ABSTRACT

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A common expectation is that non-Whites should express high levels of patriotism and should positively identify with America regardless of the extent to which their own "Americanness" has historically been and continues to be called into question. Previous research has consistently shown that Black Americans report lower levels of patriotic attitudes than White Americans, but a dearth of research analyzes patriotism among groups that identify as non-White *and* non-Black, and even fewer examinations discuss the ways in which distinctive social "othering" of racial groups shapes differences in patriotism. This study investigates if and how patriotism varies among Asian, Black, Latinx, and White Americans, and how the "politics of national belonging" can help us understand apparent racial divides. Through an examination of General Social Survey (GSS) data from 2004 and 2014, findings reveal that the vast majority of Americans report high levels of general pride in America. However, when asked about American pride in the context of the history of America and its treatment of groups, a Black/non-Black divide emerges indicating that the distinctive historical and continuing exclusion of Black Americans has a significant effect on expressions of patriotism.

The Racial Divide in Patriotic Attitudes

by
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BIOGRAPHY

Knia Olivia Fleming is a Master's student studying at North Carolina State University in the Sociology and Anthropology Department. Born and raised in Maryland, she attended Towson University in Baltimore, Maryland. While studying, she was involved in various activities including the Towson University Marching Band Color Guard, Orchestra, and Black Student Union. She also worked on-campus as a Resident Assistant and an Undergraduate Learning Assistant for the Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice Department. As a criminal justice major, she completed a combination of criminology and sociology centered courses, however, after completing a course in Race and Crime, taught by Towson University Associate Professor Elyshia Aseltine, she became interested in studying racial inequality more broadly. In her last year at Towson, she was awarded the *Irwin Goldberg Award for Outstanding Achievement in Sociological Research* for her first major sociological paper titled "Race Differences in Possible Predictors of the Authoritarian Child-Rearing Style and Corporal Punishment Support." She then decided that she wanted to further her education in the subject of inequality.

After graduating from Towson University with a Bachelor's of Science in Criminal Justice in 2014, she applied to and was accepted into the Sociology and Anthropology graduate program at North Carolina State University. She chose to specialize in the Inequality: Class, Race, and Gender area. In her second year, she collaborated with two other colleagues on a presentation discussing gender and bodies with middle school students attending Cary Academy. She is currently a member of the Southern Sociological Society and has attended its conferences, in addition to the Annual National Conference for Race and Ethnicity in American Higher Education and the Annual Faculty Women of Color in the Academy National Conference.

Knia currently lives in Raleigh, North Carolina and is on track to graduate in May 2018. She plans to use her years of education in sociology to utilize social media platforms to publish sociological literature that is more attainable for non-academics and to engage in public discussions about social inequality in order to bring awareness to and understanding of social problems relating to race, class, gender, sexuality, and their intersections.

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Recent events have spurred national conversations about what constitutes legitimate displays of patriotism and "Americanness." At the start of a nationally televised football game between the San Francisco 49ers and the Green Bay Packers on August 26, 2016, San Francisco 49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick publicly protested the oppression of people of color and ongoing police brutality against African Americans by refusing to stand during the national anthem. Many football fans responded with outrage, concerned with his apparent disrespect toward the flag and his decision to bring racial politics into an ostensibly racially neutral and patriotic arena. Instead of addressing the subject of Kaepernick's protest, opponents redirected attention toward Kaepernick, inferring that he was a bad American because of his unpatriotic public display of protest during the national anthem and against the backdrop of the American flag. In the 2017 football season, Kaepernick was not able to procure employment in the National Football League (NFL), most likely because his protests were unpopular with management and fans. However, additional professional football players, mostly African American, have since joined in the protests, kneeling during the national anthem and experiencing similar reactions from fans. Though there is no law or rule against kneeling during the national anthem, the mostly White viewership and fans of the NFL chastised the mostly Black players that participated in the protest. The mostly White audience is able to ignore racial inequality as they publicly proclaim their patriotism and dedication to "liberty, freedom, and justice for all." President Donald Trump's participation in and endorsement of the backlash serves to legitimize this willful ignorance.

The expectation is that people of color should be deferential, to display the utmost pride in their country, and to participate national rituals with no hesitation while "holding one's

tongue" about racial injustice. Dominant group membership is inextricably linked to strong national identification because of the racialization and colonization of America (Doane Jr. 1997; Tuan 1999; Golash-Boza 2006; Glenn 2011; Glenn 2015). Members have the ability to undermine the credibility and the Americanness of marginalized groups, particularly those that criticize America (Theiss-Morse 2009). In doing so, dominant group members, who regard themselves as "having preeminent right to and ownership of the nation, its resources, and its symbols" (Sidanius et al. 1997:105), protect their position in the racial hierarchy. These active and passive forms of boundary making serve to exclude marginalized groups that do not fit the socially constructed conception of a "true American," while simultaneously sanctioning those that fail to express unwavering love for their country.

The "Americanness" of non-Whites has been constantly disputed and has been actively prevented throughout U.S. history (Tuan 1999; Golash-Boza 2006; Glenn 2011, von Vocano 2014). Throughout the nineteenth century, about 90 percent of Blacks were slaves and thus not considered citizens (Feagin 1986). Though freed blacks were citizens, they were granted limited citizenship rights. Moreover, formal citizenship did not guarantee equal treatment. Blacks were routinely denied the right to education as there were very few schools that they were permitted to enroll into. They were also denied the right to vote. Entering the twentieth century, schools, jobs, and neighborhoods remained highly segregated as skin color and additional indicators of racial group membership continued to be distinctive markers of difference. Despite the establishment of constitutional amendments that legally granted Blacks more citizenship rights in the 1950s and 1960s, extra-legal discrimination persisted as a result of systemic racism and the threat of violence by resentful Whites and institutions representing them.

Formal U.S. citizenship, a preeminent marker of "Americanness," has historically been linked to whiteness (Golash-Boza 2006). In fact, the Supreme Court legally sanctioned and the scientific community legitimated the connection between formal citizenship and whiteness. The Supreme Court rulings of Takao Ozawa v. United States (1922) and United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (1923) mandated that persons migrating from Asian countries were ineligible for U.S. citizenship (Lee and Bean 2012). The Supreme Court determined that despite Takao Ozawa's skin color, he could not naturalize as White because he was of Japanese origin, and not "Caucasian" according to dominant conceptions within the scientific community. Only a year later, Bhagat Singh Thind, who had migrated from India to the United States, was classified by scientists as a member of the "Caucasian" race, but was still denied citizenship because the Supreme Court ruled that not all "Caucasians" were White. It has been nearly a century since these overtly racist rulings; however, to this day, the citizenship and "Americanness" of non-Whites continue to be called into question by institutions and in everyday interactions (Tuan 1999). Despite this, non-Whites are still expected to express high levels of patriotism and positive associations with America (Harlow and Dundes 2004; Theiss-Morse 2009).

The current study seeks to answer the question: Do non-Whites report high levels of patriotism? Based on American history, non-Whites may be more critical of America, expressing lower levels of patriotism than Whites. Blacks may be especially critical, given historical and contemporary experiences with racial injustice stemming from the "U.S. racial state" (Jung and Kwon 2013; Omi and Winant 2014). Using the General Social Survey, I assess these expectations, comparing self-reported levels of patriotism among Asian, Black, Latinx and White Americans. I find that Asian and Latinxs appear to be just as patriotic as Whites are, while

Blacks generally report lower levels of patriotic feelings, implying that the historical exclusion of Blacks has had a unique, lasting effect on their valuation of and connection with America.

RACIAL STRATIFICATION AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL BELONGING

To understand the dynamics of and the relationship between racism and patriotism, I rely on the "politics of national belonging" framework. In his critique of assimilation scholarship, Jung (2009) argued that assimilation theory generally fails to acknowledge the role of inequality and domination in thwarting achievement among racialized others. Assimilation theory's attention to increasing similarity and decreasing difference among Americans detracts from the power relations embedded in, and foundational to, racial relations in America. Instead of focusing on barriers to similarity, Jung (2009) concludes that researchers should investigate the politics of national belonging and focus on understanding barriers to equality and freedom. By focusing on racial politics, and what prevents equality and freedom, we may better understand the power dynamics involved in the making (and remaking) of the nation (Jung 2009). The politics of national belonging framework, in combination with racial stratification scholarship, can help inform us of the ways in which different groups in the United States might approach patriotism based on their historical and contemporary experiences with racial discrimination, stemming from U.S. institutions but also from daily interactions.

The divide between Blacks and Whites has served as the basis for which to locate and assess the assimilation of newcomers to the United States and sociologists have long focused on this paradigm (Gans 1999; Yancey 2003; Bonilla-Silva 2004; Lee and Bean 2007; Lee 2008; Marrow 2009). That is, they have used the historical "Black-White" division to predict future patterns of racial inequality based on seemingly subjective and objective attributes of these newcomers in terms of their placement on the Black-White color line. As a result of an influx of

immigrants, increases in individuals identifying as interracial or multiracial, and changes in racial identification patterns after the Civil Rights movement, theorists of racial inequality are turning to more complex investigations of the color line beyond a Black-White divide. The most prominent color line theories predict a shift in the color line, which could take the form of a White/non-White divide, a Black/non-Black divide, or a tri-racial hierarchy (Gans 1999; Yancey 2003; Bonilla-Silva 2004; Lee and Bean 2007; Lee 2008; Marrow 2009). Below, I describe how levels of patriotism could fall along these divisions.

The White/Non-White Divide and "Americanness"

The White/non-White divide has been legally enforced throughout the 20th Century through exclusionary efforts (Lee and Bean 2007). The Takao Ozawa v. United States (1922) and the United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (1923) Supreme Court rulings remain two examples of how racial lines were legally drawn in the 1920s, and illustrate the significance placed on distinguishing who was White (and who was not), and who was therefore eligible for U.S. citizenship. Both rulings made it clear that certain groups would not be considered White regardless of "scientific" definitions of race, skin color, ethnic background, or assimilation efforts, and therefore were ineligible for U.S. citizenship. The linkages between Whiteness and formal citizenship by the Supreme Court (and backed by "science") reinforced the White/non-White color line.

Formal exclusion efforts may continue to brighten the White/non-White boundary. More recently, federal institutions have prioritized the deportation of "criminal aliens," leading to the union of criminal justice and immigration systems—a phenomenon known as "crimmigration" (Stumpf 2006). As a result, law enforcement officials have disproportionately targeted Latinxs, regardless of their immigration status (Golash-Boza 2016). Increased policing and social control

of Latinxs has allowed and continues to enable the subordination of Latinxs in America under the guise of color-blindness (Vazquez 2015; Arriaga 2016; Armenta 2017). Institutional and systemic racial discrimination creates and spreads the narrative that non-Whites do not belong in America, further legitimizing the targeting of non-White groups.

Despite subjective and objective indicators that suggest that some immigrant groups will achieve "honorary White" status (Bonilla-Silva 2004), non-White immigrant groups continue to face barriers that prevent them from being considered fully American. The racialization and othering of "post-1965" immigrant groups have placed Latinxs and Asians in a "forever foreigner" status, which discourages full participation in American society. In her ethnography *Forever Foreigners or Honorary Whites?: The Asian Ethnic Experience Today,* Tuan (1998) demonstrated that Asian-American experiences with violence and discrimination lead to an "authenticity dilemma," which is also experienced by other Americans who identify as (and/or who are externally identified as) non-White. Racialized terrorist events such as the 9/11 attacks and the Virginia Tech mass shooting, and the lack of racialization of White assailants that perpetuate terrorism in America, have contributed further to the "othering" of non-White, non-Christian Americans (Mingus and Zopf 2010). As such, contemporary forms of exclusion could also work to "brighten" the White/non-White divide.

Non-Whites face constraints, in terms of self-identifying as American. Members of the Asian and Latinx minority groups are often confronted with the question "Where are you *really* from?" regardless of their citizenship or nativity status. The assumption that non-White and non-Black Americans are foreigners prevents many from adopting a "just American" identity (Golash-Boza 2006). Whites are better able and more likely to claim a "just American" identity (Frankenburg 1993:198; Citrin et al. 2001), while non-Whites are expected to assume a

hyphenated or a racialized identity, thus qualifying their Americanness. Daily interactions with discrimination only increase the likelihood that Latinxs and other non-Whites will embrace a hyphenated identity (Golash-Boza 2006). An unhyphenated identity is essentially reserved exclusively for Whites as membership in the dominant group allows them to identify with the nation alone, without a qualifying race or ethnicity. In doing so, Whiteness is normalized (Doane Jr. 1997; Feagin 2000).

White Americans implicitly associate Americanness with Whiteness. In their study of Yale undergraduate students, Devos and Banaji (2005) found that White Americans are more often viewed as American compared to Asian Americans and Black Americans. They argue that these "associations are reflections of sociocultural realities" (Devos and Banaji 2005:464) that maintain Whites' dominant position in America. Because racial identification and national attachment are positively correlated for Whites, but negatively correlated for Blacks (Sidanius et al. 1997), Whites continue to possess an inherent sense of belonging and privilege unachievable by Blacks and other non-Whites. "To be White in America is to not have to think about it" (Terry 1970:120); that is, the hidden nature of their race and ethnicity allows for their customs and cultures to define the "mainstream" in America (Doane Jr. 1997).

The American=White conception played a major role in the coverage of the 2008 presidential election. The Americanness of Barack Obama was constantly questioned due to his racial identity, his "foreign-sounding" name, and suspicions that he was of Muslim faith (Erigha and Charles 2012; Hughey 2012). Many questioned if Obama was American enough to be president. Obama's presidential campaign not only challenged the prototypical conception of what a "true American" looked like, but incited political debates centered on the topic of race in America. Attack ads portraying Obama as the un-American candidate utilized darkened images

of his face to emphasize simultaneously his Blackness and his alleged ties to Middle Eastern terrorist groups (Erigha and Charles 2012). “Birther” claims, suggesting that he was ineligible for the position because he was born outside of the United States dominated public discourse even after his win (Hughey 2012). To this day, after Obama served two full terms, President Trump continues to push the “Birther” conspiracy theory insisting that the birth certificate that Obama provided to refute these claims is counterfeit. The creation and propagation of these narratives centered on othering Obama illustrated the persistent link between Whiteness and authentic citizenship (Haberman and Martin 2017).

Inclusionary efforts and social movement objectives have also promoted the White/non-White divide as a way for minority groups to build coalitions in the fight against racism in America (Blauner 1972). The “third world perspective” (Blauner 2001) or the “peoples of color” hypothesis (Sears and Savalei 2006) posits that a strong racial group consciousness would develop among minority group members as a result of their common experiences with subjugation, colonization, and discrimination in America (Sears and Savalei 2006). In this way, the White/non-White divide is reinforced by efforts that emphasize the commonalities in experiences of “people of color” or “minorities” as a non-White, non-dominant collective. The expansion of affirmative action programs to include Asian Americans, Latinxs, and Native Americans has also reinforced the White/non-White color line, as it emphasizes minority experiences with racial discrimination in the United States. Moreover, the emergence and utilization of the terms “minority” and “people of color” further cements the social boundary between the minority and majority groups.

Previous research demonstrates that the “Americanness” of non-Whites has constantly been in question and has been actively prevented throughout U.S. history—a pattern that

continues today. Based on these observations, it is quite possible that a White/non-White divide also exists in patriotic attitudes. This is not to argue that Latinxs and Asian Americans will harbor the same views as Blacks concerning patriotism, but that their views will be closer to those of Blacks than to those of Whites. Based on these expectations of where people will fall along the White/non-White color line, I put forward the following hypotheses:

> 1a) When asked about their patriotism generally, Whites will be more likely than Latinxs, Asian Americans, and Blacks to describe themselves as patriotic, suggesting a White/non-White divide.
>
> 1b) This divide will be more prominent when patriotism is contextualized, that is, when respondents are asked about patriotism in relation to America's history or America's fair and equal treatment of groups in society.

The Black/Non-Black Color Line and Black Exceptionalism

Although the White/non-White divide has been reinforced throughout much of U.S. history, recent empirical studies have found more support for the emergence of the Black/non-Black color line (Yancey 2003; Lee and Bean 2007; Lee 2008; Marrow 2009), owing to historical and contemporary forms of racism that are unique for African Americans. Warren and Twine (1997: 208) offer a summary of this perspective:

> "Precisely because Blacks represent the 'other' against which Whiteness is constructed, the backdoor to Whiteness is open to non-Blacks. Slipping through that opening is, then, a tactical matter for non-Blacks of conforming to White standards, of distancing themselves from Blackness, and of reproducing anti-Black ideas and sentiments."

Also known as "black exceptionalism," this perspective posits that Blacks' persistent location at the bottom of the racial hierarchy, and consequential lower levels of patriotism, can be attributed

to their unique and historically oppressive experience in America (Sears and Savalei 2006; Citrin and Sears 2014). This perspective does not run contrary to the White/non-White (i.e., the "peoples of color") thesis that suggests that non-Whites' common experiences with subjugation produces a strong group consciousness across minority group lines, but rather, it is offered as an alternative that highlights the unique experiences of Blacks in the United States. Compared with non-White and non-Black "others," Blacks experience an alternative form of "othering" in America. While Blacks are not assumed to be foreigners due to their long history of residence in America, they have been historically perceived as less fundamentally human and therefore, less American than Whites as a result of the establishment and profitability of Black chattel slavery. The Black-White binary, corresponding to the freedom-slavery, humanity-animality, owner of property-being property, and citizen-noncitizen binaries, has historically defined the American identity (Glenn 2015:62).

Studies that examine socioeconomic indicators of the color line have pointed to evidence that since the "backdoor to Whiteness is opened to non-Blacks," Asian Americans and Latinxs may be in the process of "becoming White." These groups are more likely to be able to "assimilate" than Black Americans because they are allowed to—they experience lower levels of socioeconomic alienation and racial discrimination than do Blacks (Yancey 2003).

Studies of more "subjective" measures of the color line signify the emergence of a Black/non-Black color line. Though many Latinxs and Asians coalesce with Blacks around certain issues, it is apparent that their common "minority" or "people of color" status does not always have a strong unifying effect (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). Blackness stands to be a more important predictor of social position, and the line that socially separates Blacks from other racial groups in America appears to be the brightest and most salient. For example, despite the

material gaps between Latinxs and Whites, Marrow (2009) found the social boundary between Whites and Latinx newcomers is more permeable than the boundary between Whites and Blacks. Latinx immigrants were exposed to the stigmatization of Blacks even before migrating to the United States, and, while in the U.S., often endorsed anti-Black stereotypes and reported negative social interactions with Blacks. Studies of multiracial identification and interracial social distance find that Latinx-White and Asian-White multiracial individuals are more likely to identify as White rather than Latinx or Asian and are also more likely to be perceived as such by others (Lee and Bean 2007; Lee 2008). Due to the historical legacy of the "one-drop" rule, Black-White multiracials are phenotypically constrained by their partial Blackness and do not have the same flexibility of identification that Latinx-White and Asian-White multiracials have (Lee 2008).

Research on the relationship between race and patriotism reveals that (1) all Americans, regardless of race, show relatively high levels of patriotism; (2) Blacks tend to be less patriotic than Whites (Sidanius et al. 1997; Citrin et al. 2001; Harlow and Dundes 2004; Sears and Savalei 2006; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Theiss-Morse 2009:136-137; Citrin and Sears 2014); and (3) Latinxs and Asian Americans tend to be just as patriotic as Whites (de la Garza et al. 1996; Sidanius et al. 1997; Theiss-Morse 2009). While the majority of Whites, Blacks, Latinxs, and Asian Americans report high levels of patriotism, Blacks tend to show lower scores compared to other racial groups. Since the 9/11 attacks, patriotism and feelings of national unity have increased overall for Whites (McDaniel et al. 2016), but the event did not have the same unifying effect for Blacks.

Interview data gathered in a mixed methods study about racial differences in patriotism after 9/11 provide some insight into why Blacks are less patriotic than Whites (Harlow and

Dundes 2004). White respondents spoke of pride in America, increased unity, and excitement about the upsurge in American flag displays. On the other hand, Black respondents expressed disgust and alienation as the explosion of patriotic displays was a reminder of the chronic racial inequality that continues to plague Black lives. Rather than unifying the country across racial lines, Black respondents felt that "American expressions of freedom, equality, and democracy were hypocritical given the country's history of slavery, genocide, colonialism, exploitation, and discrimination" (Harlow and Dundes 2004:456). While Blacks generally believe in American ideals, they cannot ignore America's failure to live up to those ideals.

In sum, though there are historical and contemporary social patterns that may suggest a White/non-White divide in patriotic attitudes, the Black/non-Black divide appears to be better empirically supported. The expectation that one can derive from this scholarship is that levels of patriotism among Latinxs and Asian Americans will be closer to those of Whites than Blacks. Based on this research, I put forward the following hypotheses of the Black/non-Black color line:

> 2a) When asked about their patriotism generally, Whites, Latinxs, and Asian Americans will be more likely than Blacks to describe themselves as patriotic, suggesting a Black/non-Black divide.
>
> 2b) This divide will be more prominent when patriotism is contextualized, that is, when respondents are asked about patriotism in relation to America's history or America's fair and equal treatment of groups in society.

The Tri-Racial Hierarchy

The tri-racialization thesis offers a non-contradictory alternative to the Black/non-Black and White/non-White perspectives. This thesis also acknowledges the exceptional nature of the Black experience in America, but provides a more nuanced understanding by emphasizing the

significance of skin color, incorporating and acknowledging the importance of country-of-origin characteristics, and recognizing mixed-race individuals. Bonilla-Silva (2004), a key contributor to the tri-racial color line perspective, argued that a third, intermediate group would buffer racial relations between Whites and Blacks. He argued that three groups are emerging: Whites, Honorary Whites, and a Collective Black category. The category of "Whites" would include Whites, "new" Whites, assimilated White Latinxs, some multiracials, assimilated Native Americans, and a few Asian-origin people. "Honorary Whites" would include light-skinned Latinxs, Japanese Americans, Korean Americans, Asian Indians, Chinese Americans, Middle Eastern Americans, and most multiracials. The "Collective Black" would be made up of Filipinos, Vietnamese, Hmong, Laotians, dark-skinned Latinxs, Blacks, New West Indian and African immigrants, and reservation-bound Native Americans. The tri-racial hierarchy specifically distinguishes itself from the Black/non-Black divide by acknowledging that similar racialization occurs for certain colonized groups.

A similar argument can be found in Blauner's (2001) re-visitation of his 1975 work on internal colonization. In his critique of the third world perspective, which assumes that the similarities of oppression among peoples of color or "colonized minorities" in America will lead to coalition building, Blauner (2001) instead suggests that situational differences between how Blacks, Latinxs, Asian Americans, and Native Americans became racialized might complicate this unification. After all, Asian Americans have not only matched the socio-economic status of Whites, surpassing Blacks and Latinxs, but have also surpassed Whites in certain areas such as educational attainment (Bonilla-Silva 2004). Yet, Filipino, Vietnamese, and Hmong Americans remain near the bottom of the stratification system. The idea is that we must acknowledge

diversity of the experience of groups within predefined racial categories to better understand the consequences of our racialized past in order to explain current trajectories.

The tri-racial hierarchy perspective implies that Latinxs and Asian Americans may report patriotism levels somewhere between the two ends of the Black-White spectrum, with Whites reporting the highest levels of patriotism and Blacks reporting the lowest levels. Indeed, Citrin and colleagues (2001) provide partial support for a tri-racial hierarchy based on subjective measures. However, this research has been criticized for oversampling Latinxs and Asian Americans residing in areas with high immigrant populations and failing to control for immigration status. Because Latinx and Asian immigrants who have not lived in the United States for long show higher ethnic group consciousness and tend to report lower levels of patriotism (Sears and Savalei 2006), it is likely that this research underestimated the levels of American pride for these groups.

Due to the recent development and complexity of this theory, the tri-racialization thesis has not been adequately assessed. The current investigation does not adequately assess the thesis either, due to the inability to account for skin color, national origin characteristics, and nuanced racial identifications. Here, I rely on a loose application of this perspective, positing that levels of patriotism among Latinxs and Asian Americans will differ significantly from Whites and Blacks, with Whites reporting the highest levels of patriotism and Blacks the lowest. I offer the following hypotheses of the tri-racial color line thesis:

> 3a) When asked about their patriotism generally, the levels of patriotism among Latinxs and Asian Americans will fall somewhere between and differ significantly from both Whites and Blacks, with Whites reporting the highest levels of patriotism and Blacks the lowest, signifying a tri-racial divide.

3b) This three-tier divide will remain significant when respondents are asked about patriotism in relation to America's history or America's fair and equal treatment of groups in society.

DATA AND METHODS

Capturing Patriotism

To test these hypotheses, I examine three measures of patriotism derived from the General Social Survey (GSS). Patriotism has been defined broadly as the "degree of love for and pride in one's nation" (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989:271). This abstract definition makes it a difficult concept to operationalize. The concept of patriotism is often conflated with other related concepts such as national identity or nationalism. Some scholars have improved upon the conceptualization of patriotism by emphasizing the importance distinguishing between national identity, nationalism, and patriotism with GSS data and other surveys, providing clearer distinctions between them (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Sidanius et al. 1997; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999; de Figueiredo Jr. and Elkins 2003; Huddy and Khatib 2007). Unfortunately, few studies develop and test the new conceptualizations of patriotism, and even fewer investigate the relationship between patriotism and race.

Patriotism, as defined by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), guided the selection of the three questions that comprise my dependent variables. All questions refer to one's pride in America or being American, while refraining from appealing to feelings of nationalism or degrees of national identification. The first question captures respondents' general levels of patriotism, and asks, "How proud are you of being American?" The second question, "How proud are you of America and its history?", contextualizes patriotism by asking respondents to consider American history. The third question also contextualizes patriotism, asking, "How

proud are you of America and its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?" I selected the two contextualized questions because of their potential to trigger different responses from non-Whites. Alternative questions from the module inquired about respondents' pride in America and its achievements relating to science and technology, sports, and arts and literature, pride in America and its political influence in the world, and some others. However, pride in America in these contexts seems less likely to vary by race and would therefore be less pertinent to this study. By analyzing the responses to these three questions by race, I am able to further assess both racial differences in patriotism and how the contextualization of questions about American pride might alter responses.

The Data

The General Social Survey (GSS) is a national survey that has been administered in the United States roughly every four years since 1972. The survey covers many topics and remains one of the best resources for measuring attitudinal trends. The GSS provides a representative sample of American respondents 18 years of age or older. About every eight years, the GSS includes several questions that assess patriotic attitudes. Past discussions about patriotic attitudes have utilized the 1996 and 2004 General Social Survey (GSS) data (Huddy and Khatib 2007; McDaniel et al. 2016), but none that I can find have yet to analyze data on patriotism from 2014.

On average, about 80 percent of the respondents are White, making non-White groups difficult to analyze. For this reason, I combined data from the 2004 and 2014 GSS in order to increase the number of non-Whites included in the sample.[1] The pooled sample included a total

[1] I included a control for year in the multivariate analysis.

of 5,350 participants with about two-fifths of the sample[2] having been asked and responding to all the items used in this study. The survey questions selected for this study are a part of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) module series on National Identity that is asked of a smaller sample of GSS participants. There was very little missing data from the ISSP participants so imputation was deemed unnecessary.[3] Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics of the sample. The respondents in the subsample are an average of 48 years of age with an average of 14 years of education. Furthermore, the sample is 54 percent female, 73 percent White, 13 percent Black, 11 percent Latinx, and three percent Asian American. Ninety-one percent of respondents were born in the United States, 37 percent politically identify as Republican, and 36 percent live in the Southern region of the United States.

[2] See Tables 1-6 for specific observation counts and how they vary slightly from question to question.

[3] Of the 2,273 survey respondents that were asked the ISSP questions, about five respondents for each question failed to provide a response. About 4.7% of the ISSP participants failed to provide data for all independent, dependent, and control variables used in this study and were therefore considered “missing” for the purposes of analysis, resulting in a sample size of 2,160 for regression analysis.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of GSS 2004/2014 Data (n = 2,160)		
Variable	Mean	S.D.
Dependent Variables ("very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, not proud at all)		
Proud to be American	0.98	0.14
Pride in American History	0.92	0.27
Pride in Equal and Fair Treatment	0.68	0.46
Independent Variable		
Race		
White (=1)	0.73	-
Black (=1)	0.13	-
Latinx (=1)	0.11	-
Asian Americans (=1)	0.03	-
Controls		
Year (2014 = 1)	0.49	-
U.S. Native-Born (=1)	0.91	-
Female (=1)	0.54	-
Age	47.63	16.96
Years of Education	13.96	2.79
Republican (=1)	0.37	-
South (=1)	0.36	-

Explanatory Variable

In order to create racial categories, I utilized a combination of data from two different GSS variables that inquire about the race and ethnicity of the respondent. Those that answered "Yes" to the question 'Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino/Latina?' were coded as Latinx.[4] Those who answered "No" were further classified based on their response to a separate question that allows respondents to choose from 15 racial categories.[5] It was assumed that the racial category that the respondent selected first indicated the race with which they identify with the

[4] The majority (94%) of the Latinx group indicated origins from Latin America countries. The other 6% identified as Spanish.

[5] Those who selected "some other race" were excluded from analysis.

most. Consequently, data from respondents who identify as non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, Latinx, and non-Hispanic Asian American were considered for analysis in the current study.

Though 50-60% of "Hispanic Americans" racially identify as White, they are still subject to being racialized as non-White based on their physical appearance (James 2008). Thus, creating a possible disparity between how Hispanics choose to racially identify in a survey and how they are racialized, and subsequently treated, as non-White in everyday life. Because the current study focuses on the racialized experience in America and less about how people choose to racially identify, those who racially identified as White (or Black or Asian American) in one question and also identified as "Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish" in a separate question were categorized as Latinx. Race is socially constructed concept, and to classify persons into fixed, racial categories is inherently problematic when conducting sociological research. However, "the process of classification is necessary because of the political and social centrality of race in American society" (James 2008:35). The current study is highly limited due to these social realities and I further discuss these limitations in the discussion section.

Control Variables

For this study, I include seven control variables: year, nativity status, gender, age, years of education, political party, and U.S. region. Because I merged data sets from two different years (2004 and 2014), I needed to account for changes in patriotism from 2004 to 2014 due to unmeasured characteristics. Since patriotism in the United States increased following the 9/11 attacks that occurred in 2001 (Harlow and Dundes 2004; Li and Brewer 2004; Citrin and Sears 2014; McDaniel et al. 2016), it is likely to have waned over time from 2004 to 2014. I use a dichotomous variable to account for differential beliefs of those who were not born in the United

States (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). Some previous works have shown that women and younger respondents have lower levels of national pride than men and older respondents (Huddy and Khatib 2007). Others have shown no statistically significant differences by gender (Kosterman and Feschbach 1989) or age (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). These variables have shown varying effects on models, and, as such, I chose to include them to provide clarity on the demographic factors that affect patriotism. What has been made clear is that Republican Party identification is strongly and positively correlated with patriotism (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Huddy and Khatib 2007; McDaniel et al 2016). I include a dichotomous measure of Republican Party affiliation to account for this. To account for Southern uniqueness, I include a "South" dummy variable (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). The Southern regionality might have a differential effect on patriotism, with Southern respondents reporting stronger levels of patriotism. Finally, I include years of education as a proxy for socioeconomic status and to account for differences in awareness of social, political, and historical issues.

Estimation Techniques and Dependent Variables

To test my hypotheses, I use two types of analyses, including contingency table analysis[6] and logistic regression. For each analysis, I assess the differences between Whites, Blacks, Latinxs, and Asian Americans and their views on three separate questions that capture patriotism or pride in America: (1) in general; (2) in reference to America's history; and (3) in reference to America's fair and equal treatment of groups in society. I recoded the dependent variables from four-category ordinal measures to a dichotomous variable capturing pride in America (1 = "very

[6] The significance of associations was assessed at the 0.05 alpha level. For bivariate analyses that produced expected frequencies less than five, the Fisher's Exact Test was used in place of the Chi-Square Test to account for small sample sizes among Asian Americans and Latinxs.

proud" and "somewhat proud," and 0 = "not very proud" and "not proud at all"). I recoded the variable to include Asian Americans in the analyses, as the sample size of Asian-American respondents was small. I use logistic regression to estimate pride in America in different contexts, controlling for additional variables. I conducted all analyses using the Stata/SE 13.0 statistical package. After computing collinearity diagnostics for each model, I concluded that multicollinearity was not a problem.[7]

RESULTS

Bivariate Analysis

When respondents were asked "How proud are you of being American?", the majority of respondents reported high levels of pride across all racial groups**.** The descriptive results suggest that nearly all Americans, regardless of race, express pride in being American. The results of the chi-squared test of independence detect no apparent racial divide in attitudes here. Ninety-eight percent of Asian Americans, 97.6 percent of Whites, 97.8 percent of Blacks, and 97.3 percent of Latinxs indicated that they were proud to be American (Table 2).

Table 2. General Pride by Race, 2004 and 2014 General Social Survey (n=2,336)

How proud are you of being American?	*Race*			
	%White	%Black	%Latinx	%Asian American
Proud	97.6	97.8	97.3	98.2
Not Proud	2.4	2.2	2.6	1.8
Total	100	100	100	100
(n)	(1694)	(319)	(267)	(56)
Fisher's Exact p = 0.981				

[7] The individual and mean variance inflation factors (VIFs) were below 2.01 and 1.28, respectively, for the models.

When respondents were asked “How proud are you of America and its history?”, however, racial differences in pride emerge as statistically significant (see Table 3). For all racial groups, shares expressing pride in America in this context are lower than those expressing American pride in general (see Table 2). Whites (94.3%), Latinxs (92.1%), and Asian Americans (88.9%) show the highest levels of pride while Blacks (79.1%) report the lowest. These results suggest that Blacks feel differently than Whites, Latinxs, and Asian Americans about America’s history (Table 3).

Table 3. Pride in History by Race, 2004/2014 General Social Survey (n=2,351)

How proud are you of America and its history?	*Race*			
	%White	%Black	%Latinx	%Asian Americans
Proud	94.3	79.1	92.1	88.9
Not Proud	5.7	20.9	7.9	11.1
Total	100	100	100	100
(n)	(1685)	(325)	(278)	(63)
Chi-Square (3): 84.5617; p = 0.000				

When respondents were asked “How proud are you of America and its fair and equal treatment of groups in society?”, statistically significant racial differences emerge here as well (see Table 4). In this context, the majority of Asian Americans (75.8%), Whites (69.6%), Latinxs (66.8%), and Blacks (54.7%) are proud to America and its fair and equal treatment of groups, but the shares expressing pride are much lower in this context than those found in others. Unlike the percentage differences in pride in historical context, there is more than a 20-point difference between Asian Americans and Blacks in this context, with greater shares of Asian Americans expressing pride in American treatment of groups in society, while nearly half of Blacks express pride in American treatment of groups in society.

Table 4. Pride in Fair Treatment by Race, 2004/2014 General Social Survey (n=2,294)				
How proud are you of America and its fair and equal treatment of groups in society?	*Race*			
	%White	%Black	%Latinx	%Asian Americans
Proud	69.6	54.7	66.8	75.8
Not Proud	30.4	45.3	33.2	24.2
Total	100	100	100	100
(n)	(1636)	(318)	(274)	(66)
Chi-Square (3): 29.0952 ; p = 0.000				

General inquiry about American pride elicits high concurrence among all racial groups in this study. About 98 percent of Americans are proud to be American, and this general pride varies little by race. The results show that Whites, Blacks, Latinxs, and Asian Americans describe themselves as proud to be American at similar levels and that Blacks are just as likely to be proud to be American as other racial groups. Consensus across racial lines diminishes when patriotism is contextualized in both a historical and a social sense. Non-contextualized patriotism is highest with an average of 98 percent of Americans being proud to be American regardless of race. On average, Americans are less proud of America and its history (92 percent). A smaller share of Americans report pride in America and its fair and equal treatment of groups in society (67 percent). Patriotism by race follows this same pattern, with Blacks showing lower levels of patriotism than Whites, Latinxs, and Asian Americans in each context.

The bivariate results reveal apparent racial consensus in general pride and a Black/non-Black divide in patriotic attitudes in other contexts, but this does not mean that these findings will remain when controlling for additional factors. When taking into account factors such as age, gender, political party affiliation, will this relationship remain? I turn to this discussion next.

Multivariate Analysis

To investigate the relationship between race and patriotism, I estimate pride in America (=1) using logistic regression, controlling for the effects of year, nativity status, gender, age, education level, political party and region of the country (see Table 5). When I control for these seven factors, the relationship between patriotism and race holds true.

General Pride

Again, the vast majority of Americans are generally proud to be American and this does not appear to vary by race even when controlling for several other demographic factors. Holding all other predictors constant, a Republican's odds of being proud to be American is 370% larger than those in other political parties. When the dependent variables are analyzed in ordinal and reverse-coded form (1= "not proud at all," 2 = "not very proud," 3 = "somewhat proud," and 4 = "very proud"), the results show that Asian Americans are less likely than Blacks to report lower levels of pride in being American. However, there is still no statistically significant difference between White, Black, and Latinx general pride (Table 6, in Appendix).

Pride in History

When we control for the effects of additional variables, the Black/non-Black divide in pride in America's history remains apparent. Latinxs, Whites, and Asian Americans are all more likely than Blacks to be proud of America and its history. Whites are particularly most likely to be proud in this context, followed by Latinxs, then Asian Americans. When using either the White, Latinx, or Asian-American category as the baseline, a Black/non-Black divide holds true. Only when the dependent variables are analyzed in ordinal and reverse-coded form do the results show no statistically significant difference in attitudes between Blacks and Asian Americans in this context (Table 6, in Appendix). Holding all other independent variables constant,

Americans who are older, Republican, or live in the South are more likely to be proud of America and its history. When analyzing standardized versions of the coefficients, political party and U.S. region have the largest effect on the relationship between race and pride, while age has a relatively small effect.

Pride in Fair and Equal Treatment

A Black/non-Black divide remains apparent again in terms of America and its fair and equal treatment of groups in society. However, in this context, Asian Americans are the most likely to be proud by a large margin. Interestingly, the year during which the survey was taken has a statistically significant effect on patriotism only in terms of America and its fair and equal treatment of groups in society. The odds of being proud of America and its treatment of groups in society decreased by 49% from 2004 to 2014. The odds that U.S. natives are proud in this context are 29% smaller than for those who were born elsewhere. For every one year increase in years of education, the odds of being proud of America and its fair and equal treatment of groups in society decreases by 8% on average. A Republican's odds of being proud in this context are 139% larger than of those in other political parties. Political party has the largest effect on the relationship between race and pride, while education has a relatively small effect.

There are no apparent statistically significant differences in patriotism across racial groups when patriotism is not contextualized. However, when pride in America is contextualized by American history and fair treatment of groups, there is a clear Black/non-Black divide, even when taking into account the effects of year, birth country, gender, age, education, political party, and U.S. region. The resulting coefficients for general pride show that Blacks are no more or less patriotic than Whites, Latinxs, and Asian Americans generally. Whites, Latinxs, and Asian Americans remain significantly more likely than Blacks to indicate that they are proud of

America and its history, and its fair and equal treatment of groups in society. Holding other variables constant, gender does not have an effect on patriotism in all observed contexts. The results of subsequent robustness tests indicate that the Black/non-Black divide holds true for contextualized versions of patriotism notwithstanding manipulation of the independent and dependent variables.

Table 5. Logistic Regression of Pride in America (=1)[8]

	General Pride	Pride in History	Pride in Fair Treatment
Race			
White	-0.33	1.32***	0.43**
	(0.44)	(0.19)	(0.14)
Latinx	-0.04	1.18***	0.42*
	(0.57)	(0.28)	(0.19)
Asian Americans	0.64	1.02*	0.82*
	(1.13)	(0.46)	(0.34)
Controls			
Year (2014 = 1)	0.20	-0.04	-0.67***
	(0.29)	(0.16)	(0.10)
Born in U.S. (= 1)	0.74+	-0.05	-0.34*
	(0.44)	(0.26)	(0.17)
Female (= 1)	0.10	0.19	-0.04
	(0.29)	(0.16)	(0.09)
Age	0.01	0.02**	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Years of Education	-0.04	-0.06+	-0.08***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Republican (=1)	1.55***	1.29***	0.87***
	(0.45)	(0.24)	(0.11)
South (=1)	0.00	0.43*	-0.01
	(0.31)	(0.18)	(0.10)
Constant	2.93**	1.02+	1.68***
	(1.01)	(0.55)	(0.34)
Observations	2312	2328	2270
Psuedo R^2	0.0448	0.0992	0.0628

(Standard errors in parentheses)
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[8] Similar results were produced with the use of different racial groups as the reference category and using ordinal logistic regression on the dependent variables in ordinal form.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

While the vast majority of Americans, regardless of race, are proud to be American, there are certain aspects of American life that challenge one's patriotism, especially for Blacks. The evocation of history and equality in America dampens patriotism for all groups, but has an exceptional effect on Black attitudes, providing partial support for the hypothesized Black/non-Black divide in terms of "subjective" measures. If a White/non-White divide were emerging in patriotic attitudes, there would be no statistically significant difference between Black, Latinx, and Asian American attitudes. If a Tri-Racial Hierarchy were emerging, Latinx and Asian American attitudes would be statistically different from both Black and White attitudes, there would be no statistically significant difference between Latinx and Asian American attitudes, and a statistically significant difference between Whites and Blacks would also remain.

Only in the context of pride in America and its history do we see some evidence of a tri-racial divide. It is likely, however, that the limited sample size of Asian Americans affects our ability to draw definitive lines between racial categories, especially using ordinal rather than dichotomous variables. It is also likely that Blacks' history of colonization, slavery, discrimination and segregation affects their love for country. This affect is not seen for other non-White groups as predicted by the White/non-White divide hypothesis. Despite the fact that Blacks, Latinxs, and Asian Americans share the same minority or "peoples of color" status and have had a troubled history in America, Latinxs and Asians are not triggered in the same way. Latinxs and Asians instead demonstrate similar levels of patriotism as Whites in all contexts under investigation.

It is worth exploring why patriotism in certain contexts creates racial disagreement, even if these differences are relatively small. Deeming statistically significant racial differences as

"slight" in any context may invite a misinterpretation of racial progress in America, implying a decline in the significance of race for all non-White groups, despite the fact that Blacks continue to face unique and enduring subjugation (Bean et al. 2009). The broad categorization of minorities as a socially disadvantaged group could invite a similar misinterpretation of racial progress. The treatment of any group as monolithic is problematic in itself of course, yet the use term "minority" tends to go unchecked, even in sociological literature (Nibert 1996; Wilkinson 2000). If we are moving towards a Black/non-Black divide socially, politically, economically, and spatially, which many scholars predict and the current study suggests, then the use of the term should be revisited considering the unique situation that Blacks face. To suggest that "minority groups, display a heightened sensitivity to their collective status …asserting more often that discrimination and unequal opportunities for minority groups are ongoing problems in the United States" (Citrin et al. 2001:84), without investigating attitudinal and situational differences between groups considered within the "minority" category, is an insufficient analysis. Researchers should be more critical of the "collective" status of minorities. For these reasons, the need for Black exceptionalism to be addressed by broader society is timely and urgent.

The data, and subsequent results, are limited due to the often problematic nature of survey research. The results suggest race can be considered a predictor of pride levels in certain contexts; however, more information about respondents' racialized experience in America is needed to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between race and patriotism. Race can be better understood as an ongoing social process, dynamic and situational (Omi and Winant 1994), rather than a mere categorization. According to this conceptualization, racial differences result from "historical patterns of racial hierarchy imbedded in ongoing interactions, both

spectacular…and mundane" (James 2008:41) and without descriptive data about participants' experience as a racialized individual, we are only able to observe a part of the picture.

Moreover, due to the fluidity of race, survey data may fail to capture subtle racial patterns. Though recent changes have made the survey more inclusive of those who identify as mixed-race, allowing respondents to choose "more than one race", the formulation of delineated racial groups is inherently problematic. Isolating a racial group called "Latinx" proved to be a challenge due to the way in which the GSS asked respondents about their ethnicity (Hispanic or not) in one question, while "Latinx" is omitted as a racial category altogether in a different question. Because of the limitations of survey data, especially concerning the operationalization of the race variable and sample size constraints, we often compare groups, ignoring the vast diversity within racial groups. For example, combining many groups into one category called "Asian American" is problematic for a number of reasons, including the fact that the socioeconomic backgrounds of groups in this category span the spectrum and because of the distinctive and disparate histories of the groups that comprise the larger racial category. A customized survey, oversampling, and in-depth interviews would help minimize the essentialization of race and would be better equipped to gather more nuanced information about a respondents' racial reality.

It is also quite possible that certain respondents or groups answered questions about patriotism differently than others based on the survey environment. Patriotism is a topic that is highly subject to social desirability effects. The race of the survey administrator could have swayed some answers. For example, because Asian Americans and Latinxs are treated as "forever foreigner" and their status in the U.S. is tenuous at best, regardless of their actual immigration status, they might try to overcompensate by reporting inflated levels of pride in

America or pride in being American. Immigrants, for example, may be hesitant to express anti-American views because of the recent heightened fear of sanctions and punishment by government officials and law enforcement (Menjívar and Abrego 2012). Some groups may be more hesitant to express skepticism about America, depending on the survey environment. Though it is likely that these biases are less of a threat to the integrity of the findings because GSS uses Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) instead of face-to-face interviews, these limitations are important to be aware of. Additionally, there is possible bias concerning which groups are more or less likely to participate in survey research. In order to address these limitations, future research should avoid relying solely on secondary survey data.

If implementing a survey, researchers should create a new survey specifically tailored to the research questions at hand. Surveys should gather more detail about how the respondent identifies racially (i.e., skin color, ethnicity, survey identification vs. in-person identification), and how race might influence the respondents' daily experiences in America. If implementing a qualitative study, interviews should be conducted by persons who identify racially the same as the interviewee to attempt to reduce potential race of interviewer effects. Future research should also seek more insight into how racial groups, especially Latinos and Asians, feel about America, its history, and its treatment of groups in society. There is some evidence to suggest that Whites may think about patriotism and national unity differently than Blacks (George and Yancey 2009), so qualitative research on groups from multiple backgrounds would be useful in this regard as well. Lastly, patriotism research should be updated to capture attitudes following increased public discourse on police brutality and subsequent protest movements.

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APPENDIX

Table 6. Logistic Regression of Non-Pride in America (= 1) (ordinal-level dependent variables)

	General Pride	Pride in History	Pride in Fair Treatment
Race			
White	-0.15	0.93***	0.46***
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Latinx	0.00	0.85***	0.56***
	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Asian Americans	-0.68*	0.46	0.94***
	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Controls			
Year (2014 =1)	-0.48***	-0.26**	-0.59***
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Born in U.S. (=1)	-1.47***	-0.04	-0.40**
	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Female (=1)	0.18+	-0.14+	-0.19*
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Age	0.02***	0.01**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Years of Education	-0.10***	-0.06***	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Republican (=1)	0.80***	0.86***	0.78***
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)
South (=1)	0.23*	0.14	0.08
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Observations	2366	2328	2270
Pseudo R^2	0.0163	0.2031	0.0765

(Standard errors in parentheses)
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001