Productivity of Object-Oriented Software Development

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Introduction of object-oriented technology does not appear to hinder overall productivity on commercial projects, but it neither seems to improve it in the first two product generations. In practice, the governing influence may be the business work flow and not the methodology.

As software development cycles become shorter, and software markets become more competitive, the software industry is, yet again, faced with a productivity crisis. There are many who believe that object-oriented software development is the solution to this problem. Therefore, it is quite surprising to see how sparse the quantitative evidence is on the subject of productivity of object-oriented software development.

In this paper we present empirical productivity data for a number of commercial software products developed using object-oriented methods. We compare productivity on object-oriented projects with that observed for commercial projects developed using "classical" procedural methods in the same organization and under the same business model. Our results indicate that although the introduction of object-oriented technology does not appear to hinder overall productivity on commercial projects, it neither seems to improve it in a systematic way, at least not in the first two product generations. Examination of the data indicates that the governing influence may not be the methodology, but the business model (market and business constraints imposed on schedules, milestones, and resources). We use simulation to further investigate the impact different business models can have on software development productivity. We show that under business models which may be common in software industry, it may not be possible to (fully, or even partially,) realize productivity gains that object-oriented development promises.
Evidence

There is surprisingly little quantitative evidence that productivity of object-oriented software development is indeed consistently better than that of "classical" procedural software development in a commercial environment. Published evidence appears to derive primarily from productivity studies made in non-commercial environments under non-commercial business models, and the scalability of the results to commercial environments is not clear.

For example, Lewis et al.\(^1\) performed an experiment with undergraduate software engineering students to study the effect of reuse. Based on their productivity metrics Lewis et al. concluded that the object-oriented paradigm can improve productivity when reuse\(^{\dagger}\) is present by about 50% (about 1.5 times). However, they did not find any statistically significant evidence that object-oriented paradigm has higher productivity than procedural methods when reuse is not a factor. Melo et al.\(^2\) also conducted an experiment with graduate students that yielded seven projects ranging in size from 5000 - 25000 lines of code. The projects were developed using the Waterfall process model, object-oriented design, C++, and varying levels of reuse. Their results support the conclusion that reuse rates can increase programmer productivity by as much as two to three times\(^{\S}\). However, at what level reuse becomes cost-effective is still an open question. Optimistic economic models\(^3\) of reuse indicate that break-even reuse levels may be as low as 10-20%, while pessimistic models\(^4\) contend that cost-effective levels of reuse may be much higher and difficult to achieve. There is also evidence that other factors may confound the picture. For example, different development methodologies may impact software development productivity in ways other than through reuse. Boehm-Davis et al.\(^5\) report on a comparison of Jackson program design, object-oriented design, and functional decomposition. They found that Jackson’s method and object-oriented methodologies produce more complete solutions, require less time to design and code a problem, and produce less complex designs than functional decomposition. However, a quantitative comparison of productivities associated with different methodologies was not given. Similarly, Zweben et al.\(^6\), again in an experiment with graduate and undergraduate students, show that language-based layering and encapsulation (an object-oriented trait) may reduce software development effort. There are many other studies concerned with the value of object-oriented approach but most are not quantitative in nature.

Recent work by Hansen correctly asserts that software development must first be viewed as a business.\(^17\) The referenced productivity studies focus on the productivity effects of object-oriented technology isolated from the effects of a typical business work flow. Noticeably absent are convincing quantitative studies that focus on productivity related to object-oriented software developed by professional programmers under commercial business models. It is not difficult to understand that, although many industrial organizations claim to practice object-oriented software development, many practicing software engineers and managers are quite cautious on the subject of object-oriented productivity. In fact, it would appear\(^7\) that many organizations

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\(^{\dagger}\) Estimated re-use level may have been as high as 25% in some cases.

\(^{\S}\) For high-end productivity gains re-use levels were in range 40-50%.
simply do not systematically measure software reuse (and the associated productivity) and therefore may not have more than anecdotal evidence for or against object-oriented productivity gains.

**Productivity**

Productivity can be measured in many ways. A traditional approach is to use project size or amount of functionality, e.g., in lines of code (LOC) or function-points, and divide that by the time or effort spent developing the code. In an object-oriented environment, LOC may not be an appropriate metric for software size or functionality. In fact, in a commercial situation there are many other factors besides the size that impact software costs and productivity, particularly if issues, such as the marketing, staff training, applied research, long-term maintenance and customer support are taken into account. None of these extra factors reflect in traditional LOC metric, but do require expenditure of effort. Unfortunately, in practice LOC is often the only available metric. Therefore, we will define productivity in terms of developed/changed LOC, but with an understanding that the effort (or time) expended may include many non-coding activities that are necessary in viable commercial product.

We define average software productivity of a software team by the following relationship:

\[
\text{Team Productivity} = \frac{\text{Project Size}}{\text{Project Effort}} \tag{1}
\]

The average programmer productivity is the team productivity divided by the number of programmers on the team. If we let the project size be in thousands-of-lines-of-code (KLOC), and the project duration be in months, then (1) can be re-stated as

\[
\text{Project Effort} = \frac{\text{Project Size(KLOC)}}{\text{Programmer Productivity}} \tag{2}
\]

The above equation implies a linear relationship between the effort and size of a project, but practice shows that the size and productivity of a software team often varies over the duration of a project, and that average programmer productivity is a non-linear function of a number of factors. For example, Walston and Felix of IBM pioneered the use of regression analysis to model software project cost and productivity. They report 29 factors. Boehm developed the COmputational Constructive COst MOdel, usually called COCOMO. This model provides a way of estimating the effort required for a project and the duration of a project. COCOMO is probably the most widely used cost model currently available. Boehm defines three types of software projects and 15 factors (or drivers) that strongly influence development costs. In the COCOMO model the factors are grouped into four categories: product attributes, computer attributes, personnel attributes, and project attributes. On the other hand, Bailey and Basili propose 21 cost factors

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† COCOMO is being revised. New version, COCOMO 2.0, will include object-orientation. Information on COCOMO 2.0 can be obtained from [http://sunset.usc.edu/COCOMO2.0/Cocomo.html](http://sunset.usc.edu/COCOMO2.0/Cocomo.html)
grouped into three categories: total methodology, cumulative complexity, and cumulative experience.

For each COCOMO project type Boehm developed models relating effort, size (KLOC), and development time:

$$\text{Effort} = \alpha(\text{Size})^\beta$$

$$\text{Duration} = \gamma(\text{Effort})^\delta$$

Other researchers used similar models. The parameters $\alpha$, $\beta$, $\gamma$, and $\delta$ can be determined in a number of ways, but frequently it is by regression on the loglinear version of these models. For example,

$$\ln(\text{Effort}) = \ln(\alpha) + \beta \ln(\text{Size}).$$

The typical experience with this type of model is that $\beta>1$, i.e., larger projects have lower productivity than smaller projects. The sublinear form of the model ($\beta<1$), which implies economy of scale, is less common, but it has been reported on some projects. Furthermore, "common" wisdom is that any compression of schedules below some nominal value dramatically increases effort thus lowering productivity. This effect is questioned by Kitchenham and Jeffery et al. who note that nominal schedules may not be optimal and a reasonable schedule compression, in fact, may increase productivity. Looking beyond software development, industrial psychology literature reports broad, and significant evidence that productivity increases with specific, challenging goals.

**Data**

The empirical data discussed in this paper was collected at the IBM Software Solutions Laboratory in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. This laboratory employs about 650 people, with approximately 90% being directly involved in software development. The laboratory was ISO 9000 Certified in 1994, and has consistently received high marks in internal assessments against the Malcolm Baldrige Criteria.

We examined 19 commercially available software products developed at this laboratory. Eleven were developed using object-oriented methods, and eight using traditional procedural methods. All object-oriented projects involved either first or second generation products, while all procedural projects dealt with second or higher generation of the product.

Four of the object-oriented products were inter-platform software ports. Five projects were developed for mainframe use, and fourteen for workstation use. The products range in size from

* Data used by permission. The scales appearing on the axes of all graphs, and any product and date-related information, have been altered to provide discretion.
about 1 thousand (KLOC) to about 1 million lines-of-code, (the analyses are limited to the actual new and changed code developed in-house). Project development duration is recorded in calendar months from the time when the project is officially funded to the first customer shipping date. The effort is reported in person-years and includes the effort of the programmers, testers, writers, planners, managers, and vendors. In this number is also included a person-year equivalent for purchased software. For example, if software was purchased for $300,000 and the average programmer cost in $150,000 per year, then this purchase would be equated to two person years of effort. Software reuse data was not available.

There are two types of development. The first type are fixes to errors and minor functional enhancements, the second type is the development of a new product, or large enhancements in function for an existing project. We will call the first category maintenance releases, and the second category new version releases. The latter flow takes as input analyzed customer requirements, customer satisfaction data on existing products, and marketing profiles for specific target markets. From this a variety of planning information is generated, including the plan for a proposed product, an estimate of the staff needed to develop the product, and maintenance. It is important to see that product function and the development cycle are often established by the market pressures. Due to the strong competition in the software market, failure to deliver the right function in the right time frame can easily mean failure of the product.
Empirical Productivity

In Figure 1 we plot the logarithm of the product effort versus the logarithm of the product size, see equation (5). The hollow circles represent the products developed using procedural methods, the solid circles represent the products developed using object-oriented methods, and the solid squares represent the products developed by porting design and code from existing products that were developed using object-oriented methods.

We see the familiar growth in effort with the project size, but, excluding the ported software, there are no obvious differences between the procedural and object-oriented products. However, there is a significant difference between the ported and non-ported products. Porting software can be viewed as software development where most of the design, and significant parts of the code are reused, and, although it should not be confused with reuse it offers a hint of the effort reduction that can be obtained through reuse. While ports are generally less costly than development of new software, and in itself the observed difference between the ported and other categories is not unusual, it is important to remember that object-oriented approach inherently provides a mechanism for reuse not only when software is ported, but also for enhancements and in development of future releases. Hence the productivity gains observed
during the port of object-oriented software may be a good reflection of the possible gains the technology offers if reuse is the key productivity driver.

To examine the issue further we applied the following regression model to the non-ported data:

\[ Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_1 X_2 + \varepsilon \]  

(6)

where \( Y \) is the \( \ln(\text{Person-Months}) \), \( X_1 \) is the \( \ln(\text{KLOC}) \), and \( X_2 \) is a class variable that indicates the development method. This relationship provides a single regression model for the full data, and a means of testing whether two models are needed. Analysis shows that \( \alpha \) is about 4.4 and \( \beta_1 \) is about 0.49. The hypothesis that \( \beta_2 \) and \( \beta_3 \) are both equal to zero was tested (F-test) and was not rejected at 5% significance level. Therefore, in this case, one regression equation is sufficient to model both procedural and object-oriented products that were in the non-port category. In other words, this indicates that for this data there is no statistically significant evidence that the productivity of object-oriented software development and procedural software development differ. As expected, a similar evaluation of the data on ported software vs. other software shows a significant difference between the two. It is good news that introduction of object-oriented technology does not appear to carry excessive productivity penalties, a fear that some managers may have. It is less welcome, but probably not so surprising, that there is no obvious productivity gain in the first and second generations of object-oriented projects.

However, an explicit analysis of project staffing and productivity characteristics shows some puzzling relationships. For example, Figure 2 shows the plot of the logarithm of team productivity vs. the logarithm of product size (changed or modified KLOC). We see that team productivity (expressed as KLOC/person-month) appears to increase with project size. This observation seems contrary to observations often reported in the literature, namely that software development suffers from a diseconomy of scale.

An explanation may be that there is a large but constant overhead associated with all projects or that smaller projects are, for some reason, overstuffed. Although we did find evidence that for smaller projects staffing loads were more generous than for larger projects, there was no evidence of large systematic project overhead, nor of the need to have smaller projects better staffed because of product complexity issues. However, there was evidence\(^\dagger\) that the business model may dictate larger teams for certain types of smaller projects, namely intermediate product releases, to preserve continuity of skills and expertise between large releases of the product. While this may provide a partial explanation for the first six small projects, it does not really explain the productivity growth observed for larger projects. One could also argue that larger projects have stronger development teams which accounts for the economy of scale. This also is not supported by the data. Development teams had roughly the same experience and skill level throughout the organization.

\(^\dagger\) Based on interviews with the work flow owners and a review of the project documentation
The next relationship we checked proved to be even more interesting. It is shown in Figure 3 where we plot the "Project Development Time" (in months) per KLOC vs. the size of the project. We see that there is a steady and consistent decrease in the time per KLOC of the product as the product size increases. This is unusual and suggests some form of schedule compression. The question is whether this is the result of schedule overestimation for smaller projects, or something else. Given the fact that some of the larger projects exhibited productivity larger than the "nominal" values that might be expected for the product based on, for example, classical COCOMO model, it appears that there some genuine schedule compression did take place.
This prompted us to examine project schedule histories of several projects in detail. Figures 4 illustrates typical effects and trends that we observed. The plot show a comparison of the planned and actual milestone completion durations for a second generation object-oriented project. The hollow circles represents the planned task completions and the solid circles the actual task completions. The vertical axis is the calendar time unit when the milestone tasks complete. The horizontal axis is the project milestones. For example, milestone 6 was planned and actually finished 130 days after the project started, milestone 7 finished well after the planned date, indicating the milestone took longer than planned, while milestone 8 finished slightly late, indicating that most of the delay in milestone 7 was made up during milestone 8. We see that completions of actual tasks track the plan quite closely. Similarly compliant tracking patterns were observed for other projects, both procedural and first-generation object-oriented. How was that achieved?
Figure 4. Second generation object-oriented project. The actual (solid circles) and planned (hollow circles) project duration vs. milestone number.

One possible explanation is that the product planning process is very accurate. However, given a very wide variation in the average productivity over the examined projects, it is unlikely that the productivity rate of the associated programming teams was so well known in advance for all of them that the original project schedule estimates would do such a surprisingly good job at projecting the actual completion times. Another explanation could be that schedules were met because software functionality was changed or testing time was reduced to meet them. Examination of the project records shows that no major functions were added or deleted in these projects, and that time was not saved by shortening testing cycles. For example, the project in Figure 4 shows significant delays in the 6th through 9th milestones. These were coding milestones, and the schedules were brought back in line during this phase, not during testing. The project also has delays in milestones 15 and 16 that were testing milestones. Milestone 15 started on schedule, and milestone 16 ended on schedule. This testing effort may have been shifted, but it was not shortened. There was clear evidence that dynamic schedule enforcement and compression took place, and that this was probably a major factor in achieving the milestone compliance. Since the milestones were primarily dictated by the business schedules, we decided to examine influence this may have on the software process and productivity.
**Business Model Drivers**

As mentioned earlier, investigated software was developed in an environment that recognizes two major software project sub-categories: new version releases, and maintenance releases. The size of a maintenance release is usually smaller than "new version" release, and while the duration of a maintenance release is shorter this reduction is not in proportion to size change. While all new development must be completed with a limited number of personnel, existing projects will have an established team, and typically an effort is made to maintain or even increase the size of the team because it may not be cost-effective to totally dismantle a product software team between "new version" releases. So, it is not unusual to have a maintenance releases developed over a more relaxed schedule using the original team.

However, both categories were subject to frequent high-level reviews of their schedule status against key development dates (or milestones) established at the beginning of development. The progress towards these dates was reviewed regularly and in detail, and schedule slips in these major milestones were strongly discouraged. This approach, which may be quite common in software industry, leads us to believe that to fully explain effects such as those seen in Figures 3 and 4, we need to consider drivers that may not normally be part of a cost model. Namely, the business model milestones in combination with two human related effects, the Parkinson Law, and the Deadline Effect.

The Parkinson’s Law states that work will expand to fill the allocated time. The Deadline Effect is when programmers are compelled to work extra time to complete a task by a given deadline. These effects are supported by goal theory from industrial psychology. This theory states the productivity will increase with specific, challenging goals, over “do your best” goals. As of 1990, over 400 experiments have been performed testing this theory, with over 90% supporting it. With fixes to errors, and small functional enhancements, it is possible to overestimate effort to maintain the team size. This can result in a lax schedule. According to Parkinson’s Law and goal theory, in a situation like that the software team will not finish early but will finish according to the schedule, which may result is low nominal productivity. Conversely, large enhancements, and new products often overcommit function which can lead to aggressive schedules. The Deadline Effect and goal theory show that, up to a point, people will increase their productivity to meet the schedule. To state this in simpler terms, the productivity of the projects appears to be driven by schedule.

In our context, the implication is that the larger projects were probably understaffed and restricted to a shortened development cycles, which forced aggressive schedules and higher productivity. On the other hand, smaller projects were probably fully staffed (perhaps even overstaffed in some cases) with schedules that could comfortably be met within a given development cycle, yielding lower productivity. We discuss these issues further in the next section.
Object-Oriented Productivity

Like Hansen,17 we believe that in a commercial software development environment the primary controlling influence is probably the business model and its major milestones. To study this we developed simulation models that explore the interactions between the business model deadlines and the software methodology and process models10,19.

In our case, the business model is expressed as a series of “soft” and “hard” schedule milestones. Software development operates within the constraints imposed by these milestones. A “hard” milestone must be met, or strong negative consequences result. A “soft” milestone can slip so long as the next hard milestone is achieved. Goal theory clearly shows that productivity is higher for an aggressive schedule, and lower for a lax schedule.16 For an aggressive schedule the deadline pressures require people to work over-time and weekends to meet project milestones. For lax schedules, Parkinson’s effect will fill programmers working hours with legitimate work which, however, may not be directed at early completion of the project at hand, thus lowering the apparent overall productivity rate.

We begin simulations by estimating the minimum and maximum time needed to accomplish individual tasks required by each milestone. The estimates are governed by the average team productivity assumed for that milestone. This gives the possible range of time and effort that each milestone requires. We call the time component the milestone duration range (MDR). For a “hard” milestone, the MDR does not exceed the set deadline. This provides a way of describing the Deadline Effect. For a “soft” milestone the MDR begins no earlier than some predetermined time before the milestone, e.g., one week before the set deadline. This provides a way of simulating the Parkinson’s Effect. We then generate a duration sample for the project as a whole by taking a sample from all individual MDRs and adding the values obtained. Repeated sampling can be used to build project duration distribution. The simulation details, and a more formal (analytical) description of the interactions between the business model and the software process that uses the concept of convolution, can be found in Potok and Vouk.19
We illustrate the impact of “hard” and “soft” deadlines by showing simulation results for two hypothetical projects operating under four business models. One project has “normal” productivity range, the second project differs from the first one only in that it has productivity that has upper bound which twice as large as the “normal” productivity upper bound. Both have the same lower bound on the productivity. The normal range can be considered procedural development, and the high productivity range can be considered as object-oriented development with high levels of reuse, so, in text below, we will sometimes refer to the high-productivity project as the “object-oriented project” and to the other one as the “procedural project”. When a business model is applied, both projects operate under the same milestones and the same constraints (MDRs). When Parkinson’s Law is in effect, MDR lower bound is no earlier than one week before the deadline. When the Deadline Effect is active, MDR upper is the same as the actual deadline. These restrictions are consistent with our empirical data.

Our first model provides incentive to finish a project early, with no penalty for finishing late. The simulations are based on five soft equally spaced project milestones and no limits on MDRs. The projects under this business model can be viewed as being free from both the Deadline and the Parkinson’s effects. The planned duration for each milestone is 10 weeks, so the deadline for milestone 1 is 10 weeks, for milestone 2 is 20 weeks, and so on, with milestone 5 schedules at 50 weeks. The estimated probability density distributions for the duration of the projects under this
model were obtained by simulation and are shown in Figure 5. From the position of the peaks in the two curves, we see that a "typical" high productivity project would be expected to finish well before (about week 60) a typical "normal productivity" project (about week 71). Furthermore, there is a much higher probability that week 50 milestone will be achieved by our hypothetical object-oriented team than by the procedural team.

![Project Completion with Parkinson's Law](image)

**Figure 6.** A comparison of high and normal productivity project completion distributions with Parkinson’s Law applied

Our second model provides no incentive for finishing early, and no penalty for finishing late. There are still five soft milestones, but MDR lower bounds are one week less than the schedule deadline. There is not restrictions on MDR upper bounds. This is as if the Parkinson’s Effect alone is applied to the projects. Figure 6 shows the resulting estimated conditional density function for each of the two projects. Each curve is normalized with respect to the number of samples for the project type that have met the business model constraints. We see that the duration distribution peaks draw closer, and hence the effective productivity levels become more similar and quite low. Potential object-oriented development gains are much less pronounced, and, in fact, the likelihood that projects that satisfy the constraints finish before week 49 is zero.
Figure 7. A comparison of high and normal productivity with only the last deadline held fixed.

The third model provides incentive for finishing early, and a penalty for finishing late. The first four milestones are still soft, but the last one (at week 50) is now a hard milestone. The MDR lower bounds are not fixed, but the MDR upper bound for the last milestone is fixed at week 50. This is conceptually the same as adding the Deadline Effect to the project but having no Parkinson’s effect. Figure 7 shows the conditional density distributions computed from the simulation samples that met the constraints. Again both curves are normalized with respect to their own conditional populations. The high-productivity project has higher potential to finish significantly earlier than week 50, but neither project extends beyond the set deadline. However, potential advantage of object-oriented development over the procedural development for the project as a whole seems to have disappeared. However, as can be seen from the probability distribution, object-oriented teams that conform to the model constraints have a better chance of completing earlier if they want to than do the procedural teams. This means that in the former case the final goal can be achieved in a less abrupt fashion (and a fashion that is probably less stressful for the software teams).
In practice, it is unlikely that any of the three models will occur alone. For example, it is unrealistic to assume no penalty for late completion. A great deal of planning and effort is required to ship a product, and changing the ship date late in the cycle is costly whatever the reason. Based on the work flows analyzed in this study, a more realistic business model is one where there is no incentive to finish early, and a penalty for finishing late. Conceptually, this is the same as adding both the Parkinson’s and the Deadline effect to a project. Figure 8 illustrates the results by showing the detailed conditional schedules computed for our two hypothetical projects under this model. Conditional distributions are normalized around each milestone. This plot shows five project milestones, with the first four being soft milestones, and the last one being a hard milestone. The planned duration for each milestone is again 10 weeks, so the deadline for milestone 1 is 10 weeks, for milestone 2 is 20 weeks, and so on, with milestone 5 finishing at 50 weeks. This figure shows two interesting results, 1) both projects finish at the same time with the same overall productivity, and 2) the business processes appears to cause a reduction in variance around the milestones as the lower productivity project progresses (unfilled symbols). The tasks for the lower productivity team must be closer to many of the intermediate deadlines in order to make the final one, while the higher productivity team (filled symbols) has a more relaxed schedule (and probably a more diffuse process) since the advantage in the productivity allows them to slip many of the intermediate milestones and still make the final deadline. It is

**Figure 8.** A comparison of high and normal productivity with Parkinson’s Law applied, and the last deadline held fixed.
obvious that under this regime there may not be any visible productivity gains from the higher-productivity methodology for the project as a whole. However, again the benefits may be lowered stress on the software teams, and possibly better quality of the products since the higher productivity teams may have more time to pay attention to, for example, verification and validation details that often fall victim to schedule enforcement.

Summary

Our result indicate that in a commercial environment there may not be a consistent statistically significant difference in the productivity of object-oriented and procedural software development, at least not for the first couple of generations of an object-oriented product. The reason may be low reuse level, but it could also be the underlying business model. Investigation of 19 commercial products has shown an unusual economy of scale for both object-oriented and procedural software that is difficult to explain with traditional productivity drivers. However, a reviewing the underlying business work flows has suggested that business deadlines may strongly influence the overall productivity. In an environment where a typical delivery cycle for product versions or release is of the order of 12-24 months it may be more economical to preserve development team skills and expertise by keeping them together whether they operate under the new release or maintenance schedules. This may produce aggressive schedules for new releases, and lax schedules for maintenance releases. Aggressive schedules are influenced by the Deadline Effect which raises apparent productivity, while lax schedule are under the Parkinson’s Law which lowers apparent productivity. A review of detailed schedule analysis for three products provided empirical support to this explanation. Simulations of projects with two levels of productivity shows that business work flows can play a key role in realizing the potential productivity benefits from a new technology such as object-orientation. Investments in technology that increases productivity can be lost unless the underlying business work flows are adjusted to take advantage the improved software development capabilities.

References


