Browsing by Author "Dr. Jacqueline M. Hughes-Oliver, Committee Member"

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    Integrating Accelerated Problem Solving into Six Sigma Process Improvement Methodology
    (2003-11-19) Gilbert, Elana R.; Dr. Jacqueline M. Hughes-Oliver, Committee Member; Dr. Roger Barker, Committee Member; Dr. A. Blanton Godfrey, Committee Member; Dr. Timothy G. Clapp, Committee Chair
    Six Sigma has revolutionized the world of business and has presented a new measure of success in customer satisfaction and quality. Six Sigma uses an array of statistical and analytical tools to apply a data-driven, root-cause analysis to existing processes to minimize variation and aim for zero defects. The purpose of this thesis is to study the purposes, tools, goals of Six Sigma's scientific discovery process and find areas conducive to the integration of accelerated problem-solving techniques, in hopes of deriving a more complete methodology. A typical Six Sigma project may encounter a variety of issues that either stem from or contribute to the process problem of the project's focus. The problem solving theory presented in this thesis discusses these issues in terms of the dimensions of problem solving which are orientation level, solving stage, and tool/problem type. Viewing Six Sigma in the light of this theory revealed a need for the addition of tools that addressed issues associated with personnel and belief system limitations, 'stuck thinking', and innovative solution generation. The accelerated problem-solving tools integrated to address these issues are as follows: Six Hats Thinking, Mind Mapping, elements of the Theory of Inventive Problem Solving (TRIZ), the Theory of Constraints (TOC) and elements of Kepner-Tregoe's management model. A hybrid Six Sigma model was developed to address each dimension of problem solving. The new model was applied during a Six Sigma Green Belt project at a nonwoven manufacturing facility. The author acted as a Six Sigma Coach to the team and used accelerated problem-solving tools to address obstacles in project progress and thinking. The hybrid model was useful in increasing the quality of communication among team members, providing breakthroughs in thinking and promoting the use of the existing DMAIC tools
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    Risk Preference, Correlation Choice, Sabotage, and the Design of Promotion Tournaments
    (2003-05-16) Yumoto, Yuji; Dr. David J. Flath, Committee Chair; Dr. Duncan M. Holthausen, Committee Member; Dr. Theofanis Tsoulouhas, Committee Member; Dr. Jacqueline M. Hughes-Oliver, Committee Member
    I examine properties of worker behavior under promotion tournaments, and discuss their implications for the design of promotion tournaments. Given their tasks, workers will decide how much effort they exert. In addition to this decision-making, they have the opportunity to decide their approaches to perform their tasks within their delegated authority. I define the term approach as a method, way, procedure, plan or project to perform his task, into which a worker infuses his effort. Through their approach choices, they can control the riskiness and correlation of their performances. It is shown that under the loser-selecting tournament, which means the promotion ratio is more than one-half, workers prefer a low risk approach or a common approach which peers also know well; on the other hand, under the winner-selecting tournament, which means the promotion ratio is less than one-half, they prefer a high risk approach or their own original approaches. These results suggest that the loser-selecting tournament is more efficient than the winner-selecting tournament in terms of the cost for implementing high efforts of risk-averse workers. I rigorously show this in the case of three workers. I argue that the winner-selecting tournament is better suited for the upper job levels or for firms in innovative and immature markets or industries; on the other hand, the loser-selecting tournament is better suited for the lower job levels or for firms in stable, mature, or strictly regulated markets or industries. Furthermore, I investigate properties of sabotage under tournaments. Under the one-winner tournament, each worker attacks his peers so as to minimize the maximal value of their expected performances. The sabotage operates to create more homogeneity. Under the one-loser tournament, each worker intensively attacks one peer so as to minimize the minimal value of his peers' expected performance. One worker is intensively attacked by all peers. I argue that the one-loser tournament is more subject to damage by sabotage than the one-winner tournament.