, Kayizzi-Mugerwa, and Kennedy 2005). Again, there was an absence of country ownership and organizational participation. Negotiations were conducted between government and World Bank officials in private. Tellingly, the final version of the PRSP was not made available in Cambodia’s Khmer language until after it was finalized, excluding local input (Cooke 2004; Malaluan and Guttal 2002). As with many countries, the PRSP prioritized growth through exports and tourism, managing public expenditures, and developing infrastructure (Battaile et al. 2005). The broad generalities of the PRSP meant that the local context and culture of Cambodia was ignored. This meant that the PRSP “did not provide a longer-term vision to guide short- and medium-term programs in some of the key crosscutting strategic issues facing Cambodia” (Battaile et al. 2005:20).

Ultimately, the role of international financial institutions in Cambodia’s transition, including the UNDP, IMF, and World Bank, set the country on a trajectory for high globalization and high economic dominance. Figure 5.1 demonstrates these changes. The solid line shows Cambodia’s steady increase on the KOF Index of Globalization, and the dotted line shows their scores on the Index of Economic Freedom. The latter is used to measure economic dominance as it contains indicators for measures such as government spending, business freedom, and open marketness. The two vertical lines indicate important historical points, including when the first structural adjustment program (SAP) was implemented in 1994 and the first poverty reduction strategy plan (PRSP) in 2003. Following both there is a sharp increase in globalization.
As the next several sections show, corruption, weakened social services, deepened inequality, and an increase in migration were all associated with this path. That is, these conditions coalesced to create an environment conducive to human trafficking.

**Corruption and privatization**

As countries transition to a privatized capitalist economy, corruption is often facilitated through a lack of oversight from international structural adjustment and economic financing that allows top political leaders to siphon funds, while international banking systems prevent easy recovery of lost funds (Marshall et al. 2001; Shelley 2010). In the period following UNTAC occupation and throughout the transition, corruption remained a large issue in Cambodia. Rent-seeking behaviors were common, which included “various official and unofficial forms of capturing benefits from external (and other) public sources for non-productive purposes” (Curtis 1998). This included government officials taking a cut of development contracts in exchange for selling resources at a low price (Curtis 1998).

In the time since, Cambodia continued to struggle with corruption throughout its government (Dayley and Neher 2013; Keo et al. 2014). Between 2005 and 2017, Cambodia’s
scores on the Corruption Perceptions Index has hovered between a low of 1.8 and a high of 2.3 with a mean of 2.1 (Corruption Perceptions Index 2018). Again, scores range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). Though the IMF’s reform agenda focuses on economic growth, studies report that such reforms open up a country’s exposure to and extent of non-economic issues such as corruption (Thirkell-White 2005). Governmental corruption is tied to international assistance and the global opening of the country’s natural resources (Dayley and Neher 2013). Moreover, the highly centralized administrative structure of the government means that corruption, as well as nepotism and cronyism, is deeply entrenched (Keo et al. 2014). As studies have shown with other transitional countries, the process of privatization often opens both the public and private sectors up to high levels of corruption (Hupp Williamson 2017; Marshall et al. 2001; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997).

Weakened non-economic institutions

The transition to a neoliberal capitalist economy for Cambodia meant that non-economic institutions and their social services were often weakened in response (Sanders 2012). The social policies found within PRSPs were often based around the idea of cost recovery. That is, social services were privatized and individuals paid for services as they were used (Cooke 2004; Marshall et al. 2001). This reflects the same ideology found within SAPs, with PRSPs being noted as extending the privatization of public sector services even further (Cooke 2004). Through extensive privatization, PRSPs diminished or removed the role of the government in delivering social and economic protections and services. Privatization and its reliance on charges reduced access to social safety nets among citizens (Marshall et al. 2001). The shift is summarized by one study: “The poor and vulnerable will be taken care of by safety nets—if there is money for them—and if some people fall through the cracks, well, the Bank and the
Fund never denied that structural adjustment would be painful” (Malaluan and Guttal 2002:16). This created a state in which social protections were noted as being the bare minimum, with a lack of safety nets and social insurance (Dowling and Yap 2009; Sandy 2007).

As programs and policies tied to international loans and aid were put into place, the institutional weakness of the state receiving them was often noted. A World Bank and IMF assessment of Cambodia identified weak state institutions as a hindrance to their transition to market capitalism (Malaluan and Guttal 2002). However, as Cambodia shifted toward “market based economies after years of centrally planned political-economic models, it is not surprising that the required structures, institutions and governance processes to facilitate market capitalism are weak” (Malaluan and Guttal 2002:8). This view however, caused international donors and agencies involved in Cambodia’s transition to view previously established institutions and structures as “illegitimate or invalid” (Curtis 1998:72). This view worked not to establish strong institutions, economic or otherwise, but conversely to further weaken Cambodian institutions as all governmental reforms made before UNTAC were disregarded (Curtis 1998). Such reforms created economic dominance at the expense of other social institutions, including negative impacts on health, education, human rights, and the environment (Chossudovsky 1997).

Since shifting to a globalized capitalist economy, Cambodia faced rising health care costs despite a lack of access to basic health services (Sandy 2007). The situation was often compounded for individuals living in rural areas (Samarasinghe 2008). Compared to other Southeastern Asian countries, Cambodia ranks among the worst for maternal mortality (Samarasinghe 2008). Figure 5.2 demonstrates this difference, with maternal mortality ratio measured as the deaths per 100,000 live births (Human Development Data 2018). Though the
gap has been closing, Cambodia’s maternal mortality ratio remains higher than surrounding counterparts.

![Graph showing maternal mortality ratio from 1990 to 2015 for Cambodia and South East Asia. The graph illustrates a decline in maternal mortality ratio over time, with Cambodia's ratio remaining higher than that of South East Asia.]

**Figure 5.2.** Maternal Mortality Ratio, 1990-2015.

Public expenditures on health services remained low. Cambodia has not improved its GDP expenditures on health, particularly when compared to the world average, as well as the average for South East Asia as a whole. Figure 5.3 demonstrates this using public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Cambodia remains around 1.5% or lower, while South East Asia has been increasing to above 2%. The world average has remained above 4% since 2010. Following the implementation of Cambodia’s first PRSP in 2003, the country faced a steady decline in health expenditures through 2010. Though there was a slight increase from 1.3% to 1.5% in 2012, it has since decreased again. Overall, the data indicates that social services have not received better funding since the implementation of international financial policies and programs, but have instead weakened as economic institutions came to dominate.
Deepening inequality

Alongside the structural and economic changes that come with transition, economic and gender based inequalities often deepen (Hughes 2003; Sanders 2012; Zheng 2016). What macroeconomic growth Cambodia achieved was not distributed evenly across the population. Much of the population remained below the poverty line, with a high percentage dependent on agricultural work (Dayley and Neher 2013; Dowling and Yap 2009). In 2000, 73.7% of employment was in agriculture work, and this figure remained high at 54.1% in 2010 (Human Development Data 2018). As development continues to grow, so too does inequality, and particularly income inequality (Chossudovsky 1997; Rigg 2016). It has been noted that “compared to the region’s other poor countries, Cambodia suffers the highest degree of income inequality, suggesting that recent economic gains benefit primarily those who already have wealth” (Dayley and Neher 2013:160). The inequality-adjusted income index adjusts a country’s score lower on the human development index to account for inequality in income distribution (Human Development Data 2018). Figure 5.4 shows that Cambodia lags behind regional comparisons as well as the world mean on income inequality.

Figure 5.3. Public Health Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, 1995-2014.
Women’s roles changed in important ways during Cambodia’s transition, and there was often a push towards more traditional gender roles. This frequently resulted in gendered inequalities as women struggled to be full political and economic actors in the new economy. Studies of post-Soviet countries’ transitions from centralized to capitalist economies often note that a return to traditional gender roles and patriarchal relations accompanied transitions (Buckley 1997; True 2003; Vullnetari and King 2011). A cultural emphasis on the essential femininity of women emerged during Cambodia’s transition (Brickell 2010; Derks 2008). This included the construction of “srei krup leakkhana (virtuous woman)” which stressed the familial role of women (Jacobsen 2008). The Chbap Srey, or moral code for women, also gained “renewed relevance in the effort to restate a social order that is thought to be either lost due to years of war and destruction or at stake in the face of foreign influences. In such a context…gender ideals become emphasized and used as cultural symbols that embody ‘Khmerness’” (Derks 2008:47).

The consequences of this tension between a transition heavily guided by foreign influence and a return to traditional gender relations meant that Cambodian women were often
hindered from participating fully in new developments while also experiencing worsened social and economic situations with development (Derks 2008). Figure 5.5 indicates a large gap between male and female labor force participation. This rate represents the percentage of the working-age population currently in the labor market (Human Development Data 2018). For the most part, the difference between male and female labor force participation has remained at around a 10% difference.

**Figure 5.5.** Labor Force Participation Rate by Gender, 1990-2015.

The Gender Inequality Index is another indicator of gender equity. This index measures gender inequality based on reproductive health, empowerment, and labor market participation. The higher the score, the worse the inequity gap (Human Development Data 2018). While South East Asia as a whole tracks alongside the mean world score, Cambodia scores much worse. Figure 5.6 shows that though gender inequality significantly declined between 1995 and 2010, it has since stagnated.
Educational opportunities for women have not benefitted from the implementation of SAPs and PRSPs (Brickell 2010). Although the gender gap in primary education in Cambodia is small, many girls drop out and fail to attend upper secondary schools (Dowling and Yap 2009). Research on Cambodia demonstrates a sharp gender disparity in literacy levels and educational attainment (Samarasinghe 2008).

The associated policies and programs Cambodia entered into as part of their transition contributed to exacerbating inequality. Southeast Asian countries have faced increased inequalities corresponding with increased globalization and market integration (Rigg 2016). Neoliberal economic policies mean that public social services and enterprises are privatized and subsidized generating both economic and gender based inequality (Sanders 2012). PRSPs afforded little attention to the role of gender in economic shifts, and even less to issues of gender-based violence, gender and education, and gender in the realm of political representation (Kabeer 2003). Women have been disproportionately impacted by the IMF/World Bank implementation of cost recovery (i.e. privatization) for social services like health and education.
(van Staveren 2002). Women were also negatively affected by such changes due to their overall lower income and familial responsibilities (van Staveren 2002).

The role of regional migration

With the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge government by Vietnamese troops in 1978, the start of a ten year occupation led hundreds of thousands of Cambodians to flee the country (Chandler 2008; Dayley and Neher 2013). Many fled to refugee camps on the border of Thailand (Chandler 2008; Owen 2005). Over one million Cambodians resettled in third countries while almost a quarter of a million resettled in the United States (Dayley and Neher 2013). The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in 1989 and subsequent signing of the Paris peace agreement in 1991 resulted in UNTAC occupation until 1993. During this period UNTAC was tasked with overseeing the repatriation of over 350,000 refugees, many from Thailand (Chandler 2008; Dayley and Neher 2013; Owen 2005). Cambodia began to see a vast influx of money from tourism and the return of Cambodians who had resettled overseas following the election of 2003 (Corfield 2009).

After the era of repatriation of refugees to Cambodia however, the country has experienced high out migration (Castles et al. 2014). Figure 5.7 pictures the net migration rate for Cambodia between 1990 and 2015 expressed as the “ratio of the difference between the number of in-migrants and out-migrants from a country to the average population, expressed per 1,000 people” (Human Development Data 2018). As Figure 5.7 shows, starting in 1990 and through the UNTAC occupation in 1993, migration into Cambodia was on the rise. Following this period, net migration began to decrease, dropping steadily in the period prior and following the global financial crisis in 2007.
Figure 5.7. Net Migration Rate, 1990-2015.

Reasons for migration often include poverty, lack of opportunities, and gender inequality (Maltoni 2007; Piper 2003; Vutha, Pide, and Dalis 2011). Irregular labor migration is common, particularly from Cambodia to Thailand (Castles et al. 2014; Maltoni 2007; Sophal and Sovannarith 1999; Vutha et al. 2011). Between 2000 and 2010, the number of Cambodian migrants in Thailand increased from 18,718 to 281,321 (ILMS Database in ASEAN 2015).

Migration from Cambodia to Thailand occurred for several reasons related to both demographics and economics (Anon 2010). Maltoni (2007:7) notes: “While Thailand has decreasing birth rates and a strong economy Cambodia continues to have one of the fastest growing populations in the GMS [Greater Mekong Subregion] and few employment opportunities for a growing workforce.” Furthermore, the global financial crisis deeply impacted the Cambodian economy who saw GDP growth decrease from 10.2% to -2.0% between 2007 and 2009 (Anon 2010). With Thailand maintaining a much higher gross national income comparatively, it is an appealing destination for migrants seeking opportunity.
Impact on human trafficking

Human trafficking from Cambodia is intricately connected to the foregoing shifts in migration and inequality. Labor and sex trafficking patterns often overlap with irregular migration movements (Brown 2007; Davy 2014; Schwartz 2004; Takamatsu 2004). A 2009 study found that among the 89,096 individuals deported from Thailand to Cambodia, 23% were trafficked. Additionally, both migration and trafficking flows overlapped along the major highways that link Cambodia to Thailand (Anon 2010). Distinguishing irregular migration and trafficking across borders is often blurry in Southeast Asian countries (Asis 2008). However, acknowledging their relationship is important as it represents “a continuum from voluntary individual movement to use of middlemen to trafficking and bonded labor” (Castles et al. 2014:155).

With globalization and the associated economic policies and programs implemented in Cambodia inequality deepened (Davy 2014; Schwartz 2004). This “unrestrained” form of capitalism weakened non-economic institutions and the social safety nets the institutions previously provided (Schwartz 2004). These conditions of inequality and weakened social services then act as key drivers for migration in order to seek opportunity (Bradley and Szablewska 2016; Samarasinghe 2008; Schwartz 2004). In addition to poverty driving migration for job seeking opportunities, drought and flooding impacted the agricultural livelihood upon which many depended (Kranrattanasuit 2014). Once again, many Cambodian migrants to Thailand experienced trafficking (Kranrattanasuit 2014; Shelley 2010). Research consistently shows that that migrants who were trafficked in industries such as domestic, factory, plantation, and fishing experienced “deception, coercion, debt bondage, non-payment of salary, arbitrary
salary deductions, forced work and forced overtime, and physical, verbal and mental abuse” (Rigg 2016:115).

The response to human trafficking in Cambodia has not focused on addressing these root causes. Instead anti-trafficking efforts have “had the effect of shuffling the problem around” while also exacerbating inequalities (Bradley and Szablewska 2016:462). The government focused on sex workers without distinguishing between genuine victims of trafficking and individuals engaging in consensual sex work (Bradley and Szablewska 2016). As such, Cambodia’s law on human trafficking was restricted by an almost exclusive focus on sex work (Sandy 2012). Along with exacerbating the stigma associated with sex work, the government’s focus made all sex workers more vulnerable and ignored labor trafficking and its association with migration.

Cambodia's commitments to international and domestic human trafficking laws did not translate into sufficient action (Kranrattanasuit 2014; Schwartz 2004). A 2010 study found a lack of trafficking victim screening by immigration and police officers working with migrant laborers. Specifically, “nearly 20% of Cambodian deportees who are actually labour trafficking victims report their case, but action by authorities was not taken in any of these cases” (Anon 2010:118). Cambodia offered no formal law for protecting victim’s from prosecution (Kranrattanasuit 2014). The law and punishment approach to combatting trafficking focused primarily on anti-migration measures as a tool to prevent human trafficking. For example, Cambodia placed limitations on travel rights to curb trafficking of migrant labors to Malaysia (Kranrattanasuit 2014). Specifically, the government passed a comprehensive ban on Cambodian women traveling to Malaysia for work in domestic service (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2012). Such restrictions however, often backfired and increased risks for
trafficking as migrant workers sought out risky routes or the services of smugglers (Kranrattanasuit 2014).

Figure 5.8 shows Cambodia’s scores on the 3P Anti-Trafficking Index from 2000 to 2015. Countries are rated on a scale from 1 to 5 on three dimensions for a total possible score of 15. Cambodia consistently scores the lowest on the protection dimension, averaging a score of 2.7. This indicates there is significant room for improvement in regard to laws, policies, and funding towards the protection of human trafficking victims. The mean scores for prevention and prosecution are 3.2 and 3.4 respectively. Overall, Cambodia’s sum score ranges from a low of 7 to a high of 11. Their mean overall score however is 9.4.

Figure 5.8. Scores on the 3P Anti-Trafficking Index, 2000-2015.

Furthermore, international organizations and donors have heavily influenced the response. Conditions attached to international funding allows international organizations or even countries attach “their own values and ideology to specific aid agendas, sometimes with little thought to the local context” (Bradley and Szablewska 2016:462). For example, historically anti-trafficking funding has gone primarily to religious based NGO’s in Cambodia (Davy 2014). In
addition, funds are not funneled to programs that could help vulnerable groups, but instead focus on increasing economic infrastructure projects (Takamatsu 2004).

Another major obstacle for effective anti-trafficking efforts was corruption within the Cambodian government (Davy 2014; Keo et al. 2014; Schwartz 2004). Corruption within the criminal justice system led to the prosecution of individuals in the judiciary, police, and military (Schwartz 2004). In 2006, the former Deputy Director of the Police Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Department and two officials under his supervision were convicted for involvement in trafficking (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2007). Ultimately, anti-trafficking efforts must focus on reducing vulnerability for at-risk populations, including addressing economic and gender inequality. Rather than focus on law and order responses, more legitimate opportunities are necessary for individuals (Keo et al. 2014). Addressing corruption is also necessary with an emphasis on legal reforms and large structural changes to the criminal justice system (Keo et al. 2014).

Conclusion

My theoretical framework integrated institutional anomie, historical structural perspectives on migration, and critical global feminist theory to argue that policies put in place by international financial institutions contributed to conditions that impacted human trafficking. These factors were identified by the human trafficking literature and included economic and gender based inequality, corruption and conflict, and migration patterns. Historical analysis of Cambodia supports the theory, with high economic dominance, high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, and low social expenditures representing one pathway for human trafficking.
In Cambodia’s transition, economic dominance and high globalization quickly occurred due to the multiplicity of policies and programs put in place by the IMF and World Bank. Consistent with the literature, these neoliberal economic policies were associated with anomie and criminogenic possibilities (Messner et al. 2008; Passas 2000; Sanders 2012). A study of trafficking in Cambodia notes: “A form of unrestrained capitalism has emerged…which not only makes few allowances for the vulnerable in terms of job security or governmental welfare programs but also, in some cases, exacerbates their poverty. Rapacious industrial development and resource extraction have denied existing communities means of survival, forcing mass urban migration and, in the worst cases, trafficking of family members” (Schwartz 2004:388).

The role of international financial institutions and foreign governments represent a form of “market colonialism” through which the broader consequences of economic reform are overlooked through the lens of neutral market forces. Ultimately, a combination of social historical, political, and economic factors coalesce in Cambodia to influence trafficking. This includes the emergence of economic dominance, the disintegration of social safety nets, and deepening income and gender inequality. These conditions represent an environment in which one pathway to human trafficking can emerge.
CHAPTER SIX: NEOLIBERAL ACCOMMODATION AND THE CASE OF BOLIVIA

Introduction

This chapter will use the comparative historical method of process tracing to analyze a second of the solutions presented in chapter four. Specifically, this chapter presents the results of Bolivia, whose intermediate solution leading to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts is as follows: ~ED*GZ*ii*GI*CP. This solution indicates that the combination of not high economic dominance, high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, and high corruption combine to create a unique pathway for human trafficking in Bolivia.

Bolivia

A brief history

Located in the middle of South America, Bolivia is landlocked and shares borders with Peru, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. Known as Upper Peru while under Spanish colonial rule, the state of Bolivia declared independence in 1825 following a 15 year war (Morales 2010). Following several successful initial presidency’s, Bolivia was characterized by a succession of caudillos, or “corrupt military strongmen” who ruled the country (Morales 2010). The War of the Pacific, which lasted from 1879 to 1884 over disputed coastal territory in Bolivia, established a civilian ruling class made up of tin-mining and land elites. In 1935, the loss of disputed territory to Paraguay following the Chaco War sparked radicalism and reform among Bolivians (Morales 2010).

From the end of the Chaco War in 1935 until the Bolivian National Revolution in 1952, competing ideologies and new parties emerged. Many reformers focused on decreasing the control private economic interests had over the state (Morales 2010). Under new rule, a new constitution “introduced a state-managed central economy” in 1938 (Morales 2010). Soon after,
conservative parties regained control, but they now had to contend with parties such as the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) and FSB (Falange Socialista Boliviana) (Klein 2011; Morales 2010). These parties became key players leading to the Bolivian National Revolution. The success of the MNR party led to the installation of a government in which there were sweeping changes, including extensive land reform, the introduction of voting rights, and the nationalization of mines (Morales 2010).

A 1964 military backed coup resulted in a long and violent struggle between the ruling military and citizens until a democratic election in 1982 (Klein 2011). In the two decades that followed 1982, Bolivia cycled through a variety of governments that struggled to restore democracy and prosperity. Over this time, short-term loans through the military had resulted in a $5 billion debt to foreign banks and organizations. Economic shifts during this period included austerity measures in response to IMF lending and a capitalization program that privatized infrastructure and industry throughout the nation (Morales 2010, 2012). Social protests against privatization were common, as demonstrated in the Water War of 2000 and Gas War of 2003. The former dealt with the proposed privatization of local water while the later criticized the exportation of natural gas (Klein 2011; Morales 2010).

The 2005 election of Evo Morales marked the first indigenous presidency in the history of Bolivia and was largely connected to discontent with the effects of the previous decades of neoliberal policies (Siekmeier 2011). Similar to the outcomes following the National Revolution, the Morales administration focused on nationalizing gas, oil, and telecommunication industries; land reforms; shifts away from foreign policy involvement; a focus on environmental protection. Furthermore, the introduction of a new constitution in 2009 expanded the state conception of plurinationality and decentralization (Morales 2010). Despite making progress, critics of the
administration lament a lack of substantial change and struggles in the administration to meet all of its promises (Kohl and Farthing 2009; Morales 2012; Postero 2017). Ultimately, the history of Bolivia demonstrates a consistent tension between neoliberal economic reforms and social protest and pushback against such reforms.

*Globalization*...

As in the case of Cambodia, Bolivia implemented both structural adjustment programs and poverty reduction strategies. A New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched in 1985 in conjunction with the IMF, making Bolivia one of the first Latin American countries to implement a structural adjustment program (Mucha 2017). This SAP focused on the adoption of free market reforms aimed at curtailing the role of the state through extensive privatization (Gill 2000). More specifically, the NEP included a stance against wage increases, public sector employment cuts, the attraction of international creditors, and limitation of state intervention to anti-labor actions and support for the adjusted exchange rate (Haarstad and Andersson 2009; Jimenez 2006; Pastor 1992). Ultimately, the NEP revolved around globalizing Bolivia by opening it up to world economic markets (Jimenez 2006).

Bolivia was also a Latin American leader when it worked on its interim PRSP in 1999 (Dijkstra 2010). The PRSP was approved in 2000 and full implementation began in 2001. IMF and World Bank staff, along with donors, were heavily influential in crafting the agenda of Bolivia’s PRSP (Dijkstra 2010). The PRSP ultimately was “written by a government think-tank, by people who did not participate in the Dialogue” (Morrison and Singer 2007:727). Although PRSP’s were intended to alleviate some issues associated with SAPs by providing more country ownership, Bolivia failed to achieve this. Some core issues included a lack of prioritization, attention to feasibility, country ownership, and a controlled dialogue that excluded marginalized
groups (Dijkstra 2010; Uriona et al. 2002). Many civil society organizations held that important issues around land reform, natural resource control, and trade agreements were ignored (Morrison and Singer 2007). These organizations also noted a lack of transparency throughout the process, as citizen participation was limited and many initial documents were only presented in English (Ranis, Vreeland, and Kosack 2006).

During the period from 1986 and 2001, Bolivia received $350 million in loans from the IMF in exchange for adopting its specific economic policies (Schultz 2008). To ensure the adoption of their policies and programs, the World Bank and IMF offered a history of applying pressure to Bolivian governments (Kohl and Farthing 2009). There historically has been resistance to privatizing the many state-owned enterprises in Bolivia, including water, gas, mining, and telecommunications industries (Kohl and Farthing 2009; Schultz and Draper 2008). Following the implementation of the NEP, however, the World Bank and IMF pushed for privatization and were later backed in their efforts by the United States and Inter-American Development Bank (Kohl and Farthing 2009). This culminated in the passing of the 1992 Law of Privatization, which led to the privatization of many state firms, although not the largest (Kohl and Farthing 2009). A new privatization plan, known as “capitalization”, eventually led the Bolivian government to surrender control of oil and gas to foreign and transnational corporations (Schultz 2008; Simarro and Antolín 2012). However, “by complying with IMF’s demands for privatization, Bolivia ended up reducing its public revenue and started acquiring higher public deficits” (Schultz 2008:97). The impact of these privatizations was felt widely by those most vulnerable in Bolivian society, which I detail later.

The Bolivian government was willing to use “measures such as the state of siege to enforce its policies” (Jenkins 1997:112). This was demonstrated in February of 2003, with
deadly consequences. Demands from the IMF that the Bolivian government reduce their deficit culminated in a proposed income tax (Kohl 2006; Kohl and Farthing 2009; Schultz 2008). The resulting social protests led to clashes between military and police, ending after two days and leaving dozens dead (Kohl 2006; Kohl and Farthing 2009; Schultz 2008).

Fundamentally, the Bolivian case demonstrates that the tension between the push for neoliberal globalization and resistance against privatization creates a context of high globalization but not high economic dominance. Figure 6.1 below demonstrates this tension over time.

![Figure 6.1](image)

**Figure 6.1.** Bolivia’s Scores on Globalization and Economic Dominance.

While Bolivia’s scores on globalization have increased, particularly since the 1985 SAP, the same cannot be said for their scores on economic dominance. Instead there is actually a steady decrease in economic dominance, especially following 2004. This period is largely seen as representative of a pushback against neoliberalism that culminated in the election of Evo Morales (Dangl 2007; Siekmeier 2011; Vanden and Prevost 2012). Despite the lack of economic dominance, neoliberal economic policies and programs deepened economic and gender
inequality and created space for corruption to flourish, ultimately producing another pathway for human trafficking.

Unequal impacts

The neoliberal economic policies first introduced in 1985 were intended to stabilize the Bolivian state. While inflation was reduced, providing some economic stabilization, there was a lack of corresponding economic growth (Emmerij 1998). The neoliberal economic restructuring also served to deepen economic inequality, most often by diminishing the state’s role in social welfare provision and privatizing state enterprises (Gill 2000; Postero 2017). As an example, social expenditures as a percentage of GDP decreased from 8% in 1981 to just 1.8% in 1986 (Silva et al. 2011). Extensive privatization of various public industries throughout the 1990s worked to divert the bulk of Bolivia’s wealth into the control of foreign corporations (Dangl 2007).

Health and education are two areas that experienced considerable cuts in social spending and shifts towards privatization (Chossudovsky 1997; Silva et al. 2011). Following World Bank recommendations, Bolivia’s privatization of public health services resulted in “the segmentation and fragmentation of the health system [being] exacerbated, [and] accessibility and quality of care suffered and health status barely improved” (Silva et al. 2011:22-3). These changes followed the 1985 SAP and culminated in a health care sector with high costs and poor services that caused the formal health care system to be viewed as a “last resort” (Heckert 2018). Today, Bolivia compares poorly to other Latin American countries on a variety of health indicators, including infant mortality (Heaton et al. 2014; Tejerina et al. 2014; Thiele 2003). Bolivia’s maternal mortality rate also lags far behind other South American countries (see Figure 6.2).
Income inequality also greatly increased throughout the 1980s across Bolivia, and especially in urban areas (Psacharopoulos et al. 1995). Figure 6.3 shows that although the gap in income inequality has decreased more recently in Bolivia, inequality continues to remain higher in Bolivia as compared to South America and the world. The trend of concentrated income despite economic reforms has remained, even after the PRSP adjustments (Jimenez 2006).
The 1985 economic reforms also led to large declines in both employment and earnings (Chossudovsky 1997). The national estimate for unemployment in 1980 was 6.1% of the total labor force. This figure jumped to 19.76% by 1986 (DataBank 2018). Following the implementation of the interim PRSP in 1999, unemployment continued to skyrocket. In particular, there are now larger gaps between male and female unemployment as Figure 6.4 demonstrates.

Figure 6.4 shows the economic impacts of adjustment were often unevenly felt by men and women. Women in Bolivia have lower employment and education rates than men (Inchauste 2000; Llanos 2006). Within the PRSP of Bolivia, a lack of attention to the ways that macroeconomic policies are gendered has meant that explicit acknowledgement of gender inequality and how to tackle it has been missing from the dialogue (van Staveren 2008; Whitehead 2003). Compared to other South American countries, Bolivia lags behind in terms of equality between men and women in regard to both health and education (Gianotten et al. 1994). The Bolivian PRSP did not consider gender disaggregated data and while it did mention income inequality in passing, the report did not provide any analysis of how this connects with work.
opportunities or poverty more broadly (van Staveren 2008; Whitehead 2003). Consequentially, gender inequality in regard to poverty, access to land, credit, and the labor market has been overlooked (van Staveren 2008).

In addition to deepening inequality between socio-economic groups and between men and women, economic shifts often informed racial dynamics as well. There was a racial element present throughout adjustment, and many scholars noted that the traditional white–mestizo political class was responsible for instituting racialized changes (Postero 2017). Stemming from colonialization, a racial distinction has been made between “indios and mestizos/Europeans, with mestizos and Europeans taking on a racial categorization of ‘white’” (Heckert 2018:38). Indigenous populations were impacted negatively by neoliberal economic reforms, which privileged whites and mestizos (Postero 2017). Bolivia’s indigenous groups have borne the negative impacts of the reforms and are more likely to be among the poorest (Psacharopoulos et al. 1995). Still today, indigenous groups are more likely to come from poor households, less likely to complete primary and secondary education, less likely to be employed, and paid less when employed (World Bank Group 2015). This gap is also greater for indigenous women, with Bolivian indigenous women earning about 60 percent less than comparable non-indigenous women (World Bank Group 2015). The neoliberal economic reforms that stemmed from both the 1985 SAP and 1999 PRSP thus deeply impacted socio-economic inequality along not just class, but also gender and racial lines as well.

**The Facilitation of Corruption**

The role of corruption in Bolivia has also been significant. Compared to other Latin American countries, Bolivia has consistently ranked near the bottom on various measures of corruption (Gingerich 2010; Murphy 2004). Figure 6.5 illustrates this by comparing Bolivia’s
scores on the Corruption Perceptions Index to the mean scores for the region of South America. The scale for this index ranges from 0-10, with higher scores indicating lower levels of perceived corruption in areas of the public sphere. Bolivia’s scores have consistently been below the average for South America, ranging from 2 to 3.5 with a mean score of 2.8.

![Graph showing Corruption Perceptions Index Scores, 1995-2017](image)

**Figure 6.5.** Corruption Perceptions Index Scores, 1995-2017.

Corruption within the political sphere has predominated, and has eroded public confidence in the government and reducing administrative efficiency (Gingerich 2010; Schwarz-Blum 2006). This corruption has taken the form of patronage, siphoning money for personal profit, and bribes (Gingerich 2010; Hummel 2018; Postero 2017). One study found that intermediaries are commonly used to pay bribes to government officials: “Street vendors now pay larger bribes in lump sums to a small cadre of bureaucrats…street vendor representatives capitalized on the reorganization of licenses to collude with bureaucrats and form bribery cartels” (Hummel 2018:219). Corruption related to asset and money laundering related to cocaine is also common (Thoumi and Anzola 2010).

Anti-corruption measures focused on the public sector have been limited in their progress (Mosquiera and del Villar 2006). While legal reforms have been introduced, they often focus on
monitoring and sanctioning individual acts rather than “systematic forms of corruption linked to party funding” (Gingerich 2010:77). Moreover, the succeeding government did not follow through on anticorruption initiatives (Gingerich 2010). By focusing on abuses of power by individual offenders, political corruption within administrations and state-owned organizations have gone unchecked (Guglielmone 2008).

...And its discontents

Bolivia represents an interesting point of departure compared to many other cases due to the level of pushback against neoliberal economic policies and privatization. The fostering of this resistance reflects a long history of people’s protests (Gill 2000; Heckert 2018; Young 2017). Neoliberalism and its associated economic reforms had promised increases in prosperity and quality of life. When these promises failed to materialize and many individuals found themselves worse off, popular social movements emerged: “By 2000, the majority of Bolivians were not only disillusioned by privatization and globalization but in open rebellion against the many negative consequences” (Morales 2010:xxiii). Although the government pushed through many policies through violent means, social movements continued, “leading neoliberalism to dig its own grave” (Dangl 2007:15). It is this pushback against privatization which helps to account for the high globalization without corresponding economic dominance found in Bolivia’s pathway.

Historically, resource nationalism, or “the idea that resource wealth should be used for the benefit of the nation” has brought together various social groups at important revolutionary moments (Young 2017:1). Many times these movements have also been fueled by perceived corruption, with the government being seen as unrepresentative and self-serving (Dangl 2007; Domingo 2005). Two prominent examples of this mobilization more recently included the Water War of 2000 and Gas War of 2003. The precipitating events for these protests both involved
privatization of natural resources (Domingo 2005). Framed within the context of globalization, these protests responded to what was negatively viewed as wealth extraction that would continue to deepen inequality and subject the nation to heavy outside influence (Dangl 2007; Schultz and Draper 2008; Vanden and Prevost 2012). As Kaup (2012:4) framed it:

These are conflicts over how Bolivia’s rich natural resource base is integrated into the global economy and who benefits from it. They are conflicts over neoliberal forms of global integration – and potential alternatives – that are embedded in long histories of struggle among transnational corporations, geopolitical allies and foes, local classes and local class factions.

Globalization thus created discontents by deepening inequality, while a history of political struggle allowed pushback against such forces to flourish.

The Water and Gas Wars culminated in the election of Evo Morales, a president largely seen as opposing economic neoliberalism and foreign influence (Kaup 2012; Young 2017). However, analyses of change under Morales have been critical of the administration for bending, molding, or accommodating neoliberalism (Kohl and Farthing 2009; Panizza 2005). Natural resource extraction and dependency on global markets continued, with transnational corporations acting as the controlling force while the state simply takes a small profit (Kaup 2012; Postero 2017; Webber 2011). For example, the administration has continued to invite transnational corporations to extract and export Bolivia’s minerals and hydrocarbons (Kaup 2012). In addition, government social spending has remained low and income inequality has remained high, indicating a lack of substantial change (Webber 2011).

While some reforms have been successful, including healthcare and agrarian reforms focused on poor and indigenous populations, they have been met by serious challenges (Filho, Gonçalves, and Déa 2010; Heaton et al. 2014). The primary economic model of development centered on globalized extractive capitalism has not been fundamentally altered (Filho et al. 2010).
Instead these policy shifts represented an accommodation of neoliberalism in the sense that changes are made only “at the margins” (Kohl and Farthing 2009). Regarding the Morales administration, Webber (2011:228) stated:

“Whatever the pretenses of transnational ‘partners,’ as opposed to ‘bosses,’ the capitalist state’s principal role of facilitating the conditions for the ongoing accumulation of capital has not been interrupted by the Morales government’s new development program.” In these ways, a reconstitution of neoliberalism allows processes of globalization to continue, while social mobilization and protest has hindered the development of economic dominance. As Figure 6.1 showed, while Bolivia’s scores on globalization have steadily increased over time, their score on economic dominance has actually been decreasing since 2001.

A pathway for migration and human trafficking

Bolivia’s pathway to human trafficking also appears in the analysis for high out migration. The pathway to high human trafficking again is: ~ED*GZ*ii*GI*CP. The pathway to high out migration is: ~ED*GZ*II*GI*CP. As discussed in Chapter 4, these solutions share significant overlap, with the exception that high income inequality is a contributing rather than core factor leading to human trafficking. This shared overlap in the conditions leading to these outcomes underscores the importance of understanding the relationship migration shares with human trafficking in Bolivia.

Globalization has increased migration in Latin American countries (Castles et al. 2014). Bolivia in particular, has been characterized by high out migration. Compared to its neighboring countries, Bolivia has sustained a high rate of out migration over the past several decades. Table 6.1 demonstrates that Bolivia’s net rate of migration has remained negative since 1990, indicating out migration.
Table 6.1. Net Migration Rate Per 1,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Stemming from the neoliberal economic reforms and related industry privatizations of 1985, many Bolivians migrated to major cities within Bolivia, neighboring countries such as Argentina and Chile, or destinations such as Spain and the United States (Whitesell 2008). This migration, both international and internal, was often connected back to employment opportunities (Klein 2011; Punch 2014). Men often traveled to cities after losing their jobs from the privatization of mines; women migrated abroad seeking domestic labor opportunities (Whitesell 2008).

Remittances sent back home from migrants acted as a way to help alleviate poverty. A high percentage of Bolivia’s GDP comes from these remittances, particularly when compared to other South American countries, as Figure 6.6 shows (Whitesell 2008).

Figure 6.6. Remittance Inflows as Percentage of GDP.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the drivers of migration are often connected to human trafficking. Places with high flows of migration are likely to see corresponding flows of human trafficking (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010; Skeldon 2002). This remains true for the case of Bolivia. Case studies of teenage migration from Bolivia to Argentina revealed patterns of child trafficking as well (Bastia 2005). Bolivian migrants who work in the textile industry in Argentina have also experienced trafficking and exploitation (Castles et al. 2014; Schultz and Draper 2008).

Regarding the drivers of this relationship between migration and trafficking, Bastia (2005:62-3) noted:

> The causes…are closely related to those that sustain international migration—the prolonged political and economic crisis, collapse of traditional industries such as mining, inadequate land distribution for sustaining the rural population engaged in subsistence agriculture, structural adjustments implemented since the 1980s, gender-based discrimination, and income differences as compared to the countries of destination.

In addition to these socio-economic and gender-based inequalities that place individuals at risk of trafficking, research on Bolivia has also noted a higher risk for trafficking among indigenous populations (Cameron and Newman 2008; Seelke 2013).

As with many countries, Bolivia’s approach to combatting trafficking has focused on addressing the issue as a problem of crime, law, and order. Anti-trafficking initiatives have focused on law enforcement and stricter border controls (Bastia 2005). Regulating and restricting migrant’s movements often has had the indirect effect of making them vulnerable to human trafficking and undermining the protections available to them in their destination country (Bastia 2006; Pizarro 2008). These restrictions make migrants vulnerable to trafficking through reliance on “clandestine channels” such as the use of coyotes (Pizarro 2008; Schultz and Draper 2008). Institutionalized corruption among border and other law enforcement agents have further facilitated such movements and exploitation (Bastia 2005; Pizarro 2008).
Figure 6.7 shows Bolivia’s scores on the 3P Anti-Trafficking Index from 2002 to 2015. Countries are rated on a scale from 1 to 5 on three dimensions for a total possible score of 15. Bolivia consistently scores the lowest on the protection dimension, averaging a score of 2.3. This indicates there is significant room for improvement in regard to laws, policies, and funding towards the protection of human trafficking victims. The mean score of 2.9 for prevention indicates that there are only limited efforts made in the prevention of human trafficking, including awareness campaigns, training for appropriate authorities, national plans to combat human trafficking, and cooperation with various organizations and governments against trafficking in persons. The mean score for prosecution is the highest at 3.6. Overall, Bolivia’s sum score ranges from a low of 6 to a high of 11. Their mean overall score however is 8.8.

![Figure 6.7. Scores on the 3P Anti-Trafficking Index, 2002-2015.](image)

A lack of adequate trafficking legislation can serve to criminalize rather than protect victims, while also facilitating the impunity of the offenders (Pizarro 2008). While Bolivia did ratify the UN Trafficking Protocol in 2006, this legislation failed to effectively deal with internal human trafficking. This is particularly important given that the 2016 UNODC Global Report on Human Trafficking identified 589 victims of domestic trafficking victims in Bolivia (UNODC
2016). In practice, the 2012 Bolivian law on trafficking and smuggling often conflated the two, impacting data collection efforts and prosecutorial responses (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2018). Furthermore, the Bolivian National Police announced at the end of 2017 that it would begin to “publish a list of ‘false victims’ of trafficking crimes as an effort to prevent false allegations to police” (Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2018). This action would serve to further marginalize trafficking victims, discourage victims to report or endangering victim participation in investigations.

Conclusion

My theoretical framework integrates institutional anomie, historical structural perspectives on migration, and critical global feminist theory to argue that policies enacted by international financial institutions contribute to conditions that impact human trafficking. I identified these factors within the human trafficking literature and they included economic and gender based inequality, corruption and conflict, and migration patterns. Historical analysis of Bolivia supports the theory overall, with high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, and high corruption representing one pathway for human trafficking.

Bolivia is a unique case given its history of social protest against economic measures associated with the IMF and World Bank. This history has contributed to the lack of economic dominance and relatively high social expenditures seen today. Closer historical examination however, shows that the quality of social expenditures on services such as health, education, and employment have not worked to alleviate inequality. Instead, as globalization and an economy centered on neoliberal accommodation has persisted, economic and gender inequalities have persisted. Additionally, various Bolivian governments over time have not been successful in
addressing corruption. Altogether, this situation has spurred migration and relatedly, human trafficking.

Ultimately, a combination of social historical, political, and economic factors coalesce in Bolivia to influence trafficking. The combination includes the emergence of globalization, a corresponding deepening of income and gender inequality, and the presence of high corruption. Together these conditions represent an environment in which one pathway to human trafficking can emerge.
CHAPTER SEVEN: NEOLIBERAL (IN)STABILITY AND THE CASE OF THE GAMBIA

Introduction

This chapter uses the comparative historical method of process tracing to analyze a second of the solutions presented in chapter four. Specifically, this chapter presents the results of The Gambia, whose intermediate solution leading to weak and ineffective anti-trafficking efforts is follows: ED*~GZ*ii*GI*CP*fs. This solution indicates that the combination of high economic dominance, not high globalization, high income inequality, high gender inequality, high corruption, and high state fragility combine in important ways to create a unique pathway for human trafficking.

The Gambia

A brief history

Following the River Gambia, the small West African country of The Gambia (henceforth Gambia) is completely bounded by Senegal with the exception of its small Atlantic coastline. Though it is the smallest country on mainland Africa, Gambia has a population of just over two million. The country gained independence from Great Britain in 1965 and became known for retaining political stability in its early years (Perfect 2016). Although there was a multi-party democracy within the country, the first President Dawda Jawara governed from 1965 to 1994.

An attempted coup in 1981 splintered political parties, that resulted in an estimated 500 deaths, and effectively shattered standing beliefs about the stable nature of Gambia (Saine 2012). The fallout that resulted is summarized by Kandeh (1996:391):

The period between the failed coup of 1981 and the successful coup of 1994 was marked by growing leadership corruption, endemic poverty and public discontent. Jawara was viewed in the West as a champion of democracy and human rights and Gambia seemed the quintessence of social tranquility and political stability in Africa. This stability,
however, masked a corrupt political system mired in patronage, nepotism and cronyism. Rather than view the failed coup of 1981 as a wake-up call to reform the political system and restore probity to public institutions, Jawara continued to surround himself with sycophants and opportunists whose abuses damaged the credibility of his government. It was against this background of a complacent and discredited leadership that the AFPRC coup took place. 

The successful coup in 1994 was led by junior military officers, who ended the Jawara era without bloodshed. Yahya Jammeh subsequently established and led the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) (Perfect 2016). The AFPRC planned to return Gambia to civilian rule after four years, but mounting economic sanctions and pressures from the international community reduced the timetable to two years (Kandeh 1996). 

This presidential election to return the country to civilian rule was held in 1996, although in the months leading up to the election, Jammeh and the AFPRC introduced bans on the formation of new electoral parties and leaders (Saine 2003). These introduced constraints ultimately led to the election of Jammeh under conditions that the international community condemned as unfree (Saine 2003, 2009). Jammeh continued to win elections over the next two decades, under increasingly authoritarian rule. Indeed, Jammeh’s rule was marked by violations of political, civil, and social rights of Gambia’s citizens (Saine 2009). 

In the 2016 election however, Jammeh was defeated by candidate Adama Barrow who was backed by opposition coalitions. While Jammeh initially accepted defeat, within the week he reneged and demanded a new election (Perfect 2017). This sparked a political crisis that culminated in military intervention from the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), during which an estimated 46,000 Gambians fled the country due to threat of possible violence (Perfect 2017). In January of 2017, Barrow was sworn in as president at the Gambian embassy in neighboring Senegal. Jammeh fled to Equatorial Guinea due to a deal brokered by the African and European Union along with ECOWAS, likely due to the country’s non-
recognition of the International Criminal Court (Perfect 2017). This transition of power once
again marked another important shift in the history of Gambia.

*Some Strings Attached*

Following independence in 1965, Gambia quickly joined the IMF and the World Bank in
development plan began in 1975 and was largely dependent on borrowing funds from donors
(Jabara 1994). This included the International Development Association, the German owned
KfW development bank, and the African Development Bank (World Bank 1975). Examining the
early economic policy of Gambia, a World Bank report positively detailed the limited
government interference in private enterprise, lack of restriction on international financial
transactions, and open climate for foreign investments (World Bank 1980). Despite this, the
report noted that slow economic growth had actually resulted in a reduced average standard of
living (World Bank 1980).

To combat deteriorating social and economic conditions, Gambia adopted an Economic
Recovery Program (ERP) in 1985 (Cham 2012; Sriram 2009). Crafted in consultation with the
World Bank, IMF, USAID, and others, the ERP was continually renewed through 1990 (Jabara
1994). The ERP focused on increasing import pricing, increasing returns on exports, and
decreasing government expenditures, nonetheless, Gambia remained heavily dependent on
foreign aid and donors for the majority of its financing (Jabara 1994). The Program for Sustained
Development was started in 1990 with similar intended goals focused on tightening
expenditures, lifting price controls, and divesting public enterprises (Saine 2009). With such
policies in place, Gambia was able to receive additional loans from the IMF and World Bank
(Kea 2010; Saine 2009). The coup in 1994 however, disrupted the development projects, leading to economic sanctions and the cutting off of foreign aid (Cham 2012; Saine 2012).

After the presidential election in 1996, international aid, loans, and reforms were reintroduced to Gambia (Cham 2012). The Gambian government entered into a three year loan in 1998 through the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility with the IMF, though this was soon renamed to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (Cham 2012). Tighter financial regulations and the introduction of a new privatization framework aimed to make a stronger and more competitive economy (Saine 2009). Gambia entered an interim PRSP in 2000, the first of which was fully implemented in 2003, and the second in 2007 (Cham 2012). Satisfactory completion of these economic programs and policies led Gambia to reach HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Country) completion, a point “at which countries receive the balance of the debt relief that the international community committed to at the decision point” (World Bank 2018).

The IMF and World Bank program was critiqued for compelling African countries to join, whereby member countries were able to gain access to funds only through PRSP compliance (Ninsin 2012). As Ninsin (2012:13) noted, “the HIPC initiative carried the same tough conditionalities as were imposed under previous policy reforms – sweeping privatization and radical tax reforms designed to raise state revenue – before a country would qualify for debt relief.” The Gambian economy has been heavily reliant on foreign and international aid and assistance since its independence (Heintz, Oya, and Zepeda 2008; Kea 2010). Figure 7.1 shows the increase in net official development assistance and aid over time, including a dip in aid during the period immediately following the coup.
Gambia’s dependence on foreign aid has limited the pathways of the government and the country. The stipulations attached to the HIPC and other IMF/World Bank programs effectively constrained development strategies to those previously deemed appropriate (Heintz et al. 2008).

**Figure 7.1.** Gambia Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (Millions in USD).

A Peripheral Position in a Globalized World?

Within Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth SSA) there have been over two decades of various structural adjustment programs (SAPs) aimed at stimulating economic shifts within countries in order to enable global integration. Despite the stated intentions however, SSA continued to experience high rates of poverty and a minimal trade and exchange relationship with the global economy (Truong 2006). Instead, SAPs perpetuated policies focused on extractive economies, ignored social needs while constraining the role of the state, and lacked the breadth needed to attend to complex internal dynamics of each country (Mengisteab 1996). The policies and programs of international financial institutions led governments to implement changes that have not necessarily resulted in increased growth or productivity, but instead have entered the global economy in a “mode of dependence” (Kea 2010; Ninsin 2012).
In West Africa, member countries of ECOWAS remain at the bottom of human development indicators (Sawadogo 2012). In Gambia specifically, the small economy remains undiversified with high unemployment and poverty (Saine 2012). The country depends heavily on imports to meet needs and relies on external financial assistance to make up the vast majority of the government’s budget (Saine 2012). Ultimately, Gambia’s increasing globalization has not resulted in the diversified and strong economy promised by the multitude of structural adjustment programs. Figure 7.2 demonstrates that Gambia’s scores on globalization remained low, only recently scoring above 50 on an index of globalization ranging from 0 to 100.

**Figure 7.2.** Gambia’s Globalization Scores, 1970-2015.

Globalization created a wide gap of global inequalities between countries, and even within countries there is a widening gap between poor and rich communities (Chuang 2006). Inequalities in power structured how African countries entered the global economic market and the flows that occurred between countries (Harrison 2010). That is, African countries tended to retain a peripheral position in regard to their influence in a globalized world, while conversely, they were often impacted substantially by shifts at the international level (Harrison 2010).
Corruptible Stability

SSA faces high and endemic levels of corruption, where government leaders often used their positions of power to enrich themselves at the expense of their citizens (Shelley 2010). Globalization and the associated power inequities enabled criminal networks operating through corruption that ultimately undermines the state (Sawadogo 2012). In Gambia this included government officials implicated in drug and arms dealing associated with an increased presence of South American cartels in the region (Saine 2012). Furthermore, studies have shown that foreign aid and development assistance often came with a perilous price. A study of 53 African countries, Gambia included, from 1996-2010 showed that such funds negatively impacted institutional quality, including rule of law, government regulations and effectiveness, democracy and political stability, and corruption and accountability (Asongu 2013).

In Gambia, the 1994 coup led by Jammeh was predicated on military intervention being necessary to clean up corruption within the current government (Saine 2003). Indeed, Jawara’s time as President involved corrupt practices, including a political system full of patronage, nepotism, and cronyism (Kandeh 1996; Kea 2010; Saine 2009). Ironically, Jammeh and the AFPRC did not transform these practices, but again used positions of power for self-enrichment (Kea 2010; Saine 2012). This broadly included steps that corrupted democratic processes such as voting, disregarding the rule of law, and steadily eroding human rights (Wright 2015). Freedom of the media and press in particular declined under Jammeh. Journalists, critics, and activists disappeared, were killed, or were imprisoned (Johnson 2017). Toward the end of his time as the President of Gambia, Jammeh was noted to be among the richest people in the country and one of the richest heads of state in West Africa (Saine 2009). Meanwhile, Gambia’s scores on the
Corruption Perceptions Index ranged between a low of 1.9 and a high of 3.5 with a mean of 2.8 between 2003 and 2017 (Corruption Perceptions Index 2018).

Corruption, particularly corruption concentrated within the government, impacted political stability. When corruption and economic reforms deepen inequality and power differences, the legitimacy of the government is eroded (Saine 2012). The political reforms associated with structural adjustment programs are often lacking. In Gambia, this deepened political factionalism and wore down government legitimacy (Saine 2012). From the attempted coup of 1981 to the authoritarian rule of Jammeh, and most recently Jammeh’s refusal to step down as President, Gambia has experienced political and economic instability stemming from the reforms associated with globalization. Saine (2009:57-8) concluded:

Ultimately, The Gambia’s security and human rights deficits together with a poor governance framework plunged the economy into a crisis of unprecedented proportions. The deepening economic crisis in The Gambia intensified by policies of structural adjustment, the impacts of globalization and poor leadership, have rendered the state apparatus less able to fulfill its ‘security’ obligations. The immediate effect has been a sharp descent into social and economic ‘insecurity’ as well as the violation of civil and political rights of citizens.

This is demonstrated by Gambia’s scores on the Fragile States Index which has increased 18% from 2006 to 2018, from a score of 74.0 to 87.1. The Fragile States Index scores countries from 1-10 on 12 indicators for a total possible score of 120. Lower scores indicate improved relative stability over time (Fragile States Index 2018).

When Gambia’s scores on the 12 indicators are broken down, four specific indicators increased substantially, as shown in Figure 7.3. These four indicators all increased by over 30% in the time period between 2006 and 2018. The four indicators include: factionalized elite, which measures political power struggles and the credibility or perceived legitimacy of electoral processes; human flight, which considers the impacts of voluntary emigration and forced
displacement; human rights, which indicates abuse of legal, political, and social rights; and demographic pressures, which includes both population and environmental pressures on the state (Fragile States Index 2018).

Figure 7.3 Indicators of State Fragility in Gambia, 2006-2018.

In Gambia, turbulent electoral processes and eroding human rights act in conjunction with demographic pressures to push human flight, as will later be discussed. Together these conditions work to increase the vulnerability of the state to conflict or collapse.

*Impacts on Economic and Social Conditions*

The primary goal of economic reforms in SSA was to integrate countries into the global economy by stimulating economic growth through government spending, investments, balancing imports and exports, and generating a flow of foreign capital (Truong 2006). However, some questioned how successful reforms have been and whether or not they differentially harm the poor and vulnerable, with outcomes pointing to increasing income inequality (Mengisteab 1996). Under the economic reforms of the Jawara era, Gambia continued to remain among the poorest countries with low scores on human development indicators (Jabara 1994; Saine 2003). Gambia’s scores on the Human Development Index lag behind that of Sub-Saharan Africa as
demonstrated by Figure 7.4. This index is a composite of indicators for life expectancy, education, and income (Human Development Data 2018).

More recent reforms have shown modest improvements in economic growth, though this has not translated into employment opportunities, and poverty has increased (Sallah and Williams 2011). Beyond not reducing poverty, reductions have also not been made in regard to “hunger, malnutrition, maternal mortality, incidence of malaria and tuberculosis, and access to safe drinking water…[implying] that the so-called trickledown effects of growth have been delayed, and there is slow and uneven development in the Gambia” (Cham 2012:492). As Figure 7.5 indicates, Gambia’s scores on maternal mortality are significantly worse than both the larger region and the world average.
What growth Gambia has seen has largely benefited the urban elite (Sallah and Williams 2011). This is further indicated by income inequality, which has not improved substantially, and has remained stagnant for the past several years at a score of 0.3 out of 1 (Human Development Data 2018).

As part of the SAP in Gambia price reforms were introduced which increased prices on food, communications, water, and electric (Jabara 1994; Wright 2015). Health care service fees increased by 25-400% and cost recovery methods for health services were introduced (Jabara 1994). Earnings overall declined, public sector wages froze, and the government workforce was reduced by 24% (Jabara 1994). Public expenditures were sharply reduced, with social services, agriculture, and public works facing the steepest cuts (Jabara 1994). Overall the quality of life declined under these economic reforms, and as (Wright 2015:195) noted: “It was not a situation that bred stability.”

While expenditures on health care and education may have increased, these figures mask a reality faced by many Gambians (Wright 2015). Gambia lacked enough clinics to meet the needs of patients, while prenatal care remained minimal and is reflected in a high infant mortality.

**Figure 7.5.** Maternal Mortality Ratio, 1990-2015.
Additionally, the shift to a cost recovery system combined with high poverty has meant many people simply do not seek care (Wright 2015). Regarding education, Gambia retains a high drop-out rate along with significant gendered inequalities in regard to literacy and educational attainment (Jones and Chant 2009). The primary school dropout rate was at 25% for Gambia in 2015, with the males averaging 4.2 years of schooling compared to 2.6 years for females (Human Development Data 2018).

Examinations of structural adjustment programs indicate that they combine with existing structures of power and neoliberal policies to negatively harm women and children (Truong 2006). Specifically, economic reforms disproportionately harmed women, who often rely on social services, by cutting spending and resources put toward needed social services (Iyanda and Nwogwugwu 2016; Truong 2006; Turshen 1994). Women were hindered in their power to labor outside the home, obtain their own businesses, and move away from the reproductive tasks of the private sphere (Geisler and Hansen 1994; Iyanda and Nwogwugwu 2016). Gendered inequalities are exacerbated by SAPs that impacted access in the public sphere and burdens in the private sphere (Geisler and Hansen 1994; Lensink 1996). The gender inequality in Gambia, nonetheless, decreased somewhat, though it remained high when compared to the world and even the region of SSA (see Figure 7.6).
An example of profound gender inequality is found among female agricultural farmers, who often make up a considerable portion of the agricultural sector in the region. Due to gender-based inequalities however, female agricultural farmers are often unable to “build up sustainable enterprises” because they lack necessary resources (McFerson 2010; Truong 2006). In Gambia, patriarchal familial structures undercut efforts for women to access land because male heads of households were able to declare authority over plots (Gordon 1996). Communal rice plots also took the place of what were centrally women-owned crops once irrigation pumps were introduced (Blackden and Bhanu 1999). More recently, a gender gap in earnings persists in addition to the aforementioned educational gap, while women also tend to be concentrated in more precarious employment positions (Heintz et al. 2008). Between 1991 and 2017, the female to male ratio of unemployment remained virtually unchanged at 1.88 and 1.84 respectively (Human Development Data 2018).

A feminization of responsibility accompanied the feminization of poverty in Gambia. This entailed growing gender disparities around household labor and the ability to negotiate household obligations (Chant 2010). Research demonstrates an increase in Gambian women’s
financial responsibilities, including providing children’s clothes, food, and household furnishings (Kea 2010). Ultimately, since Gambia’s entrance into neoliberal economic reforms, the population has not seen an increasing standard of living, as poverty, unemployment, lack of quality health and educational access, and gender inequality remain prominent.

Migrating “the back way” and human trafficking

Early on, Gambia received high rates of migrants due to conflict in neighboring states (Kebbeh 2013). Since 1995 however, the country has been characterized by high out migration rates, as shown in Table 7.1. Between the period from 2006 and 2008, nearly 300 Gambian migrants were apprehended at sea near the Spanish border, while over 12,000 arrived by sea in Italy in the years 2014-2015 (Drammeh 2018; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012). Irregular migration movements toward Europe from Gambia increased, particularly among young people (Adepoju 2002; Drammeh 2018; Nyanzi 2010). Gambia ranks the highest among SSA countries for unaccompanied minors who migrate (Drammeh 2018). Migration to the West is seen as a route to a better life and increased employment opportunities (Drammeh 2018; van Nieuwenhuyze 2009; Nyanzi 2010).

Table 7.1. Net Migration Rate Per 1,000.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In addition to high rates of youth migration, Gambia experienced an increase in female migration and the emigration of highly skilled individuals (Adepoju 2003; Spadavecchia 2013). Gambia ranks in the top 10 SSA countries in emigration of highly skilled populations, with a emigration rate of 63% (Kebbeh 2013; Spadavecchia 2013). Much of this “brain circulation” takes place between the countries of Gambia, Ghana, and Nigeria (Adepoju 2003). As with
migration of youth, independent female migration is often used as a survival response to deepening poverty and inequality (Adepoju 2003). Overall, it is estimated that 4% of all Gambians now live outside the country (Kebbeh 2013; Perfect 2017).

Remittances from migrants are an important component of the Gambian economy (Saine 2009). Incoming remittances accounted for just over 10% of the country’s GDP in 2010 (Kebbeh 2013). Migration remittances as a percentage of GDP in Gambia have increased from 9.5% in 2000 to 21.23% in 2013, showing a substantial increase since 2010 (Human Development Data 2018). Remittances were used to supplement the incomes of families (Adepoju 2000; Saine 2012). Specially, remittances to Gambia were used by families to pay for basic necessities such as food, utilities, and school fees (Saine 2009).

Tightening border controls meant that migration shifted to more dangerous routes (Adepoju 2002; Drammeh 2018). The alternative routes to Europe were commonly referred to as “the back way” (Drammeh 2018). Gambian migrants may make use of the Niger route, which often involves trafficking (Drammeh 2018). Studies of youth migration from Gambia show that the process involved:

risking their lives in illegal trafficking scams, attempting long trips by sea either in pirogues or on the cargo decks of ships, being smuggled in the back of long-distance trucks, travelling by land for many months through various Sahelian countries, sex tourism with the promise of emigration, and cross-generational sex with much older tourists in exchange for visa and air ticket (Nyanzi 2010:210).

Migrating the back way today involves taking a multitude of risk entangled routes that can involve trafficking (Adepoju 2002).

Deteriorating socio-economic and socio-political conditions for Gambian citizens has intensified irregular migration. In response, many young people have been victimized through scams promising migration run by labor traffickers through fake agencies (Adepoju 2002).
Gambia acts primarily as a source country for human trafficking. While much irregular migration may simply be a case of smuggling, cases of Gambian women trafficked to Europe through similar routes have been reported (de Man and Bah 2013). In addition to trafficking that occurs through migratory patterns toward Europe, trafficking to wealthier SSA countries such as Nigeria and South Africa is also common (Shelley 2010). Within Gambia, trafficking for sexual exploitation also occurs, with child sex tourism becoming an increasingly visible issue (Fitzgibbon 2003; de Man and Bah 2013; Monzini 2005).

Figure 7.7 shows Gambia’s scores on the 3P Anti-Trafficking Index from 2002 to 2015. Countries are rated on a scale from 1 to 5 on three dimensions for a total possible score of 15. Gambia consistently scores the lowest on the protection dimension, averaging a score of 2.1. This indicates there is significant room for improvement in regard to laws, policies, and funding towards the protection of human trafficking victims. The mean score of 2.5 for prosecution indicates that the country either has no legislation specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons, or has legislation but does not enforce it adequately “in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment of such offenders” (Cho et al. 2014). The mean score for prevention is the highest at 2.9, although this still indicates there are only limited efforts being made. Gambia’s mean overall score is 7.4 out of 15.
The response to human trafficking has lacked the money and resources needed to enforce new legislation (Lawrance and Roberts 2012). Gambia passed human trafficking legislation in 2007 that does cover all forms of exploitation, and a National Agency Against Trafficking in persons (NAATIP) was created to enforce the legislation (TIP 2018). However, the agency has not been adequately funded, and few investigations and prosecutions have been undertaken (de Man and Bah 2013; TIP 2018). Moreover, corruption undermines what little state action is taken on the issue (Shelley 2010). Despite reports of government official’s involvement in human trafficking, no action has been taken (TIP 2018).

**Conclusion**

My theoretical framework integrated institutional anomie, historical structural perspectives on migration, and critical global feminist theory to argue that policies put in place by international financial institutions contributed to conditions that impacted human trafficking. These factors were identified by the human trafficking literature and included economic and gender based inequality, corruption and conflict, and migration patterns. Historical analysis of Gambia supports the theory, with high economic dominance, not high globalization, high income...
inequality, high gender inequality, high corruption and high state fragility representing a pathway for human trafficking.

Neoliberal economic reforms were intended to stabilize Gambia’s economy for entrance into the global market. Instead, Gambia lacked high globalization and experienced increasing political, social, and economic instability. The presence of economic dominance and worsening inequality acted as push factors for migration. Together with corruption, this has placed many young people, in particular, at risk for human trafficking. A combination of social historical, political, and economic factors coalesce in Gambia to influence trafficking. The factors included the emergence of economic dominance, deepening income and gender inequality, and corruption. Alongside political shifts, such factors created a nation with high fragility. Together, these conditions represent an environment in which a pathway to human trafficking emerged.
CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter concludes by bringing together the results of the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) and historical analyses in connection with the theoretical framework. First, I present a summary of the findings. This includes findings at the comparative level, as well as the within-case level. From here, I discuss the limitations of this study from both a methodological and substantive viewpoint. I detail the academic and policy implications of this study. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of avenues for future research.

Summary of Findings

At the beginning of this manuscript, I highlighted gaps in the human trafficking literature. This included a fragmented and underdeveloped body of theory, a lack of knowledge about how conditions of human trafficking combine in unique ways, and a lack of knowledge about geographic variation in human trafficking. To better understand the context of human trafficking, I created an integrated theoretical framework drawing from sociology and criminology in order to examine the social, economic, and political factors that link the local to the global. These factors were identified by the human trafficking literature: globalization, economic and gender inequality, corruption, conflict, and migration. Once operationalized, these factors were abbreviated, as indicated by Table 8.1.

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6 When capitalized, the abbreviation indicates an identified core condition (e.g., ED) and when lowercase, an identified contributing condition (e.g., ii). Note that the Boolean operator (*) denotes and, while (~) denotes not, or signifies the condition is absent.
Table 8.1. Abbreviated Condition Names.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>High Economic Dominance</td>
<td>ED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Globalization</td>
<td>GZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income Inequality</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Gender Inequality</td>
<td>GE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Corruption</td>
<td>CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Social Expenditure</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Fragile State</td>
<td>FS</td>
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The integrated theories included institutional anomie theory, migration perspectives, and critical global feminism. Together these theories draw attention to the ways that historical processes of development and social change at a macro-level have impacted countries globalization and the dominance of the economy. These shifts have resulted in deepening inequalities and increasing rates of migration that work to make individuals vulnerable to trafficking. This framework was then applied across the geographic regions of Southeast Asia, South America, and Sub-Saharan Africa through the use of set-theoretic multi-method research.

The fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis results detailed in Chapter 4 showcase four unique pathways to the initiation of human trafficking flows. The intermediate solutions for these four pathways are as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
& \text{GI*CP*SE*~FS} \\
& \sim\text{ED*GZ*II*GI*CP} \\
& \text{ED*GZ*II*GI*SE} \\
& \text{ED*~GZ*II*GI*CP*fs}
\end{align*}
\]

Overall, the solutions are largely consistent with the theoretical framework, with fsQCA allowing for the illumination of interesting combinations of conditions. The combination of gender inequality, corruption, low social expenditures, and absence of state fragility represents a unique combination (solution 1). Having both gender and income inequality alongside corruption appears important when countries have either globalization (solution 2) or economic dominance (solution 4). When both economic dominance and globalization are present together, income and
gender inequality remain important, though corruption is replaced by low social expenditures (solution 3). Importantly, these pathways shared substantial overlap with several of the seven pathways to high levels of out-migration. These results contribute to previous literature that found that trafficking and migration routes tend to overlap (Akee et al. 2010, 2014; Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010; Skeldon 2002). The solutions show why this might be—that the conditions that drive human trafficking origin flows are very similar to those that drive migration flows.

Specifically, this study was able to empirically demonstrate that the pathways that lead to high human trafficking and high out-migration have shared combinations of conditions. Three of the pathways to human trafficking were then examined through process tracing of a case study in order to better understand how these combinations of conditions emerged.

The case of Cambodia (solution 3) in Chapter 5 demonstrated how high economic dominance and high globalization work together. In this case, a plethora of IMF and World Bank neoliberal economic policies worked to shape the direction of Cambodia’s transition. Local governments and organizations were denied a role in this transition, and the ensuing policies resulted in a weakening of non-economic institutions and corresponding deepening of economic and gender inequality. These conditions represent an environment in which one pathway to human trafficking can emerge.

In Chapter 6 the case of Bolivia (solution 2) differed due to the country’s history of social protest against economic measures associated with the IMF and World Bank. This history contributed to the lack of economic dominance and relatively high social expenditures. Closer historical examination however, showed that the quality of social expenditures on services such as health, education, and employment have not worked to alleviate inequality. Instead, as globalization and an economy centered on neoliberal accommodation has persisted, economic
and gender inequalities have persisted. Furthermore, various Bolivian governments over time have not been successful in addressing corruption. Altogether, this situation has spurred migration and relatedly, human trafficking.

Finally, in Chapter 7 the case of The Gambia (solution 4) focused heavily on the role of state instability. Neoliberal economic reforms were intended to stabilize Gambia’s economy for entrance into the global market. Instead, Gambia lacked high globalization, and experienced increasing political, social, and economic instability. The presence of economic dominance and worsening inequality acted as push factors for migration. Together with corruption, this has placed many young people, in particular, at risk for human trafficking.

Altogether these cases have demonstrated the importance of considering how there may be more than one pathway through which human trafficking flows originate. Previous research on human trafficking emphasized the causes of trafficking (Cameron and Newman 2008; Chuang 2006; Farr 2004; Limoncelli 2009; Shelley 2010). A separate body of research noted the ways in which international financial institutions and the policies of economic globalization they impose onto nations result in harmful repercussions, often on nations’ social safety nets and stability (Chossudovsky 1997; Dijkstra 2010; Ranis, Vreeland, and Kosack 2006; Schultz 2008). My research connects these two literatures by demonstrating how policies put in place by international financial institutions in Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America contributed to combinations of conditions that increased migration, and concurrently, human trafficking.

Limitations

Data pose a problem in most studies on human trafficking, and this study is no exception. As a severely underreported crime, most cases of human trafficking remain unnamed and
unnoticed. Indeed, human trafficking data are not only scarce but available data are also problematic (Laczko and Gramegna 2003). It is common for country level data on trafficking to be rough estimates, often including data related to smuggling and irregular migration (Laczko and Gramegna 2003). Even with new data sources emerging from agencies across the world, no one agency acts as the focal agency responsible for collecting, cleaning, and publishing national or regional statistics on human trafficking (Laczko and Gramegna 2003). Therefore, there is no systematic global data source.

Further complicating this issue, combatting the crime of human trafficking is such a low priority that many countries do not strive to collect data on it. Laczko and Gramegna (2003:183) describe two factors leading to this low prioritization:

First, legislation is often lacking, inadequate, or not implemented, making the prosecution of traffickers very difficult and often impossible; second, trafficking convictions are often based on witness and/or victim testimony. Such testimony is hard to obtain as trafficking victims are either deported as illegal migrants or, if identified as trafficked persons, are often too frightened to testify. Inadequate legislation, for both prosecution and for victim and witness protection, means that the police authorities often prefer not to prosecute traffickers at all, with the knowledge that much effort only seldom results in a conviction.

In addition, there are limitations regarding the data selected for this study. Missing data on essential indicators caused the sample size to fall from 74 to 42 countries. Moreover, historical data for some of the indicators were unavailable. For example, the measure of globalization began in 1970 while the measure of economic dominance did not start until 1995 (Dreher 2006; Miller and Kim 2018). It would have been advantageous to have data for all selected variables from the time of the countries entrance into international financial programs and policies in order to trace their relationship more comprehensively over time. The outcome indicators of this study also prevented the distinction between internal versus transnational human trafficking, sex versus labor trafficking, and male versus female victims. This limitation
inhibits the ability to differentiate if there are unique combinations of conditions relevant to such distinctions.

In regard to the theoretical framework, a lack of data also prevents a complete test of migration systems theory. Specifically, the lack of complete data on international migration flows hinders fully testing migration systems theory (DeWaard, Kim, and Raymer 2012; Zlotnik 1992). A migration systems perspective links the macro to the micro by seeking to understand how networks of macro-level conditions and policies shape individual, micro-level migration decisions. Understanding these networks includes the legal and extra-legal institutions working at the macro-level as well as the networks of individuals operating at the micro-level. However, the focus of this research and the available data did not allow for multilevel models to fully understand the linkages between the micro- and macro-levels.

Finally, the regional focus of this study presents limitations as well. The focus of this study was on the geographic regions of Southeast Asia, South America, and Sub-Saharan Africa due to their importance in the human trafficking literature as source countries (Farr 2004; Malarek 2011; Outshoorn 2015; Truong 2003). This is primarily because this study was interested in explaining the origin of human trafficking flows. However, expanding the focus to include Western and industrialized nations often classified as destination countries would be beneficial for future studies.

**Academic Implications**

My integrated theoretical framework brings together sociological and criminological literature. This represents a step forward for a previously fragmented and undertheorized body of literature within the human trafficking field. It moves beyond focusing on human trafficking as a singular issue of crime, migration, or gender inequality, for example. Instead, the issue of human
trafficking can now be contextualized within larger geospatial issues. This includes being able to examine how the conditions that drive trafficking are functions of larger socio-economic and socio-political forces that extend from the local to the global.

For example, human trafficking scholars have noted the “need to foreground the connections between different forms of exploitation within the broader context of migratory conditions and labour relations” (Lee 2011:151). Critical global feminist theory and institutional anomie ground the framework by identifying the conditions of exploitation, including inequality, corruption, conflict, and a lack of social safety nets. At the same time, institutional anomie and migration theory are able to position these conditions in relation to larger shifts connected to development, globalization, and economic dominance. This includes and understanding of the importance of the linkages between human trafficking, migration, and the “tensions, discontents and violence of globalization” (Lee 2011:151). This is not only an important addition to the literature, but allows for studies of human trafficking to better identify the root causes of human trafficking, therefore allowing for potentially more effective solutions.

Furthermore, previous literature on human trafficking has been noted as lacking comparative analyses by region (Shelley 2010). This is problematic because it has meant that the literature has largely assumed that the conditions that drive human trafficking are the same across the world. The use of set-theoretic multi-method research in this study allowed for examination of cross-regional differences and similarities. This is useful because it allows for the identification of combinations of conditions, which may be unique to specific geographic locales. Specifically, QCA focused on the comparative level, while process tracing gave detail at the within-case level. The four pathways of human trafficking identified by the QCA demonstrated
that countries from all three regions could fall into the same pathway. Only one solution represented countries from only one region.

The use of set-theoretic multi-method research also represents a step forward for criminological research. QCA represents a way to bridge the quantitative-qualitative divide while also emphasizing complex causal processes. In particular, the focus on set relations and combinations of conditions contrasts with the emphasis on correlations and net effects that dominates conventional quantitative techniques. The ability to identify how combinations relevant to human trafficking combine in complex ways, and how there may be several pathways to the outcome, was something previously missing from the literature. While QCA was joined with the qualitative technique of process analysis for this study, it may also be used in conjunction with more traditional regression analysis, allowing for large N statistical analysis. Such applications could prove advantageous beyond the realm of human trafficking, extending to testing the application of theory in other areas of criminology.

**Policy Implications**

Human trafficking is a global issue, but enforcement is generally a domestic initiative, subject to various local policies and national laws. It is difficult to combat trafficking at the international level due to the fact that countries approach the problem differently and organizational efforts remain uncoordinated across borders (Monzini 2005). The primary response to human trafficking has proceeded from a law-and-order, crime and justice approach (Chuang 2006; Lee 2011). A moralized agenda of human trafficking has focused on criminal justice response, including immigration control measures (Lee 2011). This approach however, has led to several issues in the response to human trafficking. One such issue is the deportation of victims of human trafficking to their country of origin (Monzini 2005; Samarasinghe 2008).
Such actions not only further harm victims, but also demonstrate a flawed understanding of the reality of migration flows (Samarasinghe 2008).

To combat the fact that trafficked individuals often face prosecution for prostitution or for lacking proper identification papers, the United Nations formed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children in 2000. The protocol asks states to adopt practices “including assistance with identification and travel documents, the granting of special residency status, and protection for victims who are willing to testify against their traffickers” (Farr 2004:224). Though they may have varying stipulations, countries such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States have implemented services that provide things such as temporary residences or special visas (Farr 2004). These services are a much-needed step in the direction of helping victims of trafficking instead of simply deporting them to be re-victimized.

Another issue facing human trafficking responses is the lack of research and resources directed at evaluating and enforcing good practices (Mishra 2015; Samarasinghe 2008). Issues cited include a lack of prioritization, training, and cross-agency coordination (Mishra 2015). While many countries have ratified international protocols on human trafficking, at a national level, they may lag behind on legislation and strategies to address the issue (Shelley 2010). Moreover, many anti-trafficking initiatives have not been monitored and evaluated (Samarasinghe 2008). Without such research, many human trafficking policies have been built on stereotypes, rhetoric, and ideology (Mishra 2015).

In addition to the need for more basic research on the response to human trafficking, however, this study demonstrates the need for shifting focus to the root drivers of human trafficking. A shift from viewing the issue as purely an issue of criminal justice to a social issue...
is necessary (Lee 2011). This includes addressing the systemic issues such as the ones identified in this study, including socio-economic inequality, corruption, and conflict. A focus on local issues also becomes important, including the reality of global migration flows (Samarasinghe 2008). Ultimately, and as this research shows, there is no singular solution to human trafficking that can be easily applied across all regions (Shelley 2010). Instead, it becomes important to address the social, cultural, and economic causes that underlie the human trafficking.

**Directions for Future Research**

Based on this study, there are several directions for future research. First, it is important that researchers continue pushing for the gathering of and access to country level statistics on the numbers of trafficking victims. Such information is important for pushing the human trafficking literature forward and being able to make distinctions between various issues among trafficking. This includes comparisons between internal and transnational trafficking, sex and labor trafficking, and male versus female victims of trafficking. Additionally, it is crucial that statistics of trafficking are recorded independent from similar crimes, such as smuggling or irregular migration.

A cross-disciplinary explanation such as the theoretical framework developed here allows researchers to examine the relationships between trafficking and the processes that facilitate or hinder it. While the focus here was on the impact of international financial policies and programs, future research could make use of the framework to explore the impacts of globalization and economic dominance within a singular country, such as the United States. The framework also allows for multilevel research that can tease out the relationships between macro- and micro-level factors. Future research could thus understand how the macro-level consequences of globalization explored in this study impact individual level constraints and
choices. Furthermore, the research generated from such a framework can better inform the many human trafficking policies and programs, which are in need of factual driven strategies.

Finally, the use of QCA can be used to explore combinations of conditions relevant to human trafficking across a variety of issues. For example, QCA could be used to determine pathways to labor trafficking among migrant farmworkers, urban and rural differences, or vulnerabilities for commercial sexual exploitation. It is important to also note that the logic of QCA states that the conditions that lead to a given outcome are not necessarily the same that lead to not seeing, or an absence of, that outcome. So for example, not having high income inequality does not necessarily lead to not having high human trafficking. Thus, future research can model for conditions that lead to nations having strong and effective anti-trafficking efforts, in order to tease out what factors in what combinations have been important to those developments. Again these results can be used to help better inform policy by working with agencies to study and inform where and what resources could best be focused on to improve anti-trafficking efforts.


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Merton, Robert King. 1968. *Social Theory and Social Structure.*


APPENDIX
## Appendix A

### Table 1. Countries by UN Geoscheme Region Classification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Southeast Asia</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
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<td>Argentina</td>
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Table 2. Alternative Calibrations for Outcome of High Number of Identified Victims.

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<th>Indicator Name</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Calibration (Fuzzified Score)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Low Economic Dominance</td>
<td>Economic Freedom Index, Heritage Foundation</td>
<td>65=.05, 55=.5, 45=.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Globalization</td>
<td>KOF Index of Globalization, Axel Dreher at ETH Zurich</td>
<td>65=.05, 54=.5, 45=.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Economic Inequality</td>
<td>Inequality-Adjusted Income Index, United Nations</td>
<td>.305=.05, .45=.5, .55=.95</td>
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<td>Low Gender Inequality</td>
<td>Gender Inequality Index, United Nations Nations</td>
<td>.6=.05, .45=.5, .35=.95</td>
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<td>Low Corruption</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency...</td>
<td>25.5=.05, 34.5=.5, 50=.95</td>
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<td>High Social Expenditures</td>
<td>Public Health Expenditures as % GDP, United Nations</td>
<td>1.99=.05, 3.4=.5, 4.9=.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low State Fragility</td>
<td>Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace</td>
<td>90=.05, 80=.5, 60=.95</td>
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