

ABSTRACT

PLUMMER, LYNN MICHELLE. *Failing States in the Middle East and Africa: Terrorist Group Formation and Terrorist Attacks Over Time.* (Under the direction of Dr. Margaret Zahn).

Failed states have been found to both harbor terrorist groups and incite terrorist activities.

Not all failed states are equally associated with terrorist activity. This study utilizes four sets of data, obtained from the Start Center's Global Terrorism Database, the Failed State Index, World Governance Index and the CIA *Factbook*. The independent variables for this study are a legacy of vengeance seeking groups, control of corruption and past history of colonization.

This thesis works to determine the differences in characteristics of state failure that are most associated with terrorist activity in the developing nations of the Middle East and Africa.

This research demonstrates that those countries in Africa and the Middle East that experienced higher levels of legacies of group grievances were more likely to experience higher levels of terrorist activity, where as those that have more government control of corruption are likely to experience less terrorism. Furthermore, countries that endured indirect colonial rule by Great Britain are more likely to experience higher levels of terrorism than those countries that experienced the direct colonial rule of France.

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Failing States in the Middle East and Africa: Terrorist Group Formation and Terrorist
Attacks Over Time

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my mother who never saw me graduate and the temporary rescue that stayed until it was time to go. I miss you both.

BIOGRAPHY

I born and raised in Southern California and attended the University of California at Los Angeles, as well as California State University, Chico. I am a military spouse and mother of four. I currently reside in North Carolina, but call the world my home. I am interested in terrorism, and in particular female terrorists, as well as military families and women in the military.

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Failing States in the Middle East and Africa: Terrorist Group Formation and Terrorist Attacks Over Time

In the current geopolitical structure, asymmetrical warfare, or terrorism, has increased in lethality. Moreover, current research suggests that this trend will continue (Hoffman 1998, Ellis 2003) and have widespread consequences for a great number of people. The new age of religiously motivated terrorism (Hoffman 1998, Ellis 2003, Winkler 2008, Bergesen and Lizardo 2004), coupled with the shrinking spaces that globalization caused, (Bunker and Ciccantell 2005) offers a highly complex new phenomenon. Terrorists' goals have become more vague and ambiguous (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004) while weapons have become more sophisticated (Hoffman 1998, Ellis 2003) and targets exceedingly indiscriminate (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004). Terrorism is financially draining on the state under attack, as well as destabilizing for its communities (Schneider, Bruck and Meierrieks 2010).

Prior research on terrorism focuses on state failure and how it fosters terrorism. Failed states, however, have varying amounts of terrorist activity, thus it is important to examine more deeply areas of the world with varying levels of state failure. This research examines African and Middle Eastern countries in depth. Moreover, I will examine selected dimensions of state failure and historic factors that may explain different levels of terrorist activity.

Theoretical Basis

In order to examine terrorism, one must look at the processes. Terrorism is a form of asymmetrical warfare, a type of warfare where military powers differ significantly between

groups, and conventional warfare would greatly privilege one group over the other. As such, the choice of targets, while not necessarily states themselves, are politically motivated and key to the analysis. According to Weber (1948), states are entities that have a “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given country.” Capacity is enhanced by the states’ ability to tax in support of a standing army (Weber 1948). While states are organized around the legitimate use of force, legitimacy is paramount to state formation. This is because people must believe in the legitimacy of the state in order for it to be able to exercise force and demand compliance. Legitimacy allows the government the right to govern. For Weber (1948), another aspect of the state is a particular geographical location, or the right to property. Geographical location is the basis of unequal distribution of resources, and as such the basis for conflict (Giddens 1999).

Weber (1948) stresses that conflicts may arise in these realms: economic, power and status (cultural). Collins (1975) provides an important perspective to examine the historical aspects of terrorism in light of Weber’s three resources: economic resources are those of material conditions; power resources are those of social position within networks; status or cultural resources are those that exert control over rituals that produce solidarity (Collins 1975). Resources become important when groups mobilize in reaction to unequal distribution. Groups may mobilize in two ways: emotionally or materially (Collins 1975). Emotional mobilization is important for terrorist groups because members must have a strong sense of group identity, which permits terrorist members to perceive their beliefs as morally right and to make sacrifices for the cause. Material mobilization is also important for terrorist groups in that it encompasses communication and transportation as well as

material and monetary supplies to sustain the conflict (Collins 1975).

Crenshaw (1981) viewed terrorism as being directed against governments with the goal of political change. Acts are premeditated and symbolic (Crenshaw 1981). She furthers the definition of terrorism as a part of secular modern politics, with increases in terrorism stemming from nationalism, anarchism and revolutionary socialism (Crenshaw 1981). In the late 20th and early 21st century, Western states experience high levels of terrorism. From 1971-1980 the United States ranked highest in number of terrorist campaigns (Crenshaw 1981). Terrorism morphed in the 1960's vision of urban guerrilla warfare in Latin America to what is known today. The purpose of most terrorist activity is to gain recognition (Crenshaw 1981) as well as disrupt and discredit the government. Relying on Weber's (1948) definition of the state as the legitimate use of force, the purpose of terrorism is twofold: first to discredit the legitimacy of the state and second to create legitimacy for the terrorist organization.

Failed States

There are two views regarding the relationship between state failure and terrorism. In failing states, there is a challenge to governmental authority as well as lack of confidence in the state to control the territory (Zartman 1995, f Piazza 2008). Hehir (2007) posits that failed and/or failing states suffer administrative incapacity, where they are unable to provide basic services that are expected from such an entity. This includes the provision of security, economic stability and functioning bureaucratic institutions that ensure the population's wellbeing (Hehir 2007, Rotberg 2002). Failing states do not have the ability to provide resources, or the organization to manage them (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Lambach (2004)

notes that there is not a clear threshold of failure and that there are distinctions between weak states that may still function in some aspects and collapsed states that have no ability to effectively govern. Failed states may retain the appearance of sovereignty (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002). This type of functioning may best suit terrorist organizations in that outward manifestations of sovereignty limit outside intervention (Piazza 2008). Failed states portraying outward signs of sovereignty tend to have government officials that are more subject to corruption. Corrupt officials provide opportunity for terrorists to access passports and visas or political support (Piazza 2008). Failed states have been seen as the locations from which terrorist organizations can operate (Takeyh and Gvosdev 2002, Piazza 2008, Walsh and Piazza 2009).

The second point of view, according to Simmons and Tucker (2007), Sageman (2008), Bilgin and Morton (2004), as well as Patrick (2006) argue that the connection between failed states and terrorism is sometimes seen as tenuous at best. Failed states are too chaotic to promote terrorism, and there needs to be a degree of functioning, which will allow the bare infrastructure, such as roads and communication, to be in place so that terrorists can operate successfully (Patrick 2006). Logistically, Simmons and Tucker (2007) argue that failed states are a nightmare for reliable operations. While people in failed states do gain skills that would be well utilized by terrorist organizations, the need for their skills locally is more critical in their home country. Few failed states are utilized as training camps (with the exception of Afghanistan). However, this could be because terrorists are now receiving on the job training in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Simmons and Tucker 2007). Simmons and Tucker (2007) argue that complete state failure may not be optimal for fostering terrorist

activity.

Government Corruption

Corruption weakens and delegitimizes the state, allowing for terrorist organizations to grow (Le Billon 2008). Key concerns among developed countries are that these corrupt countries are ungovernable, and as such, the “black holes,” or spaces in which terrorism may grow (Korteweg 2008). Government corruption lends itself to the out-group, in the form of a group grievance, as was the case of Hamas in the Palestinian territories (Rosand et. al, 2008) struggling to become part of the political process, using any means necessary. Governmental corruption undermines the well-being of the populous and takes away any representation they may have had (Rosand, et. al, 2008). Hamas found a way into the political system by exploiting government corruption in the ruling Fatah party. Corruption works to weaken the effectiveness of government services and delegitimizes the state.

Korteweg (2008) refers to “comparative advantage” that lead to the creation of “black holes.” The most important of these aspects are remote areas of countries where the governments have little ability to control terrorist activities, such as the marshland between the Somalia and Kenya border. Korteweg’s use of the phrase comparative advantage is not in line with Ricardo (1817), rather it is the advantage terrorist groups see in occupying one area over another. It is physically impossible to govern such areas due to the geographic and social conditions that isolate these regions. These are challenges to the state’s ruling authority that erodes the confidence in the ability of the state to assert its control (Zartman 1995). The central government has questionable legitimacy in these non-transparent areas and groups are free to operate unnoticed. Piazza (2008) considers these as stateless regions.

Legacy of Vengeance Seeking Groups

Ethnically tense countries tend to foster more terrorist activity, as ethnicity provides the basis for group formation (Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010). Ethnicity provides a sense of identity, a way to relate to others, a shared history, and dense social networks.

Ethnic conflict bases itself on “us versus them” thinking, and social cleavage between different cultures (Schwartz et. al, 2009) . Grievances along ethnic group lines can be based on territory or the perception of injustice. If the groups’ values are strongly collectivist, the “us versus them” thinking gives rise to ingroup-outgroup dynamics.

The presence of particular ethnic or religious communities with legacies of persecution or repression may create black holes, or areas where terrorist groups have the freedom to operate and/or support of the local populous. According to Korteweg (2008), terrorist groups can plug into the particular grievances of these local communities, gaining the advantage of popular support. Through community support, terrorists can hide, gain new recruits, and possibly have access to new resources. Important here is the fact that in tribal communities a sense of duty and honor are paramount and as such, obligations to help terrorists may be part of the moral code (Simmons and Tucker 2007, Kittner 2007, Freytag, Kruger, Meierrieks, and Schneider 2009). Divisions within the state, tribe, or clan can serve as safe havens for terrorists (Green 2008). Ethnic divides and grievances along group lines also foster communities where terrorist activity thrives (Piazza 2008).

Political fragmentation is associated with more terrorism, especially with a dominate right-wing faction in power (Caruso and Schnieder 2009). Political fragmentation has two dimensions, attitudinal and structural. Attitudinal implies that the different factions have

different priorities and views, while structural means there are many government entities that overlap and struggle for political control. Political fragmentation has been associated with civil unrest, and to a degree, civil wars. Fragmentation can lead to social cleavage, while social instability is positively related to terrorism (Campos and Gassebner 2009). Campos and Gassebner (2009) additionally demonstrated that domestic instability fuels international terrorism. State failure fosters a large pool of economically disadvantaged and disenfranchised youth from which to pull potential recruits. Further, economic disparity between nation-states also causes group grievances against the current economic order and the disadvantage certain failing states experience (Bloomer, Hess and Weerapana 2004, Harrison 2006, Freytag, Kruger and Meierrieks 2010).

Colonial History

Colonial powers exercised power in one of two forms: direct or indirect rule. Direct rule, practiced by French colonizers were characterized by centralized administration in Paris and stressed assimilation. Colonizers intended to “civilize” African people so they could be more like Europeans. Indigenous authorities were subordinate to French rule, and the French intentionally weakened indigenous institutions. Indirect rule, practiced heavily by Great Britain in Africa and Asia, was characterized by relying on local traditional rulers to administer day to day governing, which made it possible for fewer European colonial administrators to oversee larger geographic areas.

Both the British and French colonized much of Africa; however, their methods of colonization were very different. The French emphasized cultural assimilation, imagining a French empire with all French citizens, replacing traditional African leadership with a French

bureaucracy (Hayes and Robinson 2010). The basis of French assimilation was that inhabitants of colonies would be French citizens if they adopted French culture (Lewis 1962). Colonies were represented in the French parliament and, while limited, the French offered European educations to some of its citizens. The French were willing to accept Africans as French citizens, as long as they embraced French culture. The British, in contrast, did not accept African equality and relied on local elites to administer British rule. This created class divisions and a bureaucratic class when independence was obtained.

The French selected leaders based on loyalty to France, rather than relying on traditional ruling structures, while the British exploited group divisions and propagated ethnic clashes as a means to maintain power, while preventing the development of a nationalistic self-consciousness (Njoh 2000). The French downplayed ethnic differences, in an attempt to build a French nationalism. These crucial structural differences left nation-states with very different abilities for self-governing. The countries under study experienced indirect rule by the British, whereas French operated under direct rule. It must be noted that Great Britain also practiced direct rule, but this did not occur in any of the countries in this study (Lange and Dawson 2009). Lange (2004) found a strong negative relationship between indirect rule and political stability characterized by ineffective central administrations, empowered local chiefs and despotic rule, leaving states near collapse. Direct rule, on the other hand, relied much more on administrative structure and formal rules, with a central chain of command. Indirect rule is associated with a lack of post-colonial political development, such as state stability, rule of law and democratization (Lange 2004). Furthermore, the history of colonial rule has been shown to produce four outcomes:

oppositional communal identities, communal divisions of labor, ethnic-based stratification, or animosity between indigenous and non-indigenous populations, none of which are mutually exclusive (Lange and Dawson (2009). Coupled with this is the haphazard way in which European powers created these nation-states, many times piecing together antagonistic groups in to one state (Cocodia 2008).

Colonial rule over Africa and the Middle East exploited existing divisions within countries. The governments were imbued with racial ideology and created societies in which political and economic power were given voice in heavily racialized tones (Jones 2008). Post-colonial Africa and the Middle East were fraught with factional struggles and authoritarian rule, only to be reinforced by a global economic system of exploitation. African and Middle Eastern nations were integrated into colonialism through tyrannical ethnic power, changing the fluidity of ethnicity into concrete distinctions, which created or accentuated social cleavages. This became the basis of the social order. The use of indirect rule accentuated ethnic divisions and installed an authoritarian rule based on hierarchical divisions (Jones 2008, Call 2008).

British rule was characterized by decentralization, which fostered ethnic stratification, as opposed to French rule that utilized a ranking system (Blanton and Mason 2001). The unranked system lent itself to the competition between ethnic groups and in turn, ethnic conflict, where as the central bureaucratic apparatus of French rule put in check ethnic mobilization and impeded ethnic challenges to authority (Blanton and Mason 2001). The British, while relying on local elites, fostered competition between groups, practicing a divide and conquer approach to colonial rule, to the point that factional rivalries bolstered

British control. The British would use ethnic leaders of one group to suppress other ethnic groups. Ethnic conflict became a part of British colonial government, whereas the French, in a more centralized state, incorporated people from different ethnic groups into one social system. The difference between French and British rule can best be demonstrated by the examples of Somalia (Great Britain) and Cote d'Ivoire (France). While both countries are failed states, according to the Failed States Index, French direct rule left semi-functioning infrastructure, such as utilities and roads, while Somalia was decimated as an extension of the fighting between Great Britain and Italy during World War II.

Being the victim of colonization, these countries have amassed grievances that may function as the rationalization for terrorism against governments, groups, or individuals. Through generational transmission, group grievances are passed along, leaving children with ideas that may make them more accepting of violence. These colonized peoples have experienced much discrimination based on religious or ethnic reasons, which lends itself to distrust and separatist thinking. Post-colonial countries are more prone to ethno-separatist terrorism (Stephens 2010), as well as secessionist conflicts. Secession is not just pursued by the out-group, as those in power may want to be separate from their "inferiors." These ethnic groups, having been drawn together by the aforementioned haphazard nation building, are accustomed to group or clan rule and have difficulty adjusting to governmental rule.

Muslim Countries

A larger proportion of Muslim countries have experienced government instability over the last sixty years than non-Muslim countries. Gurr et. al, (2005) found that Muslim countries were in crisis one of every year in the last six decades, whereas non-Muslim

countries experienced a one in seven year average. While political instability has risen and fallen in Muslim countries, there were dramatic peaks in the 1960's and 1990's. The 1990's saw 40% of Muslim countries reported to be state failures. In Sub-Saharan Africa 70% of the predominantly Muslim countries, as opposed to 30% of the non-Muslim countries, experienced political instability in the years following statehood, (Gurr et. al, 2005), however by 2003 only 16% of Muslim countries were enduring state failure.

Perhaps the most profound statistic found by Gurr et. al, (2005) was that genocides and politicides occurred in twice as many years in Muslim countries as in non-Muslim countries. Furthermore, Muslim countries experienced more adverse regime changes, such as coups, and ethnic wars. In his research on religions and state failure, Skinner (2010) found that Muslim countries were more likely to have higher scores on the failed states index than other countries. Along with his work on failed states and terrorism, Piazza (2008) found that as the percentage of Muslims in a country increases, so does incidence of terrorism (Muravchick, 2002). While Muslims on the whole may not support terrorism, social networks may provide protection for terrorists, out of loyalty (Mills and Herbst 2007).

Youth Bulge

Middle East and African countries have very young populations, who general research on violence shows are more likely to commit violent acts, both criminally and politically. This environment also fosters a large pool of economically disadvantaged and disenfranchised youth from which to pull potential recruits. Further, economic disparity between nation-states also causes grievances against the current economic order and the disadvantage certain failing states experience (Bloomer, Hess and Weerapana 2004,

Harrison 2006, Freytag, Kruger and Meierrieks 2010).

The “youth bulge” generally occurs in countries that are poor, as more children are more useful than a few well educated ones (Gurr et.al, 2005). However, this large pool of young potential workers creates a situation of low per capita income and generates a situation where there is less output per worker. Labor force participation tends to be low, which in turn leaves pools of unemployed youths who are easily persuaded to join groups and organizations that foster a sense of collective persecution (Gurr et. al, 2005).

Terrorism Defined

The first step in conducting a study on terrorism is defining it. The most comprehensive definition of terrorism is that put forth by Schmid and Jongman (1988, 2005). The authors analyzed 109 definitions of terrorism and found that 83.5% included aspects of violence, 65% political goals, 51% inflict fear, 21% indiscriminate targets, and 17.5% civilian and/or noncombatant targets. They note that terrorism is the use of violence for political objectives, with the intention to sew fear. For this study, the definition by the data collection source, the Global Terrorism Database, is: *"the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. (GTD 2007)"* Furthermore, the GTD includes acts that meet two of the three following criteria:

1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a [political, economic, religious or social goal;
2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience other than the immediate victims; and

3. The violent act was outside the precepts of international Humanitarian Law.

Hypotheses

While certain aspects of “state,” such as history, degree of corruption, and legacy of ethnic conflict, are associated with terrorism, terrorism also seems more likely to occur in certain countries and under specific conditions.

Hypothesis one: Hypothesis one is that the average number of terrorist groups and change in number of attacks over time are positively associated with a legacy of vengeance seeking groups in that country. As the legacy of vengeance seeking groups increases, so do the average number of terrorist groups and the change in number attacks over time.

Hypothesis two: Evans (1995) argued that the state is not static, but is an organization with a network of ties to society. It requires a certain degree of embedded autonomy to function properly. Embedded autonomy means: corporate coherence gives the apparatuses a certain kind of autonomy with the contradiction of connectedness into society. With this balance, the state will function properly and avoid corruption. Based on this, hypothesis two is that the average number of groups and the change in number of attacks over time are negatively associated with degree of governmental control of corruption. As corruption is brought more under control, the average number of groups and change in attacks over time will decrease.

Hypothesis three: Based on a review of the literature, with demonstrations that past colonies of Great Britain, experiencing indirect rule, have more governmental negative outcomes than past colonies of France, it is hypothesized that past colonies of Great Britain will experience more terrorist activity than past colonies of France.

Data and Methods

Data

The data for these analyses came from the National consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, or START. START is based at the University of Maryland, College Park and is an open source database. In conjunction with START, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), also open source, records terrorist activities throughout the world from 1970 through 2008, with over 87,000 cases. The GTD is the most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist events to date. It includes over 38,000 bombings, 13,000 assassinations, and 4000 kidnappings. It also includes at a minimum 45 variables for each case, with ones that are more recent having 120 or more variables. Each attack is coded for date, location, weapons used, nature of target, number of casualties, and where possible group or individual responsible. The construction of this data source is overseen by a panel of twelve terrorism research experts and is drawn from over 3,500,000 news articles and 25,000 news sources. Also utilized for this study is the Failed States Index, also an open source database, of 184 countries measured on twelve variables. Since 2005, the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine have published this annual index of United Nations member states. Ranking is based on the 12 indicators with a 0-10 scale, zero being lowest intensity or most stable, with a total possible score of 120. For the focus of this thesis, the variable legacy of vengeance seeking groups was used as was the World Governance Index's control of corruption measure from 1999-2008 (Kaufmann et al. 2010).

Sample

From the total cases, I focus on a subset from the years 1999-2008, of African and

Middle East countries, consisting of 70 cases (See Appendix A). The dataset obtained from the GTD was coded for 136 variables, covering such major topics as time, location, terrorist group responsible, weapons used, and damages done. The Failed States Index for 2005-2008 includes was also utilized. My sample is derived from these three sources. While the START data set had over 8000 observations for the countries in this study, for time period 1999-2008, for the purpose of this study the number of attacks each country experienced each year were coded into separate variables. The change from year to year was calculated to reflect the change in attacks over time variable, calculating the change from year one to year two, then change from year two to year three (repeating through year nine to year ten), adding all the changes together.

Dependent Variable

There are two dependent variables for the current study. First is the average number of terrorist groups in a given country during the ten-year period. Second is the change in number of attacks over the time period under investigation.

Independent Variables

My independent variable for hypothesis one is the legacy of vengeance seeking groups from the Failed States Index, 2005-2008. A legacy of vengeance seeking group grievances is a measure of atrocities committed against groups in forms of persecution, repression or political exclusion (Fund for Peace 2009). A continuous variable of the change in legacy of vengeance seeking groups over the time period 2005-2008 was calculated, then categories for the 25th, 50th, 75th and 100th percentile were generated as categories 1,2,3 and 4. The categories reflect the legacy of vengeance seeking groups from least to most

failed. These were then coded as dummy variables, with the baseline being least failed and each category increasing failure.

The independent variable for hypothesis two is control of corruption, from the World Bank's World Governance Indicators, years 1999-2008. Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. A continuous variable of the change in control of corruption was calculated, then categories for the 20th, 40th, 60th, 80th and 100th percentiles were calculated as categories 1,2,3,4 and 5. These were then coded as dummy variables. For the control of corruption, category one has the least amount of control and each category increases the control.

The independent variable for hypothesis three is either a past colony of Great Britain or France (See Appendix B). The determination of colonial history was found through the Exploring Africa at Michigan State University (exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu). These were coded as dummy variables with the baseline either not a past colony of France or not a past colony of Great Britain.

Control Variables

My control variables for demographics are the population size and the percent of the population that is male and ages 15-24 years. The total population and the percent male 15-24 years were obtained from the United Nations. The year 2006 was used for both because this was the only year that fell within my years of interest that the full set was available. Because crime in general is most heavily represented in the age group 15-24 (Ehrlich and Liu 2002), controlling for the age structure of the country is important. My third control variable

is the percent of the population that is Muslim. This was obtained from the CIA

FACTBOOK.

Methods

This study utilizes ordinary least squares regression, with dependent variables at the interval level. While it is acknowledged that the dependent variable of change in attacks is highly skewed with some countries having greater increases in terrorist activity than the average, the substantive questions put for in this thesis drive the selection of the statistical method. Transformations of the dependent variables were explored and their reasons for not being used will be enumerated here. Logging of the dependent variable is not advisable for two reasons: first, there are negative numbers, and second, it is important to look at the magnitude rather than if it is present or not. Mean centering and standardizing the variables did nothing to improve skewness or kurtosis. Therefore, this study will err on the side of substantive, keeping the wide distribution of the cases selected. This study controls for the effects of past colony of Great Britain or France. Three OLS regression models were generated for each dependent variable as well as for both independent variables of legacy of vengeance seeking groups and control of corruption. Two of the models were generated for past colonies of Great Britain or France, while the restricted model omits the past colony variables. Nested models were created to explore the effects past colonialism.

Results

Table one reports the descriptive statistics for the variables in the model. The average number of terrorist groups is zero, while the maximum is 9.8, with a mean of 1.77 and a standard deviation of 1.74. The change in attacks over time has a minimum of -75 with a

maximum of 1092, while its mean is 25.14 and standard deviation of 140.421. Control of corruption has a minimum value of -1.73 and a maximum of 1.07. The standard deviation is .70, while the mean is -.47. The legacy of vengeance seeking groups has a minimum of zero and a maximum of 9.48, with a mean of 6.4 and standard deviation of 1.85. The percent Muslim has a minimum of zero and a maximum of 100, with a mean of 48.72 and a standard deviation of 39.63. Table two presents the correlations for the two dependent variables in the model with the independent and control variables. Population, control of corruption, legacy of vengeance seeking groups, past colony of France, past colony of Great Britain, and percent Muslim have all statistically significant correlations with the average number of terrorist groups. For change in attacks over control of corruption, legacy of vengeance seeking groups, past colony of Great Britain and percent Muslim also are statistically significantly correlated with the change in attacks over time.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here]

For hypothesis one regarding legacy of vengeance seeking groups, models were generated with the dependent variable average number of groups and the independent variable of legacy of vengeance seeking groups (Table 3). The control variables were population, percent of the population that was male and 15-24, and percent of the population that is Muslim. Model one is statistically significant to the .001 α , and has an adjusted R^2 of .310 which indicates that 31% of the variation in average number of terrorist groups is explained by the variables in the model. Of the three quartiles of legacy of group grievance, only the fourth quartile, or most failed category, is statistically significant to the .001 α . The model predicts that countries in the fourth quartile of legacy of vengeance seeking groups

will have 2.012 more average number of groups than the baseline, the first quartile. Also statistically significant is the percent of population that is Muslim. The model predicts that for each increase in the percent of the population that is Muslim, there should be a .01 increase in average number of groups, net the effects of other variables in the model.

To explore the past colony characteristic in the countries in the dataset, Model two was generated by adding the variable past colony of Great Britain. Again the overall model is statistically significant to the .001 α , and the adjusted r^2 is .340, indicating that 34% of the variation in average number of terrorist groups is explained by the variables in the model.

The fourth quartile of legacy of vengeance seeking groups is statistically significant. Also statistically significant is the variable percent of Muslims, with a coefficient of .010. The model predicts that being a past colony of Great Britain will have an increase of .703 in average number of terrorist groups over the baseline of not a past colony of Great Britain. To see if the new model, with past colony of Great Britain, significantly improves the model, the significance of the past colony of Great Britain was examined and was statistically significant, so the new model is an improvement over the old model.

Model three was generated to explore colonization by France and was compared to model one. The model is statistically significant to the .001 α , and has an adjusted r^2 of .357 which indicates that 35.7% of the variation in average number of terrorist groups is explained by the variables in the model. Of the three quartiles of legacy of group grievance, the fourth quartile is statistically significant to the .001 α level. The model predicts countries in the fourth quartile will have 2.195 more average number of groups than the baseline, net the effects of all other variables in the model. Also statistically significant is the percent of

Muslims in the country, with a coefficient of .0121. Moreover, the model predicts that those countries with a history of French colonization will experience an increase in average number of groups of .897 over the baseline, countries that were not past colonies of France, net the effects of the rest of the variables in the model. The coefficient for past colony of France is statistically significant, so the new model is an improvement over the old.

[Table 3 about here]

Table four was generated to explore hypotheses one and three and the relationship between change in number of attacks over time and legacy of group grievance, again taking into consideration whether the country was a past colony of France or Great Britain. Model one is the restricted model and omits any colonization variable. Model two includes the variable for past colony of Great Britain, while model three includes a variable for past colony of France. All three models are statistically significant. Model one has an adjusted R^2 of .118, meaning that the model explains 11.8% of the variation in the dependent variable. Only the fourth quartile of vengeance seeking groups is statistically significant, and the model predicts that net of the effects of all other variables in the model, the fourth quartile will see 127 increase in the number of attacks over time, compared to the baseline, the least failed states in regard to a legacy of vengeance seeking groups. The percentage Muslim is statistically significant.

Model two has an adjusted R^2 of .152, meaning that 15.2% of the variation is explained by the model. Again, only the fourth quartile of legacy of vengeance seeking groups is statistically significant, with the model predicting a 138 increase in the change in attacks over time, net the effects of all other variables in the model over the baseline, the

lowest category of vengeance seeking groups. The percent of the population that is Muslim variable is statistically significant. The model further predicts that those countries that were past colonies of Great Britain will experience an increase in change in attacks over time of 61, net the effects of other variables in the model.

Model three has an adjusted R^2 of .143, meaning that the model explains 14.3% of the variation. Only the fourth quartile of legacy of vengeance seeking groups is statistically significant, with the model predicting an increase of 139 change in attacks over time, net the effects of all other variables in the model, over the baseline of the lowest category of vengeance seeking groups. The percentage Muslim and past colony of France are both statistically significant, with the model predicting a decrease in the change in attacks of 59, net the effects of all other variables in the model. Examining the significance of the coefficient for past colony of France demonstrates that the full model is an improvement over the restricted model.

[Table 4 about thesis]

To test the hypothesis of government control of corruption, three models were generated for average number of terrorist groups, and three models were generated for change in number of terrorist attacks, one with the dummy variable for past colony of France, and one for past colony of Great Britain. Model one of table five is the restricted model for past colony of Great Britain and past colony of France. The adjusted R^2 is .238, meaning that the model explains 23.8% of the variation. Three of the dummy variables for control of corruption are statistically significant. For the 60th percentile, the model predicts that there will be a decrease in average number of groups of 1.7 over the baseline, the category of least

control of corruption, net the other variables in the model. For the 80th percentile, the model predicts a decrease of approximately 2 over the baseline, the category of least control of corruption, while for the 100th percentile, the model predicts a decrease of approximately 1.5 over the baseline.

Model two of table five is the full model for past colonies of Great Britain, with the independent variable control of corruption. The overall model is statistically significant to the $.001 \alpha$, and the adjusted R^2 is $.271$, meaning that the model explains 27.1% of the variation in the dependent variable. All four dummy variables for control of corruption are statistically significant to the $.05 \alpha$ level. The coefficient for the fortieth percentile is -1 , meaning that for control of corruption in the fortieth percentile, the model predicts 1. decline in the average number of groups, net the effects of all other variables in the model. For the 60th percentile of control of corruption, the model predicts 1.5 decrease in the average number of groups over the baseline of the 20th percentile. For the 80th percentile, the model predicts a 1.6 decrease in the average number of terrorist groups, net the other variables in the model, while for the 100th, the model predicts about 2 decrease in number of groups.

Also statistically significant is the percent Muslim with a coefficient of $.012$. Past colony of Great Britain is statistically significant for model two, with a coefficient of $.827$, meaning the model predicts an increase in average number of terrorist groups, net the effects of all other variables in the model. For the full model, the model with the variable past colony of Great Britain, the overall model is statistically significant, and is an improvement upon the first model.

Model three was generated to explore the average group numbers with past

colonies of France. Model three is the full model and compared to model one, and is statistically significant to the .001 α , and has an adjusted R^2 of .275, meaning that the model explains 27.5% of the variation in the dependent variable. Three of the dummy variables for control of corruption are statistically significant as is percent Muslim. The model predicts that countries in the 60th percentile of control of corruption will experience 1.6 fewer average groups, net of the effects of other variables in the model. The model further predicts a decrease of 1.5 average number of groups in the 80th percentile, while the 100th percentile should see a decrease of 1.7, net the effects of all other variables in the model. Examining the significance of the coefficient of the variable for France demonstrates that model three is an improvement over the original model.

[Table 5 about here]

To test hypotheses two and three, with the dependent variable change in attacks over time, three models were generated, one with a dummy variable for past colony of France, and one for past colony of Great Britain. Model one of table six is the restricted model. The overall model is statistically significant and the adjusted R^2 is .092, meaning that 9.2% of the variation in the model can be explained. All four categories for control of corruption are statistically significant to the .05 α level, as is the percent of Muslims. The model predicts that for the 40th percentile of control of corruption, there should be a decrease of 133 attacks over time, from the baseline, the lowest category of control of corruption, net the effects of all other variables in the model, while the change for the 60th percentile is 141.086 less. The 80th percentile of control of corruption is predicted to be 144 lower than the baseline, while the 100th percentile is 120 lower. Model two is the full model, with the

variable for past colony of Great Britain. The overall model is statistically significant and the adjusted R^2 is .145, meaning the model explains 14.5% of the variance. Again all four categories of control of corruption are statistically significant, as is percentage Muslim. The 40th percentile of control of corruption is predicted to have 144 decrease change in attacks, net the other variables in the model, while the 60th percentile is expected to have 135 less. The 80th percentile is predicted to experience 136.444 decrease in change in attacks, while the 100th percentile expects 164 fewer.

Model three is the full model, with the variable for the past colony of France. The adjusted R^2 is .103, meaning the model explains 10.3% of the variation. Again, all four dummy variables of control of corruption are statistically significant, as is the percentage Muslim and past colony of France. The 40th percentile is predicted to have 138 decrease in change in attacks, while the 60th percentile should have 135 fewer. The 80th percentile is predicted to have 138 decrease in change in attacks, while the 100th percentile is predicted to have 138 less. Being a past colony of France is statistically significant and the model predicts past colonies of France will have 51 less attacks over time than the baseline, not a past colony of France. The variable past colony of France is statistically significant to the .01 α level, meaning it does improve the model.

[Table 6 about here]

Discussion

My findings support hypothesis one, that the average number of terrorist groups and the number of attacks over time are positively associated with a legacy of vengeance seeking groups; as the legacy of vengeance seeking groups increases, so does the average number of

groups and change in number of attacks over time. Not only are the adjusted R^2 's larger for the full models, the coefficients for past colony of Great Britain and past colony of France are statistically significant, meaning the full models are an improvement over the restricted model. In examining the legacy of vengeance seeking groups in relation to both dependent variables, average number of terrorist groups and change in number of attacks over time, only the fourth quartile is statistically and consistently significant across all models. For the fourth quartile of legacy of vengeance seeking groups, six of the most failed ten are past colonies of Great Britain. These include Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq and the West Bank. For states with the most legacy of vengeance seeking groups all models have an average of two more terrorist groups, and an increase from 126-138 in attacks over time compared with states in the first category of legacy of vengeance seeking groups. For those countries with the greatest increase in terrorist attacks over time, eight of the ten that have the greatest increase in attacks are past colonies of Great Britain. Those include Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Israel, Nigeria, West Bank, Sudan, and Kenya.

When examining colonialism, being a past colony of Great Britain increases both in the number of terrorist groups and change in attacks over time, while being a past colony of France decreases both. For the average number of groups, being a past colony of Great Britain is predicted to increase the number of groups by approximately 1 over the baseline of not a past colony of Great Britain, while being a past colony of France is predicted to decrease groups by 1 over the baseline. Table four, addressing change in attacks over time, shows that past colonies of Great Britain experience a 61 increase in attacks over time, whereas past colonies of France experience a decrease of 59. This speaks to the type of rule

exercised by Great Britain and France in the area. Great Britain exercised more indirect rule, whereas France utilized more direct rule. Coupled with this, the British exacerbated ethnic conflicts during colonial rule to bolster their power, whereas the French sought to assimilate groups, which could be the basis for fewer groups associated with post French colonialism as opposed to British.

While the variable percentage of Muslims was a control variable, it is interesting to note that it is positively associated with increases in both the average number of terrorist groups and the change in attacks over time for all models. The models predict that as the percentage of Muslims in the country increases, the average number of groups will increase by .01, while the change in attacks will increase by between .682 and .795. Also of interest is the fact that the variable percentage of male 15-24 years is not statistically significant in any of the models. The reason it is not significant across any of the models may speak to the age structure of the countries selected, since they are all similar, with high levels of youth and overall young age structures.

Tables five and six support hypotheses two and three. They support hypothesis two, the average number of groups and the change in number of attacks over time are negatively associated with control of corruption, with all six models being statistically significant. For the average number of terrorist groups, only the 40th percentile is not consistently statistically significant, meaning that those countries that fall into the second category, or second least control of corruption, do not experience a decrease in the average number of terrorist groups. Control of government corruption, in relation to average number of terrorist groups, works to decrease the average number of groups. The effect of control of corruption on the restricted

model shows that the 60th percentile experiences the largest decrease in average number of terrorist groups, while the 100th percentile experiences the least. Of those in the most control of corruption category, six of ten are past colonies of Great Britain. These include Israel, Cyprus, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Sudan. This could be reflective of the amount of corruption in the countries in the study. Corruption tends to be extensive in these countries, so an improvement may need to reach a threshold before decreases in terrorist groups can occur, however because of the prevalence of corruption, once such a threshold is reached the effect of control of corruption levels off. This is not true for the full model for Great Britain, as each subsequent increase in the control of corruption experiences fewer average number of terrorist groups. Perhaps the control of corruption works to diminish the effect past colony of Great Britain has on group formation, however, the 60th and 80th percentiles in the full model experience less of a decrease in average number of attacks than in the restricted model, indicating that the variable past colony of Great Britain has an impact on these. France, on the other hand, experiences more decrease in the 60th percentile than in the 80th, however the most is experienced in the 100th. Again, in the countries selected, where corruption is not well controlled, there is more of a decrease in the average number of terrorist groups because the baseline is incredibly corrupt, however, the same phenomenon in the change in the 60th and 80th percentiles are also demonstrated between the full model for past colony of France and the restricted model as for Great Britain. Being a past colony of France or Great Britain influences how the control of corruption decreases the average number of groups.

For the independent variable change in attacks over time, all categories of control of

corruption are statistically significant. For the restricted model in table six, the largest decrease is for the 80th percentile, while the smallest is the 100th percentile. In comparing this model to the full model for past colony of Great Britain the reverse association is observed, with the 60th percentile seeing the least decrease, while the 100th percentile experiences the most. Also, the 40th percentile sees more than the two middle categories. This may be reflective of the level of corruption of the baseline, being that any increase in control is going to see a decrease in the change in attacks over time. The intermediary categories experience the least change, which leads me to believe that while initial control of corruption sees a dramatic decrease in the average number of terrorist groups and the change in attacks over time, those countries that occupy the mid-range do not benefit equally from increases in control of corruption, however, those that occupy the range of best control of corruption benefit more. The countries that are past colonies of Great Britain, being quite corrupt, see greater improvement in the change in attacks over time when a small increase in control of corruption is implemented rather than the intermediate range of control of corruption.

Examining the significance for the coefficients of past colony of Great Britain and France, the full models are improvements over the old. Further, the difference in adjusted R²'s leads me to believe that substantively being a past colony of France or Great Britain is important to the model. Past colonization by Great Britain significantly improves the old model. Here again, the 60th and 80th percentiles are similarly impacted as in table five. Within models, the control of corruption has larger coefficients, however being a past colony of Great Britain or France impacts the size of the coefficients.

Conclusion

State failure has been found to be associated with terrorist activity, yet some failed states have high levels of such activity while others have lower levels. This study examined specific elements associated with high levels of state failure and found that the legacy of vengeance seeking groups is positively related to both the average number of terrorist groups and the change in number of attacks over time, while control of corruption is negatively associated with both. This research also establishes that the processes involved in the colonial experience have far-reaching effects for post-colonial nation states. The indirect rule of Great Britain in Africa and the Middle East led to less stable governments and in turn, were more amenable to terrorism. The French process of direct rule in these areas of the world resulted in somewhat more stable governments who were less agreeable to terrorism. This is important because little research on terrorism has cast a long historical gaze on the processes involved in creating havens for terrorist activity. In approaching terrorism this way, I have been able to build linkages between colonial and post-colonial periods and the resulting failed states where terrorism is found.

I have demonstrated clear connections between state failure in terms of legacy of vengeance seeking groups and the fostering of terrorist activity. In this country set this is of particular importance as most countries have suffered from ethnic and/or clan divides. Higher number of groups are expected in the fourth quartile of legacy of vengeance seeking groups in both the French and British models, however, being a past colony of France is expected to decrease the average number of groups by 1 where those who were past colonies of Great Britain are expected to see an increase of 1. Great Britain, as a colonial power,

encouraged group conflicts, so countries colonized by France appear more sensitive to increases in a legacy of vengeance seeking groups. In terms of change in attacks over time, there is less difference between being a past colony of France or Great Britain, indicating that the change in attacks over the last ten years has less to do with legacy of vengeance seeking groups than the average number of groups does. While countries may have large number of groups, their level of activity may vary.

Furthermore, a connection between control of corruption and terrorist activity has been demonstrated, which is important when looking at outside intervention whether in a military or aid environment. This further strengthens the argument of the failed states-terrorism connection in that corrupt governments tend to be failing governments. In examining the models in table five, it is clear that being a past colony of Great Britain is clearly more sensitive to control of corruption than being a past colony of France in the 100th percentile. Both predict larger decreases in groups than the baseline. The introduction of the past colony of Great Britain or past colony of France variable introduces historically long processes that resulted in increased levels of government corruption and state failure, however control of corruption at the highest category is most beneficial for past colonies of Great Britain.

New to the study of the failed states-terrorism connection was the use of the variables past colony of Great Britain or France. By adding this measure, the predictive power of the model was improved. This is important because terrorism is not a simple, linear, cause and effect, it is part of historical processes. This addition has not been done before, and the bigger picture adds a level of richness to the discussion that has been lacking. As such, past

colonial history may be a new avenue to explore in explaining terrorist activity. This has broadened the scope of the connection between failed states and terrorism. Because of this, closer examination of past colonial history and terrorism needs to be conducted. It is noted that some past colonies of Great Britain that experienced indirect rule do not have high levels of terrorist activity and this needs to be examined in further research.

The information put forth in this research project has added to existing literature on the connections between failed states and terrorism. By furthering research in this area, it is hoped that future studies can build on what has been started and work toward finding concrete and clearly definable aspects of state failure that contribute to the increase/decrease in terrorist activity. By doing this, policies can be implemented to help discourage the growth of terrorism. What is important in this study is that it addresses precursors to today's failed states, colonialism, and the long-term ramifications on terrorist activity. Because of this, policy implications generated from this and future research are applicable across all nation-states. Colonialism's legacy are inter-related processes that continue to advantage one group over another, while keeping those with less resources unable to coalesce around common grievances, with globalization being just one more form of exploitation. As found earlier, this study supports the notion that Great Britain as a colonizer advantaged some countries while leaving others with fewer resources to formulate strong governments.

Limitations

Because of the lack of normality in the dependent variable change in attacks over time, several models were generated with the outlier countries of Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Israel removed. When this was done, statistical significance was lost on many of the

independent variables, proving the robustness of the original models, demonstrating the stability of what is reported here. One concern remains, in that some of the results do change when those countries are removed, however, there is no theoretical justification for removing them from the analysis. The variables that are no longer statistically significant for the average number of groups when one controls for a legacy of vengeance seeking groups is past colony of Great Britain. This is because these countries are in that category. For change in number of attacks over time, the model with control of government corruption is no longer statistically significant and controlling for legacy of vengeance seeking groups sees significance for Great Britain but not France. Future research may be needed to explore deeper these relationships.

Because not all countries experienced colonialism the same way, future research should focus on case studies of particularly extreme cases in both directions of terrorist group formation and change in terrorist activity over time. By delving in to countries more deeply, the underlying processes can be explored and generate future avenues for research in the connections between state failure and terrorist activity. Moreover, resources of the nations under study need to be examined, such as agriculture versus mineral wealth, along with when they achieved independence as well as how.

While this study strove to look at the changes in terrorist activity over time, a deeper statistical analysis of a longer period of time may better elucidate answers to the connections between legacies of vengeance seeking groups, control of corruption and terrorist activity. The benefit of such longitudinal analysis would be that it allows the researcher to distinguish between short and long-term phenomena. Future research must also take into account such

recent phenomena as the “Arab Spring” and the overall instability of the region. Because of this, it is important to examine why Muslim countries experience instability. This examination may need to take into account not only longer periods of the colonization process, but also long term internal conflicts that existed prior to colonization.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (N=70)*

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Average Number of Groups	0	9.8	1.77	1.743
Change in Attacks over Time	-75	1092	25.14	140.42
Population in 2006	84600	144273200	17671178.86	2.47E-07
Control of Corruption	-1.7289	1.0697	-0.471723	0.7
Legacy of Vengeance Seeking Groups	0	9.48	6.4	1.85
Percent Population Muslim	0	100	48.7	39.6
Percent of population male 10-24 years	11.51	50.1	15.75	6.25

*Notes: [START, Failed States Index, World Bank, CIAFactbook]

Table 2: Correlations (N=70)

Variable	Average Number of Groups	Change in Attacks over Time
Average Number of Groups	1.00	0.62 ***
Change in Attacks	0.62 ***	1.00
Population 2006	0.347 **	0.068
Control of Corruption	0.300 **	-0.248 *
Legacy of Vengeance Seeking Groups	0.378 ***	0.277 *
Past Colony of France	-0.219 *	-0.129
Past Colony of Britain	0.212 *	0.219 †
Percent Muslim	0.265 *	0.194 †
Percent Male and 15-24 years	-0.10	0.015

Notes: [START, Failed States Index, World Bank, CIAFactbook]

*** p < 0.001

** p < 0.01

* p < 0.05

† p < 0.10

Table 3: OLS Regression Models for Average Number of Terrorist Groups (N=70)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>F</i> Statistic	6.174***	6.081***	6.479***
Constant	1.071†	0.659	1.2*
Variables:			
Legacy of Vengeance (by Quartiles)			
Second	-0.173 (-0.040)	0.021 (-0.005)	-0.011 (-0.003)
Third	0.444 (-0.126)	0.643 (-0.182)	0.541 (-0.153)
Fourth	2.012*** (-0.465)	2.143*** (-0.495)	2.195*** (-0.507)
Population 2006	1.44E-8* (-0.198)	1.23E-08 (-0.173)	9.81E-09 (-0.139)
Percentage Muslim	0.01* (-0.223)	0.01* (-0.226)	0.012† (-0.201)
Percentage male 15-24 yrs	-0.036 (-.130)	-0.035 (-.125)	-0.034 (-.122)
Past Colony of France			-.897* (-.241)
Past Colony of Great Britain		0.703† (-0.198)	
Adjusted R ²	0.31	0.34	0.357
R ²	0.37	0.407	0.422

Notes: [START, Failed States Index, World Bank, CIAFactbook]

*** p < 0.001

** p < 0.01

* p < 0.05

† p < 0.10

Numbers in parentheses are standardized coefficients

Table 4: OLS Regression Models for Change in Number of Attacks over Time (N=70)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>F</i> Statistic	2.534*	2.761*	2.642*
Constant	-27.81	63.782	-19.265
Variables:			
Legacy of Vengeance (by Quartiles)			
Second	-9.18 (-.026)	7.8 -0.022	1.529 -0.004
Third	-18.232 (-.064)	-0.887 (-.003)	-11.85 (-.402)
Fourth	126.609* -0.363	138.038** -0.396	138.692** -0.398
Population 2006	-1.13E-07 (-.020)	-2.65E-07 (-.047)	-3.91E-07 (-.069)
Percentage Muslim	0.682† (-0.192)	0.693† (-0.195)	0.795† (-0.224)
Percentage male 15-24 yrs	0.352 (-0.016)	0.467 (-0.021)	0.506 (-0.023)
Past Colony of France			-59.429 (-.198)
Past Colony of Great Britain		61.445 (-0.215)	
Adjusted R ²	0.118	0.152	0.143
R ²	0.194	0.238	0.230

Notes: [START, Failed States Index, World Bank, CIAFactbook]

*** p < 0.001

** p < 0.01

* p < 0.05

† p < 0.10

Numbers in parentheses are standardized coefficients

Table 5: OLS Regression Models for Average Number of Groups (N=70)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>F</i> Statistic	4.087***	4.207***	4.114***
Constant	2.694***	2.52***	2.996***
Variables:			
Control of Corruption (by 20 th Percentiles)			
40 th percentile	-0.892 (-.206)	-1.004† (-.232)	-0.967 (-.226)
60 th percentile	-1.659** (-.392)	-1.519† (-.351)	-1.601** (-.370)
80 th percentile	-1.644** (-.380)	-1.563** (-.361)	-1.544** (-.357)
100 th percentile	-1.439* (-.333)	-1.878** (-.434)	-1.705** (-.394)
Population 2006	1.979E-8† (-0.28)	1.59E-8* (-0.224)	1.505E-8† (-0.213)
Percentage Muslim	0.013** (-0.285)	0.012** (-0.284)	0.014** (-0.314)
Percentage male 15-24 yrs	-0.048 (-.171)	-0.049 (-.174)	-0.048 (-.172)
Past Colony of France			-0.778† (-.209)
Past Colony of Britain		0.827* (-0.233)	
Adjusted R ²	0.238	0.271	0.265
R ²	0.316	0.356	0.35

Table 5 (continued)

Notes: [START, Failed States Index, World Bank, CIAFactbook]

*** $p < 0.001$

** $p < 0.01$

* $p < 0.05$

† $p < 0.10$

Numbers in parentheses are standardized coefficients

Table 6: OLS Regression Models for Change in the Number of Terrorist Attacks Over Time (N=70)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>F</i> Statistic	1.993†	2.467	1.99
Constant	110.174†	98.816	130.074
Variables:			
Control of Corruption (by 20 th Percentiles)			
40 th percentile	-132.854* (-.381)	-143.975** (-.413)	- 137.752** (-.395)
60 th percentile	-141.086** (-.405)	-123.543* (-.354)	-134.909* (-.387)
80 th percentile	-144.494** (-.415)	-136.444** (-.391)	- 137.945** (-.396)
100 th percentile	-120.488* (-.346)	-164.09** (-.471)	-137.987* (-.396)
Population 2006	-8.75E-08 (-.015)	-4.79E-07 (-.084)	-4.00E-07 (-.070)
Percentage Muslim	0.882* (-0.249)	0.878* (-0.248)	0.965* (-0.272)
Percentage male 15-24 yrs	-1.185 (-.053)	-1.276 (-.057)	-1.209 (-.054)
Past Colony of France			- 51.1259** (-.171)
Past Colony of Britain		82.226* (-0.287)	
Adjusted R ²	0.092	0.145	0.103
R ²	0.184	0.244	0.207

Notes: [START, Failed States Index, World Bank, CIAFactbook]

*** p < 0.001

** p < 0.01

* p < 0.05

† p < 0.10

Numbers in parentheses are standardized coefficients

APPENDICES

Appendix A: List of countries

Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Bahrain
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Kinshasa) Dem
Cyprus
Djibouti
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Ivory Coast
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania

Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Qatar
Rwanda
Sao tome
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Syria
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Arab Emirates
West Bank and Gaza Strip
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Appendix B: List of Colonies

Country	Colonizer
Afghanistan	Britain
Bahrain	Britain
Botswana	Britain
Cyprus	Britain
Egypt	Britain
Ghana	Britain
Iraq	Britain
Israel	Britain
Jordan	Britain
Kenya	Britain
Kuwait	Britain
Lesotho	Britain
Malawi	Britain
Nigeria	Britain
Oman	Britain
Qatar	Britain
Seychelles	Britain
Sierra Leone	Britain
Somalia	Britain
South Africa	Britain
Sudan	Britain
Swaziland	Britain
Uganda	Britain
United Arab Emirates	Britain
West Bank and Gaza Strip	Britain
Yemen	Britain
Zambia	Britain
Zimbabwe	Britain
Algeria	France
Benin	France
Burkina Faso	France
Central African Republic	France
Chad	France
Comoros	France
Congo (Brazzaville)	France
Djibouti	France
Equatorial Guinea	France
Gabon	France

Guinea-Bissau	France
Ivory Coast	France
Lebanon	France
Madagascar	France
Mali	France
Mauritania	France
Mauritius	France
Morocco	France
Niger	France
Senegal	France
Syria	France
Tunisia	France
Burundi	Germany
Cameroon	Germany
Namibia	Germany
Tanzania	Germany
Togo	Germany
Angola	Portugal
Gambia	Portugal
Guinea	Portugal
Mozambique	Portugal
Sao tome	Portugal
Eritrea	Italy
Ethiopia	Italy
Libya	Italy
Rwanda	Belgium
Congo (Kinshasa)	
Democratic	Belgium
Cape Verde	Spain
	United
Liberia	States
Uncolonized	
Countries	
Iran	
Saudi Arabia	
Turkey	