ABSTRACT

BEELEN, TIM ANTONIUS LAMBERTUS. The Case of the Missing Universal: The British *Universal History* (1736-1766) and the Evolution of Universal History. (Under the Direction of Dr. K. Steven Vincent).

For millennia, traditional universal history – a genre of history that aims to collect the history of the entire universe into one universal narrative – had derived its narrative universality from its close association with the Catholic Biblical narrative. When the relevancy of the Bible went into decline in the early-modern period, the genre of universal history entered into a transition period in which the universal narrative became separated from that of the Catholic Church. But without the universality of the Bible to support the narrative of universal history, how could the genre continue to claim universality? The British *Universal History,* an extensive series of books published in installments between 1736 and 1766, serves as an instructive case of universal historians and their attempts to grapple with methodological crisis of their genre. The *Universal History* centered its narrative on the Rise of Europe in the modern world, and sought to explain how and why it was European states – and not the rest of the world – that had come to embody (in their view) the ideal of civilization. The authors of the *Universal History* saw commerce as the main spring behind this progress, and furthermore theorized that the encouragement of commerce would simultaneously stimulate intellectual progress, such as the improvement of the sciences. It was this, the authors argued, that explained the Rise of Europe; and since this narrative involved all peoples and states of the world, it was a *universal* narrative.

The Case of the Missing Universal: The British *Universal History* (1736-1766) and the Evolution of Universal History

by
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DEDICATION

To Jill

BIOGRAPHY

Tim A.L. Beelen is from the Netherlands, currently residing in the United States. He received a Bachelor of Arts in the Liberal Arts and Sciences at University College Roosevelt (Middelburg, NL) in 2018. He entered the Master of Arts in History program at North Carolina State University in 2018. He currently studies early-modern European intellectual history, particularly in Britain in the eighteenth century. The present study could very likely serve as the basis for an extended study of eighteenth-century universal history and empire-building. Tim furthermore plans to pursue further education and a teaching career on an academic level. He is interested in collecting rare books, classical and rock music, and the craft of writing.

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INTRODUCTION

Universal history as a genre stands apart from other types of history, in that it – per definition – claims an absolute measure of universality. Historians have long used the appellation 'universal' to emphasize that their work was intended to apply to the whole of history, not mere particulars. Universal history gathers all peoples and states of the world within a united narrative, while placing them on a single, linear, and universal timeline. All historical actors were fated to progress along this timeline toward a universal end-point, often envisioned as the final stage of civilization ('modernity').[1] In today's postmodern world, the historian who would dare claim such universality is inevitably criticized for overgeneralization, and inattention to detail. In a not-too-recent past, however, the appellation 'universal' was quite common, and both pre-modern and modern historiography abounds with a wide variety of historical works bearing the title.

From roughly the fifth century to the sixteenth century, the term 'universal history' had commonly been associated with the traditional, biblical, and Catholic universal historiography. At least until the eighteenth century, the title of 'universal history' did not merely entail a claim to universal applicability, but simultaneously placed it within the ancient and persistent genre of universal history. To assume the mantle of the universal historian was to enter the historiographical company of such classical historians as Diodorus, Polybius, Orosius, or the more contemporary company of Pasquier, Le Roy, Le Caron, La Popelinière, Vignier, and, of

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[1] Brett Bowden, "The "Idea" of Universal History: What the Owl Head, the Angel Saw, and the Idiot Said." *New Global Studies*, 11.3 (2017): 200-201; David Christian, "The Return of Universal History," *History and Theory*, 49.4 (Dec., 2010): 7; Craig Benjamin, "'But from this time forth history becomes a connected whole': state expansion and the origins of universal history," *Journal of Global History*, 9 (2014): 360; Marnie Hughes-Warrington, "Coloring Universal History: Robert Benjamin Lewis's *Light and Truth* (1843) and William Wells Brown's *The Black Man* (1863)," *Journal of World History*, 20.1 (Mar., 2009): 104; Tim Cornell, Andrew Fear, Peter Liddel, "Introduction," in Peter Liddel, Andrew Fear, *Historiae Mundi: Studies in Universal History* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2010), 1-2. Giussepe Ricuperati, "Time and Periodization in the Western Universal Histories: from Eusebius to Voltaire." (2000). URL: http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/program/papers/m2a/m2aricuperati.pdf

course, Bossuet.[2] The 'traditional' universal history resulted from a fusion of Hellenistic universal history and Catholic historiography. Its 'universality' derived from its close association with Biblical teachings; and it was the power of Providence, propelling history forward, that gave the whole a divine unity.[3]

However, the universalizing ethos of the Christian Church and attendant historiography took a severe blow during the Reformation, when the Protestant church broke away from its Catholic counterpart. By the end of the seventeenth century, the genre of traditional universal history had all but disappeared. The universal historian could no longer claim universal unity based on traditional Christian unity. Universal history told on a Biblical timeline declined in relevance.[4] Despite this 'crisis of universal history,' the genre of universal history persisted, but in a different form. The universal histories that appeared near the end of the eighteenth century looked nothing like traditional universal history. Clearly, an important transition had occurred during the eighteenth century within the field of universal history, as universal historians grappled with challenges arising from the loss of Biblical universality. In order to salvage the field, universal historians had to ask some straightforward yet complex questions: 'What made universal history *universal*? What universalizing principle could deliver the narrative unity hitherto provided by Biblical Providence? How could the vast diversity of human populations around the world be incorporated into one coherent – and therefore universal – story?'

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[2] Isaiah Berlin, "The Divorce Between The Sciences and The Humanities," *Salmagundi*, 27 (1974): 16; Tim Cornell, Andrew Fear, Peter Liddel, *Historiae Mundi: Studies in Universal History* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2010): 15-16, 48-49, 162-171, 178-185.
[3] Barraclough, "Universal History," In *Approaches to History* (London: Routledge, 2016): 84; Dan Smail, "In the Grip of Sacred History," *the American Historical Review*, 110.5 (Dec., 2005): 1341, 1346.
[4] Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Eighteenth Century and the Historical World (1901)" in Rudolf A. Makreel and Frithjof Rodi, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works. Volume IV: Hermeneutics and the Study of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 332; Christian, "The Return of Universal History, 12; Smail, "In the Grip of Sacred History," 1340.

To justify the universality of their universal histories, eighteenth-century historians had to come up with a new organizing principle which could unify the history of the world. In order to gain a better understanding of how universal history adapted to various methodological challenges in the eighteenth century, this thesis will study the approach of a representative and widely-known example: *An Universal History from the Earliest Account of Time,* compiled and written by various, mostly anonymous, authors. The *Universal History* was published in installments in Britain between 1734 and 1763.[5] Historian Guido Abbattista, who has written extensively on the *Universal History*, considered it as the "first large-scale historiographical, multi-authored, multi-volume work in the field of a historiographical genre, that of universal history, until then almost exclusive domain of theological historiography."[6] According to Abbattista, the *Universal History* was circulated throughout western Europe, and was translated into various languages.[7] Therefore, the British *Universal History* provides an interesting case-study for those wishing to understand the nature of universal history-writing in the eighteenth century, and the profound changes it underwent throughout that period.

The authors of the *Universal History* devised a unique argument to justify their claim to the title 'universal' by organizing their historical narratives around a central thesis. This central thesis, as the authors argued in the *Proposal for Publishing the Modern Part* (1758), concerned

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[5] Full title of the work consulted: *The Modern Part of an Universal History from the Earliest Account of Time compiled from Original Writers, by the authors of the Ancient Part* (London, printed for S. Richardson, T. Osborne, C. Hitch, A. Millar, S. Crowder, J. Rivington, P. Davey and B. Law, T. Longman, C. Ware, Vols. 1-13 (1759); Vols. 14-24 (1760); Vols. 25-33 (1761); Vols. 34-37 (1762); Vols. 38-40 (1763); Vols. 41-42 (1764); Vol. 43 (1765); Vol. 44 (1766), 8vo & folio).

[6] Guido Abbattista,"The English *Universal History*: Publishing, Authorship and Historiography in an European Project (1736-1790)," *Storia della Storiografia*, 39 (2001): 100-105.

[7] Ibid.41f. The *UH* was translated into French and Italian, as well as German, although the German variant differs markedly from the original. Abbattista furthermore reports that the *Universal History* constituted the foundation of Abbé Raynal's *Histoire philosophique et politique des Deux Indes*.

the 'meteoric' rise of the European states in comparison with the rest of the world.[8] The Europeans alone, they argued, had uncovered the secret to civilizational progress, while non-European states had fallen into an inevitable decline. Within the span of two centuries, European states had expanded beyond the confines of the European continent and – with varying degrees of success – forced an entrance into all inhabited continents of the world. The success of European imperial enterprise was perceived as a justification of the "superiority" of Europeans vis-à-vis the non-European world.[9] I will argue that explaining the historical development of the 'rise of Europe' became central to modern universal history, uniting all parts of the world into one coherent narrative. The *Universal History* exemplified this approach. It is one of the first instances of a 'modern' universal history, presenting a universalizing narrative to explain the entirety of human history. Unlike traditional universal history, the narrative of the *Universal History* did not rely on Providence to provide the catalysis behind historical movement; rather, it emphasized the historical agency of both human actors and non-human processes. The *Universal History* was one of the earliest histories to attempt to imbue European historical agents with a distinct 'European identity.' Lastly, the story of the rise of Europe was a historical narrative that touched all ends of the temporal world; and therefore, argued the authors of the *Universal History*, it was a *universal* narrative.[10]

The central argument of the present thesis, concerning how the authors solved the problem of universality, unfolds in a number of related steps. First, the remainder of this Introduction will provide a more extensive description of the mysterious authors of the *Universal*

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[8] *Proposals for Publishing the Modern Part of the Universal History* (London: printed for T. Osborne et al., 1758), 1-16.

[9] *Proposals for Publishing the Modern Part,* 14-15.

[10] Naturally, there are plenty of historians who have convincingly argued that in the 18th century, Europeans were not yet the hegemons of the world, and the Great Gap had not yet occurred as it would in the 19th century. That does not take away, however, that the authors of the *UH perceived there to be a gap between Europe and the rest of the world which they sought to explain*.

History, and a brief background of its publication and target audience. In addition, the Introduction presents an extensive definition of universal history and key characteristics. Lastly, the Introduction will lay out the historiographical context in which the *Universal History* was published, to show the extent to which universal history was intertwined with religious historiography, as well as the crisis that emerged within the field of universal history in the seventeenth century. I aim to show how this crisis launched a period of transition in the field of universal history, during which the *Universal History* was published; and that this crisis of universality is manifested in the *Universal History* itself.

Chapter 1 of the thesis concerns the narrative structure of the *Universal History*. The first step the authors took to create a universal narrative was by organizing all peoples and states in the world into one *hierarchy of civilizations*, along which the 'level of civilization' was measured by predictably Eurocentric standards. Furthermore, Chapter 1 introduces the manner in which the authors replaced the traditional catalyzing force behind historical change – Providence – with a secularized alternative: progress. Progress made historical mobility alongside the civilizational hierarchy (or 'ladder of civilizations') possible. The authors of the *Universal History* meant both the hierarchy of civilizations and the concept of 'progress' to apply universally, to all peoples and state. The unity of its hierarchy gave the *Universal History* a clear, temporal, endpoint, to which all states were progressing: the ideal civilization, the last stage of civilizational development.

Chapters 2 and 3 both concern the nature of 'progress'. The authors connected the concept of progress directly to two central themes in the *Universal History*: 'Commerce' and 'Science.' These concepts were intimately related, as the authors positioned the expansion of commerce as the precursor to scientific improvement. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I will argue that

the authors viewed commerce as a ‘civilizing force,’ capable of improving the civility, manners and politeness of commercial states (an example of the famous *doux-commerce* theory). Moreover, the authors believed that commerce brought about direct intellectual benefits. This made commerce essential for the development of intellectual and scholarly endeavors, ‘Science’ prime among them.

Chapter 3 will show how ‘progress through science’ became the new universalizing principle that allowed the authors to claim that the *Universal History* was truly universal. In order to discern this, special attention is paid to the meaning and use of the term ‘science’ in the *Universal History*. I will argue that the authors considered science to be ‘reliable, demonstrable and systematic knowledge’ which would empower the state to progress to the highest stage of civilization. The authors argued that the improvement of science constituted the only road towards the civilized ideal. As such, the development of science, by which the European states were rendered “superior” to the rest of the world, became the central narrative of the *Universal History*. ‘

Before moving on, I would like to briefly address the difficulties I encountered and the approaches I have taken to address them. First of all, this thesis considers only a portion of the *Universal History*. The *Universal History* itself was divided in an *Ancient* and a *Modern* part, together over thirty thousand pages long.[11] Though both parts technically belong to the same larger work, there are profound differences between the two. For one, the Ancient part was originally published between 1736-44, while the Modern part was published between 1759-66. Furthermore, the Ancient Part of the *Universal History* did not stray far away from traditional, biblical narratives. It contained an account of the Creation and followed the biblical timeline of

[11] The cut-off date for the Ancient part differs per volume, but in general it is the Fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476 CE.

the Old Testament.[12] However, the Modern part was an entirely different work. The authors of the *Universal History,* in 1759, could no longer resort to biblical narratives to explain the modern rise and progress of the European states, which forced them to rethink their approach to universal history. [13] Indeed, having both a traditional, biblical history and a secular history is what made the *Universal History* a transitional text. But it is the Modern Part of the *Universal History* that faced the problem of justifying its universality; and therefore it alone will be subject to examination in this thesis.[14]

Another problem faced by historians of the *Universal History* is the fact that most of the authors are anonymous, despite the book being well-known and widely-read, and commented on in the eighteenth century.[15] The German historian Eduard Fueter considered it "die erste Weltgeschichte, die ihren Namen wenigstens einigermaszen verdient."[16] Unfortunately, very few records exist of the identity of the authors who were associated with the work, nor is there any trace of an overview which stated which volume was written by whom.[17] The anonymity of the authors has made it, in most cases, impossible to ascribe any volume of the *Universal History* to one author with sufficient certainty. Instead, the term 'the authors' will be used when referring to the author(s) of any of the volumes.[18]

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[12] Abbattista, "The Business of Paternoster Row: Towards a Publishing History of the *Universal History* (1736-65)," *Publishing History*, 17 (1985): 14; Tamara Griggs, "Universal History from Counter-Reformation to Enlightenment," *Modern Intellectual History*, 4.2 (2007): 229.
[13] Griggs, "Universal History," 236-7.
[14] When citing the *Universal History* (hereafter *UH*), I will be citing the Modern Part only, which contains 44 volumes in total. Volume I of the Modern Part, however, is Volume XXII of the *UH* overall. I will stick to the numbering of the digital versions I used, which does not take into account the Ancient part.
[15] Abbattista, "The Business of Paternoster Row," 5-6, 16.
[16] Eduard Fueter, *Geschichte der Neueren Historiographie* (Munich/Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1936): 322.
[17] Abbattista, "The Business of Paternoster Row," 7.
[18] There are two exceptions: John Campbell and Tobias Smollett. I have been able to connect these two authors with specific volumes in the *Universal History*, which made it possible to describe their personal views and their influence on the argument in the *Universal History*. As I will show, the contributions of Campbell and Smollett were vital to the central argument of the *Universal History*.

Having said that, the identities of a small number of authors can be derived from personal correspondence. Their names were George Sale (1697-1736), an Orientalist and the likely mastermind behind the original inception of the *Universal History*; George Psalmanazar (1679-1763), an illustrious impostor; Archibald Bower (1686-1766), a man of many religions and often embroiled in religious controversy; John Swinton (1703-1777), a British writer and Fellow of the Royal Society; George Shelvocke (d. 1760), a Secretary of the General Post-Office in London; John Campbell (1708-1775), a Scottish scientific author and cleric; and Tobias Smollett (1721-1771), a Scottish poet and author of the novel *The Adventures of Roderick Random*. More obscure names associated with the project were one William Shirley, and one "Peter Gordon", both of whom only appear briefly in the correspondence of Smollett.[19] These writers were all part of the lower literary world, sustaining themselves by writing. They were "of uncertain means of support, prey to the whims of booksellers."[20]

Unlike other major historical works of the period, the *Universal History* was not a true 'academic' work; instead, the *Universal History* was commissioned by a group of publishers associated with Paternoster Row, London.[21] Historian Guido Abbattista, in his extensive publishing history of the *Universal History*, characterized the project as a risky, commercial endeavor on part of the publishers. The growing availability of travel books presented Western intellectuals with a new wealth of information. Spurred on by the Enlightenment, they accepted the challenge of organizing all branches of knowledge in a rational and orderly way, in the form

[19] H.P. Vincent, "Tobias Smollett's Assault on Gordon and Groom," *The Review of English Studies*, 16.62 (Apr., 1940): 184; Martz, "Smollett", 3; Abbatista, "The Business of Paternoster Row," 8.
[20] Abbattista, "The Business of Paternoster Row," 8; James G. Basker, *Tobias Smollett: Critic and Journalist* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1988): 108, 140; Based on the reviews Smollett wrote for the *Critical Review*, L.L. Martz has been able to deduce which volumes Smollett most likely contributed to himself, these being vols. XI (the part on *Terra Australis*), most likely XVI – XVIII, certainly XXIX – XXXIV; Louis L. Martz, "Tobias Smollett and the Universal History," *Modern Language Notes*, 56.1 (Jan., 1941): 5-7.
[21] Abbattista, "The Business of Paternoster Row," 7; Prominent among these publishers were T. Osborne and S. Richardson.

of encyclopedias and general histories – of which the *Universal History* was one.[22] The publishers intended the *Universal History* as a direct reaction to the increasing need for modern history among a growing middleclass British audience.[23] A surviving list indicates that the majority (roughly three-fourths) of the subscribers of the *Universal History* belonged to the middle class, such as "bankers, lawyers, clerks, accountants, secretaries, apothecaries, etc."[24] Nevertheless, a sizeable portion of subscribers consisted of aristocrats, clergymen, or academic institution, which could mean that the *Universal History* was received with broad approval from the educated ranks of British society, from casual readers to university professors and students.[25] This placed the *Universal History* at the forefront of what Mark Phillips termed "a critical moment in the adaptation of classical understandings of history to the needs of a modern, commercial, and increasingly middle-class society."[26] The audience of the *Universal History* was not interested in endless political narrative (which nevertheless make up the majority of the text), but demanded narratives pertaining to commerce, culture, society and religion. The question of 'what to include' was central to the changing field of universal history, and eventually changed commonly accepted notions of what 'universal history' meant.[27] In order to fully appreciate this

[22] Abbattista, "The Business of Paternoster Row," 7; Smail, "In the Grip of Sacred History," 1340; Histories of non-European locales relied almost exclusively on accounts of European travelers as well as – to a lesser degree – non-European sources, that were more readily available in the Early Modern Period.
[23] Abbattista, "The Business of Paternoster Row," 12.
[24] Ibid. 23-6.
[25] Griggs, "Universal History," 233-234; Abbattista, "The Business of Paternoster Row," 24; Abbattista summed it up as follows: "From a work published in instalments for the pocket of a not-too-wealthy public, to a 'standard work' for public and private libraries, printed in folio and elegantly bound in red morocco, from a huge synthesis of universal history for use in the universities by professors and students, to a compendium of historical information for the average reader, who could buy the more economical octavo edition … the publishers of the *Universal History* had managed to put a product on the market capable of attracting almost all the categories of reader." Ibid. 27.
[26] Mark Salber Phillips, *Society and Sentiment: Genres of Historical Writing in Britain, 1740-1820* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): xii; Ben Dew and Fiona Price, *Historical Writing in Britain, 1688-1830* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)*:* 5-6; George H. Nadel, "Philosophy of History before Historicism," *History and Theory,* 3.3 (1964): 313.
[27] Bowden, "The "Idea" of Universal History," 203-4; Smail, "In the Grip of Sacred History," 1340-1.

development, we shall now turn to existing definitions of the field of universal history, followed by an extended history of the genre.

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Universal history, as a historical genre, is commonly defined as history that extends across all spatial and temporal boundaries, confined within a single historical narrative. All the peoples, nations and cultures of the world were included in one central historical narrative, with a concrete point of beginning and ending. Universal historians claimed that the peoples of the entire world were fated to follow this singular and linear pathway through historical time, arriving at a universal end-point (often modernity or civilization).[28] Brett Bowden distinguished two variants of universal history. Firstly, the kind "that seeks to *account* for everyone and everything in the known world…" Secondly, the kind "that is *applied* to everyone and everything."[29] The method used by the universal historian revolved around the careful selection of those events, peoples and places in world history that contributed to the universal progress of history and helped create the contemporary state in which the world currently resides.[30] An eighteenth-century contemporary French author, Anne R.J. Turgot (1727-1781), characterized Universal History as "a consideration of the successive advances of the human race, and the elaboration of the causes which have contributed to it."[31] This quote perfectly captures the

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[28] Bowden, "The "Idea" of Universal History," 200-201; Christian, "The Return of Universal History," 7; Benjamin, "State expansion and the origins of universal history," 360; Hughes-Warrington, "Coloring Universal History," 104; Cornell, Fear, and Liddel, "Introduction," in Peter Liddel, Andrew Fear, *Historiae Mundi: Studies in Universal History* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2010), 1-2. Ricuperati, "Time and Periodization."
[29] Bowden, "The "Idea" of Universal History," 200.
[30] Bowden, "The "Idea" of Universal History," 203; Arnaldo Momigliano, "Two Types of Universal History: The Cases of E.A. Freeman and Max Weber," *Journal of Modern History*, 58 (1986): 235.
[31] Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, "On Universal History," in David Gordon (ed.), *The Turgot Collection: Writings, Speeches, and Letters of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Baron de Laune* (Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2011): 349.

teleological dimension of universal history, which almost invariably presupposes the existence of an underlying rationality to historical progress.[32]

Needless to say, the universalizing approach of universal history has not left the historiography of its own genre untouched. It should be no surprise that historians taken with the idea of universal history often characterize the genre in universalizing language themselves. Universal history is often presented as a continuous tradition within the historical field, with several basic tenets that persisted despite a few exterior changes. To the historian Alison Bashford, the stadial vision of the history from "hunting-gathering, to pastoralism, agriculture, commerce and … capitalism and beyond," which one can often find in universal history, was a mainstay in the works of "Turgot, Vico, Kames, Monboddo, Hegel, Condorcet, Rousseau" and others.[33] The title 'universal', itself a claim to knowledge and above all interpretive power, was often adopted by the authors of universal histories themselves, but that was not always the case. Some authors never explicitly advertised their work as 'universal history', and yet their work has come to be classified and interpreted as universal history by later historians. Indeed, the inherent vagueness of a term as broad as universal history meant that historians could always stretch it to encompass historical works that had not initially been placed in the genre of universal history by the authors themselves.[34]

Despite the ambiguity of the definition, one can discern a nearly-continuous tradition of universal history over two millennia until the eighteenth century. This is because universal history, broadly defined, revolved more around the essential *claim* to have written a universal –

[32] Bowden, "The "Idea" of Universal History," 204.
[33] Alison Bashford, "Deep Genetics: Universal History and the species," *History and Theory,* 57.2 (2018): 314-15.
[34] Take, for example, 'Islamic Universal History.' Marco di Branco, "A Rose in the Desert? Late Antique and Early Byzantine Chronicles and the Formation of Islamic Universal Historiography," in Peter Liddel, Andrew Fear, *Historiae Mundi: Studies in Universal History* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2010), 194.

and universalizing – narrative, than around a definite set of methods to support this claim.[35] For centuries, universal historians could securely claim universality by connecting their narratives with the universal narrative of the Bible, which was thought to be universally applicable. Indeed, this is what the authors of the Ancient Part of the *Universal History* did in their writing. Yet, as I will show, the continuity of universal history went through a significant transition in the early-modern period, as the validity of its very existence was being questioned. In order to fully appreciate this crisis of universal history in the late-seventeenth century, and the profound changes the genre underwent during the eighteenth century, one must first consider the history and development of the genre of universal history itself.

The emergence of universal history as a genre is generally dated to the Hellenic period in Classical Antiquity, which began with the Alexandrine conquests in the Near East. The enlargement of the classical empires, such as the Macedonian, the Seleucid and the Ptolemaic, precipitated the spread of a new, broadened worldview to encompass a wide variety of peoples now living under Hellenic rule. It was this enlarged worldview that served as the driving force behind the development of *classical* universal history.[36] In the centuries that followed, contacts between disparate peoples in the Hellenic world and the Augustinian Roman empire forced historians to come to terms with the reality that local narratives could no longer explain events that occurred across regional boundaries.[37] As such, they matched the broad Hellenic worldview with an equally broad conception of history that aimed to encompass all the peoples of this

[35] Especially within the Christian tradition of universal history, this continuity can be distinguished. Many of the Catholic chroniclers borrowed and built upon the work of their predecessors, and as a result their narratives and methodology remained largely the same.
[36] Benjamin, "The origins of universal history," 377; Arnaldo Momigliano, "The Origins of Universal History," in *Settimo Contributo* (Rome: 1984): 533-40; John Marincola, "Universal History from Ephorus to Diodorus," in John Marincola (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography* (Malden, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007): 171.
[37] Interestingly, one could view the Hellenic period, which featured an extensive cultural communication and exchange across the Hellenic world, as an early instance of the crisis which universal history faced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

extended world; in a sense, this conception for the first time allowed historians to argue that their historical narratives had become both *universal* and *universally applicable*. The 'all-inclusive' scope of universal history, then, was clearly a product of its time.[38] To the Greek historian Polybius (c. 208 – c.125 BCE), universal history pertained to the grand synthesis of historical events; a history that was universal in spatial terms.[39] Another Greek historian Diodorus (c. 90 – c. 30 BCE) was influenced by Polybius's approach to history, in that he likewise emphasized the universality of chronological breadth in history-writing. Both historians, however, believed universal history to be superior to the history of isolated events that left these unconnected. A local approach to history, to Polybius and Diodorus, made it impossible to make sense of the rise of the Roman Empire, which transgressed many traditional spatial boundaries.[40]

The genre of universal history underwent a profound change with the introduction of Christian narratives. The early Church chroniclers and historians adapted the earlier model of classical universal history from the Hellenistic writers, and applied it to a Biblical timeline. The result was *traditional* universal history, which derived its universality from the Catholic Church and the Holy Bible, through which history was revealed to the world. Christian universal historians understood history in "eschatological and apocalyptic terms," and incorporated the whole of humankind in their historical writing.[41] Regardless of nation, race, culture, or

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[38] Katherine Clarke, "Universal Perspectives in Historiography," in C.S. Krauss (ed.), *The Limits of Historiography: Genre and Narrative in Ancient Historical Texts* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 277-8; Cornell, Fear, and Liddel, "Introduction," 2. The word 'all-inclusive' is used less to describe the reality of universal history and more the *claim* that it made. In hindsight, it is easy to criticize universal historians for omitting countless narratives and voices in their works; needless to say, no contemporary historian today would consider any of these works to be truly 'universal'. However, what matters here is that universal historians *considered* their work to be universal in scope, and claimed their narrative to encompass all stories of the world.

[39] Peter Liddel, "*Metabole Politeion* as Universal Historiography," in Peter Liddel, Andrew Fear, *Historiae Mundi: Studies in Universal History* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2010), 15.

[40] Briand Sheridan, "Diodorus' Reading of Polybius' Universalism," in Peter Liddel, Andrew Fear, *Historiae Mundi: Studies in Universal History* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2010), 48, 51.

[41] Avihu Zakai and Anya Mali, "Time, History and Eschatology: Ecclesiastical History from Eusebius to Augustine," *The Journal of Religious History* 17.4 (Dec., 1993): 394.

geographic region, all peoples were bound by the same universal historical narrative. Contrary to the historical tradition of the ancient Greeks, which had revolved around the idea of cyclical history, the early Christians organized universal history around a single timeline, starting at the creation and progressing towards Judgment Day, the culmination of world history. For the first time in European thought, history became conceptualized as a line with a direction – history that moved towards a clear goal.[42] In the words of historians Avihu Zakai and Anya Mali, traditional universal history (or, as they termed it, "ecclesiastical history") told the "unfolding story of God's divine plan of salvation and redemption, or the whole of Christ's divine economy of salvation upon earth."[43] One of the earlier examples of this kind of universal history was the *Ecclesiastical History* by the 'Father of Church History', Eusebius Pamphili (c.260- c.340 CE), the bishop of Caesarea.[44] Eusebius provided traditional universal history with a model of providential history, which maintained the significance of world-historical events to the extent that they contributed to the unfolding of the Divine Plan.[45]

According to historian Peter van Nuffelen, the universal history of the early Church historians changed dramatically with the works of the Iberian historian Paul Orosius (c. 375 – c. 418 CE) and Philip of Side (c. 380 – c. 431). Unlike previous Christian historians, who were concerned mostly with the Christian elect, Orosius and Philip of Side extended their universal histories to encompass the pagan world. As such, van Nuffelen argued, there is a clear break between the universal historiography of the Hellenistic era and the Late Antiquity, the latter of which began with Orosius, since he was the first to incorporate secular history within the biblical

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[42] Barraclough, "Universal History," 84; Andrew Fear, "Orosius and Escaping from the Dance of Doom," in Peter Liddel, Andrew Fear, *Historiae Mundi: Studies in Universal History* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2010), 179.
[43] Zakai, "Time, History and Eschatology," 393, 394-396.
[44] Eusebius Pamphili, "Ecclesiastical History," in R.J. Deferrari (trans.), *The Fathers of the Church, Vol. I* (Washington: CUAP, 1981): 35-36.
[45] Zakai, "Time, History and Eschatology," 400, 406.

framework.[46] Furthermore, Orosius argued that it was not the history of the Church, but the history of the secular world which illustrated "the truth of Christianity."[47] The Roman Empire, in the mind of Orosius, was not inimical to God's plan: it was part of it. Orosius's historical work thus marked the first time that Christian principles were applied to secular history, and in doing so Orosius imbued the history of the world with the ultimate purpose of Christianity: the unraveling of Providence in both the religious *and* the secular world.[48]

Medieval historians inherited from Orosius the idea that history had meaning; that time was moving in the direction of the *Parousia*, the second coming of Christ. A twelfth-century work of universal history, which illustrated the influence of Orosius's approach, was the *Chronica de Duabus Civitatibus* by Otto of Friesing, an attempt to update Orosius's universal history to concurrent times. In the fourteenth century, Ranulf Higden adopted the progressive philosophy of history employed by Orosius, in the *Polychronicon*.[49] One last example was Théodore Agrippa d'Aubigné's *Histoire universelle depuis 1550 jusqu'à l'an 1601* (1616-19).[50] To all these medieval and early-modern authors, the Bible remained the primary source of information, in addition to Classics, which informed their views of the temporal world. Medieval writers incorporated the limited amount of information that originated from outside of Europe without difficulty into the existing body of established knowledge.[51]

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[46] Peter van Nuffelen, "Theology versus Genre? The Universalism of Christian Historiography in Late Antiquity," in Peter Liddel, Andrew Fear, *Historiae Mundi: Studies in Universal History* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2010), 162-163, 168, 171.
[47] Fear, "Orosius and Escaping from the Dance of Doom," 182. To Orosius, it was the secular of "natural" world which constituted the Book of Nature, which was – alongside the Book of Scripture – the primary medium of divine revelations.
[48] Ibid. 183.
[49] Ibid. 184. The title *Chronica de Duabus Civitatibus* also implies that Friesing was strongly influenced by St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*.
[50] Clorinda Donato, "Eighteenth-century encyclopedias and national identity," *History of European Ideas*, 16 (1993): 959-60.
[51] P.J. Marshall and Glyndwr Williams, *The Great Map of Mankind: Perceptions of New Worlds in the Age of Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 8.

However, if the credibility of biblical narratives, from which traditional universal history were derived, had been sufficient for historians of the pre-modern period, it certainly diminished in the centuries that followed.[52] The discovery of the New World, the advancement in natural sciences and the introduction of the Egyptian and Chinese chronologies severely discredited the Bible as a historical source. . The Florentine patrician and historian Francesco Guicciardini, for example, wrote that the discovery of the New World problematized overreliance on the Scriptures and ancient sources in historical writing; the New World simply did not feature in any of these, so how could accurate information of the Americas be derived from them? This realization fed a growing sentiment among historians that the old biblical narrative no longer sufficed to explain the world. The Scriptures eventually lost their status as universal source, especially due to the circulation of Eastern chronologies – from Egypt, India, and China – that caused writers to doubt the usefulness of Biblical chronology.[53] This led sixteenth-century historians such as Francesco Guicciardini and Jean Bodin to place more emphasis on the human element in their narratives. They began to experiment with new historical approaches in which human will, not divine providence, became central to the historical narrative.[54]

To preserve the universality of their histories and retain Providence as the sole agent of historical change, universal historians saw themselves forced to narrow their approach. The last major traditional history, *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1681) by Jacques-Benigne Bossuet, was an attempt to reconcile Divine Providence and human will as agents of historical change,

[52] Christian, "The Return of Universal History," 12.
[53] Anthony Grafton, *The Footnote: A Curious History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997): 97; Geoffrey Barraclough, "Universal History," 84; Smail, Dan, "In the Grip of Sacred History," *The American Historical Review,* 110.5 (Dec., 2005): 1346; Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 19, 20.
[54] Manning, *Navigating World History*, 18-19; Ernst Breisach, *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval & Modern* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007 [1983]), 177.

representing a turning point between traditional and modern universal history.[55] Despite Bossuet's efforts, however, providential narratives came increasingly at odds with the fruits of empirical inquiry, rendering necessary a different approach to representing the temporal world.[56] The continuing influx of information incompatible with the existing Biblical framework, encouraged eighteenth-century historians to develop a novel stadial approach that conceived of human history as progressing through "several economic stages – savagery, pastoralism, agriculture, and commerce" which all featured a unique "set of political, social, legal, and intellectual institutions."[57] Universal history, not immune to the influence of the Enlightenment, adopted the stadial structure so characteristic of early-modern historiography. No longer could the Biblical timeline be used without discretion; and no longer could the Bible usurp the place of humans as the primary agents of historical change.[58] The Enlightenment historians, therefore, sought not only to dispense with the classical biblical framework, but also with the content thereof. Providence as an active historical force was dismissed. Instead, historians placed human agency at the center of history.[59] Even though the idea of God directing history to a certain end-point had fallen into disrepute, the idea of a "guiding hand" in history was retained, albeit in a secularized form. Voltaire, who often mocked Christian universal history, considered history as

[55] Barraclough, "Universal history," 84; Manning, *Navigating World History*, 19-20; Smail, "In the Grip of Sacred History," 1341. Bossuet employed the same scheme of seven ages of man that Orosius had used.
[56] Barraclough, "Universal history," 84.
[57] Smail, "In the Grip of Sacred History," 1340; Joan-Paul Rubiés, "From Antiquarianism to Philosophical History: India, China, and the World History of Religion in European Thought (1600-1770)," in Peter N. Miller and François Louis (eds.), *Antiquarianism and Intellectual Life in Europe and China, 1500-1800* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 315-321.
[58] Grafton, *The Footnote*, 97; Breisach, *Historiography*, 199.
[59] Guido Abbattista, "The Historical Thought of the French Philosophes," in José Rabasa et al., *The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 3: 1400-1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 415-19.

"the progress of a mysterious '*esprit humain'*," a guiding hand which depended not on God, but on humans themselves.[60]

Placing human will central within historical narratives was part of a broad reconceptualization of the historical field in the eighteenth century. Intensified commercial networks resulted in a steady trickle of information and data from across the globe, now readily available to the eighteenth-century historian.[61] For the first time, a modern universal history – one that 'truly' concerned the entire globe – became possible. The tremendous influx of information simultaneously sparked the imagination and interests of literate Europeans. Historians thus began to experiment with novel forms of history-writing to suit an emerging middle-class audience. Mark Phillips, in *Society and Sentiment*, characterized this eighteenth-century movement as "a critical moment in the adaptation of classical understandings of history to the needs of a modern, commercial, and increasingly middle-class society."[62] The history of politics and public life now had to make place for histories that included other aspects of society such as commerce, culture and the arts and sciences.

The diversification of historical sources provided the eighteenth-century historian with new challenges to discover an underlying connectedness to this newly-diversified subject matter. Exemplary of this trend is Voltaire's *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (1756), which moved away from political to more general narratives and provided a 'modern model' for philosophical world history to his contemporaries.[63] Enlightenment historians believed that the Age of Discovery had made the human experience a global phenomenon, and that "they were

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[60] Fear, "Orosius and Escaping from the Dance of Doom," 184-5; Harry Ritter, *Dictionary of concepts in history* (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1986), 440-42.
[61] Marshall, *The Great Map of Mankind*, 7-8.
[62] Phillips, *Society and Sentiment,* xii, 3; Dew and Price, *Historical Writing in Britain,* 4-6.
[63] Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1935): 197, 218; Breisach, *Historiography*, 206.

witnessing the convergence of disparate histories," a development which warranted historical narratives that encompassed the whole earthly sphere and that could tell the story of the *humanitas universalis*, the modern incarnation of the Roman *orbis terrarium* or the Greek *oikoumene*.[64] The Enlightenment, in that sense, was "the attempt to reground thinking in the context of the New World's dissolving of biblical and classical authority," but at a global level.[65]

However, as historian Patrick Manning explained, despite the increase in available sources, eighteenth century history "relied more heavily on philosophical presumption," leading to works that were rather "speculative" in nature. Early-modern historians, he explained, relied on "their reading, experience and reasoning powers" to construct their historical narratives.[66] All too often was dissenting information forcefully interpreted "through established theories of religion and philosophy."[67] As a result, several historians, such as William H. McNeill, saw fit to argue that the world-historians of the eighteenth century were unable to produce a true "global view of the past" to replace "the Christian interpretation of history."[68] Nevertheless, early-modern world historians attempted to broaden their vision to study history on a global scale, by subjecting the world to a systematic philosophy of history. It was their elaborate philosophical frameworks with which they justified their claim to universal validity.[69] The *Universal History* stands as exemplary of this historiographical trend, being one of the earliest attempts to

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[64] Jennifer Pitts, "The Global in Enlightenment Historical Thought," in Prasenjit Duara, Viren Murthy, and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *A Companion to Global Historical Thought* (Malden: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2014): 184.
[65] Tony C. Brown, *The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012): 7.
[66] Manning, *Navigating World History*, 17; Ernst Breisach referred to eighteenth-century historians as "erudite historians", Breisach, *Historiography*, 201; Johnson Kent Wright, "Historical Thought in the Era of the Enlightenment," in Lloyd Kramer and Sarah Maza (eds.), *A Companion to Western Historical Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 125-126.
[67] Rubiés, "From Antiquarianism to Philosophical History," 325.
[68] William H. McNeill, "The Changing Shape of World History," *History and Theory*, 34.2 (May, 1995): 11.
[69] Barraclough, "Universal history," 85; Grafton, *The Footnote,* 23. One example on the continent in the eighteenth century was the rise of the Göttingen school around 1760, headed by J.C. Gatterer and A.L. Schlözer, who debated methodological problems related to the novel field of world history.

incorporate narratives from around the world into a new historical timeline, following a comprehensive philosophical plan.

The eighteenth-century adoption of the universal timeline, the main characteristic of any universal history, was no mere accident: it fit perfectly within the dominant intellectual atmosphere of the time. The Enlightenment philosophes and historians conceived of history as subject to a universal motion they called *progress*; all of humanity shared in this common movement toward a better world. The application of reason to what they perceived to be universal processes in nature and history, was the primary approach by which eighteenth-century historians sought to justify their narratives.[70] History, then, became the story of how civilizations steadily marched from primitiveness to modern civilization through a set stadial pattern.[71] In a sense, Enlightenment universal history retained the teleological dimension long ago introduced by Orosius and the early-Christian historians; their universal history still took the form of providential history, but – in the words of historian Andrew Fear – "the guide ha[d] changed, [while] the methodological sentiments and the end result, save for one vital difference, remain[ed] the same."[72] This vital difference was the *telos* (~ 'end goal') of history, which would constantly be reformulated by successive generations of universal historians. To the Christian historians, it was the *Parousia*; to the Enlightenment historians, it was the progress of the spirit of liberty; to Hegel, the unfolding of the *Geist*; and to Marxists, the endpoint of history became temporal, as the laws of science and nature would guide humanity towards the proletarian paradise.[73]

[70] Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment,* 199, 218; Breisach, *Historiography*, 205.
[71] Barraclough, "Universal history," 84.
[72] Fear, "Orosius and Escaping the Dance of Doom," 185.
[73] Ibid. 185.

The Enlightenment, in sum, had a strong influence on history-writing as a whole. It is, therefore, difficult to argue that *modern* universal history was a direct continuation of traditional universal history, given that the appearance of universal history changed profoundly by the second half of the eighteenth century. Immanuel Kant's *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* (1784), for example, defined history as the account of the manifestations of "human will," and the degree to which these "phenomena" are subject to "constant natural laws."[74] In the German state of Hannover, new approaches to world history were developed by members of the Göttingen School of History, such as the *Weltgeschichte* of August Ludwig von Schlözer (1735 – 1809), which focused on the social, cultural and scientific development of the entire world, as well as various physiological influences on different modes of living.[75] Universal history became increasingly synonymous with *world history*.[76] Johann Gottfried Herder, an influential eighteenth-century historian, attempted to explain world-historical trends through the rise of modern nation states, which he considered to be the primary forces of human history.[77] Later examples of the desire to incorporate the world into one historical narrative were Georg Weber[78] and Israel Smith Clare,[79] both of whom made attempts at a synthesis of universal history. Leopold von Ranke, the 'father of Modern history', argued that world history should be

[74] Hans Reiss (ed.), H.B. Nisbet (trans.), *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 41-2.
[75] August Ludwig von Schlözer, *Weltgeschichte nach ihren Haupttheilen im Auszug und Zusammenhange.* 2 vols. (Göttingen: 1792-1801); Donald R. Kelley, "The old cultural history," in Robert M. Burns (ed.), *Historiography: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies*. *Volume I: Foundations* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006): 94.
[76] At present, it *is* synonymous with world history, if one were to believe historian Manfred Kossok: "As a rule, the concept of universal history and world history are treated as identical." Manfred Kossok, "From Universal History to Global History," in Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens (eds.), *Conceptualizing Global History* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993): 94.
[77] Johann Gottfried Herder, *Ideen zur philosophie der geschichte der menschheit* (Leipzig: J.W. Brodhaus, 1869 [1784-91]); Manning, *Navigating World History*, 23.
[78] Georg Weber, *Outlines of Universal History from the Creation of the World to the Present Time*, trans. M. Behr (Boston: Jenks, Hickling, and Swan, 1853).
[79] Israel Clare Smith, *Library of Universal History: Containing a record of the human race from the earliest historical period to the present time embracing a general survey of the progress of mankind in national and social life, civil government, religion, literature, science and art* (New York: R. S. Peale & J. A. Hill, 1897)

grounded solely in archival sources, which he put to practice in the *Weltgeschichte* (in 8 volumes, 1883-1887). In Ranke's footsteps followed several other modern systematic historians, who tried their hand at world history, such as Heinrich Leo (*Lehrbuch der Universalgeschichte,* 1835-1844), Wilhelm Oncken (*Allgemeine Geschichte in Einzeldarstellungen,* 1879-1890) and H.G. Helmolt (*The History of the World*, 1899). While these works had evolved away from eighteenth-century universal history proper, they retained several key elements thereof.[80] Universal history persisted into the twentieth century and has even made a surprising comeback. Recent books such as *Homo Sapiens* by Yuval Noah Harari,[81] *The End of History* by Francis Fukuyama[82] and the field of 'Big History', spearheaded by David Christian,[83] could all be considered modern incarnations of the universal history approach of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[84] In conclusion, all of these later instances and variations of universal history had their origins in the crisis of universal history, and the transition that the genre went through in the eighteenth century.

This leads us back to the *Universal History*, the present representative case for eighteenth-century universal history. The *Universal History* itself symbolized the profound change that the field of universal history underwent in the eighteenth century, being published between 1736-66. Without the Bible as foundational source, universal historians – such as the authors of the *Universal History* – saw themselves forced to grapple with difficult methodological questions: What, then, was to bring unity to modern universal history? How could particular histories be united into one coherent whole? What universalizing principle

[80] Manning, *Navigating World History, 24-25.*
[81] Yuval Noah Harari, *Homo Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind* (London: Harper, 2014).
[82] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).
[83] David Christian, *Origin Story: A Big History of Everything* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2018).
[84] Bashford, "Deep Genetics," 313-314, 317.

would allow the authors of the *Universal History* to create a comprehensive narrative that could justifiably be styled *universal* history? In other words, how did the authors of the *Universal History* create a coherent narrative, the universality of which could reasonably be defended? These questions, and providing a convincing answer for them, will be the purpose of the following chapters of the thesis.

CHAPTER I: HIERARCHY AND PROGRESS

The *Universal History* truly is a daunting mass of words; its dense and verbose narrative must have acted as a discouragement for the contemporary reader. Even the contemporary historian Edward Gibbon called it a "dull mass … not quickened by a spark of philosophy or taste."[85] At times, perhaps, it might seem difficult to distinguish any coherent philosophy, any overarching narrative that glues the countless volumes together. The tremendous flood of information that daily made its way to Europe made a general historical synthesis deeply problematic. How could the authors of the *Universal History* incorporate all this new information about various foreign peoples and states? And how could any synthesis be called 'universal'? To organize the different peoples and states of the world in a rational and systematic way, then, was the aim of the authors of the *Universal History*. Though the formal organization of the *Universal History* was primarily geographical and chronological, the authors devised an overarching rationale by which the different peoples and states were compared. This allowed them to construct a *hierarchy of civilizations*, along which the civilizational level of each state could be ranked. The hierarchy contained all peoples and states of the world and was therefore universally applicable. This, I will argue, stood at the basis of the new universal narrative that the authors hoped to construct.

Integral to this narrative was not only the formal ranking, but the means by which states could rise and fall along the hierarchy. In order to explain why European states had ended up on top of the hierarchy, without taking recourse to 'outdated' explanations such as the idea of a Providential plan guiding history, the authors of the *Universal History* devised a temporal

[85] Edward Gibbon, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. IV (London: Strahan & Cadell, 1782): 346; Guido Abbattista, "The Business of Paternoster Row: Towards a Publishing History of the *Universal History* (1736-65)," *Publishing History* 17 (1985): 6.

alternative of historical movement called *progress*. It was progress that made 'historical change' possible, providing the civilizational mobility that could propel states toward the civilized ideal. However, far from being reserved to the European states alone, the authors applied the concept of progress to non-European states also. Indeed, as I will argue, they believed in the *innate* capacity of humanity to move towards the ideal civilization – if only one would embrace the possibility of progress. This Chapter, then, will concern the narrative structure of the *Universal History*, the hierarchy of civilizations contained therein, and the principle of progress that made possible civilizational development. It first considers the source base of the *Universal History,* followed by the *Proposal* of the Modern Part of the *Universal History* which was to guide the overall project. After that, this chapter will address the categories of comparison the authors used to construct their hierarchy of civilization, and the concept of progress that made civilizational mobility possible.

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The Modern Part of the *Universal History* is divided in forty-four volumes, each averaging roughly six-hundred pages. The first volumes began with the history of the Arabic empires, with subsequent volumes proceeding to the tell the story of the Tartars, the Indians, the Chinese, the Africans, the Europeans, and finally the Amerindians. Unlike traditional universal histories, the authors of the *Universal History* made use of an extensive source base for the period, which included sources written by non-European authors. It was Sale, one of the first contributors to the *Universal History* and the likely originator of the project, who had

persistently insisted on the use of indigenous sources. As a result, the bibliographical list of the *Universal History* consisted of European sources and various travel accounts, complemented by a variety of indigenous sources written primarily by Chinese, Arabian and Persian authors.

Despite Sale's aspirations, the extensive source base did not end up reflecting an equally extensive array of diverse historical voices. Many non-European secondary sources could only be derived from a select set of writers. For example, Western historiography of China and India in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for the most part, remained dominated primarily by the Jesuits.[86] Besides these Eastern sources, mostly collected by Jesuits, the authors did not report any non-Eurasian works to be included in the narrative, which the authors deemed unreliable.[87] Nor should one overstate the importance which Eastern historiography received in the *Universal History*; while the authors included non-European sources, they did not treat them as equal to European sources, stating that "the writings of the *Orientals* are commonly disguised [with] those rhetorical flourishes and flighty metaphors," obliging the authors to redact Eastern sources "without prejudice or partiality."[88] A worthy history of the world relied on a multitude of sources, but the authors aimed to use only those sources they deemed the most reliable and truthful.

As the monthly installments of the *Universal History* arrived into the possession of its subscribers, often after long delays, the extent of the work they had subscribed to soon became apparent. Indeed, the *Universal History*, that massive work, probably appeared to be akin to an unending compilation of historical fact, rather than a coherent narrative whole. The *Universal*

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[86] Joan-Paul Rubiés, "From Antiquarianism to Philosophical History: India, China, and the World History of Religion in European Thought (1600-1700). in Peter N. Miller and François Louis (eds.), *Antiquarianism and Intellectual Life in Europe and China, 1500-1800* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012): 340; Georg Lehner, *China in European Encyclopaedias, 1700-1850* (Leiden: Brill, 2011): 67.
[87] Guido Abbattista, "The English *Universal History*: Publishing, Authorship and Historiography in an European Project (1736-1790)," *Storia della Storiografia*, 39 (2001): 103.
[88] *Proposal for Publishing the Modern Part of the Universal History* (London: 1758): 9.

History, in this sense, exemplified Peter Manning's description of eighteenth-century British universal histories: "the authors and editors were more concerned with collecting additional information than with classifying it, more interested in exploring the limits of the human condition than in defining their own ancestry as its essence."[89] The medievalist Geoffrey Barraclough added that eighteenth-century "[c]o-operative histories … amounted to little more than compendia or encyclopaedias; their result was not world-history, which treated mankind as a unity, but an aggregate of national histories with little, if any, cohesion or connection."[90]

Volumes of the *Universal History* were not published in a particular order, either, but rather when the authors had finished compiling them. Furthermore, even though the *Universal History* intended to treat both non-European and European peoples as a unity, it narratively and physically separated each state/people from one another in different chapters and sections. Their emphasis on presenting the reader with an encyclopedic history, carefully organized and separated chronologically and geographically, often impeded their ability to draw general analyses across the different narratives. The organization of the *Universal History* ended up being geared more towards the reader seeking specific information on a single nation or people, rather than towards someone who wished to understand large historical processes that crossed national boundaries – certainly a damning conclusion for a history that aimed to help the reader understand *general history*. Nevertheless, the resulting appearance of disunity does not mean that the authors had not (initially) intended to present an overarching argument within the different volumes. Indeed, as Abbattista argues, "a glance at the printing and other typographical features demonstrates that the owners intended to present the *Universal History* as one whole single

[89] Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 21.
[90] Barraclough, "Universal History," In *Approaches to History* (London: Routledge, 2016): 86.

work."[91] Appearances aside, the *Universal History* was intended to be a coherent work. This Chapter is an acknowledgement of the authors' intentions to present the work as a united whole. By treating it such, we can gain a better understanding of the central argument, as laid out in the *Proposal for Publishing the Modern Part*, and the extent to which this thesis can be discerned from the end product.

The *Proposal for Publishing the Modern Part of the Universal History* was published in 1758, prior to the publication of the first volume of the Modern Part, and contained the plans for the upcoming volumes of the *Universal History*.[92] First of all, it stated that the Modern Part aimed to follow the original plan of the series and would pick up where the Ancient part had ceased. It advertised that the *Universal History* "is drawn from the best histories of every nation extant, carefully collected and diligently compared," which made the *Universal History* "an UNIVERSAL INDEX of authentic histories."[93] Furthermore, the *Proposal* claimed that the persons who had been commissioned to write segments of the *Universal History,* were highly respected authors who were most certainly suited for the task at hand.[94] The *Proposal* proclaimed that the sheer scope and ambition of the work rendered the *Universal History* "an UNIVERSAL LIBRARY, composed of the histories of *all* nations"; being a single physical compilation of "all the material facts, and every event in each of these countries, important enough to demand the attention of the inhabitants of any other, [which] are studiously preserved, and impartially related."[95] Finally, the authors laid out the central thesis of the *Universal History*:

[91] Abbattista, "The Business of Paternoster Row," 20.
[92] *Proposal for Publishing the Modern Part of the Universal History* (London: 1758). The quotes inserted here are all taken from this document.
[93] Ibid. 15.
[94] Ibid. 14.
[95] Ibid. 15.

> But the objects most attentively kept in sight, have been the rise and progress of those nations, that supplanting the great empires of antiquity … came abroad on the theatre of the world, and leaving their own, and overwhelming the seats of other people, have necessarily introduced new scenes in respect to policy, religion, and science. By developing these, it appears that the corruption of manners, the introduction of luxury, and the prevalence of tyranny and superstition, chiefly contributed to enervate and undermine the old, as a wild unpolished spirit of liberty, gave an irresistible impetuosity to the new. That by the revival of Science, in the western world, these have been tempered and civilized, which has given the Europeans a superiority to all, and the command over many nations in the other parts of the globe. The distinguishing the real causes of these great events, and pointing at their consequences, make it truly an UNIVERSAL HISTORY.[96]

The *Proposal* made it clear that the historical problem which the authors of the *Universal History* sought to explain was the *rise* of Europe. Their analysis of a perceived 'divergence' between the Europeans and the rest of the world appears like an early incarnation of the Great Divergence debate of recent decades.[97] The authors, in their view, could clearly perceive a difference between Europe and the rest of the world; a difference which warranted an extensive historical explanation. The *Universal History*, besides claiming to give the reader an overview of the history of all states and peoples in the world, also presented the reader with an overarching theory of why the general history of the world has turned out the way it did; why Europe had apparently managed to overcome all its rivals, and rise to the top of the global order. This overarching theory required the authors to do two things: first, they constructed a larger framework that ranked the nations and peoples that they treated with in terms of the 'level of

[96] Ibid. 15-6.
[97] In Vol. XLIV:18, the conclusion to the whole, the authors considered what they perceived to be a growing gap between Europe and China: "And, why have not they, as well as the Europeans, made discoveries of new countries and new islands, so many of which lie within their reach, and court them by a luxuriance of the richest productions of nature, to come and take possession?" The Europeans, after all, did venture out to sea, did discover new lands, and did settle new lands. But why not China?

civilization' of their state: a *hierarchy of civilizations,* which ranked the most polite civilizations above others using a set of recurring themes which allowed the authors of the *Universal History* to 'measure' civility.

The second part of the theory concerned the issue of *mobility*, the principle by which nations could rise and fall along the hierarchy of civilizations. The authors could use this principle to explain how Europe had moved up along this hierarchy of civilization while other peoples had failed to do so. This principle of civilizing mobility was called *progress*, which only came about under very specific circumstances. I argue that the alleged objective standards by which the authors measured the level of civilization of the states and peoples of the world, allowed them to construct a civilizational hierarchy that deliberately advanced the position of Europeans in the narrative, while disadvantaging non-Europeans. The race toward the 'ideal civilization' was one that non-European states could not win, at least any time soon, because the categories were fixed in Europe's favor. Thus, the resulting narrative perpetuated both the belief in Europe's superiority as well as the uniformity of humankind, reinforcing their claim to universal validity – the basis of any universal history.

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In order for Europeans to have become 'superior' to (~'above') all other nations, there had to be a uniform yardstick along which Europeans and non-Europeans alike could be measured. Although the authors of the *Universal History* never formally laid out such a ranking, they constantly compared and weighed the merits and faults of the different nations and peoples of the world. The extensive geographical, cultural, social, and political descriptions all served to help the authors categorize each state and people. In their efforts to create a 'universal library' of

history the authors resembled the great naturalists of the eighteenth century, who embarked on a "globalizing project of natural history" which "sought to represent, to classify and to order the world." Both intended to "create a system in which every species could be assigned a unique position in a comprehensible pattern."[98] Comparative analysis allowed the authors to at once create the hierarchy of nations and place each nation in its proper place in it.[99] It was also possible, for a while even fashionable, to compare peoples and states of different time periods, such as J.-F. Lafitau in his *Moeurs des Sauvages Amériquains* (1724), in which he drew comparisons between contemporary native Amerindians and the ancient Greeks and Jews.[100]

Besides the purpose of classification, many exotic examples also helped attract a predominantly middle-class audience eager to learn about the customs and manners of foreign nations. The comparative mode was particularly useful in engaging middle-class readers.[101] Through comparison, the *Universal History* exposed the reader to a variety of European and non-European descriptions of cities, peoples, civilizations, and other themes. Besides entertainment, comparison served to crystallize a European identity in the minds of the readers, one constructed by the authors.[102] For example, in Vol. VII, the authors described the people of Siam [i.e.

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[98] Charles W.J. Withers, "Geography, Natural History and the Eighteenth-Century Enlightenment: Putting the World in Place," *History Workshop Journal,* 39 (1995): 138-141; Another comparison could be made between the *UH* and another massive Enlightenment project, the *Encyclopédie* (1751-1772), edited by Denis Diderot. The whole project of the *Encyclopédie* "was imbued with a belief in the essential unity of phenomena, and in the eventual possibility of showing that unity through a system of facts and axioms." Andrew Wernick, "Comte and the *Encyclopedia," Theory, Culture & Society,* 23.4 (2006): 32-33; Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, 225.

[99] David Carrithers, "The Enlightenment Science of Society," in Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler (eds.), *Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995): 241-2.

[100] Ibid. 242.

[101] Mark Salber Phillips, *Society and Sentiment: Genres of Historical Writing in Britain, 1740-1820* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): xii.

[102] From their language it is clear that authors considered Europe to have a distinct identity. The creation of such an identity was instrumental in explaining why it was the collectivity of 'Europe' had risen above the rest of the world – which implied, to the authors , some sort of shared characteristic. Therefore, when comparing with non-European peoples, they often refer to 'European' attributes, and they refer to Europe as 'Us'. In this they anticipated Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who was later one of the first European thinkers to articulate the idea of "the West." Georgios Varouxakis, "The Godfather of "Occidentality": Auguste Comte and the Idea of "The West"," *Modern Intellectual History*, 16.2 (2019): 411-2.

Thailand], including their houses. The authors held the Siamese house to the same standards as a European house, expecting the same types of furniture and other attributes. Their comparison between the two emphasized what aspect of the Siamese house was unique (that is, non-European), while complementing this with an overview of what *was not* present. For example: "Their bedstead is a wooden frame, matted, *but without either head or posts*," "They have *no chairs or seats*, but bulrush mats: *no carpets…*"[103] Comparisons with non-Europeans are always presented from a European perspective, with European standards and customs dictating normalcy.[104] Take, for example, this comparison between the weaving practices of Europe and Africa: "the [African] weaver hath neither shuttle, nor any of those appurtenances which *belong* to a loom. From which it is plain that one of our weavers with his *proper* tools could dispatch more in one day than these can do in a month."[105] One last example would be the streets in Peking [i.e. Beijing], which were "*not paved*," – like the roads in London – and therefore "dusty in dry and windy weather."[106] The highlighted words give away the European standard by which other nations were being measured. Descriptors such as "well-formed," "handsome," "good" can be taken to signify "like us," either in the sense of lacking "threatening features" or simply displaying "human qualities."[107] Often the authors tried to explain a foreign practice or attribute by comparing it to a European example that they thought came closest to it, which would have helped their audience understand the comparison. For example, describing the clothing of the

[103] *UH:*VII:230-231.
[104] This changes when the authors discuss other European states. In this case, the "us" in question is British, and the shared identity being constructed is, likewise, British.
[105] *UH*:XIV:31.
[106] *UH*:VIII:17. Another example, regarding Ottoman clothing: "Their breeches or drawers are of a piece with their stockings, and they wear flippers *instead of shoes* … They wear shirts with wide sleeves, *not gathered at the wrists or neck*, and over them a vest tied with a sash, their upper garment being a loose gown somewhat shorter than the vest." *UH*:XLIII:130.
[107] Peter Hulme, "Tales of Distinction: European Ethnography and the Caribbean," in Stuart B. Schwartz, *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 163.

Tartars, the authors wrote: "They wear a round bonnet with a border of fur, in the *Polish* manner, and a kind of loose coat of sheepskins, which comes down to the middle of their leg."[108]

The act of comparing European and non-European states on a wide variety of topics and characteristics allowed European readers to develop a distinct sense of the Otherness of non-Europeans.[109] Considerations of the *exotic* (exo ~ 'out from'; e.g. 'it is *out from* us') emphasized clear external differences, which would at once create and reinforce the identity of both the observer and the observed. In the words of historian Tony Brown: "if, for example, Hottentots differ from Lessing's fellow Europeans because, unlike the latter, they smear animal fat on their naked bodies, then one attribute of Hottentot-ness will be a naked body smeared with animal fat, and one attribute of European-ness will be a clothed body not smeared with animal fat."[110] The New World, especially, played a central role in this process: "[t]he New World inaugurates modern Europe and the modern European both economically and intellectually… [and] the European looks at the supposedly savage Amerindian to perceive itself as civilized."[111]

The identity that the authors hoped to construct with such comparisons were twofold: in the first place, the "us" of the text is the British audience of the *Universal History*; and when the authors address other European nations, the standard used to make comparisons is invariably British. This changed when the authors moved outside the bounds of Europe (which, to them, included the part of Russia west of Siberia). By comparing Europe with non-European nations or peoples, the authors aimed to create a *European* identity, of which the British identity was a part. When discussing artillery in China, for example, they compared the Chinese handling of artillery

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[108] *UH*:XLIII:165.
[109] Joanna de Groot, *Empire and History Writing in Britain c. 1750-2012* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013): 21.
[110] Tony C. Brown, *The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012): 63; cf. *UH*:XLIII:288.
[111] Brown, *The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage,* 6; Jeremy Smith, *Europe and the Americas: State Formation, Capitalism and Civilizations in Atlantic Modernity* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2006): 77.

to the "European way" of artillery usage – not a specifically British or Italian or German way.[112] Russian envoys visiting the Qing capital at Peking were described as being "dressed after European manner"; an adjective that must surely have held some form of meaning for the audience of the *Universal History*.[113] In sum, the endless comparing and contrasting of various nations and peoples allowed the authors of the *Universal History* to construct clear national and supra-national identities. And, more importantly, these identities represented alleged coherent units which could be ranked.

Indeed, categorization in the *Universal History* had quite different connotations than it had in scientific endeavors. Historian Joanna de Groot explained in her book *Empire and History Writing in Britain* that eighteenth-century historians used comparative categories such as 'civilized,' 'Christian,' 'despotic,' 'Oriental', and 'barbaric' as a means to create a hierarchy which placed Europeans over subaltern civilizations and societies; and that, in doing so, they equally sought to define European identity as well: "Contrasting tyranny with good government, religion with idolatry or superstition, productive labour and social order with idleness and savagery, Europeans used comparisons and assumptions drawn from contact with other societies to make sense of themselves."[114] In other words, "the distinctive shared qualities of a 'nation' could be established through comparison and contrast between its own virtues, successes and qualities and the deficiencies, faults and limitations of others, both European and non-European." [115]

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[112] *UH*:VIII:151.
[113] *UH*:VIII:509; the question of whether Russia was to be considered 'European' was one of the issues that eighteenth-century theorists ran into when constructing the European identity. In the words of historian Ezequiel Adamovsky: "Russia's geographical ambiguity could be used as a metaphor of her cultural ambiguity, half-European and half-Oriental." Ezequiel Adamovsky, *Euro-Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France (c. 1740-1880)* (Oxford: Peter Lang AG, 2006): 30. Apparently, these Russians at the very center of the Oriental Far East, stood out to the authors for their "European" dress
[114] Groot, *Empire and History Writing in Britain*, 28-29.
[115] Ibid. 22.

To differentiate between the different nations and peoples, the authors of the *Universal History* used a set of recurring themes and qualifiers which influenced a state's position within the hierarchy of civilizations. The theme of 'the state' was one such theme, pertaining to form of government, military power, and the cultivation of territory. Naturally, the British form of government was seen as the most refined and civilized. At the very least, the authors agreed that in general European states were endowed with "excellent governments."[116] In the opinion of the authors of the *Universal History*, the governments of states outside of Europe were either tyrannical and despotic (such as China), or non-existent altogether (such as in Africa or in Central Asia). For example, governments in Hindustan (northern and central India) were characterized as "tyrannical government[s]," while the government of Kochinchina (southern Vietnam) was seen as despotic.[117] In both cases, it was the perceived lack of constitutional checks on the power of the monarch and the arbitrary nature of his rule that the authors of the *Universal History* considered to be highly negative.[118] Similarly, cities occupied by a nomadic people (such as the Tartars or the Uzbeks) had a "disorderly government."[119] It was clear to the authors of the *Universal History* that no nomadic people – especially the Tartars – could sustain a stable government: "for the Tartars are very ready to destroy buildings; but very backward either to erect any new ones, or to keep the old in repair."[120] Lastly, there was the group of peoples that were categorized as stateless, seen as completely lacking any form of political and social structure. For example, the Quiros in Australia lived "without fortifications or walls, without kings, laws, or government, in a kind of primitive simplicity and innocence."[121] The

[116] *UH*:XLIII:323.
[117] *UH*:VI:252.
[118] *UH*:VII:442
[119] *UH*:VI:138.
[120] *UH*:VI:138.
[121] *UH:*XI:278.

number of African peoples supposedly living without a state far outnumbered the few governments that the authors acknowledged to exist in Africa.

A second qualifier which influenced the position of a state in the hierarchy of the civilized world, was religion. Understandably, the authors preferred Christian states above all others. Islamic countries, for example, were seen as less civilized simply because of their persuasion. The deeply inimical relationship between Christian Europe and Islamic Arabia had created a deep ideological rift between the two sides. As a result, most European scholars were reluctant to engage with the primary theological, philosophical and ethical texts of Islam, which many simply rejected as false. Besides that, obtaining the Quran itself was an arduous task, for it was unacceptable for Muslims to sell a single copy to someone of a different religion. It was only around the start of the eighteenth century that copies began to circulate in Europe. Scholars had various motives for their interest in Islam, ranging from rediscovering ancient Greek texts from Arabian translations, to diplomacy and trade.[122] Despite their interest, European historians – the authors of the *Universal History* included – commonly characterized Islam, and in particular the Ottoman Empire, as "anticultural and anti-intellectual." It was the contention of European historians that the Ottomans had destroyed the centers of learning in Arabia, which once had thrived under renowned intellectuals such as Avicenna, Averroes and Ibn Khaldun.[123] Arguably, the newfound attention to Islam did not correspond to newfound appreciation.

With regard to religions other than Christianity and Islam, the authors were often more dismissive. In general, they argued that indigenous priests or shamans had diluted or corrupted

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[122] Noel Malcolm, "The Study of Islam in Early Modern Europe: Obstacles and Missed Opportunities," in Peter N. Miller and François Louis (eds.), *Antiquarianism and Intellectual Life in Europe and China, 1500-1800* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012): 266, 270, 273-274.
[123] Malcolm, "The Study of Islam in Early Modern Europe," 277; Alastair Hamilton, "Western Attitudes to Islam in the Enlightenment," in *Middle Eastern Lectures,* 3 (1999): 82-3.

the 'primitive' religions of non-Europeans. Take, for example, the Brahman priests in India, whom the authors charged with introducing idolatry to the Hindu religion: "Thus the primitive religion of the Hindus seems to have been entirely free from idolatry: for although in the Shaster we find the worship of images introduced, yet is evident, from the place itself, that it was not originally a part of the Indian religion."[124] The authors viewed all non-Christian priests – and Jesuit priests, despite their Christianity – as tricksters, for they "know how to make their advantage of the people's folly."[125] A passage concerning the Talapoy, the priests of the Lanjan (an otherwise 'civilized' people, according to the authors), speaks volumes: "This class of men are reckoned the most perfidious in all the kingdom, as well as the very dress of the people. A lazy, slothful race, and the sworn enemies of industry … They are hard-hearted and inhuman beyond expression; more merciless and cruel than wild beasts. But what can be expected from men, who sacrifice everything to their interests, and devote all their wit and vigour to debauchery."[126] To have cast off the yoke of these 'deceiving priests', then, was a mark of civilized peoples.

Another attribute which exemplified the civility of a government was the level of cultivation and land development within a state. For example, while the authors recognized the sheer size and efficiency of the Chinese state, they refused to acknowledge it as an advanced civilization. They criticized the Chinese authorities, who were supposedly unable to prevent famines despite China being "very well-endowed by nature."[127] Apart from China, it was primarily nomadic peoples who received the majority of criticism from the authors; it can hardly

[124] *UH:*IX:587, 605.
[125] *UH*:VII: 23, 169-172.
[126] Ibid. 171.
[127] *UH:*VIII:186, 279, 342, 439; Guido Abbattista, "At the Roots of the Great Divergence in Cultural Transfers in the Global 18th Century," in Matthias Middel (ed.). *Cultural Transfers, Encounters and Connections in the Global 18th Century*. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitatsverlag GmbH, 2014): 139.

be expected that a people that did not live a sedentary existence would develop their territory in the way comparable to the agrarian states in Europe.[128] An even clearer sign of an uncivilized people was the failure to exploit a land with agrarian or industrial potential. The authors frequently described lush paradises abounding in food, minerals, and other riches, while lamenting that the inhabitants had neglected to utilize their natural advantage. Not only was the failure to capitalize on natural riches a sign of barbaric peoples, the authors considered such peoples to be "lazy" and "indolent."[129] The more negative characteristics a people accrued, the lower the opinion that the authors had of it. By comparing these negative characteristics to positive ones, the authors believed they could discover the principles and attributes of the ideal civilization.

But what did this ideal civilization look like? To many contemporary writers, such as David Hume, the ideal civilization possessed perfect liberty and a stable society, which stimulated commerce and the progress of the arts and sciences. Hume was convinced that there were certain social conditions which alone were capable of sustaining the civil state – and as such, it was of vital importance to identify and maintain these conditions.[130] Hume's belief in the existence of 'the perfect conditions' for civilization echoed the views of Giambattista Vico, an Italian historian and philosopher of history. Vico was one of the earliest historians who conceived of the idea of a changeable human nature, which opened up the possibility of civil progress. History, in his seminal work *Scienza Nuovo*, was "to be the account of the succession and variety of men's experience and activity, of their continuous self-transformation from one

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[128] *UH*:VI:142, 205.
[129] *UH*:XI:322.
[130] Serge Grigoriev, "Hume and the Historicity of Human Nature," *Journal of the Philosophy of History,* 9 (2015): 130.

culture to another."[131] Later theorists such as Hume – and the authors of the *Universal History* – took Vico's cyclical idea of human changeability and fused it with their linear vision of a hierarchy among civilizations, by which they believed the states and peoples of the world could be ordered. Each different set of historical conditions became a *stage* in the history of the rise and fall of civilizations. These stages ranged from the so-called 'primitive' stage to the civilized stage, together forming what Voltaire termed *l'histoire de l'esprit humain*.[132] The authors of the *Universal History*, too, attempted to identify the different conditions conducive of civil progress, and as a result the mass of historical drudgery pertaining to political and public transactions was frequently interrupted by sections of conjectural history, of the type practiced by the Scottish historians William Robertson and Adam Ferguson.[133] Though the *Universal History* was not a conjectural history *in toto*, the many comparisons it featured were an expression of the authors' general theories which explained the progress of history on a global scale.

These generalizations and comparisons also point to a darker side of the *Universal History*. Because the authors' aspired to construct a universalist work, they ended up applying the same 'universal' standard of civilization to every state they described. The resulting standards which made possible the descriptors 'civilized' and 'barbaric' did not take into account the unique historical development and cultural particularity of the non-European peoples and states. Marnie Hughes-Warrington, an Australian historian, has argued that early-modern universal histories were "a modern, masculinist, imperial, Enlightenment project designed to depersonalize those believed to be outside the West." Such universalist attitudes caused

[131] Isaiah Berlin, "The Divorce Between The Sciences and The Humanities," *Salmagundi*, 27 (1974): 31-32.
[132] Guido Abbattista, "The Historical Thought of the French Philosophes," in José Rabasa et al., *The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 3: 1400-1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 409-12, 420.
[133] Conjectural history, rather than treating exclusively with political narrative, was organized as a "moral science" which aimed to generalize history to uncover the successive stages of human development. Phillips, *Society and Sentiment*, 171-2; David Allan, "Scottish Historical Writing of the Enlightenment." in José Rabasa et al., *The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 3: 1400-1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 505-507.

Enlightenment ideals to become “entangled with imperialist designs.” Universal history, therefore, was “deeply flawed in its treatment of colonized peoples as being outside of history, as objects, and unable to speak for themselves.”[134] Enlightenment histories aimed to place Europe at the center of world history, and consequently any world historical narrative revolved around Europe. The historical agency accorded to European actors was not similarly attributed to non-Europeans, who were portrayed as static unless Europeans acted as catalysts.[135] Though the division between volumes dedicated to Europe (27) and the rest of the world (17) might seem equitable, every single volume was intended to emphasize the effects of European power on the Americas, Asia and Africa. Throughout the *Universal History*, non-European peoples are portrayed as static; it is only when Europeans enter the scene that any form of historical change is acknowledged. And even then, it is the European that propelled this change, while a similar agency for non-Europeans is denied.[136]

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By narratively monopolizing the capacity for historical agency, the Europeans portrayed in the *Universal History* were the only civilization still capable of climbing the ladder of civilizations. Having surveyed all peoples and states of the world, the authors of the *Universal History* confidently concluded that the European states – Britain foremost – had to be positioned atop the hierarchy of civilizations. However, this conclusion confronted the authors with the

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[134] Marnie Hughes-Warrington, “Coloring Universal History: Robert Benjamin Lewis’s Light and Truth (1843) and William Wells Brown’s The Black Man (1863),” *Journal of World History*, 20.1 (Mar., 2009): 100; Udah S. Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999): 83; Jerry Bentley, “World History and Grand Narrative,” in B. Stuchtey and E. Fuchs (eds.), *Writing World History 1800-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 47-49; Groot, *Empire and History Writing,* 76.
[135] Johnson Kent Wright, “Historical Thought in the Era of the Enlightenment,” in Lloyd Kramer and Sarah Maza (eds.), *A Companion to Western Historical Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002): 127.
[136] Tamara Griggs, “Universal History from Counter-Reformation to Enlightenment,” *Modern Intellectual History,* 4.2 (2007): 236-237.

difficult question of how the 'Rise of Europe' had come about in the first place. Even though the authors were all in agreement that Europeans deserved to be recognized as the most civilized civilization, they could hardly deny the less-than-admirable past from which the European nations had risen. From the very first volume, which concerned the rise of the Islamic Caliphate in the seventh century, the authors emphasized the despicable state of Europe during the medieval period. In true Enlightenment fashion, they portrayed the period between the Fall of the Roman Empire and the Renaissance as a Dark Age in which one could hardly speak of civilization as it existed in the East. Only since the fifteenth century, they noted, had Europe undergone profound changes and improved greatly.

Since then, the authors argued, the Europeans had outdone all their rivals and ascended to the top of the global order. Nevertheless, this meteoric rise still had to be rationally explained. The loss of Providence as a causal agent barred the authors from explaining the rise of Europe by simply stating that Europeans were 'favored' by God. They could not argue that historical change was effected through God's will, providing the impetus that made it possible for states to evolve from the primitive state into successive levels of civilization.[137] Without a divine force to catalyze historical movement, the authors – like many other Enlightenment theorists – had to take recourse in another principle, which was called *progress*. It was progress that made historical movement possible, either towards the civilized ideal or from it. [138] The focus of world history shifted to the competition of nations and empires, which led to both victors and vanquished. History came to tell "the story of the rise and fall of such civilizations."[139] The

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[137] Brown, *The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage,* 32.
[138] Wright, "Historical Thought," 130; Barraclough, "Universal History," 84; Dan Smail, "In the Grip of Sacred History," *The American Historical Review*, 110.5 (Dec., 2005): 1340.
[139] Ernst Breisach, *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval & Modern* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007 [1983]): 183, 205; Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, 199,218.

theme of progress and decline, then, was at the heart of the central thesis of the *Universal History*.[140]

But what is progress, and how did it work? Under what conditions could progress take place? These were the questions with which the authors of the *Universal History* were concerned. Progress, to them, was "the belief in the movement over time of some aspect or aspects of human existence, within a social setting, toward a better condition."[141] Progress could not be a 'natural' thing that 'just' happened, like historical change catalyzed by God's will. Without being able to rely on terms such as 'God' or 'Providence,' it became increasingly difficult for eighteenth-century commentators to narrate the "passage from primitive to nonprimitive." For what guaranteed this passage?[142] Clearly, existing ideas of the nature and working of civilizational progress had to be reimagined. This gave rise to many contemporary theories, which attempted to explain the principle by which societies could become civilized. Lord Kames, for example, theorized that the American natives did not progress because they

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[140] The question of progress was related to the early-modern intellectual debate known as the conflict between the Ancients and the Moderns. The former group of intellectuals conceived of history as having *degenerated* from the golden age of the ancients, whereas the latter group believed that history had *progressed* since then and that the moderns were capable of greatness too. Manning, *Navigating World History*, 20; David Spadafora and James Spada, *The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990): 27-8.

For example, the Scottish historian William Robertson once wrote that "in every part of the earth, the progress of man hath been nearly the same; and we can trace him in his career from the rude simplicity of savage life, until he attains the industry, the arts, and the elegance of polished society." Ben Dew and Fiona Price, *Historical Writing in Britain, 1688-1830* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): 119; William Robertson, *History of America.* 3 vols. (London/Edinburgh: Strahan, Cadell & Balfour, 1777-92);

Another eighteenth-century historian, Friedrich von Schilling, applied the progression narrative to universal history as a genre. Like Robertson, he considered the uncivilized nations outside of Europe to be reflections of "the lost beginning of our race." Mankind – especially Europe – had progressed far since its humble origins. Universal historians, according to von Schilling, tasked themselves with the quest to identify the historical factors that had contributed to "the contemporary state of the world and on the condition of the generation now alive…" But the downside of this approach, he pointed out, was that the universal historian worked *backwards*, whereas "the real series of events descends from the origin of things to their most recent state" (*forwards*). Friedrich von Schiller, "The Nature and Value of Universal History: An Inaugural Lecture [1789]" History and Theory 11.3 (1972): 325, 331.

[141] Spadafora and Spada, *The idea of progress*, 6; Guido Abbattista, "The Historical Thought of the French Philosophes," in José Rabasa et al., *The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 3: 1400-1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 409;

[142] Brown, *The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage,* 44.

lacked sufficient sexual drive. Ferguson believed that European society became civilized because they were "by their nature let loose from the trammels of instinct."[143] Hume, too, believed that there was nothing supernatural at work in history that pushed human history towards the civilized ideal.[144]

The idea that progress was a *historical* process, implying change – and not stasis – changed the European conception of stability. For a long time, Europeans had admired the longevity of the ancient Eastern empires, in particular China. The *Universal History*, however, was one of the first historical works in eighteenth-century Britain that was openly critical of China and its apparent immobility.[145] As far as the authors were concerned, perennial stability was *not* a virtue. While the Chinese had long maintained an advanced civilization, they had ultimately failed to stop the decline of their civilization, exemplified by the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644 CE.[146] The authors wrote: "the wonder will rather be, how they came, after so long and glorious a continuance, to degenerate so far from their valour and politics, as to suffer their whole country to be overrun and conquered, and their monarchy overturned, in almost as few years as it has stood thousands."[147] The authors concluded that the Chinese had made the mistake of clinging to tradition, rendering them unwilling to change or to make the necessary improvements. This was especially true for the sciences, symbolized by the prestigious but aging imperial observatory in Beijing, whose astronomers were rather "fond… of their old defective

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[143] Robert Woklet, "Anthropology and Conjectural History in the Enlightenment," in Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Woklet (eds.), *Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995): 41; Adam Ferguson, *History of Civil Society* (1767)
[144] Grigoriev, "Hume and the Historicity of Human Nature," 131.
[145] Abbattista, "At the Roots of the 'Great Divergence'," 138-9; Anthony Pagden, "The Immobility of China: *Orientalism and Occidentalism in the Enlightenment*," in Larry Wolff, Marco Cipolloni (eds.), *The Anthropology of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007): 57-60.
[146] In the 1640s, Ming China was invaded by the Manchus who, in 1644, established the Qing Dynasty (which lasted until 1911). The Manchus, being 'Tartar' people, were less capable of civilized rule in the eyes of the authors.
[147] *UH*:VIII:15.

[instruments].”[148] In conclusion, the authors of the *Universal History* argued that a civilization in stasis could not last; and that all nations of the world, including China, *had to* labor to improve their country by embracing progress. Only then could these peoples become ‘historical’; only then could they reach and maintain an ideal civilization.

Only the Europeans did the authors characterize as distinctly ‘historical,’ since it was the Europeans alone who were supposedly moving towards the civilized ideal. The rest of the world remained frozen in time and history, trapped in a barbarous past.[149] Since progress now constituted the only key to achieve an ideal civilization, modern history came to narrate the story that aimed to capture this development. History was to uncover “the enemies of progress” during each period of human history and explain how these ‘enemies’ were (or could have been) routed from existence.[150] An important facet of the idea of effecting progress was that it could only be achieved through collective action in a state. The failure to maintain the required material conditions that made progress possible, doomed the state to a fate of inevitable decline.[151] This was, according to the authors of the *Universal History*, the mistake made by the non-Europeans. The perceived inability of non-Europeans to embrace progress was precisely the reason why they had failed to keep up with the Europeans. The modern world order placed Europe firmly above what the authors considered less-civilized societies, a feat which the authors largely attributed to the incredible increase of knowledge available to Europeans. Furthermore, their ‘superior’ form of state, commerce, culture, customs, religion and science allowed Europe to progress beyond the non-European. The authors did not think that such advanced forms of civilization existed

[148] *UH*:VIII:29.
[149] Jennifer Pitts, “The Global in Enlightenment Historical Thought,” in Prasenjit Duara, Viren Murthy, and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *A Companion to Global Historical Thought* (Malden: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2014): 190.
[150] Berlin, “The Divorce,” 21; Carrithers, “The Enlightenment Science of Society,” 246.
[151] Ibid. 236.

outside of Europe in their time. Instead, if they acknowledged non-Europeans to have developed civilized states, they placed these firmly in the non-European past. No wonder, then, that the authors portrayed most non-European states and peoples as having degenerated from a past age of flourishing. This pattern recurs in nearly all descriptions of non-European peoples, civilizations, and societies. Take, for example, the description of the Rajput caste, of which the authors wrote that it had gone through three stages: flourishing, decline, and present state.[152] Religion had little to do with such portrayals. The African Kingdom of Abyssinia [i.e. Ethiopia], which the authors readily conceded was once a prosperous Christian kingdom, had "been long since laid under the thickest darkness of ignorance and superstition…"[153]

At the bottom of the hierarchy one could find the so-called 'primitive' or 'savage' peoples, who had 'utterly' failed to make any form of progress at all. The 'primitive' peoples represented a stage of humanity *nearest* to its original primitive state; but why would the authors have had to include these peoples in their study of progress? The reason for this was that the primitive and the 'savage' both became a mirror of Europe's own past; they became "an anterior form of the European…"[154] Primitive peoples were both pre-and not-European; and therefore, to understand the entire range of progress from primitiveness to civility, to truly gain universal *Weltkenntnis*, the authors included so-called primitive or savage states and peoples in their historical narrative. They constituted the 'bottom' of the hierarchy, the literal bottom-line by which the progress of 'more-advanced' peoples could be measured. At points, the authors' characterization of non-European peoples comes across as prejudiced against anyone but Europeans. Indeed, the extreme derogatory language used against non-European – and especially

152 *UH*:VI:255.
153 *UH*:XIV:29.
154 Brown, *The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage*, 69-70.

African, Australian and North-American – peoples, may easily be interpreted as a form of systematic racism, propelled by the authors' distorted view of non-European societies. Despite their harsh language, however, the authors' characterizations of non-Europeans were not racially motivated (though they were certainly biased).

One question worth asking is whether the authors *truly* treated both non-Europeans and Europeans according to a similar standard. One could make the case that an innate prejudice predicated on some 'inherent biological disadvantage' would immediately skew the balance in favor of European peoples; and that, in essence, the authors gave preferential treatment to Europeans. However, the problem with characterizing the authors' portrayal of non-Europeans as 'racist' is that doing so has the unfortunate side-effect of distorting our understanding of what motivated their portrayals in the first place. The term 'race' in the eighteenth century pertained to 'lineage' (derived from the French word: *une race* ~ 'shared origin'); it was not yet based on skin color or physiognomy.[155] Even though, in the words of historian Nicolas Hudson, "European explorers certainly imagined themselves as superior to all the peoples they encountered…, this sense of superiority was founded not on a race hierarchy, but on the belief that Europeans had achieved a level of civilization unknown in other nations." It was only around the end of the eighteenth century that notions of race were infused with the narrative of progress, which had become standard by 1790. Only then was the term race appropriated by science to describe groups thought to share a common origin, culture, or location. And only then was race connected to biological and genetic properties that supposedly explained an inherent

[155] Bronwen Douglas, "Climate to Crania: Science and the Racialization of Human Difference," in Bronwen Douglas and Chris Ballard (ed.), *Foreign Bodies: Oceania and the Science of Race 1750-1940* (Canberra, *ANU* E Press, 2008): 34-35; In the words of Maupertuis: As a matter of fact it is most likely that the difference between whiteness and blackness, which is so apparent to our eyes, is but a slight thing in nature." *The Early Venus,* 76-7.

inferiority in the natural constitution of non-European peoples.[156] No such conception of race, however, exists in the *Universal History*. Though different climates clearly resulted in physical differences in their inhabitants, the authors were convinced that such differences did not deny any people from making progress.[157]

It was not the authors' belief in a perceived qualitative difference between Europeans and non-Europeans, or different 'races', that motivated their criticisms. Rather, it was precisely because they *did not* see a difference between European and non-European peoples in their *potential* to achieve an ideal civilization. Though some peoples had admittedly been more successful in this than others, the authors believed in the universal capacity of progress that applied to all of humanity. Conversely, they believed that all peoples – Europeans included – were capable of uncivilized or 'barbaric' acts. There are several instances in the *Universal History* in which the authors criticized Europeans for failing to meet universal standards of the ideal civilization. The Portuguese, for example, were lambasted for not having developed the city of Diu (India) better, meaning that many potential riches remained unexploited.[158] Far worse was a Dutch ship crew under Jacob Roggeveen, who landed on Easter Island in 1721. Though the Dutch were hospitably received by the natives, the Dutch nevertheless commenced hostilities. The actions of the Dutch were strongly denounced by the authors of the *Universal History*: "No arguments, indeed, can palliate the conduct of the *Dutch* on this occasion; for it appeared equally

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[156] Groot, *Empire and History Writing in Britain,* 57, 84.
[157] The idea that climate determined everything from a people's physical appearance, to their social norms and form of state was called *climatological determinism*. One recurring motif in the *UH* concerned the apparent 'indolence' of the natives of hot climates. The reason for this, explained the authors, was that the inhabitants of hotter climates, where natural resources were plenty, induced the natives to a less 'active' existence; in other words, they became "lazy" and marred with "indolence." Even so, the authors believed that even peoples in this state had the potential to make progress; it would simply require more effort, or – perhaps – outside help by, to no one's surprise, the Europeans. Jim Egan "The "Long'd-for Aera" of an "Other Race": Climate, Identity, and James Grainger's "The Sugar-Cane"," *Early American Literature,* 38.2 (2003): 189.
[158] *UH*:VI:218-219.

devoid of religion, humanity, and policy, too much akin to that brutal pride and over-weening insolence they had shewn in all their settlements in the *Indies*, both to natives and *Europeans*."[159] One last example concerned Indian astronomers, who, according to the authors of the *Universal History* were prone to ascribe supernatural causes to occurrences that could easily be explained by European science. The passage described how, when an eclipse would occur, spectating Indians jumped in the rivers and shouted prayers to the sky. The authors concluded, however, that "Europeans have no reason to laugh at this folly and superstition of the Hindus[, for] they were formerly as deeply immersed in it as they."[160] Though clearly intended to mock the superstition of the Indian people, this passage simultaneously reminded the European reader of their own ignorant past. There was nothing innate in Europeans that made them superior over non-Europeans; and if they failed to uphold the ideal of civilization, they were destined to share the same fate as the non-European states.

The level of civilization was thus not attributed to the biological or natural constitution of a people but rather to socio-political factors and other material circumstances. The authors determined a people's position on the ladder of civilizations not based on race, but rather by evaluating its type of government, the degree to which commerce, industry and science were developed, and their religious persuasion. Overall, the authors are markedly less critical of the Persian, Indian, and Asian states when compared to the peoples of Australia, Africa and the Americas. But despite the authors' rather strong criticism of the Australian people in particular, they readily conceded that the Australian natives "are equally capable" making progress as any

[159] *UH*:XI:334-340.
[160] *UH*:VI:274-275.

other people.[161] It was the responsibility of both European and non-European states to improve their material circumstances, to embrace progress, and labor towards the ideal of civilization.

Labor was key, however; laziness was inacceptable, as far as the authors were concerned. For example, note the following distinction between "laborious" and "lazy" African peoples: "It will not be improper to remind our readers, that what we have said of the indolence and want of genius and industry of the native *Africans* extends no farther than to those who inhabit the inland parts; those who live on the coasts and maritime parts, having been long since allured to a more active and laborious life, as well as civilized in their manners, by their frequent commerce with the *Europeans* and other strangers."[162] Nevertheless, the authors were not convinced that it was equally *likely* for each people to make the first steps toward progress independently. Though the coastal Africans were more actively engaged in commerce and industry, the authors attributed this solely to the influence of the Europeans.

A more insidious consequence of the conclusion that non-Eurasian peoples were equally capable of achieving civilization was that, in the views of the authors, there was no longer any excuse for their perceived backwardness. The path toward civilization was the only rational and logical way forward, and it was inexcusable that peoples outside Eurasia had 'failed' to move

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[161] *UH*:XI:296-8. Though that is not to say the commerce driven by the Moluccans originated in mutual consent. The authors, nevertheless, believed the Moluccans had made great progress through their commerce with the Europeans and had developed an adequate spice production.

[162] *UH*:XIV:32. I should point out that the authors are *not* here euphemistically expressing their support for the practice of slavery as a means to 'allure' Africans to an 'active' life. In fact, the authors opposed slavery as an institution, believing it to be an impediment to the capacity of African peoples to make progress. This was most eloquently expressed by Tobias Smollett, one of the authors of the *UH,* in one of his reviews of the volumes concerning African history: "We will only observe, that an African has perhaps more reason to characterize the Europeans the most inhuman, perfidious, artful, fottish, and brutal set of men under the heavens, were they to deduce a general character from the infinite number of particulars they must have collected from the conduct of our sailors and traders; and possibly the custom of purchasing, stealing, and kidnapping slaves, and our barbarous usage of them, reflects more dishonour on the human species, than any law or custom to be met among the most uncivilized nations of Africa. We are blessed with the lights of Christianity, of morality, and science, consequently less excuseable in permitting violence so opposite to nature and religion, however consistent with the laws of policy and interest." Tobias Smollett, "The Modern Part of the *Universal History*," *Critical Review* 9 (1760): 82-3.

away from barbarity. The inland African peoples were not less capable of progress than their coastal neighbors, but were simply unwilling to overcome their "national repugnance" to labor.[163] The state of Africa was "destitute" but more "thro' their stupidity and negligence" than "any defect" in the country itself.[164] The authors complained that despite the growing number of Europeans that had settled in Africa, 'modern' industry had failed to develop among the locals – especially the inland peoples: "[T]hey are naturally too proud and indolent to learn industry from a parcel of indigent despicable strangers, whom extreme poverty and want forces to abandon their native country," the authors lamented.[165] It is this same 'national indolence' that the authors believed to explain the progress – or lack thereof – of the indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia and Australia, exemplified by the fact that the local men let women and slaves do all the work. As a result, the authors almost invariably equated the inhabitants of Africa, Southeast Asia and Australia with savage, lawless peoples; living like brute animals, naked, without religion or commerce.[166]

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In conclusion, the creation of a universal hierarchy of civilizations had profound implications. The authors' conception of progress allowed for only one road forward, mirroring the traditional Christian conception of a linear timeline.[167] The *Universal History* singled out each geographic region to assess the extent to which it had progressed in the same way as

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[163] *UH*:XIV:32.
[164] *UH*:XIV:2.
[165] *UH*:XIV:29-30.
[166] *UH*:XI:290, 293, 295, 306.
[167] Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, 199, 218; Breisach, *Historiography*, 205.

Europe, judged along a European standard, and compared to European successes. It was Europe that crowned the resulting hierarchy of states as the pinnacle of modern civilization. Arguably this was a race that non-European peoples could not win, because the categories that determined the level of civilization were decidedly Eurocentric – and Europe, naturally, surpassed all in being itself.[168] Did the authors, however, view the rise of Europe as inevitable? Was progress the product of the passage of time itself? Indeed, the authors appeared to be entertaining ideas akin to historicism, the idea that history progresses based on historical laws.[169]

Because Europe had developed all the characteristics of the ideal civilization, according to the authors, it became the hegemon of the civilized world. The standards by which the authors measured European *progress* became *universal*; they, therefore, applied to the Europeans as well as the Africans, Asians and Americans, even though they had been derived from the historical self-reflection of European intellectuals.[170] The essentially laudable practice of including non-European sources in their narratives – many of which had never been published in Western historiography before – also had the effect of giving the authors a monopoly on the historical narration of non-European history. By crystalizing the historical movement of non-Europeans, their histories were rendered static, leaving only Europeans as active agents of historical

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[168] Abbattista, "Towards a Publishing History," 19. Or, in the words of contemporary academic Adam Ferguson: "The greater part [of nations] have chosen themselves, as at once, the judges and the models of what is excellent in their kind, are first in their own opinion, and give to others consideration or eminence, so far only as they approach to their own condition." Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*. 4th ed. (London: printed for T. Caddel et al., 1773): 341.

[169] Wayne Hudson, "Theology and historicism," *Thesis Eleven,* 116.1 (2013): 20; Jacques Bos, "Nineteenth-century historicism and its predecessors: historical experience, historical ontology and historical method," in R. Bod, J. Maat and T. Weststeijn (eds.), *The making of the humanities. – Vol. 2: From early modern to modern disciplines* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012): 131; F.R. Ankersmit, "Historicism: An Attempt at Synthesis," *History and Theory*, 34.3 (Oct., 1995): 133, 143-144, 150; As opposed to the "irrational forces [that were] still gripping the [non-European] societies," Breisach, *Historiography,* 206.

[170] Groot, *Empire and History Writing in Britain*, 76.

change.[171] World history, as such, became European history writ large, for Europe had become the world.

To illustrate the extent to which the authors of the *Universal History* believed that their work exhaustively treated the history of the entire world, one can consider this excerpt from a review written by Tobias Smollett – one of the authors – after the publication of the first three volumes in 1759:

> We are astonished, when we reflect that a set of private booksellers could be found to engage in such an enterprize; and still more amazed, that they should find authors to execute their plan with any degree of uniformity and precision. Let it then be remembered, for the honour of the undertakers, that they have atchieved a work not unworthy of the most eminent and learned academy that ever flourished in Europe; that they have extracted the essence of all that has been written on the subject; and produced one composition, that, in some measure, *has rendered all other histories extant, useless and unnecessary*.[172]

The universal approach the authors of the *Universal History* took allowed them to dismiss those histories deemed 'too unimportant' to be included in the general narrative. The worldview that classed the nations of the world into a hierarchy of civilization, while positing that historical change could be possible only through civilizational progress, became central to the genre of universal history.[173] Instead of an exposition of Biblical Providence, universal history as presented by the authors, would address the central historical question of how (European) nations could rise to the top of the civil hierarchy, while others stayed behind or declined. Despite the endless criticism the authors subjected the non-European nations to, their

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[171] Brett Bowden, "The "Idea" of Universal History: What the Owl Head, the Angel Saw, and the Idiot Said." *New Global Studies*, 11.3 (2017): 201; Hughes-Warrington, "Coloring Universal History," 104.
[172] James G. Basker, *Tobias Smollett: Critic and Journalist* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1988): 141-2; Tobias Smollett, "The Modern Part of the *Universal History*," *Critical Review,* 7 (Jan., 1759): 1-2.
[173] Barraclough, "Universal History," 84.

message was clear: each and *every* state or people had the capacity to overcome any natural or cultural barriers and embark on the path of progress. There was no reason, no excuse to be made, to explain a people's inability to create the correct conditions that facilitated progress, as the Europeans had done. Universal progress, in a word, was a distinct reality. The hierarchy of civilizations, with Europe at the top, was not merely a system of ranking: it was a roadmap, with exemplary civilizations at the top leading the way.

Setting up the hierarchy and introducing the principle of progress, however, was merely the first step. For the categorization of the world was not enough to make the *Universal History* 'universal'. Universal history, after all, was not about including every historical fact, but rather selecting the most important facts and arranging these into a general, universal narrative. For the *Universal History*, this narrative concerned progress, and specifically that of the European states. However, the authors still had to explain the nature of the principle of 'progress' and the conditions that facilitated its existence. There were a wide variety of characteristics, ranging from religion, 'perfect liberty', and form of state, to agriculture, social norms and military prowess that the authors considered in their dealings with the different states of the world. Though all these played a role in determining a state's rank in the civilizational hierarchy, the authors viewed two other characteristics as the most important. Indeed, there were two central themes that the authors addressed throughout the *Universal History*, themes that they intimately linked to the operation of progress. It was these two themes that were the key to unlocking civilizational progress, to render a people 'historical': *Commerce*, and *Science*. Both themes were integral to the central thesis of the *Universal History*, for they made possible the meteoric rise of Europe. In addition, they were closely linked, as the increase in commerce necessarily

preceded the advancement of science. How the authors envisioned the working of this process is the subject of Chapters 2 and 3.

CHAPTER II – COMMERCE

The creation of the hierarchy of civilizations, based on a universal, Eurocentric standard of civilization, allowed the authors to rank and organize all states and peoples in the world. This ranking was not a static chain, but rather a dynamic ladder along which states could move towards and from the civilized ideal. The historical movement on the ladder of civilization, as explained in the previous chapter, was called *progress*. This chapter, then, intends to explain the manner by which nations could rise – and fall – across the civilizational ladder of the *Universal History*. Since the historical rise of Europe, the central thesis of the *Proposal* of the *Universal History*, coincided with the decline and fall of non-European empires, the authors had to explain the nature of "the rise and progress of [the European] nations," and the precise *means* by which the Europeans had been accorded a "superiority to all, and the command over many nations, in the other parts of the globe."[174] Of the many themes explored in the *Universal History*, the authors highlighted *Commerce* as the key to civilizational progress. Even though the narrative structure of the *Universal History* essentially locked each nation and people in their position on the civilizational ladder, commerce provided a means of mobility. In other words, nothing was fixed; the commercial disposition of a nation could – and would – change over time, and along with it its position in the global hierarchy. I will argue that commerce, given its alleged ability to civilize the state, occupied a central position in the authors ' conception of progress. This chapter, then, will concern itself with the meaning of 'commerce', which is central to explaining the nature of progress in the *Universal History*.

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[174] *Proposals for Publishing the Modern Part of the Universal History* (London: printed for T. Osborne et al., 1758): 15-16.

The authors ' theory of commerce, like so many ideas that were thought to be self-evident, is nowhere completely spelled out, save for two exceptions: Volumes X-XI and XXXVIII-XLI. The key to understanding the significance of commerce, then, lies within these volumes. Though the authorship of most volumes in the *Universal History* is shrouded in mystery, these volumes are a fortunate exception. There is good reason to believe that the volumes in question were (predominantly) written by the Scotsman John Campbell (1708-1775).[175] Of all the authors of the *Universal History*, Campbell was perhaps in the best position to comment on the nature of commerce and the progress of commercial nations. He wrote several tracts on maritime commerce in his early career in which he laid out his economic theories. These theories carried over into his work for the *Universal History*, reflected in the volumes X-XI and XXXVIII-XLI. Campbell's contributions to the *Universal History* are at the center of this narrative because it was Campbell who most clearly articulated the essence of commerce and role it played in the civilizational progress of states. Campbell argued that commerce was the driving force behind the British empire, its prosperity, and its success.

As with several contemporary thinkers, Campbell propagated the notion that commerce had the capacity to civilize or 'polish' a people, a perspective now known as the *doux-commerce*

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[175] The volumes in question pertain to the history of the European trading companies in Asia, and the History of the Americas. The idea that Campbell may be the author of these volumes was first suggested by the historian Guido Abbattista, who has studied the works of Campbell as well as the publishing history of the *UH*. Guido Abbattista, "The English *Universal History*: Publishing, Authorship and Historiography in an European Project (1736-1790)," *Storia della Storiografia*, 39 (2001): 104; For a more extensive overview of John Campbell's economic thought, see Matthew W. Binney, "Personal Identity and Tory Commercialism in John Campbell's *The Travels and Adventures of Edward Brown* (1739)," *Journeys,* 19.1 (2018): 27-51 and Guido Abbattista, *Commercio, colonie e impero alla vigilia della Rivoluzione americana: John Campbell pubblicista e storico nell'Inghilterra del sec. XVIII* (Florence: LS Olschki, 1990). Even though Campbell most likely authored these volumes, that does not rule out potential influence from other authors , such as Tobias Smollett, with whom Campbell edited the *UH*. From Smollett's correspondence it appears that he most likely provided the last chapters of Vol. XI concerning the history of Australia, while Campbell wrote the rest of the volume. Louis L. Martz, "Tobias Smollett and the Universal History," *Modern Language Notes*, 56.1 (Jan., 1941): 5.

theory.[176] However, beyond mere polishing of the manners, Campbell argued for the existence of a direct link between commerce and the intellectual development of a people as well as the individual mind. This intellectual improvement made possible progress in the arts and sciences, the requirement of all 'civilized' nations, which will be discussed in chapter three. The beneficial effects of commerce were not reserved to Europeans alone; rather, they extended towards all peoples of the world, if only those peoples would engage in commercial intercourse with the world. Commerce, therefore, served as the first step towards improving any nation's position on the ladder of civilization within the framework of the *Universal History*.

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According to Samuel Johnson, the word 'Commerce', in the eighteenth-century English language, signified two things: (1) "Intercourse; exchange of one thing for another; interchange of anything; trade; traffick." (2) "Common or familiar intercourse" between individuals.[177] Commerce was thus the benevolent goddess who bestowed upon her worshippers all the luxuries and pleasures that the Earth had to offer. To Campbell, a contemporary of Johnson, commerce represented "the master-wheel which put[s] in motion all the rest..."[178] The increased attention given to commerce during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was part of a larger reconceptualization of the meaning and nature of 'wealth', which had hitherto lacked a conclusive definition. It was common belief, until the seventeenth century, that gold and silver

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[176] Matthew Binney, "Interest, Trade and 'Character and Circumstances': John Campbell's (1708-1775) Earlier Work," *History of European Ideas*, 42.4 (2016): 516-19; Binney furthermore explained that Campbells unique commercial theory blended "Old Whig" arguments (Charles Davenant) and "new Whig" arguments pertaining to progress (Daniel Defoe) with John Locke and Bolingbroke's Tory commercialism to create "a distinctive commercial theory that prioritizes the recognition of the interest and circumstances of all nations and peoples within an unconstrained and reciprocal exchange of commodities in order for the home nation simultaneously to resist corruption and flourish." Ibid. 516.
[177] Samuel Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language*, 2 vols. (London: 1755), "Commerce".
[178] *UH*:XI:245.

were the most valuable resources that one could acquire. However, by the mid-eighteenth century, it had become abundantly clear that the possession of gold and silver mines alone was not sufficient to enrich a nation. Seventeenth-century theorists had misunderstood the nature of wealth, thinking it to consist in bullion. Instead, such diverse economic thinkers as the humbly-born Irishman Richard Cantillon and the nobly-born Frenchman Montesquieu argued, wealth consisted solely in *labor* and *land*.[179] Likewise, the Scotsman Adam Smith, in the *Wealth of Nations*, conclusively showed that gold and silver prices were not correlated with the wealth or poverty of a society.[180] The move away from bullion marked a decisive shift in economic thought on wealth, and, furthermore, gave a new importance to industry and commerce. Indeed, as the authors of the *Universal History* remarked: "Industry and parsimony are always the best mines; and they alone have raised to the highest pitch of affluence every nation cultivating them…. Commerce is of itself the richest mine."[181]

This novel attention to the value of commercial enterprise changed the measure by which different civilizations could be compared. For one, the authors preferred commercial nations over bellicose aggressors. Clearly, by that standard, the Spanish Empire – the archrival of the British Empire – could no longer be considered the pinnacle of civilization by the eighteenth century in the hierarchy of civilizations that the authors had constructed. The Spanish had failed to capitalize on the natural potential of their territory, while they had focused on conquest over commerce. In doing so, the authors argued, the Spanish had strayed from the ideal civilization. Besides war, the failure to capitalize on the natural resources of nature was a mark of 'sloth' and

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[179] Richard Cantillon, *An Essay on Economic Theory*. Chantal Saucier (trans.), Mark Thornton (ed.) (Auburn (AL): Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2010): 21, 98.

[180] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (São Paulo: Metalibri, 2007 [1776]): 191.

[181] Jeremy Jennings, "The Debate about Luxury in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 68.1 (Jan., 2007): 85; *UH*:X:254; *UH*:XXXVIII:1.

'laziness', according to the authors . This criticism was used especially toward the peoples that lived under tropical or arctic conditions. As I explained in the first Chapter, the authors ' belief in climatological determinism persuaded them that the bounty and heat of countries in the torrid zone induced indolence in natives, while temperate climates stimulated industriousness in its inhabitants. By casting wealth as labor, the authors could "claim cultural and moral superiority" over non-Europeans who lived in a state of indolence, and, as such, mark them as potential targets for British Empire.[182] Commerce and Empire had become inextricably linked in eighteenth-century Britain, and many thinkers – the authors included – deliberated on the nature of this relationship, and the consequences that commerce had for the future of the state.

To eighteenth-century Britons, the British Empire appeared not as a continuous colored area on an early map, but rather as a series of territories linked by commerce which centered upon the political center, London.[183] Through these links, trust between the different components was established, both between Britain and its colonies, as well as within the British Isles themselves. Even so, there was no defined 'British' identity associated with the Empire. This identity did not immediately arise as a result of the Union between England and Scotland in 1707, or the Jacobite Revolt in 1745, but would only gradually develop throughout the eighteenth century, especially as a result of the almost continuous warfare between Britain and France in the latter half of the eighteenth century.[184] Though ostensibly political in nature, these wars were often waged in the context of empire; and the possession of colonies and commercial success were at stake. Empire and the imperial economy linked the interest of Scotland, Ireland

[182] Julia Simon, "Commerce, Property and the Ethics of Trade in Bougainville's *Voyage autour du monde*." *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 31.1 (2008): 143-4.
[183] Natasha Glaisyer, "Networking: Trade and Exchange in the Eighteenth-Century British Empire," *The Historical Journal*, 47.2 (Jun., 2004): 458-62.
[184] Charles Ludington, *The politics of wine in Britain: a new cultural history* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 116, 164, 173-5, 178; Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1992): 3-7.

and England, even as politics and religion divided them.[185] The British Empire, then, became "an empire of the seas centered on trade."[186] Indeed, the British preoccupation with trade was not accidental; for commerce served as the very foundation for its continuing survival as an independent state; nor could the British colonies develop without the commercial aid of Britain.[187]

Throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century, the 'natural' archenemies Britain and France were almost continuously at war with one another. In 1744, Britain and France stood on opposite sides during the War of Austrian Succession (1740-48), while less than a decade afterward, a new war, the Seven Years' War (1756-63)[188] broke out in which Britain and France fought a titanic struggle for global maritime dominance. Following the Seven Years' War, France and Britain would again meet during the War of American Independence (1775-83) and the Revolutionary Wars (1793-1802;1803-15). Throughout this period, Britons were fearful of the looming threat of French invasion (coupled with the perennial possibility of Jacobite insurgence, at least until c. 1750).[189] In the midst of what has been called the 'seventy-years' war

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[185] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English state, 1688-1783* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989): xx-xxi, 191-2; Colley, *Britons*, 55-6; Glaisyer, "Networking," 459-60;
In the words of the authors of the *UH*: "For the interests and commerce of the British empire are so inseparably united, that they may be very well considered as one and the same. For commerce is that tie, by which the several, and even the most distant parts of the empire, are connected and kept together, so as to be rendered parts of the same whole, and to receive not only countenance and protection, but warmth and nourishment from the vital parts of our government, of which, if we may be indulged so figurative an expression, our monarchy is the head, and our liberty the soul. Whatever therefore assists, promotes, and extends our commerce, is consistent with our interest." *UH*:XLIII:583.

[186] Anthony Page, "The Seventy Years War, 1744-1815, and Britain's Fiscal-Naval State." *War & Society,* 34.3 (Aug., 2015): 163.

[187] Voltaire, "On Commerce," in *The Works of Voltaire. A Contemporary Version. A Critique and Biography by John Morley, notes by Tobias Smollett,* vol. XIX. William F. Fleming (trans.) (New York: E.R. DuMont, 1901): 16; Alain Clément, "Liberal economic discourse on colonial practices and the rejection of the British Empire (1750-1815)," *History of Economic Thought*, 21.4 (2014): 585; The nature of British maritime differed from traditional land empires in that "territories came more and more to be seen as fungible demographic and economic resources, rather than as bundles of dynastic rights." John Shovlin, "War and Peace: Trade, International Competition, and Political Economy," in Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind, *Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire* (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014): 317.

[188] Alternatively known as the French and Indian War.

[189] Page, "The Seventy Years War," 164; Brewer, *The Sinews of Power,* 191.

with France, Britain needed to develop adequate means of defending itself. Instrumental to British security was the creation of the fiscal-military state, which entailed "high taxes, a growing and well-organized civil administration, a standing army and the determination to act as major European power."[190] The eighteenth-century expansion of the British state coincided with the centralization of the tax system and a growing bureaucracy, instrumental for the central organization of war and taxation.[191] These developments gave the Hanoverian state an edge vis-à-vis France, being able to efficiently collect financial resources from its population. Potential opposition to tax increases were avoided by British officials by predominantly taxing the exchange of goods and services through the excise and customs tax. Since an increase in commerce meant an increase in taxable revenues, the survival of the British fiscal-military state depended for a large part upon the fortune of commerce.[192]

This phenomenon was observed by contemporaries as well, such as the Scottish political economist Adam Anderson (1692-1765), who argued that "only states that embraced commerce could raise revenues to cover the cost of expensive modern military technologies, and this meant that competition for markets, or 'Jealousy of Trade', was the defining feature of the eighteenth century."[193] The result was that the so-called 'Blue-Water' policy predominated in British foreign policy, gearing Britain's political energies towards securing commerce, trade and colonies.[194] Even though empire was not a primary goal of the blue-water policy, the acquisition

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[190] Simon Deveraux, "The Historiography of the English State During 'The Long Eighteenth Century': Part Two – Fiscal-Military and Nationalist Perspectives," *History Compass*, 8.8 (2010): 843; Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, xiv -xx,

[191] Brewer, *The Sinews of Power*, 127-8.

[192] Deveraux, "The Historiography of the English State," 844-6.

[193] Paul Tonks, "British Union and Empire in the *Origin of Commerce*: Adam Anderson as Eighteenth-Century Historian and Scottish Political Economist," *History*, 105.364 (2020): 60-1, 63-4; Shovlin, "War and Peace," 306; Daniel Baugh, "Great-Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689-1815," *The International History Review*, 10.1 (Feb., 1988): 41.

[194] Baugh, "Great-Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy," 34, 40; John Campbell, likewise, was a staunch defender of the Blue-Water policy. Matthew Binney referred to Campbell's politico-economic ideology as "Tory commercialism",

of foreign territory could be a means to an end wherever necessary. Colonies, after all, were not mere trade posts for trade, but also served the political function of extending empire and guaranteeing British sovereignty – and, thereby, commerce, abroad.[195] The security of the British nation, therefore, came to depend on commerce; and liberty, in turn, upon national security. British theorists had recognized that their liberty could be reconciled with empire through political economy, by making commerce a matter of state. The "value of trade rested not necessarily in itself but in its service to the commonwealth."[196] In sum, the identity of the British empire was shaped by commercial interests, which legitimized the imperial conquests while preserving British ideals of freedom and liberty. The British empire, in the words of historian David Armitage, was "Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free."[197]

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The idea that commerce could stand at the foundations of the British state was not one that was immediately accepted when it was first articulated. For the scores of authors who argued that the greatness and happiness of a state were directly related to the commercial fortune of that

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which consisted of a blue-water policy, unconstrained trade and a developed navy which upheld the commercial interests of Britain (as opposed to continental interests). Matthew W. Binney, "Personal Identity and Tory Commercialism," 30.

[195] Emma Rothschild, "Global Commerce and the Question of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth-Century Provinces," *Modern Intellectual History*, 1.1 (2004): 12; John A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 [1985]): 77; Paul Cheney, *Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy* (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 2010): 30.

[196] Philip J. Stern, "Corporate virtue: the languages of empire in early modern British Asia," *Renaissance Studies*, 26.4 (2012): 514.

[197] Glaisyer, "Networking," 459; Juan L. Sánchez, "Domesticating the Atlantic: British Representations of Spanish America and the Shaping of British Imperial Ideology." *The Yearbook of English Studies,* 46, Writing the Americas, 1480-1826 (2016): 278; Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, 108-9; In the words of Campbell:
"There is nothing, however, more obvious, than that commerce ought to be a principal concern with a British ministry; since the extension of trade is, perhaps, the sole means of raising the power and credit of the nation. Our naval force will ever render us considerable abroad; but this cannot be maintained by any other means than promoting a spirit of trade and navigation." *UH*:X:146, 168; *UH*:XXXVIII:1.'
As to domestic commerce: "What part of commerce carried on by the merchants of [Britain], is not in some measure dependent on or connected with that of the *East Indies*?" *UH*:X:3.

state, there were plenty of authors who opposed the idea that the increasing reliance on commerce could do the nation any good. The controversial role and value of commerce in society came to be at a center of an ideological debate that lasted for nearly two centuries (if it ever abated fully).

The impact of the commercial revolution in early-modern Britain was felt far beyond the written discourse of a few erudite individuals. The proliferation of commerce coincided with the occurrence of a veritable consumer revolution in Britain. The extension of consumer culture to the lower classes of society had the attendant effect of bringing a greater number of people into contact with commerce and its benefits.[198] The historian Neil McKendrick has argued that the consumer revolution in Britain was preceded by a commercialization of British society, which helped garner public acceptance for commerce and commercial values. However, until the late-eighteenth century, the idea of unleashing the drive for self-acquisition among all non-landowning classes was considered a threat by those occupying the higher rungs of the societal pyramid.[199] Indeed, an ideological storm was brewing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as aristocrats of landed wealth ramped up their efforts to contain the egalitarian danger inherent to the spread of commercial values, which threatened to upend the traditional social order.

Though commerce had, of course, existed prior to the early-modern period, merchants and their endeavors had always been relegated to a peripheral status in society. Medieval virtue was incompatible with the perceived avarice and greed of the merchants. St. Augustine had once

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[198] Neil McKendrick, John Brewer and J.H. Plumb, *The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982): 1-5.
[199] McKendrick, Brewer, and Plumb, *The Birth of a Consumer Society*, 16, 23, 33.

identified the lust for money as one of the three principal sins of fallen man.[200] The merchant was led by his passions; and therefore, was thought to be liable to vice and licentiousness. Opposed to commercial greed stood aristocratic virtue, which only men of secure property (land) could hope to embody. The medieval hierarchy, supported by a clear moral difference between the various classes, thus organized medieval society for centuries. However, the early-modern period eroded the mainstays of medieval moral philosophy, such as the aristocratic ideal of honor and glory. No longer, wrote the historian Albert Hirschman, could "moralizing philosophy and religious precept … be trusted with restraining the destructive passions of men."[201] A new conception of virtue entered the scene, one which revolved around the acquisition of personal wealth through commerce and trade. The traditional aristocratic economy, and the alternative market economy, however, implied completely different systems of wealth distribution. The aristocrat defined his social stature through giving and taking; this is what placed him above his inferiors. The merchant, on the other hand, operated within a level marketplace, negotiating with people of the same stature as him (the equality of the market). Moreover, the marketplace was open to those of all ranks, which offered new possibilities of wealth to those normally excluded from traditional power.[202] It would only be a matter of time, so feared the nobility, before the new monied class would attempt to usurp the traditional bases of aristocratic power.[203]

The controversy over political economy during the seventeenth and eighteenth century came to a head as the British economy was transitioning from a society of scarcity to one defined by expenditure and accumulation. At least to the proponents of commerce, no longer was the

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[200] Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977): 9.
[201] Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, 14-5.
[202] Laurence Fontaine, "Prodigality, Avarice and Anger: Passions and Emotions at the Heart of the Encounter between Aristocratic Economy and Market Economy," *European Journal of Sociology,* 59.1 (2018): 42-3.
[203] Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, 68-9.

pursuit of virtue or divine salvation the highest attainable good of society; henceforth, the individual quest for happiness came central to social existence. The emerging consumption market caused fear for those who believed their societies to have become overwhelmed with excess, or *luxury*, both implying intolerable moral behaviors.[204] The existence of a booming print culture, as well as an emerging press whose reports on parliamentary debates integrated public discussion into politics, catapulted the commercial controversy into the public domain. It was on this *mons publica* that the stature of commerce would stand or fall.[205] The aristocratic counterattack was an ideological charge that the emerging commercial class could not ignore. The value of public credit, on which the fortune of Britain was contingent, depended largely on public opinion; and therefore, it was of the greatest necessity for the commercial bloc to discredit their opponents while strengthening the trustworthiness of their own side.[206] A clash between the aristocratic and commercial camps was inevitable.

Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the theorists of the two opposing sides waged an ideological war with one another, centering on the question of whether commerce could reign in the passions or whether it would exacerbate them.[207] Opponents of commerce posited that commerce indeed corrupted the individual, nullified his virtue and as such relegated him to an existence led by the passions, leading to 'hysterical' behavior.[208] Only virtue could protect men from this fate; and only by retaining the proper political relations in the state, by putting commerce in its proper place, could the survival of political virtue be achieved. Secondly, the preoccupation of the merchant with commerce would create luxury, which, if left

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[204] Jennings, "The Debate about Luxury," 81-2.
[205] Page, "The Seventy Years War," 163.
[206] Carl Wennderlind, *Casualties of Credit: The English Financial Revolution, 1620-1720* (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 2011): 194, 199.
[207] Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, 71; Joyce Oldham Appleby, *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978): 16.
[208] Wennerlind, *Casualties of Credit*, 173-7.

unchecked, was likely to cause the commercial society to deteriorate into decadence.[209] François de Fénelon, on the one hand, wrote in his work *Telemachus* that "luxury poisons a whole nation."[210] The commercial apologists, on the other hand, posited that the ideal of civic virtue, the safeguard against the passions, could not exist in modern times (nor that it ever really had, in the first place); in its place they put commerce, which had the capacity to refine the passions in to opinion, and relieve the 'irrational' merchant from his hysteria. Even if commerce was incompatible with civic virtue, it had the capacity to develop the manners and refine the arts of mankind, in addition to providing humanity with perceptions and values that were more refined, more universal, than any of the virtues of Antiquity.[211]

The eighteenth-century principle of a 'civilizing commerce' has come to be known as the *Doux-commerce* theory (*douceur* ~ gentle). At the heart of *doux-commerce* lay a clever rhetorical stratagem that made possible the whole argument by creating a division between the 'worse' and 'milder' passions. Some eighteenth-century authors such as Bernard Mandeville and David Hume argued that the harmful effect of the passions could be cancelled out if one juxtaposed two opposing passions, while others saw commerce as a dangerous pastime which posed an imminent threat to the moral health of the commonwealth.[212] The intellectual history of this heated debate was first explored by Albert Hirschman in his seminal book *The Passions and the Interests* (1977). Hirschman showed how doux-commerce, a seemingly innocuous moral innovation, allowed eighteenth-century theorists to construct an entirely-novel system of morality around the idea of opposing one passion to another. The goal of such thought-experiments was to eliminate

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[209] Laurence Dickey, "*Doux-commerce* and humanitarian values: free trade, sociability and universal benevolence in eighteenth-century thinking." *Grotiana*, 22/23 (2001/2): 275.
[210] Robin Douglass, "Montesquieu and Modern Republicanism," *Political Studies,* 60 (2012): 713.
[211] Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, 115, 122; John A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975): 492.
[212] Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees – or, Private Vices, Public Benefits* (London: published by T. Ostell, 1806 [1732]): 31.

the dangers of the worst passions by substituting a less harmful, 'innocent' passion. The passions assigned to countervail the other passions were called the 'interests.'[213] By the eighteenth century, the term came to refer solely to *economic advantage* of persons or groups. The intellectual stratagem of recasting vicious commerce as an interest capable of nullifying man's worst passions was a crucial step in the creation of public acceptance of commerce as a social good.[214] The first instance in which an author articulated the rudiments of the *doux-commerce* theory was in a French textbook for businessmen called *Le Parfait Négociant* (1675), by Jacques Savary.[215] In the following decades, many notable names, such as Pierre Nicole, Bernard Mandeville, Jean-François Melon, Montesquieu, David Hume, and William Smith would contribute their own understandings of the *douceur de commerce.*

Doux-commerce, in essence, is the eighteenth-century idea that the expansion of commerce acted as a civilizing agent which could refine the passions and polish the manners of individuals. As such, commerce refined as well as moderated the behavior of those which engaged in it. According to historian John Pocock, "Notions of refinement and politeness, then, were crucial elements in the ideology of eighteenth-century commerce."[216] If it could be proven that commerce indeed polished the manners and stimulated the cultivation of the self, then doux-commerce "promise[d] prosperity without any of the corruptions of luxury."[217] Luxury, according to the French author Jean-François Melon in his *Essai Politique sur le commerce* (1734) did not lead to moral defects, but instead was the "destroyer of sloth and idleness." Luxury spurred on individuals to improve themselves, in order to be able to afford its sweets.[218]

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[213] Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests,* 26-8.
[214] Ibid. 32, 41-2.
[215] Fontaine, "Prodigality, Avarice and Anger," 47; Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, 19.
[216] Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, 49, 115;
[217] Dickey, "*Doux-Commerce* and humanitarian values," 273.
[218] Jennings, "The Debate about Luxury," 80.

However, individual improvement was not the sole benefit of commerce; instead, it had a profound impact on the manner with which citizens interacted with one another.

The central element in the *doux-commerce* theory was the notion of 'sociability', which referred to one's ability to converse, cooperate and unite with one's fellow citizens in the public interest.[219] The manner in which commerce could increase the individual's sociability revolved around the idea of *oikeosis*. In the words of the historian Laurence Dickey, *oikeosis* was "a doctrine that holds that as human beings have more contact with each other they begin to exhibit a willingness to negotiate and co-operate with each other in common endeavors, especially in endeavors that help preserve the material well-being of socially organized groups (e.g., families, nations and empires)." Commerce, facilitating civil cooperation, thus effected an increased "fellow-feeling" or "humaneness" among citizens, as well as nations.[220] The Scottish empiricist philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) explained why this was so. To Hume, the human faculty for moral judgment required frequent practice. The act of interaction with fellow human beings in a sense compels one to reconsider one's existing prejudices and consider the moral systems with which one comes into contact. As such, a commercial people tend to become more sociable. Thus commerce, which unites merchants from hither and tither, was the primary force which through this mutual exposition bred sociability in all it touched upon.[221]

Indeed, according to the eminent eighteenth-century Scottish historian, William Robertson (1721-1793) in a work called *View of the Progress of Society in Europe* (1769), "Commerce tend[ed] to wear off those prejudices which maintain distinctions and animosity

[219] Johnson, *A Dictionary,* "Sociableness" and "Social"
[220] Dickey, "*Doux-commerce* and humanitarian values," 280-1.
[221] Neil McArthur, "Cosmopolitanism and Hume's general point of view," *European Journal of Political Theory*, 13.3 (2014): 326, 333.

between nations. It *softens and polishes* the manners of men."[222] Commerce had the capacity to not only civilize men, but also civilize states. According to Adam Smith, it was apparent that "commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours and of servile dependency upon their superiors."[223] Or, in the words of Montesquieu: "Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling: and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities."[224]

Doux-commerce, therefore, was cast as a civilizing force capable of refining the manners of individuals, ensuring gentleness of government, and securing a lasting peace between nations. Indeed, the *douceur de commerce* was a contagious – but benevolent – bacterium, invisible to the naked eye but spreading daily to anyone who came into contact with it. To Montesquieu, the ability of commerce to ensure the gentleness of government was perhaps the most important benefit. In *L'Esprit de Lois*, Montesquieu explained that political liberty could only exist in gentle or "moderate" governments.[225] To Campbell too, there could not be any doubt as to the veracity of a link between commerce and gentle government. "Whence it may pass for a certain rule in politics, that where trade thrives, the government grows daily better, if not in its principles, at least in its administration; and, where trade declines, it shews that either the

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[222] Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, 32, 41-2.
[223] Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, 317.
[224] Charles le Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws.* Thomas Nugent (trans.) (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001 [1748]): 346; Douglass, "Montesquieu and Modern Republicanism," 711; Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, 60, 73.
[225] Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws,* 44-5; Douglass, "Montesquieu and Modern Republicanism," 708; Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment*, 470.

government is altered for the worse, or that the executive part of it is in bad hands."[226] Both gentle government and the flourishing of commerce were marks of a civilized state. The civilizing effect of commerce rendered it ideal for the role explaining the civilizational mobility by which civilized states could come about. It was commerce, therefore, which the authors placed at the heart of the concept of progress, and its influence can be detected throughout the *Universal History*.

* * *

The authors constantly referred to the commercial success of failure of the various states and peoples they described. It is not surprising that commerce, essential for civilizational progress, should occupy such a central place in their analysis. In order to better understand the manner in which the authors believed commerce could result in the progress of the state, we must shift our attention to the various uses of the term commerce in the *Universal History* itself, specifically in the volumes written by John Campbell. Campbell was convinced that, in order to uncover the nature of commerce in a country, it was essential to understand the particulars of a region and its people, their customs and manners; and only then, which such understanding, could any meaningful commerce take place. By residing in a locale for an extended duration of time, the traveler would better accustom himself to the local customs and manners. This would allow him to identify the natural and promising commodities that existed in the regions, and base this on local knowledge. Echoing the legal cosmopolitanism of Montesquieu, Campbell was adamant in his rhetorical assault on commercial parochialism, which assumed that the commercial needs of every nation were one and the same. Instead, the merchant should make an

[226] *UH*:XI:140.

effort to study foreign customs and traditions, which would make possible an "unconstrained commerce."[227] Throughout the volumes of the *Universal History* that he wrote, Campbell identified with great detail the various commodities extant in each locale, as well as the commerce that was being driven there.

Another observation that Campbell, as well as the other authors of the *Universal History*, frequently pointed out, was that commerce would only thrive in countries where government was gentle and moderate. This sentiment echoed Hume, who explained that a civilized government was "defined by its ability to implement a system of 'general laws' – that is, ones that treat similar cases *consistently*, treat all citizens the same…" [emphasis mine].[228] Government, likewise, needed to be constant. This required the elimination of a ruler's passions, which were erratic and unpredictable, and therefore a dangerous liability. What was necessary was a predictable consistency; for consistency, or *constancy,* provided the necessary basis for commerce and the security of property on which merchants relied.[229] Another illustration of the degree to which the inconstancy of government could imperil the commercial prosperity of a state, the authors of the *Universal History* often employed the example of the 'barbarous' peoples, such as the Tartars. The Tatar (or Turkic) peoples embodied the nomadic 'barbarians' of the great Asian steppes, who had so often swept across the so-called civilized sedentary states, leaving a trail of destruction. It would not have surprised the contemporary Briton that a government run by a rabble would come to naught; and indeed, there are plenty of examples in this regard. For example, to take one of many, the authors gave an account of Orkanj (or Urjensh), a city situated near the Caspian Sea in the Kingdom of Khwarazm. Though once "it

[227] Binney, "Personal Identity and Tory Commercialism," 45; Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws,* 323.
[228] McArthur, "Cosmopolitanism and Hume's general point of view," 334.
[229] Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, 52-4.

was very considerable," the city had since fallen into decay under the mastery of the Tartars. "This is owing partly to the *disorderly* government of the Uzbeks."[230] The disordered, or inconstant, nature of government, the authors explained, prevented foreign merchants from taking up residence in the town for want of the liberty and security of property they require to conduct a satisfactory commerce. Indeed, the authors lamented the tragedy of this situation, for "Urjensh is situated very conveniently for commerce."[231]

It was common belief in the eighteenth century that the inhabitants of "fruitful countries" were rarely industrious; indeed, the authors of the *Universal History* state as much: "The necessaries of life shooting up almost spontaneously, render the toil and labour of inhabitants unnecessary. This damps the spirit of enterprise, checks that ardour excited by necessity, and renders mankind indolent, because they can live without industry or danger."[232]The abundance of the earth's riches, however, would not guarantee the prosperity of a state. It was this apparent paradox that puzzled many eighteenth-century political economists, especially with regard to the (mis)fortune of the Spanish empire.[233] Even with half the bullion of the world, Spain ultimately derived no lasting benefit from its possessions in the Americas. Their failure to capitalize on the plenty and bounty of the American colonies was to be attributed completely to a failure of government to secure a profitable commerce, according to Campbell. "We may, indeed, affirm, that were the Spanish councils vigorous in the prosecution of commerce, these colonies open the noblest field for wealth and glory. They contain every valuable material of trade which the increase and refinement of luxury hath rendered necessary to life; but it requires industry at

[230] *UH*:VI:138.
[231] *UH:*VI:138-9.
[232] *UH*:XXXI:10.
[233] Frederick Whelan, "Eighteenth-Century Scottish Political Economy and the Decline of Imperial Spain," *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies*, 38.1 (2018): 56.

home to set this complex machine in motion." Hence arose Campbell's "first principle" of beneficial commerce, diligent industry. For, "unless it be properly directed, all those vast resources serve only to impoverish, weaken, and enfeeble the whole constitution."[234] To seize the potential of one's state was of the utmost importance, whether it concerned the Spanish, or the people of Tonkin; to fail to do so could only be due to a 'indolence' of the people.[235] Commerce, to Campbell, is "ever productive of wealth and power to those who have been possessed of it and used it properly; … [that] the loss of which has been always ruinous; and … which all the pretenders to naval dominion have constantly struggled for in all ages; [and] is highly valuable in itself, and inestimable in its consequences."[236]

Trade and war, however, do not generally mix well. Commercialist theorists often opposed the beneficence of commerce to the destructiveness of conquest. It is not clear whether Campbell believed conquest to be ineffectual in every case. After the Battle of Plassey in 1757, he noted, the British profited significantly from their victory over the French in India. "It may indeed be questioned, whether all the great powers of Europe engaged in a war, in which rivers of blood have already been spilt, and millions of treasure exhausted, will, in the conclusion, reap so much solid profit as the English East India company did, with no more than 2000 men, two-thirds of them Indians, under the conduct of Mr. Clive, whose martial abilities posterity will read with amazement, and which even contemporary envy, jealousy, and malignity, are forced to admire."[237] Yet, perhaps the British gain in the Seven Years' War was the exception that proved the rule. Overall, Campbell seemed to adhere to the notion that conquest was inimical to the progress of commerce. For example, the military aggression of the Arabs had undone the

[234] *UH*:XXXIX:89.
[235] *UH*:VII:471-2; *UH:*XI:322.
[236] *UH*:XI:272.
[237] *UH*:X:205.

flourishing trade which, in ancient times, was being conducted on the Indian Ocean: "the military genius of the Arabs, the successors of Mohammed, extinguished every spark of the spirit of commerce and science. Fury, mad zeal, ignorance, and barbarity, seemed to be let loose to waste every thing, to debase the human genius, and confound mankind in a cloud of impenetrable darkness of obscurity."[238]

In general, however, it was important for British theorizers to avoid connecting the progress of the British Empire to martial ambition and military conquest because they saw their empire as an empire of liberty and trade. For the British, the moral dilemma of the early-modern period with regard to empire-building, pertained to whether one could possibly construct an empire not based on conquest and destruction, as the Spaniards had done in the Americas; for the wanton misery of the natives was the painful result. In the eighteenth century, a similar picture was painted of Britain's archnemesis, the French empire. Campbell surmised that the many wars that King Louis XIV waged were most certainly the reason why French commerce in the Indies never reached the heights of Britain's.[239] France made the fatal mistake of attempting to extend their empire through conquest, successfully taking British-held Madras in the 1740s. And even though they now held the trading post at Madras, one of the principal commercial outposts in India, they could not capitalize on it because war had rendered their commerce almost non-existent at that point.[240] Commerce, on the contrary, could overcome the passions for conquest that caused strife between nations, and replace it with a secure and lasting peace. It was commerce, not conquest, that led to true power.[241]

[238] *UH*:X:269. Please see chapter 3 for a fuller explanation of the authors ' views on the state of science and learning in the Islamic empires. Though he was often critical of the Arabs, they did redeem themselves in Campbell's eyes when they built the city of Cairo, and protected the merchants there, which caused "liberty, learning, science, arts, and everything valuable and dear to men" return to the Middle East & Indian Ocean.
[239] *UH*:XI:91.
[240] *UH*:X:208.
[241] Shovlin, "War and Peace," 311; Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, 79.

Campbell, along with other British authors, went to great lengths to portray Britain as "a modern oceanic empire of trade and settlement," thereby solving the "perceived incompatibility between an imperial ideology predicated on exploitation and subjugation and its metropolitan norms of liberty, equality and rule of law."[242] Of course, in stressing the peaceful consequences of commerce, British authors like Campbell hid the conquering nature of Britain's commercial enterprise, and the attendant violence. The exploitation of native peoples was obscured beneath the perceived equilibrium that commerce brought and would bring.[243] But despite such unfortunate realities of the British Empire, British authors insisted that their empire followed the path of beneficial commerce; one that, according to Campbell, would ultimately mitigate all potential harm it could do. Beyond mere mitigation, Campbell argued that commerce offered vital benefits that would ultimately aid and strengthen the modern state; moreover, the benefits that commerce offered to the intellectual growth of the *individual*.

Campbell clearly was a staunch defender of the ideals of the *doux commerce* and its civilizing effect. However, in his theories, he would often match, even exceed, the optimism with which eighteenth-century theorists hailed commerce. For, while there appeared to be consensus among early-modern commercial theorists regarding the beneficial effects of commerce, not all were in agreement as to the extent to which commerce benefited the individual, and the state. Indeed, some thinkers were convinced that the beneficence of commerce went beyond the mere polishing of the individual's manners. Both Hume as well as Campbell theorized on the possibility of a link between commercial endeavors and the intellectual development of a nation. Hume theorized that, even though true genius only came to a full expression in very few

[242] Sánchez, "Domesticating the Atlantic," 278.
[243] Lynn Festa, "Sentimental Visions of Empire in Eighteenth-Century Studies," *Literature Compass*, 6.1 (2009): 30-1.

individuals, it still required the cultivation of a fertile breeding ground: "a share of the same spirit and genius must be antecedently diffused throughout the people among whom they arise…. The mass cannot be altogether insipid from which such refined spirits are extracted."[244] Hume's revelation made the encouragement of genius a national matter, pertaining to the people as a whole. If a nation were desirous to bring forth citizens of genius, it would have to create the correct circumstances for genius to take hold.

First of all, Hume contended, the proliferation of the arts and sciences in a country require "that people enjoy the blessing of a free government."[245] Hume was convinced that it was more likely that arts and sciences should begin in a republic, rather than a monarch; and certainly not in an autocracy. However, even though the ideal birthplace of the arts and sciences was the republican state, Hume took pains to stress that knowledge could spread to other states, including monarchy. This brought him to his second point, that this spread of "politeness and learning" was facilitated through commerce, which connected neighboring states together.[246] The mechanism by which this knowledge transfer could take place, Hume explained, consisted in the competition that arose between nations competing commercially. Such competition furthers the progress of the arts and sciences since each nation would seek to outdo the others. This is why the progress of learning in China, unlike Europe, had lately stagnated: "None had courage to resist the torrent of popular opinion; and posterity was not bold enough to dispute what had been universally received by their ancestors," while in Europe a fruitful competition existed perennially.[247]

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[244] David Hume, *The Philosophical Works of David Hume. Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the more important Alterations and Corrections in the successive Editions published by the Author*. Vol. III (Edinburgh: printed for Adam Black and William Tait, 1826): 127.
[245] Hume, *The Philosophical Works,* 128.
[246] Ibid. 131-2.
[247] Ibid. 133, 136.

Through commerce, at last, the arts and sciences would spread to any government that was not despotic. The republic, Hume argued, was more suitable for "the growth of the sciences," while a "civilized monarchy" was more likely to breed the polite arts.[248] Unfortunately for the so-called despotic regimes, no such beneficence would accompany commerce. For no "pure despotism, established among a barbarous people, can ever, by its native force and energy, refine and polish itself. It must borrow its laws, and methods, and institutions, and consequently its stability and order, from free governments."[249] The idea that there could be a link between commerce and the intellectual development of a state was adopted by several contemporary writers in the mid-eighteenth century. Consider, for example, the following excerpts from a poem by the British poet Richard Glover (1712-1785), dedicated to a personified *Commerce*. First, he reaffirmed the civilizing effect of spreading commerce:

> Barbarity is polish'd, infant arts
> Bloom in the desert, and benignant peace
> With hospitality begin to sooth
> Unsocial rapine, and the thirst of blood;[250]

Later in the poem, Glover reminded the reader of the intellectual beneficence of Commerce:

> Thou nurse of arts, and thy industrious race;
> Pleas'd with their candid manners, with their free
> Sagacious converse, to inquiry led,
> And zeal for knowledge; hence the opening mind
> Resigns its errors, and unseals the eye
> Of blind opinion;…[251]

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[248] Ibid. 138.
[249] Ibid. 139. It is not difficult to see in this the precursor to a more malignant parochialism revolving around the notion of Western superiority, which held sway over the minds of many European in the nineteenth century, of which the (in)famous 'White Man's Burden' is but one example.
[250] Richard Glover, *The Poetical works of Richard Glover: with the life of the author* (London: printed for C. Cooke & J. Wright, 1816): 258.
[251] Ibid. 264.

In many ways, Campbell was clearly inspired by Hume's conception of the beneficial influence of commerce on the intellectual development of a state as a whole. Yet, whereas Hume presented his argument in perhaps a more nuanced manner, Campbell seemed determined to push the notion a step further. In Volume XXXVIII, which concerns the history of the European settlement in the Americas, Campbell elaborated on his theory. Since wealth was defined as labor, the more labor a country possessed, the wealthier it was. "A superfluity of labour is a real treasure to society…"[252] It is at this point where commerce becomes truly useful to a state. Commerce, Campbell explained, had the capacity to "augment [the total stock of] labour, [which] in effect increases the grandeur of the state."[253] In addition, "by its imports [commerce] furnishes the materials of industry, and by its exports it gives encouragement for working up divers commodities, not required for domestic consumption." These ideas led to Campbell's final point: "Hence the mind acquires *additional vigour*, it enlarges its powers and faculties, and the spirit of improvement is pushed to every art and science. Philosophy and the art of war are best understood in those countries, where the mechanic arts have attained the greatest perfection."[254]

Here Campbell's argument diverges from Hume's. Even though Hume had linked the encouragement of commerce to the intellectual development of a state in the arts and sciences, the link he posited between commerce and individual mind was *indirect*: commerce created the proper *circumstances* for genius to come to fruition in a citizen. Campbell's contribution to this discourse was that he directly linked commerce to the development of the intellectual faculties in the individual mind. In doing so, Campbell placed his own version of the *doux-commerce* theory

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[252] *UH*:XXXVIII:1.
[253] Ibid. 1-2.
[254] Ibid. 2; No wonder then, that the Spanish, according to the authors of Vol. XLIV, had "contracted a contempt for the mechanic, and even liberal arts"; for they had neglected commerce, "agriculture and manufactures" in their ravenous search for gold. *UH*:XLIV:36.

in direct opposition to another concurrent discourse, that of *genius*. The discourse of genius was, by its nature, diametrically opposed to the discourse of political economy in general. The main point of contention was the distribution of productivity in a society. Writers, writing within the discourse of genius, concerned themselves with "the formation and organization of the productive forces of a society" based on the distribution of *mental capacity*.[255] According to such authors as William Duff (1732-1815), a Scottish Presbyterian minister, it was only genius by which "new discoveries in the regions of Science [could be made]," and which could "enlarg[e] the sphere of human knowledge and human happiness."[256] Most importantly, Duff and others like him argued that genius would only come naturally to very few, and was decided upon by Providence. It was at this point where Campbell intervened. To Campbell, genius had nothing to do with Providence or divine intervention, but rather with the material circumstances in which individuals grow up; and improving these circumstances was very much within the power of temporal governments.[257]

Campbell argued that encouraging commerce was a certain method of improving the material circumstances in a state, thereby increasing the occurrence of genius among its people. One of his favorite historical examples was the kingdom of Sweden. Like so many European countries described in the *Universal History*, Sweden had long been trapped in a 'barbarous past.' The Swedes were, Campbell contended, a warlike people constantly engaged in endless wars with their neighbors.[258] By the time of King Frederick I (r. 1720-1751), however, things had steadily improved. In 1731, Frederik extended a charter to various merchants in Gothenburg,

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[255] Zeynep Tenger and Paul Trolander, "Genius versus capital: eighteenth-century theories of genius and Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations'," *Modern Language Quarterly*, 55.2 (Jun., 1994).
[256] Tenger and Trolander, "Genius versus Capital"; William Duff, *An Essay on Original Genius and its Various Modes of Exertion in Philosophy and the Fine Arts, particularly in Poetry* (London: 1767): 5.
[257] Binney, "Personal Identity and Tory Commercialism," 42.
[258] *UH*:XI:247-50.

allowing them to form the Swedish East India Company.[259] Campbell praised the success of the Swedes in establishing a trade with Asia, and his description of the conduct of the Swedish merchants is extensive. Campbell thought it to be remarkable that the hitherto "martial" Swedes had become so good-natured, driving a peaceful commerce with foreigners.[260] "It is in these pieces," Campbell concluded, "that we see the good effects of commerce, and how much it contributes to civilize and polish mankind by introducing arts and sciences, and by excluding those groundless prejudices, which are the effects of a narrow capacity, and are productive of nothing but poverty and pride."

The Swedes in many regards had become the prime example of nation which had, "under all imaginable disadvantages," dared to venture into the East Indies trade and maintained themselves successfully for twenty years without settlements or conquest, a point which Campbell emphasized.[261] This constancy illustrated the fact that the Swedes had adopted a 'commercial spirit' "which the sweets of commerce have given them."[262] Commerce spun a virtuous circle, in which commerce created a commercial spirit, which in turn induced the population to devote more resources and effort towards commerce. Such a process only occurs in commercial nations: "whence can this public spirit [of improvement], this alacrity to labour, this readiness in advancing money arise, but from the nation's being sensible of the advantages flowing from commerce, and their willingness to contribute to whatever may extend it?"[263]

The question, of course, was whether this civilizing effect was merely reserved for Europeans, or whether it could extend to the other – even 'barbarous' – nations also. The central

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[259] Campbell referred to the Swedish East India Company as the "Ostend Company," not to be confused with the short-lived Ostend Company chartered in the Austrian Netherlands between 1722-1731.
[260] *UH*:XI:247.
[261] *UH*:XI:269-270.
[262] *UH*:XI:269.
[263] *UH*:XI:270.

problem was whether European sensibility, the “susceptibility of the mental and physical capacities,” could be said to occur among non-Europeans as well.[264] Campbell answered in the affirmative; indeed, commerce was the securest way of establishing rudimentary forms of contact with foreign peoples and gain their trust and respect. In lieu of armed conflict to force a friendship, the facilitation of commerce had the capacity to procure the loyalties of even the most suspicious foreigner. The civilizing effect was the fundament on which this cultural intercourse could take place (though, perhaps, rather one-sided). In theory, therefore, the concept of sociability could be stretched to encompass all of humanity.[265] This was at the heart of the problems which, according to Campbell, hampered the progress of the French colonies in Northern America. Earlier, Campbell had expressed his agreement with the Dutch policy in Surinam of first ensuring commerce, only second attending to the conversion of the natives. The French Jesuits in Canada, however, did the exact opposite, having made “the conversion of the Indians the primary object of the colony.”[266] In their determination to persist with this approach, they had caused friction between French colonials and natives. “Had the savages, instead of being taught the fopperies of [the Catholic] religion, been taught to taste the sweets of commerce with the French, they would soon have come into the habits of civil life, and the practice of Christianity; if the religion of the Jesuits can be called such.”[267] In other words, commerce was more effective at converting natives to Christianity than conversion itself.

Where commerce could not be established without taking possession of native lands, the colonial administrator had to rule prudently and gently. He was to “us[e] the inhabitants with gentleness and affability, observing the most severe justice in all dealing with them, and this by

[264] Festa, “Sentimental Visions of Empire,” 28.
[265] Dickey, “*Doux-Commerce* and humanitarian values,” 284.
[266] *UH*:XXXIX:482.
[267] *UH*:XXXIX: 482-3.

degrees conciliating their esteem to the European manners. This we take to be the true method of inducing them to use or take off European commodities." Natives thus coaxed into espousing the manners of the Europeans would become reliable trading partners. Commerce could then be guaranteed without having to resort to military force. And, in turn, "navigation and naval power, the arts, the sciences, and the true knowledge of life will be promoted."[268]According to J.L. Sánchez, it was by showing the possibility of exporting British domestic ideals to non-British societies, that British authors could spread the idea that British society itself could be transplanted abroad as well. In Daniel Defoe's famous novel *Robinson Crusoe*, the titular protagonist, stranded on a Caribbean island, attempts to civilize the natives that he encountered. "In domesticating the natives," Sánchez argued, "Crusoe in effect transforms them … into potential consumers of English goods." The exportation of such civil ideas, therefore, was a means to de-exoticize the 'Orient' for commercial purposes.[269]

The most telling example of the potential of commerce as a civilizing force is found in Africa. Though, as pointed out in the previous chapter, the authors overall had a very negative and derogatory opinion of the natives of Africa, there was one notable caveat to their condemnation. The authors insisted that one should distinguish between the Africans who lived in the interior, and those who lived on the coast. Only the former suffered the scourge of "indolence and want of genius and industry" indefinitely; the latter, on the contrary, lived in close proximity to the European trading posts. As such, they had "long since [been] allured to a more active and laborious life, as well as civilized in their manners, by their frequent commerce with the Europeans…"; an example, that, to the authors ' disdain, was not heeded by their fellow

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[268] *UH*:X:254.
[269] Sánchez, "Domesticating the Atlantic," 289. Moreover, commercially-minded theorists understood the absolute necessity of ensuring that the British public could imagine the future profitability of commercial ventures, on which present credit came to depend. Wennerlind, *Casualties of Credit*, 229.

natives in the hinterlands. As a result, commerce in the majority of Africa was not carried on by Africans, but rather by Europeans, Arabs and Persians.[270] This had the unfortunate effect of barring the inland African peoples from enjoying the beneficial effects that commerce had to offer.

The idea that 'commercial barbarians' were somehow more civilized than their non-commercial neighbors was one that continually reappears throughout the *Universal History,* signifying that Campbell was not alone in this view. One of the other authors , Tobias Smollett – together with whom Campbell edited the modern part of the *Universal History* – likewise insisted that the mere adoption of commerce warranted a distinction. Smollett wrote the final chapters of Volume XI, concerning the history of the discovery of the continent of Australia, of which, in his own words, not much was known at the time.[271] The majority of the narrative consisted of various accounts of the travels of European navigators, exploring the extent of the exotic continent. Smollett took note of the many peoples of Terra Australis, and often endowed them with many negative criticisms, on account of their being 'savage' and 'rude'; but there were exceptions. For example, on Schouten's Island there lived a people who were "exceedingly lively and active" which showed "of their having had on extensive commerce" with both the Spanish and the Chinese. And, to no surprise, the natives were incomparably better than the natives of neighboring islands: "They were taller, more robust, and stronger made, than the natives of the neighbouring islands. Their vessels were the largest, and best adapted to use … they readily parted with their bows and arrows in exchange for European commodities…"[272] The

[270] *UH*:XIV:32-33.
[271] Though Campbell wrote Vols. X and most of Vol. XI, there is sufficient reason to believe that the last section of Vol. XI was written by Smollett. The latter furthermore edited a large part of the *Universal History*. For a more extensive overview of Smollett's role in writing the *Universal History*, please see Chapter 3.
[272] *UH:*XI:315.

affirmation of sensibility among the natives of what many saw as the least civilized continents of the planet, attests to Smollett's – and Campbell's – belief in the possibility of universal human perfectibility, and the universal ability of any nation to transition from primitiveness to civilization.[273] Commerce, in sum, provided the key to progress to all nations, be they European or non-European.

* * *

The authors of the *Universal History*, and Campbell first and foremost, provided the reader with countless historical examples of the benefits that encouraging commerce had for the state. They continually connected the rise and fall of states with their commercial prowess – or lack thereof. No wonder, then, that the authors saw commerce as crucial to the continued prospering and survival of the British state. At the same time, commerce signified the authors ' imperial aspirations for the future of the British Empire and its position in the global world. In the conclusion of the *Universal History*, the authors went so far as to suggest that France could be 'dealt with' by "the peaceable arm of commerce."[274] The British ought not to be tempted by the prospects of empire through conquest, but rather extends its power by engaging in a peaceful commerce with the rest of the world, and by "invit[ing] all hither who are oppressed in other countries; for plenty of people and of useful arts yield beneficial employment, and will give us such power, that no nation, nor any confederacy, will dare to insult us."[275] Commerce provided the glue that bound the British Empire together, rendering it a strong whole, capable of facing

[273] Festa, "Sentimental Visions of Empire," 29.
[274] *UH:*XLIII:582.
[275] Ibid. 582.

any external threat.[276] However, it was not merely the ability of commerce to unite the state and avoid war, that attracted the authors .

The true value of commerce, according to the authors , consisted in the fact that it could enable civilizational mobility across the ladder of civilizations: simply by encouraging commerce, a state could rise toward the ideal of civilization. Commerce was able to effect all this because it polished the manners, improved the tastes, and civilized governments. Not only that, commerce directly improved the minds of those engaged in it. Moreover, by improving the material circumstances within the state, commerce also created the ideal breeding ground for the proliferation of genius. Given these effects, it is not difficult to see how Campbell made the connection between commerce and science. The growth of commerce and the revival of the sciences were directly related to one another. Commerce, then, while the key to civilizational mobility, was not the *end goal* of civilization. Unlike contemporary theorists, Campbell did not view the commercial state as the highest form of civilization. It was science that would distinguish the commercial nations from those that had advanced to the next stage of civilization, a process to which we shall turn our attention in the next chapter.

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[276] Ibid. 583.

CHAPTER III – SCIENCE

The connection between science the state is so self-evident today that hardly anyone is concerned with the historical development that brought it about. Over the past centuries, science has become the dominant institution of learning (notwithstanding the specialization of different fields), clearly demarcated from other scholarly endeavors such as the humanities. However, the hegemony of scientific knowledge was anything but an inevitable certainty in the early-modern period (nor did a unified field of 'science' exist in the first place). Instead, a loosely connected intellectual field known as the 'sciences' battled against competing interpretative systems, many of which initially garnered more credence than the empirical, experimental program from which modern science sprang. To understand the meaning of science in the early-modern period, one must cast away contemporary understandings of the term; for only then do the divergent and alternative meanings once associated with it come into view. This is no different in the *Universal History*, where, as previously shown, the concept of 'science' played a central role in the narrative. Chapter II set up the relationship between commerce and science; this chapter, then will focus on the meaning and nature of 'science' in the *Universal History.* Yet, the meaning of the term science in the *Universal History* is difficult to pin down. While it seems central to the narrative, it is curiously scarce within the main text. Despite this intriguing scarcity, how did the authors interpret science? Who was to conduct this science? How did science succeed in the civilizing of the nation state, and how was it connected to the Rise of the European nations?

Given the importance that the authors of the *Universal History* assigned to the "revival of Science" (instead of the plural 'sciences') in the *Proposal* of the *Universal History*, any analysis

of the central thesis must be preceded by an understanding of what the authors meant by "Science," and the function they envisioned for it in the larger narrative of the series.[277]

This is easier said than done, however. Unlike the *Proposal*, the term 'science' rarely appears in the singular, usually in conjunction with 'the arts' (i.e. the *arts and sciences*). The meaning of the term 'Science' or 'sciences,' then,' is incorporated into the broader term. Furthermore, in only a limited number of volumes does a section on 'the Arts and Sciences' or 'Learning' appear; in most cases, it is up to the reader to find a mention of science somewhere along the massive wall of text of which the *Universal History* is comprised. It is an interesting contradiction: on the one hand, the concept of science clearly played a large role in the overarching philosophy of the *Universal History*, given the prominence it bears in the *Proposal,* yet the actual historical text does not strongly reflect this. This scarcity does not mean, however, that a theory of scientific progress is altogether absent. Science is present in what Michael Polanyi would refer to as a "tacit dimension," which pertains to the "propositions and opinions shared by a group and so obvious to it that they are never fully or systematically articulated."[278] Science, therefore, only infrequently comes to the surface on occasion when the authors felt it necessary to comment on it, mostly encapsulated in the phrase 'arts and sciences'.

Like the previous chapter, which highlighted the role played by John Campbell in the articulation of a variant of the *doux*-commerce theory in the *Universal History*, the present chapter focuses on the theories of scientific progress of another Scottish author, together with whom Campbell edited the *Universal History*: Tobias Smollett (1721-71), who was both a surgeon and respected critic. Smollett was daily exposed to a wide variety of scientific materials

[277] *Proposals for the Publishing of the Modern Part of the Universal History* (London: printed for T. Osborn et al., 1758): 15.
[278] Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977): 69.

through his work for the *Critical Review*, a periodical published between 1756 and 1790. He was, therefore, in an excellent position to comment on the virtues and utility of the sciences to the state; it seems likely that the ideas expressed in the *Universal History* with regards to the nature of science were in large part owing to Smollett.[279] In sum, this chapter will show how the authors – Smollett *primo inter alia* – directly linked the improvement of the arts and sciences to the progress of the civil state; that the authors of the *Universal History* envisioned the gentry, nobility, and kings to carry out this scientific endeavor; and lastly, that given the significant amount of nobles and gentlemen among the readership of the *Universal History*, the work should be interpreted as the authors' call to action aimed at their readers. Science in Britain, after all, was conducted largely by private individuals, unlike in France where state and science were more closely connected. Anyone endeavoring to stimulate the progress of the sciences in Britain, had to capture the attention of the wider literate audience.[280]

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Tobias Smollett had initially begun his career as a physician in 1747;[281] but fairly soon, in 1748, he turned to the literary life, producing a steady stream of novels, treatises and reviews until his death in 1771. Some of his more lasting literary works include *The Adventures of Peregrine Pickle* (1751), *The Adventures of Ferdinand Count Fathom* (1753) and his work for the *Critical Review* (1756-176?). However, of particular interest for the purpose of the chapter is

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[279] However – as with Campbell in the previous Chapter, – I must stress that it is impossible to say for certain which parts were written by which author, and which were edited by which author; therefore, when I substitute Smollett for 'the authors ', it merely indicates a high *probability* – not certainty – that Smollett was indeed the mind from which the text in question came forth.
[280] Mark Harrison, "Science and the British Empire," *Isis*, 96.1 (Mar., 2005): 56.
[281] Ibid. 3.

his pivotal role in the writing and publication of the second edition of the *Universal History* (1747-1766), which included the Modern Part. Smollett was almost certainly involved with the project as early as 1751, and reportedly edited up to one-third of the final product – which would amount to about fifteen volumes.[282] These volumes include Vol. XI, the last section pertaining to Terra Australis; Vol. XVI, concerning the West coast of Africa; Vols. XIX – XXXV, which include the histories of Spain, France, Italy, Venice, Naples, Genoa, the German states, the United Provinces, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Lithuania, and Russia.[283]

Among all the known authors of the *Universal History*, Smollett seemed the best-capable to comment and theorize on the subject of science. Smollett reviewed an unimaginable amount of articles and works during the period he contributed to the *Critical Review*, and as such would have come into contact with a great amount of scholarly works on a wide variety of topics – including science, which made up about thirty percent of the *Critical Review*'s content.[284] Smollett believed that the ultimate goal of science was "practical utility," echoing the predominant Baconian ideal of science of his age. Scientific endeavor was to be put to good use in service of the state.[285] Smollett was, in addition, a fervent opponent of those who sought to limit the practice of the sciences to the higher echelons of the socio-economic ladder only. He

[282] James G. Basker, *Tobias Smollett: Critic and Journalist* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1988): 108; Louis L. Martz, "Tobias Smollett and the Universal History," *Modern Language Notes,* 56.1 (Jan., 1941): 1, 5-7; Martz, *Career*, 7-8.

[283] The evidence which Martz cited came from reviews in the *Critical Review* which were presumably written by Smollett (based on an analysis of the language and style). The reviewer clearly has inside information on the editing process – which only an insider would know. In addition, the reviewer often cites copious amounts of the volumes he reviews, corrects the minutest typos and mistakes only an editor would catch, and often displays an abnormal amount of knowledge pertaining to the sources used in the *UH* volume in question, implying that the reviewer most likely studiously read these sources himself. However, the evidence is circumstantial – and not completely conclusive, given the absence of author lists in the *UH*. Therefore, I have elected to use the shorthand 'the authors ' instead of Smollett, unless where I am certain of his involvement. In this case, it can be safely assumed that Smollett wrote or at least largely directed the writing of Vols. XI, XVI, XXIII-XXV, XXXIII and XXXV (Australia, Africa, France, Sweden and Russia respectively).

[284] Basker, *Tobias Smollett*, 122.

[285] Ibid. 122.

detested the elitism of such institutions at Oxford and Cambridge, arguing that genuine science could be conducted elsewhere also. He argued that it ought to be the task of scientific institutions not only to discover new advances in science and disseminate these, but also to "diffuse[e] a spirit of inquiry and emulation among people who without their example, would never have dreamed of exercising their faculties in these pursuits…" (Jan. 1756, 409).[286] This idea of science having a motivational influence on the general (literate) citizenry would inform Smollett's opinions on the utility and application of scientific endeavor in the *Universal History.*

Smollett's own conception of 'science' should be understood in the context of the eighteenth century. For the most part, the definition of science was riddled with duplicity and ambiguity. Nor was the term 'science' used as such by contemporaries; instead, one would commonly refer to the 'arts and sciences.' There was no united, coherent body of knowledge now known as 'science', nor did such a body come into being overnight, or even over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The meanings and limits of 'science' were hardly established, often changing and quickly shifting.[287] The dynamic nature of the meaning of science or sciences is exemplified by the way the terms occur in the *Universal History.* Indeed, science did not have the same singular meaning universally applied across all volumes. Eighteenth-century sciences (and arts) were not separated by rigorous disciplinary boundaries as is common practice at present in schools and universities. Yet, the term science encompassed a wider range of disciplines in the early-modern period than its narrower modern counterpart. Theology, for example, was once commonly referred to as the "queen of the sciences" in the early-modern period; at same time defenders of mathematics and astronomy, such as Galileo

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[286] Ibid. 120.
[287] Steven Shapin, *The Scientific Revolution*, 2nd ed. (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2018 [1996]): 3-5.

Galilei, had yet to convince the intellectual world that they practiced a true *science*.[288] By the time of the *Universal History*, however, the tables had turned: no one questioned the legitimacy of mathematics, while "theological disquisitions" and "metaphysical jargon" were equated to "the epidemical distemper of Europe."[289] In the absence of a clear definition from the authors , one can only guess at their precise meanings; but the term 'arts & sciences' seems to have been used as an umbrella term for the different branches of knowledge without a strict nominal separation between the two.

To gain a better insight over the meaning of the 'sciences' and the 'arts,' an analysis of the various ways in which the authors employed these terms is instructive. For example, take the authors' description of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, established by Peter the Great. The academy, they wrote, was divided in the "academy properly so called" and "the university". To the former belong the "Professors" who "are employed solely in finding out new inventions or in improving the discoveries of others." These 'applied science' scholars were engaged in four "classes": "1. The Astronomical and geographical class. 2. The physical class, whose province is to make improvements in botany, anatomy, and chymistry. 3. The physico-mathematical class, who study mechanicks, civil and military architecture, and experimental philosophy. 4. The higher mathematical class, who solve questions and problems proposed by the other classes..." The Academy was a research facility; it did not teach pupils. Instead, students were taught by "particular professors" at the university, "who read lectures in the sciences, both in the Russian and Latin languages." To these "sciences" belonged "poetry, *Greek* and *Latin*, arithmetic, drawing, geometry, and other branches of the mathematics, civil and

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[288] Galileo Galilei, *Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina of Tuscany* (1615): l.151-153, 255-258; Agostino Ramelli, *The Various and Ingenious Machines* (1588).
[289] *UH*:XXXIV, 409.

ecclesiastical history, genealogy and heraldry, philosophy and antiquity."[290] Considering that the term 'science' only occurs encapsulated within the broader, non-defined 'arts and sciences', this chapter will look at the meaning of the broader term. In conclusion, the appearance of science in the central thesis of the *Universal History* (the "revival of Science, in the western world") could refer to a broad range of disciplines; it was by no means separate from 'culture' and disciplines nowadays referred to as humanities.[291]

The arts and sciences in the *Universal History* developed a particularly close relationship to the emergence of the modern state; the authors assumed the verity of the usefulness of the systematic learning in the form of the arts and sciences, and believed that it the cultivation thereof bore a direct relationship to civilizational progress. Indeed, this was the argument they made in the *Proposal* of the *Universal History,* which related "the revival of Science" to possibility of ridding the world of the "corruption of manners…and the prevalence of tyranny and superstition."[292] This echoed a remark by Voltaire, who once argued that a nation would only be endowed with individuals of genius when society as a whole had advanced.[293] The authors of the *Universal History*, likewise, were curious to uncover the historical examples of successful states and their advances in the arts and sciences. Throughout the *Universal History*, the authors were quite interested in the degree to which the arts and science, or learning, were present among the people of each society they covered. The absence of a certain desirable level of these counted towards a lower ranking in the stadia of civilization, which has been covered in Chapter I. For example, one learns that the Dutch are "proficient in science and the arts"; in

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[290]*UH*:XXXV, 40.
[291]An example of the fading boundary between science and culture, see J. Pimentel and J.R. Marcaida, "Dead Natures or Still Lifes? Science, Art, and Collecting in the Spanish Baroque," in Daniela Bleichmar and Peter C. Mancall (eds.), *Collecting Across Cultures: Material Exchanges in the Early Modern Atlantic World* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 100.
[292] *Proposal for Publishing the Modern Part of the Universal History*, *15.*
[293] Pierre Force, "Voltaire and the necessity of modern history," *Modern Intellectual History*, 6.3 (2009): 469.

Denmark, there are few “geniuses, either in the arts or sciences,” nor any doubling as “good mechanics”; the Germans “heretofore … were barbarous...; but they have been civilized and polished by their assiduous application to the study of arts and sciences, in which they have made considerable progress.”[294]

The authors viewed the arts and sciences as essential for the creation of a modern state. They judged nations by the existence of scientific programs and the quality of these programs. The nations not yet touched by the “enlightening beams of science” were destined to remain in a state of degeneracy.[295] The *Universal History* inscribed this global arena under construction to distinguish full members of the civilized community from the relics of an unscientific past. It is no wonder, then, that the authors of the *Universal History* frequently waged war on their predecessors in the camp of the Ancients. They argued that the Moderns were superior in scientific knowledge to the Ancients, who had failed to make sufficient progress in the arts and sciences. Self-evident truths of the eighteenth century, such as the spherical nature of the planet, could not have been actual ‘scientific’ knowledge among the Ancients; for the Ancients did not have a Magellan, a Drake, or a Cavendish to circumnavigate the globe and demonstrate beyond doubt the physical sphericalness of the Earth.[296] The ‘science’ of the Ancients, then, was often but conjecture, which was not on the same level of credibility. “After all, wrote Smollett (very

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[294]*UH*:XXXI, 3, 11; *UH*:XXIX, 15. The rest of the quotation reads as follows: “Yet their improvement is rather owing to indefatigable toil and industry than to their natural vivacity, genius, and penetration, in which they are counted inferior to almost all their neighbours. Indeed, this allegation seems justified by their works, which are not at all remarkable for spirit or imagination; but commonly composed of tedious citations, compiled by dint of toil and perseverance; so that they have incurred the imputation of carrying their genius not in the brain but in the back. They have nevertheless acquired some reputation in philosophy and the belles lettres, and made very *ingenious improvements in mechanics*; but their histories are not so much to be depended upon, because of their excessive credulity. This may have likewise contributed to that spirit of alchemy which hath engaged so many of their nation in search of the philosopher’s stone” (15-16).

[295]*UH*: XXXIX, 1, 133-134; Sverker Sörlin has argued that it was not until Isaac Newton made his appearance in the late seventeenth century, that science came to be *seen* as being in the interest of the state, and, therefore, could come to be seen as *necessary* for the development of the modern state. Sverker Sörlin, “Ordering the World for Europe: science as intelligence and information as seen from the northern periphery," *Osiris,* 15 (2000): 54.

[296] *UH*:XLIII:5.

likely), "guessing is not science, and if the principles of an art are not capable of demonstration, as those of astrology are not, it has no pretence to that title."[297] The term science in the *Universal History*, then, seems to denote 'systematic' or 'useful' knowledge; 'scientific' similarly, was used to denote knowledge which was deemed highly credible and valid.[298]

Besides the Ancients, the authors of the *Universal History* sparred with the multitudinous array of metaphysical systems. Metaphysics, according to a Spanish contemporary named M. Juvenal de Carlenças, was the study of "Being, in general, and spiritual Substances…"[299] One of the more famous metaphysical systems of the seventeenth century was that of René Descartes (1596-1650), the French philosopher and scientist. Grounded in his excessive skepticism culminating in his famed expression *cogito ergo sum*, Descartes built an entire metaphysical system around this one core incontrovertible truth. The Cartesian system extended beyond the *ego*, however, and strived to explain the natural world as an array of vortices filled with celestial matter or *corpuscles*. Descartes maintained that any sound philosophical system and truth had to be grounded on "eternal, unalterable, universal truths." These, in the Cartesian system, could only be discovered with the use of rational rules and the conclusions one derives therefrom. Each successive generation must build on the findings of its predecessor.[300] In response, the Anglo-Irish natural philosopher Robert Boyle (1627-1691) objected that philosophical certainties were not an accurate reflection of the physical reality of the world. He firmly maintained that the most reliable method of creating proper natural philosophical knowledge was through empirical experiments. He called this knowledge 'facts'.[301] Even though facts were constructed as

[297] *UH*:XX:140.
[298] By this definition, an 'art' could be 'scientific', while still being an *art*; not a *science*.
[299] M. Juvenal de Carlenças, *The History of the Belles Lettres, and of the Arts and Sciences, from their Origin, down to this Present Time* (London: printed for John Duncan, 1740): 121.
[300] Berlin, "The Divorce," 15.
[301] Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985): *Leviathan and the air-pump,* 22.

objective linchpins of human interpretative theories, facts could be disputed and even dismissed if found untrue – unlike metaphysical systems, which needed the *absolute* assent of everyone to remain valid.

Boyle's criticism reverberated amongst the empirical opponents of the metaphysical schools. The faults of metaphysical systems, they contended, consisted in the fact that their proofs were not based on physical evidence (Boyle's facts). It was for this reason that empiricists argued that they could construct a superior system of empirical science, because it was underpinned with countless observations to which British scientists were daily adding.[302] Instead, metaphysical philosophers were more interested in devising a novel system that could compete with other metaphysical systems than ensuring that their system reflected physical truths; and therefore, posterity generally discredited their relevance: "Such will always be the Lot of those, who, not satisfy'd with known Truth, seek to raise a Name to themselves, by the Novelty of their Systems."[303]

The authors of the *Universal History* were unanimous in their agreement with the campaign against metaphysics. In nearly every volume, one can find an example of a paragraph which denounces or derides metaphysical theorists or priests and religious leaders (who were commonly subsumed under the same label). Indeed, metaphysics was the linchpin of superstition against which the *Proposal*'s science was mainly aimed. Emblematic for the futility of metaphysical and alchemical learning was the fruitless search for the philosopher's stone.[304] But

[302] Carlenças, *The History of the Belles Lettres*, 130.
[303] Ibid. 123.
[304] Pierre Louis de Maupertuis, *Oeuvres de Maupertuis: Nouvelle Édition corrigée & augmentée*. Vol. II. (Lyon: printed for Jean-Marie Bruyset, 1768): 431. The French scientist Pierre Louis de Maupertuis argued, furthermore, that the whole search for the Philosopher's Stone, alongside that for the *perpetuum mobile*, should be outright prohibited: "large number of people possessing the necessary knowledge to judge the means and purpose of what they undertake, but flattered by imaginary rewards, spend their lives on three problems, which are the chimeres of science; I speak of the philosopher's stone, the quadrature of the circle, and the perpetual movement. The Academies

the systematic arts and sciences would rout superstition, the authors argued; and so it was in the *Universal History* when they were introduced: “Darkness was dispelled from the human mind, and jargon banished the schools; the philosophers stone was no longer the pursuit of naturalists; nor the prediction of future events, the study of astronomers.”[305] In another volume of the *Universal History*, the authors again praised the introduction of science: “In a word, the spirit of good sense, that now prevailed, destroyed insensibly those silly prejudices and superstitious notions which had so long enthralled reason, and fettered the mind in shackles, which could only be removed by the influence of *science*.”[306] The authors lamented the shameful corruption of the progress the Lithuanians had made by adopting the Latin language (still the universal language among Catholics), who, instead of “making any efforts in polite learning,” elected to apply “their knowledge of the *Roman* language to theological disquisitions, and that species of metaphysical jargon, which in those days might be deemed the epidemical distemper of *Europe*.”[307] Catholics in Poland, which bordered on Lithuania in the early eighteenth century, “pique themselves on adapting the metaphysics of Aristotle to the doctrines of Christianity, by which they render the latter in all respect as profound and unintelligible as the former.”[308]

The relationship between scientific knowledge and religion, however, was more ambiguous. Of Jewish rabbis, the authors commented that among these there were “many famed

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know the time they are losing to examine the so-called discoveries of these poor people: but it is nothing at the price of the one they lose themselves, the expense they are, and the penalties they give themselves.”

[305] *UH*:XXV:214-5; This quote reminds one of the manner in which the French mathematic and astronomer Alexis Claude Clairout (1713-65) eulogized the achievements of Isaac Newton: "The famous book of *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* marked the epoch of a great revolution in physics. The method followed by its illustrious author Sir Newton ... spread the light of mathematics on a science which up to then had remained in the darkness of conjectures and hypotheses." Alexis Clairaut, "Du systeme du monde, dans les principes de la gravitation universelle,” in *Histoires (& Memoires) de l'Academie Royale des Sciences en 1745* (1749): 329.

[306] *UH*:XXV:215.

[307] *UH*:XXXIV:409; Cf. Maupertuis, *Oeuvres,* 430: “We have long been listening to Philosophers, whose science is only a habit and a certain fold of the mind, without our having become more skillful: natural Philosophers perhaps instructed us better; they would at least give us their knowledge without having sophisticated it. After so many years in which, despite the efforts of the greatest men, our metaphysical knowledge has not made the least progress…”

[308] *UH*:XXXIV:35.

men in most sciences."[309] The greatest confusion over the dynamic between Christianity and science in the *Universal History*, however, exists due to the current interpretation of the Modern Part of the *Universal History* as a *secularized* version of universal history.[310] In fact, the worldview in which the authors operated was profoundly religious; far from espousing an atheist view of the physical world, the authors subscribed to a Protestant interpretation bordering on Deism. This explains why they are explicitly anti-Catholic, and would explain why God is never present to physically intervene in the larger narrative. Instead, God is implicitly present as the Creator of the divine design that is the natural world. There are many tacit indicators of this worldview. The authors often refer to God as "the Great Father of the universe."[311] In the last volume of the *Universal History*, which contains an 'original' approach to geography, the authors expressed their marveling at the fact the two mega-continents (Europe-Asia-Africa and the Americas) were both aligned along a single middle-line, and that the oldest civilizations could generally be found on this line (Arabia). The continents, therefore "seem[ed] both designed by Providence as a counterpoise to each other."[312] More than once do the authors describe the characteristics of individuals as being bestowed upon them by God – especially the gift of 'genius'.

The authors of the *Universal History* were, therefore, not remotely dismissive of Christianity. Nor was the progress of the arts and sciences inherently inimical to religion. Indeed, the authors, like many in the eighteenth century, saw Isaac Newton's natural system, the supposed 'secular origin of modern empirical science,' as a *reaffirmation* of the existence of a

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[309] *UH*:XII:289.
[310] This is an argument made by Tamara Griggs, "Universal History from Counter-Reformation to Enlightenment," *Modern Intellectual History,* 4.2 (2007): 236-7.
[311] *UH*:XLIII:580.
[312] *UH*:XLIII:3.

divine Creator; one who had masterfully engineered the universe and regulated it through natural laws, after which He refrained from direct intervention. [313] Not all religions, however, were created equal; and some were more compatible with scientific progress than others. The authors reaffirmed the primacy of British Protestantism over all other religions, to no one's surprise. When it came to non-British denominations of Christianity, their interpretation was rather different. The Catholic Church was portrayed as an important impediment to the progress of scientific knowledge, on account of the role it played in the so-called "darker" ages.

The Jesuit Order seemed to be an exception to the rule on account of their engagement with empirical and physical science of sorts. In the city of Grodno, for example, there was a "fraternity of *Jesus*," which was endowed with "a college for the instruction of youth, which is in considerable reputation, many of the nobility, both of *Poland* and *Lithuania*, sending their children to receive the first principles of education, under the tuition of a society celebrated for their skill in the arts and sciences."[314] The authors did not pretend that 'Jesuit science' was in any way comparable to proper British science. In their account of Madras, for example, it is mentioned that there was a native college there; but "as no art or science is studied in it, it can only be nominal." They noted that it would be prudent to alter this situation, for even the Jesuits, with "*very superficial knowledge* in practical mathematics and astronomy" had "procure[d] … a proper footing" with local rulers [emphasis mine].[315] For the authors, it was perhaps better to be altogether rid of the Jesuit order. In Vol. XLII, in a section which was meant as a supplement to

[313] Sarah Irving, *Natural Science and the Origins of the British Empire* (London: Routledge, 2015): 32-36, 73-75; Tony C. Brown, *The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012): 38.
[314] *UH:*XIV: 413.
[315] *UH*:X:241.

the History of France by bringing it up to date, the authors commended the French government for finally having "exterminated out of *France* the order of the Jesuits."[316]

However, even the Jesuits were not derided by the authors like non-European priests, astrologers, and shamans. They were the main culprits, according to the authors, for the perceived tardiness of non-European science. For example, while the authors were impressed with the magnanimity of the Mogul empire, they criticize their love for the study of astrology, "in which there are many pretenders."[317] While the authors harshly criticized the Chinese government for their inability to avert famines, they also acknowledge that it had been led astray by the Chinese astrologers, who "pretend to foretell wars, famines, sickness, droughts, good or bad seasons, and a vast number of other such *trash*."[318] Astrologers had such a strong hold on the court that the Great Mogul did not take any decision without consulting them. The African peoples, in general, practiced no scientific medicine but instead sought recourse to "their quacks; who, instead of proper remedies, pretend to cure them only by their charms; but commonly cheat them out of their money and lives."[319] These conclusions influenced the level of civilization of the various states and peoples under consideration. The existence and level of the arts and sciences, then, had a great influence on a state's position on the ladder of civilization.

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What did the ranking of states, measured by the level of scientific knowledge, look like? Unsurprisingly, the authors praised above all the (collective of) European nations as "the most renowned for learning and arts. The Europeans had brought all their scientific knowledge to a

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[316] *UH*:XLII:515.
[317] *UH*:VI:249.
[318] *UH*:VIII:186.
[319] *UH*:XIV:29.

much greater perfection than either the Asiatics or Africans ever did; and the invention and improvement of numberless useful and ingenious arts, particularly that of navigation, on which all intercourse of foreign commerce between distant nations depends, is wholly owing to the genius and industry of the inhabitants of this part of the world."[320] *Primo inter alia*, of course, stood Britain, "where science and the arts have notwithstanding flourished with more vigour, than in any other country, recorded in ancient or modern story."[321] In addition, the British Empire seems to have occupied a higher place among the European states, too. For example, the colonists in New England were described as both "the greatest traders on the continent of America" and as "daily making [progress] in the arts, sciences, and polite literature of every kind…[322]

The authors were convinced that the European nations had rightfully earned their position atop of the global hierarchy, as a result of their successful improvement of the sciences. The same was not true for the rest of the world outside Europe, which the authors deemed wholly 'unscientific' – including the ancient and traditional empires such as the Chinese, the Ottomans, and the Indians, once renowned for their learning.[323] To the authors , the failure of these empires to adapt 'modern' approaches to scientific advance was emblematic for their stagnation and decline. A central feature of this narrative of progress and decline was the history of the Islamic World, which exemplified the failure of the non-European empires to adopt (European) modern science. To the authors , this was rather surprising given the history of the early Islamic empires.

[320] *UH*:XLIII:324.
[321] *UH*:XXXIX, 184.
[322] *UH*:XXXIX:344.
[323] De Maupertuis likewise expressed this opinion: "We can scarcely doubt that several of the most remote nations do not have much knowledge which would be of use to us. When one considers the long succession of centuries during which the Chinese, the Indians, the Egyptians cultivated the sciences, and the works that come to us from their country, one cannot help regretting that there is not more communication between them and us [so that their science may be improved]." Maupertuis, *Oeuvres*, 398.

They acknowledged that, for a brief moment, the Arabic Umayyad Caliphate (660-750 CE) surpassed all of Europe in all branches of learning; and the Caliphs presided over an unprecedented flourishing of the arts, sciences, and polite literature. The Islamic Empire was dotted with centers of learning such as the Academy of Sciences at Samarkand, which was "one of the most famous seats of literature amongst the Mohammedans."[324] The ascension of the Abbasid Caliphate in 750 CE, which removed the seat of learning to Baghdad, did not damage this golden period of learning, especially under such rulers as Al-Ma'mun (786-833).[325]

However, this period of intellectual prosperity was doomed to end, the authors argued, due to the continual warfare that the Islamic states waged. The once great cultural centers of Islam suffered a "great decay of learning," due to wars, devastation and "the tyrannical government" of – for example – the North African states.[326] What probably did not help the image of the Muslims with regards to learning, arts and sciences, was their destruction of the Library of Alexandria in the early seventh century, an event the authors cite as a momentous loss for the state of Islamic learning in general. Far worse was the rule of the Islamic Ottomans, who were the enemies of learning since they "have no manner of genius or inclination for the improvement of arts and sciences." Instead, they waste their time in their harems or opium dens. Worse still, they "have no curiosity to be informed of the state of their own or any other country."[327] The authors summed up their view on the Ottomans as follows: "The Turks [are] enemies of science, politeness and liberty…"[328] The image of the decline and decay of Islamic Empires became central to European Orientalism that gained traction among European

[324] *UH*:II:342.
[325] *UH*:II:406.
[326] *UH*:XVIII:103, 236.
[327] *UH*:XLIII: 130-31.
[328] *UH*:XLIII: 21.

commentators in the eighteenth-century – especially after the Ottoman defeat at the Siege of Vienna in 1683.[329] The authors of the *Universal History* used their case as a warning of the dangers of failing to stimulate the arts and sciences within a state. It was a warning they extended to another powerhouse on the Asian continent: China.

On the whole, the authors of the *Universal History* were remarkably more positive with regard to the Chinese than any other non-European state. For example, they wrote that "it was no less matter of wonder to the *Europeans*, than to the *Chinese*, to find a part of the world, at such a distance from them, so like themselves in learning and politeness; while all the vast tracts that lay between them, are still so far inferior, not to say opposite to them, in both respect."[330] However, the authors by no means universally praised the Chinese. The Chinese were supposedly deluded by their many superstitions. The authors lambasted the inability of the Chinese government to prevent famines, even though the soil was capable of producing copious amounts of sustenance. More damning still, however, was the reluctance of the Chinese to innovate, as mentioned in Chapter I. The Chinese were slow to respond to European advances in the sciences, in which the authors agreed Europe had far surpassed them. Stagnation in a world continuously moving ahead equates to a relative decline; and the example of the Islamic states, the authors argued, had provided a strong premonition of what was in store for the Chinese if their unwillingness to adapt persisted.[331]

Lastly, there was the world outside Europe and China. The authors had no good words for these 'mostly barbaric' peoples, especially the inhabitants of the African continent. In the volumes on the African peoples, the authors warned that they would not spend an excessive

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[329] Humberto Garcia, *Islam and the English Enlightenment, 1670-1840* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2012): 13-4-33.
[330] *UH*:VIII :9.
[331] *UH*:VIII:15.

amount of time on the development of arts and sciences there: "[I]t would be as vain and absurd to seek for figs and dates growing in *Greenland,* as for arts and sciences flourishing among the *Africans*." Often, the authors would refer to this perceived lack of knowledge and science among Africans as "swarthiness of the mind."[332] The extreme negativity of the authors with regard of the intellectual prowess of the African, and especially black African peoples, continuously throws doubt on the idea – laid out in Chapter I – that progress was not restricted to Europeans solely, but could even be extended to the Africans. However, did the authors believe that it was physically possible for the African peoples to make *intellectual* advances, to improve the African *mind*?

The answer to this question relates to the Author's conception of the capacity of the human mind to further the advance of scientific knowledge. According to the authors , climate determined nearly every facet of a people, from skin color to system of government.[333] At several points in the text did they link a "hot climate" directly to "indolence" and a "lack of progress."[334] Both hot and frigid climates were unfavorable to intellectual endeavors. Of Sweden, for example, the authors remarked: "To their little taste for mechanic employments is owing their slow progress in useful manufactures, especially such as require application and ingenuity. We may add to this description that the severity of the climate seems to have influenced their minds as well as their bodies."[335] Likewise, a connection between "excesses in eating and drinking" and a decline of "the faculties of the mind" in Denmark.[336] However, even

[332] *UH*:XIV:20.
[333] Jim Egan "The "Long'd-for Aera" of an "Other Race": Climate, Identity, and James Grainger's "The Sugar-Cane"," *Early American Literature,* 38.2 (2003): 189.
[334] *UH*:VII:239.
[335] *UH*:XXXIII:6.
[336] *UH*:XXXI:12. The whole passage: ": "It is general observation, that *Denmark* has produced but few great geniuses, either in the arts or sciences; that they neither excel in imitation or invention; are neither good mechanics, or deeply skilled in speculative learning; …. Philosophers have endeavoured to explain the reasons, why shining talents are seldom conspicuous in northern cold climates; and to the physical causes we may probably add some

though the authors acknowledge the existence of a *correlation* between the climate and genius, they did not establish a *direct causal* link between them.

Climate, then, predisposed some peoples to intellectual endeavors while discouraging – but not barring – others. This simply meant that it would be more difficult for some people to adapt to the reality of the necessity of scientific progress.[337] For peoples such as the Southeast-Asian Lanjans who lived in a prosperous paradise, it was only to be expected that they would "lead an indolent life," and "neglect all art and sciences."[338] Climates that were too hot and too cold simply retarded scientific progress by draining the human mind of vigor and vitality. The ideal climate, then, fostered scientific progress. Naturally, it is the British climate that occupied the center in the authors objective standard: "our climate is so moderate, that the sun neither exhales, nor the cold phlegmatizes the spirituous parts, but allows a temperature between both; so that our native imaginations are neither too airy for consideration, nor too dull for invention."[339] The primacy that the authors gave to the British climate – as an ideal climate – closely resembles the opinion of French natural scientists such as Comte de Buffon and Pierre-Louis de Maupertuis, who both likewise believed that temperate climates were ideal for the

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political ones, which would seem to have a great influence over *Danish* genius. *Their excesses in eating and drinking must necessarily blunt the faculties of the mind.* Fancy, judgment, and memory, are all weakened or destroyed; and these causes, greatly corroborated by the despotism of the present government, and the little encouragement given to literary merit."

[337] The authors ' favorite success story of a people who, regardless of the frigid climate they inhabited, presided over a successful period of scientific progress, was that of Russia under Peter the Great: "Formerly the Russians, like all other people in their first state, were wholly employed in agriculture, feeding of cattle, hunting and fishing." "…but they were entirely unacquainted with the more ingenious mechanic arts. However, numbers of excellent artificers having been invited to *Petersburg* by *Peter the Great*, the *Russians* shewed, that, with proper instructions, they did not want a capacity for all kinds of handicraft-trades; for they have now flourishing manufactures of velvet, silk, woolen stuffs, linen, copper, brass, iron, steel, and tin; and make great guns, fire-arms, wire, cordage, sail-cloth, paper, parchment, glass, gun-powder, &c." *UH*:XXXV:155.

[338] *UH:*VII:157-158.

[339] *UH*:XLIII:579.

existence of beautiful and intelligent people.[340] It was only right, the authors argued, that the 'balanced peoples' of the world should occupy the top of the ladder.

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The hierarchy of the world's nations in regard to their scientific prowess contains few surprises, showing both the authors' prejudices toward 'non-scientific' modes of knowing, and their aspirations for scientific progress. At this point we will turn to the 'program' of encouraging the progress of the arts and sciences itself, and what the authors envisioned it to be. First of all, who, according to the authors, was to conduct this scientific learning? Who was to oversee such a program? From the onset it was quite clear whom the authors believed should *not* engage with scientific learning: the lower – often illiterate – classes. One could not expect the lower classes to engage in scientific enquiries, for – according to the authors – they were "mean, mercenary, ignorant, indolent, and indigent to an extreme."[341] Interestingly, the authors allowed the Incan king Roca, in the volume on early American history, to explain why. Roca, who established "many excellent laws" had decreed that "the children of the common people should not be taught the liberal arts and sciences, which served only to render them haughty, proud, and above labouring at the mechanic arts, so essential to the good of society."[342] This was a policy which a later successor, Huayna Capac, continued. Capac, too, said that "the sciences should be taught only to the nobility. Knowledge made the vulgar proud, insolent, conceited, lazy, and unfit for the profession suitable to their sphere of life, while they qualified the nobility for the

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[340] Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, "The Geographical and Cultural Distribution of Mankind'," in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (ed.), *Race and the Enlightenment: A Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997): 26; Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, *The Earthly Venus (Venus Physique)*, Simone Brangier Boas (trans.) (New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1966 [1745]): 67.
[341] *UH*:XXXIV:6. This section specifically deals with the Polish peoples, but the authors submitted that their criticism could be universally extended to lower classes across the world.
[342] *UH*:XXXIX:43.

government of the state. Politics, especially, would he say, is a science with which the vulgar should not be permitted to meddle."[343] Though both these speeches were made by non-European kings, the authors of these sections expressed their utmost agreement with the statements contained therein.

Indeed, the authors were convinced that the arts and sciences ought to be conducted by those individuals of the right rank and position. Among these were East India Company Officials and Merchants. Through their commerce and extensive voyages, they contributed directly to the acquisition of certain geographic knowledge, allowing for the creation of helpful maps. Additional navigational technology further stimulated commerce, a virtuous circle.[344] Campbell, in Vol. XI, put it thusly: "Nothing can be more favorable to the progress of those studies, than the leisure and peculiar circumstances which attend many of the company's agents. The length of their voyages, the changes of climate, the serenity and clearness of the sky, the necessary knowledge they must have in arithmetic, and the principles of geometry, navigation, and geography, all afford the happiest occasions for promoting science and the arts."[345] However, merchants were by no means constituted the ideal scientific community in the eyes of the authors . Instead, they turned their gaze to men of a more respectable social rank.

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[343] *UH*:XXXIX:83.

[344] *UH*:XI:372. The full quote: "By the application of the loadstone, and the nice theory of the needle, all those inconveniencies are removed; the meridian line is known with equal ease and certainty; the mariner is enabled to quit the old and timid manner, to steer boldly into the wide ocean, and to force his passage to the most distant parts of the globe by the shortest, fastest, and most expeditious ways imaginable. Such was the invention which enabled the Portuguese, in the beginnings of the 15th century, to make prodigious voyages and discoveries in the east. The success attending their endeavours gave rise to that series of voyages and travels, which soon became no less advantageous to commerce than to society and science in general. The fables of the antients have been supplanted by true history; every part of the globe is found to be inhabited; …"

[345] *UH*:XI:241. "But," he laments, "the acquisition of money seems to be the only view of those gentlemen, in which, indeed, they are not to be blamed, considering the value put upon it in the mother country, where it gives honour, esteem, and worth at pleasure."

It was kings, nobles and gentlemen, each fulfilling a different role, whom the authors of the *Universal History* had in mind when envisioning the community responsible for scientific progress in the *Universal History*. Nobles and gentlemen were to directly engage with scientific inquiry, while the king was essential in providing funding, opportunity and direction to the scientific program of the state. The authors often express their preference for kings and noblemen who were "great encourager[s] of the arts and sciences" or "learned," both signifying positive character attributes throughout the *Universal History*.[346] The ideal Patron-King, then, had three primary tasks. He should (1) stimulate trade and commerce, (2) protect the state from foreign invasion (for war is the enemy of science) and (3) he could directly stimulate the arts and sciences through patronage and founding universities.[347] Alternatively, he could promote the sciences is "by shewing a singular respect for those who excelled in them."[348] A monarch who failed at these three tasks could be no true patron of the arts and sciences. For example, the authors argued that the reason for the dismal state of scientific learning among the Ottomans is their despotic government; and that the past flourishing of the Ottoman Empire had (in 1750s hindsight) been only temporary, owing to the skill of individual rulers.[349]

The role of the king of encourager of the arts and sciences in the *Universal History* is similar to that once argued for by Francis Bacon (1561-1626), an English philosopher and

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[346] *UH*:XII:136.

[347] *UH*:XXXVI:343. A few examples: The Tonkinese kings, according to the authors , actively encouraged their subjects "to refine and improve all the sciences." The reward for excelling in learning was nobility and royal recognition. As a result, a sizeable class of respectable physicians exists amongst them. *UH:*XLIII:233.
Of the city of Florence: "Her people were rich, powerful, united, and flourishing in learning, arts, and sciences, beyond perhaps what any people ever were …. All this prosperity was owing to the wisdom and virtue of a private citizen, Lorenzo de Medici." *UH*:XXXVI:341.
Under the Prussian king Frederick I (d.1713) of Brandenburg, the state flourished. He stimulated (1) their industry and trade, which let to (2) luxury to appear in the form of "clothes, tables, equipages, and buildings." As a result, (3) "the fine arts now began to flourish in Berlin" and therefore the king founded "an academy of painters"; lastly, (4) the king founded a Royal Academy of Sciences. *UH:*XLII:265.

[348] *UH*:XX:221.

[349] *UH*:XLIII:132.

statesman. Bacon envisioned the king (in Bacon's case, the Scottish, English, and Irish King James VI & I (1566-1625)) as the ideal patron of the arts and sciences. Bacon hoped that King James would play a central role in Bacon's scientific plans, which featured the creation of a modern scientific institution, where the sciences were systematically practiced. [350] Not only King James, added the authors of the *Universal History*, but *any* king ought to endeavor to encourage the growth of the sciences in his realm. In the case of Poland, they wrote, "one able monarch or minister might raise Poland from its present despicable situation..."[351] It was the lack of a royal court in the Dutch Republic due to their "abhorrence of regal power" and "distaste of the manners of the polite nations" that they fail "to raise many men of genius, or to cultivate the more refined arts of contemplative life and liberal science."[352] The special importance the authors placed on the king with regard to national science resembles an argument made by Voltaire, who argued that a strong-willed force – especially an enlightened monarch – was sufficient to salvage a modern state out of the (medieval, superstitious, irrational, etc.) past and put it onto the path to progress.[353]

It is also very likely that the authors were acquainted with a letter written by the French scientist Pierre Louis de Maupertuis, entitled *Lettre sur le Progrès de Sciences* (1752), a

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[350] Charles Whitney, "Francis Bacon's Instauratio: Dominion of and over Humanity," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50.3 (1989): 377; Rose-Mary Sargent, "From Bacon to Banks: The vision and the realities of pursuing science for the common good," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 43.1 (Mar., 2012): 82-84; Tobin L. Craig, "On the Significance of the Literary Character of Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* for an Understanding of His Political Thought," *The Review of Politics* 72 (2010): 219; Silvia Manzo, "Francis Bacon: Freedom, authority and science," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 14.2 (2006): 256; John Channing Briggs, "Bacon's science and religion," in Markku Peltonen, *The Cambridge Companion to Bacon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 182-184.

[351]Ibid. 35.

[352]*UH*:XLIII, 472-73. This excerpt comes from the second-to-last volume of the series, which contains summaries and additions to the other volumes. This addition contradicts the description of the United Provinces in Vol. XXXI, which claimed that the Dutch were "proficient in science and the arts," although this was probably an allusion to their "ingenious mechanics" (3, 11).

[353] Ezequiel Adamovsky, *Euro-Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France (c. 1740-1880)* (Oxford: Peter Lang AG, 2006): 39.

translation of which appeared in sections in *The Edinburgh Magazine* throughout 1759.[354] Maupertuis's letter was addressed to the King of Prussia and positioned the king as the ideal person to direct the scientific effort of the state in those directions where he deemed it to be most needed and useful. "There are," he wrote, "sciences which require for their progress the power of the sovereigns; they are all those which require greater expenses than can be made by individuals, or experiments which under ordinary circumstances would not be practicable."[355] The king, furthermore, had direct influence on the scientific endeavors of his subjects because he could "promote their progress by making the study of them advantageous."[356] The opposite effect occurred when the King exploited his subjects, as the authors of the *Universal History* demonstrated. Scientific learning in the kingdom of Siam, for example, never developed because their king required artists and scientists to work gratis for him.[357]

However, a Patron-King by himself could do little to establish the permanency scientific institutions required. Without established institutions and other individuals attached to the project, the scientific endeavors of a king will follow him into the grave. For example, Casimir the Great of Poland was an unusually strong and vigorous Polish king. Upon ascending the throne, he rid the country of brigands, thereby opening up the roads. This allowed peasants to return to their lands, but moreover, it gave merchants the opportunity to engage "afresh in commerce," while the "mechanic reaped securely the fruits of his industry." The return of commerce "enlarged and repeopled" the cities; and, as a result, "civil society was reestablished,

[354] Walter Ruddiman Jr. (ed.), "A Letter to the King of PRUSSIA, from the famous M. de Maupertuis, on the progress of the sciences." *The Edinburgh Magazine*, Vol. 3 (Aug.-Oct., 1759): 404-7, 460-1, 512-8. Accessed April, 2020. https://search-proquest-com.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/publication/publications_2774?accountid=12725
[355] Maupertuis, *Oeuvres*, 376, 377. The letter is addressed to the King of Prussia. The link with the *UH* can be deduced from the fact that the authors of the *UH* referred to this letter in Vol. XLIV and quoted it at length, demonstrating that some among the authors were acquainted with it.
[356] Maupertuis, *Oeuvres*, 377.
[357] *UH*:VII:241.

and the arts and sciences began to be cultivated, where they were before unknown, under the auspices of their royal patron" (Task 1).[358] Casimir furthermore secured this progress by making peace with Russia, which avoided warfare with Poland's archenemy (Task 2). Lastly, he established the University of Cracow (Task 3).

Despite Casimir's virtuous rule, it had not yet changed Poland for the better in any significant way. The authors still considered Poland to be backward vis-à-vis the western part of Europe: "Poland is now what the more civilized nations of Europe were two centuries ago."[359] Even though Poland possessed the University of Cracow, "the sciences have made but little progress."[360] The Polish commoners could not be blamed, for they could not be expected to practice the arts and sciences, let alone read. It was the Polish nobility, though "early initiated in letters" who "seldom make any progress in matters of taste or science."[361] While the situation might look dire for Poland, the authors contend that "they are not incapable of reformation," since an encouragement of "greater progress in science and the arts, would produce an intire change."[362]

In short, the key to the development of the sciences laid with the gentry and the nobility, according to the authors. It is not incidental that a sizable number of the subscribing audience to the *Universal History* consisted of English nobles and gentlemen. The authors presented a clear message to them: it was up to nobles and gentlemen to further the cause of scientific learning for the benefit of the nation. In this admonishment the authors of the *Universal History* echoed the example set by Robert Boyle and the Royal Society of London less than a century earlier

[358] *UH*:XXXIV:64-65.
[359] *UH*:XXXIV, 34.
[360] Ibid. 3.
[361] Ibid. 6, 5.
[362] Ibid. 35.

(1660s). The royal society was funded by and consisted of English gentry, partially sacrificing their good names in the pursuit of experimental science in accordance to the rules and guidelines laid out by Boyle. Additionally, the emphasis on the ultimate usefulness of scientific endeavors alluded to the awareness on part of the authors with the ideas of Francis Bacon and his *New Atlantis*. The authors, then, identified two countries whose monarchs and nobility had successfully managed to improve the scientific institutions of the state. The monarchs of these countries, then, were to serve as role models for any monarch wishing to further the progress of the sciences in his state: Louis XIV of France, and Peter the Great of Russia. In both cases – and this was unique – an entire chapter was devoted to their influence on the progress of science and the arts.

At this point, it is important to specifically mention the role that Smollett played in the writing of the volumes of the *Universal History* concerning Louis XIV and Peter the Great, because it was Smollett's input that informs our understanding of the sections discussed below. Unlike most of the volumes loosely attributed to Smollett, it is more than likely that Vol. XXV (on France) and Vols. XXXIII and XXXV (Sweden and Russia) can be attributed to his pen.[363] In a section title 'Containing a Survey of the civil Policy of France, the Progress of Arts and Sciences, during the Reign of Lewis XIV,' Smollett discussed the politics of Louis XIV in furthering the sciences in France, helped by his ministers Richelieu, Colbert and Mazarin. The section, however, is hardly original work: in fact, it is largely based on Voltaire's *Le Siècle de Louis XIV*, a work of history dealing with the state and progress of France under the rule of *le Roi Soleil*.[364] Voltaire, in his work, aimed to show "the progress of the human mind and of all the

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[363] Or, at the very least, the sections concerning scientific progress discussed here.
[364] M. de Francheville, *Le Siècle de Louis XIV*. 2 vols. (Berlin: C.F.Henning, Royal Printer, 1752). This is supported by several mentions Smollett makes of Voltaire in the main body of the text as a source of inspiration.

arts under Louis XIV," presenting his reign as "an example for the centuries to come."[365] In 1761, Tobias Smollett - alongside Thomas Francklin - edited an English translation of Voltaire's complete *Works*.[366] According to historian Eugène Joliat, Smollett's main role was to annotate and edit Voltaire's prose, independently from Francklin, who translated the dramatic works. He critically reviewed Voltaire's work, correcting statements and adding copious notes. He was, therefore, most certainly well-acquainted with Voltaire's texts.[367]

Like Voltaire, Smollett concluded that "the reign of Lewis the Great effected a total revolution in the arts, genius, manners, and civil policy of the *French* nation."[368] Smollett praised Louis XIV for his role in changing the "manners, the habits, and the prejudices, of the people"; and, they wrote, "it was by enlightening the mind, introducing science, and removing that dark cloud of ignorance, in which the greater part of Europe was still enveloped, that these great purposes were effected."[369] Inspired by the "experimental academy at Florence and the royal society in London," Louis XIV decided to found his own Academy of Sciences, and had "persons eminent in science … honour the new academy with their presence; Cassini was brought from Italy, and Huygens from Holland..."[370]

Louis XIV had successfully effected the creation of a "culture of the mind" in France, by pushing "to the summit of perfection" the arts, architecture, poetry, comedy, history, law, et cetera.[371] With the help of the Academies of Douay and Metz, Louis XIV could rely on the artillery officers properly instructed in mechanical arts and proper cannon usage. In addition, the

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[365] Force, "Voltaire and the necessity of modern history," 465.
[366] Tobias Smollett, et al. *The Works of Mr. de Voltaire. Translated from the French. With notes historical and critical.* 36 vols. (London: printed for J. Newbery, R. Baldwin, etc., 1761-69).
[367] Eugène Joliat, "Smollett, Editor of Voltaire," *Modern Language Notes*, 54.6 (Jun., 1939): 429-432.
[368] *UH*:XXV:214.
[369]*UH*:XXV, 214.
[370]Ibid. 214.
[371]Ibid. 215-216.

"seminary for sailors" that he founded "secured and promoted trade."[372] In sum, Smollett praised Louis XIV because he "introduced industry, promoted commerce, cherished and cultivated science"; and thereby saved a country in which, prior to his ascension, "commerce [was] almost unknown, arts and science [were] plunged in obscurity..."[373] Unfortunately, Louis XIV almost undid his own legacy of patron of the golden age of learning in France through his failure to uphold the second task of the ideal Patron-King. After the death of minister Colbert, Louis waged an unfettered war against the major powers in Europe, which at once exhausted the country and impeded the progress of the arts and sciences.[374]

Voltaire's influence is also noticeable in Smollett's treatment of scientific progress during the rule of Peter the Great of Russia. He based most of the volume of Sweden and most of the one on Russia on Voltaire's *History of Charles XII* (1731) and *History of the Empire of Russia under Peter the Great* (1759) respectively.[375] His role as editor and annotator of these works would almost certainly be fresh on Smollett's mind when he edited the *Universal History* volume on Russia, which was published in 1762. Voltaire's views of Russia therefore illuminate Smollett's opinions on the same. Voltaire, for one, was instrumental in the creation of the eighteenth-century myth of Russia as 'a land of possibility' governed by 'enlightened czars' – especially Peter the Great, whom he admired.[376] Voltaire also cultivated a friendly relationship with Elizabeth, the Tsarina of Russia, who made him an honorable member of the Russian

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[372]Ibid. 217, 218.
[373]Ibid. 222; some contemporary historians have supported the idea that Louis XIV had an overall beneficial influence on the state of science in France, presiding over the creation of a "scientifico-colonial machine" which integrated science, the state and the colonial empire under one imperial bureaucracy. James E. McClellan III, and François Regourd, "The Colonial Machine: French science and colonization in the Ancien regime," *Osiris*, 15 (2000): 32.
[374] Ibid. 220.
[375] M. de Francheville, *Histoire de l'empire de Russie, sous Pierre Le Grand. Par l'Auteur de l'Histoire de Charles XII*. 2 vols. (1759-63); Voltaire, *Histoire de Charles XII* (1731).
[376] Adamovsky, *Euro-Orientalism*, 37.

Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg in 1746. In 1757, she commissioned Voltaire to write a history of Peter the Great, which was eventually published as *Histoire de l'empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand* (1759-63). Voltaire intended the work to narrate the story of how Peter the Great founded the modern Russian nation through domestic reforms and imitating the western European nations. He praised Peter the Great for his learning and patronage of the arts and sciences.[377]

Not surprisingly, Smollett viewed Peter the Great in the same manner. The story of Peter the Great's restoration of western science in Russia, is one that begins in Sweden. The Swedes, the authors claimed, were "alert and ready enough in learning the elements of arts and science, … seldom [making] any great proficiency..."[378] Nevertheless, the majority of Swedish nobles were educated in the arts and sciences and engaged in some form of learning. Another activity these nobles would definitely be engaged in under the militaristic regime of Charles XII was war. The outbreak of the Great Northern War in 1700 had forced Charles XII and his officers to fight off several foes, among whom was the giant of the East, Russia. In 1709, the Russians decisively defeated the Swedish at the Battle of Poltava in the Ukraine, which led to a large number of Swedish officers being taken prisoner.

On the orders of Peter the Great, the czar of the Russian empire, the Swedish officers were brought into the empire and put to work as "painters, sculptors, or architects; some taught the languages and mathematics." Some of the nobles were sent to the city of Tobolsk in Siberia, where "they set up schools there in the year 1714, for teaching the children of *Swedes, Russians, Cosaks, Tartars, &c.* the *German, Latin,* and *French* languages, with geography, geometry, and drawing. Many of them also took in boarders; and these schools acquired such reputation that

[377] Inna Gorbatov, "Voltaire and Russia in the Age of Enlightenment," *Orbis Litterarum*, 62.5 (2007): 382-3.
[378] *UH*:XXXIII, 6.

children were sent to them from great distances, to be educated."[379] The beneficial effect the capture of the Swedish nobles had on the country was so successful, that the authors concluded "that by the victory of Pultowa, Peter the Great not only laid the foundation of power and security of Russia, but of the arts and sciences, at that time wholly unknown in his empire."[380] Most of these officers would remain in Russia until the Treaty of Nystadt, which ended the Great Northern War in 1721, when most officers returned to Sweden. [381]

Despite their departure, the nobles had contributed to the beginning of what the authors of the *Universal History* termed the arrival of the arts and sciences in Russia – again an example of the instrumental role played by the nobility in the development of the sciences. Yet, the authors made sure to emphasize the critical role played by Peter the Great himself. He founded the aforementioned Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg in 1724, which "inspire[d his subjects] with a taste for arts and sciences."[382] Peter the Great famously traversed Europe to study the arts, sciences and mechanical arts himself, such as shipbuilding, astronomy, navigation, and architecture. He furthermore encouraged his subjects, contrary to his predecessors, to do the same. Furthermore, Czar Peter invited to Petersburg some "excellent artificers" to instruct the Russian people in "the more ingenious arts" to manufacture "all kinds of handicraft-trades."[383] He personally saw to the encouragement of the arts and sciences throughout his realm. For example, he spent most of the winter in 1706 in Moscow for that purpose.[384] Without the leadership of Peter the Great and his reforms in the institution of learning in Russia, the authors

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[379] *UH*:XXXV:87.
[380] Ibid. 369.
[381] *UH*:XXXV:87.
[382] Ibid. 39-40, 155.
[383] Ibid. 155-156, 399-401.
[384] *UH*:XXXV:429.

conclude, the empire "would have relapsed into the chaos from which it had formerly emerged."[385]

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The *Universal History* provided the reader with a wide array of colorful ideas about scientific learning and the benefit of the arts and sciences to the growth of the state. The motions of scientific progress, the authors argued, were indiscernible to the individual observer; only universal – or "general" – history can transgress regional boundaries to tie histories together and allow the reader to draw inferences from the whole.[386] The advances of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century historical methodology had made available an abundance of material simply waiting for the general historian to synthesize in a useful general narrative.[387] In their method, the authors of the *Universal History* stood halfway between traditional humanistic history (with an emphasis on the public transactions of individuals and rulers) and Voltaire's critical method, which required one to be "discriminating in the extreme; only what serves to tell the story of the progress of the human mind is relevant."[388] Voltaire fervently believed that the interdependency of the world, recently interconnected through global commerce, required a new, modern history with a new guiding principle.[389] But what was this principle to be? What aspect of history were

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[385] Ibid. 448. According to the authors , the effect could be said to have lasted: "Since the time of Peter I, the empress Elizabeth has also erected a university and two seminaries at Moscow. However, the number of Russian literati is as yet but small: and as there are only three universities in that vast empire, which are those of Petersburg, Kiew, and Moscow, learning may be said to be only in its infancy in Russia: nor must we judge of the state of literature in the whole empire, from the present appearances at Petersburg; though the Russians are far from wanting natural talents." Ibid. 155.
[386] *UH*:XLIV:xx.
[387] Force, "Voltaire and the necessity of modern history," 479; Guido Abbattista, "The Historical Thought of the French Philosophes," in José Rabasa et al (eds.), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing: Volume 3: 1400-1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 406.
[388] Force, "Voltaire and the necessity of modern history," 479; Abbattista, "Historical Thought of the French Philosophes," 406.
[389] Force, "Voltaire and the necessity of modern history," 475.

universal historians to emphasize, in order to discern the important from the frivolous, the momentous from the unimpactful, the "finest hours of mankind" from the masses of darkness?[390]

The uniting principle, to the authors of the *Universal History*, was certain, useful, demonstrable and systematic, or 'scientific' knowledge: *science*.[391] Science was the "justification" that allowed the historical narrative to move towards a higher ideal; and by continually perpetuating this view, the *Universal History* strove to make this ideal a reality.[392] Science and Progress replaced Providence as the great unifier, the one weapon that could break through cultural and religious barriers. Both Protestants and Catholics, Muslims, Confucians and barbarians could – in theory – unite behind the promise of scientific progress. In the words of the German historian Wilhelm Dilthey: "from the sphere of natural science, with its universally valid knowledge of the lawful system of the universe, came the idea of the solidarity and progress of the human race." The universal applicability of the Newtonian system of science, then, made such a universality possible.[393]

It was the principle of science that allowed the authors a complete historical narrative, complete with heroes, villains, and awesome clashes. It was the story of how the Arabic nations had failed to adapt to the new reality of the need for scientific progress. It was the story of how China was on the edge between stagnant stability and ruinous decline. It was the story of how rampant luxury, left unchecked by commerce and science, could ruin entire nations.[394] It was the

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[390] Berlin, "The Divorce," 18.

[391] Encapsulating both the arts and sciences that lived up to the title 'scientific.' An art such as rhetoric could be a science, while an art such as astrology did not. Yet both are arts.

[392] Jennifer Pitts, "The Global in Enlightenment Historical Thought," in Prasenjit Duara, Viren Murthy, and Andrew Sartori (eds.), *A Companion to Global Historical Thought* (Malden: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2014): 191.

[393] Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Eighteenth Century and the Historical World (1901)" in Rudolf A. Makreel and Frithjof Rodi, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works. Volume IV: Hermeneutics and the Study of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 339.

[394] The most eloquent example of this was the African kingdom of Whidah, which was conquered by the king of Dahomey, who used stratagem to easily rout the "effeminate soldiers" of the Whidah army. "The fate of this kingdom furnishes a striking lesson to all commercial states, how they suffer luxury, the natural concomitant of

story of noble kings, single-handedly lifting their country out of superstition. It was the story of collective action of kings, nobles, gentlemen, scientists and merchants, that the progress of civilization can be guaranteed.[395] It was the story of barbarians, who, despite their disadvantage in climate and culture, had every opportunity to better themselves. But above all, it was the narrative of how the Europeans had been given "a superiority to all, and the command over many nations, in the other parts of the globe," and that "by the revival of Science, in the western world."[396]

Though the authors of the *Universal History* did not articulate this narrative on every single page, in every single section, it is a narrative that is *always* implicitly present, informing the authors ' interpretation of the vicissitudes of national scientific progress. This overarching super-narrative in the *Universal History*, then, above all, served as a *call to action*, aimed at a middle-class and upper-class audience. The authors ' admonished their readers to take up the call, and to participate in the commercial and scientific enterprise of the British nation, on which it had come to depend. 'Look at the countless examples of peoples who failed to rise,' the authors would say. In a word, the whole enterprise of state-building itself was dependent on the participation of those who practiced the sciences.[397] The many examples listed in this chapter all

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wealth, to creep among the people. It may, as a judicious modern essayist observes, help to civilize and refine the manners; but it at the same time weakens and debauches the mind. Luxury may introduce arts, and improve science; but it will surely enervate the genius by excess, ruin the morals, excite at once a spirit of avarice and profusion, destroy public spirit and patriotism, confining our whole views to the gratifications of our unruly passions, and the means of supporting our pleasures, at the expence of honour, honesty, liberty, religion, and every thing that can or ought to be dear to man." *UH*:XVI:411; Smollett, *Critical Review*, IX:257.

[395] An idea echoing the views of Kames, Smith, Ferguson, Hume and Millar, all contemporary writers, on the corrupting effects of luxury on civilization. David Carrithers, "The Enlightenment Science of Society," in Christopher Fox, Roy Porter, and Robert Wokler (eds.), *Inventing Human Science: Eighteenth-Century Domains* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995): 236.

[396] *Proposals*, 15-16.

[397] Sörlin, "Ordering the World for Europe," 54-56.

reinforced the idea that scientific progress was not only within the reach of respectable classes of a state; it was their *responsibility* to effect it.[398]

The *Universal History*, in conclusion, was imbued with a teleological dimension that prophesied the eventual ascendancy of Europe to the seat of world domination and high civilization. All that was required of the aspiring hegemonic, civilized state, was to follow the examples set out in the *Universal History*: to implement the scientific programs of Louis XIV and Peter the Great; to encourage the nobility and gentry to partake in scientific endeavors; and to stimulate commerce, both contingent on and a stimulant of the sciences. And finally, the monarch was responsible for the creation of official channels of communication with the major hubs of science, such as the Royal Society or the Academy of Sciences in Paris. These were the elements of the history of the modern world. It prophesied the ascendancy of Europe to the universal throne of the globe. It was a narrative that, through the universal working of science, applied to every nation and people across the world. Scientific progress, then, was the last stage of civilization. And science, the spring behind the narrative of modern history, became the element that made the British *Universal History* truly *universal*.

[398] An idea anticipating Kant's later dictum that the citizen was essentially *historical*, meaning that "he fulfills his moral task only in the continuity of culture." Wilhelm Dilthey, "Friedrich Christoph Schlosser and the Problem of Universal History (1862)" in Rudolf A. Makreel and Frithjof Rodi, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works. Volume IV: Hermeneutics and the Study of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 299.

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