Browsing by Author "Dr. Nancy Mitchell, Committee Chair"

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    Absolute Commitment: Ideology, Human Rights and the Carter Administration's Policy toward Central America, 1978-1979
    (2010-03-04) Nix, Shannon; Dr. Nancy Mitchell, Committee Chair; Dr. Lars Schoultz, Committee Member; Dr. Richard Slatta, Committee Member; Dr. Steven Vincent, Committee Member
    Michael Hunt has claimed that the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is “incomprehensible, perhaps inconceivable,†without taking into account a panoply ideas that comprise a nationalistic strain in U.S. foreign policy. Founded on an exceptional national identity, Hunt traced the evolution of three persistent ideas, often subtle though sometimes shrill, that have informed U.S. foreign policy from its inception. In one sense, Hunt’s work was an existence proof, one that since has been widely accepted by historians. On the other hand, he was tendering a call to arms, a Geertzian mandate to bring the subtle influences of ideology on U.S. foreign policy “into the light of day.†Some have argued that interests, and not ideology, are what determine foreign policy – policymakers imagined to be hard-nosed realists with an omniscient capacity to determine the “national interest.†While it is not my thesis that ideology determines U.S. policy, I submit that it mediates the formulation, deployment and reception of that policy. For many, the values implicit in human rights are indistinguishable from the nation and, by implication, their preservation and propagation are indistinguishable from the national interest. Ideology forms the mediating lens through which policymakers grapple with the complex and nuanced realities that comprise the “national interest.†Ideology shapes and circumscribes the discourse that determines the “national interest.†Ideology matters. In an attempt to answer Hunt’s call, I pose this central question: To what extent and in what ways did these persistent strains of nationalistic ideas affect the formulation, deployment and reception of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua and El Salvador during their respective succession crises that culminated in rapid succession in the last half of 1979? The Carter administration was more self-conscious than most about the legacies of a historically nationalistic U.S. foreign policy – the legacies of empire in Latin America, of racial discrimination and cultural chauvinism, and of an “inordinate fear of communism.†Nevertheless, nationalisms are socially constructed and, as such, are historical phenomena. They have an historic arc and an historic mass – in short, an ideological inertia, sensitivity to which is insufficient to arrest its momentum. The Carter administration, though more reflective than most, was ultimately incapable of escaping ideology’s gravitational pull or its historical residue. The discourse of universal human rights, steeped in notions of Western exceptionalism, provides rich auger for exploring Hunt’s trilogy of ideas in the formulation, deployment and reception of policy. While many in the Carter administration were sensitive to past U.S. interventions in Latin America, the administration’s human rights policy was a proselytizing policy. It replaced Roosevelt’s gunboats and Taft’s greenbacks with human rights commissions, foreign assistance, and diplomatic démarches. Second, the administration founded its prescription for advancing human rights on Western tropes of modernity; U.S. values and institutions – presumed to be universal, the ultimate expressions of modernity – were deployed to remedy a presumed endemic Latin American “backwardness.†Finally, the Carter administration deployed human rights as a means to wage the Cold War, the institutional underpinnings of human rights – the rule of law, democracy and development – all Burkean prescriptions to reduce the vulnerability of benighted societies to the specious ideologies of revolution. My method for discovering ideology at work in the Carter administration’s human rights policy is to examine the discursive contrails of that policy, the use of language in the public and private rhetoric of those that formulated and followed U.S. foreign policy. In successive chapters, I examine the formulation of the Carter administration’s human rights policy in early 1977, and then its application in the Nicaraguan succession crisis during 1978 and the Salvadoran crisis in 1979 following the Nicaraguan revolution. While the ultimate object of this study is the effect of ideology on that foreign policy, the immediate object of examination is the policy itself and the rhetorical acts surrounding that policy. Not wishing to “cherry-pick†my evidence from the voluminous record surrounding the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran succession crises, I will attempt to remain detached from any ideological analysis during the course of this “thick description,†deferring such analysis until the final chapter.
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    Alert Today, Alive Tomorrow: The North Carolina Civil Defense Agency and Fallout Shelters, 1961-1963
    (2008-11-17) Blazich, Frank Arthur Jr.; Dr. Nancy Mitchell, Committee Chair; Dr. James Crisp, Committee Member; Dr. Joseph Caddell, Committee Member
    From 1961 to 1963, the administration of President John F. Kennedy attempted to create a vast network of public and private fallout shelters across the United States. The North Carolina Civil Defense Agency (NCCD) during this period focused instead on emergency preparedness. Fallout shelters were a façade, providing funding that allowed the NCCD to quietly focus its efforts on emergency preparedness. While the state managed to provide fallout shelters for only eight percent of the population, this failure was not as damning as most scholars have assumed. In fact, the state agency used available federal funding to prepare the state for natural disasters and isolated, minor emergencies. State civil defense officials implemented improvements in communication networks, emergency rescue squads, and the professionalizing of fire and police departments state-wide. Citizens did not criticize the civil defense agency in North Carolina; following the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was no public backlash against the state agency. The crisis, on the contrary, validated the state’s approach to civil defense. By focusing on emergency preparedness instead of investing in fallout shelters, local civil defense agencies were able to operate in accordance with the specific demographic, geographic, and financial needs of the county residents. Most people assume that the fading yellow and black “Fallout Shelter†signs are the only residue of the civil defense program in North Carolina. In fact, the professional development of the state’s rescue squads, police and fire departments harkens back to the efforts of civil defense offices in the early 1960s.
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    "The Drill": The Emergence of the "New Right" as a force in U.S. Conservative Politics during the Panama Canal Debates, 1977-1978
    (2006-05-18) Pfeffer, Stephen Todd; Dr. Nancy Mitchell, Committee Chair
    This thesis examines the rise of the "New Right" in conservative American politics during the Panama Canal debates in 1977-1978. The "New Right" emerged from the frustration many conservatives felt towards the traditional Republican Party establishment because of the defeat of Barry Goldwater, the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the policy of détente, and the scandal of Watergate. The "New Right" had financial, legislative and social components that worked together to promote its conservative agenda of lower taxes, vigorous anti-communism, and, in the early years of the Carter administration, opposition to the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties. This thesis looks specifically at the "New Right's" fundraisers, most notably Richard Viguerie, Terry Dolan, Paul Weyrich, and Howard Phillips, who raised money in order to influence legislation and provide support for conservative candidates; it also examines the members of Congress who worked in conjunction with this financial apparatus; finally, it analyzes the relationship of Ronald Reagan to the "New Right." The Panama Canal treaties debate served as a test case for the "New Right" to hone its fundraising and media skills on a national level. This work details two "New Right" tactics used to block U.S. Senate ratification of the treaties: the Panama Canal "truth squad" and the direct mail campaign. The "New Right" used the Panama Canal as a campaign issue during the 1978 midterm elections and the candidates it supported defeated three incumbent Democratic senators who had voted for ratification. During the Panama Canal debates, the "New Right" worked outside of the Republican Party to create an effective and well-organized grassroots organization.
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    Jimmy Carter, Mexico, and the Natural Gas Negotiations of 1977-1979
    (2007-08-28) Vidunas, Amy; Dr. Nancy Mitchell, Committee Chair; Dr. Joseph Caddell, Committee Member; Dr. Lois Huffman, Committee Member
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    A More Muscular Foreign Policy: Saudi Arabia and the Militarization of US Middle East Policy, 1979-80
    (2008-01-07) Montague, Archer Allen III; Dr. Michael Allen, Committee Member; Dr. Akram Khater, Committee Member; Dr. Nancy Mitchell, Committee Chair
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    Political Shifts During the Carter Years: North Carolina Conservativsm and Stokes County's Perception of Tobacco, The Economy, and Foreign Policy
    (2003-04-30) Mitchell, Robert Wayne; Dr. Nancy Mitchell, Committee Chair
    This thesis explores political shifts in the 5th District of North Carolina during the years President Jimmy Carter occupied the White House. In order to demonstrate how national politics percolate down to the local, it also examines voting patterns, voter perception of several important issues, and the political survival of 5th District Democratic Congressman Steve Neal in a time of increasing GOP dominance. Sources included careful reviews of local newspapers, campaign literature, interviews, position papers, and polling data. The 5th District of northwestern North Carolina and a rural county within that district, Stokes County, is examined as an example of the political shifts that occurred in favor of the more conservative Republican candidates. The intense rhetoric in opposition to Congressman Neal, a Carter loyalist, regarding the issues of tobacco, economics, and foreign policy are highlighted, for they played major roles in swaying the local electorate in the elections of '76, '78, and '80. In addition, this research considers the impact of national politics on local and state races at a time when President Carter was becoming less popular. This research also analyzes Congressman Neal?s struggles to maintain his political life. Neal was successful, when other Democrats on the ticket, including N.C. Senator Robert Morgan and President Carter, were soundly defeated. The ability of Congressman Neal to fight back against negative attacks and often outlandish rhetoric reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the Democratic Party in the South, in North Carolina, and the 5th District. It also underscores how conservatism has come to dominate, with few exceptions, at the ballot box.
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    "A Rat Hole to be Watched"? CIA Analyses of the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948-1950
    (2006-07-26) Mehta, Coleman Armstrong; Dr. Alex DeGrand, Committee Member; Dr. Nancy Mitchell, Committee Chair; Dr. Charles Carlton, Committee Member
    This thesis studies Central Intelligence Agency analyses of the June 28, 1948, Tito-Stalin split. It discusses the many issues that the CIA confronted after the first public breach of a heretofore united Communist monolith. This thesis also places these analyses in context, examining the problems faced by the newly created CIA as it struggled to find a place in the national security bureaucracy. After the Agency was established in 1947, its very existence was consistently challenged by the Departments of State and Defense, organizations which were unwilling to cede any bureaucratic control away from their own intelligence operations. The Secretaries of State and Defense used their superior status on the National Security Council to bolster their positions, while the Agency's ad hoc organizational structure and uncertain mandate provided a weak case for more authority. Along with its administrative struggles, the early CIA was also marked by a series of high-profile intelligence failures, among them the Tito-Stalin split. Despite its ongoing bureaucratic struggles, the CIA quickly recovered from the shock of the split. It provided remarkably prescient analyses of the rift's consequences. Using a collection of newly declassified CIA files, as well as a series of interviews with the CIA Station Chief in Belgrade from 1948 until 1951, this thesis analyzes those reports. It follows a year-by-year progression between 1948 and 1950. The first chapter, covering 1948, discusses the CIA's initial post-split analyses, in which the possibility was broached of provoking more "Tito" defections throughout Eastern Europe. It also discusses the initial likelihood of a Soviet or Sattelite invasion of Yugoslavia in order to depose Tito, Stalin's initiation of "Titoist" purges in the Sattelite states, and the initial repercussions of Yugoslavia's aid to Greek Communist rebels and disputed claim to Trieste. Concomitant with the deteriorating relations of the United States and Yugoslavia before the split, the CIA during 1948 considered Yugoslavia "a rat hole to be watched." By 1949, that perception was beginning to change. The second chapter discusses CIA analyses of Tito's staying power, as well as the harm this entrenchment caused to the Soviet-led international Communist Movement. CIA analyses of Stalin's options for interference in Yugoslavia are again considered, with the addition of reports discussing possible Soviet-led insurrection in Yugoslav Macedonia. American economic and military aid, needed to offset a Soviet-Satellite blockade of Yugoslav trade, also receives consideration. In 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War caused a reassessment within the CIA of Stalin's willingness to go to war in the Balkans. Chapter Three discusses these analyses, as well as the process by which the United States used a severe drought in Yugoslavia to offer military assistance. The beginning of each chapter offers context, noting major Cold War events and significant occurrences within the CIA. The thesis ends in early 1951, with the establishment of a joint Yugoslav-American intelligence sharing agreement.
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    Revolving Door War: Former Commanders Reflect on the Impact of the Twelve-Month Tour Upon Their Companies in Vietnam
    (2004-07-06) Helton, Bradley Dean; Dr. Richard H. Kohn, Committee Member; Dr. Nancy Mitchell, Committee Chair; Dr. Michael Allen, Committee Member; Dr. Joseph Caddell, Committee Co-Chair
    The purpose of this study has been to examine the impact of the US Army's twelve-month tour individual rotation policy for officer and enlisted personnel assigned to Vietnam between 1965-72 upon the tactical performance of companies. This inquiry drew upon the upon the views of a select group of officers attending the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania from 1981-85 that had commanded one or more companies during the war. Their views suggested a mixed aggregate effect. The army's rotation policy adversely impacted the tactical performance of companies by creating problems with continuity that forced companies to perform below their potential, sometimes leading to needless deaths of soldiers. The twelve-month tour further hurt morale by damaging the bonds of camaraderie between soldiers. But the tour also bolstered morale by providing soldiers with a known limit to the duration of their obligation to serve in combat. Therefore, the tour successfully alleviated many of the serious morale problems associated with the ineffective individual rotation policies attempted by the army during World War II and Korea.
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    War Eagles: A Bird's Eye View of 305th Bomb Group and the Eighth Air Force from the experiences of David C. Cox and Joseph B. Boyle
    (2006-06-27) McDowell, Michael Norwood; Dr. David Zonderman, Committee Member; Dr. Joseph Caddell, Committee Co-Chair; Dr. Nancy Mitchell, Committee Chair
    The purpose of this study is to document the history of the 305th Bomb Group and the Eighth Air Force during the critical early period (late 1942 through 1943) in World War II through the experiences of two members who served during this era. This thesis will take a personal view of the aerial combat through the wartime diary of David C. Cox and the oral history of Joseph B. Boyle. Cox and Boyle were friends who served in the 305th Bomb Group from its beginning until they were shot down during different missions in 1943. After the downing of their planes by the Germans, both men became re-acquainted as they became roommates in Stalag Luft III, the German POW camp where events depicted in the movie The Great Escape happened. Other studies have documented the history of the Eighth Air Force and the 305th Bomb Group. During this time, the Eighth Air Force was just beginning to learn the difficulty of conducting daylight bombing missions over Europe. During the period from October 1942 through December of 1943, the losses for the Eighth Air Force were very high, mostly due to the lack of a fighter that could escort the bombers all the way to their targets and back. Other historians have documented the difficulties that the Eighth Air Force, and the 305th Bomb Group in particular, faced during this stage of World War II. What makes this study unique are the sources of David Cox's diary and Joseph Boyle's oral history, which make a much richer and more personal history of the early days of the 305th Bomb Group.