

ABSTRACT

JOHN, ELISE MICHÈLE-ANGE LAURA. Navigating Nationalist Waters: The Central Tensions Surrounding Education in Egypt from 1882 to 1952. (Under the direction of Dr. Akram Khater).

The social and cultural revolution that transformed Egypt at the turn of the twentieth century centered around the topic of education. This thesis will add to the existing literature on this topic by dialectically placing the ruling elite and civic groups in conversation together as they struggled over the disciplining/liberating tensions surrounding education. Education became a political platform from which the different voices played out. Lord Cromer, as consul-general of Egypt from 1882 to 1907, used education as a means to discipline the Egyptian population in order to maintain stability, which was critical to colonial rule. Similarly, Christian missionaries and the *ulama* at Al-Azhar University used disciplining tactics as well, but with a different intent. Meanwhile, the intelligentsia, civic groups and certain nationalists actively resisted the attempts of the governing elite to enforce educational disciplinary control.

Indeed, Lord Cromer believed education unnecessary for the lower-classes or for Egyptian women. The British did not want the *fellahin* causing problems for the colonial administration or women causing social unrest by entering the public sphere. Accordingly, Lord Cromer made education inaccessible for the average Egyptian and blocked educational reforms for women. Conversely, elite Egyptian nationalists believed the *fellahin* and women should have access to a limited education, yet not to the extent that it would disrupt the Egyptian economy or the Egyptian family. As such, there was some overlap with how the British and Egyptian nationalists viewed education.

With the use of memoirs, press articles, private correspondence, public speeches, pamphlets and a host of secondary works, this thesis explores and illustrates how the state and

civic society struggled over education. Despite the elites restricting access to higher learning, both feminist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood worked within patriarchal societal norms and at times outside of them in an attempt to achieve agency and liberate both the self, and ultimately, the nation.

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Navigating Nationalist Waters: The Central Tensions Surrounding Education in Egypt from 1882
to 1952.

by
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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents who taught me that the pursuit of education is a life-long endeavor. I would also like to thank my sisters for their unending emotional support. Finally, to my husband Nick who encouraged me to return to school to pursue my Master's degree and who has encouraged me and cheered me on every step of the way.

BIOGRAPHY

Elise John was born and raised in Canada. During her childhood she lived in Madrid and Granada, Spain where she fell in love with travelling and Moorish architecture. After high school, Elise studied to be a culinary chef in Montreal, Quebec and then spent a season working at Castello Vicchiomaggio in Tuscany, Italy. During this experience, she realized that she missed school and chose to return to her studies. She graduated from Concordia University in Montreal, with a Bachelor of Arts, Major in History and Minor in Political Science, in 2010. At that point, Elise decided to travel and spent a number of years teaching English in Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia. In August 2016, she joined the graduate program in history at North Carolina State University.

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INTRODUCTION

Taha Husayn's (1889-1973) autobiography *Al-Ayam*, initially disseminated serially in the Cairene magazine *al-Hilal* in 1926, recounts the author's early life in an Upper Egyptian village as well as his impressions of university life as a young man in Cairo. Struck with ophthalmia and blinded at age two, Husayn's family reasoned that he could become a Quran reciter; as such, he was educated at the local *kuttab*, before attending *Al-Azhar*, followed by the Egyptian University. Deeply disappointed with *Al-Azhar*, Husayn bemoaned the stagnating teaching methods that included repetition and learning the Quran by rote that had been in place for centuries; abandoned were topics such as mathematics, history, geography and literature.¹ For Husayn, *Al-Azhar* was a necessary, albeit unhappy, step in his education.

Describing his experience at the Islamic institution, Husayn writes that, "... the boy had spent a whole year [at Al-Azhar] in acquiring practically nothing new in the way of learning [and that]... there was not a single thing in all that he heard said to give him a good opinion of either lecturers or students."² *Al-Azhar* with its outdated pedagogy, in an age where change and reform—or liberalism—were the topics *du jour*, seemed anachronistic to the young Husayn. Shortly thereafter, he transferred to the Egyptian University where he reveled in the courses and opportunities offered. Husayn's experience dealing with the antedated pedagogical practices at *Al-Azhar* and his transfer to the modern and dynamic new Egyptian University exemplifies one of the major debates occurring in Egypt during this time period: that of social order versus liberation. In other words, the central tension surrounding education, that involved on the one hand, its use as a disciplinary method of social control and, on the other, its ability to allow for

¹ Hillary Wayment, introduction to *The Stream of Days: A Student at the Azhar*, by Taha Hussein, trans. Hillary Wayment (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1939), vi

² Taha Husayn. *The Stream of Days: A Student at the Azhar*, trans. Hillary Wayment (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1948), 102, 95

greater agency made for a contentious struggle within society. This debate further involved the idea of nation, of the role of women within society, of religion versus secularism, and of national identity.

These debates were elements of the social and cultural revolution that was reshaping Egypt at the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, the transnational flows of information caused in part by the British invasion of 1882, led to dialectics involving nationalist sentiments coupled with an intellectual movement desiring social and educational reforms, which increasingly took place in newspapers, magazines and dailies. Many of the debates published in the media related to liberalism and its intimate connection to education. Moreover, intricately linked to the advancement of education was modernity and the potentiality of liberation of both nation and self. Modernity was a loaded word for Egyptians that had vastly different meanings for different segments of society. Egyptian nationalists understood that modernizing was necessary in order to regain their independence from the British and thus the emphasis on education. Yet, and as mentioned above, education could both discipline and/or liberate depending on who was in charge.

Education, for Lord Cromer, could possibly cause a revolution. For Egyptian nationalists it could lead to independence. For Christian missionaries, who opened numerous schools across the breadth of Egypt, education would allow Muslims to study the Bible and then Muslims could be “saved” through conversion.³ For the conservative *ulama* at *Al-Azhar*, who held the preeminent position of society’s moral guardians and educators, education should remain as is and therefore the status quo would be upheld. In other words, with the secularizing of education, the *ulama* would lose their societal status. Indeed, religion “... justified and legitimized the rule

³ Heather J. Sharkey. *American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in the Age of Empire*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 36

of the dominant by consecrating and sanctifying social divisions.”⁴ For their part, feminists believed that a new, modern nation needed educated wives and mothers, and for some, women moreover, needed to fully take part within the public sphere. Finally, for organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (or *Ikhwan*), education would likewise save the nation, yet only if Egyptians were reeducated in the ways of Islam.

Thus, the tensions surrounding education affected all levels of society. To illustrate, for the British, a two-tiered education system was critical to keeping inequality in place in order to stabilize colonial rule. Lord Cromer (1841-1917), who was consul-general of Egypt from 1882 to 1907, wanted a small cadre of bureaucrats who could help run the daily affairs of government, under British tutelage of course. Furthermore, he also wanted to ensure that no Egyptian attained a level of education that made him unfit for the fields or ripe for revolution. By making higher education too expensive for the average Egyptian, Lord Cromer all but guaranteed that his policies be followed.⁵ Besides, with just three state secondary schools, Egypt had fewer than one hundred graduates per year. During Lord Cromer’s tenure illiteracy remained at ninety-nine percent for women and ninety-one percent for men.⁶ In Foucault’s words, the most concentrated disciplinary forms constructed by society were the “cloister, prison, school, regiment.”⁷ Lord Cromer’s educational policies perfectly embodied an aspect of this theory by ensuring strict social control. Indeed, the *fellahin* received nothing more than a basic Islamic education that kept them rooted in their geographic and societal place.

⁴ Jyoti Dalal. “Pierre Bourdieu: The Sociologist of Education.” *Contemporary Education Dialogue*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2016): 232

⁵ John Marlowe. *Cromer in Egypt*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 290

⁶ *Ibid.*, Cromer’s system of ideas rooted in a laissez-faire policy aspired to keep taxes low; focused almost exclusively on state projects that would increase the country’s revenues; and left all social endeavors including an education system solely in need of funds, medical clinics and help for the poor to private organizations. The results were catastrophic with most cities and towns having little to no irrigation systems and epidemic diseases running rampant.

⁷ Michel Foucault. *Discipline and Punish*, (New York: Vintage and Random House, 1979), 293

Conversely, in the first decades of the twentieth century, Egyptian nationalists endorsed limited educational reform for women and peasants. They understood that in order for Egypt to evolve into a modern nation, women required an education that would then allow them to raise good citizens of tomorrow. Therefore, opening schools in order to allow women to study was central to modernizing the nation—or in other words—educated mothers raised educated sons and for many, Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908) included, women’s education benefitted both the household and the nation.⁸ However, educating women was to improve their skills as mothers and wives, and *not* so they could take their place next to men in the public sphere. Thus, nationalists such as Kamil and Sa’ad Zaghloul (1859-1927), were ready to reimagine Egyptian culture and educate women, but only enough to benefit the nation and not to upend the status quo or allow women a place (or space) to participate in publicly. Likewise, limited education for the peasants—or *fellahin*—was also acceptable, but for the time being, Egyptian peasants could best serve the nation by doing their jobs, and they did not need access to higher education in order to do this. As such, nationalists such as Kamil and Zaghloul felt that independence must come first and this meant taking care of Egypt’s financial obligations. In this way, there was some overlap between the Egyptian elites and the British, but for different reasons. Different visions of education were thus central to the social vision held by different groups within society.

For Egyptian nationalists, feminists and the Muslim Brotherhood alike, education would uplift and save the nation, but only if Egyptians were educated a certain way, and therein lay the crux of the problem. For instance, would educated women leave the home to work and disrupt the family unit and moreover, society? Furthermore, would the *fellahin*, if educated, flock to cities and cause unrest? This thesis seeks to explore the tensions embodied by the educational

⁸ Qasim Amin. *The Liberation of Women and The New Woman: Two Documents in the History of Egyptian Feminis*, (Cairo: American University, 2000), 62-63

debate. Different segments of Egyptian society advocated and deployed education as a means to achieve national and social progress in tandem all while under imperialist control. In exploring the conflicting aspects of education that could engender agency, liberate both the nation and self, yet simultaneously discipline, these groups fought to advance their specific mandates.

Education and the National Community: Theoretical Perspectives

Education was also crucial in strengthening the bonds of the community, and in shaping a national identity. Sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) argued, “It is society as a whole and each particular social milieu that determine the ideal that education realizes. Society can survive only if there exists amongst its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential similarities that collective life demands.”⁹ Additionally, for functional theorists, educational institutions both conserve culture while simultaneously altering it. In the words of Hobsbawm and Ranger, “... state education, transform[s] people into citizens of a specific country: ‘peasants into Frenchmen.’”¹⁰ Traditions—invented or otherwise—a shared heritage and a common language are all aspects of schooling that conserve culture, engender social cohesion and create citizens.

Yet conserving Egyptian culture as Al-Azharites aspired to do, was an oppressive/disciplinary type of pedagogy as it required nothing from students apart from their learning and memorizing by rote. Conversely, education could also allow for change and growth, as the new Egyptian University did with its student missions to Europe. Therefore, education

⁹ Emile Durkheim. *Education and Sociology*, (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1956), 70

¹⁰ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 264

could alter a student's understanding of society and of the world around them, which could create both a positive or negative outcome. American author John Dewey (1859-1952) posited that antediluvian educational methods—as exemplified by Al-Azhar University—led to stagnation. While effective education could engender personal growth and moreover allow students to, “1) express themselves individually; 2) act freely; 3) learn through experience...”¹¹ But, if education could liberate students, it could also destabilize the status quo.

Functional theorists further argue that schools meritocratically sort students and prepare them for their future role in society, which conflict theorists disagree with as they surmise that education reaffirms and maintains inequality within society. Indeed, conflict theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) believe that hegemonic pedagogical practices reinforce societal class structures. In other words, “The school is not a culturally neutral zone, as it embodies the culture of the dominant group, endorsing it as legitimate and naturally given.”¹² Central to this theory is power and the maintenance of said power within society. Therefore, it is in the interest of those holding power to control the educational system in order to maintain social stratification. In this way, the function of education meets the demands of the societal elite rather than society as a whole.¹³

Furthermore, Michel Foucault argues that educational settings inculcate students with disciplinary measures that are internalized. Foucault posits that student examinations, rooted in the transfer of knowledge, prepare “the body,” for its future in society. In other words, the disciplinary power, “... is exercised through its invisibility,” and creates the object—or the recreated student—who can then uphold the laws, rules and regulations of society because they

¹¹ Gabriela Pohoata and Mihaela Mocanu. “Aspects of the Philosophy in John Dewey’s View.” *Euromentor Journal*, vol. 6, no. 4 (2015): 15

¹² Dalal, 237

¹³ Ibid.

have been internalized.¹⁴ This is one method through which education disciplines. However, disciplinary power can also be enforced by keeping students segregated.¹⁵ This was apparent in Egypt where the fear of mixing socioeconomic classes kept parents from sending their daughters to school, lest they meet the wrong kind of people. Moreover, it was also exercised by Lord Cromer who kept large segments of the population from attaining an education in order to prevent ideas of liberation from spreading and possibly causing social unrest.

In fact, from Muhammad Ali's epoch onwards, the classroom became a space where young Egyptians were taught "a curricula that reflected the goals and ideals of the government."¹⁶ However, one result of the Egyptian educational system and curricula was that it became a vehicle from which to impart nationalist rhetoric. For example, there are a number of key components that encompass nationalism that most theorists agree upon. These may (or may not) include a shared cultural affinity based on tradition, a similar ethnicity, a consonant religion, a finite territorial state, and an analogous history and language that unite the populace. Yet these are merely the broad strokes of nationalism, and there are other crucial aspects that are necessary for nationalism to flourish. Preeminent is a method to disseminate the nationalist rhetoric, and the media plays a germinal role in the spread of these novel ideas.¹⁷ Finally, education then imbues the populace with the chosen nationalist rhetoric. But the question we must ask, is *whose* nationalist rhetoric?

¹⁴ Foucault, 184-187

¹⁵ Michel Foucault 1971. "J.K. Smith: A Conversation with Michel Foucault." *Partisan Review*, 38: 193-94

¹⁶ Lisa Pollard. *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing and Liberating Egypt, 1805-1923*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, Ltd, 2005), 100

¹⁷ Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities*, (Brooklyn: Verso, 1983), 44, 45

Thesis Structure

In analyzing the intersection between education, nationalism, and imperialism in Egypt from 1882 to 1952, this thesis seeks to contribute to the existing literature on this topic by theoretically framing it from both a disciplining/liberating perspective. In other words, the first section of my paper analyzes how the dominant elite enforced a disciplinary educational mandate in order to achieve their agendas. The latter two sections of my paper frame the nexus between education, nationalism and imperialism from a subaltern position that explores how agency and liberation could be achieved through education. In chapter one, I examine a range of primary sources including Lord Cromer's private correspondence written to Lord Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916) in 1912 alongside Lord Cromer's autobiography, published in 1908. Additionally, I accessed the Parisian newspaper *Le Temps*, which published a number of articles on Mustafa Kamil's mandate. This was juxtaposed with Kamil's speech, given at the Zizinia Theatre in Alexandria in 1907, which highlighted his educational goals for Egypt. Inter alia, Kamil also authored a treatise in 1899 about the English crisis and the importance of Egyptian independence. Finally, Taha Hussein's *Stream of Days* summarizes his educational experiences at both Al-Azhar and the new Egyptian University.

Besides these primary sources, secondary works include historical texts beginning with Donald Malcolm Reid (1990), who, in the first section of his book, demonstrates how an Egyptian hegemonic elite used higher education to maintain the existing social order. Reid does this by exploring a number of themes including the connection between Western imperialism and the rise of Egyptian nationalism(s) alongside the creation of the new Egyptian University in 1908. Additionally, Reid explores "university autonomy versus state control," elitism versus classlessness, and finally secularism versus religiosity. It is the first part of Reid's work that is of

interest for this paper. Reid expertly shows the competing discourses revolving around the opening of the university and the struggle between the state and civil society. Indeed, Lord Cromer, in his quest to keep the university from opening clearly evinced his desire to keep middle-class Egyptian from gaining an education, thus maintaining a rigidly structured class system. The British knew first-hand, from their experience governing India, the dangers of education thus the reason why Lord Cromer stymied the opening of the Egyptian University. Moreover, Nadav Safran in *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952*, argues that the struggle occurring within Egyptian society lay in how the political elite attempted to dismantle the tightly wrought hold Islam had on society in order to evolve into a modern polity. Safran analyses this struggle by extrapolating on political parties, the British, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although Mona L. Russell (2001) argues that the imperialist agenda often overlapped with that of the indigenous nationalists, allowing for the preservation of a bifurcated educational system, this was not always the case as this section of my paper will attempt to prove. For example, Mustafa Kamil supported educating women, yet he also countenanced both seclusion and veiling.¹⁸ Finally, Hoda A. Yousef (2013), explores the consequence of European influence on the evolution of the Egyptian education system both before and during British colonialism. Furthermore, she posits that the Egyptian belief that education could be a panacea for all of society's ills was undoubtedly one of the more significant legacies of European education. Indeed, Yousef goes on to state that the juxtaposition between a modern, secular, European style education and an Egyptian religious one is by its very nature problematic. This duality fails to take into account how educators across the spectrum (in mission, public and private schools)

¹⁸ Juan Ricardo Cole. "Feminism, Class and Islam in Turn-of-the-Century Egypt." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 13, no.4 (1981): 391

attempted to incorporate and blend aspects of both liberal and indigenous teaching methods.¹⁹ In using the above mentioned sources, I analyze the state and civil society from disciplinary framework exploring how the British and the indigenous elite, who governed Egyptian society, used education to serve their own ends, which in turn maintained social inequality.

In the second part of my thesis, I approach the nexus between education, nationalism and imperialism, in the first part of the twentieth century, from a gendered/feminist perspective. I analyze a number of primary sources including Huda Sha'rawi's (1879-1947) memoirs. In her memoirs, Sha'rawi recounts her early life, her marriage as well as some of her feminist endeavors including how she organized the first university lectures for women. Additionally, a lecture given at the Umma Club in 1909 by Bahithat al-Badiya (1886-1918) discusses her educational agenda. Later feminist Doria Shafik's (1908-1975) dissertation from la Sorbonne, published in 1940, explores the lives of women at the turn of the twentieth century and the needed changes in order to evolve as a successful, modern polity. Secondary works include a monograph by Margot Badran (1995), who asserts that Egyptian feminists challenged the patriarchal order and advanced the nationalist cause all whilst remaining within the boundaries of Islam. Moreover, Badran argues that feminists were central to the political and cultural changes that occurred in Egypt.

Likewise, Beth Baron (1994), who centers her work on the evolution of the women's press, focuses (like Badran) on the notion that women were active agents who promoted their own agendas (including the importance of girls education to the nation) despite the limits imposed upon them by both imperialists and indigenous sources. These works provide the basis of my argument. However, I shift the perspective and argue that while Egyptian feminists used

¹⁹ Hoda A. Yousef. "Seeking the Educational Cure: Egypt and European Education 1805-1920s" *European Education*, vol. 44, no. 4 (2012-2013): 52

nationalism as a vehicle to push their educational agenda, they actively resisted patriarchal forces that attempted to keep them bounded within certain normative limits. Furthermore, feminists propounded that while specific aspects of Egyptian culture must be conserved, only through changing—or altering—certain parts of it, such as educating girls and women, would Egypt truly be liberated as a nation.

The final section of my paper focuses on the lower-classes, education, and the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s. This chapter engages with primary sources including press articles, historical records as well as a series of pamphlets published over a dozen years by founder of the Brotherhood Hasan al-Banna. Additionally, secondary sources include Brynjar Lia's (1998) discourse which investigates how the Brotherhood grew so exponentially and moreover, how founder al-Banna used organizational tools, including that of training and education, in order to spread their message. Similarly, Vickie Langhor (2005), argues that the state-funded adult literacy classes, taught by Brotherhood members, alongside the relocating of *Ikhwan* teachers by the ministry of education throughout the nation helped propagate the spread of the Brotherhood's educational message. Finally, Andrea Mura (2015), suggests that founder al-Banna struggled with Pan-Islamism and nationalism, but eventually embraced a territorial understanding of nation. Indeed, Al-Banna's pamphlets elucidate the connection between education and nation. I use these arguments, but purport to take them one step further. I argue that the Brotherhood's educational agenda, that became territorially-bounded by the 1940s, attempted to dismantle the social stratification long-held in place by the British and the societal elites. Hasan al-Banna understood that in order to evolve into a successful, modern polity, reeducating Egyptians, with Islam as the core principle, was absolutely necessary. As such, al-

Banna saw education as creating agency and of being able to liberate the self and nation, yet only once Egyptians were firmly inculcated with Islamic teachings.

Methodologically, chapter one explores the position of the British and the Egyptian societal elite using a top-down, politically centered approach. The elite and the intelligentsia are generally credited with the first stirrings of nationalism. Czech historian and political theorist Miroslav Hroch argues that the intellectual aspect of nationalism (Phase A) by its very nature excludes the petty bourgeoisie. Hroch's Marxist perspective, based on class divisions, asserts that Phase A is responsible for framing the idea of nation, which is then disseminated and absorbed by the petty bourgeoisie, craft producers, and traders (Phase B) which is then transcended to Phase C and mass mobilization of the populace.²⁰ Despite the fact that Egypt had yet to undergo an industrial revolution by the beginning of the twentieth century, the framing of nation and the underlying connection to educational reform was, in the beginning, an elite affair before being absorbed by the middle classes. This was a result of many of the changes that took place during the nineteenth century.

For instance, throughout the nineteenth century, education became the means by which urban Egyptians found upward mobility.²¹ Specifically, the advent of educational opportunities created by Mohammed Ali's paternalistic state led to a new, *secular* elite class of civil servants, lawyers and teachers.²² Yet this was a very small elite class. The majority of Egyptians, the *fellahin* who made up ninety percent of the population, saw little change in their quotidian life. Only after the turn of the twentieth century would the middle classes and eventually lower

²⁰ Miroslav Hroch. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 137

²¹ Nadav Safran. *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 32

²² M. A. Faksh. "An Historical Survey of the Educational System in Egypt." *International Review of Education*, vol. 22, no. 2 (1976): 235

classes attain access to education. Consequently, education became a point of contention for different groups within society. This was especially true following Egypt's bankruptcy and Khedive Ismail's (1830-1895) deposition in 1879. In the aftermath of the British arrival in 1882, all funding for educational endeavors ended. Lord Cromer's sole objective was to restore Egypt's finances and educating the masses (or anyone deemed unnecessary for British purposes) was superfluous and possibly dangerous. In fact, Lord Cromer worried that educating the *fellahin* might cause them to leave the fields, discover revolutionary ideas and possibly overthrow the British regime! Something to be avoided at all costs.

Other groups were also unhappy with the secularizing direction of the Egyptian education system. This greatly worried the *ulama* at Al-Azhar University.²³ Historically, higher education involved the study of the Quran and this was how the *ulama* wanted things to remain. Furthermore, adding to an already contentious issue were Christian missionaries, who arrived in Egypt in the first part of the nineteenth century, with the ambitious goal of educating Egyptians in order to spread the gospel message and convert souls.²⁴ Finally, indigenous nationalists such as Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908), who received a secular education and embodied the rise of a new Egyptian middle class, vehemently opposed the British occupation and positioned themselves in support of an Egyptian nation. Kamil understood that in order to govern their own country, Egyptians needed an education. Yet, which Egyptians? And how much education? This was a struggle and a visceral issue that galvanized Egyptians across the spectrum. This chapter seeks to explore how these overlapping (and at times competing) interests brought about changes to the

²³ The *ulama* were renowned as experts in law and Islamic theology. The *ulama* was comprised of religious teachers, lawyers (*muftis*), judges (*qadis*), and shayks, or high governmental officials. The secularization wrought by Muhammad Ali culminated in leaving the domain of religion solely under the purview of Al-Azhar University with all else falling under secular education. This was a serious blow to the prestige of this bastion of Islamic learning who had long been amongst the most powerful within Islamic society.

²⁴ Pollard, 106

educational sphere from 1882 to Egyptian independence in 1922, and to provide a contextual analysis of the tensions felt between the state and civil society. The educational changes wrought by the British, the *ulama* at Al-Azhar, foreign missionaries and nationalists like Mustafa Kamil culminated with the genesis of a nationalist political community.

The second section of my paper explores how Egyptian feminists combatted political, social and cultural forces, in the first part of the twentieth century, that limited women's access to education and to the public arena. Feminists advanced women's rights primarily by using nationalism and the media as a vehicle to advance their educational agenda. As such, the trajectory of the woman's movement in Egypt was coterminous with the rise of Egyptian nationalism. Additionally, with the advent of the women's press in the 1880s, which created a platform where women could publicly voice their opinions on subjects most pertinent to them, women began demanding greater rights than those solely pertaining to becoming better mothers.²⁵ In other words, female reformers actively resisted the boundaries established by their male feminist counterparts. At any rate, these boundaries had more to do with the creation of the "new [Egyptian] man," rather than Qasim Amin's (1863-1908) "new woman."²⁶

Indeed, the notion that uplifting women through education would uplift the nation gained momentum following Amin's *The Liberation of Women* (1899) and *The New Woman* (1901). However, this also entailed maintaining social order, or keeping women in their place: the home. In analyzing how subjugated groups exercise agency, Pierre Bourdieu argues, "I do not see how relations of domination, whether material or symbolic, could possibly operate without implying,

²⁵ Margot Badran. *Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 15

²⁶ Mona L. Russell "Competing, Overlapping, and Contradictory Agendas: Egyptian Education Under British Occupation, 1882-1922." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, vol. 21, no. 1&2 (2001): 55

activating resistance... *The dominated, in any social universe, can always exert a certain force, inasmuch as belonging to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing effects in it.*²⁷ This was the case with Egyptian feminists. Initially, some chose to work within the system, helping their male counterparts achieve independence. The understanding was that with the achievement of independence, then the foci could turn to other matters, including the goals advanced by feminists such as educating girls and women from the middle classes. Yet with the achievement of (partial) independence in 1922, women realized that if they wanted to attain greater rights, they would need to do so independently, and they set out to do so achieving great success in the process.

While there were many issues that brought Muslim feminists together, key amongst them the topic of education, analyzing feminists in the first half of the twentieth century must be done as a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the many differences that separated women including their differing socio-economic backgrounds, familial authority and/or permissibility, the epoch within which they resided and finally, and most importantly, how they assumed agency cannot be overstated.²⁸ Using whatever means available to them, feminists including Bahithat al-Badiya (1886-1918), Huda Shar'awi (1879-1947), Nabawiyah Musa (1886-1951), Munira Thabit (1902-1967) and Doria Shafik (1908-1975) worked both within established patriarchal normative limits and at times outside of them. Author Saba Mahmood argues that, "If the ability to effect change

²⁷ P. Bourdieu and L.J.D. Wacquant. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 80. Cited in Dalal, "Pierre Bourdieu: The Sociologist of Education," p. 240

²⁸ For example, feminist reformer Bahithat al-Badiya lived in a vastly different Egypt the early nineteenth century than did Doria Shafik in the 1940s. To illustrate, finding books to read was an incredibly difficult endeavor for women in the early twentieth century; Huda Sha'rawi recalled secretly buying books from a traveling salesman who came to her front door and moreover, breaking into her father's bookcase in order to pilfer books to read. While the topic of educating women and having literate wives flooded the Egyptian press, accessing reading material was still extremely difficult with many books out of reach for literate middle and upper-class women. The Khedivial Library, founded in 1870 and now known as the Egyptian National Library, only allowed women entry somewhere between the late 1920s and early 1930s. (Beth Baron, "The Women's Press in Egypt," 223)

in the world and in oneself is historically and culturally specific (both in terms of what constitutes “change” and the means by which it is effected), then the meaning and sense of agency cannot be fixed in advance, but must emerge through an analysis of the particular concepts that enable specific modes of being, responsibility, and effectivity.”²⁹ In supporting Mahmood’s analysis of agency, and both how one resists and inhabits norms, this chapter argues that the aforementioned feminists navigated a male-dominated culture, grappled and engaged with the “Woman Question,” and most importantly, succeeded in achieving agency in order to realize their educational objectives.

The final section of my paper focuses on a populist, Islamic approach and explores how the Muslim Brotherhood used their message and their educational agenda to appeal to both the lower-classes and *la petite bourgeoisie*. At its founding the *Ikhwan* was a welfare society, moderately influenced by Sufism, and rooted in the moral rehabilitation of Egyptians.³⁰ However, within a decade the organization’s ideology and agenda would include a nationalist mandate that it would spread, using the educational system and its members, throughout the nation. The view that traditionalists, or Islamists, had an anachronistic, backwards looking mandate fails to appreciate the complexity of their beliefs. For example, al-Banna felt that Egypt could embrace modernity while retaining its cultural authenticity. As such, tradition was a fluid term for al-Banna and could be etymologically adapted to fit with modernity. For al-Banna, an “*Islamization of modernity* took place as an effect of colonization, revealing a counter-hegemonic and assertive use of tradition.”³¹ Al-Banna believed that Islam could embrace science,

²⁹ Saba Mahmood. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 14

³⁰ Brynjar Lia. *The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942*, (Reading: Garnet Publishing Limited, 1998), 25

³¹ Andrea Mura. *The Symbolic Scenarios of Islamism: A Study in Islamic Political Thought*, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2015), 36

technology and other Western innovations and create a modern Egyptian polity. In other words, al-Banna postulated that it was possible to both conserve traditional aspects of Egyptian culture rooted in Islam, while simultaneously altering the stultifying aspects that caused Egypt to fall behind other nations.

What al-Banna hoped to rectify through the *Ikhwan* was the subjugation of the populace by the British: an occupation causing Egyptians to question their values, their traditions and their religion. Through the *Ikhwan*, al-Banna aspired to aid disaffected Egyptian and assist them in returning to Islam.³² In the early years of its existence, educating the working and lower-classes was the basis from which the *Ikhwan* hoped to transform society. Despite dealing with numerous external and internal tensions, this core basis of the *Ikhwan*'s mandate, reeducating Egyptians in the ways of Islam, remained unchanged. Thus, an Islamic education became the framework and the vector from which to internalize moral discipline (or greater *jihad*), gain individual agency and build a new Egyptian nation. The *Ikhwan*'s mandate was initially pan-Islamic rather than nationalistic; however, as it increasingly became politicized, (and as Mura states) pan-Islamic goals became articulated alongside nationalist ones. This final chapter argues that the Brotherhood's nationalist goals, rooted in the creation of an Islamic state, advanced an educational mandate based upon greater (or internal) *jihad*. Moral discipline would liberate Egyptian Muslims and then ultimately, the nation.

Ostensibly these socio-economic classes, political organizations, benevolent societies would seem to have little in common and yet there were parallels amongst them. The question we return to is who had the right to an education? Moreover, what purpose should that education serve? Egyptian groups, contrary to the British, concurred that educational reform was to uplift

³² Lia, 33

the nation. How the nation should be uplifted, however, was another matter. The British and the Egyptian elite believed that financial solvency was key to Egypt's future and this involved keeping the *fellahin* in the fields and thus limiting their access to education. Similarly, while the elite wanted women educated in order to modernize the nation, they did not want to upend their traditions (including veiling and seclusion for some), nor their culture by having them take a role in the public arena. Many feminists disagreed and by the 1940s, they were arguing for more political rights. Furthermore, groups like the *Ikhwan* believed that conserving Islam as the guiding principle of society meant waging greater *jihad*, which would lead to the liberation of the self and the nation. Al-Banna understood that a new, modern polity necessitated the acceptance of science and was therefore willing to make the alteration needed in order to create a successful nation. As the struggle over education in Egypt can attest, education can do many things. For example, it can preserve traditions and culture, it can be a disciplinary conduit and enforce social order, yet it can also allow for greater individual agency, which can lead to the liberation of both the nation and the self. In Egypt, the strife and tension between the state and civil society took place over the terrain of education. Different groups used educational reform, couched in nationalist rhetoric, and negotiated, compromised and at times resisted in order to discipline and/or liberate the nation.

CHAPTER 1

Navigating Nationalist Waters: *Competing Interests and the Fate of the Egyptian Educational System 1882-1914*

Egypt being essentially an agricultural country, agriculture must of necessity be its first care.

Any education, technical or general, which tended to leave the fields untilled, or to lessen the fitness of disposition of the people for agricultural employment, would be a national evil.³³

Lord Evelyn Baring Cromer, Cairo, 1905

In 1805, Muhammad Ali (1769-48), an assistant-commander in the Albanian battalion, seized control of Egypt. As the new Pasha, Muhammad Ali's primary goal was to modernize the Egyptian army. In particular, he wanted a disciplined, well-trained and orderly military similar to the French; something he remarked upon when fighting Napoleonic forces in Egypt at the turn of the nineteenth century. This meant creating a functioning, administrative bureaucracy, which meant restructuring the education system.³⁴ The need to modernize the newly constituted Egyptian army drove the advancement of education. As such, during his reign over Egypt, Muhammad Ali opened numerous schools including medical, veterinarian, engineering and cavalry schools all to aid the growth of the military. Alongside the founding of secular schools, Muhammad Ali reshaped Egyptian society by establishing factories, hospitals and agricultural departments. These changes resulted in the increasing stratification of Egyptian society.³⁵ Thus, during the nineteenth century education helped sections of the urban populace become socially

³³ Cromer, Annual Report, *Parl. Pap.*, 1905, vol. 137, p. 571. Cited in Starrett. *Putting Islam to work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt*, p. 30

³⁴ Safran, 32

³⁵ James Heyworth-Dunne. *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt*. New Impression ed., (Bristol: Burleigh Press, 1968), 104

mobile.³⁶ Moreover, these educational opportunities led to the creation of a *secular* elite class of Egyptians.³⁷

Yet this elite class represented a miniscule section of society; the lives of the majority of Egyptians, who lived in the hinter-regions, remained completely unchanged. Only after the turn of the twentieth century would the middle classes and eventually lower classes attain access to education. As such, access to education became a focal point of contention within society. Did peasants, who spent the majority of their day tilling fields, need an education? What purpose would it serve? None, according to the British. Educating the masses could possibly cause the colonial administration much aggravation. Furthermore, the Egyptian elite (like the British) felt that the *fellahin* could best serve the nation by doing exactly what they were raised to do: farm. This, aided by the cotton-boom caused by the American Civil War, would get Egypt out of debt and hopefully bring about independence that much sooner. Yet, unlike the British, Egyptian nationalists did believe that the *fellahin* should have access to a basic level of education.

Thus, the British wanted an elite Egyptian taskforce educated to their specifications that would serve as bureaucrats and help them govern the country. Simultaneously, they advocated that indigenous women needed to be educated and portrayed themselves as the saviors of the “oppressed Muslim women” therefore justifying their *mission civilizatrice*. In reality, the British did nothing to advance the cause of Egyptian women. The British wanted to slightly alter the education system, but only enough to suit their purposes. Therefore, withholding funds from the Ministry of Education was meant to enforce social order—or discipline. Lord Cromer purposefully set out to keep the majority of Egyptians uneducated. However, Egyptian nationalists such as Mustafa Kamil, did want women (and the *fellahin*) to receive a limited

³⁶ Safran, 32

³⁷ Faksh, 235

education, simply not too much of one.³⁸ Egyptians should be educated in order to properly fulfill their station in life. For peasants, this meant a basic, primary education. For women, it meant being educated in the domestic arts in order to make good wives and mothers.

Per contra, the religious elite exemplified by the *ulama* at Al-Azhar University vehemently opposed any secularizing of the education system, which threatened their preeminent position as society's moral educators. They wanted to conserve the status quo at all costs. Indeed, when change arrived in the form of jurist and Islamic-modernist Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), the old guard was quick to force his resignation from the prestigious institution in order to retain their antedated pedagogical traditions. Al-Azhar negated the necessity of Western science or any subject that could possibly threaten their ascendancy. Their pedagogy, long based on simply absorbing the Quran, *hadiths*, the four schools of law and *tawhid* without question, did not allow for any freedom of thought or critical analysis. Indeed, this method of learning was a form of intellectual subjugation where students were disciplined and formed into "docile bodies."³⁹

Finally, for Christian missionaries, educating Egyptians was the pathway to salvation as Egyptians could then be "saved" through conversion. Missionaries not only wanted to alter the education system, they aspired to completely alter Egyptian cultural and social norms. With the many schools they opened, missionaries wished to convert Egyptian souls in the hopes of expanding the global Christian flock. This assault upon Egyptians was a different approach to disciplinary power as it aspired to create willing Christian subjects who would then in turn go on to spread the word.

³⁸ Cole, 391

³⁹ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 184-187

This chapter explores how the state and certain segments of civic society approached educational reform from a disciplinary agenda. For some, this agenda encompassed maintaining strict social divisions and enforcing social order, for others it meant disciplining Egyptians in the ways of Islam or Christianity. Indeed, the visceral debate over the creation of a new, modern Egyptian nation, with each advancing their own particular *weltanschauung*, centered around education reform.

Many scholars, including Jean Anyan (1941-2013), argue that education systems reflect the needs and goals of the dominant elite, which then allows them to maintain social and cultural control. Indeed, sociologist Emile Durkheim in *The Evolution of Educational Thought: Lectures on the Formation and Development of Secondary Education in France* demonstrates that from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, the French education system promulgated the requirements of the Catholic church.⁴⁰ Durkheim further argued that:

Education is thus simply the means by which society prepares, in its children, the essential conditions of its own existence... Education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to stimulate and develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole, and by the particular milieu for which he is specifically destined...⁴¹

There is thus an intimate and direct connection between education, society and the nation. It is Karl Marx who wrote, "... that man's consciousness is determined by his social being."⁴² Knowledge then is socially constructed. As such, the constitution of nationalist rhetoric is intimately connected "to the ideologizing influences of its social context."⁴³ In analyzing the role

⁴⁰ Jean Anyan. "Ideology and United States History Textbooks." *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 49, no. 3 (1979): 362

⁴¹ Emile Durkheim. *The Evolution of Educational Thought: Lectures on the Formation and Development of Secondary Education in France*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1938), 71

⁴² Karl Marx. *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. 1844: 225, quoted in Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann: *The Social Construction of Reality*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 5-6

⁴³ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. *The Social Construction of Reality*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 9

of institutions in the social construction of reality, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann argue that since we are the architects of reality, then we are, therefore, capable of modifying or destroying it. Yet once this knowledge is institutionalized and transmitted to a future generation, the objectivity of this reality “thickens and hardens” and we are left with, “This is how it has *always* [italics mine] been done.”⁴⁴ This constructed reality then becomes fact and is no longer so easy to modify. The institution of educational thought, and the cementing of a particular nationalist rhetoric, then comes to play a consequential role in nationalism and the rise of a modern nation. Furthermore, educational facilities instruct the citizens of tomorrow how to imagine the nation. For Michel Foucault, this is a place of both exclusion and inclusion. Exclusion encompasses not only what practices and forms of knowledge society rejects, but also how students are spatially excluded from society while being conveyed specific forms of knowledge that result in social control. Once students absorb what the state deems are the correct values, then reintegration into society occurs.⁴⁵

For example, Egyptian students who attended Mohammad Ali’s secular schools at the beginning of the twentieth century (or who studied in France) were meant for either the military or the bureaucratic cadre of civil servants. Yet, in this case, and when these students were reintegrated into society, they brought with them notions of western science, of liberalism and for some, the superiority of all things European. Most spoke at least two languages and believed that “... the Egyptian people could be “improved” by the right kind of education.”⁴⁶ This, according to F. Robert Hunter, initiated the first stirrings of an Egyptian identity. Hunter writes that the advancement of local Egyptians to governmental positions “... led to the emergence of a

⁴⁴ Ibid., 59

⁴⁵ Foucault, “J.K. Smith: A Conversation with Michel Foucault,” 193-94

⁴⁶ F. Robert Hunter. *Egypt Under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984), 92

technocratic elite in the higher administration composed of men familiar with European science and somewhat sympathetic to European civilization.”⁴⁷ Additionally, Mohammad Ali’s successors, Khedives ‘Abbas (1812-1854) and Sa’id (1822-1863) insisted upon hiring Arabic-speaking Egyptian students for bureaucratic positions in order to stem the flow of foreigners running the government. This was similarly advanced by Khedive Isma’il (1863-1879) who expanded the bureaucratic cadre from twenty thousand to fifty thousand.⁴⁸ As mentioned above, a consonant language is necessary for nationalism to flourish. The upper-classes tended to speak in French, unlike the majority of Egyptians who spoke Arabic.⁴⁹ ‘Abbas I and Sa’id insisting that governmental positions be filled with Arabic speakers, created a communal vernacular necessary for the founding of an *imagined* nationalist community.⁵⁰

What is also advantageous is having an “other” that can be used to unite the populace. Egyptian officer Aḥmad ‘Urabi Pasha al-Miṣri’s (1839-1911) “other” were the Turkish and Circassian high-ranking military officers who filled all the senior ranks leaving native-born Egyptians like ‘Urabi out of the fold. In 1881, ‘Urabi led the first Egyptian revolt with a cry of “Egypt for the Egyptians.” The revolt was quickly put down, yet it remained an important historic moment for Egyptians and ‘Urabi became the first national Egyptian hero. Historian Nadav Safran writes that the first manifestation of Egyptian nationalism was the ‘Urabi revolt of 1881.⁵¹ However, Donald Malcolm Reid believes that the ‘Urabi revolt was a proto-nationalist one and this paper supports Reid’s view.⁵² As Reid argues, “... a perceived collapse of law and order on the periphery, a proto-nationalist revolt, a threat to the Suez route to India, Anglo-

⁴⁷ Ibid., 41

⁴⁸ Pollard, 22-23

⁴⁹ Badran, 26

⁵⁰ Anderson, 44-45

⁵¹ Safran, 49, 50

⁵² Daly. *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 218

French rivalry, and maneuvering by “men on the spot” in Egypt,” resulted in the British and French impressing upon the Ottoman Sultan the need to depose the Khedive Isma’il (and his profligate spending) in favor of his son Tawfiq (1852-1892).⁵³ Shortly thereafter, the port city of Alexandria exploded into a riot that killed fifty Europeans and left over a hundred Egyptians dead. The British stepped in with the bombardment of Alexandria in July of 1882 and restored order. In other words, they revoked many of the changes ‘Urabi attempted to make. The British restored the Turko-Circassians to positions of power along with European officials and made their sole focus in Egypt the restoration of the national debt.⁵⁴

With the arrival of the British, the “other” that ‘Urabi grappled with shifted. British policies undertaken by Lord Cromer became both a strong point of contention and a rallying cry for certain segments of society. Cromer, who spent the first part of his military career as a colonial official in India not long after the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-58, had a negative opinion of subalterns.⁵⁵ Cromer believed that the colonized, whether Indian or Egyptian, would never be wholly civilized and as such, educational and social reform had no place in his agenda.⁵⁶ Cromer was consul-general of Egypt from 1882 to 1907 and comported himself as an autocrat similar to the Khedive of Egypt. The British used the term “veiled-protectorate” to describe their occupation of Egypt, but being placed under semi-colonialist rule rather than direct rule, nevertheless, changed little for Egyptians; the oppression remained the same.

⁵³ Ibid., 219

⁵⁴ Ibid., 231, 238

⁵⁵ The Sepoy Mutiny was a short-lived rebellion against British imperialism in India. The oppression wrought by the British reached a boiling point when Indian troops serving in the British army were forced to use Enfield rifles. In order to load the rifle, the Sepoys needed to bite off the end of the lubricated cartridge that was rumored to have been dipped in a combination of both beef and pig lard, thus offending both Hindus and Muslims. Many British officers alongside their families were killed, yet the revenge visited upon the Indians was far worse with a toll of well over a hundred thousand Indians dead.

⁵⁶ Robert L. Tignor. *Egypt: A Short History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 234

In 1903, Cromer wrote that less than one percent of Egyptian state revenues went towards education.⁵⁷ The fear that overeducated Egyptians could cause problems and possibly rise up against the British was something Cromer did everything in his power to avoid. Moreover, he felt completely justified in his de facto rule of Egypt writing, "... that in 1882 the army was in a state of mutiny; the Treasury was bankrupt; every branch of the administration had been dislocated; the ancient and arbitrary method, under which the country had for centuries been governed, had received a severe blow, whilst, at the same time, no more orderly and law-abiding form of government had been inaugurated to take its place."⁵⁸ Retaining a bifurcated education system in order to enforce social control suited British interests.

Forsooth, the missionaries living in Egypt were extremely happy with the arrival of the British. Indeed, they saw historical moments such as the British bombardment of Alexandria in 1882 as simply reconfirming Anglo-Saxon ascendancy over less-developed nations who had yet to embrace Christianity.⁵⁹ The educational endeavors of Protestant missionaries began in Egypt in the 1820s, decades before the issuance of the Hamayouni Decree that regulated the maintenance and construction of Christian churches.⁶⁰ From the first, they emphasized reading over writing and felt that adult literacy was as important as child literacy.⁶¹ The Anglo-American

⁵⁷ Ibid., 234

⁵⁸ Evelyn Baring, The Earl of Cromer. *Modern Egypt*, vol. 1, (New York: Macmillan, 1908), 326

This was written in 1908 as part of his memoirs. Additionally, to morally justify their imperial entrenchment, the British likened themselves as "saviors of oppressed Muslim women." Cromer saw Islam as goodly in that it was monotheistic; however, as a social system it was an absolute failure. Cromer expanded on Islam's failure writing, "First and foremost, Islam keeps women in a position of marked inferiority. In the second place, Islam... crystallizes religion and law under one inseparable and immutable whole... according to the antique principles which were laid down as applicable to the primitive society of the Arabian Peninsula of the seventh century. In the third place, Islam does not, indeed, encourage, but it tolerates slavery. Lastly, Islam has the reputation of being an intolerant religion, and the reputation... is deserved." (134-137)

⁵⁹ Ussama Makdisi. *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East*, (London: Cornell University Press, 2008), 177

⁶⁰ Pollard, 107. Missionaries came from numerous countries and included Jesuits, les Frères, Swedish and Dutch missionaries; however, by 1910 the United States was sending out more Protestant missionaries than any other nation.

⁶¹ Sharkey, 36

Protestant missionaries were part of a universal movement that hoped to convert those residing in less-developed nations worldwide. Heather J. Sharkey writes that in Egypt, “American missionaries opened dozens of schools, medical facilities and public libraries; initiated rural development programs to improve livestock and reduce the spread of endemic diseases; and vigorously promoted literary campaigns, especially for the sake of Bible reading.”⁶² Indeed, missionaries did everything possible to actively entice Egyptians into their fold in order to transform Egyptian society into the West’s image.

Much of the missionary work done in Egypt focused on women since during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the state had little interest in allocating funds to educate women. Missionaries then set out to convert Egyptians by educating their women.⁶³ By the mid 1860s, they were running numerous schools including a girls’ school in Alexandria and both a boys’ and a girls’ school in Cairo; this was followed shortly thereafter with the opening of another boys’ and girls’ school in Assiut, in Upper Egypt.⁶⁴ With the British occupation, funding to social-welfare ministries such as the Ministry of Religious Endowments ended; private organizations, colonial spouses and missionaries filled the void.⁶⁵

It would be an exaggeration to say that Lord Cromer wholeheartedly welcomed the presence of missionaries in Egypt. Missionaries served a purpose, but Lord Cromer often saw them as more of a necessary irritation. Despite Lord Cromer’s lukewarm welcome, the Egyptian

⁶² Ibid., 14

⁶³ Beth Baron. *The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 135

⁶⁴ Sharkey, 42, 43

⁶⁵ Beth Baron. *The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood*, (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2014), 30. Isma’il cautiously welcomed missionaries who desired to help those less fortunate in society. It was the responsibility of the Ottoman-Egyptian state to take on the role of *wali*—or guardian—in safeguarding and protecting those most vulnerable within society. It was Isma’il who established the guardianship court in 1873, regulated the age of majority to eighteen, and established the Ministry of Religious Endowments to meet social welfare needs including the administration of the majority of schools, medical clinics, mosques and shelters.

Evangelical Church grew exponentially thanks to the protection they received from the British.⁶⁶ Additionally, “Missionaries were expected to provide the empire with a veneer of ethics, respectability, and moral purpose; to praise British governance among churchgoing audiences at home; and to act in ways that would tacitly support and not compromise British rule on the ground.”⁶⁷ Missionaries predominantly supported British policy in Egypt; however, one point of contention was the lack of protection the British gave those Muslims who chose to convert to Christianity. At the World Missionary Conference held in Edinburgh in 1910, missionaries accused the British of catering to elite Egyptians in order to have them assist colonial rule thereby accommodating Islam over Christianity. Missionaries were, of course, well protected under the colonial umbrella, but in most cases converts were not.⁶⁸ Thus, it was in the interest of the British to “... curry favor with Muslim ruling elites as a way of securing cooperation and facilitating colonial rule.”⁶⁹ Lord Cromer felt that protecting Muslim converts could exacerbate British rule. In this matter, the British and missionaries were at cross-purposes. The British wanted Egyptians quiescent and the missionaries converting Egyptians could have the opposite effect. Religion was a sensitive subject and had been since French philosopher Ernest Renan (1823-1892) espoused in 1883 that Islam and science (therefore modernity) were incompatible.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Sharkey, 53

⁶⁷ Ibid., 65

⁶⁸ Ibid., 66

⁶⁹ Ibid., 65

⁷⁰ Akram Fouad Khater, *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 30-32 . This led Islamic-modernist Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897) to espouse that Islam was indeed sympathetic to modernity and that through *ijtihad*—or the reinterpretation of the Qur’an through reason—the cultural ossification caused by long-held patriarchal traditions could be rectified. In response to Ernest Renan’s critique of Islam in 1883, Al-Afghani wrote, “... I cannot keep from hoping that Muhammadan society will succeed someday in breaking its bonds and marching resolutely in the path of civilization after the manner of Western society....” Furthermore, the central goal for Islamic-modernists was to comprehend why and how European nations had advanced so quickly, allowing them to colonize Eastern and Asian countries. Why had Egypt been left behind? Why had Egypt failed to modernize like western nations? How had Egypt come to be colonized by the British? In attempting to answer these questions, Islamic-modernists analyzed western nations, and upon looking at Egypt’s situation realized that Islam, in its current form, was causing the nation to decay. Unlike European thinkers who embraced the ideas of the Enlightenment and who equated progress with secularization, Islamic-modernists did not want to abandon Islam as

This was exactly what jurist and Al-Azharite Muhammad Abduh wanted to rectify: Islamic orthodoxy and modernity could be reconciled and the almost ninety percent of the Egyptian populace left by the wayside (and possibly prone to conversion) could be brought back into the fold.⁷¹ As a friend and colleague of Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897), the founder of Islamic-modernism, Abduh absorbed aspects of al-Afghani's political-religious doctrine, yet Abduh believed in a gradualist approach. As part of the *ulama* at Al-Azhar University, and eventually Mufti of all Egypt, Abduh desired a middle way.⁷² Above all, it was clear that Islam was being marginalized by the elites, and Abduh realized that only through the reinterpretation of Islam, and through religious reform, would Egypt manage to progress and modernize without losing itself in the process. Abduh's movement, the Salafiyya movement, hoped to replace *taqlid*—or blind imitation—with *ijtihad* in order to repair the religious rigidity that was causing the *umma* and the nation to stagnate.

Similarly, one of Abduh's most fervent goals was educational reform. From 1894 onwards, Abduh managed to initiate numerous changes at Al-Azhar:

He improved the living conditions of students, reorganized the libraries, reformed the administration, tightened up teaching regulations, and lengthened the university year. He thus succeeded in the raising the number of candidates presenting themselves for the doctor's degree from an average of three yearly to nearly a hundred. As for the curriculum itself, he managed to add a number of modern subjects—mathematics, Islamic history, composition, geography, literature—some of which had to be taken by every student in addition to the traditional sciences.⁷³

the founding principle with which to govern their nation. Rather, they attempted to modernize the nation, through reforming Islam—this meant reinterpreting Holy Scriptures through the use of *ijtihad*.

⁷¹ It is important to note that modernity and the meaning of modernity for different segments of society was a hotly contested issue that did not neatly fit into any singular definition.

⁷² Christina Phelps Harris. *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood*, (The Hague: Published for The Hoover Institution On War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, by Mouton, 1964), 118

⁷³ Wayment, ix

Abduh believed "... that one could find evidence of contemporary scientific principles and discoveries (including evolution) in the Qur'an [and that] science and Islam were uniquely compatible."⁷⁴ Educated in a *kuttab* (primary school) and eventually at Al-Azhar, Abduh believed that central to mobilizing disaffected Egyptians (including the lower classes) was the elimination of rote learning, and the integration of individual reasoning. Additionally, he fully agreed with British author and educator Herbert Spencer's (1820-1903), opinion on the importance of a moral education. As such, for Abduh, education needed to nourish and cultivate the mind all the while building character.⁷⁵

Furthermore, one of Abduh's goals was to standardize the curriculum at Al-Azhar. Throughout the nineteenth century, the educational system evolved, but changes were not routinized resulting in a mishmash of schools and differing educational curricula that left many Egyptians excluded. In the late 1860s, the Organic Law was instituted that outlined:

The subjects to be taught in every school and those who were to teach in them, those who were to administer, the books to be used, the timetable of instruction, the clothes that students were to wear, the plan of buildings, the layout of the classroom and its furniture, the location of each school the source of its funds, the schedule of its examinations, the registration of students, and the physical handicaps for which they should be excluded.⁷⁶

Additionally, Khedive Isma'il appointed Egyptian administrator Ali Mubarak (1823-1893), also a pedagogue and an engineer, to the position of Minister of Education and Minister of Public Works in the winter of 1867-68.⁷⁷ Mubarak opened primary, preparatory (or secondary) and final schools across the nation dependent upon the size and location of the locale. Small hamlets generally had only a primary school. Additionally, schools were restricted to males only, with

⁷⁴ Marwa Elshakry. *Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 164, 165

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 196

⁷⁶ Heyworth-Dunne, 362-369, quoted in Mitchell. *Colonizing Egypt*, p. 76

⁷⁷ Timothy Mitchell. *Colonizing Egypt*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 63

schools of the highest level restricted for the children of elites. The reality was that under Muhammad Ali, and following his reign, the schools created did little to help the Egyptian masses. Moreover, the average *kuttab* that the (male) masses did have access to “led nowhere, except into medieval curriculum of Al-Azhar, a handful of ill-managed trade schools, or back to the cotton fields and often a relapse into illiteracy.”⁷⁸ This was exactly what Abduh hoped to change. Yet working against the tide of Al-Azharites who were content with maintaining the status-quo, Abduh had little chance of success.

However, in the case of those Egyptians born into better circumstances, access to higher education was a given. Such was the case for *Effendi* Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908), who received a secular education and became a lawyer, and represented the rise of a new middle class of Egyptian nationalists—or the new *petite bourgeoisie*. In 1900, Kamil began publishing *al-Liwa* (the Flag), a daily that was strongly anti-British and that argued for immediate independence.⁷⁹ Thanks in part to Cromer, who felt that “... the native press was not of sufficient importance to warrant censorship,” Kamil’s journal flourished under British occupation.⁸⁰ Believed to have somewhere between seven and nine thousand readers, *al-Liwa*’s message nevertheless managed to spread throughout the nation thanks to ambulatory orators who read his daily in different villages to largely illiterate crowds of *fellahin*.⁸¹ In its first years of publication *al-Liwa* stated the need for educational reforms including a *madrassa kubra*—a school that offered students access to primary, preparatory and higher levels. By 1904, the daily called for the need for an Egyptian

⁷⁸ Donald Malcolm Reid. *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 15

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 24

⁸⁰ Afaf Lufti Al-Sayyid. *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), 159

⁸¹ “Le Panislamisme en Egypte.” *Le Temps*; 22 August 1906: p. 1
<https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k2387163.r=mercredi%2022%20aout%2C%201906Moustafa%20Kamel%20Moustafa%20Kamel?rk=21459;2>

college (*madrassa kulliyya*) and recommended naming it the Muhammad Ali College.⁸² Kamil understood that in order for Egypt to evolve, to become fully “civilized” and to throw off the imperialist-yoke, Egyptians must have access to education.

Yet it is important to remember that Kamil was preaching to a group of urban men predominantly from *la petite-bourgeoisie*. Kamil’s French law degree from Cairo University and his subsequent studies at Toulouse University (he graduated in 1894) were completely out of reach for illiterate peasants. The *fellahin* had little education, held onto traditional values and were considered largely “uncivilized” by the *Effendi*. The *Effendiya* saw themselves as modern Egyptians in the process of building a modern nation.⁸³ Kamil also felt that women should have limited education. In other words, enough education to make good spouses, but they, “did not want competition for jobs from their female relatives... and simultaneously argued for strict veiling and seclusion practices.”⁸⁴

In 1907, Kamil founded *al-Hizb al-Watani* Party (the Nationalist Party) to actualize the needs of an Egyptian community that included both Muslims and Copts. As such, Kamil refused to embrace religiosity as a base for a political platform. A national identity for Kamil encompassed all Egyptians, and the *Watanists* mandate was an all-inclusive one premised first, on patriotism to the Egyptian nation, second, on an allegiance to the wider Islamic community epitomized by the Ottoman Empire, and third, on a glorious Pharaonic past.⁸⁵ Indeed, “... the

⁸² Reid, 24

⁸³ James Whidden. *Monarchy and Modernity in Egypt: Politics, Islam and Neo-Colonialism between the Wars*, (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2013), 67, 68

⁸⁴ Cole, 391

⁸⁵ Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski. *Egypt, Islam and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 8. Benedict Anderson writes that an “imagined political community” needs a concatenate community firmly supportive of a united national identity. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger further posit that the creation of nation needs a historical tradition, possibly an “invented one.” Therefore, in historical tradition there is continuity that then legitimizes the idea of nation. The idea of an Egyptian identity linked to a glorious Pharaonic past began at the turn of the twentieth century and reached maturity in the 1920s when the middle-class embraced the concept. In doing so, Pharaonic themes became commonplace in art,

populist message of the *Watani* Party began the process of defining and popularizing urban Egyptian nationalism.”⁸⁶

In 1907, Kamil mobilized large swaths of the population in response to the Dinshaway Incident.⁸⁷ Speaking to members of the *Watani* Party at the crowded Alexandrian Zizinia Theater in late 1907, Kamil touched upon a number of topics including the injustice of the Dinshaway Incident, the injustice of British policies vis-à-vis Egypt, the need for independence and for constitutional government and finally, about the importance of education. Kamil, known as the “father of modern Egyptian nationalism” was famous for giving eloquent speeches in packed venues.⁸⁸ In his address, Kamil articulated a ten-point agenda for the *Watani* Party, which included his goals for educational reform:

literature, poetry and Egyptian culture. Artists and the populace alike embraced depictions of the nation as a Pharaonic Queen or the use of Pharaonic symbols. Examples were numerous including Mahmud Mukhtar’s sculpture *Nahdat Misr* (The Awakening of Egypt). This sculpture depicted a peasant woman who was resting one hand on a sphinx, symbolizing Egypt’s glorious Pharaonic past, while her other hand was in the process of unveiling herself, representing a gendered modern Egypt. (Beth Baron. *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, p.65) In linking ancient and contemporary Egypt, proponents of a Pharaonic past believed that “basic racial kinship... was the source of those common characteristics in social structure, patterns of thought, and artistic expression that marked the history of the people of Egypt over the millennia.” A Pharaonic past then helped create a distinct Egyptian identity based on the notion of racial integrity. Despite being invaded numerous times, Egyptians were able to maintain “genetic continuity” causing invading forces to take on Egyptian genetic qualities rather than the reverse. This evidently proclaimed the superiority of Egyptian physical genetics. (165-166)

⁸⁶ Ziad Fahmy. “Media-Capitalism: Colloquial Mass Culture and Nationalism in Egypt, 1908-1918.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 42, no.1 (2010): 83

⁸⁷ P.J. Vatikiotis. *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*. 4th ed., (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), 206. This incident was a prime example of British colonial power. While the British ruled through the monarchy, they held the ultimate authority to naysay any decisions the Khedive made and took action when they felt it necessary. The Dinshaway incident spread throughout the nation with fervor, rallying and uniting Egyptians against the colonizing “other.” The incident occurred in 1906 and involved a contentious dispute between British officers, who chose to go pigeon shooting on private Egyptian lands, and an Imam whose wife was shot in the process. This event resulted in an altercation between the British officers and local villagers and ended with two wounded officers, one of whom succumbed to his wounds on his return journey to his base. In response, the British arrested fifty-two villagers and sentenced four to death. The Dinshaway Incident was a galvanizing moment in nationalist rhetoric as it mobilized Egyptians from all strata behind the idea of nation for the first time.

⁸⁸ Gershoni and Jankowski, 6-7. According to author Nadav Safran, if Mustafa Kamil is the father of modern Egyptian nationalism, Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid (1872-1963) is undoubtedly its architect. In *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952*, Safran writes that Al-Sayyid and Kamil initiated the beginnings of liberal nationalism; however, al-Sayyid’s friendship with Muhammad Abduh, and Kamil’s support of pan-Islamism later drove the two apart. This split caused al-Sayyid to found the *Umma* Party (The People’s Party) in opposition of Kamil’s political platform. The *Umma* Party garnered support from numerous intellectuals including Qasim Amin and Sa’d Zaghlul, as well as rich landowners; moreover,

La propagation de l'instruction dans tout le pays sur une base fermement nationale de sorte que les pauvres puissent avoir le plus large part, la guerre aux erreurs et aux stupidités, la propagation des sains principes religieux qui appellent au progrès, et l'incitation des riches et des puissants, à aider à l'instruction en fondant des universités, en envoyant des missions en Europe et en créant des écoles de nuits pour les ouvriers.⁸⁹

This fifth point, from his *Watanist* manifesto, stated the necessity of expanding a nationalist-style educational system throughout the whole country, specifically so that the poor could attain the greatest benefit; the fight against error and stupidity; the propagation of sound religious principles that called for progress; and finally, the appeal to the rich and powerful to help education by founding universities, by sending students to Europe in order to study, and by setting up evening schools for the working class. Kamil's aspirations for the *Watani* Party clearly intimated the importance of education in building an independent "Egypt for Egyptians."⁹⁰

While Kamil's rhetoric galvanized many, according to an article published in the Parisian newspaper *Le Temps* in August of 1906, Kamil was unable to garner any support abroad.⁹¹ Despite repeatedly appealing to the French and indeed, Europe as a whole, Kamil's rhetoric threatened British ascendancy and countered their claim that they had a moral right to occupy Egypt.⁹² In *Culture and Imperialism* Edward W. Said writes that "The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them."⁹³ Narratives were what colonialists

it had the support of the British. Like Kamil, al-Sayyid refused to base the *Umma* Party's platform on religiosity. In arguing against pan-Islamism, al-Sayyid set himself apart from popular opinion and with those who felt that aligning themselves with the Islamic community at large could help in overthrowing the British.

⁸⁹Mustafa Kamil. *Ce Que Veut Le Parti Nationale*. Speech given by Mustafa Kamil on October 22, 1907 at the Zizinia Theater in Alexandria, Egypt. <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6257758v/f8.image> (p.30)

⁹⁰ Al-Sayyid, 160. Kamil's loyalty to the Khedive and to the Ottoman Empire on religious grounds led some Copts to boycott Kamil's movement fearing his movement was too pan-Islamic.

⁹¹ "Le Panislamisme en Egypte." *Le Temps*; 22 August 1906: p. 1, Accessed May, 17, 2019.

<https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k2387163.r=mercredi%2022%20aout%2C%201906Moustafa%20Kamel%20Moustafa%20Kamel?rk=21459;2>

⁹² Mustafa Kamil. "Le Péril Anglais : Conséquences de l'Occupation de L'Égypte par l'Angleterre."

<https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58048940/f1.image.texteImage>. The French saw Kamil as a threat to their colonial interests in Africa, fearing that if his ideas spread chaos would ensue.

⁹³ Edward W. Said. *Culture and Imperialism*, (New York: Random House, 1993), xiii

used to justify occupying foreign countries and similarly what the colonized used to galvanize the nation into rejecting the yoke of imperialism.⁹⁴ Kamil understood how interwoven education was to nation-building, and how important the dissemination of a nationalist rhetoric was to the masses. Yet, so too did Cromer. As such, Cromer did what he could to stymie the advance of Egyptian education lest the final result be over-educated Egyptians, without gainful employment and with too much time on their hands. Such a denouement could only cause problems for the colonizers.

Notwithstanding, and at the insistence of the Legislative Council and the local press, in his Annual Report Cromer delineated his Egyptian educational mandate that consisted of a two-part state system:

First, Europeanized education for a small number of pupils in the higher primary and secondary schools, plus the three colleges designed to prepare them for government service, their numbers limited by the need to pay fees. Secondly, a system of mass education in the village schools (or kuttabs) involving only what Cromer called ‘the three R’s in the vernacular language; nothing more’.⁹⁵

Conversely, Cromer’s goal of keeping Egyptians tilling the fields countered the ultimate goal held by missionaries. Their primary aim in Egypt was social activism.⁹⁶ Missionaries

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Roger Owen. *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 314

⁹⁶ The American board of missionaries believed Islam to be a suppressive, tyrannical religion rooted in despotism. Harems and polygamy were examples of such despotism. For Protestant missionaries, both the rise and fall of Islam were foretold in the Bible, as was the vanquish of the Holy Land by the Jews. Indeed, Ussama Makdisi in *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* writes, “The restoration of the Jews to Palestine and their conversion to Christianity anticipated the end of Islam and the Second Coming of Christ.” (66) Heading out to the world to convert ‘heathens’ then was very much a crusade for the missionaries, albeit not a violent one. Heather J. Sharkey in *American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in the Age of Empire* posits that “In places like Cairo, Tehran and Lucknow, many Christian missionaries described their missions to Muslims as a return to, or fulfillment of, the twelfth—and thirteenth—century Crusades, and propounded the idea that Islamic societies were backward, ignorant and poised to disintegrate.” (55) What greatly aided the missionaries in their work was their close connection to Western colonialism and more importantly their wholehearted embrace of orientalism. They were at the height of Anglo-Saxon power believing themselves to be from the most righteous and powerful Christian civilization. It was their duty to help those less privileged and simultaneously spread the truth and help all Muslims (and indeed Copts and Catholics) see how they erred in their religious beliefs.

presupposed that by studying the Bible and by having a complete understanding of Christ's sacrifice, they could save Muslims through conversion.⁹⁷ As such, and as proclaimed by United Presbyterian Church of North America (UPCNA) historian James B. Scouller, Calvinist theology demanded that parishioners fully comprehend the Bible meaning that the acquisition of knowledge was essential. However, acquiring knowledge must be done with the objective of a deeper comprehension of scripture; learning was not about acquiring knowledge solely for its own sake. Similar to Al-Azhar University, missionaries saw students as empty vessels that they could fill with "proper" knowledge. This then made "education and Bible-based literacy a mission priority... by starting schools in towns like Luxor and Assiut before they [even] had functioning Evangelical churches in place."⁹⁸ Schools were the perfect venue to proselytize to the masses. True to the ideals of Martin Luther's sixteenth century Reformation, Protestant missionaries insisted the Bible be accessible to all. Mission schools in Egypt, and indeed around the world, became central to spreading the Christian message.⁹⁹ Thus, teaching Egyptians how to read was how missionaries would achieve their ultimate goal of conversion and moreover, discipline Egyptians with "correct" knowledge.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Sharkey, 36

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Legally, Muslim men who chose to convert "faced disinheritance (on the Islamic legal grounds that a non-Muslim cannot inherit from a Muslim); nullification of a marriage to a Muslim woman (on the Islamic legal grounds that a Muslim woman may not marry or remain married to a non-Muslim man); and loss of child custody (again on related grounds that Muslim minors should not be placed under non-Muslim custody)." Additionally, converts often faced physical harm from their family and complete social ostracism. When Al-Azhar graduate Ahmed Fahmy converted in 1877, his family tried desperately to bring him back into the fold by contacting the rector at Al-Azhar who recommended he be burned. Following that pronouncement, Fahmy's family then kidnapped him, issued countless threats and finally engaged the help of noted Islamic-modernist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. All attempts failed and eventually Fahmy managed to escape to safety unharmed and realizing he had little hope of making a life for himself in Cairo, he immigrated to Scotland. Interestingly enough, Fahmy went on to study medicine at the University of Edinburgh, took a post with the London Missionary Society and made his way to Zhangzhou, China where he opened a hospital in 1887. This is undoubtedly the most celebrated Egyptian conversion that occurred during the British occupation. (Sharkey, 67-68)

In the decades following the arrival of the missionaries in Egypt, over 130 foreign schools opened their doors. “The American Protestant education endeavor mirrored and often reinforced the process through which the home and the family were being targeted by the state.”¹⁰¹ While there was not a standardized curricula taught by missionaries until the 1910s, there were some standard courses that were usually included such as geography, math, grammar, religious studies, English, French, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, physiology and philosophy. Female students were taught some of these subjects; however, an emphasis was placed on the art of home economics, reading, writing, arithmetic and social discipline.¹⁰² Missionaries increasingly saw their duty as being twofold: educating Egyptians in order to read the Gospel, and restructuring the Egyptian home. Monogamy was central, but so was the idea of nation. In saving and disciplining souls, missionaries hoped to help with the creation of modern Egyptian nation—one that would ideally be Christian.¹⁰³ In this way the home was central to the educational endeavors of the missionaries.

Exempli gratia, in *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing and Liberating Egypt, 1805-1923*, Lisa Pollard writes of a woman named Mrs. Hind Ammun. Ammun completed her education at the Girls’ Boarding School in Cairo and following the premature death of her husband proceeded to write and publish a history of Egypt.¹⁰⁴ Pollard states that events such as this one allowed missionaries to claim that their educational endeavors and their restructuring of the Egyptian home helped create a pride in nation and led to the spread of nationalism.¹⁰⁵ However, Egyptian nationalists felt missionaries were part of a cultural

¹⁰¹ Pollard, 106

¹⁰² Ibid., 109

¹⁰³ Ibid., 110, 111

¹⁰⁴ Beth Baron writes in *The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press* that Ammun’s history book began being used in state schools in the 1910s.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 113, 114

onslaught on Egyptian values and morals and believed missionaries to be nothing more than imperial puppets.¹⁰⁶

Moreover, the western-style curricula taught in mission schools was the last thing the shaykhs at Al-Azhar University wanted to implement. Indeed, they were vehemently opposed to any type of reform. This greatly aggravated Muhammad Abduh who felt that a compendious reform (with Islam as the founding principle) was necessary and eventually, after a decisive split with Khedive Abbas, resigned from his position at the renowned institution.¹⁰⁷ Much like Muhammad Ali, Abduh realized that to implement educational changes his best option was to start anew elsewhere. Thus, after years of attempting to remodel the curricula at the stagnating Al-Azhar, Abduh alongside other notables in society, embraced Mustafa Kamil's call to open a new university.¹⁰⁸ Whether Kamil was the first to call for a new modern-style university is much debated with credit also going to Prince Ahmad Fuad, Saad Zaghlul, Qasim Amin, Muhammad Abduh, Yaqub Artin and Jurji Zaydan.¹⁰⁹ Regardless of who set in motion the idea for a new

¹⁰⁶ Philadelphia Historical Society. RG 209/26/12, article published in *al-Siassa* by Muhammad Husayn Haykal June 16, 1933.

¹⁰⁷ M. Elshakry, 215

¹⁰⁸ In the same period, Syrian journalist Jurji Zaydan (1861-114) proposed that American missionaries open a university in Cairo like the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut. The college, founded by American missionaries in 1866, comprised of advanced courses in the liberal arts, medicine, pharmacy, and commerce. Eventually known as the American University of Beirut, it initially catered solely to Christians before finally accepting Muslims. By the turn of the century close to sixty Egyptian students a year traveled to Beirut to attend the university. (Reid. *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*. p.23) Zaydan, an ardent secular liberalist, believed that the second Arab *Nahda*—or Awakening—was upon them. According to Zaydan the *Nahda* began when the French occupied Egypt in 1798 and destroyed the tyrannical Mamluks. Moreover, Zaydan believed that “The idea that this *Nahda* would eradicate the centuries of “torpor” and overcome the senescence of its own classical tradition through translation was key.” (Elshakry. *Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950*. p.11) Therefore, central to modernizing and cultural evolution was the translation of historical works from the Arab Golden age. As such, education was of the utmost importance for progress. Discussions began regarding opening an American University in Cairo, but efforts were stymied by the onset of World War One. (Reid. *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*. p.23)

¹⁰⁹ Mustafa Kamil did not live to see the university that he was so keen on establishing open. He died prematurely of tuberculosis in 1908, aged 34.

modern-style university, it quickly gathered speed thanks to the Dinshaway incident that galvanized the nationalist movement.¹¹⁰

Needless to say, Cromer was vehemently opposed to the opening of a new university. His method of dealing with this unfortunate annoyance was to prevaricate, avoid and evade the issue. In appointing Sa'ad Zaghlul to the Ministry of Education, Cromer hoped to lessen societal discord, much of it caused by Kamil's *Watani* supporters. Tensions caused by the Taba affair, the law student strike and finally, the Dinshaway incident continued to simmer under the surface with many believing that Cromer was purposefully avoiding educational reform in order to keep Egyptians unable to rule their own country.¹¹¹ In 1907, Cromer retired due to ill health and handed off the question of an Egyptian University to his successor Sir Eldon Gorst (1861-1911). Gorst became Consul-General of Egypt following Cromer's retirement in the Spring of 1907 and shortly thereafter, in December of 1908, allowed for the opening of the first Egyptian University.¹¹² In remarking upon Cromer's legacy in Egypt, Kamil wrote:

Egypt... would remember that Cromer had usurped Khedivial authority, that he had conquered Sudan with Egyptian men and money, and then denuded Egyptians of every

¹¹⁰ Reid, 22. Shortly after the Dinshaway Incident, Sa'ad Zaghlul was given the post of Minister of Education. In *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, Beth Baron writes that Zaghlul was known as "Father of Egyptians" and having great political aspirations, married Safiya Fahmi Pasha in 1906, the wealthy Turko-Circassian daughter of pro-British Prime Minister Mustafa Fahmi Pasha. This connection allowed him entry into the highest echelons of Egyptian society.

¹¹¹ John Burnam. "British Strategic Interests versus Ottoman Sovereign Rights: New Perspectives on the Aqaba Crisis, 1906." *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol. 37, no. 2 (2009): 286 and Afaf Lufti Al-Sayyid. *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), 166-68. The Taba Incident occurred in January of 1906 when a Turkish platoon set up an outpost in the Sinai Peninsula. The Sultan Abdul Hamid II claimed the area as part of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it was of strategic importance due to the Hijaz railway destined to pass from Maan to Aqaba; however, Cromer insisted upon a buffer zone in order to protect the Suez Canal and British interests. Eventually, the British demanded the Sultan retreat, which he did. The Taba incident divided the nationalist cause in Cairo with Kamil, who supported the Sultan in the affair, accused of being a religious fanatic. As well, the incident antagonized moderates within society who felt that Kamil was nothing more than the Sultan's puppet. Just one month later, in February of 1906, tensions arose again when students at the Khedivial Cairo Law School went on strike at the prompting of Kamil's *al-Liwa* publication. Al-Liwa's editorial about the director of the school's incessant mistreatment of students caused students to walk out and despite the threat of being expelled, refuse to return. Cromer eventually stepped in to negotiate a truce between the two groups and the students returned to school. In addition to these events, in April the Dinshaway incident occurred.

¹¹² Reid, 21, 22

influence in that land; that he had deprived the executives of every power; that he had attacked the Muslim religion; that he had denied the Egyptian his right to education, and accusing him of ignorance and ingratitude, had insisted that Egypt be ruled by England; that he had attacked nationalism and attempted to stifle it; above all, that he had turned Egypt into a British colony.¹¹³

By 1908 building a new Egyptian University was no longer in the hands of the nationalists. Muhammad Abduh passed away in 1905, and Qasim Amin and Mustafa Kamil followed in 1907. The palace, under the direction of Prince Ahmad Fuad (1868-1936), later King Fuad I, preempted the project and raised the funds necessary to open the college. Central to the university was toleration for all religions, unlike Al-Azhar that was exclusively for Muslims.¹¹⁴ Initially, the curricula included English, Arabic literature and Islamic history and had few professors, but within a few years, the university offered classes in social and economic sciences alongside political and rural economy. According to a publicized university proclamation, what was necessary “was to seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge, as was the case in those early days of Islamic civilization and as is now the case among the nations of the West and Japan.”¹¹⁵ This exemplified a form of education that could liberate and create individual agency.

Indeed, in its early years the Egyptian University mirrored Al-Azhar in that, “It had no organized curriculum, firm admission standards, class levels, attendance requirements, grades, examinations, or degrees [and] anyone who registered and paid the modest fee was welcome.”¹¹⁶ Yet despite these early impediments, the University strongly encouraged missions abroad in order to train future professors. Before even officially opening its doors, a mission was sent in September of 1908, and from then until 1925 twenty-four of the many students who trained

¹¹³ Al-Sayyid, 180

¹¹⁴ M. Elshakry, 216

¹¹⁵ Ibid. The inclusion of Japan was due to their victory over Russia in the 1904-1905 War. The Russo-Japanese War was rooted in imperial rivalries regarding both Manchuria and Korea. That a small oriental power was able to defeat one of the largest Christian nations had an electrifying impact on the nationalists in Egypt, and indeed around the world.

¹¹⁶ Reid, 44

abroad in England, France, Germany and Italy became professors.¹¹⁷ One such student was Taha Husayn (1889-1973), who became the first Egyptian Dean of Arts in 1930.¹¹⁸ Husayn was one of the first students to attend the Egyptian University and to study abroad with one of its missions.¹¹⁹ Husayn's disheartening experience at Al-Azhar was everything Muhammad Abduh had attempted to reform, but to no avail. The stagnating teaching methods at the religious institution including repetition and learning by rote had been in place for centuries. The curriculum included:

The traditional sciences, based on divine revelation, and therefore exempt from criticism became firmly established... the chief of these are four in number: (1) *Hadith*, the body of tradition which apart from the Koran is the chief source of our knowledge of the Prophet and his teaching. The study of hadith involves examination not only of the text but also of the authorities by whom each tradition was handed down. (2) *Tafsir*, or interpretation of the Koran. (3) First Principles, or the fundamentals of law, which represent the basis of agreement between the four schools of law, or rites of orthodox Islam, the *Hanafite*, *Shafite*, *Malikite*, and *Hanbalite*. (4) Tawhid, or doctrine of the One God.¹²⁰

Additionally, students studied grammar, syntax, prosody, rhetoric, logic, and touched upon astronomy. Abandoned were mathematics and the humanities.¹²¹ Abduh's attempt at combining Western science with Islamic learning came to naught and Al-Azhar continued limping along as it had for centuries, much to the dismay of the students. The curricula at Al-Azhar, according to Abduh, was antithetical to the original teachings of Islam.¹²² For Husayn, Al-

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 63

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 2

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 64

¹²⁰ Wayment, vi

¹²¹ Ibid., vi

¹²² Following Abduh's death, Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Abduh's biographer and most fervent follower, continued publishing the journal *Al-Manar*, which became central to propagating the *Salafiyya* message. (P.J. Vatikiotis. *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*. p.198) Ana Belen Soage writes that Rashid Rida's *Salafiyya* movement, premised on the work of al-Afghani and Abduh, advocated a return to the early principles of the Prophet and the four Caliphs. Per contra, while both Al-Afghani and Abduh supported the reconciliation of modernity and Islam, Rida eventually determined that modernity would cause Egyptians to lose touch and finally abandon Islam. Unlike Rida, Al-Afghani and Abduh's *Salafism* was a genuine attempt to question Islamic traditions that had no true connection to the Holy Scriptures, and moreover, engage Islam with the western innovations they deemed most positive, such as scientific enquiry. (Ana Belen Soage. "Rashid Rida's Legacy." *The Muslim World*. P.

Azhar was a required step in his education. As such, being able to attend the newly opened Egyptian University and moreover, being sent on a mission abroad made the young Hussayn incredibly happy.

Conversely, the idea of Egyptian students studying abroad greatly displeased the British. During his tenure, Cromer obstructed attempts by students to study in Europe fearing they would return with nationalist ideas and become hostile to the British presence in Egypt. In 1912, he remarked to Lord Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916), who became Consul-General following Gorst's untimely death in 1911, "When I was in Egypt I did whatever I could to discourage young Egyptians being sent to England at all, the true solution being to improve higher and technical education in Egypt to such an extent as to render the dispatch of young Egyptians to Europe unnecessary."¹²³ Contrary to these words, in his twenty-four years as Consul-General Cromer did everything in his power to limit, stymie and all but neglect higher education for Egyptians fearing the possibility of rebellion.¹²⁴ The end result of Cromer's disciplinary mandate was a two-tiered system that, because of the fees needed to attend higher levels, greatly limited the vast majority of Egyptians from attending.

16) It is also important to note that Rida's ideas and reforms manifested later than Al-Afghani and Abduh's. Rida's rigid orthodoxy no doubt developed in response to the imperial actions of the British in governing Egypt. While Rida was content to carry on parts of Abduh's reforms, he focused most of his energies on defending Islam against attacks by those who fully embraced western traditions and values. For Rida, the use of reason, specifically western reasoning, would corrode Islamic practices as such, he attempted to direct his followers towards a more rigid and literal expounding of Islamic text. Rida's beliefs eventually propelled him towards "... an uncompromising legal and traditional puritanism akin to the spirit of the Wahhabis of Arabia, which alienated him from all other groups [furthermore] his revisionism was too daring for the conservatives, his puritanism too dry for the simple masses, and his restrictions too rigid for the Western-educated." (Nadav Safran. *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 196), 84)

¹²³ Cromer to Kitchener, London October 21, 1912, Cromer Papers, vol. 21, p. 302, cited in Mellini. *Sir Eldon Gorst: The Overshadowed Proconsul*, 171, 172

¹²⁴ Peter Mellini. *Sir Eldon Gorst: The Overshadowed Proconsul*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 172

However, Consul-General Gorst, once in charge, concluded that as long as the students were carefully selected and supervised whilst abroad, he would support the student missions.¹²⁵ Yet Gorst's support of the new Egyptian University and of the missions came too late. Despite attempts to enact changes to the educational system alongside the new Minister of Education Saad Zaghlul (1857-1927) that included, "... expanding the school system, introducing scholarships to the needy, resuming study missions to Europe, and Egyptianizing the teaching staffs,"¹²⁶ strikes and walk-outs occurred with increasing regularity at the Khedivial Law School, at the Royal School of Engineering and at Al-Azhar University. A central problem that frustrated both Gorst's attempts at reform and that of the nationalists was the special advisor to the Ministry of Education Douglas Dunlop.

Dunlop was a British missionary appointed by Cromer and referred to as the "assassin of education in Egypt" by Zaghlul.¹²⁷ Similar to other special advisors in the Egyptian government, Dunlop could overrule any reforms instituted by Zaghlul that displeased him—and there were many. One change that Zaghlul tried to implement was the teaching of Arabic at the primary and secondary levels. For nationalists, learning Arabic was key to learning Egyptian history, which would stroke loyalty and the love of Egypt in the young; however, the British desired a curriculum that advanced their imperialist agenda. As such, Dunlop pushed for the hiring of British teachers, who did not speak Arabic, and who taught Egyptians history, geography and mathematics in English.¹²⁸ However, by superseding Dunlop, Zaghlul reached an understanding with Gorst that entailed having primary students be taught all subjects in Arabic except English

¹²⁵ Ibid., 172

¹²⁶ Reid, 21

¹²⁷ Russel, 54

¹²⁸ Ibid.

and that also placed a greater emphasis on religious studies.¹²⁹ Indeed, the reforms advanced by Zaghlul would go on to create a middle-class in the 1930s vastly different than the small one found at the beginning of the twentieth century, but this was still decades away.

As such, at the turn of the twentieth century the Egyptian intelligentsia consisted mainly of a small privileged class known as the *Effendiya*, who had access to higher education and who were able to travel to Europe to finalize their studies.¹³⁰ Slowly, this class grew to encompass middle-class notables such as Kamil, yet in this period using education to become socially mobile was still very difficult without coming from a well-connected family. Thus, the *Effendiya* class became part of an emerging secular middle-class and came to embrace the understanding of an Egyptian identity. Educated and privileged, the *Effendi* nevertheless found themselves treated as inferiors by the British, and were quick to support the liberal nationalist parties such as Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid's (1872-1963) *Umma* Party (The People's Party), founded in 1907.¹³¹ However, the *Effendi* who belonged to the *Umma* Party were nationalists who believed in gradual change and furthermore, felt that they still had much to learn from the British.

Not so for members of the *Watani* Party who believed the British had no right to govern their country. This put the *Watani* members at odds with the *Umma* Party and tensions arose over Egypt's future. In the period leading to the first World War, competing agendas were found between numerous groups and some took to politics in the hopes of enacting change. Yet what

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ The *Effendi* class *ab ovo* arose in the nineteenth century and constituted western-educated Egyptians stemming from the upper classes. This privileged class worked as bureaucrats in Khedive Ismael's modernizing government; however, by the turn of the twentieth century, the *Effendi* encompassed numerous professions including doctors, engineers and lawyers. The *Effendiya* and the elites that ran the country had little in common with the majority of the population. The *fellahin* had little education, held onto traditional values and were considered largely "uncivilized" by the *Effendi*. The *Effendiya* saw themselves as modern Egyptians in the process of building a modern nation. There was little place for uneducated peasants whom they felt could contribute little to the nationalist dialogue.

¹³¹ Arthur Goldschmidt Amy J. Johnson, and Barak A. Salmoni. *Re-Envisioning Egypt 1919-1952*, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005), 124-30

united urban Egyptians was the understanding that without education, modernizing was impossible. Cromer knew that once educated, subalterns would make a mockery of the imperial *mission civilizatrice* and a rebellion would undoubtedly occur. Missionaries, for their part, had their own agenda and while supportive of the imperial mandate, nevertheless aspired to educate in order to convert souls. Prior to World War One, Egypt was in such dire need of schools and medical clinics that Egyptians tended to accommodate missionaries because of their limited options. Yet this too would not last and eventually many Egyptians would want missionaries expelled from their country.

In conclusion, from 1882 until Egyptian independence in 1922, the changes made to the education system did little to help the majority of Egyptians. In 1882, Abduh (while in exile in Paris for taking part in the Urabi' Revolt) sent a paper on educational reform to the Egyptian government advocating that students needed both religious learning and technological training. In his paper Abduh wrote that "lack of religion in the government schools, and the absence of the latter [technology] in the religious schools, account for the educational and motivational deficiencies that are holding up progress."¹³² Yet this did not affect upper-class Egyptians who had the means to study abroad. The British, specifically Cromer's educational policies rooted in social control, created a two-tiered system between the educated urban Egyptian elites and the illiterate rural *fellahin* in order to maintain stability, but, this eventually changed with the beginnings of a new middle-class. Gregory Starrett writes that, "For the new Egyptian elites created by the schools, educational institutions eventually became centers of nationalist resistance to imperial goals, as they struggled both with the British and with traditional Turco-

¹³² A. Chris Eccel. *Egypt, Islam and Social Change: Al-Azhar in Conflict and Accommodation*, (Berlin: Klaus, Schwarz, Verlag, 1984), 146

Circassian elite of the Palace for control over the benefits of schooling as an engine of agricultural productivity, a tool of social control, and later as a basis for mass mobilization.”¹³³

Indeed, tensions and competing agendas regarding Egypt’s future, revolving around both access to education and the educational curricula, stemmed from the British, the Egyptian government, Al-Azhar University, the missionaries as well as a new breed of nationalists such as Kamil, who no longer accepted the British *mission civilizatrice*. The British, for their part, did everything they could to limit access to education and enforce a curricula that supported imperialist goals. Notwithstanding, with Cromer’s departure the curricula in local *kuttabs* changed and came to encompass Egyptian ideals that would forge a new generation keen for independence and motivated to implement it. Cromer’s worse fears came to pass in that those student missions educated abroad, thanks to Consul-General Gorst’s approval, returned home hostile to the British.¹³⁴ The middle-class wanted access to higher education, and the opening of the Egyptian University paved the way for some, however, many Egyptians were left on the periphery unable to access education, afford it or—in the case of women—obstructed because of societal norms. This would change in the coming decades, but only with much effort from numerous people, organizations and a revolution no less.

¹³³ Gregory Starrett. *Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics and Religious Transformation in Egypt*, (London: University of California Press, 1998), 63

¹³⁴ Mellini, 172

CHAPTER 2

Navigating Nationalist Waters: *Egyptian Feminism, Education and the Middle-Class*

If I had the right to legislate I would decree... Primary and secondary school education for girls, and compulsory preparatory school education for all. Instruction for girls on the theory and practice of home economics, health, first aid, and childcare. Setting a quota for females in medicine and education so they can serve the women of Egypt. Allowing women to study any other advanced subjects they wish without restriction.

Bahithat al-Badiya, Cairo, 1909¹³⁵

Author and pedagogue Malak Hifni Nasif (1886-1918), known under her pen name as Bahithat al-Badiya, was an *avant-garde* Egyptian reformer who advocated for women's rights. Born into the literary middle-class, Al-Badiya argued that education could help women take their rightful place in public next to men. The quote above, given by al-Badiya as part of a speech at the Umma Club in 1909, not only argued that education was critical to an emerging Egyptian feminist agenda, but also delineated the complexities involved within this debate. Whilst endorsing schooling for women and girls, al-Badiya also supported veiling in public, framed her argument within Islamic precepts, and finally, engaged in nationalist, anti-colonialist rhetoric. As such, al-Badiya neither embraced upper-class secular elitism as some feminists did, nor buttressed the notion that a woman's role was solely that of a wife and mother. Al-Badiya exemplified and highlighted the complexity and fluidity of the debates in Egypt about women's roles and status.

Her blending of local and global ideas and sensibilities stood in stark contrast with the arguments of Islamic-modernists, such as Qasim Amin, who at the turn of the twentieth century, tended to base their gendered ideas upon a secular European understanding. Indeed, notions of

¹³⁵ Bahithat al-Badiya. "A Lecture in the Club of the Umma Party," 1909, in Margot Badran and Miriam Cooke. *Opening the Gate: A Century of Arab Feminist Writing*, (London: Virago Press, 1990), 237-238

women's progress often used European methods of mothering as a comparison.¹³⁶ Amin believed that a direct causal link could be found between Europe's civilizational advancements and European normative values relating to women.¹³⁷ As such, if Egypt wanted to modernize and take its place on the world stage and moreover, achieve independence, women needed an education. However, as Mona L. Russell argues, creating "the new woman" had little to do with women themselves, and more to do with how their education could effectively abet their husband's position and in turn, advance Egyptian society.¹³⁸ This articulation of an Egyptian nationalist ideology, that stemmed from the educated Turko-Circassian elite, and linked the role of women with that of domesticity, was also an articulation of patriarchal power, "... understood as a strategic relation of force that permeates life and is productive of new forms of desires, objects, relations and discourses."¹³⁹ Islamic-modernists theorized the ways—and places—Egyptian women should (and should not) be moving, acting and living in order to create a modern Egypt rooted in progressive values. In other words, this theory involved maintaining social order, and enforcing disciplinary control over the roles of women.

In the decades following al-Badiya's speech, numerous feminists advanced women's rights primarily by using nationalism and the media as a vehicle to advance their educational agenda. Indeed, with the advent of the women's press in the 1880s, which created a platform where women could publicly voice their opinions on subjects most pertinent to them, women began demanding greater rights than those solely pertaining to becoming better mothers.¹⁴⁰ As

¹³⁶ The ascribing of European values to Egyptian women resulted in the creation of numerous Islamic societies that asserted that Islam offered a complete solution to all of society's ills, including in the construction of gender.

¹³⁷ Cole, 395

¹³⁸ Russell, 55

¹³⁹ Michel Foucault. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Trans. C. Gordon, 109-33. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1972, cited in Saba Mahmood. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 17

¹⁴⁰ Badran, 15

such, the trajectory of the woman's movement in Egypt was coterminous with the rise of Egyptian nationalism. As mentioned, the "Woman Question" and the modernizing of Egypt were dyadic; nationalists like Amin felt that educating women would benefit the nation. Yet this opening, that allowed women a modicum of freedom, had strict guidelines attached. However, women actively resisted the disciplinary forces that fought to keep them in "their place."

Indeed, Egyptian feminists including Bahithat al-Badiya, Huda Shar'awi (1879-1947), Nabawiyah Musa (1886-1951), Munira Thabit (1902-1967) and Doria Shafik (1908-1975) advanced their agendas initially by attempting to work within the established societal paradigm, but eventually realized that real change required actively resisting patriarchal normative limits. It is important to note that these feminist reformers came from different socio-economic backgrounds, lived in different time periods and had different familial situations that affected how much mobility they had. While there were similarities amongst them, chiefly education, changing laws pertaining marriage, and advancing women's right, how they assumed agency and fought to enact change must be analyzed individually.¹⁴¹ This chapter argues that feminists Bahithat al-Badiya, Huda Shar'awi, Nabawiyah Musa, Munira Thabit and Doria Shafik navigated a male-dominated culture, grappled and engaged with the "Woman Question," and most importantly, succeeded in achieving agency in order to realize their educational objectives, despite the patriarchal, normative limits imposed upon. Indeed, by actively resisting the disciplinary forces that fought to keep them regulated to the private sphere, women managed to

¹⁴¹ For example, feminist reformer Bahithat al-Badiya lived in a vastly different Egypt the early nineteenth century than did Doria Shafik in the 1940s. To illustrate, finding books to read was an incredibly difficult endeavor for women in the early twentieth century; Huda Sha'rawi recalled secretly buying books from a traveling salesman who came to her front door and moreover, breaking into her father's bookcase in order to pilfer books to read. While the topic of educating women and having literate wives flooded the Egyptian press, accessing reading material was still extremely difficult with many books out of reach for literate middle and upper-class women. The Khedivial Library, founded in 1870 and now known as the Egyptian National Library, only allowed women entry somewhere between the late 1920s and early 1930s. (Beth Baron, "*The Women's Press in Egypt*," 223)

carve out public spaces to initially congregate in, and eventually achieve an education. Successes included the spread of welfare/benevolent societies, the opening of educational institutions, and having middle-class women attain access to education.

In exploring the women's movement lived by these feminists, the oppressive British occupation must be acknowledged. Within colonialist Egypt, gender was used by the British as a tool to rationalize and legitimize imperialist and paternalistic systems of power. Portraying themselves as the saviors of "oppressed Muslim women" allowed the British to morally justify their invasion of Egypt. Thus, the imperialist rhetoric placed women at the center of *la mission civilisatrice*, in turn galvanizing the local populace to engage in the "Woman Question." As consul-general of Egypt, Lord Cromer believed that, "The position of women in Egypt, and Mohammedan [sic] countries generally, is, therefore a fatal obstacle to the attainment of that elevation of thought and character which should accompany the introduction of European civilization, if that civilization is to produce its full measure of beneficial effect. The obvious remedy would appear to be to educate the women."¹⁴² Yet his policies vis-à-vis women was to limit education as much as possible. As mentioned, Lord Cromer wanted a quiescent Egypt that would follow colonial directives while the Egyptian economy was repurposed to suit the needs of the British economy. The primary goal for the British was to keep Egypt firmly ensconced as a dependent economy, "which guaranteed the security of European loans, investments, and other interests."¹⁴³ Socially, Lord Cromer wanted no trouble with the locals and certainly did not want

¹⁴² Evelyn Baring, The Earl of Cromer. *Modern Egypt*, vol. 2, (New York: Macmillan, 1908), 539. The debate surrounding Egyptian women began with the Napoleonic invasion at the turn of the nineteenth century, which greatly influenced Egyptian culture, and moreover, led to comparisons between French and Egyptian women. Elite Egyptians saw French women as educated, independent and well-spoken, while Egyptian women were seen as their direct opposite. With the British occupation of 1882, these gendered ideas were further cemented. Additionally, Cromer was renowned for his anti-feminist views in Britain, yet had no qualms vilifying the treatment of subaltern women by indigenous men in order to legitimize the colonization of Egypt.

¹⁴³ Cole, 390

to encourage educating women (despite their contradictory imperial rhetoric) lest Egyptian men take umbrage and cause problems with the colonial mission.

The nationalist debate surrounding the British occupation, along with a thriving print media, created the perfect aperture for the feminist movement to flourish. Increasingly confronted with European ideas and values, the “Woman Question” became a publicly contested dialectic creating friction and tensions within society.¹⁴⁴ In *Egypt as a Woman*, author Beth Baron writes that the “Woman Question” culturally divided society between traditionalists who felt women’s primary role was that of a mother, and secular-modernists who believed women should actively participate within the community.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, it divided society on topics such as seclusion, segregation, veiling, education, marriage law, work, domesticity and finally education. Women for their part, according to Baron, tended to argue from three differing positions: secularism, modernism and Islamism. Secularists tended to focus on language and education; modernists hoped to ameliorate women’s roles within familial circles through the reinterpretation of the Quran; and finally, Islamic feminists believed that the Quran espoused women’s rights and a return to Islam was the answer.¹⁴⁶ These were not hermetically sealed categories and at times, agendas were remarkably similar.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ This included those who argued for an abandonment of Islamic practices that favored the segregation and seclusion of women with those who felt that women could be liberated within Islam.

¹⁴⁵ Beth Baron. *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, (Oakland: University of California Press, 2005), 32-34. Conservative sectors of society felt that Egypt had lost its way when it had begun absorbing French and British values and that a modern Egypt meant founding an Egyptian Islamic nation that ensured traditional continuity. In other words, this meant ensuring that women remained veiled and spatially entrapped in the private sphere. For others, modernity meant emulating European nations, having a society built on the principles of the Enlightenment and an Egypt that emphasized reason and scientific progress that was based on Islamic-modernism. This view held that women should be spatially liberated and allowed access to education. Islamic-modernism was premised on the notion that many traditional practices were not in keeping with Islam, and this was advanced by Islamic scholars Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). These were not stringent, binary categories and class played an important role vis-à-vis the construction of gender roles.

¹⁴⁶ Baron, *The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press*, 7

¹⁴⁷ Beth Baron writes that prior to the 1919 Revolution, women tended to fall into either the modernist or Islamist groupings. Islamic feminists claimed that while they believed in the rights of female education, they did not wish to change Islamic law. Rather, they hoped to work within it. Modernists, however, hoped to advance the cause for

As some Egyptian women increasingly voiced their demands in the public sphere, few came to embrace the idea of feminism. This in itself caused moral outrage in certain quarters; conservative forces desiring the return of an Islamic society felt that feminism was a western cultural implant. French activist Hubertine Auclert conceptually framed the term feminism during the nineteenth century. Auclert desired the rights and freedoms promised to women during the French Revolution.¹⁴⁸ The word itself, as defined by the Oxford Dictionary of the English Language, is described as, “Advocacy of equality of the sexes and the establishment of the political, social, and economic rights of the female sex.”¹⁴⁹ Yet this generic definition does not do justice to the historical evolution of feminism in developing countries. Feminism, whether French, American or Egyptian, was a movement that flourished based on the demands particular to the nation where these women resided. As such, no two feminist movements were alike, and as this paper will attempt to emphasize, Egyptian feminism was specifically oriented to the needs of Egyptian women and to the historical context of Egypt, which included an oppressive British occupation obsessed with maintaining social control at all costs, anachronistic patriarchal Islamic traditions and an educational mandate. As mentioned earlier, feminist al-Badiya emblemized the dichotomous nature of the feminist movement in Egypt. While being vehemently against polygamy, she was nevertheless firmly Islamist, strongly disliked any foreign mimicry, and yet outspoken in her aspirations for both educating girls and for allowing women into the workforce if they so chose.¹⁵⁰

women with a genuine restructuring of the law, specifically pertaining to marriage laws. Moreover, while the agendas of the two groups sometimes seemed to merge, politically they supported different ideological platforms. The modernists tended to be liberal and affiliate themselves with the *Umma* Party, while the Islamists generally favored the pro-Ottoman *Watani* Party.

¹⁴⁸ Badran, 242

¹⁴⁹ *Oxford Dictionary*, s.v. “feminism,” accessed April, 12, 2017.

<https://www.oed.com.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/view/Entry/69192?redirectedFrom=Feminism#eid>

¹⁵⁰ al-Badiya, 237-238

In an exploration on gender and power, author Joan W. Scott concludes that it is a socially-constructed phenomena. In other words, gender, like class and race, has a socially agreed upon meaning. Prior to Scott's seminal work, feminists posited that the analyses of gender fell into one of three conceptual categories: patriarchy and male domination, a Marxist approach and finally, a psychoanalytical one based on French post-structuralism and Anglo-American object relations theorists.¹⁵¹ Scott disagreed with these approaches and rather argued that "gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power."¹⁵² This definition further involved a number of subsets. Essentially, the representation of power invariably affected social relationships between the sexes. In using Scott's approach, the analysis of gendered space in Egypt in the early twentieth century then is about the contestation and articulation of disciplinary power. Nowhere was this more relevant than in the negotiation and repurposing of gendered space for women's education.

Furthermore, it is important to note that in a modernizing Egypt, "The religious establishment [Al-Azhar] was eroded piecemeal in the drive towards secularization of education and law. The only exception to this was the sphere of personal status laws... which created an awkward dichotomy between their [women's] role as citizens of the nation (*watan*) and as members of the religious community (*umma*)."¹⁵³ Specifically, when Khedive Ismail brought the Egyptian criminal court under the purview of the French Civil Code in the 1870s, he left marriage laws untouched, which meant they remained part of Sharia law.¹⁵⁴ In essence, civil

¹⁵¹ Joan W. Scott. "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis." *The American Historical Review*. vol 91. no. 5 (1986): 1057

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 1067

¹⁵³ Margot Badran. "Competing Agenda: Feminists, Islam and the State in Nineteenth-and Twentieth-Century Egypt." in Deniz Kandiyoti. *Women, Islam and the State*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 201

¹⁵⁴ Muhammad Ali's grandson Khedive Ismail succeeded the throne in 1867. Ismail managed to complete the Suez Canal and then lose it, as well as the Egyptian nation to the British in 1882. It is readily apparent that the Khedive

status pertaining to marriage, divorce, inheritance and children remained under the purview of Islamic law. These were all laws that directly affected women, which created a disconnection within society. Not wanting to alienate the patriarchal, religious forces in society, Ismail left family law intact.¹⁵⁵ For instance, feminist Huda Sha'rawi's contracted marriage to her much older first cousin pertained to her inheritance. Thus, the subjugation of women often related to ensuring that wealth remained within the immediate family, and moreover allowed men to dictate what was, and what was not, acceptable behavior for their wives to engage in.¹⁵⁶ This included being able to open a benevolent society in their private dwelling, which al-Badiya did, or having access to higher education, something Musa's family forbade.¹⁵⁷

However, this latter aspect, that of education, was not an issue for elite Turko-Circassian women who were educated in the family home. It is these women who were behind "the woman's awakening" at the turn of the twentieth century. Beth Baron further posits that this was the beginning of Egyptian feminism. Women used print culture to propagate their message and argued that through education they could aid in the social metamorphosis of society.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, the advancement of education in tandem with the growth of print culture gave previously secluded women a place to, "... defend women's rights and express their views [and]... help advance the nation."¹⁵⁹ Indeed, writing for love of country was not only a noble endeavor that

equated modernity and civilization with everything European. The Khedive asserted plainly, "My country is no longer in Africa; we are now part of Europe. It is therefore natural for us to abandon our former ways and to adopt a new system adapted to our social conditions." Quote from Alan Mikhail. *The Animal in Ottoman Egypt*. Ismael's quest to turn Egypt into a European nation brought the country on the verge of bankruptcy, at which point the British stepped in, in 1882. The core issues for the British were to protect the Suez Canal, stabilize the Egyptian economy and, of course, to occupy it before France had the chance to.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 201, 202

¹⁵⁶ Spaces and places in Egyptian society were stringently organized and controlled, whether in the home or in public.

¹⁵⁷ Badran, *Feminists, Islam and Nation*, 54

¹⁵⁸ Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press*, 3

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 1, 42

early feminist writers embraced wholeheartedly, but was also of preeminent importance in spreading the ideals of nationalism. Historian Benedict Anderson connects the importance of nationalism and media in *Imagined Communities*. He writes that newspapers are a necessary component of the nationalist debate; Anderson defines them as “one-day best-sellers” that help a nation imagine and spatially conceive of itself.¹⁶⁰ The spread of women’s magazines, journals and dailies did just that. It created a community of readers who, on a daily basis, would access the same information as their compatriots connecting them through topics and (eventually) a vernacular language.

As such, print and popular culture provided a hitherto untapped space where a very public contestation of what it meant to be Egyptian took place. The women’s publishing industry began taking shape in the 1890s with discussions of topics such as veiling, seclusion and marriage laws.¹⁶¹ These issues created a dynamic, thriving debate with newspapers supporting different aspects of the women’s movement.¹⁶² One of the first women’s journals in Egypt, launched in 1882, was *al-Fatat*, which published the views of women and debated and defended their rights. The editor Hind Nawfal wrote, “Do not imagine that a woman who writes in a journal is compromising her modesty or violating her purity and good behavior.”¹⁶³ Journals and dailies were an acceptable means to participate in the nationalist struggle about education under colonial rule without damaging one’s reputation. One can surmise that neither Lord Cromer nor Egyptian men saw the launching of women’s journals as a threat to the status quo. Yet female

¹⁶⁰ Anderson, 35

¹⁶¹ Baron, *The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press*, 14

¹⁶² Islamic marriage laws were often at the root of this debate. These diverging views on marriage, on veiling and other topics related to gender and modernity played out in the public sphere.

¹⁶³ Baron, *The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press*, 1

writers realized the power of the pen and more importantly, the power an “imagined geography” had in the construction of gendered space and in the resisting of patriarchal norms.

Initially, the women’s press focused mostly on European sources, but eventually this changed and an “indigenization” of press articles occurred. Furthermore, women’s journals increasingly attempted to reach a larger audience by publishing materials and events targeting a more diverse female readership.¹⁶⁴ In this way, women’s journals transcended class lines.¹⁶⁵ Periodicals published during this time period included Munira Thabit’s *L’Espoire* (1925) and *Al-Amal* (1926), Huda Sha’rawi’s *L’Egyptienne* (1925) and the Arabic language *Al-Misriyya* (1937). Additionally, Nabawiyah Musa published autobiographical essays in the journal *Majallat al-fatat* (1937), and Doria Shafik founded *Ittihad Bint al-Nil* in 1945 and took control of *La Femme Nouvelle* in 1947.¹⁶⁶

For instance, al-Badiya published numerous articles in *al-Jarida* (founded in 1907), a journal that represented the views of the *Umma* Party.¹⁶⁷ As an unhappily (and unwitting) second wife, she argued vehemently against polygamous marriages, desired laws pertaining to marriage changed and canvassed for girls’ education in government schools.¹⁶⁸ Al-Badiya attained her secondary school diploma in 1903, and became a teacher in 1905. However, her marriage to a Bedouin chief two years later ended her short-lived career as a pedagogue. In enforcing strict disciplinary control over the roles of women, the Egyptian school system did not allow married

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 66

¹⁶⁵ Baron writes that the content of the journals shifted overtime to focus more specifically on Egyptian upper and middle-class women rather than Western women. (p. 66)

¹⁶⁶ Osman, Ahmed Zaki. “Women’s Movement: A Look Back, and Forward.” March 8, 2012. Accessed March 10, 2018. <https://www.egyptindependent.com/news/womens-movement-look-back-and-forward>

¹⁶⁷ Badran, *Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences*, 21

¹⁶⁸ Baron, *The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press*, 113

women to work as teachers.¹⁶⁹ She did, however, continue to write.¹⁷⁰ Al-Badiya felt controlled by her husband, and deeply resented her plight, and indeed that of Egyptian women. In 1909 she wrote:

We have archaic practices that shout for reform... [men] are subject to the injustice of the government on one hand, and the difficulty of making ends meet on the other. They find no one to take revenge upon except us... Oh God, inspire the men of our government to do right because their injustice to the nation has many repercussions on us.¹⁷¹

Although al-Badiya firmly supported the movement to educate girls and women, she did not believe all women should unveil. In this matter, and “While they were claiming women’s rights to public space [she] and Huda Sha’rawi actually opposed the unveiling of the face, which pro-feminist advocated. They wanted women to gain more education and to reclaim public space before they unveiled, as a tactical move.”¹⁷² As such, al-Badiya separated herself from ardent feminists who based their agendas on a secular understanding and believed unveiling to be of, “... ideological and symbolic value.”¹⁷³ Moreover, al-Badiya believed women had the right to decide what was in their best interest and neither men, nor other women, should impose their viewpoints on such a personal manner.¹⁷⁴ Equally important, al-Badiya felt that women should have access to historically premised male-dominated spaces such as the mosque in order to attend public prayer.¹⁷⁵ The agency al-Badiya displayed in these scenarios resisted upper-class, hegemonic secular-liberal norms, while simultaneously countering Islamic orthodoxy.

¹⁶⁹ Badran, *Feminists, Islam and Nation*, 54 and, Margot Badran. *Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences*, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009), 69

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 134

¹⁷¹ al-Badiya, 136

¹⁷² Badran, *Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences*, 22

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ Leila Ahmed. *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 180

¹⁷⁵ al-Badiya. 230

In 1909, al-Badiya summed up (and refuted) the main arguments made by men to keep women at home. Many of these arguments were advanced by Mustafa Kamil's *Watani* Party, who were, "... antagonistic toward women's emancipation, which they claimed was a result of Western influence and would undermine Egyptian society."¹⁷⁶ First, al-Badiya stated that men blamed the discord between men and women on their terrible upbringing, yet she posited that the real problem was, "... men's ignorance and pride."¹⁷⁷ Second, men felt that once women were educated, they would overtake the workplace; al-Badiya's response was that historically, before machines, women worked alongside men. It was men, and their inventions, that pushed women out of work. Al-Badiya approved and appreciated progress, but women should (finally) be allowed to return to the workforce.¹⁷⁸ Next, she argued that housework took up at most half the day, and therefore, women would not neglect the home, but rather would have something to occupy themselves with the other half of the day. Furthermore, the age-old argument that, "You women have been created for the house and we have been created to be breadwinners," was not a mandated by God and was moreover, nonsensical.¹⁷⁹

Finally, the claim that women being overly educated would do more harm than good, and also, that men were actually sparing women from the "burden" of working were ridiculous arguments.¹⁸⁰ In one speech, al-Badiya managed to lay waste to all of the male arguments *du jour*. The only argument missing being that nation came before women's rights, this would soon become a refrain that would be repeated ad nauseum. Al-Badiya tragically passed away at the age of thirty-two of the Spanish flu, yet before her death she managed to initiate numerous

¹⁷⁶ Badran, *Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences*, 22

¹⁷⁷ al-Badiya, 228

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 229

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 230

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 231

committees including, “A women’s association, intended to bring women together and disseminate information; an emergency dispensary and nursing service modeled on the Red Cross, for emergency relief, and a nursing school for women, which she established in her own home at her own expense.”¹⁸¹

Unlike al-Badiya, Sha’rawi came from the elite Turko-Circassian class. Raised in the enclosed and secluded family space of the harem, Sha’rawi was the daughter of Muhammad Sultan Pasha and a concubine. As mentioned, her family forced to marry her first cousin at age 13; in her memoirs she wrote, “I was deeply troubled by the idea of marrying my cousin whom I had always regarded as a father or older brother deserving my fear and respect. I grew more upset when I thought of his wife and three daughters who were all older than me, who used to tease me saying, ‘Good day, stepmother!’”¹⁸² Sha’rawi’s mother and cousin/legal guardian ‘Ali Sha’rawi made the decision that she would marry ‘Ali, thus keeping the wealth in the family.¹⁸³ This was a perfect example of daughters subject to the whims of their family due to inheritance laws. Fifteen months into the marriage Sha’rawi’s husband impregnated one of their slaves. Sha’rawi’s familial connections allowed her the freedom of mobility and she left her husband for seven years.¹⁸⁴ They did reconcile, but in the interim Sha’rawi, while circumspect, did appreciate the freedom it afforded her and began attending and hosting literary salons.¹⁸⁵

In 1909, whilst separated from her husband, Sha’rawi organized the first university lectures for women. Being quite young, Sha’rawi needed an older female patron to sponsor the

¹⁸¹ Ahmed, 184

¹⁸² Margot Badran and Miriam Cooke. *Opening the Gates: A Century of Arab Feminist Writing*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 45

¹⁸³ Badran, *Feminists, Islam and Nation*, 35

¹⁸⁴ Huda Sha’rawi, *Harem Years: The Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist (1879-1924)*, (New York: The Feminist Press at CUNY, 1986), 61

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 76, 78

event and she found this in Princess Ain al-Hayat.¹⁸⁶ A Frenchwoman named Marguerite Clement gave the first lecture in French at the Egyptian University. Sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation, the lecture involved a comparative analysis of European and Egyptian women and a debate about veiling. Attending publicly given lectures at the Egyptian University was a coup for the women's movement. Lectures took place on Fridays, the day men attended prayers at the local mosques, thus allowing women to repurpose space for educational endeavors.¹⁸⁷ The lecture series became very popular with an audience that included numerous princesses as well as the wives and daughters of beys, pashas, Christian notables and future prime ministers.

Within two years the lecture series that initially covered topics such as psychology, philosophy, education and feminism expanded to include lectures in Arabic on topics such as history and home economics; native Egyptian teacher Musa was in charge of lectures given in Arabic.¹⁸⁸ Al-Badiya also gave a lecture in 1909 titled "A Lecture in the Club of the *Umma* Party." She addressed numerous topics including the touchy subject of class differences amongst women. Furthermore, al-Badiya felt that, "Our education should also include home management, healthcare, and childcare."¹⁸⁹ Unfortunately, the women's section of the university was shut down after just three years of operation. The bellicosity of male students towards the "female invasion of 'male' space [led to] threats on the life of the university secretary."¹⁹⁰ Moreover, demonstrators made up of male students attempted to prohibit women from entering these repurposed educational spaces.¹⁹¹ As such, Sha'rawi, alongside both female teachers and students, in attempting to subvert male-dominated space faced resistance when challenging

¹⁸⁶ Sha'rawi, *Harem Years: The Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist (1879-1924)*, 93

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 93-94

¹⁸⁸ Mona L. Russell. *Creating the New Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education and National Identity, 1863-1922*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 124

¹⁸⁹ Margot Badran and Miriam Cooke, *Opening the Gates: A Century of Arab Feminist Writing*, 237

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 55

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

established norms. In other words, male students despite *not* using the space during Friday prayer, refused to accept women into a public space hitherto solely the purview of men.

Indeed, this was a prime example of the challenges early feminists dealt with as they attempted to carve out public spaces for their educational endeavors. By linking women to the nationalist debate, family honor became linked to national honor and female morality became linked to the morality of the nation.¹⁹² Women attempting to transcend the private sphere violated this code.¹⁹³ As mentioned earlier, even certain conservative sectors of society, such as members of the *Watani* Party, believed that women should have access to education as long as it was used in the home, and not to navigate the public sphere. The nationalist debate then was inextricably connected to familial metaphors. This narrative, in linking gender and motherhood to the nation, conceived of women as moral guardians and reproducers of the citizens of tomorrow; this created a representation of a feminized nation in need of male protection. The nationalist discourse necessitated a rhetoric that would create a cohesive community, and thus positioned men and women in specific roles.¹⁹⁴ Women, as moral guardians and mothers of the nation, initially used these roles to break into the public sphere, yet being placed upon a pedestal eventually became very limiting.

¹⁹² Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press*, 3, 4

¹⁹³ In 1920, two Egyptian sisters named Raya and Sakina were arrested in Alexandria, along with their spouses, for having murdered seventeen women and having hidden their bodies under the floorboards. Raya and Sakina were both prostitutes and owners of four houses of depravity. This story created a media sensation and had society up in arms. Conservative forces felt that the flourishing of prostitution was caused by foreign influences, and that women should not be allowed in the public sphere; moreover, women should be kept secluded under the watchful eyes of their fathers and husbands. Egypt was seen as being in the midst of a moral crisis caused by an erosion of Egyptian values, and a return to Islam would fix this dilemma. Conservative forces furthermore saw the murdered women as both victims and perpetrators. The women were blamed because they had placed themselves in the situation (the public sphere) where they could be harmed, and victimized not just because they had been killed, but because of the negative European influences that were destroying Egyptian society. The impact of the murders brought into question the public comportment of the sexes in the public sphere, and the press debated these issues of morality and the advent of a secular modernized Egypt on the nation. Shaun T. Lopez. "Madams, Murders and Media; Akhbar al-Hawadith and the Emergence of a Mass Culture in the 1920s Egypt." In *Re-Envisioning Egypt 1919-1952*, pp.371-393: 381

¹⁹⁴ Ahmed, 173

The mandate of many of the feminists was to aid in the modernization project by improving healthcare, establishing medical clinics, changing laws pertaining to marriage and finally, aiding women access education. This last aspect, as exemplified by the incident at the Egyptian University, was no easy feat as it involved maneuvering in forbidden male-dominated spheres. With the budget for education all but cut by Lord Cromer, women faced many setbacks in meeting their goals. Much of what they did achieve, in regards to education, pertained to middle-class women in urban areas. This would remain unchanged until 1923, when the Egyptian government regained control of the Ministry of Education. As previously stated, missionaries stepped into the void concluding that they could convert souls through education and they actively sought women believing that, as the heart of the family, they would then aid in the “civilizational” process of the home. Additionally, British wives also aided in charitable endeavors to help those in need. Yet this slowly changed as Egyptian feminists took up the mantle to care for those in need within their society.

Although upper-class women were able to leave the seclusion of the home, there were designated spaces in the public sphere specifically for women. If there was no designated space, then women were barred from entry. Women activists had a difficult time even meeting in public to discuss reform. In 1914, Shar’awi wrote that the Ladies Literary Improvement Society had a burdensome time finding a place to meet as “it was still not acceptable for women to have a place [in public] to congregate.”¹⁹⁵ In 1910, Sha’rawi and Princess Ain al-Hayat discussed opening a dispensary with a school attached. The purpose was to educate women on domesticity and modern healthcare. The Princess passed away and the project stalled for a period of time, but Sha’rawi eventually revived it. With the help of the Princess’ son, they rented a building in the

¹⁹⁵ Badran, *Feminism, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 55

Muhammad Ali section of Cairo and had a pharmacy constructed as well as a school. Sha'rawi created a committee and received donations to furnish the building.¹⁹⁶ This project came partly in response to an invitation that Sha'rawi received shortly before the Princess' death from the new Lady Cromer. The invitation was to attend a tea given in honor of the late Lady Cromer and the ladies who helped establish a pharmacy. Sha'rawi did not attend feeling that since she had not been part of the project that it would not be suitable for her to accept. Sha'rawi approved of the the dispensary; however, she felt that Egyptian women should run such projects.¹⁹⁷ While Sha'rawi was both intelligent and compassionate enough to appreciate the opening of a pharmacy by the late Lady Cromer, she contested the right of Europeans to transform Egyptian space. Indeed, she had "declined to take part in an enterprise headed by an Englishwoman."¹⁹⁸ As such, repurposing gendered space for educational (and medical) purposes also had important nationalist undertones.

Feminist Nabawiyah Musa clearly understood how difficult it was to navigate in a patriarchal society. Musa was the first Egyptian woman to pass the state baccalaureate examination in 1907. It would take two decades before another followed in her footsteps as, following Musa's success, the British barred Egyptian woman from sitting for the exam for the remainder of their tenure.¹⁹⁹ Born in lower Egypt in 1886 in the province of Qalyubiyah, Musa came from a middle-class family. Her father was an Egyptian officer in the army, which was the highest rank attainable for an Egyptian as the upper ranks were solely for elite Turko-Circassians. Her father died in the Sudan before she was born, and shortly thereafter her family, consisting of her mother and brother, relocated to Cairo in order for her brother to pursue an

¹⁹⁶ Huda Sha'rawi, *Harem Years: The Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist (1879-1924)*, 96

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 94

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation*, 44

education.²⁰⁰ Girls were rarely educated past the primary levels, and this was what Egyptian feminists hoped to rectify believing that curing ignorance was central to transforming the nation. “Many felt that ignorance was women’s basic problem, identified education as the cure, and attributed to it magical transformative powers.”²⁰¹ While the conservative elite championed educating girls, they supported private education in the home rather than have their daughters be educated in a public place. As important to segregating girls and women in public schools, was ensuring that social classes did not mix.²⁰² Generally girls could either attend the village Qur’anic school (*kuttab*), study with a local shaykh or be tutored at home. In pushing for educational reform, and for greater educational opportunities for girls, activists such as Musa hoped to establish curricula similar to the European model but rooted in Egyptian values.²⁰³

Unfortunately, for a middle-class woman like Musa, achieving an education without strong familial support was extremely difficult. The school system set in place in the nineteenth century, that included secular European-style schools, left religious schools under the control of the local shaykhs. The British, rather than amalgamate the two types of schools, preferred to keep them separate, thus keeping the different classes apart and enforcing a two-tiered educational system. The local village *kuttab*s had to “equip the pupil with sufficient knowledge to take care of his own interests in his own station of life, as small land-owner, fellah, petty shop-keeper, handicraftsman, weaver, village headman, boatman, fisherman.”²⁰⁴ In this way, the British hoped to adequately educate Egyptian peasants for their station and simultaneously ensure social control over the populace. This was similarly the case for Egyptian girls. Lower-

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 38, 39

²⁰¹ Baron, *The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press*, 122

²⁰² Ibid., 123

²⁰³ Ibid., 124

²⁰⁴ Starrett, 52

class girls attended vernacular schools, while middle and upper-class daughters attended primary schools. Upper-class students also had the option of being tutored at home, and many took advantage of this. Musa, however, was left to her own devices once she finished primary school and had to study on her own for certification.²⁰⁵ By the early twentieth century, many if not most of these village *kuttabs* became part of the Ministry of Education's purview. This then opened the door for state-trained teachers to increasingly begin teaching at these village schools.²⁰⁶

Yet becoming a female teacher was an arduous proposition due to the limited number of schools available. At the turn of the century, the Sania Normal school (where al-Badiya studied) opened its doors and shortly thereafter the Bulaq Normal School opened to train female teachers for local girls' *kuttabs*.²⁰⁷ The girls who aspired to become teachers came from one of only two state primary schools. As girls began attending public primary schools, one serious problem was the lack of state secondary schools for girls. Girls with a primary school education were not ready and too young to attend the Sania or Bulaq Normal School. Moreover, the problem remained that *kuttabs* and primary schools were in desperate need of female teachers and because of this lack male teachers filled the gap, which then "provided parents with justification for prohibiting or limiting their daughters' education."²⁰⁸

The first secondary schools opened only in 1920 and until this, Musa was the only Egyptian woman with a secondary certificate.²⁰⁹ Musa studied for the exam by pilfering books from her brother, sat for the exam and graduated in the top third of her class.²¹⁰ This was clearly Musa enacting agency as, "... agency [is] not simply... a synonym for resistance to relations of

²⁰⁵ Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press*, 130

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 126, 127

²⁰⁷ Russell, *Creating the New Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education and National Identity, 1863-1922*, 122

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 123

²⁰⁹ Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press*, 129

²¹⁰ Russell, *Creating the New Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education and National Identity, 1863-1922*, 124

domination, but as a capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create and enable.”²¹¹ Musa adhered to the patriarchal norms that restricted her access to a secondary state institution, and yet she succeeded in her quest to achieve a secondary certificate by circumventing these same norms.

Consequently, Musa was extremely aware of how careful she needed to be if she wanted to continue maneuvering in male-dominated public spaces and circumventing the status quo. Leaving the confinement of protected, permitted spaces meant that Musa, and other women who followed in her footsteps, had to be stringently careful with their reputation. For middle and upper-class women who symbolized not only Islam in its purest form, but also the morality of the family and of the Egyptian nation, this meant veiling while in public.²¹² This was especially important if you were navigating in forbidden spaces, such as Musa when she first began teaching. Musa, like al-Badiya and Sha’rawi, found that veiling created a boundary that allowed her more mobility in public environments. In many ways, the veil was an intermediate step to fully claiming gendered space in the public sphere. The veil allowed her to move freely without being completely exposed.²¹³

Indeed, mobility for Musa was of utmost importance to the extent that she refused to even consider marriage especially considering she would lose her teaching post upon doing so. Marriage would have “... entailed her reconfinement to the domestic sphere,” something she had no desire to return to after having won her freedom and independence.²¹⁴ Furthermore, choosing not to marry was a form of agency that empowered Musa and that allowed her to achieve her

²¹¹ Mahmood, 18

²¹² Badran, *Feminism, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 47

²¹³ Badran, *Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences*, 73. Eventually, both Sha’rawi and Musa chose to unveil as did many other middle and upper-class women in the 1910s and 1920s.

²¹⁴ Badran, *Feminism, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt*, 45

objectives. Thus, Musa inhabited norms, but simultaneously resisted them, which allowed her the freedom she needed to continue working as a teacher.

Musa was both a feminist and a nationalist who believed all women should have access to education and be able to work in the public sphere. Above all she wanted to be independent and self-sufficient. Musa was "... born fatherless in a culture where the patriarchal family was paramount."²¹⁵ This greatly affected the choices she made during her lifetime. Musa became a teacher, a headmistress and opened a number of schools.²¹⁶ As such, she was the first to take on roles previously held only by men and foreigners. Musa negotiated male-dominated spaces, founded girls' schools and actively reimagined and then set about socially reconstructing male-dominated spaces.

What drastically upended the concept of male/female spaces was the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, something feminists wholeheartedly supported and took part in. The Revolution had numerous causes, the greatest of which was the promise given Egyptians by the British: if Egypt supported the British during World War One, once the War was over the British would deliberate upon the idea of Egyptian independence. The spark that caused the conflagration was the exiling of Wafd Party founder Sa'ad Zaghlul to Malta when he attempted to initiate independence. The Revolution mobilized the entire nation including the *fellahin*, the *Effendiya*, the elites, and women. Somewhere between one hundred and fifty to three hundred women took part with banners, slogans, crescents, crosses, both veiled and unveiled.²¹⁷ One notable exception was Musa, who knew the British government would shut her school the minute they took to the street. She concluded that:

²¹⁵ Badran, *Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences*, 92

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 75

The country is in great need of education. Teachers should be far removed from militancy in the national movement because they are performing great national work that they should not put aside for anything else, however important it might be. Their work is to teach an illiterate nation where ignorance is widespread. We have to sustain our efforts in combatting this ignorance.”²¹⁸

Following the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, Egyptian (male) nationalists continued to stress that a cohesive vision of the nation took precedence over all else, and in turn sacrificed the rights of women and other minority voices that threatened their concatenate vision of nation. The claim was that once Egypt achieved independence, then issues dealing specifically with women would be addressed. Above all, independence was more important than women’s rights including addressing the serious lack of schools for girls. The result was that in order for middle-class women to become educated they needed a wealthy sponsor and/or they attended mission schools. The majority of mission schools were French alongside some British schools, yet it was not quite fashionable for Muslim families to send their daughters there. Most attendees were Coptic, Greek or Jewish; however, by the 1920s these schools increasingly became more popular for Muslim girls, yet again, not so they could take their place in public, rather so that they could become a “Lady of the Salon,” and move about in more exalted circles.²¹⁹

In spite of the unending work feminists did in helping Zaghlul and his followers bring about Egyptian independence in 1922, when the Egyptian Parliament opened in 1924, women were barred from entry. Parliament was a male-dominated space that had no places for women. Legitimately outraged, Sha’rawi, as the President of the Women’s Wafd Central Committee (WWCC), chose to break with the Committee. Feminists hoped that by becoming part of the Egyptian political apparatus, they could then change the laws that specifically affected women,

²¹⁸ Badran, *Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences*, 78

²¹⁹ Cynthia Nelson. *Doria Shafik, Egyptian Feminist: A Woman Apart*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 12

especially pertaining to education. After the incredible blow dealt them by Zaghlul and his supporters, Sha'rawi stated in 1924, ““What is good of making all that noise and saying you are serving the nation... we have done nothing but make noise since 1919, and all we have gotten out of it is a bad headache.”²²⁰ Sha'rawi decided that the rights of women could be better served in an independent organization. As such, she founded the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in 1923 and proceeded to travel to a number of international women's conferences advocating for women's rights.²²¹

After resigning from the WWCC, and no longer needing to push the nationalist agenda Sha'rawi, “... refused to sacrifice women's liberation for male political purposes.”²²² Moreover, she, alongside other feminists including journalist Munira Thabit, chafed at the restraints caused by the idealization of women as keepers of the nation, and mothers of the citizens of tomorrow.²²³ As head of the EFU, Sha'rawi now felt clear to articulate goals pertaining to social reform. In her memoirs she stated:

Through their arrogance, men refuse to see the capabilities of women. Faced with contradiction, they prefer to raise a woman above the ordinary human plane instead of placing them on a level equal to their own. Men have singled out women of outstanding merit and put them on a pedestal to avoid recognizing the capabilities of all women.²²⁴

Thus, the social and cultural construction of gender that initially allowed women a level of mobility to navigate in designated places in the public sphere in the first decades of the twentieth century became nothing short of an enclosed prison. Sha'rawi realized that working within, “... the structures of subordination,”²²⁵ failed to actualize feminists' goals. Likewise, it is possible

²²⁰ Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, 162

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 171

²²² Sha'rawi, 129

²²³ Baron. *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, 171-172. Sha'rawi continued to fight for social and political reform until her death at age sixty-eight in 1947.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 131

²²⁵ Mahmood, 15

that Sha'rawi felt that in the same way the *Wafd* Party helped Egypt achieved partial-independence from Britain, so too could the EFU focus their efforts solely on women's liberation and also succeed in their objectives.

Unlike Sha'rawi, and stridently focused upon education and the founding of educational institutions, Musa preferred to stay out of the political fray lest her schools suffer for it. She chose to use an alternate route to achieve her goals: by assembling an elite group of women from Alexandria and forming the Society for the Advancement of the Young Woman. By finding alternative means in achieving her aims, Musa's, "Agentival capacity [was] entailed not only in those acts that resist[ed] norms but also in the multiple ways in which [she] *inhabit*[ed] norms."²²⁶ The society founded primary schools for girls by finding funds and influencing hesitant parents to trust the school with their daughters. Musa, of course, ran the day-to-day affairs of the school.²²⁷ All of Musa's schools had a strict nationalist curricula and moreover, had (as much as possible) Egyptian educators. She highly disliked the idea of foreigners teaching Egyptian children western ideals, and stated plainly in 1920:

If we entrust the education of our daughters to foreign women, our daughters will imitate foreign ways, whether good or bad, whereas our own teachers can inculcate in our students an understanding of our own culture and morality. They will be able to discriminate and to reject what is not suitable for us. Moral values [that are alien] would pass from the educated girls to those in the process of being educated... Our children would acquire a sense of nationalism from their Egyptian teachers that they do not get from foreign teachers.²²⁸

However, Sha'rawi felt that petitioning the Egyptian government would be the best course of action. Following nominal independence, the EFU proposed to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education that they open secondary schools for girls and furthermore, put in

²²⁶ Ibid., 15

²²⁷ Badran, *Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences*, 144

²²⁸ Badran, *Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences*, 146

place the same curricula taught to boys. In 1925 the Shubra School opened its doors welcoming girls from middle-class families.²²⁹ The following decade saw numerous girls schools open across Egypt; however, and in order to enforce disciplinary control, the curricula differed from that taught at the boys schools. As such, women were reminded of their place: that of first and foremost wife and mother. In 1927 the journal *L’Egyptienne* printed that:

To appease male opinion concerning the education of women a large part of the curriculum is reserved for housekeeping, domestic economy, and culinary arts. In this way, men who wish to see their future companions preserve the charms of the Chrysalis of former times applaud the government’s effort to reconcile past ways with the present.²³⁰

Appeasing male opinion was not on feminist Thabit’s agenda. Known as the “Amazon of the Egyptian Press,” she spent the early 1920s publishing articles in a number of newspapers including *al-Ahram* (1875) and *al-Sufur* (1915).²³¹ Thabit attended a state-run primary school and eventually became the first Egyptian woman to receive her law degree from the French School of Law in Cairo. Thabit’s father worked as a civil servant, and her mother was of Turkish descent. As such, her family was distinctly middle-class; as part of both the “woman’s awakening” and the later politicized feminists, Thabit bridged the gap between the elite and the middle and working-class feminists that arose following the end of World War II. Close with both Sa’ad Zaghlul and his wife Safiya, she spent much time at the “House of the Nation.”²³² Thabit’s

²²⁹ Ibid., 143

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, 178

²³² Safiya Zaghlul became known as *Umm al-Misriyyin* or “Mother of all Egyptians.” As honorary head of the Women’s Wafd Central Committee (WWCC), she took part in the 1919 Revolution, and demonstrated with a number of women against the exile of her husband Sa’ad (and his compatriots). The WWCC also released a statement “protesting British efforts to crush the revolt by exiling its leaders and criticizing the impending visit of the Milner Mission to draft [an Egyptian] constitution acceptable to the British.” (Gada Hashem Talhami. *The Mobilization of Muslim Women in Egypt*, 10) While her husband was in exile, Safiya ensured he was not forgotten by positioning herself as a political activist. As a member of the elite, Safiya was constantly in the press and through the careful manipulation of her public image, became the most visible and popular woman in the 1920s. Indeed, Safiya Zaghlul “planned her public persona, carefully chose her words, weighed her actions, and controlled her image, particularly her photographic image... she [also] manipulated maternal symbolism to carve out a political role for herself.” (Beth Baron. *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, 135) In the absence of her

newspaper advanced women's rights and unlike other feminist journals also reported on the political affairs of the country. Thabit "... called for political rights for women—to vote and to be elected to parliament—before a parliament even existed in Egypt."²³³ Moreover, she hoped to attain women's rights in tandem with independence, which put her in direct opposition with religious conservative leaders.²³⁴

Her friend and mentor, Sa'ad Zaghlul assured Thabit that once Egypt was politically stable, women would have political rights.²³⁵ Yet when independence came, he failed to deliver on his promise. Initially, she remained loyal and supported the male *Wafd* party, placing herself in direct opposition with Sha'rawi's EFU; however, eventually they reconciled when Thabit realized that Egyptian men were not going to give women rights' unless they fought for them. Thabit, like Sha'rawi, became disillusioned with the *Wafd* Party seeing them as "a lot of words, little action and productivity... the *Wafd* Party did not acknowledge the principle of equality between the sexes or even among one sex!"²³⁶ Thabit realized the futility of attempting to change societal norms from within the established patriarchal order and decided instead to push her own agenda, often being the only voice in the fray to do so.²³⁷ Ten years after Thabit first advocated

husband, Safiya continued to meet with members of the Wafd Party in her home. In fact, her home soon became known as *Bayt al-Umma* (the House of the Nation). Labels such as this one further reproduced the familial trope that in turn advanced the notion of a national Egyptian family. Moreover, the use of familial metaphors also served to eliminate class-consciousness. In attempting to unite Egypt into a national family, it made sense that the elite class and, in this case, parents of the national family (Sa'ad and Safiya) held authority over the lower-class children (the Egyptian masses). In attempting to harmonize class antagonism, ironically, the national family further fortified them. (Beth Baron. *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, 145) Upon her husband's return from exile, Sa'ad ran for parliamentary elections with resounding success. Shortly thereafter followed the creation of the Egyptian constitution of 1923. Safiya then reinforced her national role through that of her husband's. In choosing to become "Mother of all Egyptians" she further linked familial metaphors to the nationalist discourse. These familial metaphors helped in the formation of a concatenate vision of Egypt, yet they also relegated women to specific domestic roles that further undermined their rights within the political arena. (Beth Baron. *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, 140, 145, 161)

²³³ Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, 178

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 180

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

for the right to vote, the EFU joined her in demanding suffrage. By the 1940s, this would become part of the wider feminist agenda.

Thabit, like feminist Doria Shafik who followed in her footsteps, understood that the quest to educate women and girls necessitated a political voice. No longer could they be at the mercy of male politicians; the only way to achieve the rights they desired was to have a political voice meaning the right to vote. Thabit's goals clearly show the evolution of the feminist movement and her quest for agency and liberation. Al-Badiya articulated many of the same goals as Thabit at the turn of the century, but Egyptians were not yet ready for such far-reaching reforms. Thabit, made one of the first attempts to seriously challenge the patriarchal normative order. Not content to appease, or work within patriarchal boundaries, Thabit strove to increasingly push her agenda despite the wide-ranging discontent it caused within society.²³⁸ The same occurred with Doria Shafik who not only fully supported Thabit's agenda, but placed herself completely outside of acceptable societal structures.

Shafik owed her educational success to Sha'rawi, Musa and the work of countless other feminists who came before her. Shafik's parents were from different social classes, something that made her childhood quite difficult. It also meant that she needed help funding her education.²³⁹ Shafik attended a French Mission School called Notre Dame des Apôtres with her mother's goal of turning her into a "Lady of the Salon" like Sha'rawi.²⁴⁰ In 1928, Shafik entered and won a national essay competition honoring the memory of Qasim Amin. Sha'rawi invited Shafik, who was just nineteen years old, to speak to a large audience at the ceremony. Shafik argued for an end to female "captivity," an end to the walls that spatially entrapped women, and

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Nelson, 4

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 13

impressed upon men the importance of liberating women and letting them "... out into the world!"²⁴¹ Shafik saw in Sha'rawi a mentor and a mother she had lost too young.²⁴² Shortly after the ceremony, Shafik received a scholarship from the Ministry of Education and sailed to Paris where she studied Philosophy at La Sorbonne.²⁴³ She successfully defended her doctoral dissertation in 1939.

In her dissertation, Shafik analyzed the plight of Egyptian women in the early twentieth century. She traced the historical evolution of Egypt, explored the Arab invasion, before evaluating the works of both Qasim Amin and Muhammad Abdu. After examining the "Woman Question" from both a juridical and legal point of view, she concluded that the "Woman Question" was a social problem related to the misinterpretation of the Qur'an. In seconding Abduh, she wrote, "L'interprétation du Coran par Cheikh Mehammad Abdou nous prouvera que les vicissitudes de la législation islamique dont souffre la femme proviennent, non de la religion, mais d'une mauvaise interprétation de celle-ci."²⁴⁴

Additionally, Shafik argued that the blame for women not knowing what their rights were, and for not being educated, was the fault of Egyptian men:

L'homme, fait-il remarquer, fut naturellement chargé d'appliquer les lois imposées par l'Islam. (Il était naturel qu'il en fut ainsi, étant donné la supériorité physique de l'homme sur la femme). D'après Kassim-Amin, l'homme, chargé de cette application dès les débuts de l'Islam, aurait abusé de son rôle de protecteur de la femme, aurait appliqué ces lois, peut-être à la lettre, mais tout en favorisant ses propres intérêts. Donc, après des centaines de générations, les femmes en arrivèrent au point, non seulement de voir leurs droits méconnus, mais d'ignorer l'existence même de ces droits.²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ Ibid., 28-29

²⁴² Ibid., 34

²⁴³ Ibid., 29

²⁴⁴ Doria Shafik. *La Femme Et Le Droit Religieux: De L'Egypte Contemporaine*, (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1940), 12

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 100

Man, she stated, was charged with applying Qur'anic law; according to Qasim Amin, he abused these rights in order to serve his own interests. The consequence being, that after generations of keeping women in ignorance, women did not even know they had rights let alone what they were! She concluded that by abandoning outdated traditions, Egyptian women could be liberated within Islam.²⁴⁶ Shafik's studies prepared her for a future where she would argue vehemently on behalf of women.

Upon completion of her dissertation, the Egypt Shafik returned to was a vastly different country than the Egypt of the 1920s. By the 1940s, the right to vote and participate politically was part of the progressive feminist agenda. By the end of WWII, the radicalization of Egyptian politics similarly transcended the women's movements that increasingly argued for greater equality. Shafik became one of the leading feminists of the era and an avid proponent of both education and suffrage. Shafik further posited that most familial problems stemmed from anachronistic marriage laws (including polygamy and rash divorces) that did little to safeguard the rights of women and children. Shafik argued for the protection of women and children, a female political party with representation in Parliament and better jobs for women.²⁴⁷ Her fight to achieve full equality for women set her up against the most conservative elements of society. Indeed, in her struggle on behalf of Egyptian women "she openly challenged every social, cultural, and legal barrier that she viewed as inimical and oppressive to the full equality of the women in her society... [and] she presented a radically different model as a leader of the women's movement in Egypt."²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 136-37

²⁴⁷ Stanley Swinton, "Feminist Fights for Women's Rights in Egypt." *The Gazette and Daily*. November 16, 1949. <https://www.newspapers.com/image/65893125/?terms=Egypt%2BIslamic%2BFeminist> (Accessed March 22, 2018)

²⁴⁸ Nelson, xii

In her desire to enact change, Shafik used her writing skills, her feminist organization and finally her militancy in dealing with the powers in charge. In an article written for *Al-Misri* Shafik argued against Shaykh Hasanain Makhluf's (the Mufti of Egypt) public pronouncement that Islam forbade women's entry and participation in public life. This was nothing more than a disciplinary method of control and Shafik espoused that "the strongest opposition, in the name of religion, to every step towards the advancement of women in Egypt has always been a sign that success is closer at hand." Moreover, she felt that statements such as Makhluf's did nothing more than harm the reputation of their nation. In Shafik's estimation, nothing could stop the march of progress vis-à-vis women's emancipation and spatial liberation.²⁴⁹ Shafik's agency in enacting change was, "... ineluctably bound up with the historically and culturally specific disciplines through which [she was] formed."²⁵⁰ Shafik studied at a French mission school, had the secular Sha'rawi as a mentor, then spent over a decade living and studying in Paris. All of these events profoundly affected and "formed" Shafik. In other words, the ideals that Shafik chose to elevate can be traced to her experiences, which then affected how she countered hegemonic-patriarchal norms such as those espoused by Makhluf.

Shafik's mandate to attain full political participation for women also incorporated an in-depth social reform agenda that included educating the illiterate. Despite her background, Shafik managed to become highly educated thanks to the religious mission schools and the scholarship she received to attend La Sorbonne. Yet these options were not available for most middle-class Egyptian woman. Shafik realized that women needed to be part of the law-making process in order to create long-lasting changes. Shafik idolized Sha'rawi and the EFU; however, following

²⁴⁹ Badran and Cooke, 354

²⁵⁰ Michel Foucault. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. trans. C. Gordon, 109-33. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), cited in Saba Mahmood. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 29

Sha'rawi's death in 1947, she created *Ittihad Bint el-Nil* in order to take the feminist struggle to another level that included engaging women from all social strata. She spent much of her time demanding a change in parliamentary politics in order to allow women the right to run for political office.

The two publications she founded, *La Femme Nouvelle* and *Ittihad Bint el-Nil*, exhibit her feminist evolution from "... moral feminism [espoused by the] E.F.U.... toward a more radical demand for equal rights."²⁵¹ Moreover, the titles of her magazines further proclaimed the evolution of the feminist movement. French periodical *La Femme Nouvelle* created a break between the old style of feminism (moral, philanthropic) with a new form (politicized, demanding suffrage) of feminism that would not settle for anything less than equality. Furthermore, *Bint el-Nil* proclaimed its indigenous roots creating a disconnection with the original upper-class Turko-Circassian feminist movement.²⁵² Like the feminists who came before her Shafik, through her journals, was actively using an "imagined geography" to socially construct a cohesive community of women. Shafik argued for Egyptian women from all classes of society and continued to do so well into the 1950s.

In conclusion, feminists Bahithat al-Badiya, Huda Shar'awi, Nabawiyah Musa, Munira Thabit and Doria Shafik challenged numerous authoritarian frameworks, in a myriad of ways, in order to advance the right for women (from all strata) to be educated. "Some of these structures were grounded in institutional standards of Islamic orthodoxy, and others in norms of liberal discourse; some were grounded in the authority of parents and male kin, and others in state institutions."²⁵³ These feminists countered these disciplinary frameworks often by working within

²⁵¹ Khater and Nelson, 470

²⁵² Ibid., 469-70

²⁵³ Mahmood, 15

established paradigms, but also at times taking the fight well outside of acceptable normative boundaries. The women's movement used the media, the nationalist debate and the advancement of education as a vehicle to step into the public arena. Initially, women linked familial metaphors to the nation and claimed that as mothers of future citizens they needed to be educated, yet these goals evolved and came to encompass the wider issue of women's rights.

While the socio-economic backgrounds of Bahithat al-Badiya, Huda Sha'rawi, Nabawiyya Musa, Munira Thabit and Doria Shafik were different, some stemming from the elite class, while others came from the middle-class, their agendas were remarkably similar in that they all believed that women should have access to education and should be allowed access to the public arena. Egyptian public spaces had long been reserved solely for men; this space was then further repurposed by an imperialist power. Moreover, men used numerous excuses to keep women from accessing public life, yet despite their arguments, feminists challenged patriarchal norms and succeeded in achieving many of their goals, amongst them aiding middle-class women attain an education. Regardless of the impediments hindering the women's movement, these feminists clearly enacted agency as shown in the multiple ways they achieved their objectives, at times by circumventing hegemonic boundaries from within, while at others pushing against patriarchal norms from without.

CHAPTER 3

Navigating Nationalist Waters: *The Muslim Brotherhood: Education, Egyptian Nationalism and the Lower-Classes*

Every Islamic nation and community pursues a policy in educating and bringing up the new generation, and producing the adults of the future upon whom the life of the new nation will depend. This policy must be based on wise principles, which guarantee religious immunity for the upcoming generation, a moral impregnability, and a knowledge of the precepts of their religion as well as an appreciation of its ancient glory and its vast expansion. This is only a small selection from the many principles, which the Muslim Brotherhood wish the Islamic nations to consider carefully in bringing about the modern revival. And they are directing this appeal to all Muslims, to both the people and the governments.²⁵⁴

Hasan al-Banna, Cairo, 1937

In 1928, in a small town in the Suez Canal Zone, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) launched a small Islamic society called the Muslim Brotherhood. In a short period of time, this small religious group spread throughout the nation as well as *in extenso* the Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood—or *Ikhwan*—became the founding organization that influenced the initiation of many modern Islamic groups in the twentieth century. How the *Ikhwan* managed to spread at such a precipitous pace and moreover, how they managed to survive numerous attempts of government suppression over the years has been the basis of much study. The Brotherhood's creation stemmed from a history of Islamic reformist thinkers including Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1837-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) who felt that a return to core Islamic values of the *salaf* and the practice of *ijtihad* were the only answer to the westernization and secularization that was increasingly encroaching upon Egyptian society.²⁵⁵ At its founding the *Ikhwan* was a welfare society, moderately influenced by Sufism, and rooted in

²⁵⁴ Hasan al-Banna, 'Da'watuna' (Our Message), in *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (1353/1935); also appeared as a pamphlet in 1937, https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/_6_-our-message.pdf

²⁵⁵ Alison Pargeter. *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power*, (London: Saqi Books, 2013), 9

the moral rehabilitation of Egyptians.²⁵⁶ However, within a decade the organization's ideology and agenda would include a nationalist mandate that it would spread, using the educational system and its members, throughout the nation.

As mentioned earlier, the creation of a modern Egypt was a divisive, messy affair that pitted many different segments of society against each other. For instance, there were modernists who based their beliefs on the principles of the Enlightenment including rationalism, scientific progress, industrialization and a certainty that antedated traditions were impeding the evolution of Egypt. Additionally, there were conservative elements who believed that Islamic precepts, such as the implementation of sharia law, must be the foundation of a new Egypt. These were not mutually exclusive groupings and there was much overlap to be found between these different positions. Indeed, the view that traditionalists, or Islamists, had a backwards-looking mandate failed to appreciate the profundity of their belief system. For example, al-Banna felt that Egypt could embrace modernity while retaining its cultural authenticity. In other words, that an Islamic state could embrace science and technology and be the basis of a modern Egyptian polity.

What al-Banna hoped to rectify through the *Ikhwan* was the subjugation of the populace by the British: an occupation causing Egyptians to question their values, their traditions and their religion. Through the *Ikhwan*, al-Banna aspired to aid disaffected Egyptian and assist them in returning to Islam.²⁵⁷ In the early years of its existence, educating the working and lower-classes was the basis from which the *Ikhwan* hoped to transform society. Alongside this agenda, the Brotherhood's General Law guidelines created in the early 1930s included a clause that decreed that the *Ikhwan* would not involve itself in the political process nor attach themselves to any one

²⁵⁶ Lia, 25

²⁵⁷ Lia, 25

particular political party.²⁵⁸ Yet a number of external factors caused the *Ikhwan* to change its mandate including the threat Christian missionaries posed and the Arab Revolt of 1936. Moreover, the *Ikhwan* had pressure coming from other directions as well including the British and Egyptian government and at times, from their own members.

Despite dealing with numerous external and internal tensions, the core basis of the *Ikhwan*'s mandate remained unchanged: to reeducate the working and lower-class Egyptians in the ways of Islam. Indeed, in the quote shown above, al-Banna articulated not only the need for Egyptians to have a grounding in Islamic religious precepts (such as following the five pillars of Islam), but also based this education at the heart of nationalist rhetoric and of the founding of a *new* nation. Thus, an Islamic education became the framework and the vector from which to build a new Egyptian nation. The *Ikhwan*'s mandate was initially pan-Islamic rather than nationalistic; however, as it increasingly became politicized, pan-Islamic goals became articulated alongside nationalist ones. Consequently, when the *Ikhwan*'s primary mandate of educating the masses became politicized, its educational mandate then came to encompass a nationalist agenda. This chapter argues that the *Ikhwan*'s nationalist agenda, rooted in the establishment of an Islamic state, advanced an educational imperative premised on the disciplinary tenets of greater—or internal—*jihad*. This would allow Egyptian Muslims to liberate themselves, and ultimately, the nation.

Indeed, for the *Ikhwan* education was the primary tool used to reach the masses and “To guide all of humanity to the precepts of Islam and its teaching.”²⁵⁹ Al-Banna, like his father Shaykh Ahmed al-Banna al-Sa’ati, was an Imam as well as a teacher, and graduated from Al-

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 243

²⁵⁹ Hasan al-Banna, ‘Da’watuna’ (Our Message), in *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (1353/1935); also appeared as a pamphlet in 1937, <https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/6-our-message.pdf>

Azhar University in Cairo. Raised in this orthodox setting, al-Banna began his religious education at a relatively young age and came to embrace the Order of the Hasafiyya Brothers, a Sufi Order. This led young al-Banna to forge the Hasafiyya Society for Charity. This Charity had two mandates: “to fight for the preservation of Islamic morality, and to resist the work of Christian missionaries in the town.” Al-Banna was thirteen when he helped found this Order; it would later come to be the precursor for the *Ikhwan*.²⁶⁰

In 1923, Al-Banna left his hometown for Cairo to train as a teacher. What he saw in Cairo shocked him: the numerous foreigners parading about town, the secularization and liberalizing of society (partly influenced by Kemalism in Turkey), the governmental discord and the parties where men and women freely engaged. Profoundly affected by the powerlessness and quiescence of the Shaykhs of Al-Azhar University, as well as the disaffected Egyptian youths alienated from their Islamic roots, Al-Banna blamed the disrupting forces of the missionaries attempting to convert Egyptians to their cause. After being formally trained as a teacher at Dar al-‘Ulum, and receiving his teaching certificate in 1927, the Egyptian ministry of education transferred al-Banna to a primary teaching post in Ismailia. The Egyptian ministry of education transferring teachers from one part of Egypt to another would, in the end, serve *Ikhwan* members very well. Indeed, Al-Banna would use these opportunities, as would many of its members, to disseminate the *Ikhwan*’s ideology.²⁶¹

Upon arriving in Ismailia, the British military occupation as well as the foreign economic occupation of the town appalled al-Banna. Author and revolutionary Frantz Fanon’s *The*

²⁶⁰ Richard P. Mitchell. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. 2d ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 2

²⁶¹ Vickie Langohr. “Colonial Education Systems and the Spread of Local Religious Movements: The Cases of British Egypt and Punjab.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 47, no. 1, 2005: 181

Wretched of the Earth, written in 1961, perfectly depicts what al-Banna encountered upon his arrival:

The colonist's sector is a sector built to last, all stone and steel. It's a sector of lights and paved roads, where the trash cans constantly overflow with strange and wonderful garbage, undreamed of leftovers. The colonist's feet can never be glimpsed... They are protected by solid shoes in a sector where the streets are clean and smooth, without pothole, without stone. The colonist's sector is a sated, sluggish sector, its belly permanently full of good things. The colonist's sector is a white folks' sector, a sector of foreigners.

The colonized's sector... is a disreputable place inhabited by disreputable people. You are born anywhere, anyhow. You die anywhere, from anything. It's a world with no space, people are piled one on top of the other, the shacks squeezed tightly together... [It] is a famished sector, hungry for bread, meat, shoes, coal, and light... [It] is a sector that crouches and cowers, a sector on its knees, a sector that is prostrate.²⁶²

Indeed, the British and foreign investors resided in large houses on the waterfront, whereas Egyptians lived in shantytowns. Egyptians saw foreigners profiting from their natural resources, while the impoverished went hungry and turned to missionaries for the basic needs the nation failed to provide.²⁶³ In response, al-Banna immediately involved himself in a local Islamic group. Shortly thereafter, six local men who worked for the British, approached al-Banna. Moved by al-Banna's religious teachings and powerless in light of the drastic changes occurring in Egyptian society, the founding of Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 aspired to be an alternative to the daily oppression wrought by the British occupation.²⁶⁴

What particularly galled al-Banna was the license foreign missionaries had to practice and preach to the locals. Al-Banna felt that these missionaries manipulated the lower classes through their medical clinics, their schools and orphanages.²⁶⁵ In response, the *Ikhwan* took it upon themselves to open their own schools and workshops and provide help to the poor who

²⁶² Frantz Fanon. *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. R. Philcox, (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 4-5

²⁶³ Baron, *The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood*, 121

²⁶⁴ R. P. Mitchell, 8

²⁶⁵ Baron, *The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood*, 119

might contrarily go to the missionaries for support. Responding to the threat the missionaries posed became the heart of the *Ikhwan*'s mandate in the early 1930s. Indeed, the Christian missionaries actively shaped the ideology of the Brotherhood in their early years.²⁶⁶

The *Ikhwan* elucidated three key aims to discourage families from sending their children to Christian missionary schools: they publicized incidents where Muslim girls were being “forcibly converted to Christianity;” they appealed to King Fu’ad (1868-1936) in the hopes of changing government regulations; and finally, they created committees to alert locals of the dangers of turning to the missionaries for aid. The *Ikhwan* further took on the responsibility of extricating girls from the traps laid by the missionaries.²⁶⁷ For their part, the missionaries continued to open schools, orphanages and medical clinics in order to access impoverished Egyptians who had few options. Their presence aggravated many Egyptians, yet sanctioned as they were by the British, locals had little recourse in the matter. Conversely, the press continuously published articles from numerous scholars who enjoined Muslims to rise up against the threat missionaries posed to their society and their children.²⁶⁸

Beth Baron, in her book *The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood*, argues that Christian missionaries played an important role in advancing the ideology of the *Ikhwan*. Baron discovered a little-known event where a Protestant missionary beat a young, orphaned girl named Turkiyya Hasan who resided at the Swedish Salaam Mission School; this event created shockwaves throughout Egyptian society, to the extent that Prime Minister Isma’il Sidqi resigned. Al-Banna, deeply affronted by the affair, “saw the education of

²⁶⁶ Lia, 112

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 113

²⁶⁸ Philadelphia Historical Society. RG 209/26/12, numerous articles appeared in the press throughout the summer and fall of 1933 including in *al-Balagh*, *al-Ahram* and *al-Siassa*.

youth along Islamic lines as his main mission and the key to Islamic reform and revival.”²⁶⁹ The Muslim Brotherhood, took part in the national agitation vis-à-vis the role of missionaries in Egypt. In an article published in the magazine *al-Siassa* in 1933, Liberal Constitutionalist Muhammad Husayn Haykal wrote:

... the government has... deported an evangelist (a woman)... and decided to take away all Moslem girls from Al-Salam Schools... this is not a curable treatment as several evangelists may come to replace the one deported [and] evangelists will easily find means to corrupt the religious beliefs of Moslems. The only remedy is to pass a law to have all schools... under the complete control of the Government in order to save religion, character and nationality of the Egyptians from corruption. The foreigners who conduct such schools in Egypt are interested in spreading their history, their religion and establishing their political influence.²⁷⁰

The missionaries caused the Brotherhood to expand their educational mandate and to create and provide welfare programs as an alternative to the missionaries: this provided a means to connect with larger segments of society. Baron argues that the missionaries not only galvanized the *Ikhwan* into creating corresponding welfare institutions, but that the *Ikhwan* also adopted many of its strategies as a means to recruit new members. Baron writes, “They [the missionaries] also provided an excellent model for organizing and a template for action.” The *Ikhwan* mirrored missionary institutions and similarly, they started proselytizing at the local marketplace, at coffee shops, handing out pamphlets, going door-to-door and offering aid to those in need whenever possible.²⁷¹ At the time of its founding, the *Ikhwan*’s mandate was in defense of Islam on a small, local scale. The confrontation with the missionaries was a struggle that the *Ikhwan* could win; it was a motivating force that animated its members and provided a tangible purpose that aided in the early spread of the organization.

²⁶⁹ Baron, *The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood*, 123

²⁷⁰ Philadelphia Historical Society. RG 209/26/12, article published in *al-Siassa* by Taha Hussein June 16, 1933.

²⁷¹ R. P. Mitchell, 133

Additionally, by finding a tangible “other” like the missionaries, the *Ikhwan*’s mission became more compelling. The British and foreign investors were out of reach for a grassroots organization of the *Ikhwan*’s size in the early 1930s; however, the missionaries were a cooperative that they could oppose in person and victory could be assured with every child and parent that they managed to deter from the Christian groups. This shift in ideology gave them a message that allowed them to appeal to a larger segment of the population and enhanced the *Ikhwan*’s reputation as a force to be reckoned with. The people felt that finally, they had a champion who articulated much of the discontent that had been quietly seething under the surface since the Revolution of 1919.²⁷²

When Egypt achieved nominal independence in 1922, the Egyptian government took control of the education system and made a firm attempt to standardize education. In other words, “In the new government schools the emphasis was on secular subjects, with the prominence of education inversely proportional to the students’ economic status.”²⁷³ Al-Banna decried this and felt that a correlation could be made between the loss of Islam as society’s guiding principle and its similar loss in status as a colonized nation.²⁷⁴ Al-Azhar University’s

²⁷² Throughout the 1920s, Egyptian political scene was gridlocked between the Wafd Party, the King and the British. The popular, secular-modernist Wafd Party invariably won the majority of seats in Parliament. Sa’d Zaghlul, despite being firmly elitist, managed to characterize himself as a man of the people. As “Father of the Egyptian Nation” and, additionally, residing in the “House of the Nation”, Zaghlul managed to retain the support of the populace; however, little headway was made towards attaining full independence or in helping the majority of Egyptians increase their standard of living. (Baron. *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*. 153) Initially cause for celebration and exuberant optimism, the reality was that Egyptian independence, achieved in 1922, was an empty victory. The 1920s was a decade of hope and the belief that independence was imminent. These feelings soon led to despair, cynicism and a complete lack of faith in the Wafd Party and the King. There are numerous reasons why the Egyptian parliament failed to succeed in establishing a stable government. Chief amongst them were the extensive powers allotted the King, the continuous political infringement by the British, the lack of respect for opposing political platforms and finally, the never-ending discord between the Wafd Party, the King and the British. These continual struggles resulted in the dissolving of parliament by the King, with power-struggles within the government and amongst the ranks of the elite causing the upper echelons of government to lose sight of the issues affecting Egyptian society. Moreover, the elite continued to embrace western values and secular practices that further isolated them from the middle and lower classes. (Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton. *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 182-184)

²⁷³ R. P. Mitchell, 167

²⁷⁴ Langohr, 172

focus on the ritualistic, outdated practice of instructing the Qur'an by rote was irrelevant to the needs of Egyptians and according to secular elites, impeding the progress of the nation.²⁷⁵ As such, al-Banna was at odds with the curricula of the secular elites as well as the Al-Azhar Imams. The focus for al-Banna was in defining an Egyptian identity as it moved beyond colonial rule and greater *jihad*, which focused on disciplining the self, was central to this plan.

Vickie Langohr argues that the growth of educational schools throughout Egypt after 1922 inadvertently helped the *Ikhwan* propagate their message in three distinct ways. First, the *Ikhwan* taught adult education during the evenings and weekends and the government learning of this program had local soldiers attend. Second, in its early years, the *Ikhwan*'s membership included a good portion of teachers who worked for the Ministry of Education. As such, many of these *Ikhwan* members worked in state-run public and private institutions. Finally, the education ministry transferred teachers from one teaching post to another, simultaneously allowing *Ikhwan* members to promulgate their message all over the country.²⁷⁶ In his memoirs, Brotherhood member and teacher Ahmed al-Biss wrote that following his posting at a rural school, the number of female students who veiled increased dramatically.²⁷⁷ This is salient as it shows that Brotherhood associates used their teaching positions to propagate the *Ikhwan*'s message.²⁷⁸

It is important to note that from the mid-1930s until his death in 1949, al-Banna disseminated a *rasal* to all of his *Ikhwan* brothers: "a kind of pamphlet which served as a major mode of communication for al-Banna throughout his political life."²⁷⁹ In his early writings, al-Banna predominantly focused on the idea of awakening Muslims to the true and moral path of

²⁷⁵ Starrett, 63

²⁷⁶ Langohr, 181

²⁷⁷ Langohr, 184

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 173

²⁷⁹ Mura, 104

Islam. In his *Ikhwan* pamphlet *To What do We Invited Humanity?* disseminated in 1936, al-Banna wrote, “Jihad is the means of spreading the Islamic call and of preserving the sacred principles of Islam. This is another religious duty imposed by Allah on the Muslim, just as he imposed fasting, prayer, pilgrimage, alms and the doing of good and abandoning of evil.”²⁸⁰ In this quote, *jihad* refers to the internal struggle or striving to become a good and faithful Muslim. In teaching “dormant” Muslims how to return to the true path of Islam, society would regain its footing. Al-Banna’s approach was one from below, whereby through the self-disciplining aspects of *jihad* the people could liberate themselves; the liberation of the nation would come later when Egyptian Muslims were ready. It was, moreover, not an ideology rooted in violence. Al-Banna’s ultimate aim was to “establish Allah’s sovereignty over the world.”²⁸¹ According to Andrea Mura, al-Banna relied on traditional symbolic configurations rooted in:

Fiqh (jurisprudence of Islamic law) *shari’ah*, social and legal norms regulating the ‘personal status’ of Muslims, ‘Islamic theology,’ ‘Islamic ethics,’ (disciplining for instance, sexual division and moral virtue, happiness), traditional discourses on *jihad*, traditional elements drawn from Sufism, (spiritualism, organizational matters, etc.), references to the discourse of the caliphate, and Islamic universalism – all constitute ‘traditional’ discursive fields from which al-Banna draws on when articulating his own discourse.²⁸²

In this way, al-Banna articulated a modernity rooted in tradition while simultaneously using the language of modernity to promulgate traditional ideals.²⁸³ The core mandate in these early years was the “education of souls” or the “purification of souls and [of] moral rectification.”²⁸⁴ Ultimately, al-Banna believed that the people would only be willing to sacrifice to achieve the aims of the Brotherhood with a spiritual awakening.²⁸⁵ In the early 1930s, Al-

²⁸⁰ Hasan al-Banna. *To What do We Invite Humanity?* Appeared as a pamphlet in 1936, https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/_2_-to-what-do-we-invite-humanity.pdf

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Mura, 106

²⁸³ Ibid., 36

²⁸⁴ Lia, 69

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 69

Banna linked the “education of souls” to pan-Islamism believing that spiritually awakened Muslim brethren took precedence over any form of territorial or national loyalty.²⁸⁶

Additionally, littered throughout *To What do We Invite Humanity?* are anti-colonial references arguing against those nations who oppress and steal the rights of others. Nations who “wallow in luxury” and “drown in material luxury,” and who have forgotten to strive in the path of Allah would undoubtedly end in failure.²⁸⁷ In other words, these nations had no self-discipline. Again, al-Banna articulated the importance and necessity of a spiritual awakening in order to fulfill the *Ikhwan*’s mission. In elucidating the Brotherhood mission, al-Banna argued that Islam had everything needed to achieve its aims:

Globalism, nationalism, socialism, capitalism, Bolshevism, war, the distribution of wealth, the link between producer and consumer, and whatever is closely or distantly connected to the discussions preoccupying the statesmen and the social philosophers, we believe that all of these have been dealt with thoroughly by Islam, and that Islam has set forth the regulations assuring that the world employs all that is good, as well as avoiding whatever may lead to danger or disaster.²⁸⁸

As mentioned, these pamphlets were the preeminent means through which al-Banna communicated the *Ikhwan* message to Brotherhood members.²⁸⁹ As such, these pamphlets demonstrate the evolution of his thoughts on religion, society, politics and the nation. As the Supreme Guide of the *Ikhwan*, and as al-Banna’s ideology developed, so too did the mandate of its members. This ideology would change quite drastically with the Arab Revolt of 1936.

In the mid-1930s, the *Ikhwan* turned their focus on the plight of the Palestinians in the Levant. In 1936, Palestine was swept with waves of violence caused by the increasing Jewish

²⁸⁶ Hasan al-Banna. *To What do We Invite Humanity?* Appeared as a pamphlet in 1936, https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/_2_-to-what-do-we-invite-humanity.pdf

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Hasan al-Banna. *To What do We Invite Humanity?* Appeared as a pamphlet in 1936, https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/_2_-to-what-do-we-invite-humanity.pdf, cited in Mura. *The Symbolic Scenarios of Islamism: A Study in Islamic Political Thought*, p. 111.

²⁸⁹ Mura, 104

immigration (due to Hitler's rise to power in Germany), the ongoing British occupation and the continuous in-fighting within the Palestinian Arab leadership.²⁹⁰ A general strike occurred on April 19, 1936 that would last until Palestinian achieved their demands. These included controlling Jewish immigration, the sale of Palestinian lands as well as the creation of a democratic government.²⁹¹ In October of that same year, the British brutally suppressed the Palestinian rebellion leaving over a thousand Arabs dead. However, this did not end the hostilities and violence broke out anew with the British once again shutting down the rebellion and inflicting mass casualties on the Palestinians.²⁹²

Author Israel Gershoni posits that the Arab Revolt in the late 1930s is important in comprehending the prodigious expansion the *Ikhwan* underwent in this period.²⁹³ Gershoni writes, "The first turning-point in the Society's attitude to the Palestine problem was ideological."²⁹⁴ Until this event, al-Banna's focus was on the reestablishment of a moral society, but with the Arab Revolt the *Ikhwan* stepped into the international political arena. The *Ikhwan* firmly directed its ideology towards a pan-Islam orientation with Al-Banna articulating the belief that every Muslim's loyalty should encompass these over-arching ideals.²⁹⁵ Al-Banna's decision to involve the *Ikhwan* in the Palestinian cause was their first foray into the political sphere.²⁹⁶ Arabs in the Middle East were deeply disconcerted over the ongoing Jewish expansion; this exacerbated an already tense dynamic in Egyptian society. Egyptians felt that the government was not doing enough to help the Palestinian cause, which made the treaty signed in 1936

²⁹⁰ William L. Cleveland, and Martin P. Bunton. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 5th ed., (Boulder: Westview Press, a member of the Perseus Books Group, 2013), 238

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 239

²⁹² *Ibid.*, 241

²⁹³ Israel Gershoni. "The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939." *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3, 1986: 368

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 369

²⁹⁶ R. P. Mitchell, 15

between Wafd Party Leader Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha and the British for Egypt's complete independence seem pointless.²⁹⁷ The government's unwillingness to send troops to aid the Palestinians proved to most Egyptians that the British were still in charge.

The Brotherhood stepped into this void and led the rallying cry of solidarity uniting Egyptians in defense of the Palestinian cause. Throughout 1936-37, the *Ikhwan* raised funds to send to Palestine, published articles attacking the British and Zionists, boycotted Jewish goods in Egypt, held rallies and meetings, disseminated propaganda in educational centers and mosques and finally, *Ikhwan* sent delegates to Palestine to report findings directly to al-Banna.²⁹⁸ Author Brynjar Lia posits that the Arab Revolt cemented aspects of the Brotherhood including their internal organizational strength as well as their ability to mobilize Egyptians in defense (in this case) of the Palestinian Arabs; it must also be noted that a number of historians have argued that the *Ikhwan* had a "general tendency to exploit the pro-Palestinian campaign as a material and ideological springboard for domestic expansion."²⁹⁹ Many viewed the *Ikhwan*'s campaigning on the Palestinian's behalf as disingenuous believing their true purpose to be the increase in membership numbers and branch offices, and the elevation of the *Ikhwan*'s status within Egyptian society. Yet Lia asserts that in tracing the funds raised for the Palestinian cause, almost all were sent forward, which counters the belief that for the *Ikhwan*, their campaigning for the Palestinians was an entirely self-serving enterprise. During this time period, the greatest metamorphoses for the *Ikhwan* was undoubtedly "the transition from religious preaching and education to... dynamic political activism."³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷ Lia, 236

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Gershoni, "The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939," 381-382

³⁰⁰ Lia, 242

Despite the *Ikhwan*'s General Law guidelines stating that they would not involve itself in the political process, the Arab Revolt brought them into the Egyptian political arena; this caused a number of problems for al-Banna within the *Ikhwan*.³⁰¹ This was not the first time the 'Supreme Guide's' authoritarian decisions caused issues with Brotherhood members. Indeed, tensions within the *Ikhwan* included disputes over appointments of branch leaders, the dissemination of funds for the Palestinian cause, and the radicalization of factions within the organization.³⁰² By 1938, the Arab Revolt in Palestine dominated the political scene in Egypt. The people, unhappy that the stagnating Egyptian government was doing nothing to help, increasingly turned to the *Ikhwan* for leadership. This support encouraged the *Ikhwan* who "concluded that they were capable of taking more radical measures toward realization of 'the Islamic Mission.'"³⁰³

At its onset, al-Banna claimed he wanted to educate society first and once the people had achieved greater *jihad*, an Islamic State would be the natural next step. It seems as though the Arab Revolt caused their entry into the political arena sooner than expected, and al-Banna, seeing his chance, seized it. In establishing connections with active political parties in tune with the Brotherhood's Islamic message, the hope was to achieve the next phase of the process, that of the "application and realization of the Islamic mission."³⁰⁴ Moreover, through political activism the *Ikhwan* wanted to further their goals of increasing their status within society and amongst their members as well as obtaining new ways to disseminate their message. In essence, "the shift

³⁰¹ Ibid., 243

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Gershoni, "The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939," 382

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 383

from *da'wa qawliyya* (declarative mission) to *jihad 'amali* (practical *jihad*) was accomplished through [the] Palestinian campaign."³⁰⁵

However, and notwithstanding their foray into the political sphere in defense of the Palestinian cause, the *Ikhwan* still continuously fought to have their educational aims met. For instance, in the mid-1930s, a suggested educational proposal aspired to increase foreign language classes whilst diminishing the number of hours given to Arabic and religious instruction.³⁰⁶ In response, the Brotherhood took it upon themselves to create, "committees calling for the reform of religious education... and submitted open letters and petitions to the Minister of Education and the members of the government-appointed Committee for Educational Reform."³⁰⁷ As such, and despite dealing with other matters affecting Egyptian society, the *Ikhwan* never lost touch with the underlying reason they created the Brotherhood in the first place: "To guide all of humanity to the precepts of Islam and its teaching."³⁰⁸ This would lead to internal and external liberation.

During this time period, Egyptians, in imagining a political identity, looked to the past for legitimization. Hasan al-Banna wrote in an *Ikhwan* pamphlet published in 1937 entitled *Da'watuna* (Our Message), "The Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in a nationalism containing these ideas or their like, nor do they advocate Pharaonism, Arabism, Phoenicianism, or Syrianism, or employ any of those epithets by which peoples rival."³⁰⁹ The nationalist ideas the *Ikhwan* disliked encompassed fanaticism and the attempt to connect Egypt to a period of time preceding Islam. Furthermore, al-Banna did not find favor in aggressive forms of nationalism as

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Lia, 138

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Hasan al-Banna, 'Da'watuna' (Our Message), in *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (1353/1935), also appeared as a pamphlet in 1937, https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/_6_-our-message.pdf

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

embraced by countries like Germany and Italy; however, he agreed with certain nationalist virtues including honor, discipline and finally, the political community, stating that "... if they mean by 'nationalism' that a man's kin and his nation are the most deserving of all mankind for his love and devotion, and the most worthy of his favor and striving [*jihad*], then it is the truth."³¹⁰ In *Da'watuna*, al-Banna slowly began embracing the wider ideals of nationalism.

The late 1930s signaled a decided shift in the Brotherhood's strategy. No longer content with proselytizing through schools and mosques, the *Ikhwan* now purported to reach a larger audience from a national stage. The ideological shift that occurred in this period began with the Arab Revolt; however, the Revolt merely highlighted the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the Egyptian government in dealing with either the Palestinian problem and more importantly, in dealing with the British and the issues occurring domestically. The infighting and stagnation that seemed continuous within the Egyptian government galvanized the *Ikhwan* to turn their propaganda towards critiquing the defunct state apparatus. They employed "... mass demonstrations to protest the 'indifference' and 'hesitancy' of the Egyptian government and to force it to support the Palestinian Arabs 'unequivocally'." This and other protests led the authorities to imprison several members of the *Ikhwan*. With these new steps, the Brotherhood officially began waging "political jihad."³¹¹

In 1939, the *Ikhwan* held their fifth congress celebrating their tenth anniversary and al-Banna defined their new mandate and ideology as being: "(1) a Salafite call, (2) a way based on the prophetic model behavior, (3) a Sufi reality, (4) a political association, (5) an educational society, (6) an economic company, and (7) a collective thought."³¹² It should be pointed out that

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Gershoni, "The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939," 385

³¹² Barry Zohurul. *Re-Emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt*, (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1995), 24

fractious tensions materialized within the *Ikhwan* during this period. Some desired a more radical approach to change, but al-Banna remained firm in choosing gradual change through moderation. These tensions led to the secession of numerous members who formed their own revolutionary organization named the Society of Our Master Muhammad's Youth; however, this rift did little to slow or hamper the Brotherhood's expansion.³¹³ By the end of the 1930s, the *Ikhwan* had a clear organizational structure, mandate and ideology. Now a firmly established organization, the *Ikhwan* redirected their energies towards changing the Egyptian state apparatus with the hopes of throwing off the yoke of the British occupation. The establishment of an Islamic State became of preeminent importance for al-Banna who turned his attention to the specific type of Islamic state he hoped to bring forth in Egypt.

Indeed, in his pamphlet *Between Yesterday and Today*, published in 1939, al-Banna defined three types of Muslim nations. First, he defined the nations seriously affected by the European tyranny of materialism. This encompassed countries such as Turkey and Egypt where Islam was no longer part of public life and instead, banished to the private sphere of mosques and Sufi retreats. Second, nations externally affected by the West, but who retained a strong emotive attachment to Islam like Iran and North Africa. Finally, nations not affected by the corrupting influence of the West (apart from the elites and the well-educated) such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq.³¹⁴ According to al-Banna, the "awakening" would cause Muslims to become more aggressive in demanding Islam's return.³¹⁵

Furthermore, the tone in the *Ikhwan* pamphlet *Between Yesterday and Today* differed greatly from the earlier pamphlets published by al-Banna. There is an urgency and a call to arms

³¹³ R. P. Mitchell, 19

³¹⁴ Hasan al-Banna. *Between Yesterday and Today*. Appeared as a pamphlet in 1939, https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/_7_-between-yesterday-today.pdf

³¹⁵ Ibid.

no longer solely theologically premised. Al-Banna wrote that the *Ikhwan*'s two goals were now: "(1) Freeing the Islamic homeland from all foreign authority, for this is a natural right belonging to every human being which only the unjust oppressor will deny. (2) The establishment of an Islamic state within this homeland, which acts according to the precepts of Islam, applies its social regulations, advocates its sound principles, and broadcasts its mission to all of mankind."³¹⁶ What is most telling is how al-Banna concluded this *rasal*:

Dear brothers, you are not a welfare organization, nor a political party, nor a local association with strictly limited aims. Rather you are a new spirit making its way into the heart of this nation - reviving it with the Qur'an; a new light dawning, dispelling the darkness of materialism through the knowledge of Allah; a resounding voice rising high - echoing the message of the Apostle (PBUH). In truth and without being excessive, you should feel that you are the bearers of a burden the rest of mankind has shrugged off. If someone asks you: "To what are you calling?" Say: "We are calling you to Islam, which was brought by Muhammad (PBUH): Government is part of it, freedom is a religious obligation." If someone should say to you: "This is politics!" Say: This is Islam, and we do not recognize such divisions.³¹⁷

With this pamphlet, al-Banna absorbed the political within his moral mandate. By arguing that Islam encompassed politics he managed to stay true to the General Law of the early 1930s stating that the *Ikhwan* would not attach itself to either the political process nor to any particular political party. For example, in his pamphlet *Oh Youth!* disseminated shortly after *Between Yesterday and Today*, al-Banna's focused on rallying youths to their cause of overthrowing the British. He warned them that disparate philosophies, diverse slogans, multitudinous doctrines, contradictory strategies and too many individuals and groups desiring to lead would mean failure.³¹⁸ Yet despite widening the scope of their mandate to include the political, the underlying tenets of the *Ikhwan* remained firm. *Oh Youth!* published over ten years

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Hasan al-Banna. *Oh Youth!* Appeared as a pamphlet in 1939, [https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/ 9 -oh-youth](https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/9-oh-youth)

after the founding of the *Ikhwan* still had as its primary goal “[1] Ask people to follow the teachings of Islam, [2] Uplift people in order to establish the religion of Allah, [3] And to take people into action.”³¹⁹ Thus, teaching and educating the people remained the first and primary decree of the *Ikhwan*.

Moreover, al-Banna’s *Oh Youth!* pamphlet was also a rallying cry against the explosion of authoritarianism in Europe and the rise of hyper-nationalist ideological platforms such as fascism and Nazism that appealed to young Egyptians.³²⁰ After years of gridlocked politics, Egyptians hoped that a different model of government, such as the ones advocated by Italy’s Benito Mussolini or Germany’s Adolf Hitler, could help galvanize Egyptian politics and the stagnating economy.³²¹ In stating that Islam was the best and indeed the only solution to the ills that had befallen society and the nation, al-Banna argued against all other political systems. “The

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ The 1930s also saw the rise of other movements such as *Misr al-fatat* (Young Egypt). Young Egypt was a hyper-nationalist group with strong religious convictions, and moreover, extremely ethnocentric. They approved the use of violence and created a paramilitary organization called *Al-qumsan al-khadra* (Green Shirts). Similar to the *Ikhwan*, Young Egypt attracted a wide array of members from rural peasants to the urban poor and university students. These groups manifested from the hardships the nation was experiencing due to the Depression, the backlash of liberalism, and also in response to Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi’s (1875-1950) revokement of the 1923 Constitution. The new Constitution empowered the monarchy at the expense of parliamentary politics, and Sidqi became a repressive authoritarian ruler. (P.J. Vatikiotis. *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*. 320)

³²¹ Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930*, 4. There is little doubt that Young Egypt admired the Nazi platform. In 1936, it sent a number of its members to the Nuremberg Rally. This Rally (1923-1938) was held annually and was a propaganda event for the Nazi Party. Young Egypt’s ideology also mirrored certain aspects followed by fascist and Nazi parties including the military training they insisted all youths receive, and the hyper-ethnocentrism they demanded from their members. It is disputed whether the *Ikhwan* imitated fascist parties during their early years. Historian Ana Belen Soage asserts that al-Banna’s use of slogans to advance his agenda imitated fascist parties. Also, al-Banna’s “world-view [fit] with totalitarianism, with its portrayal of history as a process of decline from a mythical past, its depiction of the Muslim Brothers as the saviors of the nation (in this case, the *umma*) and his plan to recover the lost utopia.” (Soage. “Hasan al-Banna or the Politicization of Islam.” P.34) While Soage makes a good argument, al-Banna has generally been seen as a shrewd and pragmatic leader who acted in ways that were politically expedient. It is possible that he may have mimicked the methodology used by fascist parties; however, similarities would have ended there. Historian Juan R.I. Cole points to the lack of similarities in the respective ideologies of the *Ikhwan*, of Spain’s Francisco Franco’s dictatorship and Mussolini’s fascism, and declares it impossible to link these groups together. Similarly, Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski in *Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s* write that “... “fascist” is an inadequate descriptor for the Muslim Brothers [and]... the designation fails to allow for the uniquely *Muslim* nature of the movement.” (Gershoni and Jankowski. *Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s*. p.211)

western way of life which was founded on material knowledge, technical know-how, innovation, invention and the dominance of the world markets with its products, was not able to give the human soul a ray of light, a hint of (spiritual) inspiration or a strand of faith.”³²² Al-Banna believed that fascism would fail once the people realized their ruler was a tyrant. Besides, with the rise of communism and socialism, al-Banna felt that Muslims would realize that they had no need to turn outwards for guidance, that indeed, the only thing necessary was a return to Islam.³²³ As al-Banna continued to proselytize, his charisma and popularity continued to grow, and his base of followers slowly began to change.

Specifically, the *Ikhwan*'s message increasingly appealed to the new *Effendiya* class. The *Effendiya* were a group of professionally educated men stemming from the lower stratum and born in the first part of the twentieth century who saw the parliamentary system and liberal politics as a complete failure. Egypt was still no closer to independence, the monarchy and the

³²² Hasan al-Banna. *Peace in Islam*. Appeared as a pamphlet in 1948, [https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/ 4_-peace-in-islam1.pdf](https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/4_-peace-in-islam1.pdf)

³²³ Ibid. Another ideological platform that attracted Egyptians was communism. The growth of communism in Egypt stemmed from a small movement in the 1920s called the Egyptian Socialist Party (ESP). Predominantly supported by trade unionists and foreigners, the ESP's agenda initially focused solely on the colonial situation in Egypt. (Botman. *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970*. P.2) The party was renamed the Egyptian Communist Party but was quickly crushed by Zaghul's Wafd Party in the mid-1920s; Marxism did not reappear again until the late 1930s. Following the restitution of the 1923 Constitution in 1935, political pluralism flourished once again. The revival of a Marxist ideology grew out of a liberal anti-fascist movement that attracted members of the Egyptian Jewish community. Socialist and Marxist ideas flowed from Europe through the Jewish intelligentsia who founded clubs and met regularly to discuss the rise of fascism in Europe, the ongoing British occupation, and their place amidst it all. Prior to the Second World War, Jewish activists linked their communist movement to the international community. (Botman. *Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919-1952*. p.125-126) Apart from an anti-fascist agenda, Communists during the late 1930s and early 1940s hoped to revitalize the Egyptian economy that stagnated under the liberal political order. Furthermore, they hoped to restructure Egyptian's class system. They felt that regardless of what laws changed, invariably only the elite profited. Most Egyptians felt that the corrupt political elite had long ago lost touch with the plight of ordinary Egyptians. Only through drastic change, such as a reordering of society, would lasting change occur. Throughout the Second World War, and until the Revolution of 1952, Egyptian Communists were factionalized and divided. (Botman. *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970*. P.2-3) This inter-ideological struggle likewise represented Egyptian society at large. The failure of liberalism pushed Egyptians towards numerous ideological platforms including Islamic groups like the Ikhwan, fascist-leaning groups like Young Egypt, and Marxist movements. These groups attracted the *fellahin*, but it is important to note that these movements, including the para-military groups that espoused violence, also appealed to the new *Effendiya*, urban professionals and university-educated students.

elite parliamentary politicians were self-serving and corrupt, and the new *Effendis* could not find employment. Involved in the 1935 demonstration to restore the Constitution of 1923, this new, younger generation of *Effendis* began endorsing movements such as the *Ikhwan*.³²⁴ Islamists appealed to the Egyptian populace because they preached an ideology and an understanding of identity that was familiar, secure and reactive against western traditions and values. This message promulgated as “authentic” attracted Egyptians to such an extent that by the close of the 1930s, the *Ikhwan* had cadres all over the nation. Indeed, in the 1930s the Brotherhood attracted a large following of professionals, civil servants and highly-educated students. However, it should be noted that the majority of Brotherhood members still came from the lower classes including peasants, small landowners, petty traders and artisans.³²⁵

By the early 1940s, the *Ikhwan* had close to fifteen hundred branches in Egypt. The British, worried about the stability and security of Egypt during the Second World War, instructed the Egyptian government to censor and suppress any dissenting voices. Despite the impediments levied by the state, the *Ikhwan* was able to continue meeting in mosques and managed to maneuver around the draconian measures instigated by the British.³²⁶ Mustafa al-Nahhas, leader of the Wafd Party, still had some support from the local populace, yet for many Egyptians the disorganization, elitism, and abuses of power left them feeling predominantly disenfranchised.³²⁷ Social issues were rarely addressed in parliament leaving Egyptians with no concrete leader to represent them, while the acceptance of Western liberal values by the political aristocracy further isolated them from the middle and lower classes. The weakening of Islamic traditions and the ideas propagating that Western culture was superior caused the masses to feel

³²⁴ Lia, *The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942*, 209

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 200

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 257

³²⁷ Cleveland and Bunton, 185

alienated from those representing them. The *Ikhwan* seemed a shining beacon of hope within this mélange. Arguing that “If a ruler goes astray, the people are obliged to force him to abide by the law and return him to the origin of justice,” al-Banna asserted that it was a moral duty for the people to rise up against the Egyptian government and more importantly, to do so through the *Ikhwan*.³²⁸

Thus, the politicization of the Brotherhood marked an important shift in their ideology and mandate. For al-Banna, Islam was and could be part of every aspect of private and public life. Al-Banna believed that “A Muslim will never become a real Muslim if he is not political and [does not have] a view for the affairs of his people.”³²⁹ Having entered the political sphere through the Palestinian question, al-Banna realized that the only way for true change to occur within Egyptian society was to gain political power and direct the affairs of state. Al-Banna understood that alienating the King and the ruling political party would do little to help their movement and as such, he was pragmatic in his approach in dealing with authorities.³³⁰

In 1942, seventeen members from the Brotherhood ran for political office; al-Banna ran in Ismailia on a moral, Islamic platform. However, the government pressured the *Ikhwan* to withdraw and while most members opposed this, al-Banna made the executive decision to do so, upsetting many members in the process. In exchange, the *Ikhwan* continued to organize meetings and meet without censorship, and the government promised to regulate and curb alcohol distribution and prostitution. Alison Pargeter, in her book *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power*, argues that al-Banna’s most pressing concern was the survival of their mission regardless of whom he had to make deals with or whom he upset. Acting unilaterally

³²⁸ Lia, 202

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Pargeter, 24

caused al-Banna numerous problems within the *Ikhwan* to the extent that he eventually chose to create a secret military arm in order to assuage some of the demands stemming from members who wanted a more extreme approach to change.³³¹

The “secret apparatus” was founded in 1942 or early 1943; however, it is possible the idea for such unit may have been discussed as early as 1930. A lack of confidence in the Egyptian government followed by clashes during the war years led to al-Banna’s decision to create the unit as a means of defense.³³² The “secret apparatus” in turn led to the development of a Brotherhood battalion system to motivate and assure loyalty from *Ikhwan* members. With this, a “system of cooperative families” was established based on cells that allowed for no more than five members at any given time. These relationships were interwoven and kept independent from each other so that at any given time, members within the “secret apparatus” had little to no knowledge of other enrollees.³³³ Yet from the beginning, al-Banna believed that change must be gradual and refused to agree to violent, aggressive action to achieve their goal of establishing an Islamic State within Egypt.

As such, and from the early 1940s onwards, al-Banna clearly articulated the *Ikhwan*’s mandate vis-à-vis its nationalist strategy:

Egyptian nationalism has a definite place in our call. It is its right that it should be defended. Surely we are Egyptians; the most honourable place on this Earth to us, we were born and raised up here. Egypt is the land, which has been an abode of belief. It gladly embraced Islam and gave it a new territory; it has repelled the enemies many times during the course of history... It cannot reform itself except by Islam, which is alone in providing a cure... So how can we not work for Egypt and its welfare? Why shall we not defend it with all of our energy and strength? How can it be said that the Egyptian Nationality cannot fit in with the demands of the belief of a Muslim.... We struggle for it and wage jihad for the sake of its good and welfare.³³⁴

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² R. P. Mitchell, 31

³³³ R. P. Mitchell, 33

³³⁴ Hasan al-Banna. *Our Message in a New Phase*. Appeared as a pamphlet in 1939
[https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/ 5 -our-message-in-a-new-phase.pdf](https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/5-our-message-in-a-new-phase.pdf)

Yet Al-Banna, despite fully embracing the nationalist call, still believed that Islam transcended borders and noted that the concept of Arabism remained important to their mandate, as Arabs comprised the chosen community.³³⁵ In studying the evolution of his ideology in his pamphlets, al-Banna began firmly placing the formation of an Islamic State within distinct territorial borders. Thus, his ideology changed conceptually and became rooted spatially within the Egyptian nation.

Regardless of the pressing and insistent tone al-Banna's writings took in the 1940s, he did not embrace a fundamentalist approach to either Islam or to the creation of an Islamic State. In *The Message of the Teachings*, disseminated in the early 1940s, al-Banna argued that the different Islamic jurisprudence schools should not cause divisions amongst Muslims. Moreover, he stated that visiting gravesites and tombs was acceptable if done in the way of the Prophet, which countered the fundamentalist belief that this constituted *shirk*.³³⁶ This clearly showed that al-Banna attempted to promulgate an Islamically-inclusive ideology and similarly disagreed with the more rigid and orthodox Saudi Arabian Wahhabist doctrine. He also had a very strong view concerning the labeling of Muslims as *kafir*. According to al-Banna, if an individual pronounced the two declarations of faith and similarly followed the prescribed duties of Islam then one could not be *takfir*. The *Ikhwan*'s slogan, "The Qur'an is our constitution, and the Prophet is our example," was an invitation for all Muslims.³³⁷ As such, al-Banna did not concern himself with what he considered minor details in practice and preferred instead to educate Muslims so they could rediscover Islam in its proper form.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Hasan al-Banna. *The Message of the Teachings*. Appeared as a pamphlet in the early 1940s, the exact date is unknown, https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/_3_-the-message-of-the-teachings.pdf

³³⁷ Ibid.

In this same pamphlet, al-Banna outlined his call to action for brethren members and this included:

[1] Reforming the self. [2] Establishing an Islamic home. [3] Guiding society by spreading the call of righteousness... and observing the Islamic principles in all aspects of public life. [4] Liberation of the homeland from all un-Islamic or foreign control, whether political, economic, or ideological. [5] Reforming the government so that it may become a truly Islamic government, performing as a servant to the nation in the interest of the people. By Islamic government I mean a government whose officers are Muslims who perform the obligatory duties of Islam, who do not make public their disobedience, and who enforce the rules and teachings of Islam. [6] Rebuilding the international prominence of the Islamic Umma by liberating its lands, reviving its glorious past, bringing closer the cultures of its regions and rallying under one word. [7] Guiding the world by spreading the call of Islam to all corners of the globe.³³⁸

In this excerpt al-Banna reiterated the necessity of internal *jihad*, or of internal discipline. With the achievement of greater *jihad*, then the creation of an Islamic State was possible. Through education and the revival of the *umma*, the Egyptian homeland could then be liberated from the yoke of colonialism. Al-Banna then emphasized the creation of an Islamic government that would serve the *Egyptian* nation. Andrea Mura writes that this quote exemplifies al-Banna's use of "modern national signifiers" as he articulates the need for an Islamic government beholden to the people, rather than God.³³⁹ This also depicts the desire for popular sovereignty. Al-Banna did not want to violently overthrow the Egyptian governing body. Rather, he aspired to change the hearts and minds of Egyptians, which would naturally lead to the creation of an Islamic nation. Once this succeeded, the *Ikhwan* could then aid the international *umma* in achieving the same.

In 1945, members of the *Ikhwan* once again ran for political office in a number of different ridings campaigning from an Islamic platform. While the *Ikhwan* had the popular

³³⁸ Hasan al-Banna. *The Message of the Teachings*. Appeared as a pamphlet in the early 1940s, the exact date is unknown, <https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/3-the-message-of-the-teachings.pdf>, cited in Mura. *The Symbolic Scenarios of Islamism: A Study in Islamic Political Thought*, p. 121

³³⁹ Mura, 122

support of the people, they nevertheless lost the primary in what has widely been considered a rigged election.³⁴⁰ This time period also saw the *Ikhwan* responsible for a number of violent outbreaks; however, Brynjar Lia argues that “the political violence of the Society’s military wing took the form of revenge and blood feuds... rather than systemic attempts to destabilize the regime.” This supports the premise that the *Ikhwan* wanted “accommodation and reform (rather than) confrontation and revolution.”³⁴¹ Indeed, al-Banna hoped to create an Islamic State democratically through the electoral process, rather than through a coup d’état. By 1948, the Egyptian government, believing a revolution imminent, issued a call for the dissolution of the *Ikhwan*. The struggle for supremacy between the Wafd Party and the *Ikhwan* was one of many struggles occurring within Egypt between various factions during this volatile time period.³⁴² The violence overflowing throughout Egyptian society eventually caught up with al-Banna who was assassinated in February of 1949; an act believed to be condoned by both the King and the government.³⁴³

In conclusion, the *Ikhwan*, in propagating their ideology absorbed the organizational methods used by missionaries. This included proselytizing in public places (hitherto unheard of) such as coffee shops, the marketplace, going door-to-door and most importantly, using their positions as school teachers. As Vickie Langohr posits, being relocated to different teaching posts throughout Egypt helped the *Ikhwan* reach a broad range of people. Their base ideology, morally reeducating the people through the Qur’an, remained constant from their inception to Hasan al-Banna’s death in 1949. As their mandate evolved from a pan-Islamic one to a

³⁴⁰ Cleveland, and Bunton, 34

³⁴¹ Lia, 271

³⁴² R. P. Mitchell, 58

³⁴³ Ibid., 71

territorially premised one rooted in Egyptian nationalism, the importance of education to their ultimate goal never wavered. In 1936, al Banna wrote:

This is a saying which the Muslims have been hearing for a long time, but perhaps it is unclear and incomprehensible to them. Perhaps they may say: 'What is wrong with this group in that they write about ideas which cannot even be achieved. What is the point of expressing utopian ideals except for floating around in a world of imagination and dreams?' My dear brother in Islam, take it easy! What you consider today as obscure and far away was commonplace to your predecessors. Your striving (*jihad*) will never bear fruit until it becomes just that- believe me, the earliest Muslims understood the Noble Qur'an the first time they read it: what we are handing on to you today was revealed to them.³⁴⁴

In this excerpt al-Banna explains that change is gradual and that changing all levels of society will take time. It also implies the necessity of truly reforming the polity from below, from the lower and working-classes, through education and greater *jihad*, in order to create a just and equitable Islamic state. Following the Arab Revolt, and the politicization of the *Ikhwan*, educating the community became of even greater import. In running for local office, the *Ikhwan*'s goal of being democratically elected further demonstrated the ideal of having the support of the people. Once al-Banna and the *Ikhwan*'s directive became a nationally premised one, education then became the framework and vector for Egyptian nationalism to take root in the hopes of ushering in an *Egyptian* Islamic state.

³⁴⁴ Hasan al-Banna. *To What do We Invite Humanity?* Appeared as a pamphlet in 1936, <https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/2-to-what-do-we-invite-humanity.pdf>

EPILOGUE

Gamal Abdel Nasser: *The End of Civic Engagement and New Forms of Discipline*

Building factories is easy, building canals is easy, building dams is easy—but building men, that is the harshest difficulty.³⁴⁵

Gamal Abdel Nasser, Cairo, 1969

On the eve of the Free Officers Revolution in the summer of 1952, Egypt was in complete disarray. With the reelection of the once popular Wafd Party in 1950, Egyptians hoped the ousting of the British was imminent. Unfortunately, government corruption and constant internecine infighting deepened the political stagnation. This political torpor was mired by the ever-widening gap between the rich and poor; en plus, the ongoing conflict in Palestine severely disillusioned the populace.³⁴⁶ As such, when the Free Officers movement seized control of Egypt in a bloodless coup d'état, the people quickly fell in line and gave their wholehearted support. The charismatic frontrunner of the Revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970), alongside a small group of military officers, ushered in a new era in Egyptian history. Indeed, the Free Officers Revolution seemed like a miraculous cure that would fix all of Egypt's ills. Yet this new era would exact a heavy toll including the complete loss of all civil liberties alongside new forms of state-enforced disciplining methods.

Nasser and his comrades grew to adulthood during the late 1930s, when the backlash against liberalism was overtaking the nation. This small group of military officers, all friends and all battle-hardened, belonged to a number of different organizations in the years leading to the

³⁴⁵ Omnia El Shakry. *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 205

³⁴⁶ Joel Gordon. "The False Hopes of 1950: The Wafd's Last Hurrah and the Demise of Egypt's Old Order." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 21, no. 2 (1989): 193

Revolution. Many Free Officers belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood while others to such groups as the Marxist-Communist Left. What set the Free Officers movement apart from these groups was that they remained ideologically neutral.³⁴⁷ Their allegiance was to the military and to the Egyptian nation. After taking control of the country, the Brotherhood and the Left quickly found that their voices were not welcome in Nasser's Egypt. Indeed, no dissenting voices were welcome, including that of feminists such as Doria Shafik who emphatically argued for political rights for women.

Once in power, Nasser established a Revolution Command Council (RCC) that quickly took charge of the daily affairs of the country. Their first order of business was the forced abdication and exiling of the highly unpopular King Faruq (1920-1965). Next, they put an end to the titles held by government officials (bey, pasha and so forth) and curtailed many of their luxuries including the government's summer hiatus to Alexandria every year. Also on the agenda was a land redistribution plan, which in turn led to the resignation of the political cabinet in September of that same year.³⁴⁸ What followed were numerous arrests of Palace officials and elite civil servants and finally, in January of 1953, the banning and dissolution of all political parties. The RCC then officially declared themselves leaders of a three-year interim government. In the following twelve-month period the RCC destroyed the remaining vestiges of the monarchy, as well as the last of the political ruling class and nullified the 1923 Constitution. Lastly, they nationalized and censored the press.³⁴⁹ Following these acts, all that was left were civic organizations.

³⁴⁷ Joel Gordon. *Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt Free Officers and the July Revolution*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 40, 46

³⁴⁸ Vatikiotis, 380-383

³⁴⁹ Vatikiotis, 380-383, and Nelson, 188

Of those, first on the list was the Muslim Brotherhood. Following the assassination of the authoritarian founder Hasan al-Banna in 1949, the Brotherhood, much like the country, was in complete disarray. Eventually, the *Ikhwan* elected Isma'il al-Hudaybi as the new General Guide. While Al-Banna was an autocratic leader, his personal magnetism and charisma had inspired men to follow him; Hudaybi followed a different type of leadership. His imperious attitude and secret government meetings led to much petty squabbling and worse, the stagnation of the Brotherhood and loss of members.³⁵⁰

Despite these internal issues, the *Ikhwan* felt that their ongoing methodical offensive against the *ancien régime* and foreigners alike was the reason the Free Officers movement was successful. As such, they fully expected to share at least some power with the RCC.³⁵¹ They promptly brought their long-held goals to the acting powers expecting to put their agenda in motion. This included first and foremost the creation of an Egyptian government established on the basis of Islam.³⁵²

Exactly how much the *Ikhwan* had to do with the actual coup is unknown; the Free Officers however, quickly understood that the Brotherhood could become a serious threat.³⁵³ With the attempted assassination on his life in October of 1954, Nasser launched a campaign to annihilate the Brotherhood. It is unclear whether the attempted assassination actually happened or was simply staged in order to give the Nasserist regime a reason to quash all potential rivals. Shortly after these events, Nasser's government declared the abolishment of the Muslim

³⁵⁰ R. P. Mitchell, 117-125

³⁵¹ Peter Mansfield. "Nasser and Nasserism." *International Journal*, vol. 28, no.4 (1973): 673

³⁵² R. P. Mitchell, 105

³⁵³ Mansfield, 673

Brotherhood. Nasser felt that “no quarter could be given to those who would oppose [the revolution] actively, passively or with indifference.”³⁵⁴

Similarly, Nasser also quashed, ousted or coopted other civic groups and religious organizations including the missions and clinics run by Christian missionaries. Their troubles began in the late 1930s when, based on the Montreux Convention of 1937, the Egyptian government stopped issuing them new visas. Moreover, just over a decade later, the new Law 38 decreed, “the ban on exposing non-Christian students to Christian teaching or worship and stipulated that students must receive instructions in their own religion, while also requiring all foreign schools to teach Arabic, Egyptian history and geography, and civics up to government standards.”³⁵⁵ This new law added additional pressure on mission schools that often struggled to raise the necessary funds needed to keep their doors open.

In this same period, the declaration of the state of Israel and the War that followed suit further aroused anti-Western sentiments in Egypt and the Arab world. With the issuance of Law 538 in 1956, missionaries knew their time in Egypt was drawing to a close. This Law insisted that all schools teach Islam to Muslim students, something private Christian schools neither had the training nor the desire to do. This occurred at the same time Nasser began nationalizing foreign businesses and banks, which led to the emigration of many foreigners.³⁵⁶ The Suez Crisis of 1956, brought the closing of British and French mission and the deportation of their missionaries. Shortly thereafter, and due to law 160 that stated that all school directors must be Egyptian, American mission schools transferred power over to the directorship of Coptic

³⁵⁴ R. P. Mitchell, 129

³⁵⁵ Sharkey, 214-215

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 232

Evangelical Church.³⁵⁷ A small cadre of American missionaries chose to remain in Egypt, but the Christian missionary heyday was officially over.

In his quest to assume complete control of Egypt and to silence every dissenting voice, Nasser turned his eye on women's groups and moreover, on the *ulema* at Al-Azhar University. Women's groups and the *ulema* were often at odds, especially during the 1940s as women's organizations increasingly argued for more political rights. Neither would be spared by Nasser. He targeted first Al-Azhar and in 1952 he nationalized all *waqfs*—or religious endowments. Three years later, Nasser took control of the judicial courts pertaining to civil status laws, long the purview of the *ulema*. He finished his assault on the ancient institution by enforcing his own brand of discipline on it. Nasser argued that Al-Azhar, despite numerous reform attempts over the decades, remained out of touch with modernity. In other words, it taught an Islam based on traditional rights, which included the *ulema's* right to political legitimacy and dominance. This would not stand and in 1961, Nasser enforced a complete overhaul of the institution.³⁵⁸

He then turned to women; Nasser had no time for women's groups who opposed his plans for Egypt. Doria Shafik, in her quest to keep the woman's movement alive following Nasser's ascension, and to highlight the fact that women were not represented in the drafting of the new Constitution, began a hunger strike in March of 1954. The strike ended after eight days with the assurance from the governor of Cairo that the new Constitution would offer women complete political rights. However, the RCC reversed their decision within a week and by 1956 the Nasserist regime subsumed all women's groups and organizations under the state Ministry of

³⁵⁷ Sharkey, 214-215

³⁵⁷ Ibid., 239

³⁵⁸ Malika Zhegal. "Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State (1952-1994)." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3 (1999): 373 (371-399)

Social Affairs.³⁵⁹ Finally, Shafik's celebrity status due to her activism both at home and abroad made her a target by the media who vilified her and came to see her as treasonous, thanks to Nasser's propaganda machine. This culminated with Shafik's house arrest in 1957, and her social exiling that would last until her tragic death in 1975.³⁶⁰

With political, religious and civic organizations crippled by Nasser's onslaught, he turned his full energies on creating a *new* Egypt. Nasser embarked on a "social-welfare mode of regulation... premised upon the state apparatus as arbiter not only of economic development, but also of social welfare."³⁶¹ Indeed, this could best be understood as an etatist regime.³⁶² As a post-colonial leader, Nasser aspired to create a strong, modern Egypt rooted in socialist values and he felt that the best approach was through the creation of the "new peasant." As such, in 1955 he launched a social experiment called the Tahrir Province project (TPP). This project related to Nasser's land reclamation policies, which entailed having small families relocate to a new settler village, where they would then be inculcated with the socialist communitarian values of the new administration. This would provide a fertile breeding ground for spreading the ideals of the Revolution and moreover, forging a new type of Egyptian citizen.³⁶³

There were many experts charged with the running of the TPP. The families, rigorously tested for suitability, trained first at the village of Omar Shahin, before being moved to their final destination. At Omar Shahin they learned:

An explanation of the principles of the revolution, and what productive and political projects it had undertaken; a description of the foundations of the Tahrir Province project; a study of social acclimation, and measurement of the direction of social change that settlers were faced with in their encounter with a new life and community in Tahrir Province; training of settlers in the practicalities of cooperative life—the organizing

³⁵⁹ Nelson, 193, 204

³⁶⁰ Nelson, 249

³⁶¹ O. El Shakry, 198

³⁶² Ibid., 202

³⁶³ Ibid.

principle in the new village; and the dissemination of health awareness. The vanguard settlers in Omar Shahin village would begin their day with communal athletic exercises, the disciplinization of the body occurring in unison... followed by public lectures on topics such as the “Socialism of Islam.” The aim was nothing less than than “purity of spirit,” “soundness of body,” and “care for the general interest and mutual cooperation.” Training and instruction were to be fairly extensive, and included primary and vocational education, child care, household care, and hygiene.³⁶⁴

This was the complete disciplining of the subject, internally and externally, and the creation of a “docile body” that would fit Nasser’s idea of what constituted citizenship in a modern, socialist Republic. Needless to say, the project was a dismal failure due to administrative problems, political discord and competition between those in charge.³⁶⁵ Yet this is a perfect example of the etatist disciplining enforced by the Nasserist regime. Michel Foucault discusses the “invisibility” of disciplinary mechanisms and perhaps that invisibility is exactly what is needed in order for it to succeed. Such overt methods of indoctrination as exemplified by Nasser’s TPP while possible on paper, seemed inconceivably difficult to maintain overtime.

In conclusion, Nasser had specific goals he wanted to accomplish in order to create a modern Egyptian state and he was successful at many of them. Amongst these successes were his agrarian reforms, the industrialization of the nation, giving all Egyptians access to education and health services and nationalizing the country’s economy.³⁶⁶ Additionally, he also aspired to create new Egyptian citizens rooted in socialist, communitarian values. While the TPP failed, he nevertheless managed to give back to Egyptians, specifically the *fellahin*, their dignity and pride in nation. Yet certain segments of the Egyptian population, especially those civically engaged, paid a very steep price for Nasser’s disciplinarian mandate.

³⁶⁴ O. El Shakry, 207

³⁶⁵ Ibid., 208

³⁶⁶ Mansfield, 688

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