ABSTRACT

The Wall around a House: Borders and the Emirate of Afghanistan 188-1901 (Under the direction of Dr. David Gilmartin)

This paper challenges the traditional telling of the creation of the Afghan borders during the reign of Emir Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901). Traditionally the story is one of the British and Russians forcing modern borders on Afghanistan as part of the “Great Game,” taking over Afghan territory in the process. This is not true; however, the Afghan government used various tools to shape its own borders. Emir Rahman Khan wanted these borders for a variety of reasons. These included: defending his lands from Russian expansion, limiting British influence in his country, and increasing the power of his own government, although historically, Afghanistan had a decentralized power structure. The Emir, however, did not get all of what he considered his through Afghanistan agreements with the British. Specifically, the British gained control over a territory called *yaghistan.* However, this control was only surface deep, for the Afghan Emir had religious and historical connections that he could use to influence the Pashtun population on the British side of the border. This created in the British a feeling of being “strangers in a strange” land, having only a surface level of control over a territory they did not truly rule.

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The Wall Around a House: Borders and the Emirate of Afghanistan from 1880-1901

by

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BIOGRAPHY

I am James Livingston Britt, a North Carolina State University graduate student. I have been accepted into the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for their history doctorate program for the Fall 2023 semester. I focus my studies on Central Asia and military history. In the past, I have researched on the Soviet Afghan War and Emir Rahman Khan.

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In the late 19th century, the governments of Britain Russia, and Afghanistan create what are recognized as the modern borders of Afghanistan. Historians like Mohammad Kakar have argued these borders were forced on Afghanistan, which in and of itself part of a large body of work that argues the Afghan government was unwilling or unable to carry out foreign affairs due to a variety of factors. This is not true, what is seen during the reign of Abdul Rahman Khan was a central government using the demarcation of its borders to achieve a variety of goals, while at the same time keeping it influence in parts of Afghanistan officially under the control of the British. This introduction looks at the historiography of Afghanistan and how this study fits into the current debates on Afghanistan. For this study, I am dividing Afghanistan historiography into three broad categories: the historiography of Afghanistan's government, Afghanistan and Islam and, the historiography of *Yaghistan*. Each section will look at significant works connected to these categories, with many works being explored several times and working through multiple types. Finally, the last section will expand my thesis and lay the roadmap of where we are going.

This thesis explores the connections between the Afghan government and the creation of the modern borders of Afghanistan. Specifically, the Afghan government used its knowledge of the British to guide it policy on the border. By doing this, the Emir maintained control over strategic territory on the border, defended his country from Russian invasion, and leverage it position to receive money from the British. To explore this, the historiography of Afghanistan's government must be looked at, since the very idea of an effective Afghan government can be controversial. Islam, which served as an essential justification of Emir Rahman Khan rule and policies, must also be explored. Finally, an essential part of my thesis is that while *yaghistan* was not part of the nation-state of Afghanistan, the Emir maintained direct control over it. *Yaghistan*

demonstrated the complexity of the Emir's position, exerting control over a nominally British territory but also had to keep in good relations with the British to maintain the income they gave him.

Forming a State: The Historiography of Afghanistan

The heart of this thesis is state building and the exercise of power by the Afghan state. Afghanistan historiography is also interested in the state. A central question is when did the state of Afghanistan come into existence? In Jos J.L. Gommans's book *The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire,* he argues that the Afghan state was created in the early 1700s.[1] While Vartan argued in his book *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan* that the modern state of Afghanistan came much later, during the rule of Emir Rahman Khan, building up on the centralization efforts of his predecessors and adopting a European-style army.[2] Another central theme is whether Afghanistan was a centralized state. Some historians, like Louis Dupree, argued often state power did not extend much out of Kabul. Many in politics declared Afghanistan a failed state and tried to understand why.[3] To explore these topics, this section examines at a major work for each of these arguments, examining their theses, evidence, and significant examples.

At least chronologically speaking, Gommans argues for the earliest form of the Afghan state or rather states, in this book *The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire.* In this book, Gommans's main argument was that the states of Afghanistan started with the Durrani empire which in turn borrowed from Indian and Iranian models of government.[4] He further explains that these empires came about due to several factors. One is that Afghanistan sits on the crossroads

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[1] by Jos J. L. Gommans, *The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire, c.1710-1780*, Brill's Indological Library, 0925-2916 ; v. 8 (Leiden ; New York : E.J. Brill, 1995., 1995), 7, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU921605.
[2] *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan; Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946.* (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1969., 1969), 6, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU68556.
[3] *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan; Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946.*, 7–8.
[4] Gommans, *The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire, c.1710-1780*, 7.

between Arabia and India and therefore had a great deal of control of the horse trade and, by extension, the trade in calvary, which played an essential role in armies of the region in this era. Afghan warriors, an important part of the mercenary trade in this era, often became land-granted, tax-collecting administrators. This was further assisted by the fact that Afghanistan's climate allowed for both a base of agricultural taxation and land for raising horses. The Durrani empire would ultimately come to command both this powerful Afghan cavalry and control agricultural areas like the Peshawar valley and Northwest India, allowing for regular tax revenues.[5] The Peshawar valley would be considered one of the most critical regions for the Afghan government, even after its capture by the Sikhs in 1834. This system pulled some of the best ideas from previous Iranian (such as the Safavids) and Indian (Mughals) empires.. Eventually, the Durrani empire went from being the region's power to a minor player due to several factors. One was the British, who moved trade from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, weakening the Durrani empire. The Russian empire's expansion into central Asia would also harm Afghan trade to a lesser extent, and together these would take away an essential part of the Afghan empire's economy.[6] The other reason was that, in the long term, the Afghan cavalry model would be replaced by the British infantry-based warfare model. Gommans argued that the Afghan state came out in the 18th century, gaining its power from its control over the Afghan cavalrymen and agrarian valleys due mainly to the vacuum created by the weakening of Mughal power. However, the European companies moved trade away from Central Asia, and the advantages of the European military system weakened the Afghan state financially, leading to its eventual decline.

The first primary source of evidence was the use of Persian sources. One of the most important was epics commissioned by the Rohilla leaders to explain the origins of the Pashtun people.[7] These works demonstrated the importance of religious authority to these early Afghan

[5] Gommans, 159.
[6] Gommans, 7–8.
[7] Gommans, 162–63.

rulers. The Pashtuns believed they descended from both the Israelite royal family and early followers of Mohammad, as recorded in the Rohilla-sponsored *Amir-Nama.*[8] The importance of religion to the state is further seen in Ahmad Shah Durrani's letters, religiously justifying his claims of Safavid territories.[9] Another important source was the English records of the horse trade in Central Asia, along with secondary sources about horse trading and the military application of horses in general, such as Digby *Warhorse and Elephant in the Delhi Sultanate*.[10] Digby's book focused on the importance of the horse trade and cavalry in Central Asia during the 18th century. A third piece of evidence was using *jama* (revenue valuation). These records show the value of the Rohilla lands and how agriculture continued to grow during this era, despite the Rohilla support of grazing, which helps support Gommans argument about the importance of the "dual economy" of horse breeding and agriculture that the Afghan could pull off due to their territory.[11] The principal evidence for this book comes from Persian sources, British sources, and the records of *jama,* which Gommans used to make his argument.

The first example that is discussed is the rise of Ahmad Durrani. Ahmad Durrani originally served with the Persian monarch Nadir Shah; as such, it is easy to see the Safavid Persian influence on his government and military.[12] Another essential part was using the Mughals to justify his conquest of parts of India, arguing that he had come to revive a dying Islamic empire. He also connected with the Rohilla, as a fellow Muslim and Pashtun, to take large parts of Northern India without a fight. [13] Another example in this book is Daud Khan, who demonstrated the importance of Afghan mercenaries, and their connection to the government. Daud Khan started their life as a highway robber, during this time he gathered a following. Using it, he became a successful mercenary and in return for his service gained land revenues.[14] A last

[8] Gommans, 164–65.
[9] Gommans, 63–64.
[10] Gommans, 75–77.
[11] Gommans, 147–48.
[12] Gommans, 142.
[13] Gommans, 60–61.
[14] Gommans, 117–19.

example from this book is the *Rohilkhand*, which served as the origin story of the Rohilla state. The Rohilla acquired fertile land in this state and used underground irrigation to expand the arable land.[15] The Rohilla also gain as vassals the mountain states of Garhl and Kumaun, allowing it to dominate local trade.[16] As the third leg of this state, horse trading and military adventuring remained essential parts of the state and its economy.[17] This example showed how the Afghan state took both the Indian focus on agriculture and the Central Asian focus on trade and military adventurism, allowing it to form its governments to take advantage of both.

On the other hand, Gregorian placed the creation of "modern" Afghanistan with the reign of Emir Abdul Rahman Khan. Gregorian defined modernization as "a complex historical process involving 'the systemic, sustained, and purposeful application of human energies to the rational control of man's physical and social environment for various purposes.'"[18] Before beginning, Gregorian does not deny the importance of the Durrani empire or the various shahs and emirs that ruled before Abdul Rahman Khan but argues that these rulers could not have created "modern" Afghanistan. The first reason was that Afghanistan's modernization depended on its interactions with the west, which Gregorian argued did not begin till the 19th century. Second, other Afghan kings had not had the military resources to break tribal power, at least temporarily, that Abdul Rahman Khan had.[19] Gregorian also argues that nationalism in Afghanistan largely owes its origins to anti-European influences. Specifically, he argues that Afghan often found its national unity and greatest national heroes in its wars with the British. However, Afghanistan's modernization also needed technology from the West, which was hard to use due to many Afghans' rejection of European technology.[20] This two-headed snake led to the limited

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[15] Gommans, 150–51.
[16] Gommans, 155.
[17] Gommans, 159.
[18] Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946*, 1st Edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1969), 2.
[19] Gregorian, 2,133.
[20] Gregorian, 6.

modernization of Afghanistan. The royal family, however, pushed European modernization to build up their power and keep their country independent from the European powers.[21] Gregorian argues that the modern state of Afghanistan began in the 1880s with the reign of Emir Rahman Khan. However, the modernization efforts of the Afghan government remained limited since it was politically difficult for the government to adopt technology and ideas from the hated European powers.

What is Gregorian's evidence for these claims? For the reign of Emir Rahman Khan, Gregorian relies heavily on the autobiography of Emir Rahman Khan and the correspondents of several English officials and servants of the emir.[22] He explains that the autobiography of Rahman Khan, while suspected by some Afghan scholars, is widely used to understand the motivations of the Emir and was not challenged by English or Afghan officials of the time. The British writings give access to an outsider view of the Emir, with many of the British impressed with the Emir's governmental reforms but horrified by the violent methods that the Emir used to enforce his rule (note this is a somewhat ironic analysis, since the British also used violence to enforce their rule).[23] Another major form of evidence for this book was Russian scholarly sources. Gregorian states that Russian academics, especially during the Soviet era, did much work on the Pashto language, along with results on various parts of the Afghan government during the 19th and 20th centuries.[24] Other major interests of Soviet historians were the Durrani empire, the development of Afghan feudalism, and the Tajik and Turkic ethnic groups. This last one makes sense because of the many Tajiks who lived in the Soviet Union. While these are the significant sources that Gregorian uses, he also talks about his difficulties writing Afghan history, and many of his problems are still seen today. One is that the study of Afghan is greatly assisted by the knowledge of several languages, such as Persian, Pashto, English, Russian,

[21] Gregorian, 3.
[22] Gregorian, 129–33.
[23] Gregorian, 133,137-138.
[24] Gregorian, 4–5.

and French. Urdu and Arabic are other valuable languages. The other problem is that Afghanistan is not a well-researched area, partly because Afghanistan as a state exists between several regions of area study, namely the Middle East and Central Asia. These are the sources and challenges of Gregorian's works.

As has been done throughout this paper, let's review some major examples that Gregorian uses in his work. Gregorian shows the aborted attempts to form an Afghan state to discuss the fragility. His first example was the Roshania movement of the 16th and 17th centuries, which tried, among other things, to defend their lands against the Mughal empire. Still, its unifying message was unconvincing to many.[25] The first prosperous Afghan state was the Ghilzai state that Mir Wais formed in 1709. However, this state was a regional focus one and they quickly lost power due to their inability to effectively manage their urban, segmentary, and Shiite subjects. The Ghilzai kingdom fell to the Persian conqueror Nadir Shah in 1729.[26] The Afghan state that was the center of Gommans's book came next with the conquests of Ahmed Shah Durrani; however, Durrani owed his power to the support of the Durrani clans and had to give them many concessions in the form of tax exemptions and land allotments.[27] This system provided other powers to the tribes, such as influencing the succession, meaning that neither Durrani, his son, or his grandson could consolidate power into the royal government.[28] This decentralization made the state fragile, leading to territories breaking away from the state, like the Khan of Kalat. Another example of Gregorian was the reform activities of Rahman Khan. In these reform elements, Rahman Khan did find some success, creating a central organized Afghan army that could be used to force the tribes into compliance. [29] He also started some manufacturing, starting with military gear and moving into other products like alcoholic beverages.[30] However,

[25] Gregorian, 43–44.
[26] Gregorian, 45.
[27] Gregorian, 47.
[28] Gregorian, 51.
[29] Gregorian, 140.
[30] Gregorian, 143.

despite these successes, the Emir could not change the economic structure because he was still dependent on his Durrani kin. His reliance on religion and his attacks on Europeans made it politically challenging to recruit European specialists. These are some of the most important examples of Gregorian's arguments about the fragility of early Afghan states and the difficulty of modernization, even for leaders like Emir Rahman Khan.

It is important to look at how that historiography has affected views and policies surrounding Afghanistan. In his book *Afghanistan's Endless Wars,* Larry Goodson tried to understand why Afghanistan had become a failed state.[31] While he primarily blames the failures of the Cold War international order, where these states became pieces on the international chessboard, he also gives a lot of historical reasons for the weakness of the Afghan state. Goodson argued that the Afghan decentralized power structure made state-building extremely difficult, especially given what he sees as the isolated mindset of the Afghan people.[32] By the way, this tribal structure is why I believe that *yaghistan* is an essential concept in Afghan history. Afghans always could rebel when they disagreed with their government, which was something that the Afghan government had to take into consideration with all its decisions. This argument was very similar to the opinions of Gregorian and Afghan specialists like Louis Dupree.[33] This belief has led to many European Afghan specialists arguing that it is "unnatural" and, in many ways, impossible for a strong central state to form in Afghanistan. This had a further bearing on this paper because this makes the Afghan state seem unable to carry out any form of domestic or foreign policy effectively. On the other hand, my work argues that while the tribes were undoubtedly influential, the Afghan government by the 1880s could restrain them and had the power from to act on its policies.

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[31] Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban* (Seattle, UNITED STATES: University of Washington Press, 2002), 6, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=3444465.
[32] Goodson, 23.
[33] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 6.

Faith: How religion supports and is beyond other forms of power

To understand the Afghan government of this time, Islam must be studied as an essential part of that study. Islam would serve to justify the rule of Afghan leaders, and sharia law will be the framework for the first national Afghan law. To study Islam in Afghanistan, this section will look at important works in the field, especially works that deal with the time period between the rule of Ahmad Shah Durrani and Abdul Rahman Khan.

I will first analyze *Frontiers of Faith* by Sana Haroon. This book argues that the mullahs of what is now the Northwest Frontier of Pakistan provided a trans-tribal leadership structure that mobilized military force to react to political events on both sides of the border. In Afghanistan's historiography, this argument contests two other theses of leadership in the borderland. The first is what could be called the "khan's leadership" thesis, which argues that what became the Northwestern frontier was led by what Frederick Barth would categorize as the highest social class of Pashtun society (which Barth calls the *Pakhtun*). Barth does not deny that religious leaders had an important place in local politics. However, *Pakhtun* had a stronger claim on leadership due to controlling land and agricultural resources, which allowed them to create the contractional agreements central to political leadership in the Swat valley. The second is that the frontier was the center of "religious fanaticism" that would plague various governments on both sides of the border. This argument is often found in colonial accounts, as recorded in *Heroes of the Age* by David Edwards, colonial powers used fanaticism to explain the problems the British encountered on the border. While this argument is not very popular today in academic work, this idea still exists in political studies of the region. An example is *The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, tribal conflicts, and the failures of great powers* by Peter Tomsen.

Haroon argues that the networks of students (*murids*) and teachers (*pirs*) on the frontier were important to understand religious leaders influence.[34] This created genealogies (called *pirimuridi*) of religious leaders that shared a connection and similar religious ideas, allowing for easier collaboration. One of the most important genealogies of *pirimuridi* was the line of Akhund Abdul Ghaffur.[35] Another critical point for her work was that religious leaders had various tools that they could use to enforce their authority. An example of this is that they served as arbitrators in feuds.[36] This was because the mullahs were seen as outside of the tribal system. They represented a universal power, God, so that they could act as a neutral arbitrator representing the divine. Another critical ability was that the mullahs could excommunicate people for immoral acts. If a mullah excommunicated someone, they would be cut off from their family and neighbors, making life difficult.[37] If a mullah excommunicated a tribe, they would not have access to mullahs for arbitration and nearby tribes had a reason for raiding them.[38] Also, the mullahs had their military forces, with a corps of *talibs* (students) and *sheikhs* (deputies).[39] Frontier mullahs had a variety of tools to enforce their will.

Look at historical events that showed the mullahs on the border had the ability to pull together multiple tribes to carry out militant operations. The first example was Hadda Mulla, a religious leader from the line of Akhund Abdul Ghaffur, who led rebellions against the British in 1893, 1897 and 1899. [40] Another example was the two rebellions against the Afghan ruler Amanullah. In the first rebellion, the religious leader did not support the uprising against Amanullah and supported the Afghan ruler, with warriors from the Afridi, Wazir, and Mohmand tribes called up by religious leaders coming to Kandahar from British-controlled tribal area to

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[34] Sana Haroon, *Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 31.
[35] Haroon, 43.
[36] Haroon, 74.
[37] Haroon, 72.
[38] Haroon, 73.
[39] Haroon, 82.
[40] Haroon, 46–47.

support the Emir against the rebellion.[41] In the 1929 rebellion, however, the frontier mullahs initially did not help either side. They eventually supported Amir Amanullah's general Nadir Khan's coup, who gave them stipends and honors for their support.[42] A third example was the mullahs organizing resistance against the British in 1930, with the mullahs leading Afridi, Wazir, and Mohmand's *lashkars* (tribal armies) throughout the year.[43] The mullahs' ability to raise military force made them both an asset and dangerous to the Afghan governments.

Another major work about Islam in Afghanistan was a collection of essays called *Afghanistan's Islam*. This book covers major arguments about Islam in Afghanistan's history, including Christopher's assertion that many of the educational traditions of the Islamic and Christian world educational traditions originated from Central Asia's Buddhist monasteries.[44] For this study, the most important chapters in this paper were Chapter 5, "Transporting knowledge in the Durrani Empire: Two Manuals of Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufi Practices." and chapter 6, "Islam, Sharia and State-Building under 'Abd al-Rahman Khan." The first work tries to understand Islam during the founding of the modern Afghan state, one of the least studied periods in Afghanistan's Islamic studies.[45] The second study examines how Emir Abdul Rahman Khan used Islam to try and overcome tribal authority and independent religious leaders to centralize power in himself and his government.

Chapter 5 of this book looked at the Sufi Naqqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufi order manuals. Specifically, it looks at two manuals from this order to understand what knowledge was transmitted and how it was transmitted through the Durrani empire.[46] This article argues that

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[41] Haroon, 114.
[42] Haroon, 118.
[43] Haroon, 150–54.
[44] Nile Green, "Introduction.: Afghanistan's Islam: A History and Its Scholarship," in *Afghanistan's Islam*, ed. Nile Green, From Conversion to the Taliban (University of California Press, 2017), 5, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1kc6k3q.6.
[45] Green, 15.
[46] Waleed Ziad, "Transporting Knowledge in the Durrani Empire: Two Manuals of Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi Sufi Practice," in *Afghanistan's Islam*, ed. Nile Green, From Conversion to the Taliban (University of California Press, 2017), 105, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1kc6k3q.11.

these manuals represented a new form of knowledge transportation, being more concise and combining mystical theology and praxis.[47] These manuals arose because of the need for a religious credential for a diverse area. The manuals accomplished this by teaching a familiar core philosophy that could be adopted to local practices. This work also pushed against the study of Afghanistan's Islam from a merely political standpoint, arguing that on the day-to-day, religious teachers were interested in the development of their community on a moral, spiritual, and intellectual level over political and social action.[48] He overstates this, however, while Afghan Islam is often understudied outside of its effects on Afghan politics. It does not make it any less accurate that Islam was an essential part of Afghanistan's politics. This study of Islam during the Durrani empire and studying Islam separate from political history in Afghanistan makes this article an essential part of the historiography of Islam in Afghanistan.

The other important chapter of this study was chapter 6, which talked about religion and the reign of Emir Abdul Rahman Khan. This paper follows a well-accepted argument that Abdul Rahman Khan would centralize power throughout his reign. This paper argues close similarities between what happened in Afghanistan then and Max Weber's theories on creating the modern state.[49] Religion transcended the power structure of Afghan politics, which traditionally divided power. Rahman Khan used religious law, Sharia, and the professionalization of Afghan religious teachers to serve a similar purpose to the technical bureaucracy Max Weber discusses. Sharia specifically serves as the replacement for "traditional" authority in Weber's work. This paper shows how the Emir centralized religious authority into his person by arguing that he was the head of the Islamic community. As such, he professionalized the religious occupation and

[47] Ziad, 116.
[48] Ziad, 125.
[49] Amin Tarzi, "Islam, Shari'a, and State Building under 'Abd al-Rahman Khan," in *Afghanistan's Islam*, ed. Nile Green, From Conversion to the Taliban (University of California Press, 2017), 132, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1kc6k3q.12.

pushed people to seek justice through the official religious courts.[50] This study is critical because it shows Islam's importance for Abdul Rahman Khan's goals.

A third major work for studying Afghanistan is R.D. McChesney's *Waqfs in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1899*. This work's overall methodology was to take a long durée approach to the history of the shrine at Mazar-i-Sharif.[51] According to Dr. Green, this is one, if not the most, essential works on Afghanistan's religion, showing the importance of shrines architecturally and historically. Specifically, the last two chapters show how in weak governments, such as in the 18th century, the Mazar-i-Sharif shrine held a great deal of political and especially economic power, with land resources in both urban and rural economies.[52] The shrine came under the authority of the Afghanistan government during Abdul Rahman Khan' reign and he issued a Farman putting the shrine under his government's administrative control.[53] This has led to several arguments about this takeover, with some believing that he took control of all waqfs (land grants to religious shrines and institutions) and stripped the religious leaders of their incomes. In contrast, others suggest he just took administrative control and destroyed the economic independence of the religious leaders.[54] Dr. McChesney argues that while he did take religious control, this was not uncommon for the Afghan Emirs, who saw it as their religious duty. What makes this book important is its use of Farman and waqfs records to show that this shrine continued to serve as an essential economic and religious resource throughout its history, either as a semi-independent institution or a valuable prize for the rulers of Afghanistan.

In this thesis, Islam has an important role as a means of legitimizing the government authority at home and abroad. This makes presenting this historiography of Afghan Islam

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[50] Tarzi, 133, 143–44.
[51] Green, "Introduction.," 11.
[52] R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1889* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 282–83, https://muse.jhu.edu/book/34296.
[53] McChesney, 294.
[54] McChesney, 274.

importatnt. First, as said in *Afghanistan's Islam,* Afghanistan's religious history is not a well-studied field, and when it is studied, it tends to focus on Islam through political history. Another central theme is that religion served as an essential part of the centralization of authority, either in the hands of religious leaders or the central government. Religious leaders tended to build power through a network of students who would have their own students. According to Haroon, these networks of saints and students allowed religious leaders to put strong political pressure on their ends by drawing on members of their same religious genealogy. A final theme is that while religious authority was helpful for various leaders, often religious authority was independent of political control unless coerced. The level of independence depended on the state's ability to exercise power. The strong government of Abdul Rahman Khan brought almost all the mullahs into the state employment; however, the religious leaders of Mazar-i-Sharif had to be physically conquered by the Afghan state in 1852.[55] On the other hand, the religious leaders had a great deal of independence on the British frontier.

Yaghistan: Land of Independence or Colonial Control

Yaghistan is an important region for this study. Translated from Persian, *yaghistan* can mean "land of the rebels/unruly."[56] In English sources, *yaghistan* often refers what is now the Federally Administrated Tribal Zone of Pakistan (FATA) or the Northwest Frontier of the British Raj. In this thesis, it will be shown that *yaghistan* was indirectly rule by the Afghan government through a variety of means. Still, *yaghistan* had also been used to describe any part of Afghanistan independent of the central government, and whose return to government control was dependent on force.[57] This broader argument had a moral element in the eyes of Emir Rahman Khan, who

[55] McChesney, 293.
[56] Haroon, *Frontier of Faith*, 29.
[57] Cheryl Benard, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, and Center for Middle East Public Policy (Rand Corporation), eds., *Afghanistan: State and Society, Great Power Politics, and the Way Ahead: Findings from an International Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2007*, Conference Proceedings (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 24.

saw the rebellion against his government as a rebellion against God. Thes areas In his philosophy, he was not only king but also “viceregent of God” to his kingdom.[58] However, many of the historical arguments deals with the North-West frontier. The central argument is whether the frontier was independent or a site of colonial control. This section looks at either side of the debate to see the methodology, arguments, and evidence.

The first book to look at will be *Ruling the Savage Periphery* by Benjamin Hopkins. This book wants to understand why violence continues to break out in places like the FATA of Pakistan or Nigeria are places of violence?[59] In this book, the author argues that both places were socially and geographically on the frontier of the British Empire. These frontiers were not treated the same way as the colonies were. The frontiers did not have access to judicial and economic resources given to the colonies. This stunted their economic development and made them dependent economically on the empire and states that would replace them.[60] The frontiers were indirectly ruled by the government. Instead, the “man on the ground” ruled. However, the standard practice was collectively punishing the frontier's people. This was due to the assumption that the “traditional” people of the border acted collectively, so punishment had to be carried out the same way.[61] Hopkins argues that the processes that turned these places into “frontiers” originated in the Northwest Frontier.[62] He further says that the frontier was not a place but a set of policies that included economic dependence, indirect rule, and separation from the political and judicial systems of the empires and states that created and maintained them. This set of policies originated in the North-West frontier of the British Raj.

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[58] Abdul Rahman Khan and Mahomed Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, vol. 2 (Boston, MA: Elibron Classics, 2001), 15, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU1701018.
[59] Benjamin D. Hopkins, *Ruling the Savage Periphery: Frontier Governance and the Making of the Modern State* (Cambridge, UNITED STATES: Harvard University Press, 2020), 1–2, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=6144135.
[60] Hopkins, 6.
[61] Hopkins, 194.
[62] Hopkins, 10.

It is essential to talk about Hopkin's methodology and sources. One of the main sources of this book is the writings of British administrators. This included the famous work of Mountstuart Elphinstone's *Kingdom of Kabul.*[63] In this case, the author shows how the author was influenced by Roman writing, especially *Germania,* which seems to affect his reports about Afghanistan. He also uses the service history of these administrators to show how the Afghan frontier became the origin of the policies that created frontier. An example is that many administrators would make the "frontier" of southern Iraq and Palestine previously worked for the British Raj. They came to Iraq and Pakistan in support of the Indian army sent to take this territory in the First World War.[64] Another example is that the creator of the Nigerian colonial system, Frederick Lugard, started his government service as a soldier on the Afghan frontier.[65]He also used the policies created by the British to show this similarity. An example was the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which was used to regulate southern Iraq. It was ripped almost entirely from the frontier regulations of the Afghan border. This makes sense due to the previous experience of the administrators on the Indian frontier.[66]

Hopkins used examples to show how the frontier dominated the people of the frontier. The first example is the collective punishments that the British used to punish the Pashtun tribes. British administrators thought the Pashtuns, as an "uncivilized" people, supported their friends and relatives who committed crimes like robbery.[67] To punish these actions, the British used a variety of punishments. For example, the British attacked villages if bandits hid in them. The other common punishment for the Pashtun tribes was a blockade, which prevented the Pashtuns from going into settled districts.[68] Another example is the importance of "on-the-spot" leaders in frontier policy. A specific example on the Afghan frontier was Sir Robert Groves

[63] Hopkins, 17.
[64] Hopkins, 61.
[65] Hopkins, 76.
[66] Hopkins, 65.
[67] Hopkins, 38.
[68] Hopkins, 54.

Sandeman.[69] Sandeman was largely independent as head administrator of the Balochi frontier. He created the tribal militia system to help gain control over the frontier and provided subsidiaries for supportive tribal leaders.[70] This made the Balochi leaders dependent on the state, with some government servants saying that working with Sandeman had a feudal feel.[71] These are examples of how the British system brought the frontier into the imperial system.

The other camp saw the frontier as independent from Afghanistan and the British/Pakistan governments. For this side, we will look at the *Frontier of Faith* by Haroon again. A significant part of Haroon's argument is that the frontier mullahs had power as trans-tribal leaders due to the lack of a strong government on the frontier. This meant the mullahs used various methods to keep both governments out.[72] It is important to highlight similarities between the two camps before continuing. Both camps agree that the British Raj treated its frontier fundamentally differently than the rest of its colonies. Still, they disagreed on whether it was just another form of British control or a zone beyond the real power of either government.

To continue discussing Haroon's work, her sources must be explored. Her first evidence was the communications between the leaders on the border and the two governments. An example is when the religious leaders supported Amanullah's war against the British in return for remaining independent in internal affairs.[73] Another significant piece of evidence was that rebels against either government fled to the frontier to escape said government and plan new actions. On the Afghan side, an example would be Hadda Mulla, who would spend his life trying to undermine the Afghan and British governments.[74] Both governments also discussed internally the border area. An example would be Durrani's assessment that the Emirs of Afghanistan did not have control over border tribes like the Wazir.[75] On the other side, the British described the

[69] Hopkins, 52.
[70] Hopkins, 54.
[71] Hopkins, 52.
[72] Haroon, *Frontier of Faith*, 2.
[73] Haroon, 104.
[74] Haroon, 61.
[75] Haroon, 19–20.

frontier as *yaghistan,* a place no Englishmen could go, at least not in safety by 1868.[76] Haroon gained her evidence from communications of governments to the border, the action of people on the border, and governments' communications both internal and external communications.

Here are some significant examples that Dr. Haroon used to show the independence of the frontier area. The first example is Jamaat-i Mujahideen. The Jamaat-i Mujahideen was an anti-colonial resistance movement that started in India and spread to the tribal areas.[77] Frontier mullahs supported the movement, as they had long preached against the British as infidels. However, despite the British worry that this was being organized from India, local mullahs provided leadership on the frontier. When deciding how to attack the British, the leaders in India did not even try to coordinate with the frontier area; instead, they provided support and funding to the local mullahs. Local mullahs saw the organization as a valuable way of building prestige, especially by handing out money and ammunition given to them by the Jamaat-i Mujahideen.[78] Another example is multiple attacks led by mullahs during the early 1930s against the British, which had to be put down with airpower.[79] A third example was the support the Mujahideen received from the frontier mullahs, including raising *lashkars*, providing housing, and giving financial support for Afghan refugees. In return, the Afghan refugees supplied labor for the Pakistani Pashtun, and eventually help create the Taliban.[80]

Strangers in a Strange land: Sovereignty of the state of Afghanistan, Britain, and the border

Now that we discussed some of the significant works in Afghanistan historiography, this section lay out this thesis and how its arguments will be expanded in the following chapters.

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[76] Haroon, 29.
[77] Haroon, 92–94.
[78] Haroon, 97.
[79] Haroon, 151–52.
[80] Haroon, 192–94.

This thesis looks at all three of the major themes that are mentioned above. It takes a new perspective by looking at how the borders that the Afghan government pushed for were part of a larger effort to centralize their power and protect their country from occupation. To do this, the Afghan government would borrow tools and ideas from the British and incorporate them with Afghan political methods. British sovereignty was built on its strength, which it used to create an international order that placed nations on a hierarchy of "civilization." In this system, "civilization" came from promoting peace and law, and a sign of significant progress in civilization came from creating strong borders. British strength came in part from its Indian army, which influenced the Afghan regular army. Afghan sovereigns had to work in a political system that favored decentralization in which leaders had to attract followers by offering goods and safety. Emirs would try to unite their people through religious authority and, increasingly, a more powerful central government paid in part by the nearby European Empire. The idea of a border being a meeting place on sovereignty, while a seemingly obvious statement, directly argues against the failed or weakened state presented in Gregorian and Hopkin's works. Instead of being a colonial frontier, as shown in *Ruling the Savage Periphery*, Afghanistan was an independent state whose government was not ignorant of the wider world and the political ideas of the two empires around it. This paper argues that the government of Afghanistan used this meeting place of British and Afghan sovereignty to achieve both its foreign policy and domestic goals. Part of these goals depended on the Emir's claims of authority over what I call "Afghan space," which included the nation-state of Afghanistan and the territory and people that the Emir had power over due to historical, religious, and ethnic connections. The border of Afghanistan in the 19th century was a meeting place of Afghan and British sovereignty, which the government of Emir Rahman Khan used to achieve his domestic and foreign policy.

The first chapter of this paper will discuss the British conceptions of sovereignty and statehood. This chapter will examine several critical English political thinkers: Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, and Walter Bagehot. British sovereignty was built on a political ideology that

put them at the top of a national hierarchy, with nations like Afghanistan and their military power beneath them. When put into the greater context of the British dominance of large parts of the globe, these opinions on good government and sovereignty had significant influence. An essential part of these conceptions of sovereignty, as recorded in *The Historical Foundations of the World Order: The Tower and the Arena* by Douglass M. Johnston and Reisman, is that states had to exist to define borders and population.[81] Another critical part of the British conception of sovereignty was that "barbaric" nations did not have protection against invasion. This meant that the Indian army played an essential role in sovereignty in Central Asia. It served as a tool to spread British influence; however, this strategy did not play out effectively in Afghanistan, with the British being forced to leave Afghanistan, losing their power over the internal affairs of Afghanistan. However, this military power in India was not completely effective, with the British losing the Second Anglo-Afghan war. The Emir would also work to "civilize" his state, increasing safety inside the country, arguing his wars had brought peace to the country and he had started to enforce the law. These changes led to the British acknowledging Afghanistan as a "civilizing monarch" by helping it create borders and lifting some of the restrictions of the Treaty of Gandamak.

Chapter 2 deals with sovereignty in Afghanistan. The Emirate of Afghanistan had several claims to its territory. The first is historical. Afghan emirs claimed control over a large part of the former Durrani empire since they claimed direct descendants of Durrani, and his family ruled early in the emirate's history. The Afghan government claimed all territory in modern Pakistan west of the Indus River. Another claim was by religion. After the overthrow of the Sadozai family, Dost Mohammad would be the first Afghan leader to take the title of Emir, using it to rally support for his operations against the British and Sikhs. Emir Rahman Khan would carry this claim even further, using it to claim a kind of "divine kingship" that he would use to help solidify

[81] Douglas Johnston and W. Michael Reisman, *The Historical Foundations of World Order: The Tower and the Arena* (Brill Nijhoff, 2007), 409, https://brill.com/view/title/14239.

his power. The Afghan government also claimed control through tributary relationships, with tribes that assisted in the forms of taxes, tribute, or warriors to the royal government, seen as part of the Afghan state. This became especially important with the border tribes, which the government had loose control over. Emir Abdul Rahman Khan would lead to a sea change in Afghanistan's politics and sovereignty by creating a more centralized state. As mentioned above, this Afghan government used an interpretation of Islam that claimed he had a divine mandate to lead the Muslims of Afghanistan in defense of the faith. The second pillar of this new Afghan state was the military, used to enforce internal control over the rebellious tribes and as a foreign policy tool. The third tool was the Emir's alliance with the British, which gained him money and weapons. At the same time, the Afghan authorities officially rejected the British and rallied the people to its banner by promising to protect the country from the British and Russians. To conclude, in early Afghanistan, the power of the royal government was based on the will of powerful Afghan tribes, and the kings of Afghanistan claimed religious authority. Throughout the history of Afghanistan, however, the Emirs continuously tried to increase their power. The efforts of consolidating in the reign of Emir Rahman Khan created a more centralized state through a new, more authoritarian interpretation of Islam and a professional army that enforced the Emir's rule at home and served as a valuable tool in foreign policy.

Speaking of the importance of the military to the reign of the Emir, the third chapter will work on how the new professional army of Afghanistan was closely tied to its borders. First, Emir Rahman Khan did not control all of Afghanistan at the beginning of his rule. Essential territory, such as Kandahar, had to be taken by force. Also, as mentioned above, the Afghan military demonstrated "effectively controlled" over territory, an essential part of the European understanding of state borders. The Afghan army served visible sign of the Emir's government. When the border commissions would ask about which government controlled what, the presence of nearby Afghan soldiers, or militias paid by the Afghan government, provided robust evidence for "effective control." The Afghan army also provided security on the border from

raiders from Russian and British-based raiders. Finally, Afghanistan's army provided a means of forcing compliance inside Afghanistan. This is important because, as mentioned above, a crucial part of European statehood was controlling your territory. Emir Rahman Khan knew this suppression of tribal influence would make his country look More "civilized" and, therefore worthy of being an independent nation. The Afghan army served an essential purpose of legitimizing the border since it allowed the state to take control of autonomous territory, show "effective control" over the border, protect border people from raiders, and suppress rebellion so the state could be seen as "civilized."

Chapter 4 gets to the heart of the thesis. The Afghan government used its knowledge of European understanding of international affairs to push its own goals while claiming authority over what I called "Afghan space," which included not only the territory of the state but also large parts of what is now Pakistan. This chapter begins by showing the European influences on Abdul Rahman Khan, including having a European military teacher and spending time in Russian territory in the company of important Russian colonial officials. After this, this paper talks about the negotiations around the borders of Afghanistan. It should be noted that two very different policies drove the Afghan government when it came to demarcating its border with Russia and the British. The Afghan government's main focus for the Russian border was security, specifically against Russian encroachment. The Afghan government had a treaty with the British, the treaty of Gandamak, that stated that the British would help the Afghans if they were invaded. However, the lack of a firm border meant that the Russians kept taking small bites out of territory claimed by the Afghan government. This made forming a border with the Russians a necessity for national security. On his border with the British, the Afghan Emir wanted to claim as much territory as possible. However, he did not want to endanger his relationship with the British and the sizable income that came with it. The Afghan government tried various methods to achieve these goals, including using their own maps, stalling talks, and putting Afghan governors in charge of border regions. While these methods did get some

results, the British gained control over many Afghan tribes. Specifically, the ones under the rule of the Sikhs kingdom.

The territory that the British took is *yaghistan* and serves as the meeting place of faith and state in this paper. Of all the titles that Rahman Khan is known for, Emir is the most used. This title has deep ties with the Afghan government's continued claims of sovereignty over this space. Emir is a short version of the title “commander of the faithful” and an obligation for Muslims in his kingdom, including those in y*aghistan,* to listen to him. This religious claim was further strengthened by the Afghan Emir’s long history of funding religious leaders on the borderland and Rahman Khan’s use of religious pamphlets to enforce his authority over Muslims in general and particularly the act of declaring jihad. Rahman Khan also used historical claims over this territory. He maintain the loyalty of local leaders through regular payments and communications. This all led to a system where the space was under British rule according to international law, but it was under the influence of Afghan emirs. This arrangement led to the British having a paranoid mindset about the frontier and putting the frontier under a different regime than the rest of the Indian colony.

Chapter 1: With Musket and Law: British International Understanding and the Afghan Border

The British in the 19th century were a superpower. Other European powers controlled large sections of Africa and Asia, but the British Empire's role in defeating Napoleon allowed it to expand its commerce and naval power.[82] By the end of the Victorian era in 1901, the British controlled a fourth of the world's soil and people.[83] This role as a superpower, as is pointed out in Wilhelm George Grewe and Michael Byers' book, *Epochs of International Law,* allowed Britain to control the development of international law from 1815-1919.[84] This dominance of military power and ascendancy directly affected the British when they were making the borders of Afghanistan. This chapter will show how the British in India tied sovereignty to a mixture of international norms and a reliance on military power, which affected British decision-making. This chapter is divided into several subtopics, beginning with a brief account of how British power flourished in the 19th century. The following subsections explore international law in the 19th century and the influence of the British military in India, respectively. The last sections are devoted to how these influences directly affected the relationship between the British and Afghans.

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[82] Jane Samson, *The British Empire* (Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM: Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2001), 105, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=5746886.
[83] *The Victorian Empire, 1837-1901; a Pictorial History.* (New York : Praeger Publishers, [1970], 1970), 15, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU80775.
[84] Wilhelm G. Grewe ; translated and revised by Michael Byers, *The Epochs of International Law* (Berlin ; New York : Walter de Gruyter, 2000., 2000), 429, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU4501776.B

Everything the Sun Touches is Yours: The British dominance in the 19th century.

The 19th century saw the British Empire at the height of its power. The British played an essential role in the defeat of the French empire at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.[85] The British kept their distance from the Europe. After the Napoleonic wars, British power came from its international empire and industrial might.[86] In the 19th century, the British controlled 25% of the world's landmass, just under a fourth of the world's population.[87] In India alone, the British rule a landmass larger landmass than all of Europe.[88] The subcontinent served as the "jewel" of the empire. As recorded in *The Victorian Empire*, Lord Curzon said, "As long as we [Britain] rule India, we are the greatest power in the world. If we lose it, we shall drop straightaway to a third-rate power".[89] The British empire used the Indian army to enforce its will abroad.[90] The British also gained from India vast amounts of raw goods, such as cotton, and turned India into the primary trade partner of Great Britain.[91] Indian served the British as a massive reserve of military and economic power. This made India an essential part of British dominance in the 19th century.

It was not just the Indian colonies that gave the British its power during the 19th century. The British industrial might and economic systems strengthened its global influence. At the beginning of the 19th century, the British were the world's industrial power, industrializing a generation before its major rivals.[92] From 1815-1870, Britain served as the "workshop of the

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[85] Alan Forrest, *Waterloo: Great Battles* (Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=1961763.
[86] Byers, *The Epochs of International Law*, 429.
[87] *The Victorian Empire, 1837-1901; a Pictorial History.*, 15.
[88] *The Victorian Empire, 1837-1901; a Pictorial History.*, 178.
[89] *The Victorian Empire, 1837-1901; a Pictorial History.*, 175.
[90] Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*, 1st U.S. ed. (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1996., 1996), 200, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU896300.
[91] James, 172.
[92] by James A. Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion*, 5th ed. (London : Macmillan ; New York : St. Martin's Press, 1964-54., 1965), 472, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU441003.

world," becoming the world leader in producing cheap, staple goods.[93] Even after the U.S. and Germany started to overtake the British in industrial output in the 1880s, the other great economic strength of the British economy, its financial tools, cushioned its loss in industrial production.

Britain's financial position in the 19th century allowed it to have influence far beyond its formal empire. As the capital lender of the world, the British provided undeveloped economies with the capital to industrialize.[94] British citizens had around £195-£230 million in foreign investments, which gave the British a significant source of income and helped expand its "invisible empire." [95] The British became dependent on the returns of its foreign investment by the 1820s to provide a surplus and to keep imports at a level so as not to harm domestic employment.[96] The financial institutions of Great Britain provided a sizable income and helped expand its informal empire. British trade and investment forced countries into the global market it controlled. Examples included investments in American cotton plantations and cattle ranches in Uruguay.[97] These investments also created political influence, as illustrated by British treaties with Siam and Japan in the 1840s and 1850s.[98] The financial tools of the British cushioned the decline in its industrial output and gave it influence in countries not under its direct control.

The British navy served as one of the empire's most effective coercive tools and as the shield of its more significant resources: maritime trade. Controlling one of the strongest navies of its time, the British strived to maintain more capital ships than the following two naval powers, which it did during the age of sail and in the 1850s, though it lagged behind during the rise of ironclads. The British fixed this rule of thumb with the Naval Defense Act of 1889, which made this "two-power" policy official. This naval supremacy allowed the British to gain a monopoly

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[93] James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*, 172.
[94] James, 172–73.
[95] P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, "The Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas, 1750-1914," *The Economic History Review* 33, no. 4 (1980): 478, https://doi.org/10.2307/2594798.
[96] Cain and Hopkins, 475.
[97] James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*, 173.
[98] James, 177.

during the Napoleonic War over trade in Africa and Asia and to deprive its French rivals of their colonies such as Tobago, St. Lucia, Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, and its wealthiest colony, St. Domingo. The British Empire's image abroad became tied to the gunboat, and the British relied on its naval might to protect its international trade.

International Law in the British Empire

The strength of the British Empire, as pointed out in *Epochs of International Law,* meant that from 1815-1919, the British dominated international law.[99] The section is divided into several sections to discuss international law during this time and how the British influenced it. The first section will discuss some major 19th-century British international thinkers. The second looks at the historical development of British international law as a field of study. This all leads to the significant point of this section, namely that in the 19th century, the European powers, and particularly Britain, saw a fundamental difference between "civilized" European countries and the "uncivilized" non-European countries; however, some countries like Afghanistan did enjoy some, but not all, of the protections of fully civilized nations.

One of the most important political philosophers of 19th-century Britain was Herbert Spencer (1820-1903).[100] Herbert Spencer derived much of his political philosophy from his understanding of biology and drew parallels between an organism and a society, namely the correlation between growth and complexity in both organisms and society.[101] As part of this view, Spencer saw international relations as driven by "survival of the fittest " better known as Social Darwinism.[102] This belief led to an idea that international politics should only benefit "strong

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[99] Byers, *The Epochs of International Law*, 429.
[100] "Catalog Record: Herbert Spencer | HathiTrust Digital Library," accessed June 6, 2022, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/101759190.
[101] by William Henry Hudson, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer : With a Biographical Sketch*, 2d ed. (New York : Haskell House, [1975], 1897), 116, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU243609.
[102] *English Political Thought in the 19th Century.*, Harper Torchbooks, TB1071 The Academy Library (New York : Harper, [1962], 1962), 233, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU161401.

nations" and that weaker nations must accept their fate. Spencer divided the world between civilized (stronger) and uncivilized (more vulnerable) nations. According to him, industrialized countries were civilized. In contrast, "warlike nations" were uncivilized.[103] Another sign of a civilized nation was monogamous marriage, while uncivilized nations practiced polygamy.[104] A third sign was that a civilized country was likely democratic, while barbaric nations were despotic.[105] These beliefs would place Afghanistan on the decidedly uncivilized side of the aisle. The British Major General Charles McGregor described the Afghans as "a race of. tigers…"[106] Afghan men were also allowed to have up to four wives, following Islamic law.[107] Spencer's criteria for an uncivilized nation fitted Afghanistan, which by Spencer own viewpoint made Afghanistan the subject to the whims of the civilized, mighty British.

Another essential British thinker who wrote on the differences between "barbarian" and "civilized" states was John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).[108] John Stuart Mill served in the East India Company (EIC) and as a political philosopher.[109] Mill believed strongly that the British government did not intervene in other countries except to benefit humanity.[110] An example he used was the British attempts to stop the slave trade. He also argued that when the British went to war against barbarians and gained trade concessions, they secured them for all of humanity.[111] He also argued that differences exist between the barbarian and civilized states.[112] A barbaric state, to Mill, was the societal stage of development before a nation became civilized

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[103] Hudson, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, 130.
[104] *English Political Thought in the 19th Century.*, 234.
[105] Hudson, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, 131.
[106] edited by William Trousdale, *War in Afghanistan, 1879-80 : The Personal Diary of Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor* (Detroit : Wayne State University Press, 1985., 1985), 78, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU654266.
[107] Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, [1978], 1978), 188, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU514170.
[108] "The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill - NC State University Libraries Catalog," accessed June 7, 2022, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU1943763.
[109] Byers, *The Epochs of International Law*, 454.
[110] "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," *Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical* 3 (1865): 238.
[111] "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," 239.
[112] "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," 252.

(Mills believed in 4 stages of societal development: savagism, slavery, barbarism, and civilization). Still, Mill suggested that many countries stagnated as a barbaric nation, or returned to a more primitive state.[113] Such barbarian states did not understand international reciprocity, and these states, unlike more advanced nations, might benefit from being subjected. This belief led to the different ways that barbarian and civilized states interacted with international law.[114] "Barbarians have no rights as a nation, except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one." Mill wrote, "The only moral laws for the relations between a civilized and a barbarous government are the universal rules of the morality between man and man."[115] On the other hand, civilized nations were governed by "international customs and the same rules of international morality…." These customs and rules made up international law. Mill's belief that the British government served as a beneficial force on the world stage and that barbarian states did not have the same rights as civilized ones served as the mainstay of Mill's philosophy.

A third philosopher that significantly impacted British thought at the time was Walter Bagehot. Bagehot wrote extensively on why the British had gained such an ascendant position worldwide, which he attributed to the British government.[116] Bagehot believed the British social system was the best designed for democracy since the lower classes did not rule or want to rule.[117] To expand on this, Bagehot said that the poor classes are not used to making decisions, while the aristocracy has much more practice with this skill. The poor learned by tradition to obey aristocrats who used their skills in decision-making to rule.[118] The poor benefited from not ruining the government due to a lack of skill. Bagehot believed that humans developed unevenly

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[113] Beate Jahn, "Barbarian Thoughts: Imperialism in the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill," *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 3 (2005): 604.
[114] "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," 253.
[115] "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," 259.
[116] *English Political Thought in the 19th Century.*, 192.
[117] *English Political Thought in the 19th Century.*, 181.
[118] Bagehot, Paul Smith, and Raymond Geuss, *Bagehot: The English Constitution: The English Constitution* (Cambridge, UNITED KINGDOM: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 32, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=164762.

across the population.[119] Specifically, he argued that certain races, like Africans, did not have the mental capacity to run a government well. He also believed that race was a biological determinant, with races like Africans or Asians lower than Europeans like the French or English.[120] In a specific example, the British failure to bring European "enlightenment" to India was because the Indian people were unable to comprehend the goodness or civilization of the British.[121] This was evidence that "uncivilized" people, like Afghanistan and the English poor, could not understand how to govern well. Therefore their rule was dangerous for themselves and others.

British approaches to international law were shaped not just by these prominent political thinkers of the 19th century but also by international lawyers and by the tenets they were trained in. At the beginning of the 19th century, international law was not a specialization in the British law profession. Instead, the lawyers who practiced international law trained either in admiralty law, the law that governed British maritime conduct, or as civilian lawyers who advised the government on treaties.[122] As the century progressed, international law moved into the realm of academics.[123] This change came about primarily due to an increased interest in the political questions raised by international law, and by 1838 London University had a chair of International Law, held by J.T. Graves. Throughout the 19th century, international law became a field of study that focused on the political questions of the time. A recurrent theme is that international law was a set of rules for the "civilized" world.[124]

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[119] Bagehot, Smith, and Geuss, 6.
[120] Walter Bagehot ; with an introduction and notes by Roger Kimball, *Physics and Politics : Or, Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of "Natural Selection" and "Inheritance" to Political Society* (Chicago : Ivan R. Dee, [1999], 1872), 97, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU1232728.
[121] Kimball, 129.
[122] Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, and Maria Vogiatzi, *Time, History and International Law* (Leiden, NETHERLANDS, THE: BRILL, 2006), 67, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=467633.
[123] Craven, Fitzmaurice, and Vogiatzi, 70.
[124] Craven, Fitzmaurice, and Vogiatzi, 86.

What did the English consider signs of a "civilized society? In his book, C. Hangerman argued that the British had two metrics: internal peace and law.[125] Harry Verelst, a colonial official of the East Indian Company whose writing influenced British thinking about its Indian colony, said that the British conquests in India had "brought peace to millions."[126] In John Malcolm's "Sketch of the Political history of India, from the introduction of Mr. Pitt's Bill in 1784," said, "...through the action of its [Britain's] influence and power, union and tranquility over a considerable portion of the globe: and of bringing to nations, who found it involved in continual discord and war, blessings and harmony, and peace."[127] Peace was an important metric to the British for a "civilized" nation.

The other metric for the British, according to Hagerman, was law. Some British saw its Indian colony as devoid of any recognized law; therefore, the British had to bring law to this region's chaos.[128] Other British colonial administrators, namely Sir William Jones, saw that India had laws, but the laws needed organizing.[129] Sir William Jones saw his role as a "Justinian of Asia" and wanted to create a unified law for all of India by compiling, rationalizing, and organizing existing laws. The British saw the law as an essential metric for civilization.

One of the most apparent signs of a sovereign state to the British were linear European borders. Author Marie de Rugy argued that states in Asia, such as Siam and much of India, traditionally had many political power bases.[130] The state was built on a relationship between a central power base and other political power bases. This Mandala model created gray peripheral areas over which the central authority had little control. As will be expanded in the next chapter, the Afghan government had many political centers, some of which the government

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[125] C. Hagerman, *Britain's Imperial Muse: The Classics, Imperialism, and the Indian Empire, 1784-1914* (London, UNITED KINGDOM: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 73, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=1183210.
[126] Hagerman, 71.
[127] Hagerman, 75.
[128] Hagerman, 70.
[129] Hagerman, 71.
[130] Marie de Rugy, *Locating, Demarcating, and Crossing the Border* (Brill, 2021), 224, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004469853_010.

had loose control over.[131] In these systems, the particular line demarcating state authority was not crucial, something the French Colonel Bernard commented on when he assisted the French border demarcation with Cambodia in 1904.[132]

The Europeans saw linear borders as the clear sign of a "civilized" nations and the mandala frontier model as "barbaric." [133] Colonel Holdich, who worked and wrote extensively on the Northwest Frontier in the 1880s, said that creating borders was a clear sign of a progressing civilization.[134] According to historian Malcolm Anderson, the old system of other power divided among nobles and a king naturally led to war. At the same time, creating a nation-state that was tied to linear borders suggested a state was politically stable, which made war less likely.[135] Colonel Holdich said that the creation of the nation's linear borders created peace and goodwill by limiting the expansion of other states.[136] Europeans also tied the creation of borders with the universal application of a single law to a territory.[137] This could not be true for European feudalism and Mandala systems, where law and loyalties to different power structures could overlap.

As the legal profession changed in the 19th century, some basic concepts started to be defined. The most important for this work was defining a state and nation. As mentioned above, European law of the 19th century described a state as a bordered territory with a centralized, independent government that protected and ruled its people.[138] However, according to Colonel

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[131] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 51.
[132] Rugy, *Locating, Demarcating, and Crossing the Border*, 224.
[133] Dominic Davies, *Imperial Infrastructure and Spatial Resistance in Colonial Literature, 1880-1930*, Race and Resistance across Borders in the Long Twentieth Century ; 2 (Oxford : Peter Lang, [2017], 2017), 160, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU3930166.
[134] Thomas Hungerford Holdich, *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making* (London: Macmillan and co., limited, 1916), 2, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001433067.
[135] Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers : Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge : Polity Press, 1996., 1996), 25, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU928900.
[136] Holdich, *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making*, x.
[137] edited by Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen, *Borderlines and Borderlands : Political Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-State* (Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, [2010], 2010), 6, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU2246695.
[138] Johnston and Reisman, *The Historical Foundations of World Order*, 576.

Holdich and other writings, another critical factor was a state incorporated an entire people or nation.[139] Nations, on the other hand, consisted of a group of people that shared a common ancestor, shared culture and/or language, and a historical connection to each other.[140] Most importantly, however, a group must form a shared community that identifies as a nation to be a nation. These definitions came about during the European imperial age, and the Great Powers got a significant say in which states were sovereign and which were not.[141] For example, nationalism became a defining characteristic of states in Europe partly due to the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire, forming new states based on national identity.[142] Some examples included Greece and Romania. Also, war outside Europe was considered natural until 1914. This was partly due to the state systems like the Mandala system and partly to the "warlike" nature of non-European states, as expressed in Spencer's work. Ultimately, the main point of international law in the 19th century was to justify empire.

Through the study of British thinkers and the development of international law, a common thread became clear, British international law supported their empire. In the study of British thinkers, a common thread is that there was a division in the world between the "civilized," usually with the English being the supreme example, and the "uncivilized," which included all of the non-European world. The "uncivilized" part of the world could not be governed as well as "civilized" nations. These states needed to be conquered for their own good. The international law's narrow definitions of state and nation did not consider the various types of states worldwide. It was Europeans, and by extension, the British, who had the right to deny other states sovereignty due to their international strength at the time. International las legitimized wars of conquest and the creation of their empire.

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[139] Holdich, *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making*, 13.
[140] Byers, *The Epochs of International Law*, 485.
[141] Johnston and Reisman, *The Historical Foundations of World Order*, 74, 577–78.
[142] Johnston and Reisman, 679.

By the Musket: Military Power and the rule of India and the Empire

While the British built an international law that legitimized their empire, the British military was the essential tool of the empire. This thesis already discussed British naval power and how it allowed the British to create a sizeable informal empire based on trade. Another essential part of the British military was its armies in India. To go further in-depth about this vital imperial tool, this section will briefly describe the history of the British army in India, with a particular focus on the Mutiny of 1857. Next, this paper will demonstrate how the Indian government allowed the British to have a large and expensive army without seriously affecting the people of Britain. This all comes to another point, discussed in the last two paragraphs, that the British saw its army in India as an essential tool of coercive control over its empire.

The British army of India started even before Britain was an established power on the subcontinent. The British East India Company (EIC) originally only had a small military force. The Nawab of Bengal, who controlled the centers of British trade in India, decreed the British could only have 30 soldiers and an ensign .[143] British military power in India was built initially on the native tradition of raising retainers of cavalry, but this changed in the 18th century when the French Indian company brought on Joseph Dupleix.[144] Joseph Dupleix began European military training in India. The British Major Stringer Lawrence, “the Father of the Indian Army,” began European style training of its Indian soldiers after the French took Madras in 1748.[145] This newly trained army allowed the EIC to defeat the French and Dutch by 1760 with the military under the

[143] editor Ian Cardozo, *The Indian Army : A Brief History* (New Delhi : Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research, United Service Institution of India, 2005., 2005), 1, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU1944351.
[144] Cardozo, 10–11.
[145] J. Biddulph, *Stringer Lawrence,the Father of the Indian Army,* (London, 1901), 19–20, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951001767475a.

leadership of Major-General Clive.[146] This new army was divided into three presidencies: Bombay, Madras, and Bengal. Each presidency recruited their own European-styled infantry, cavalry, and artillery units.[147] These armies recruited differently, with the Bombay and Madras armies drawing on many social classes. In contrast, Bengal (the largest of the three presidencies' armies) drew mainly from the higher ranks of Hindu society, namely the Brahmins and Rajputs. This became a problem, because the higher-class Hindus required a special diet, were reluctant to leave India, and resisted orders from lower-class Indian and British officers.[148] The British armies in India helped expand the power of the Company across the subcontinent and Asia in general. For example, the EIC used the army to intervene in Afghanistan in the First Anglo-Afghan War and in China in the First Opium War. [149] The British built their Indian army to tackle European threats in India. However, it evolved into an effective tool for projecting power in Asia and Africa.

The Indian Army's most enormous conflagration and changes came about due to the Indian Mutiny of 1857.[150] In India, the war has sometimes been portrayed not as a rebellion but instead called the "War of India Independence." [151] The immediate reason for the revolt was the new Enfield 1853 rifle-musket's ammunition.[152] These rifle cartridges were greased to make it easier to load the rifle, but rumors spread that the grease was either beef tallow or lard. Both of these

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[146] Madan Paul Singh, *Indian Army under the East India Company*, 1st ed. (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1976., 1976), 199, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/UNCb9480659.
[147] Daniel Marston, *The Indian Army and the End of the Raj : Decolonising the Subcontinent*, Cambridge Studies in Indian History and Society ; 23 (Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2014., 2014), 7, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU3101594.
[148] Marston, 8.
[149] Bruce A. Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989*, Warfare and History (London ; New York : Routledge, 2001., 2001), 20, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU1481275; Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 377.
[150] Lionel Knight, *Britain in India, 1858-1947*, Anthem Perspectives in History (London ; New York : Anthem Press, 2012., 2012), 6, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU2765368.
[151] edited by Biswamoy Pati, *The 1857 Rebellion*, Oxford in India Readings. (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2007., 2007), 25, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU2181240.
[152] Kim A. Wagner, *The Great Fear of 1857 : Rumours, Conspiracies and the Making of the Indian Uprising*, The Past in the Present (Oxford : Peter Lang, 2010., 2010), 1, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU2663022.

options were problems for the sepoys, with Hindus considering cattle sacred and eating beef was a significant taboo. Muslim troops, on the other hand, considered pigs unclean. There were also long-term causes, including disapproval of the British rule, the expansionist policies of the British, and a breakdown of the rural society (this was because the British recruited heavily from the Brahmin farm owners and promised radical land reform).[153] The rebellion started properly with the mutiny of the sepoys at Meerut on May 10, 1857.[154] During the Mutiny, the sepoys killed British officers, civilians, and Christians. This initial revolt spread, leading to a revolt that consumed northern India until its brutal suppression in 1858.[155]

The suppression of the Mutiny of 1857 had two effects on the Army of the Raj as it marched into the second half of the 19th century. The first was the immediate punishments for the sepoy troops participating in the mutiny. Angered by real and exaggerated claims of atrocities committed against British civilians, the British carried out large-scale executions of mutinous sepoy regiments. An example was the 26th Native Infantry regiment, whose 500 soldiers had been slaughtered to a man after they dropped their weapons and fled.[156] Other popular execution methods for the soldiers included hanging, having sepoys blown apart by cannons, and torture.[157] The attacks affected not only the sepoys but also the civilian population.[158] Based on the political theories mentioned above, including Spencer's thoughts, these actions were considered legitimate to bring “civilization” to the “barbaric” sepoys. When describing the sepoys, Major Harriot called them, as recorded in *the 1857 Rebellion,* “treacherous villains.” According to Mill’s political thought, sepoys, as barbarians, did not have the protections afforded to civilized people.

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[153] Knight, *Britain in India, 1858-1947*, 7.
[154] Wagner, *The Great Fear of 1857*, 1.
[155] Pati, *The 1857 Rebellion*, xxxvii,1.
[156] Knight, *Britain in India, 1858-1947*, 6.
[157] Pati, *The 1857 Rebellion*, 118.
[158] Pati, 119.

The changes caused by the Mutiny of 1857 did not stop with the brutal suppression and executions of native soldiers involved in the mutiny. Another notable change involved the Indian military taking in more British native soldiers. This was because, to use the words of Major Harriot in*, The Great Fear of 1857,* "Once betrayed by those whom they had trusted, the British could no longer bring themselves to trust anyone with a brown face: all alike were tainted."[159] The number of the sepoys to native-British soldiers was kept at 2:1, and the British maintained exclusive control over artillery and the higher levels of command.[160] Many sepoys were fired directly after the Mutiny, dropping the sepoy armies from 238,000 to 140,000 soldiers. The Indian regiments also changed their organization and recruitment practices. The old regimental system recruited soldiers into units based on caste and religion. However, the new system mixed recruits from different faiths and castes into the same regiment to limit their cohesion. The idea was that mixed units would not be able to organize themselves as effectively as when they were from the same area and/or caste. The army also changed where it recruited from. One of the wars fought by the East India Company was against the Kingdom of the Sikhs in 1848.[161] The Sikh army of the Sikhs had European-style military training. After the kingdom was annexed, a significant problem for the Company was what to do with this large, well-trained, and currently unemployed force.[162] Initially, the Company only recruited small numbers of Sikh soldiers due to professional jealousy among the sepoys and pushback by some British officials. This changed during and after the Mutiny. The Sikhs units proved overwhelmingly loyal to the British, with their province providing a base of operations for the British while providing 50,000 Sikhs soldiers during the war. This loyalty led to a change in recruitment, with increased recruitment of Sikhs and Gurkhas (a people of western Nepal who also proved loyal and

[159] Wagner, *The Great Fear of 1857*, 235.
[160] Knight, *Britain in India, 1858-1947*, 18.
[161] *The Victorian Empire, 1837-1901; a Pictorial History.*, 74–75.
[162] Marston, *The Indian Army and the End of the Raj*, 8–9.

effective during the Mutiny) and a decreased recruitment from Brahmin and Rajput, who were tied to the Mutiny.

These changes led to the British-Indian army of the late 19th- early 20th century. By the 1880s, a third of the British Indian army comprised native British soldiers.[163] These soldiers, however, were supported by the Indian tax base instead of the U.K. The Indian Army also started to recruit heavily from groups such as the Sikhs, Pashtuns, and Gurkhas, partly due to their loyalty during the mutiny and partly due to a racial theory called "martial theory." [164] "Martial theory" argued that certain inhabitants of India, many from the Northwest frontier, had traits that made them better suited for the military.[165] The British commander, Sir O'Moore Creagh, said (as recorded in *The Indian Army*), "In the hot, flat regions, of which by far the greater part of India consists…are found races, timid both by religion and habits, servile to their superiors, but tyrannical to their inferiors, and quite unwarlike. In other parts… where the winter is cold, the warlike minority is to be found, but its component peoples vary greatly in military virtue. Nowhere, however, are they equal in that respect to Europeans or Japanese."[166] Lord Roberts of Kandahar said, " I distinguished their forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning of the present century, But long years of peace, and the security and prosperity attending it, had had upon them as they always seem to have on Asiatic, a softening and deteriorating effect; and I was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit has died in them…and that they could no longer with safety be pitted against warlike races, or employed outside the limits of Southern India."[167]

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[163] by Roger Beaumont, *Sword of the Raj : The British Army in India, 1747-1947* (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, c1977., 1977), 107, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/UNCb1483397.
[164] Beaumont, 6.
[165] Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army : Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation* (Delhi ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1990., 1990), 46, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU822229.
[166] Cohen, 47–48.
[167] Cohen, 46.

The army had other changes due to the 1879 Eden Commission.[168] The Eden Commission came about due to the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The war was expensive and the Indian army was not as effective as the government had expected.[169] The commission recommended, among other things, a reduction in the number of the army regiments and an increase in the number of soldiers and officers per regiment. It also urged the consolidation of the British presidencies under a central command.[170] While a wash in terms of saving money, these reforms changed the Indian army fundamentally, consolidating control over the military and changing its organization.

By the 1880s, the Indian army was much larger than the British army. The sepoy army had over 200,000 soldiers, while the British army in the U.K. had only 90,000.[171] The Indian army also consisted of British soldiers, but Indian taxes paid, equipped, and pensioned both Indian sepoys and British soldiers in India.[172] The Indian government used 35-40% of its budget on the military by 1920, with the army being over half the budget in the 19th century.[173] Compared to the rest of the Empire at the time, the English spent 17% on defense, and Canada did not even spend 2% on its military. To put a fine point on it, of the 325,000-man army of the British empire, ⅔ of it was paid by the Indian government. [174]

This expensive army primarily served to maintain control over its Indian holdings. The British did have a police force of around 158,000 men in India, but it was underfunded and poorly trained.[175] It also was not well-respected, known for the use of torture and its inability to punish

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[168] Marston, *The Indian Army and the End of the Raj*, 10.
[169] Brian Robson, "THE EDEN COMMISSION AND THE REFORM OF THE INDIAN ARMY—1879-1895," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 60, no. 241 (1982): 4.
[170] Robson, 7–9.
[171] Knight, *Britain in India, 1858-1947*, 18.
[172] John Darwin, *The Empire Project : The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970* (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009., 2009), 182, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU2275147.1
[173] edited by Douglas M. Peers and Nandini Gooptu, *India and the British Empire*, The Oxford History of the British Empire. Companion Series (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2012., 2012), 19, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU5433834.
[174] Darwin, *The Empire Project*, 183.
[175] Knight, *Britain in India, 1858-1947*, 17.

criminals.[176] This meant that the army often provided for domestic security.[177] From 1899-1901, the army was called out 69 times to crush internal resistance. An example is the 1848 expedition against the Naga, a "robber" tribe in Northeast India.[178] Another example was the Ramps people revolted in 1879-1880, which required the use of the army to be suppressed.[179] The constant threat of internal dissent was a significant reason for maintaining the large Indian army, even in peacetime.[180] Internal control over one of its most important colonies was an essential function of the Indian army.

The other major use of the Indian army was as a tool to exercise its coercive power abroad. In Asia, the Indian military played an essential role in the Arrow War, an extension of British opium pushing in China, and forced the Chinese government to give the British Kowloon on the Chinese mainland and another trading port at Tientsin.[181] In 1882, the Indian army led the invasion of Egypt, securing the Suez Canal.[182] The Indian military also led operations against the Mahdi movement in Sudan in 1885-1886 and 1896.[183] In this war, the British destroyed the Mahdist forces at the battle of Omdurman and conquered Sudan in 1898.[184] The use of the Indian army closer to the home included conquering the Kingdom of Burma in 1885. The Indian army also played an essential role in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.[185] The British

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[176] Lawrence James, *Raj : The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 1st U.S. ed. (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1998., 1998), 204–6, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU1032765.
[177] Knight, *Britain in India, 1858-1947*, 18.
[178] Kaushik Roy, *The Army in British India: From Colonial Warfare to Total War 1857 - 1947* (London, UNITED KINGDOM: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2014), 67, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=1080388.
[179] Byron Farwell, *Armies of the Raj : From the Mutiny to Independence, 1858-1947*, 1st ed. (New York : Norton, [1989], 1989), 71, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU966387.
[180] Douglas M. Peers, "State, Power, and Colonialism," in *India and the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 33, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199259885.003.0002.
[181] Farwell, *Armies of the Raj*, 73–75.
[182] Peter Duckers, *The British-Indian Army 1860-1914*, Shire Album ; 412 (Princes Risborough : Shire, 2003., 2003), 43, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU1866763.
[183] Sumit Sarkar ; foreword by D. A. Low, *Modern India, 1885-1947* (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1989., 1989), 16, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU715297.
[184] Samson, *The British Empire*, 183.
[185] Duckers, *The British-Indian Army 1860-1914*, 44.

Indian army allowed the British empire to either build its empire through conquest or to exert power on other states.

The British-Indian army was an important institution of the empire. It underwent significant reforms due to the Mutiny of 1857 and provided internal and external coercive force for the empire. It was also wildly expensive, but since Indian taxpayers paid for it, the army did not have a direct cost to British citizens. It also served as a model of British philosophy. The first example was that the British kept officers' positions only open to themselves. This not only acted as a safeguard against rebellion but also fitted with the British philosopher Mill belief that it was the duty of “civilized” nations, like the British, to lead “barbaric” countries, like India. Another way was using military force to enforce its will abroad, which fit perfectly with the philosopher Spencer's belief that “might make right.” The British army served as an essential component of imperial defense and control, and as a physical metaphor for the British empire’s political philosophy.

The Treaty of Durand and Gandamak: British philosophy in Afghanistan

So far, this chapter has discussed the connections between British political philosophy and the Indian military and how both affected British policy within the empire and without. This section explores the effects of these forces on Afghanistan. To do so, this section briefly examines some British ideas about Afghanistan during the Second Afghan War, including a brief consideration of directly ruling Afghanistan. The Treaty of Gandamak, which ended the war, codified British political theories into an agreement with Afghanistan gained by British arms. These ideas of British sovereignty would be further expanded with the Durand Treaty between the Raj and Emir Abdul Rahman Khan.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War was the British Raj's first significant interaction with Afghanistan after 1857. The British started to become concerned about Afghanistan in the 1860s when the Emir of the time, Sher Ali, started to create a professional army in the mold of his neighbors, Turkey, Russia, and the British.[186] Copying the Russian model, his army was built on conscription and soon reached 50,000 men. Russian expansion in the 1870s into Central Asia aggravated British concerns.[187] Historian David Loyn argued that Sher Ali did not particularly like the British, believing they were using his country.[188] This came to a head when the British sent an armed military force as an envoy to the Kabul government in 1878 in reaction to a Russian envoy sent earlier that year. When it was turned away, the British declared war on Afghanistan. This concern over a stronger Afghanistan and an aggressive Russia led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

Instead of providing a blow-by-blow account of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, this chapter will discuss the British plans for Afghanistan after the war and how they changed over time. The initial strategy for Afghanistan was the “forward policy.”[189] The “forward policy,” created by Sir Henry Rawlinson before the war, argued that the British should take over the city of Herat, which he called “the key to India,” and exercise direct control over the Hindu Kush border area.[190] Some “forward policy” supporters even wanted to take direct control over Kabul and Kandahar.[191] This policy met with two challenges, a change in the British government and the defeat at the battle of Maiwand.[192] The British conservatives lost power in 1880, and the liberals

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[186] Edgar O’Ballance, *Afghan Wars, 1839-1992 : What Britain Gave up and the Soviet Union Lost*, 1st English ed. (London ; New York : Barssey’s, 1993., 1993), 32, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU837530.
[187] Farwell, *Armies of the Raj*, 106.
[188] David Loyn, *In Afghanistan : Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American Occupation*, 1st ed. (New York, NY : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009., 2009), 80, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU2232109.
[189] Jeffery J. Roberts, *The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan* (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2003., 2003), 16, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU1678091.
[190] Roberts, 16–17.
[191] by Archibald R. Colquhoun, *Russia against India; the Struggle for Asia* (London ; New York : Harper, 1900., 1900), 160, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU242922.
[192] Farwell, *Armies of the Raj*, 116–18.

sent Lytton to be the Viceroy of India and ordered him to pull troops out of Afghanistan. [193] In the arguments that led to the change of Afghan policy, Lord Lawrence said that the conquest of Afghanistan would lead to conflict with "a mass of warlike people…evil consequences, and give a fatal blow to the already overburdened finances of India."[194] These concerns about the "warlike people" increased with the defeat at the battle of Maiwand in 1880, where of the 2476 British soldiers present, the British lost 964 killed and 167 wounded.[195] Lord Roberts avenged this defeat at the Battle of Kandahar on September 9, 1880, but this would be the last battle of the war, with the British withdrawing from Afghanistan shortly after.[196]

What can be gleaned about how British thoughts on sovereignty affected the Second Anglo-Afghan War? The first was the war itself, fought in the flimsiest of contexts. The Afghanistan government had made it clear that it did not want a British resident in Afghanistan.[197] The British also had intelligence that the Afghan border guards had been told to stop or, if need be, arrest any British envoys trying to cross.[198] To put it simply, the British created an excuse for war. What was being discussed before the war, namely the "forward policy," suggest that ultimately the British policy was driven by this progression: Herat was a likely invasion route into India, and the Russians were getting unsettled by close to Herat from which they could invade India. Therefore, the British should take Herat and large areas of Afghanistan to defend India. This fits with the "might makes right" policies of Spencer. The British had no claims to Herat, so they created a reason for war to take it by force. The British retreat also played into Spencer's views, with the British withdrawing when it became clear that Afghanistan would be hard and

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[193] James, *Raj*, 377.
[194] Christopher Wallace, "The Liberals and Afghanistan, 1878–80*," *Historical Research* 85, no. 228 (2012): 312, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2011.00592.x.
[195] Archibald Forbes, *The Afghan Wars* (Luton, Bedfordshire, UNITED KINGDOM: Andrews UK Ltd., 2012), 151, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=4460729.
[196] Forbes, 161.
[197] Forbes, 77.
[198] Forbes, 78.

expensive to hold while better options for the defense of India were placed on the table by the liberal government.[199]

The Treaty of Gandamak, which ended the first phase of the Second Anglo-Afghan War, was another example of British ideas of sovereignty affecting its relationship with Afghanistan.[200] One of the main concessions made by the Afghans was that "his Highness the Amir will not enter into any engagements with the Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any foreign states, except with the concurrence of the British Government."[201] This giving up of Afghan sovereignty followed the writings of John Stuart Mill. This was because of his arguments that "civilized" nations should subjugate "barbarians" to civilized them. A similar statement was made by Bagehot, who believed in the need for select groups need to rule the inferior for the benefit of both. This almost paternalistic attitude from the British can be seen in the promise of "money, arms, or troops" if another country threatened Afghanistan. However, these resources were "employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for the purpose." The British also forced several concessions to the internal policy of Afghanistan, despite the treaty saying, "...the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness' dominions." The government of Afghanistan promised not to impede British traders as long as they had the permission of the British government, and they promised to provide protection and infrastructure improvements to the major roads through Afghanistan. The Treaty of Gandamak manifested the political philosophies of British thinkers, in which the "barbarian" country gave up some of its sovereignty, both in foreign and domestic affairs, in return for the protection and support of a "civilized country."

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[199] Forbes, 161–62.
[200] D. P. Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907; a Study in Diplomatic Relations* ([St. Lucia] : University of Queensland Press, [1963], 1963), 44–45, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU210091.
[201] Edited and annotated by Clive Parry, *The Consolidated Treaty Series.*, vol. 155 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. : Oceana Publications, [1969]-<c1981 >, 1969), 107, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU76508.

The Civilizing Monarch

A theme throughout this work was that Abdul Rahman Khan saw the dangers and opportunities of the international order. Following the writings of Antony Anghie, the Europeans saw non-Europeans as "barbaric" and that they did not have a right to international law.[202] However, at the same time, there were ideals about what made a nation "civilized": control over territory and a following of what Europeans understood as law.[203] Abdul Rahman Khan wanted to make the case that his nation was "civilized" and deserved to be part of the family of nations. In his autobiography, Rahman Khan argues that he had "civilized" his country by introducing law and safety. Some Europeans supported this exertion, and the British recognized him as a civilizing influence.

When he became Emir after the Second Anglo-Afghan War, Rahman Khan described Afghanistan as one in "disorder."[204] He said this was due to the power of local leaders in Afghanistan, who would rob and kill people since their mullahs taught them they did not have to work.[205] The Emir's first step to civilize his country was to crush these local forces, which he did.[206] He deflected criticism of his bloody campaigns against these regional power by pointing out that the British government had crushed local rebellions in its history and that his government had made Afghanistan safer and more "civilized" than the British borders of India. He also stressed how his rule had also brought down the murder rate.[207] He points out that his reported murder rate was less than in much of the "civilized" world. He also argued that his violence ultimately brought peace to Afghanistan.[208] A quote from his autobiography that sums

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[202] Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law*, 1st edition (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 59.
[203] Anghie, 85.
[204] Abdul Rahman Khan and Mahomed Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, vol. 1 ([Boston, MA] : Elibron Classics, [2001], 2001), 217, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU1701018.
[205] Khan and Khan, 1:218.
[206] Khan and Khan, 1:219.
[207] Khan and Khan, 1:228.
[208] Khan and Khan, 1:229.

up the Emir's efforts to become “civilized”: “Praise be to God that the same country, which was in the deplorable condition I have described, has made such marvelous progress, blessed by peace and prosperity, that it friends are rejoiced and look upon the people as a strong nation, which may be of great help to them, whilst its foes look upon them as a strong, dangerous enemy. The Emir brought “civilization” to his kingdom, enforcing the law and his control over it.

The British took notice of this “advancement of civilization” and their voices and the Durand treaty.[209] This agreement was more favorable to Abdul Rahman Khan, partly due to some of the reforms Abdul Rahman Khan having made Afghanistan look more like a centralized nation. British surgeon John Alfred Gray said, “Afghanistan has during the last ten years made considerable strides toward civilization…And [that] this progress has been entirely due to the remarkable Prince now occupying the throne of Afghanistan-Amir Abdurrahman [Abdul Rahman Khan]- requires but little proof.”[210] Lord Curzon, describing his visit with the Emir, said His name will always deserve to rank high in the annuals of his own country…”[211] The Emir also received an honorary acceptance to the Order of the Bath in 1893.[212] The British saw Abdul Rahman Khan as a civilizing force in Afghanistan.

With this considered, the deal made by the British makes sense. The British increased the pay to Afghanistan from 6 lakhs of rupees to 12 lakhs of rupees a year and allowed the Afghan government to buy weapons.[213] The British, however, still kept many paternalistic policies of the treaty of Gandamak. For example, the British demanded that the Afghan government give up

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[209] Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907; a Study in Diplomatic Relations*, 155–56.
[210] by John Alfred Gray, *At the Court of Amîr : A Narrative* (London : Richard Bentley, 1895., 1895), 516, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE001241706.
[211] by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston ; edited by Peter King ; introduced by Elizabeth Longford, *A Viceroy’s India : Leaves from Lord Curzon’s Note-Book* (London : Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984., 1984), 103, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU680284.
[212] William Arthur Shaw and George Dames Burtchaell, *The Knights of England; a Complete Record from the Earliest Time to the Present Day of the Knights of All the Orders of Chivalry in England, Scotland, and Ireland, and of Knights Bachelors* (London : Printed and published for the Central chancery of the orders of knighthood, Sherratt and Hughes, 1906), 214, http://archive.org/details/cu31924092537418.
[213] Parry, *The Consolidated Treaty Series.*, 155:237.

possession of its territory north of the Oxus river.[214] The British also said that they would settle any disagreements on the Afghan-British boundary would be fixed by a joint Afghan-British commission.[215] However, during one of these commissions, the Pamir commission, the Afghan representatives seemed only to rubber stamp the British's demarcation lines.[216]

This border was a gift to Emir Abdul Rahman Khan. The Emir had pushed for the British to help establish the border with Afghanistan.[217] The reason was that the Russians, a significant power in Central Asia at the time, did not respect the boundaries of Afghanistan.[218] A defined border would allow the Afghans to defend their territory and, more importantly, guarantee British support when invaded.[219] Also, as Holdich pointed out, by helping Afghanistan create borders, the British, whether consciously or not, admitted that Afghan had progressed toward civilization. As pointed out in the last paragraph, this would have been part of a more widespread recognition of the Emir's actions. This solidification of the Afghan border along European lines by the great power of Europe and that made Afghanistan beyond the reach of other European powers.

Conclusion

The British Empire was the power of the 19th century, especially in comparison with Afghanistan. According to *The Epochs of International Law,* this gave the British control of international law from 1815-1919.[220] To understand British international law. This paper looked

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[214] Parry, 155:235.
[215] Parry, 155:236.
[216] "Report on the Proceedings of the Pamir Boundary Commission - University of Nebraska Omaha," 19, accessed July 7, 2022, https://unomaha.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay/alma991007613719706390/01UON_OMA:UNOMAHA.
[217] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.* (Lucknow : Nav-Jyoti Press, 1965., 1965), 41, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE001823310.
[218] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 55.
[219] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 42,44.
[220] Byers, *The Epochs of International Law*, 429.

at three influential British political philosophers. The British philosopher Herbert Spencer argued that international relations were built on the "survival of the fittest." "Civilized" countries, like the British, were at the top, and "uncivilized" countries, like Afghanistan, had no choice but be subservient. Another British political philosopher John Stuart Mill argued that it was the duty of "civilized" countries, to subjugate and civilize "barbarian" nations, like Afghanistan. The third political thinker was Walter Bagehot, who wrote extensively about uneven human development, comparing races that were not Europeans to the British working poor and, therefore concluded they were unable to run a country competently.

The European powers started to think about nationalism as an essential part of statehood when the multinational Ottoman empire began to weaken. [221] British political norms also thought warfare outside of Europe was natural due to the Mandala system that they saw promoting war. On the other hand, the British and Afghans saw the creation of borders with Russia as a guard against such expansion. After discussing these political theorists, this chapter demonstrated some general principles of international law, namely the definition of states and nations and how this serves British interests.

The practical tool of these political philosophies was the subject of this chapter second section. The British Indian Army was first under the control of the East India Company, but by the 1880s, it came under the power of the British Raj. It became a tool of coercion abroad without increasing the tax burden for British citizens. The British, especially after the Mutiny of 1857, did not allow Indian citizens to enter the officer corps, creating a system much like that seen in Walter Bagehot's work, where the British led the "uncivilized" sepoys. The army also allowed the British to force surrounding nations, such as Egypt to submit to its will, or outright annex countries like Sudan. The Indian military provided the coercive force to keep India subjugated.

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[221] Johnston and Reisman, *The Historical Foundations of World Order*, 679.

Finally, after seeing the political philosophy and tools that the British used on the international stage, how did this affect Afghanistan? The Second Anglo-Afghan War was built on the concern about Russian expansion in Central Asia and how that could invade India through Herat. Some British decision-makers thought that the best approach would be to take over large sections of Afghanistan in what was called the “forward policy.” This policy did not respect Afghanistan's sovereignty, lead to a war and failed when a new liberal government decided it was too costly in money and manpower. The Treaty of Gandamak was built on the British being a paternalistic power to Afghanistan, exchanging pieces of Afghan sovereignty for payment. Finally, under Abdul Rahman Khan, who acted as a civilizing force, the Durand Agreement offered increased revenue, allowing the Afghan government to buy weapons and offering joint commissions on boundary dispute as will be discussed in chapter 4.

Chapter 2: By Wheat, Khan, and Gun: Sovereignty in Afghanistan

This chapter will examine sovereignty in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a relatively young state, with the current country tracing its origins in the Durrani Empire, formed in 1747 under Ahmad Shah Durrani.[222] This chapter argues that Emir Rahman Khan used Afghan and British governance tools to centralize power. To begin the look at sovereignty, this chapter looks at the early founding of Afghanistan and how Afghan leaders up to Rahman Khan legitimized and enforced their rule over a country where power was decentralized. These emirs kept trying to centralize power in their royal government. However, their efforts failed due to the strength of local elites and the turmoil caused by British interference.[223] The second section of this chapter will look at the driving factors behind Rahman Khan's centralization efforts and how he created a strong and "civilized" state to prevent annexing his country to the British or Russians.

In Afghanistan, Every Man is a King: Kingship from Ahmad Durrani to Dost Mohammad.

This section looks at the early kingship in Afghanistan, specifically from the reign of Ahmad Durrani (who ruled from 1747-1773) to Dost Mohammad (who ruled from 1826-1839 and 1843-1863).[224] The section will start by looking at power structures of the Pashtun. The leaders of Afghanistan come from the Pashtun ethnicity, and the Pashtun are the largest ethnic group

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[222] Ahmad Ali Kohzad, *Men and Events: Through 18th and 19th Century, Afghanistan* (Forgotten Books, 2017), 93–94.
[223] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 47–90.
[224] Tamim Ansary, *Games without Rules: The Often-Interrupted History of Afghanistan* (New York, UNITED STATES: PublicAffairs, 2012), xiii–xiv, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=1044413.

inside Afghanistan.[225] After this, this chapter looks at religion in early Afghan kingship. For Afghan rulers, the blessing of people with divine inspiration legitimized their rule and religion could be used as a rallying symbol to achieve state objectives, such as fighting off Invaders and taking back territory. The last section will look at specific governmental institutions, especially the military and taxes, and how early Afghan kings did not have anywhere near a monopoly in either of these fields and had to negotiate with local power brokers.

The discussion of political leadership among the Pashtun has existed as long as Europeans have studied Afghanistan. The colonial view saw Pashtuns as a unique people in central Asia, independent and warlike, guided solely by their faith in Islam and their tribal code, the *Pashtunwali*. This view paints Pashtun society as illogical and emotional, which gelled well with the Scottish and Ancient Germanic models that colonial officials like Elphinstone used when studying Afghanistan.[226] A new way of looking at a Pashtun society that does not subjugate itself to this colonial mindset came out of the work of Fredrick Barth. Barth argued that instead of being driven by some primal loyalty to the tribal system, Pashtun's political culture was economically driven. The Pashtun agricultural system was contract-based, with landowners (or *Pakhtun* as he calls them), needing workers and specialists to make their farms productive. These specialists and laborers depended on landowners for their livelihood.[227] This created a system where landowners had to show their dependents their generosity and a willingness to defend their interests or risk losing them to another landlord. The workers contracted their work on their landowners' land in return for such guarantees.[228]

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[225] Ludwig W. Adamec, *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan* (Lanham, MD, UNITED STATES: Scarecrow Press, 2011), 358, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=817138.
[226] B. D. Hopkins, *The Making of Modern Afghanistan*, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series (Basingstoke [England] ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008., 2008), 19–21, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/UNCb5874499.
[227] Fredrik Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans.*, London School of Economics. Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 19 ([London] : University of London, Athlone Press, 1959., 1959), 44–46, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU513004. (*Pakhtun* according to Barth, were the landowners in this system)
[228] Barth, 83.

Barth's study also hinted at why he believed centralizing power in Afghanistan was tricky. He argued that Pashtun leaders could not concentrate power due to this contractual system.[229] If someone starts to consolidate power, other leaders might kill him to prevent him from recruiting their followers.[230] The more common problem is that the leader had a minimal loyal power base, with most of his supporters being able to move loyalty to another leader if needed. This study follows Barth's argument with some critical caveats. First, Barth claims this system came about partly due to the lack of money in Swat.[231] While this may have been his experience in Swat, money was available in Afghanistan, with the minting of coins being one way an Afghan king showed his authority.[232] Another is that the Afghan kings ruled over multiple ethnic groups, with the Pashtun being the largest. Afghan rulers had different, more invasive policies for non-Pashtuns. This was especially useful in tax collection since tax breaks were given to Pashtun landowners who assisted in military endeavors by raising and maintaining troops. Elphinstone's book will provide much of the "facts" about the Durrani empire, but the chapter uses Barth's model with the appropriate changes listed above for its analysis.

The Pashtuns trace their origins from the four sons of the semi-mythical ancestor, Kyse Abdooresheed.[233] At the time of his rise, the Durrani (who used to be called the Abdali) and the Ghilzai represented the two major powers among the Pashtun tribes.[234] The Ghilzai had once been able to rally much of the Pashtun ethnic group to their banner, promising liberation and loot from the Safavid Empire.[235] The Ghilzai leader, Mir Wais, led a revolt in Kandahar and defeated both the Safavids and his local rivals, the Abdali.[236] His oldest son, Mir Mahumad,

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[229] Barth, 91.
[230] Barth, 83.
[231] Barth, 43.
[232] Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India : Comprising a View of the Afghaun Nation, and a History of the Dooraunee Monarchy* (New Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal, 1998., 1815), 512, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU1563706.
[233] Elphinstone, 158.
[234] Adamec, *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan*, 224.
[235] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 45.
[236] Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 324.

would expand their kingdom to include the Safavid capital, Isfahan, in 1722.[237] However, Mahumad was mentally unstable, which caused unease among his Ghilzai lords and eventually led to them withdrawing their support and to fight among themselves. This made the kingdom fragile, and it was ultimately destroyed by a new Persian Shah, Nadir Shah.[238] This was because, in part, except for specific categories, such as tenant farmers and clients of Pashtun men, all men were equal.[239] These cultural norms led to the creation of a tribal government that was both anarchical and democratic. Khans and jirgas lead Pashtun tribes.[240] The khan, who came from the oldest family in the tribe, was chosen by either the *padshah* (king) or through a local election. However, if anyone in the family wanted to claim the title, they could petition the king or raise his supporters to go to war with the current khan.[241] In many cases, however, the jirga held legislative and judicial authority in the tribe.[242] Almost every division in a tribe had a jirga, with the khan leading the principal jirga, made up of chiefs from the great branches of the tribes.[243] Nadir Shah would incorporate the military power of the Abdali into his army after a failed revolt, using them to crush the Ghilzai. The rise and fall of the Ghilzai was a classic example of Barth's model. When the Hotak family, the family of Mirs Wais, and the Muhmad family were powerful and able to give loot and more political freedom, they gained support, but when the chiefs became mentally unbalanced, their followers withdrew support, which in turn led to the collapse of a dynasty that was dependent on their approval.

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[237] Dupree, 325.
[238] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 45.
[239] David B. Edwards, *Heroes of the Age : Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier*, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies ; 21 (Berkeley : University of California Press, [1996], 1996), 63, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU927669.
[240] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 161.
[241] Elphinstone, 159–60.
[242] Adamec, *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan*, 271.
[243] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 161.

Pashtun culture and the “contractual system” also affected the military power of Afghan states. Pashtun men tied their male identity to their weaponry.[244] The leaders of Pashtun society were also obligated to show bravado and a willingness to commit violence.[245] Violence was especially committed in defense of one’s honor or *nang*.[246] This was because Afghan leaders unwilling to commit violence to guard their honor ran the risk of being run over politically and economically by their rivals, who would poach their followers and their land.[247] For this reason, Pashtuns' higher classes kept armed servants, who carried out murder on their leader’s behalf.[248] When a Pashtun tribe went to war, its military force would be composed of either volunteers or, in critical cases, the khan and jirgas would call up the entire fighting male population.[249] Anyone aspiring to political leadership would show up, along with the men who are loyal to them. These forces would form a tribal army that the Pashtun called a *lashkar*.[250] Pashtun political leaders had to show a willingness to use violence to maintain face, often using their servants and men under their patronage. Leaders also were able to create tribal armies that were surprisingly effective.[251]

Ahmad Shah Durrani would spend his life before becoming king in service of the Persian king, Nadir Shah, as an aid and leader in his royal guard.[252] During an successful coup against Nadir Shah, Ahmad Durrani took Nadir’s signet ring, Koh-i Nur diamond (both symbols of Nadir

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[244] Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, 74.
[245] Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans.*, 81–83.
[246] Hamid M. Khan, *Islamic Law, Customary Law, and Afghan Informal Justice*, Special Report ; 363 (Washington, DC : U.S. Institute of Peace, 2015., 2015), 363, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/UNCb8276820.
[247] Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans.*, 85–86.
[248] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 273; Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans.*, 85.
[249] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 164.
[250] Seth G. Jones and Arturo Munoz, “Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces” (RAND Corporation, July 9, 2010), 27, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1002.html.
[251] Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans.*, 122.
[252] Ali Ahmad Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan : From the Great Game to the Global War on Terror*, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, Kansas : University Press of Kansas, [2017], 2017), 100, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE007935999.

Shah's Islamic rule), and 6000 Afghan soldiers.[253] With this military family force and these symbols in hand, Ahmad Durrani, who up till this time went as Ahmad Shah Abdali, attended a meeting of Durrani leaders at the tomb of a Sufi saint named Surkh Sher Baba.[254] According to legend, the Durrani tribes met because they needed a king. However, it is more likely that with these symbols and military force, Ahmad Shah thought he could unite the Durrani much as the Hotak family had done for the Ghilzai. The Durrani leaders, however, did not see any of them as superior to the others. This deadlock was broken when a religious mystic, Sabir Shah, placed a head of barley in the turban of Abdali, declaring only he was fit to be king.[255] The other Durrani leader took this as a divine sign and a convenient solution and placed their supported behind Ahmad Shah.[256] This legend provided an example of how political power was gained among a Pashtun tribe. Ahmed Shah Durrani had a large military force that could be used to protect his subjects and expand his domain. He had one of the world's largest diamonds, which would make him almost instantly wealthy, and he had the endorsement of a religious leader, suggesting his rule was divinely inspired. In David Edwards's book, *Heroes of the Age,* he pointed out that people like Sabir Shah were outside of the tribal system, and they could directly communicate with God.[257] He further points out that religious mystics could unite large groups through Islam, which had a broader appeal than what tribal leaders could gain through Pashtun-specific ideals and economic systems.

The Pashtun political system impacted the makeup of Ahmad Shah Durrani's royal government. The Durrani king received assistance in ruling from a group of advisors, including a grand vizier, a head of intelligence, a chief secretary (who handled the king's correspondents),

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[253] Jonathan L. Lee, *Afghanistan : A History from 1260 to the Present* (London, UK : Reaktion Books, 2018., 2018), 104–5, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU5399853.
[254] George Passman Tate, "The Kingdom of Afghanistan: A Historical Sketch," c.1, no. aleph:001615208 (n.d.): 69.
[255] Kohzad, *Men and Events*, 93–94.
[256] Tarzi, "Islam, Sharia, and State Building under 'Abd al-Rahman Khan," 69.
[257] Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, 187.

chiefs of the army, and a director of revenue.[258] These positions were given to power families of the Durrani and Ahmad Shah's supporters, in line with how Pashtun leaders use generosity to secure the loyalty of their clients.[259] For example, the Grand Vizier position went to the Barakzai, and the role of Lord Chamberlin went to the Popalzai family.

An essential part of the government was who had what powers. The Afghan king was the only person who could order the minting of coinage. Other powers included: the capabilities to make war and peace, collect and spend revenue, and control the army.[260] This chapter will discuss the Durrani army later, but there were some caveats to each of these powers. The first was the king's power over revenue. The king could not increase the taxes on land.[261] He also had to give up the ability to tax fruit trees, cattle, and grapevines.[262] Another caveat was that at the local level, tribal leaders carried out tax collection.[263] Some tribes, however, would not even allow royal officials to come and reassess their assets, meaning taxes from them were less of a collection of taxes and more of a yearly tribute.[264]The Ghilzai went further, collecting taxes on merchants that went through their territory.[265] These grants, again, were part of Pashtun political leadership. The Afghan king gave gifts, such as tax breaks and the ability to collect taxes on the king's behalf, to secure the loyalty of his noble clients, so they would not change allegiances. There was also some limitation on the king's ability to make war and peace. The king could not give up the territory he controlled.[266] His army, as discussed below, also depended on tribal warriors.

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[258] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 318–19.
[259] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 47.
[260] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 512–13.
[261] Elphinstone, 513.
[262] Tate, "The Kingdom of Afghanistan : A Historical Sketch," 47.
[263] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 521.
[264] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 48.
[265] Sir Henry Marion Durand, *The First Afghan War and Its Causes* (New Delhi : Bhavana Books & Prints, 2000., 1879), 253, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/UNCb4229605.
[266] Tate, "The Kingdom of Afghanistan : A Historical Sketch," 48.

An essential institute of this government was the army. The early economy of the Durrani state depended on raiding and war, with victory producing loot that Ahmad Shah Durrani could use to maintain his standing army and pay off the powerful tribes under his rule.[267] The army also helped Ahmad Durrani control his wild population. Due to how the Afghan army at the time was raised, the Durrani leaders and their military forces would accompany Durrani in his campaigns, which kept them from consolidating power while he was away. He also used his military success to pull other Pashtun tribes, specifically the Ghilzai, into his rule. Again this follows with what is learned in Barth: Afghans will offer their loyalty to whoever they think will offer them the best incentives. Part of Ahmad Shah's army was the *Ghulam Shah*, a 13,000 long-serviced military unit made up of Tajiks and Qizilbash. Since it was made up of non-Pashtuns it did not have a connection to the local Pashtuns and depended on the king for their livelihood and therefore more reliably loyal.[268]

However, the importance of the military could be a weakness of Durrani kingship. As mentioned before, the army of Afghanistan included the leaders and retinues of Durrani leaders. To accomplish this, Ahmad Shah gave these leaders *jagirs,* a land, grant in return for a certain number of troops.[269] The soldiers and leaders also received cash payments while campaigning.[270] This model of troop mustering would get the government around 12000 soldiers. Another major part of the Afghan army, the *Eilajari*, was an emergency militia that was easier to call up if the royal army was in their province to force them into compliance. It would disintegrate quickly if not carefully monitored. After all, if the kings called up this militia, it could be seen as a weakness. These leaders would not follow the king if he were not strong enough to hold onto his kingdom.[271]Beyond these methods, uprisings in defense of the kingdom, were

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[267] Tate, 544–45.
[268] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 530–31.
[269] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 47.
[270] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 530.
[271] Elphinstone, 534.

led by local leaders and not under royal control during a foreign invasion. Such uprisings were called a *Wolossi*, and they would seek to drive out the invader. Ahmad Durrani's army was a source of strength and weakness to his power and the power of his successors.

The Islamic scholar community provided a sense of unity in the multi-power Afghan kingdom. Religious leaders did not wield political power like what khans and chiefs would wield. However, they played an essential role as spiritual advisors.[272] They also usually provided education and Islamic legal advice, giving them significant influence, especially in the cities.[273] Since they were seen as not part of the Pashtun political system, they also provided a chance for the peace, by brokering deals between warring tribes.[274] The mullahs also had the power to rally the tribes to jihad against perceived threats, uniting multiple tribes by appealing to something that was seen as above local politics, Islam.[275] Mullahs had great power in Pashtun society because of their education in Islam theology and law.

As mentioned above, the intervention of a religious leader at the Pashtun leaders' meeting led to Ahmad Durrani's crowning. The religious establishment gained much power in his kingdom, especially in cities. Mullahs often had judicial power in towns and cities under royal authority.[276] Many mullahs also received payment from the crown, either through direct cash payments or they were given royal lands.[277]Finally, the king provided some important royal positions to mullahs, such as the *Pishnumaz*, the king's Imam, and *Imam Parikab*, who worked as the king's Imam if the king was traveling or if the king's primary Imam was unavailable.[278]

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[272] Christine Noelle, *State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826-1863)* (London, UNITED KINGDOM: Taylor & Francis Group, 1997), 143, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=981752.
[273] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 215.
[274] Elphinstone, 216.
[275] Tate, "The Kingdom of Afghanistan : A Historical Sketch," 202; Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans.*, 97.
[276] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 539.
[277] Elphinstone, 540.
[278] Elphinstone, 539.

The Afghan kings also provided support for educational opportunities by providing funding for students and a professor (*Muderris*) for the royal mosque.[279]

The third group crucial to the Durrani kingdom's power were not Pashtun. This group included the Tajiks, the Hazaras, the Uzbeks, Qizilbash, and the Turkmen. These people provided a unique opportunity for the Afghan government, a population they could use to balance the power of the Pashtuns, whose leadership required a transactional arrangement to remain loyal and who made up a large part of the violent force of the government. Most of these other ethnic groups were brought in by conquests led by Pashtun warriors around 1749.[280] In his work, Barth points out that the Pashtun conquest of Swat made the Swati tribe subjects of the Pashtun Yusufzai.[281] In *Heroes of the Age,* Edward argues that non-Afghans were incorporated into local Pashtun society by becoming *Hamsayah* (neighbors), non-tribal clients not part of the tribe.[282] Elphinstone reports the same thing in his studies of Afghanistan.[283] Elphinstone, however, pointed out that the Afghan government often acted to protect the rights of Tajiks. The reason for this is simple, the non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan were under threat of having their lands conquered by Pashtuns. Still, the government acting as the champion of the non-Pashtun made these groups dependent on them, and revolt against the government could be crushed by giving the Pashtun free reign to attack their neighbors.

Being a champion of the non-Pashtuns had benefits for the government. First, the government often recruited Tajiks into its armies and militias. The *Ghulam Shah* was recruited from the non-Pashtun population around Kabul, especially from the Qizilbash and Tajiks.[284] This unit was known for its loyalty and being given the most difficult tasks due to its knowledge that if

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[279] Elphinstone, 539–40.
[280] Shaista Wahab and Barry Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan* (New York : Facts On File, c2007., 2007), 72, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/UNCb5185447.
[281] Barth, *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans.*, 7.
[282] Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, 63–64.
[283] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 312.
[284] Elphinstone, 530–31.

the government failed, it would be unlikely to find favor among the Pashtun landowners. The same logic guided the Tajiks having heavier taxes than the Pashtuns. The government protected the Tajiks from Pashtun domination. In return, they served as a balance against the Pashtuns. The Pashtun, on the other hand, had an essential role in the creation story of the Durrani empire.

Through this section, Ahmad Shah Durrani was dependent on the goodwill of the Durrani tribe and the religious establishment to both legitimize his rule and help run his kingdom. However, this dependency continued for other Afghan kings. A great example was the “Kabir” or “the Great” Emir Dost Mohammad Khan.[285] Dost Mohammad was not from the royal family of Ahmad Shah Durrani. He instead came from the powerful Mohammadzai family.[286] The Mohammadzai family was part of the powerful Barakzais.[287] The Barakzais had been more powerful economically, with a larger population than the royal Popalzai clan.[288] And by the time Dost Mohammad was growing up, the Mohammadzai had taken over many of the positions in the royal government.[289] Suraj Shah, the last of the Popalzai royal family, was driven out by Fateh Khan and Payanda Khan. Their relative, Dost Mohammad, took over the kingdom in 1826.[290] Dost Mohammad's takeover came due to rebellions from the Ghilzai tribe and an uprising against the Popalzai by the Barakzai led by Dost Mohammad and Fateh Khan.[291] These rebellions came about due to the perceived weakness of the Popalzai and the punishments that the Popalzai carried out on members of the Barakzais.[292] In *The Return of a*

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[285] Sirdar Muhammad Abdul Kadir, *Royals and Royal Mendicant: A Tragedy of the Afghan History, 1791-1949* (Lahore: Lion Press), 2.
[286] Kohzad, *Men and Events*, 93–94.
[287] by Mohan Lal ; with a new introd by Nancy Hatch Dupree, *Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul*, Oxford in Asia Historical Reprints (Karachi ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1978., 1846), 10, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE000356557.
[288] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 397–99.
[289] Dupree, *Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul*, 11.
[290] *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan; Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946.*, 74.
[291] Dupree, *Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul*, 64–66.
[292] William Dalrymple, *The Return of a King : The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42*, First Edition (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 2013., 2013), 22, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU2841461.

King, William Dalrymple argued that it was explicitly the torture and death of Dost Mohammad's father that drove the Barakzai, suggesting it was the immediate cause was personal revenge. This was probably true, but as seen in Barth's work, if a political leader was unwilling to commit violence against those that wronged them or their families, it could lead to their clients questioning if they would defend them. They might start looking for other leaders.

Despite these successful revolts, Dost Mohammad did not officially claim the title of Shah or "*emir-ul-mu'min*" (commander of the faithful) until it was given to him by Mir Vaiz, the leader of the *ulama* (body of Islamic scholars) in Kabul.[293] This taking of the title had apparent parallels with the crowning of Ahmad Shah Durrani, with Mir Vaiz placing a head of wheat in Dost Mohammad's turban.[294] I believe that these parallels were intentional and were meant to show divine favor had moved from the Popalzai to the Barakzai clan, giving the violent overthrow of Shah Shuja more legitimacy.

The rise of Dost Mohammad demonstrated the power of the tribes and clans through the revolts of the Ghilzai and Barakzai to achieve radical change in the Afghan royal government. It also showed the importance of Islamic justification, with a religious leader giving Dost Mohammad the legitimacy to claim the title of Emir. Emir Dost Mohammad would remain dependent on tribal leaders throughout his career, a prominent example of this being his resistance during the First Anglo-Afghan War. The war saw the British supporting the claim of the then-exiled Shah Shuja against Dost Mohammad.[295] When Shah Shuja entered with the British into Afghanistan, several tribal leaders, namely the chief of Kakar, who saw the combined force's power, swore loyalty to Shah Shuja.[296] This follows the theme that Afghan political leaders often tied their loyalty to the person most likely to give them the best deal. Under the leadership of Dost's son Akbar Khan, the Afghan royal family raised the Khyber tribes

[293] Dupree, *Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul*, 169; Dalrymple, *The Return of a King*, 87.
[294] Kohzad, *Men and Events*, 93–94.
[295] Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 378.
[296] Durand, *The First Afghan War and Its Causes*, 154–55.

to revolt, even though they had supported Shah Shuja.[297] The “carrot” for the Khyber tribes was capturing the wealth of the British baggage trains, while a “stick” was the fear of British, Christian rule.[298] Dost Mohammad and his son raised several tribal revolts, including among the Uzbek and Anjuree tribes. However, a defeat of these forces by the British and fear of betrayal by the Kohistan tribe led to Dost Mohammad surrendering to the British on November 3, 1840.[299] Dost Mohammad's inability to fulfill his “contracts” with his supporters led to his defeat by Pashtun leaders by 1840. Shah Shuja began his new government in Kandahar by handing out two lakhs of rupees handed out to the poor, which helped turn some of the poor to his cause.[300]

The British also began to have a problem with the Ghilzai tribe during their occupation. The Ghilzai had traditionally taxed the merchants and travelers that passed through their territory.[301] They had also resisted control by the Afghanistan royal government and were the second strongest Pashtun tribe after the Durrani.[302] The British were initially able to contain the threat of the Ghilzai by offering them a better deal in the form of tribute. The British, however, did not seem to understand the political leadership of the Pashtun and thought that they had bought the Ghilzai loyalty. The British started to decrease their payments to the Ghilzai. Following Barth’s understanding of Pashtun leadership, the Ghilzai probably saw this as a sign of weakness and felt that they could exert their power, so they started a war with the British.[303] The Durrani chiefs, angry about what they saw as Shah Shuja’s mistreatment of them, also rose in revolt.[304] According to Mahomed Uzbek Khan, the entire countryside had risen against the British by this

[297] Durand, 167.
[298] Durand, 214–15.
[299] Durand, 294.
[300] William Dalrymple, *The Return of a King : The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839-42*, First Edition (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 2013., 2013), 155, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU2841461.
[301] Durand, *The First Afghan War and Its Causes*, 253.
[302] Durand, 254.
[303] Durand, 329.
[304] Durand, 301.

point.[305] When the British tried to clamp down on the rebellion, they killed several tribal leaders. The families of the tribal leaders, if they wanted to maintain their followers, had to punish the British, so they rallied behind Akbar Khan against the British.[306] Akbar Khan would strengthen his alliances with his marriage to a daughter of Mohammad Shah Khan, a powerful Ghilzai chief.[307] With this new alliance, Akbar Khan wiped out the army of General Elphinstone as it retreated from Kabul.[308] This defeat and the growing expense of the Afghanistan expedition convinced the East Indian Company to return Dost Mohammad to Afghanistan as Emir.[309]

The tribal forces were at the center of resistance to the British occupation. Still, the royal family used Islam to appeal to Afghans for its defense and to rally resistance around the royal family specifically. The first example of this happened before the First Anglo-Afghan War. In 1835, Dost Mohammad used his title of Emir to call a jihad against the Sikh kingdom to reclaim the city of Peshawar, which he had lost earlier in this reign (the Sikh leader Ranjit took the city in 1824 and formally annexed it in 1834).[310] The religious justification for the war helped the then-broke Dost Mohammad raise the troops and funds he needed for his expedition, even though it proved unsuccessful. When the British attempted to make Shah Shuja king of Afghanistan, Emir Mohammad used their support against him.[311] He told the border tribes that Shah Shuja had abandoned the faith of Islam and became a slave to the *Kafirs* (infidels). Appeals to religion appealed to a higher power, with one chief saying, “he would fight for the sake of his religion even if all the Barakzais were exterminated.” Dost Mohammad’s son, Akbar Khan, would also use religion to rally the population to war. Telling the Afghan leader in Jalalabad to fight “in the

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[305] Durand, 332.
[306] Durand, 367–68.
[307] Dalrymple, *The Return of a King*, 300.
[308] Dalrymple, 337.
[309] Dalrymple, 419.
[310] by Mohan Lal ; with a new introd by Nancy Hatch Dupree, *Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul*, Oxford in Asia Historical Reprints (Karachi ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1978., 1846), 169–70, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE000356557; Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 352–53.
[311] Dalrymple, *The Return of a King*, 158–59.

name of the Prophet."[312] He even suggested that supporters of Shah Shuja were apostates.[313] These words also had their intended effect, swelling Akbar's army as he besieged Jalalabad. Religion was a valuable tool for Afghan monarchs, allowing them to rally support that might otherwise be hard to come by.

The political system of the Pashtun and the use of religion were both double-headed snakes for the Afghan government. As seen throughout this paper, Pashtun has a political system that made centralization difficult and Islamic scholars could claim an Emir did not serve the best interests of Islam, which could turn the population against the Emir.[314] Afghan kings tried to create a more dependable power base for these reasons. One way of doing this was creating a source of wealth independent of the Pashtun, especially the Durrani tribes. An example of this from Ahmad Durrani's time was raiding to fill the royal coffers.[315] Emir Timur Khan, who succeeded Ahmad Durrani, increased taxes on the Tajik and Qizilbash. This policy was continued under Dost Mohammad, who expanded the tax base by increasing the taxes on Hindu traders and the Hazara people.[316] Afghan kings also tried to get money from foreign sources, with Dost Mohammad receiving money from the British for the economic concessions they wanted.[317] He even sent his brothers to Britain and Russia to raise the funds necessary to retake Kandahar.[318]

The Afghan leaders saw the royal military as a tool to overcome the Pashtun political decentralization. Since the time of Ahmad Durrani, the royal army of Afghanistan had included a

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[312] Durand, *The First Afghan War and Its Causes*, 384.
[313] Dalrymple, *The Return of a King*, 364.
[314] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:210; David B. Edwards, *Heroes of the Age : Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier*, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies ; 21 (Berkeley : University of California Press, [1996], 1996), 178–79, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU927669.
[315] Zeynep Tuba Sungur, "Early Modern State Formation in Afghanistan in Relation to Pashtun Tribalism," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 16, no. 3 (2016): 440, https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12211.
[316] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 49-50,80.
[317] Gregorian, 92.
[318] Gregorian, 82.

portion made up of non-Pashtuns called the *Ghulam Shahs*.[319] The hope was that this portion of the military would ultimately depend on and be loyal to the Emir. For a similar purpose, the Afghan kings raised a calvary force called the *Amlah Sarkari,* which received horses from the government and, at the time of Dost Mohammad, was commanded by the sons of the Emir.[320] These reforms, however, ultimately could not break the Afghan king's reliance on the tribal forces who made up the majority of the military power of Afghanistan. The major problem was financial, with Afghan kings like Dost Mohammad Khan unable to regularly pay his troops. What pay did come sometimes came in the form of food, cash, or goods.[321] Despite wanting a royal army, the Afghan emirs did not have the funds to maintain such a force.

The Iron Emir: the changes of Emir Abdul Rahman Khan

As seen above, the before the reign of Abdul Rahman Khan, Afghan Emirs had a rule built on the power of the Pashtuns, especially the Durrani. Afghan kings used religion to maintain this power, arguing their authority was divinely inspired. They also tried to build power bases beyond the Pashtuns, attempting to create a royal army and a more lucrative tax base. However, the power of the Afghan nobles limited where they could get taxes from, so the royal government needed capital to maintain and expand the royal army. However, Emir Rahman Khan centralized power much more than any before him. He would do this through traditional methods, such as religious ideology and new techniques, namely the first genuinely nationally trained and paid army. These new tools allow Abdul Rahman to move the monarchy, at least during his rule, from a khan writ large to the head of a centralized state.

The primary source for the life of Emir Rahman Khan is his autobiography, which Sultan Mohammed Khan wrote, based on the Emir notes and dictations. This work comes out in two

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[319] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 530–32.
[320] Dupree, *Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan of Kabul*, 240.
[321] Dupree, 241.

volumes. The preeminent scholar of this work, and this period in general, Dr. Hasan Kakar, argued that the first volume is genuine, written either by the emir or more likely transcribed by Sultan Mohammed Khan from his spoken word.[322] The second volume of the book, however, he is more suspect of. Kakar argues that this was likely a British write-up, done when Sultan Mohammed published the book with an English publisher.[323] However, he considered this section still helpful in studying the period. The other factor to discuss is why The Emir had this book written. The part of the book published in Persian is called *A Book of Advice on the World and Religion*.[324] The book's title gives out what it is, a guide to future Emirs on governance, especially about international affairs. This makes this a valuable source because the first volume is the Emir using his early history to justify his decisions in government and explain his reasoning for particular political positions.

The first thing that Abdul Rahman Khan learned from his youth was the value of a trained army loyal to himself. As a young man, one of his teachers was an English soldier of fortune named Campbell, who also served as a military advisor to his father, the governor of Balkh.[325] Abdul Rahman Khan was also named the head of his father's army, consisting of about 15000 professor soldiers. In contrast, the rest of the 30,000-man army consisted of militias raised from the Uzbeks, Durrani, and Kabuli.[326] This position gained him the personal loyalty of the military.[327] This loyalty became important when Dost Mohammad died, leading to a conflict between his sons, including Abdul Rahman's father, Afzal Khan, and his uncle, Sher Ali.[328] During this war, Abdul Rahman said that his many victories came about due in part to the

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[322] M. H. Kakar, "Afghanistan : A Study in International Political Developments, 1880-1896 / by M. Hasan Kakar.," 1971, 217, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Afghanistan-%3A-a-study-in-international-political-%2F-Kakar/4a25e1323eadfbdb8e657bba131ad7e611a7b5b0.
[323] Kakar, 220.
[324] Kakar, 217.
[325] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:4–5.
[326] Khan and Khan, 1:5,8.
[327] Khan and Khan, 1:63.
[328] Khan and Khan, 1:62.

training of his soldiers.[329] An example of this was when he defeated a 40,000 man rebel army from Kataghan with 3000 soldiers, which he said was due to the organization of his army and the fact his artillery was able to play havoc with the bunched-up rebels.[330] He also could count on the loyalty of these soldiers, giving their allegiance to him after his return from exile in Russia.[331] His early position as a leader in his father's army convinced him of the importance of a trained, professional army due to its effectiveness and loyalty.

Rahman Khan would expand on this understanding of the importance of military power as Emir. In his autobiography, Rahman Khan said, "to secure the crown and throne of Kabul for my sons and successors from the foreign aggressors, the various claimants to the throne, and the rebels of Afghanistan, great attention must be paid to the military system of the country."[332] In his vision, the Afghan government would have a million-man army equipped with the latest military equipment, such as repeating rifles and breech loading artillery. This never happened. However, the Afghan king raised an army of about 150,000.[333] One of his most significant changes was in the payment and logistics of the military.[334] Logistically, he made the army self-sufficient, building extensive grain storage facilities in major Afghan cities and providing 50,000 pack animals to provide transportation for the military. These logistics allowed the army to operate effectively during its internal campaigns.[335] He also gave regular payments to his soldiers mainly in cash, and the amount was reasonably stable.[336] He also worked on a pension system, which had the government provide money to the parents and children of soldiers killed in combat. [337] The soldiers also got ⅘ of any goods found during a campaign. There was a good

[329] Khan and Khan, 1:75; Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:197.
[330] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:30–32.
[331] Khan and Khan, 1:186.
[332] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:190–91.
[333] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 271.
[334] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 140–41.
[335] Gregorian, 141.
[336] Hasan Kawun Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan*, Illustrated edition (University of Texas Press, 1979), 99.
[337] Kakar, 99–100.

reason to focus on paying the soldier. It made it where soldiers were economically dependent on the government for their livelihood and to provide an opportunity for economic advancement, with many officers becoming fabulously wealthy due to booty policy, collected from campaigns against various rebellions. Increased logistics allowed the army to carry out operations against the government's internal enemies. At the same time, the focus on the soldiers' compensation shows how the government used economic resources to ensure the loyalty of this regular army.

The military's loyalty did not only come through the payment system of said army. Another essential tool was where troops were based. Here is how it worked. Most soldiers for a regiment were recruited, or more accurately conscripted, from the same region. Still, the government stationed regiments in an area far away from the region they were raised from. [338] There were also serious attempts to prevent the soldiers from interacting with the local population.[339] Kakar believed this was because the Emir thought such interactions would lead to the army losing its fighting spirit; however, there is a better reason. Soldiers stationed among a hostile; unfamiliar population were less likely to revolt since the people would likely not support them. According to Kakar, relationships between soldiers and the local population were very contentious, adding to the proof that local people would not support soldiers, making them dependent on the central government's support.

As seen above, many Afghan emirs wanted an army like the one the Emir was building, but Rahman Khan increased the government income to build his army. First, he expanded industry in his country, starting with goods that his army needed but then producing things like wine and other alcoholic beverages to sell to the European powers.[340] He also went after outside funding. He received large amounts of money and military equipment from the British due to his support for some of their policies.[341] The third way is increased tax revenue. He increased the tax rate

[338] Kakar, 97–98.
[339] Kakar, 114.
[340] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:29–37.
[341] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 130–31.

and collected taxes on previously untaxed goods and land.[342] The past Emirs did not do this because they gave exceptions to the Durrani nobility and other influential groups, which would likely revolt. This fear was well-founded, with Emir Rahman Khan fighting at least 12 wars against various rebelling powers, such as the Ghilzai, the Kilman, and the Hazara.[343] However, the other forms of income allowed Emir Rahman Khan to finance his army and defeat these rebellions. The British were especially useful in this compacity, sending supplies during uprisings in 1880, 1882, and 1887.[344] Rahman Khan expanded his government's revenue to pay for his army. In return, the military gave him the ability to enforce his tax base expansion.

The other lesson Abdul Rahman Khan learned from his early life about the Afghan military was the value and danger of the irregular army of Afghanistan. In his father's war with the Mirs of Badakhshan, militias comprised a large part of his army.[345] He also would have knew his grandfather had extensively used militias and tribal forces in his battle with the British in the 1st Anglo-Afghan War.[346] He also saw how an armed Afghan population threatened the leaders. He fought Afghan rebels in his father's wars, which could outnumber his soldiers many times. Rahman Khan had to face a rebel army of 40,000 me while in his father's service.[347] The other problem the Emir had was that these forces often fought for their interests or those of their leaders, which made them unreliable. For example, during his wars with Sher Ali on behalf of his father, he refused the service of several Uzbek cavalrymen, worried that they would hurt him due to the bad blood between the Pashtuns and the Uzbeks.[348] He also had seen early in his reign that other royal claimants and leaders in Afghanistan could raise armies against him from the armed population, some of which were quite effective. For example, during one of the

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[342] Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan*, 73.
[343] Kevin Baker, *War in Afganistan: A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier 1839 to 2011* (Dural, NSW, AUSTRALIA: Rosenberg Publishing, 2008), 93, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=932980.
[344] Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan*, 103.
[345] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:14.
[346] Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, 84–85.
[347] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:31.
[348] Khan and Khan, 1:49.

Ghilzai revolts, they defeated one of the armies sent to quell them by Emir Rahman Khan.[349] So Emir Rahman Khan had a paradox with the irregular army; on the one hand, it was a handy tool for national defense but on the other hand, it was a danger to the Emir due to their loyalties being to themselves and their leaders over the royal government.

Emir Rahman Khan's solution to this paradox was twofold, a “carrot and stick,” if you will. The “carrot” was that he would give these irregular forces weapons, training, and gifts. For example, he provided weapons to some elders in the east of his kingdom as part of his building up of the irregular army.[350] He also gave military titles to local leaders who commanded or maintained irregular military forces, such as colonel.[351] He would also provide allowances to leaders to maintain a cavalry force.[352] The Emir also allowed tribal soldiers to collect booty from campaigns they helped him with at the same rate as the regular army.

The “stick” was the regular army mentioned above. Training for the irregular army was not consistent. The Emir enforced training only during times of perceived emergency, such as in 1897, when the Emir feared a British invasion, and even then, training was only done once a week.[353] The Afghan regular army, on the other hand, received modern military manuals translated into Persian.[354] Also, the Emir designed the army so that the professional army had access to better rifles than the irregular army, though, in practice, this might not have always been true.[355] One of the most significant advantages the regular army had was artillery, weapons usually not used by irregulars.[356] He could also, ironically, use the irregular army as a “stick.” The Emirate of Afghanistan consisted of many people who did not always get along. For

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[349] Khan and Khan, 1:255.
[350] Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan*, 113.
[351] Kakar, 109.
[352] Kakar, 110.
[353] Kakar, 112.
[354] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:196–97.
[355] Robert Johnson, *The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight* (Cary, UNITED STATES: Oxford University Press USA - OSO, 2011), 140, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=829388.t
[356] Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan*, 110.

example, he used the hatred of the Hazara by other Afghans to raise 30,000-40,000 tribe members to support his campaign against them.[357] The use of the regular Army and the divisions in the irregular army became the “stick” that Rahman Khan used to help control his irregular forces.

Another lesson that Abdul Rahman Khan learned in his youth was the importance of Islam for the Afghan Emir. According to his autobiography, Abdul Rahman Khan believed in divine intervention into the life of mortals. An example of this was when he had a battle against Sher Ali, where his army of 7000 defeated Sher Ali’s army of 25,000, which he attributed to God.[358] Abdul Rahman Khan also saw the death of the son of Sher Ali (Mahomed Ali Khan) as divine intervention. He claimed it was punishment for Sher Ali for killing one of his own brothers at the same battle.[359] Abdul Rahman Khan also saw how religion was essential in kingship. When his father was made king of Afghanistan, he read the Friday sermon in his father's name, which was a necessary part of Afghan kingship. He also saw how oaths taken on the Korans were influential. One example was when he was in Bokhara, a village greeted him with a Koran to ask him not to raze their town, to which he agreed.[360]

When he became Emir, Rahman Khan harnessed Islam to give his government a much more direct impact on the lives of his subjects. Rahman Khan, in his autobiography, would say that as the Emir of Afghanistan, he was the “viceregent of God” for his kingdom, which of course, made rebellion against him paramount to rebellion against God’s chosen servant.[361] Rahman Khan would strengthen this by pointing out his interactions with the divine. An example is his autobiography; Rahman Khan speaks of dreams he would have when the prophet and the four Caliphs told him of his right to rule Afghanistan in their name.[362] Rahman Khan said it was

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[357] Kakar, 111.
[358] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:74.
[359] Khan and Khan, 1:63,77.
[360] Khan and Khan, 1:167.
[361] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:15.
[362] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:230–32.

his divine mission to reform Afghanistan's Islam, which clueless or evil mullahs had corrupted.[363] One heretical teaching he mentioned was that Muslims did not have to work but instead could steal what they needed. These projects had another motive besides religious devotion. The Emir planned to replace the local laws and judicial systems with his interpretation of Sharia law, which according to Kakar would be the first time Afghanistan was under a uniform set of laws.[364] However, using religion was not without danger. Due to his dealings with the British early in his reign, Rahman Khan faced several rebellions raised in part by mullahs claiming that Rahman was an infidel.[365] This made it apparent that religion could only be a valuable tool if it were brought under the authority of the Emir's government. The Afghan government would make it so Islamic teachers had to be approved by the government to receive government pay.[366]

The first step to bringing these reforms to life was providing some standardized theology of Islam. In his official manual for Afghan judges, *Asas al-Quzat* (Primer for Judges), the Emir ordered that all judicial decisions be made based on the Hanafi school of thought.[367] To enforce this, he required Islamic scholars to receive a national certification if they wanted to receive stipends from Afghanistan's government.[368]

With the system of jurisprudence and the education of religious leaders taken care of, Rahman Khan began to enforce Sharia as the law of the country. In a letter about his efforts, he expressed his fury at the governor of Katawaz for not enforcing Sharia law over customary Pashtun law in his province.[369] He also reprimanded the governor of Ghazni for not bringing murder cases to the Islamic court.[370]

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[363] Khan and Khan, 1:218.
[364] Tarzi, "Islam, Shari 'a, and State Building under 'Abd al-Rahman Khan," 131.
[365] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:210.
[366] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:205.
[367] Tarzi, "Islam, Shari'a, and State Building under 'Abd al-Rahman Khan," 137.
[368] Tarzi, 144.
[369] Tarzi, 136.
[370] Tarzi, 136.

The Emir also began to solidify his control over religious institutions. An example of this was Mazar-I-Shariff, a central shrine in Afghan Turkmenistan, which was put under the Afghan government's authority in 1889, where Rahman Khan claimed the ceremonial leadership role of the shrine, as mutawalli.[371] Bringing this shrine under central government control had several advantages. First, it allowed him to prevent religious leaders from preaching against his rule since those same preachers were dependent on his government for their livelihood. Second, shrine complexes like Mazar-i-Sharif produced a lot of money through various means, such as revenues from land given to the shrine and selling souvenirs to religious pilgrims. The Afghan government could use some of that pay for government services, such as building hospitals.[372] It also created a pool of religious leaders who could fill this new government's judicial positions.

A final lesson that Abdul Rahman Khan learned was how to appeal to European powers while at the same time keeping them at arm's length. When he and his uncle lost their succession war with Sher Ali, they fled to Russia.[373] On his return to Afghanistan, he began to raise an army for jihad against the British, who had engaged the Afghans in the Second Anglo-Afghan War.[374] However, he received a letter from the British asking what had brought him to Afghanistan. This letter started a correspondence that ended with the British supporting Rahman Khan's claim to the throne and withdrawing.[375] In these negotiations, the British also gave the public a written document that promised support for the new Emir. This support immediately included giving the Emir artillery, money, and a fortress built by the British. The British served as an essential part of Rahman Khan rise to power.

Rahman Khan would continue to build on British support, As mentioned above, the British provided him with money and weapons that he used to build his army. The Emir also saw another use for the British, their knowledge. To build up his government, Rahman Khan wanted

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[371] McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, 294–95.
[372] McChesney, 296.
[373] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:143.
[374] Khan and Khan, 1:185–90.
[375] Khan and Khan, 1:197–99.

to build his industry and his economic power.[376] He did this in part because he believed industry was at the heart of British power. He used his connections with Lord Dufferin to recruit the electrical engineer Mr. Jerome to build the first Afghan factory. He also hired an English engineer, Mr. Pyne, to finish the task when Mr. Jerome left his service unexpectedly.[377] The British also honored his sons. They made his heir apparent, Habibullah Khan, a member of the Knights Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. He also believed that the British served as a counterbalance to Russian interference in Afghanistan, and would guarantee the ascension of his son, Habibullah Khan, without the Russians fermenting a civil war.[378] The Emir's connection with the British gave him many benefits to strengthen his kingdom and his family's power.

However, this friendship with the British had a significant problem. The British had twice invaded Afghanistan, which caused many Afghan citizens disliked the British as infidels.[379] For Emir Rahman Khan, his closeness with the British plague his early rule. Ayub Khan, son of Sher Ali and the Emir that the British had overthrown, captured Kandahar.[380] Ayub Khan raised such a large army partly because many mullahs had claimed Rahman Khan was an infidel due to his friendliness with the British.[381] Ayub Khan and his supporters continued to fuel the rebellion against the Emir by claiming that Rahman Khan was a British-supporting infidel.[382] In his early reign, Rahman Khan saw that support from the British had its challenges, giving his enemies a reason to go to war against him.

So the question for Abdul Rahman Khan was, how could he have the economic, military, and political benefits of his alliance with the British without giving his enemies a cause for naming him an infidel, which was a significant source of his legitimacy? He answered that he would

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[376] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:20–21.
[377] Khan and Khan, 2:23.
[378] Khan and Khan, 2:181–83.
[379] Khan and Khan, 2:117.
[380] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:212.
[381] Khan and Khan, 1:210.
[382] Khan and Khan, 1:225.

continue to accept British help while at the same time publicly denouncing them and arguing that he was defending Afghanistan against them. In a public statement he made in 1887, during the Ghilzai rebellion, he claimed that Afghanistan was “a mere spot under the compass of two infidels.”[383] He said that both of these infidels threatened the independence and the destruction culture of Afghanistan.[384] He then noted that support of his government, specifically his army, would defend the country and that his experience living in a European control area made him the idea champion against the infidels.[385] He also published several pamphlets, including ones on jihad and the responsibilities of the Emir.[386] One booklet, specifically *Kalimat Amir al-bilad fi targhib ila al-jihad*, talked about the importance of preparing for jihad against the Christian imperial power.[387] This use of public declaration against the Christian powers seems to have been effective. His autobiography does not record rebels claiming he was a British pawn besides Ayub Khan. The Ghilzai even tried to send a letter to the British, asking for assistance.[388] This would probably not have been attempted if the Ghilzai knew of the close relationship between the British and the Emir, which suggests the Emir's proclamation against the British had been effective at making the Emir look like an anti-European leader.

This interpretation is in opposition to the narrative of Kakar. Kakar believed the Emir did not trust the British and was actively hostile against them.[389] His evidence for this claim is the decrees of the Emir, which tended to demonize the British. He also points out that many of the pro-British statements of the emir come from the suspect second volume of his autobiography. While it agreed that the Emir did not wholly trust the British or Russians, the evidence suggests that he maintained a close political relationship for his advantage. The British gave the Emir a

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[383] Stephen Wheeler, *The Ameer Abdur Rahman;* (London: Bliss, Sands and Foster, 1895), 248, https://www.loc.gov/item/05003514/.
[384] Wheeler, 249.
[385] Wheeler, 250.
[386] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 135.
[387] “Afghanistan Digital Library Newsletter,” Newsletter (New York, NY: New York University, July 1, 2004), 1, http://afghanistandl.nyu.edu/pdf/ADL2004.pdf.
[388] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:253.
[389] Kakar, “Afghanistan,” 220.

great deal of money and weapons, something they would not do if they considered the Emir an enemy. The Emir also spoke well of his relationship with the British in the first volume, which is widely considered legitimate.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter, the leaders of Afghanistan had built their power based on the consensus of the Pashtun political leaders, along with religious claims of legitimacy. This system lasted throughout the Durrani empire, with Durrani leaders having to provide enough benefit to their followers to convince them to remain loyal. Major change came about when Dost Mohammad became the new ruler of Afghanistan after the overthrow of Shah Shuja. Dost Mohammad started to emphasize his title of Emir, or "commander of the faithful," over "*padshah*," which was a title tied to the overthrown Shah Shuja and his family, the Popalzai. The title of Emir also had the benefit of being a religious title, which he used to declare a jihad against the kingdom of the Sikhs at a time he did not have the resources to convince Pashtun leaders to support this war.[390] As Barth said, this system meant that Afghan emirs had an unstable hold on power, and defeats or unpopular decisions could lead to a withdrawal of support from their followers which could spell the end of their political power or life. Examples include Dost Mohammad losing the support of many Afghan leaders due to his losses to the British, leading to his surrender to the British for fear of being killed by members of the Kohistan tribe. Afghan leaders tried to create more reliable bases of power, such as a national army. Still, financial restraints and disasters such as the 1st Anglo-Afghan War made such reforms nearly impossible.

Emir Rahman Khan would change this by centralizing power in himself. He did this by drawing on lessons learned when he was younger. First, Emir Rahman Khan understood the importance of the Afghan military. As a young man in charge of his father's army, he learned the

[390] Dalrymple, *The Return of a King*, 87.

value of a trained, professional soldiers. As Emir, he created a large national army that was regularly paid and whose regiments were stationed far away from the provinces they were raised from so that the soldiers would have little support from the population. The Emir also saw the usefulness of the irregular cavalry and infantry. They had proved helpful in both his campaigns and in the defense of Afghanistan in the past; however, these same forces had also proved unreliable in their service to the Emirs, often serving other claimants. To bring in this force required a “carrot” in the form of gifts and titles and a “stick” in the form of a regular army that could defeat rebellions.

The second lesson learned from his youth was the importance of religion. As mentioned before, religion had served the past emirs, and Rahman Khan claimed divine intervention in his own life. Using this divine intervention, Rahman Khan would make a much stronger claim for it than his ancestors, taking the title “viceregent of God” and arguing that rebellion amounted to heresy. He also took over religious centers like Mazar-I-Sharif and their lucrative lands and enterprises. He justified centralizing power with religion. A key example of this was centralizing judicial decisions by introducing sharia law as the law of the land. Islam became the justification for the centralization of the state.

The other factor for Rahman Khan's rise to power was the British. Rahman Khan’s first real interaction with the British was at the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan war. In this first interaction, Rahman Khan was able to regain most of his kingdom, along with money, guns, and fortresses, without ever raising a sword. The British continued to be useful to the Emir, providing the money and equipment to fund his army, helping him recruit engineers to build up his industry, and helping to strengthen the claim of his chosen heir. However, British support was also a threat in Rahman Khan’s early reign. Ayub Khan and his family used British support for Rahman Khan to rally an army, one of the first significant challenges to Rahman Khan’s rule. Rahman Khan would counter this by pushing the image of himself as the defender of the liberty of Afghanistan and the Islamic faith. He released royal proclamations and pamphlets about the

evils of the British and his role in defending the faith. This seemed to stop public discussion of British support for the Emir, even as the relationship between the two remained.

Chapter 3: The Afghan Military and the Creation of the State

"I am Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the king (padshah) of Afghanistan… I have now prepared a map (naqsha) of your own country and also a map of those countries which are located on the four sides of your country. If you people consider well the map which is drawn for you, it will allow you to see with your eyes how blessings may accrue to you in your religion (din) and also in this world (dunya)."391

This opening is a proclamation of Abdur Rahman Khan, reproduced from the book *Heroes of the Ages* by David Edwards; It shows how the Emir wanted to show his country and the surrounding powers. It demonstrated how the Afghan king interacted with these two worlds, having an inner and the outer audience. This paper argues that the military, both the formal army and tribal militia, played an essential role in helping to create Afghanistan's international borders and legitimized government control internally. The Afghan government dealt with two audiences, the empires surrounding it and its people. As said in chapter two, political power in Afghanistan was decentralized, and Afghan ethnicities, tribes, and political had territory that served as their power center. This paper splits into several sections. The first section briefly covers the work done on Afghanistan's history and the second section talks about various external and internal groups affected by the borders of Afghanistan. The following section covers how the Afghanistan government used the military to justify its borders internationally. The fourth section discusses the use of the military to legitimize the government to its border peoples and the benefits the government gained from its control. The last section turns inward, showing how the army was used to display power to the Emir's domestic audience by breaking up rebellions.

391 Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, 78.

Military Historiography in Afghanistan

The history of Afghanistan, as told by Afghan historian Ali Ahmad Jalali, is the history of war.[392] Military and political history provided the most common frameworks for examining Afghanistan's history. The military history focus on Afghanistan appeared most often in popular history, which includes such titles as *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban* by Stephens Tanners and *Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires: A New History of the Borderlands* by David Risley. These works came about mainly due to U.S. military interests in Afghanistan after 9/11.[393] However, academic history also focused on Afghanistan's military history in works like *A Military History of Afghanistan: from the Great Game to the Global War on Terror* by Ali Ahmad Jalali. Some of the earliest Afghan histories focus on military affairs, such as *Jang-nama* (The Book of War), a Persian epic war account of the First Anglo-Afghan War written by a participant but not published till the mid-twentieth century.[394]

The focus of military history in Afghanistan comes from several factors. As mentioned above, the U.S. War on Terror promoted the study of Afghanistan's history. Another reason is the conceptual frameworks of Afghanistan historiography by the West. In western historiography, the "Great Game Paradigm" remains a central framework for exploring Afghan history. The "Great Game Paradigm" states that outside forces, like the British and Russians, drove most of Afghanistan's history. The British, Russians, and Afghans often clashed with each other, as seen in the border conflicts between the British, Russians, and Afghanistan, the three wars between the British and Afghans, and the invasion by the Soviet Union.[395] Finally, the primary

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[392] Douglas M. Peers, "A Military History of Afghanistan: From the Great Game to the Global War on Terror by Ali Ahmad Jalali (Review)," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 49, no. 1 (2018): 182.
[393] Shahzad Bashir et al., *Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands* (Cambridge, United States: Harvard University Press, 2012), 1, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=3301079.
[394] Nile Green, "Introduction: A History of Afghan Historiography," in *Afghan History Through Afghan Eyes* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 13/47, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190247782.003.0001.
[395] Kevin Baker, *War in Afghanistan : A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier 1839 to 2011* (Dural, NSW, Australia: Rosenberg Publishing, 2008), 1, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=932980.

sources, especially in English, skew toward military endeavors. In the period studied in this book, one significant type of source is the journals and memoirs written by British soldiers, like *War in Afghanistan, 1879-1880* by Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor and *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900* by Colonel Sir T. Hungerfold Holdich. Another area of primary sources was the analysis of the situation by government officials around the world, like *Afghanistan: English versus Russia* by U.S. Bvt. Brigadier General Theo F. Rodenbough and British scholar George Passman Tate's book *The Kingdom of Afghanistan: A historical sketch,* both of whom studied the military affairs of Afghanistan.

A Wall around a house, the political meaning of the Afghan border

The Russians and British solidified the borders of Afghanistan through several bilateral agreements between 1873 and 1895.[396] Chapter 1 discussed the importance of borders in British international law, but how did the Afghan government conceive of borders? In the second volume of his autobiography, the Emir considered the borders of Afghanistan as the walls around a house and saw their creation as essential to promote safety and order.[397] The wall of a home has two purposes. One is to keep out invaders. The Emir often talks about the importance of borders, especially in stopping the Russian empire's expansion.[398] This had definite ties to the idea that in Europe, a country with a fixed border had advanced to the point of civilization that simply annexing it would be against international law. The British supported this international law by promising to defend Afghanistan from invasion. The British gave money to Emir Rahman Khan, which allowed him to gain great authority over his country.[399]

The other use of the wall of a house, and a home in general, is to provide a fixed territory that would serve as the domain of the household's head. As mentioned above, the Emir believed

[396] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 267–68.
[397] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:168.
[398] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:241.
[399] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 36.

that borders would help bring order to his domain. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Afghanistan's political leadership had a contractual agreement with their followers. Due to this, power was hardly ever centralized due to the ability of clients to follow a new leader or break away if a better deal was offered. In the past, Afghan leaders had even supported the British when they seemed on top, such as the support given to Shah Shuja or Afghan leaders providing logistical support to the British army.[400] With the creation of borders, the English and Russians gave up their ability to interfere with Afghan internal affairs.[401] The Durand agreement, in particular, also had another effect as the British agreed to allow the Afghans to buy weapons from them, support the Afghan army, and double the British stipend to the government.[402] As mentioned in chapter 2, the Afghan government used these resources to build up the army at the center of this chapter. The Emir would use this army as his tool of control. The Afghan government, who had closely watched the British Raj, observed how the army served as a means of exerting control. The Emir's also had experience using a professional army role to maintain control as his father's general.[403] The Emir would use this army to bring order to his new walled house.

Compared to the "walled house" arising from these agreements, Afghanistan did not have such strong security before Rahman Khan. The decentralization of political power led to dividing the state into several political centers. After the First Anglo-Afghan War, Dost Mohammad became the Emir again but had lost control of much of the country.[404] He slowly had to retake his country, with him finishing this reconquest right before he died with the capture of Herat in 1863. This happened again after Dost Mohammad's death, with the country split between supporters of Sher Ali and Afzal Khan.[405] Even after Rahman Khan claimed Afghanistan, he was

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[400] Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and State Formation on a Colonial Frontier* (Redwood City, UNITED STATES: Stanford University Press, 2011), 72, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=692445.
[401] Parry, *The Consolidated Treaty Series.*, 155:236.
[402] Parry, 155:237.
[403] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:40.
[404] Dalrymple, *The Return of a King*, 426–27.
[405] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:42.

also Emir over a divided kingdom.[406] These divisions made Afghanistan vulnerable to annexation since annexing a piece of Afghanistan would be more acceptable than annexing the entire country.[407] Afghanistan traditionally had a decentralized system, which meant that Afghanistan often divided into smaller states, requiring the Emir to conquer them or risk the possibility of Europeans annexing the pieces of their kingdom.

International recognition of the border

The central argument of this section is that the Afghan army played different roles in legitimizing the border negotiations with foreign governments based on the foreign government. Like the British, the Afghan army came to be a tool of the government to enforce its power. The Afghan government used this tool to display its authority to its internal and external audiences. For the external audience, the Russians and the British, the Afghan government used the military to make international claims on their borders. It did this by securing Afghan claims on breakaway provinces through military force, pushing British acceptance by showing "effective control" over the borderland, and contesting Russian aggression until the border was solidified by treaty.

During this time period, the Afghan army became the case study of a mixture of European and Afghan policy ideas that defined the Emir's creation of the nation-state of Afghanistan. As mentioned in chapter two, the Emir saw the effectiveness of a professional army as a youth, and his military philosophy was heavily influenced by the former British officer Shir Mahomed Khan. His professional army specifically was part of a broader change in professional Afghan forces. Traditionally, the professional Afghan army focused on cavalry during the Durrani Empire.[408] However, seeing the British infantry's effectiveness, Afghan emirs started under Sher Ali to build

[406] Khan and Khan, 1:210.
[407] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:167–68.
[408] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 97.

armies based on the British model, with manuals based on Persian translations of British manuals. The Afghan army maintained a higher discipline than other Islamic states, which according to Vambery, a traveler in the region, had reached a similar level as European soldiers.[409] The Emir initially planned to have a million-man army with a peacetime strength of 300,000; however, this was unrealistic for logistical and training reasons. [410]By his death, the army had about 150,000 men under arms.[411] This new military centered around a regular army with uniforms based on the British model.[412] Though Rahman Khan had to rebuild the army from scratch, based on his experience, the army still relied on British equipment and training.

However, Emir Rahman Khan retained the most potent element of Afghanistan's traditional military: the irregular army. Chapter 2 described the irregular army. During his reign, The city of Kandahar could raise 8000 irregular horsemen, Kabul 15000, Ghazni 5000, and Balkh 10,000.[413] He could also increase the immense forces of tribal infantry that proved such a difficult opponent to the British, raising tribal infantry forces at times as high as 20,000.[414] The use of these forces will be discussed later in this chapter

The British Raj and Russian Empire were the states from whom the Afghan government tried to get recognition [415] The Russian government had expanded its control over central Asia since the time of Peter the Great, who sent two expeditions in 1716-1717.[416] In more contemporary times, the Russian government annexed Turkestan in 1867, threatened Bokhara in 1878, and threatened Herat in 1885.[417] The Russians' advance, driven by imperialistic policies, did not

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[409] Rodenbough, *Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute; an Account of Russia's Advance toward India...* (New York : G. P. Putnam, 1885., 1885), 24, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU404111.
[410] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 187.
[411] Jalali, 271.
[412] Rodenbough, *Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute; an Account of Russia's Advance toward India...*, 24.
[413] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 272.
[414] Jalali, 271.
[415] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 41.
[416] Rodenbough, *Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute; an Account of Russia's Advance toward India...*, 2.
[417] Rodenbough, 9–12.

respect for the historical claims of the Afghan government, or any other Central Asian state, had for territory.[418] The British moved toward the Afghanistan border due to an imperialistic expansion policy in India.[419] The British had already fought two Anglo-Afghan Wars when Rahman Khan became Emir.[420] The British also saw Afghanistan by this time as an extension of their defense policies against Russian advancement, providing a buffer state between the powers.[421]The imperialist states of Russia and Britain surrounded Afghanistan, threatening its sovereignty.

The Emir first claimed recognition in the international arena of Afghan borders by taking territory traditionally part of Afghanistan but which had split away during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, namely Herat, Kandahar, and the Kurram valley.[422] Emir Rahman Khan considered these territories part of Afghanistan, especially Kandahar, which he claimed as a royal city.[423] Initially, the British agreed with the Emir's claim on Herat though they added, according to the autobiography of Emir Rahman Khan, that, "the possession of which [Herat] cannot be guaranteed to you, though the Government is not disposed to hinder measures which you may take to obtain possession of it." The British would accept Emir Rahman Khan's control over Herat if he could take it. However, the British initially refused the claim on Kandahar, which they put under the care of one of their allies, Wazir (governor) Sher Ali.[424] However, Ayub Khan built up an army and defeated Sher Ali and his British supporters in the Battle of Maiwand on July 27, 1880, which allowed him to put Kandahar under siege.[425] The British relieved the city after defeating Ayub Khan on September 1, 1880.[426] However, after this setback, the British

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[418] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 70; by Ram Sagar Rastogi, *Russo-Afghan Boundary Disputes, 1870-1900* (Lucknow : Rastogi, 1976., 1976), 2, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE000278917.
[419] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 79.
[420] Jalali, 260.
[421] Jalali, 261.
[422] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 12,18-21.
[423] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:195.
[424] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 22.
[425] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 235–36, 248–51.
[426] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 24.

agreed to give Kandahar to the Emir, though only if he could hold it. Emir Rahman Khan eventually took these territories permanently in 1881, personally taking Kandahar from his rival Ayub Khan, who captured it earlier that year, while his servant Sirdar (leader) Kudus Khan took Herat.[427] Emir Rahman Khan began his campaign for international recognition of its borders by using its military to retake Afghanistan's traditionally territory.

In line with this, the Afghanistan government started using its military to invade territories over which it had a less clear claim. A significant example of this was Kafiristan. The Kafirs, a term for unbelievers, occupied territory which extended along the Hindu Kush and skirted Afghanistan, British and Russian territory.[428] The Kafir people divided into three major tribes, the Rumgali or Lumgali, the Waigali, and the Bushgali.[429]The people of Kafiristan hated their Muslim neighbors, with Afghan tribes raiding the Kafirs people for slaves, partly due to the Kafirs being non-Muslims.[430] Who controlled Kafiristan remained unclear until the Durand Line Treaty of 1893, which gave the land to the Afghan government.[431] According to his autobiography, Emir Rahman Khan initially planned to incorporate Kafiristan through kindness, mercy, and generous bribes. However, in this same autobiography, he justified his eventual invasion with the arrival of the Russians near Kafiristan, taking over the Pamirs. This advance gave him concern over the Russians taking over Kafiristan or that the Russians would influence Kafiristan to attack and take control of areas in Afghanistan, namely the provinces of Jalalabad and Panjshir Laghman. In response to these threats, the Emir invaded in the autumn of 1895 along multiple routes, and he succeeded quickly.[432] In this invasion, the Emir's professional army received support from

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[427] Ali Ahmad Jalali, *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War /* (Quantico, Va.:, 1999), 263, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015043247678; Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:215.
[428] H. C. Tanner, "Notes on the Chugáni and Neighbouring Tribes of Kafiristan," *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography* 3, no. 5 (1881): 278,296, https://doi.org/10.2307/1800570.
[429] Tanner, 280.
[430] Tanner, 293.
[431] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:287–88.
[432] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 270.

tribes of Afghanistan, which allowed for the massive invasion that so quickly defeated the Kafirs.[433] After the conquest, the Emir moved much of the population, forced it to convert to Islam, and resettled the land with former soldiers and other Afghans, calling it Nuristan (land of light). The Afghan government had to take over and occupy territory forcefully, to prevent European annexation. The Afghan army was overall a loyal force to the government and represented "effective control" over territory. The Afghan army also allowed the government to react quickly to trouble stirred up by European powers and to contest invasions. This demonstrates that the Afghanistan government used its military to protect its territorial claims and prevent the British and Russian takeover of Afghanistan.

The Emir not only used his military to take over territory that had traditionally been part of Afghanistan, but he also used his military to receive British aid by defending his country. As part of his agreement with the British (though this was not laid down in a treaty), the British agreed to defend Afghanistan.[434] However, the British pushed for the Afghan military to become involved in the conflict before they became involved. The first example was the conquest of Kandahar. When the Emir lost Kandahar to Ayub Khan in 1881, the British Lord Hartington declared that Ayub would soon sit on the throne, and the British refused to support the Emir publicly.[435] When the British made the deal to support the Emir, they specifically told him their support was based on "Your Highness follow [my] the advice of the British Government in regards to your external affairs unreservedly."[436] This came to a head with the conflict between the Russians and Afghans over Panjeh. To offer a complete picture, The Afghan army moved a battalion to the Panjeh, according to the Emir, to prevent aggressive movements from the Russians.[437] The Russians attacked and defeated the Afghan battalion in 1885 due to Russia's overwhelming

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[433] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:292.
[434] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 21.
[435] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 35.
[436] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:198.
[437] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:242.

numbers and poor equipment of the Afghans.[438] This makes it seem that a British request that the Afghan army stays at Panjeh arrayed against the Russians thinking the Russian would not take the territory or attack the Afghans.[439] However, they also did not want the Afghans to initiate any conflict. If the Russians did attack the British would support Afghanistan.[440]

Afghan government also placed its military on the border to demonstrate "effective control" over the border to the British. When the British and Russians decided on the border of Afghanistan on the Russian frontier (1880 to 1893), they built their assumptions on several things, including the area that the Afghan government could carry out "effective control," and whether the local tribes respected the Afghan government claims.[441] When interviewing the local leaders on the border, the leaders often mentioned the Emir's soldiers protecting important people like Nur-ud-din, an accountant on the border.[442] This makes sense since a military force is the symbol of the government's coercive power—the military's deployment in an area provided proof that that area served the Emir. Troops traveling with officials allowed officials to carry out their duty without fear of danger and acted as a symbol of the government's power. For these reasons, the army became essential to the Afghanistan border legitimization strategy with the British.

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[438] Jalali, *The Other Side of the Mountain*, 268; Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:244.
[439] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:243–44.
[440] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 74.
[441] Ram Sagar Rastogi, *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.* (Lucknow : Nav-Jyoti Press, 1965., 1965), 43–45, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE001823310; Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:286.
[442] "Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc" (Andkhoy; Ashgabat; Badakhshan; Bala Murghab; Balkh; Balochistan; Basaga; Batumi (Batoum); Berlin; Bombay; Bosaga; Bukhara; Calcutta; Caspian Sea; Caucasus; Chaman; Chardzhou (Charjui); Chul; Dukchi; France; Germany; Gulhek; Gulran; Hari River (Heri-Rud); Helmand; Herat; Hindu Kush; India; Iran (Persia); Istanbul (Constantinople); Jamrud; Japan; Kabul; Kandahar; Kara Tappa; Kars; Kashan; Kelif (Kilif); Kerki; Khamiab; Khoja-Saleh; Khorasan; Kunduz; Kuskh; Mashhad (Meshed); Maymana; Meruchak; Merv; Murghab; Nushki; Odessa; Oxus River (Amu Daria); Panjdeh; Paris; Punjab; Qom; Quetta; Russia; Sari; Seistan; Shimla (Simla); St Petersburg (Leningrad); Tabriz; Taxkorgan (Tashkurghan); Tblisi (Tiflis); Tehran; Tigris River; Turkestan; Ufa; Ust; Uzbekistan; Yolöten; Zulfikar, March 1, 1887), 40,45, FO 539/113, Central Asia, Persia and Afghanistan, 1834-1922: From Silk Road to Soviet Rule, http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Details/TNA_FO_539_113.

However, the Afghan government had to get recognition from the Russians. The Russians only accepted Afghan claims on territory if they had a treaty with the Afghans.[443] In fact, Russians did not recognize the Afghan government authority on the border when they formed the border commission with the British in 1884.[444] This disregard for Afghan claims in the borders came directly from the Panjeh incidents. The Afghans contested another Russian border excursion, with General Syad Shah Khan answering a Russian border attack with heavy fire, forcing a Russian withdrawal.[445] According to the Emir, this was the last skirmish between the two states, due to the British and Russians agreeing on the northern border of Afghanistan. When dealing with the Russians, Afghanistan had to rely on military power to protect a border that was not truly nailed down until 1893. While not consistently successful, the Afghan army provided a valuable tool for holding the border until the Durand line solidified more permanently.

Afghanistan borders military and domestic gains.

The Afghanistan government did not only have to justify their borders internationally, but they had to secure them domestically as well. As mentioned in chapter 2, political power in Afghanistan tends to splinter. A significant factor of the Emir's legitimization campaign is that it could defend the people from foreign powers and robbers while having a direct presence in people's lives. This is because Afghan political leaders are supposed to protect their clients. In European ideas, an army showed an area under the control of a government. It allowed the government to carry the duties of a "civilized" government, such as enforcing laws and arresting criminals. The government would use militia units on the border as its primary defensive force on the border.

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[443] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 70.
[444] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 55.
[445] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:287.

When talking about rebellion and borders during the reign of Emir Rahman Khan, an important word to understand is *Yaghistan.* In the broadest sense of the word, *Yaghistan* means "land of the unruly" and describes any place in Afghanistan that was outside of the Emir's authority.[446] The other definition describes a part of the traditional Afghan territory that had by the 1880s became part of the British Raj. While this area is an essential part of chapter four, due to the focus on the Russian border and the fact that the Afghan army operated mostly inside Afghanistan and against rebellious Afghan citizens, this chapter will focus on the first definition of *Yaghistan*.

Colonial Sir Thomas Hungerfold Holdich talked about this in his journal, calling the border peoples "fierce and unconquered tribes of Afghan origin."[447] The wording of "Afghan origin" suggests that they did not fall under the control of the Afghanistan government. Historians of Afghanistan also record Emir Rahman Khan's problems with border tribes like the Wazir and Afridi. Rastogi identified the Waziris as an independent tribe in his work, *Indo-Afghan Relations*.[448] In the same book, he pointed out that in 1879, the British leadership did not consider the Afridi as ever under the control of Emir Abdul Rahman Khan.[449] Beyond these named tribes, Colonel Holdich and Emir Rahman Khan talked about nebulous "robbers" on the border.[450] These independent tribes acted similarly to the Apache tribes on the U.S.-Mexican border.[451] The Afghan tribes, like the Wazir and Afridi had their territory cut in half by the Durand Line.[452] The Apache also conducted raids across a border, then go on the other side to

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[446] Tarzi, "Islam, Shari'a, and State Building under 'Abd al-Rahman Khan," 130.
[447] Sir T. Hungerford Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900* (Delhi : Gian Pub. House, 1987., 1901), 3, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE000805612.
[448] Holdich, 180.
[449] *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 33.
[450] Sir T. Hungerford Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900* (Delhi : Gian Pub. House, 1987., 1901), 3–4, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE000805612; Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:284.
[451] Rachel St John, *Line in the Sand : A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border*, America in the World (Princeton : Princeton University Press, [2011], 2011), 40, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU4896198.
[452] Victoria Schofield, *Afghan Frontier : At the Crossroads of Conflict*, Rev. ed. (London ; New York : Tauris Parke Paperbacks ; New York : Distributed in the U.S. and Canada exclusively by Palgrave

escape retribution, at least if the Americans and Mexicans did not work together.[453] A similar thing happened on the Afghan-British border, with a specific example being a man named Lewanai Jaji, who fled to the British side of the border after his rebellion against the Afghanistan government failed in 1901.[454]

Leaving aside the danger of some of the border tribes for a moment, the Afghan army's effort to resist invaders and control the border did a lot to build up support for the Afghanistan government. An example was the successful pushing back of a Russian advance by Afghan General Syad Shah Khan. According to Rahman Khan, this victory significantly improved the prestige of the Afghan army.[455] The Emir's rhetoric directly connected the military to his regime, using the military to teach lessons to his subjects, such as accepting your place in life.[456] In another proclamation, he talked about how loyal subjects in 1895 gave his government 1/10 of their annual income. He said, “requesting me to buy ammunition and war materials with the money, so that their country might be protected against foreign invaders.”[457] All of this proves that the Emir’s government used its ability to defend the people and country from outside invaders as the primary reason that his government should be in power. His government’s prestige increased when his army did well, especially when fighting foreign invaders. After all, one of a Pashtun leader's critical duties is to defend his clients' lives, property, and honor.

The Afghan military also legitimized the rule of its government by providing security on the border against predatory peoples and thieves. In his autobiography, Emir Rahman Khan argued that a king must provide safety and security for his people.[458] When comparing his kingdom to

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Macmillan, 2010., 2010), 60, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE004287054; John, *Line in the Sand*, 53.

[453] F. S. Naiden, “Lines in the Sand,” *The Wilson Quarterly (1976-)* 31, no. 1 (2007): 55–57.

[454] British Library. Oriental and India Office Collections., *British Intelligence on the North-West Frontier, 1901-1949: India Office Political and Secret Reports on Tribes and Terrorism.* (Leiden, The Netherlands: IDC Publishers, 2008), 13, http://www.idcpublishers.com/ead/557.xml.

[455] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:287.

[456] Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, 81.

[457] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:229.

[458] Khan and Khan, 2:224.

the British, he points out that his country was safe but that “on the borders of Afghanistan, in the parts under British rule, nobody can move a step without being protected by a strong bodyguard.”[459] The people on the Afghanistan border also spoke positively about the security that the Afghan government had brought. An example of this was Mullah Rakim Akhundzada, who lived on the Afghan-Bokhara border, who said that when Faiz Muhammad Khan became governor of Akeha, he made the roads and country safe.[460] Another Afghan interviewee, Nazir Nur-ud-dan Khan (the Afghan accountant mentioned before), said that the government placed troops in the town of Chul, a village behind the frontier, to go after robbers.[461] Another person that spoke out about the safety brought about by the Afghan government, Muhammad Alan, said that Khamiab horsemen were posted at Karkin to act against Kara raiders. At the same time, if the Khamiab needed assistance against a large raiding party, troops in Akeha could help.[462] This relief about a safe country makes a lot of sense. The people on the Afghan border needed safety to move freely.[463] For frontier tribes, feeding their animals necessitated access to the plains.[464] Afghanistan’s borders had important roads and ferries necessary for local pastoralists and regional trade.[465] Robbers made travel in the borderland dangerous. This danger made the Afghan army a vital security force on the border, and this, in turn, gave the government legitimacy since it fulfilled some of the promises of Emir Abdul Rahman Khan.

The government also legitimized its authority on the border by simply having a military presence on the border. An example is the accountant Nur-ud-din, who traveled around the country with a military force to protect himself as he managed the assessment and collection of revenue for the Akcha district.[466] Several people on the border, such as Abdul Ghafur, the

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[459] Khan and Khan, 2:219.
[460] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 47.
[461] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 48.
[462] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 49.
[463] Benjamin D. Hopkins Magnus Marsden, *Fragments of the Afghan Frontier* (New York : Columbia University Press, [2011], 2011), 2, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU2691804.
[464] Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900*, 74.
[465] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 47.
[466] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 40.

governor of Kerki, Mirakhor, headman of Bosagha, and Juma Kuli, headman of Chakir, in their communications with the Russian commission in June 1880s (the exact date is not recorded) mentioned that a small Afghan force was sent with Nur-ud-din.[467] This demonstrates that the Afghanistan government tied its authority to its military presence. The provinces' structure shows the ties between the military and government control. Khoja Salar was “a political, military, fiscal, and administrative unit” of the Akcha district.”[468] Governmental leaders had military responsibilities. The Deputy Governor's duties included the “watch and ward of the frontier” which would put him in power over the soldiers who patrolled the border. The accountant Nur-ud-din served as a military and civil servant on the border.[469] The Afghan government also used intimidation. In one record, the Afghans moved their forces to Akcha, which led the Mir (leader) of Akcha to flee to Bokhara, and headmen submitted without the Afghans having to enter the territory.[470] The Afghan military helped legitimize the government by becoming an integral part of life and government on the border.

The government received military benefits from the control of their side of the Afghan border. Since the border people accepted or at least did not outright reject the government authority, the government could use militias to patrol and defend the border. Nazir Nur-ud-din recorded that for 18 years, militia horsemen operated in the subdivisions of Khwaja Salar, namely Khamiab had 54 horsemen, Dali had 10, Karkin had 50, and Akjui had 8.[471] These horsemen would always be ready to patrol the border, going to Jar Kuduk, Kara Tapa, Kak Tali, Ali Kadim, and the Bosagha frontier. The horsemen in Khamiab and Karkin played an essential role in driving off Kara raiders and served as the primary force for this duty. A regular army came in from Akcha if a raiding force was too large for the militia.[472] The government posted militias in

[467] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 45.
[468] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 62.
[469] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 40.
[470] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 49.
[471] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 48.
[472] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 49.

troubled areas, such as Chul, known as a target for robbers.[473] A general levy, called by the governor, could supplement the militias.[474] The government did pay the militias according to their rank, with horsemen receiving 100 tangas, Yuzbashi (the commander of each subdivision) receiving 200 tangas, and Mingbash(the head officer) got 500 tangas, paid with both currency (ruppees) and barley.[475] The militias also did not pay taxes. However, the militias lived in their own houses, and as best as can be seen, they supplied their horses and equipment. As mentioned above, the Afghan people were relatively well-armed, and according to Ali Jalali, their equipment included spears, shields, swords, pistols, and knives.[476] The militias could also help with other governmental duties, such as police work.[477] The governor ordered that the leaders and people of Danachi, a subdivision of Khaimah, arrest Charak Bai, and if they did not, their houses would be plundered and fined.[478] Finally, the governors of this territory would keep up 5 to 20 militia horsemen that served as his orderlies.[479]The border control gave the government access to part-time militias that could repel raiders, act as police, or act as orderlies to the governor.

The Afghan government had a difficult task in bringing its borderland to heel. Independent and heavily armed Afghans, especially in the border areas, provided a potential challenge to the government's authority. The Afghan government used its army to bring its control to this realm by building up its reputation as a defender of Afghanistan, bringing safety to the borderland, and putting its military and government right into the middle of life. The Emir's government gained a strong militia force from these ventures, which could operate in the area, provide their equipment, and provide various duties, from being courtiers to driving off raiding parties.

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[473] "Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.," 66.
[474] "Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.," 63.
[475] "Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.," 47–48.
[476] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 272.
[477] "Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.," 63.
[478] "Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.," 41.
[479] "Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.," 49.

Internal Audiences and the Limits of the Nation-State

As mentioned above, this borrows the idea from Vartan Gregorian's book *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946,* that Emir Rahman Khan created the modern nation-state of Afghanistan. To do this, had to overcome the decentralization of power in Afghanistan, and his tool to overcome the other leaders of Afghanistan would be his army. Besides the three ethnicities mentioned earlier in this paper, the Afghan states included Turkoman.[480] These ethnicities further divide into tribes. This leads to what Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen call the "substate border." This section will begin with exploring the basic structure of local politics in Afghanistan; then, it will explore some of these tribes, namely the Durrani, Ghilzai, and Hazara, and their territories. These divisions led to massive rebellions during Emir Rahman Khan's reign, which he dealt with through forced mass migrations, and turning the different tribes and ethnic groups against each other. These independent powers served as the greatest threat to the Emir, and their suppression was his greatest success.

As mentioned before, the Afghan government had difficulty ruling its people. The rulers before Abdul Rahman Khan tended to be less invasive in ordinary life. This, along with the splinter of Pashtun political power and the chaos after the death of Emir Dost Mohammad, meant that the Afghan citizens had not had a central authority to rule over them for an extended period of time.[481] Emir Rahman Khan's autobiography states, "every priest, mullah, and chief of every tribe and village consider himself a king." The tendency of Afghans to be heavily armed exacerbated the problem of control. One observer noted that they hardly went anywhere without a sword and shield; many had pistols and matchlock muskets.[482] This independence, added to

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[480] Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900*, 130.
[481] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:217.
[482] Rodenbough, *Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute; an Account of Russia's Advance toward India...*, 24.

the availability of weapons, led to a people able and willing to fight if they did not accept or like the government. As seen in the lifetime of Abdul Rahman Khan, he was involved in no less than 12 wars inside Afghanistan.[483]

For exploring local politics, this paper draws heavily on the writings of Colonel Holdich, who conducted informal interviews with local leaders and a former officer in the 9th Bengal Lancers.[484] Mahomed Khan was a khan, or regional leader in the village of Paghman, located on an offshoot of the Hindu Kush.[485] According to Holdich, the khan was the final authority in the town, with the mullah, or Islamic religious teacher, being of secondary importance.[486] This simplifies the Afghan power since the Afghan political power split even in villages among several influential landowners. A leader could lose all his authority if he could not provide for and protect his clients. Another story from a local leader in Afghanistan, Sultan Muhammad Khan of Pech Valley, as told by his son, Samiullah Safi, recorded another leadership system that existed along with the power of a khan. Sultan Muhammad was a *hakim,* or governmentally recognized local leader, of the Perch Valley, with power like a khan.[487] However, in local affairs, the ruling of a *jirga* had a decisive influence.[488] Called by elders a *jirga,* a town meeting, handled disputes in the local area, such as murder. In local Afghanistan politics, there are two powers: the khan or local leader, whose power deals with the national government and local affairs. Still, they are also under the authority of the *jirga,* a tribal assembly that can be called to deal with local disputes.

The largest and the most politically important tribe in Afghanistan were the Durrani.[489] The Durrani originally called themselves the Abdali. According to Colonel Holdich, the Abdali traced

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[483] Baker, *War in Afghanistan : A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier 1839 to 2011*, 93.
[484] Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900*, 30.
[485] Holdich, 30-31,33.
[486] Holdich, 32.
[487] Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, 33.
[488] Edwards, 46.
[489] Rodenbough, *Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute; an Account of Russia's Advance toward India...*, 16; editor Tom Lansford, *Afghanistan at War : From the 18th-Century Durrani Dynasty to the 21st*

their origins to a lost tribe of Israel and “still fight with all the ferocity of the destroyers of the ancient civilization of Canaan.”[490] The Abdali changed their names to honor the founder of the Durrani empire, Ahmad Shah Durrani, in 1747.[491] The Durrani empire evolved into the Emirate of Afghanistan, and it's the Durrani tribe from which the kings of Afghanistan came, including Abdul Rahman Khan. However, the Durrani did not act as one group. The tribe had two influential families, the Sadozai family in the Popalzai subtribe and the Mohammadzai family in the Barakzai subtribe. These two families fought over the throne, and Abdul Rahman came from the Mohammadzai family. The Durrani lived around Kandahar.[492]

Another influential group in Afghanistan was the Ghilzai.[493] According to Colonel Holdich, they had Turkish origins, although they spoke Pashtun as their primary language. The Ghilzai was divided into several significant clans. These included the Suliman Khel, the Nasirs, and the Kharotis.[494] The Ghilzai identified both as warriors and Povindahs, or nomadic traders that moved fruit and cloth from Afghanistan to India.[495] The Ghilzai also famously played an essential role in defeating the British in the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1842.[496] This made them potentially dangerous to the rule of Emir Rahman Khan.[497] The Ghilzai leaders could claim that their ancestors bled for Islam, and the leaders of the Ghilzai needed to protect the advantages they had gained since losing them could make them lose clients. The territory of the Ghilzai included the mountains to the east of Afghanistan, specifically between Ghazni and Qalat.[498] The Ghilzai power came largely from their warriors, who could form a tribal army of an

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Century (Santa Barbara, California : ABC-CLIO, an imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC, [2017], 2017), 152, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU3893395.

[490] Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900*, 43.

[491] Tom Lansford, *Afghanistan at War*, 152.

[492] Rodenbough, *Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute; an Account of Russia’s Advance toward India...*, 16.

[493] Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900*, 42.

[494] Holdich, 41.

[495] Holdich, 42.

[496] Baker, *War in Afghanistan*, 96.

[497] Rodenbough, *Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute; an Account of Russia’s Advance toward India...*, 16.

[498] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 264.

estimated 30,000 warriors.[499] Emir Rahman Khan called the leaders of the Ghilzai more powerful than the Emirs when he came to power.[500] The Ghilzai posed a significant concern for the rulers of Afghanistan.

Another power inside Afghanistan was the Hazaras. As mentioned above, the Hazaras descended from Mongolians and followed the Shiite faith, compared to the primarily Sunni faith of the rest of Afghanistan.[501] Hazara spoke Persian as their primary language. The Hazaras hated their neighbors and acted practically independently from the government of Kabul.[502] The Hazaras had two major leadership structures: the first was secular, which during the early reign of the Emir meant this tribal chiefs or khans. The other center was spiritual leadership, which centered on a man named Qazi Asghar. The British and Afghan governments knew the Hazaras as workers.[503] When the British fought the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the Hazaras carried out business with the British and worked with them as diggers and sappers. Finally, the Hazaras' territory stretched over one fairly continuous area from the Koushan pass, Marchat (on the Turkoman frontier), Sirpool (Turkestan), Girishk, Kandahar to Herat.[504]

What did all these divisions mean for the Afghan central government in Kabul? These powerful tribes and ethnicities had enough self-rule in their territory to launch violent revolts when they believed the central government had weakened enough to get away with it or if they felt that the government threatened their privileges. This threat of violent revolt concerned Emir Rahman Khan so much he said of the early years of his reigns, “The Mirs of Turkestan, The Mirs of Hazara, the chiefs of Ghilzai were all stronger than their Emirs, and, as long as they were the rulers, the King could not do justice in the country.”[505] This independent streak led to

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[499] Rodenbough, *Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute; an Account of Russia’s Advance toward India...*, 16.
[500] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:217.
[501] Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900*, 42.
[502] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 266.
[503] Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900*, 42.
[504] Tom Lansford, *Afghanistan at War*, 18.
[505] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:217.

the Ghilzai revolt of 1886-1887.[506] According to Rahman Khan, this rebellion happened for several reasons: the imprisonment of Sher Khan Tokhi Ghilzai, who rebelled in 1881, Ghilzai support of Emir Sher Ali, who was a rival to Rahman Khan, mullahs preaching against Rahman Khan in Ghilzai territory, and the Ghilzai did not want to pay any taxes since they have not paid taxes in years.[507] In response to these changes, the Ghilzai attacked Afghan government officials, raided Mashaki, then lost to government forces and dispersed. The Ghilzai rebelled again in 1887 because the government tried to confiscate weapons from the Ghilzai Hotak tribe, a subdivision of the Ghilzai tribe. This rebel had early success, defeating the governor of Maruf, and forming an army of over 30,000, sending out feelers to Russia and Britain to see if they would support their rebellion. [508]The rebels broke up after General Ghulam Haidar Khan decisively defeated them, ending the uprising.[509] The Hazaras led three rebellions against the Emir between 1891-1893.[510] The Emir said that these rebellions started when the Hazaras refused to sell goods to Afghan officials, stopping Afghan soldiers from foraging and they began raiding Afghan caravans.[511] The rebellions followed the same broad strokes, with the Hazaras rebelling and attacking caravans.[512] The Afghan government in response sent military forces that suppressed the rebellion. However, the last rebellion had the worst consequences for the Hazaras. This rebellion took place during the trouble with the British, who had threatened to send a military force to the border. [513] There was also danger at Jalalabad and Maimana. This Hazara rebellion stretched over a much more widespread area, going beyond the Hazara territory and including Hazaras in the Afghan regular army.[514] There was a genuine threat of being overwhelmed by the crises, which could convince other leaders that his rule was weak

[506] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 263.
[507] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:251–53.
[508] Khan and Khan, 2:256.
[509] Khan and Khan, 2:258.
[510] Khan and Khan, 2:249.
[511] Khan and Khan, 2:278.
[512] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 266.
[513] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:282.
[514] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 267.

and convince them to revolt. Due to this, the Emir sent in an overwhelming military force, including tribal fighters that were promised that they could loot and enslave rebelling Hazaras. This not only showed the Emir's ability and willingness to crush the rebellion and protect his power, but he also was able to give economic benefits to both his army and tribal leaders that did not come from the royal treasury. The divisions in Afghanistan concerned the government as the different tribes could and did rebel, requiring them to be put down violently.

The government responded to these rebellions violently and often moved entire ethnic groups in an attempt to put rebellions down permanently. Both rebellions required the use of force. However, the government used the independence of the separate ethnic groups to its advantage. During the last Hazara rebellion, several khans offered to raise warriors at their own expense to fight the Hazaras, whom they saw as infidels.[515] The other way the Emir punished rebellious people was to remove them from their home territory. After the Hazara rebellion, the Afghan government allowed the allies who supported their campaign to resettle people in Hazara lands, forcing the migration of many Hazara people out of their land.[516] In their place were people who owed their new lands and lives to the Emir. This had the advantage of removing tribes from their centers of power and, as Dupree pointed out, allowing the Emir to turn enemies into allies. The Ghilzai might have been traditional enemies of the royal Durrani, but they supported their fellow Pashtuns when they moved into a Tajik-controlled area.[517]

There was one other threat to his rule that Rahman Khan had to deal with, the rebellion of his governor of Afghan Turkestan, Ishak Khan.[518] Ishak Khan was Rahman Khan's cousin and, therefore, as discussed, a claim to the Afghan throne. When his father died, Rahman Khan supported Ishak's father as Emir until his defeat by Sher Ali. After leaving Russia, Rahman Khan got loyalty pledges from his family members and supporters, including Ishak Khan, and in

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[515] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:283.
[516] Jalali, *A Military History of Afghanistan*, 267.
[517] Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 419.
[518] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:261.

return, Ishak Khan got the governorship of Afghan Turkestan. The province of Afghan Turkestan was an important post because it sat on the border with Russia.[519] Because of the danger of invasion, ample food and military supplies stores were kept in the province. Ishak Khan swore to be a loyal governor of one of the most important provinces of Afghanistan.

As soon as he became governor, Ishak Khan began to hoard the best firearms sent from the Emir. Secondly, he started to take money out of the taxes he was supposed to be collecting for the central government for his use, claiming that his province did not produce enough to match his tax requirements.[520] He also appealed to the locals by publicly becoming a devout Muslim. He also joined the dervishes of the Naqshbandi's, which was a famous Sufi order in Turkestan.[521] This conversion convinced the mullahs of the provinces, and especially the leader of the Naqshbandi's, to tell Ishak that God had given him the throne of Kabul, so in 1888, he proclaimed himself Emir of Afghanistan.[522]

The declaration was an immediate threat to Emir Rahman Khan; however, he suffered from severe gout.[523] This medical condition made the Emir not able to accept guests other than his doctor or attendant. Since it was unusual for the Emir not to be available for state business, rumors spread that the Emir had died, allowing Ishak to claim that he was his successor and to begin to mint coins.[524] The minting of coins was an important symbolic act because, as mentioned by Elphinstone, only Emirs could mint coins.[525] This could not stand, and the Emir sent a military force commanded by his esteemed General, Ghulam Haidar Khan, and the governor of Kataghan and Badakhshan, Sirdar Abdullah Khan. The battle between the Emir and Ishak's forces was hard fought. The defeat of Sirdar Abdullah's column and the betrayal of

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[519] Khan and Khan, 1:262.
[520] Khan and Khan, 1:263.
[521] Khan and Khan, 1:264.
[522] Khan and Khan, 1:265.
[523] Khan and Khan, 1:266.
[524] Khan and Khan, 1:267.
[525] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 512.

some soldiers under General Ghulam Haidar Khan seemed to turn the battle in favor of Ishak Khan. However, when Ishak Khan saw some of the Emir's soldiers come toward him, he thought they were trying to kill him and fled.[526] These soldiers were trying to switch sides, but the seemingly random flight of Ishak eventually led to his army's defeat as word spread throughout the day.[527]

The Emir's army again proved its loyalty and effectiveness during this war. The reports of disloyalty among the officer corps were mainly untrue. At the same time, the army proved effective against Ishak's army, and a rebellion broke out in Badakhshan while the Emir was in Mazar-i-Sharif.

These internal divisions concerned the Emir. In his writings to future generations of Afghanistan's rulers, he stressed the importance of unity.[528] He said that any great nation must be united; on the other hand, the divisions inside Afghanistan could lead to it being carved up by outside powers.[529] To this end, the Emir spent much of his life trying to break down Afghanistan's tribal structures to prevent the rebellions that plagued his career.[530] By the end of his career, none of the traditional local leaders could oppose him. This uniting of the country by arms used the methods discussed above: death, bribery, exile, and governmental services.[531] Abdul Rahman Khan worried about the Afghan division and considered its unification, along with limiting the power of local leaders, his greatest accomplishment.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that the Afghan army played an essential role as an effective tool in defining the borders of Afghanistan during the reign of Abdul Rahman Khan. The defining of

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[526] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:269.
[527] Khan and Khan, 1:270.
[528] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:178.
[529] Khan and Khan, 2:167.
[530] Khan and Khan, 2:176–77.
[531] Khan and Khan, 2:219.

these borders served the Emir as it legitimized his kingdom in the eyes of the European powers. With them unable to interfere directly with his domain, he used his resources to bring it under his order and control. The Emir used his military to define his borders to an internal and external audience. To the Russians and British, the Emir used the army to show that he was the undisputed lord of Afghanistan and would contest any advance or influence into his domain. He did this by retaking the territory claimed by his government that he did not have direct control over, showing the British that he did have “effective control” over his country, and contesting Russian advances in Afghanistan till the border solidified in 1893. The Emir also used his army to justify his control to his internal audience. To the border people, he acted as an Afghan leader, protecting them by fighting foreign encroachment and banditry and inserting his government into the lives of the border people. This control over the border gave the government access to the local militias, which proved a versatile force for the government on the borders. Finally, to his audience of Ghilzai, Hazara, and Ishak Khan leaders, he showed both the danger of his fury and the benefits of supporting him. Against all three of these, he crushed their revolts and caused major upheavals for these power centers; he would push Ishak Khan into exile, move the Ghilzai across the country to a hostile population, and the Hazara he would sell into slavery or forced out of their homeland. To those who supported him, he gave the spoils of war. While the Afghan army served this central role as a tool of border creation and preventing European interference. The Emir would further express his rights as a sovereign of an independent state through his diplomatic relationship with the British and border tribes.

Chapter 4: Strangers in a Strange Land: Political and Afghan Space on the Afghan Frontier

Throughout the historiography of Afghanistan, the demarcation of the borders of Afghanistan displayed European colonial power over a weak vassal state. Historians of this view include famous Afghan political historian Hasan Kakar and Afghan economic historian Shah Hanifi, who argues that Emir Rahman Khan was a British vassal.[532] I have disputed this narrative, arguing instead that the government of Emir Rahman Khan acted to secure his interests as an independent head of state. As an independent country, the Emirate of Afghanistan used various methods to achieve its goals. Beyond this, the Afghan government pushed its power beyond its political territory marked out by treaties with the British. It influenced what I called "Afghan Space," which included the nation-state of Afghanistan and the region of tribes that accepted him as "Emir" or "commander of the faithful" and "padshah" or king. Afghan territory, or the nation-state, included lands under the direct control of the government of Afghanistan. To talk about Afghan space, this paper will discuss a variety of ways that the government demonstrated its authority over space.

This paper will be pulling much of its primary source from the autobiography of Abdul Rahman Khan, which, while suspected by some Afghan scholars as being in part created by the British, is still widely considered a valuable resource for understanding the Emir and, at the time of its publication, was widely considered a legitimate source.[533] Additional primary source material comes from the official reports and treaties surrounding the demarcation of Afghanistan's boundaries. These sources provide the black-and-white details of these boundary

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[532] Mohammad Hassan Kakar, *Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan, 1863-1901* (Boston, United States: BRILL, 2005), 159, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ncsu/detail.action?docID=3004098; Hanifi, *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan*, 130.
[533] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 129.

agreements. For secondary sources, I will draw on the works of Kakar and Singhal. Both of these authors had done important and extensive work during this period. Kakar specifically had they worked extensively on exploring the new government structure of Abdul Rahman Khan along with the various disputes between the British, Russians, and Afghans. Singhal worked specifically on Indian-Afghan relations and [provided an extensive discussion of the demarcation of the Durand and Russian-Afghan lines. These are the significant sources used for this work.

The theoretical basis of space will guide this chapter. The analysis is influenced by the work on *Siam Mapped* by Thongchai Winichakul. Winichakul explains how pre-colonial Siam saw itself through the lens of Buddhist cosmology. Still, through the British influence, the Siam government adopted a European border system that saw the borders solidify power in the borderland and help create the idea of Thainess. This system had broad similarities with Afghanistan, but more interesting still are the differences. The Afghan government never gave up its claims on sacred space. To understand a vision of “Afghan Space” that extended beyond its demarcated boundaries, one must see that, like Siam, historical and religious claims to authority were not tied to the new borders but by religious familiarity and a client/patronage relationship. The Afghan government, however, followed similar paths and claimed recognized political control over territory like the Siamese government. The Afghan government also used its maps to challenge the British claims during the negotiations. A final connection between the two is that both governments saw the creation of European-style borders as part of a more significant effort to create a more vital, centralized state.

Afghanistan as an independent country

The question of whether Afghanistan was a genuinely independent country has exercised many historians. Historians, such as Hanifi, have argued that Afghanistan at the time was a

vassal to the British, specifically an economic vassal.[534] In my argument against this, I will demonstrate how the two British invasions of Afghanistan saw the British suffer grievous defeats. They also found a country with an armed population and a tax base that could not support an occupation. Despite the claims of Hanifi, even after the British started subsidizing the Afghan government, they still carried out policies in their interests, even if these were sometimes opposed to the British.

The first time the British tried to enforce its will on the Afghan people and government was during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842). The reasons for the British intervention were multifaceted. Significant reasons included the fear of a Russian Afghan alliance. The British also wanted to promote a new trade route to the Indus, limiting the power of the rising Sikhs kingdom by putting the English-friendly Shah Shuja on the Afghan throne.[535] To launch this invasion, the British East India Company gathered the largest military force it had used in at least two decades, around 60,000 people, of which 20,000 were soldiers.[536] The British East India Company was at the height of its power; it had just decided to carry out a war against the Chinese government that would prove successful.[537] The British also hoped that bringing along Shah Shuja, who had ruled in Afghanistan when he was younger, would give the invasion a sense of legitimacy by returning an exiled king to power.[538] By gaining indirect influence, the ascendant British EIC hopes to stabilize British power in the region.

The British did achieve some initial success, with the placement of Shah Shuja on the Kabuli throne and the capture of the Afghan Emir, Dost Mohammad.[539] However, the British government made critical mistakes. First, they did not capture Akbar Khan, Emir Dost

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[534] Hanifi, *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan*, 101.
[535] Dalrymple, *The Return of a King*, 128–29; Hanifi, *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan*, 55; Hopkins, *The Making of Modern Afghanistan*, 51,54.
[536] Dalrymple, *The Return of a King*, 127,137.
[537] Dalrymple, 197.
[538] Dalrymple, 129.
[539] Dalrymple, 188.

Mohammad's charismatic and militarily astute son, who was also heir apparent to his father.[540] The second was that while Shah Shuja had some supporters in Afghanistan, the fact that he came in with the support of the British shredded his legitimacy as a ruler, a problem made worse by the continual British occupation of Kabul after Dost Mohammad's defeat.[541] Finally, the British operated on a flawed understanding of Afghan politics, shaped by the work of the British colonial agent Mountstuart Elphinstone. Elphinstone's book, the *Kingdom of Kabul*, tried to make sense of Afghan politics through comparisons between the Scottish clan system and the Afghan tribal system. But that comparison did not consider that the Afghan tribal leaders, *khans* and *Malik,* did not have the same authority over their people as Scottish clans' leaders did.[542]

These misunderstandings led to grave consequences for the British invaders. The Afghan nobility, a key element of early Afghan political culture, did not look kindly at Shah Shuja's new allies or his dictatorial rule. As seen in earlier chapters, an Afghan ruler that cannot either bribe or force loyalty from their followers will see their followers either do their own thing or support other leaders that they thought aligned more with their interests. The unpopularity of Shah Shuja's rule led to various Durrani and Ghilzai rebellions. Akbar Khan, who raised a force of 6000 Uzbek cavalrymen from Northern Afghanistan, took these rebellions and organized them. He cut off the British and besieged their main army in Kabul, which he destroyed during its disastrous retreat toward Jalalabad in 1842.[543] Akbar then besieged the British in Jalalabad; though, the British were ultimately able to break the siege in December of 1842.[544] The British also found that the Afghan economy could not support the country's occupation.[545] The British Army of Retribution, a force sent to punish the Afghans for the defeat of the British detachment in Kabul and to rescue its prisoners of war, while destructive, did not have any benefits to the

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[540] Dalrymple, 299.
[541] Dalrymple, 205.
[542] Dalrymple, 346–47; Hopkins, *The Making of Modern Afghanistan*, 29.
[543] Durand, *The First Afghan War and Its Causes*, 377.
[544] Dalrymple, *The Return of a King*, 363, 383.
[545] Dalrymple, 439.

British cause.[546] Finally, Shah Shuja could never escape the idea that he was a British stooge, and his diplomatic overtures to possible allies failed with his assassination in 1842.[547]

This disastrous defeat was not the only attempt that the British made at controlling Afghanistan. The British would attempt again to bring the Afghans under their heel in 1879-1880, known as the Second Anglo-Afghan war. This war followed similar themes as the first, with the British having initial success but being unable to capitalize on it due to severe defeats and the cost of the occupation of the country, which by the time the war ended, had cost the government around 18 million rupees.[548] The British also suffered a significant military defeat in Afghanistan, losing about 1800 dead, 175 wounded, and about 1000 rifles lost at the Battle of Maiwand.[549] With the advent of a new liberal government in the United Kingdom, the British government decided that, as experience had proven, the Afghan people and government could not be conquered by military means.[550] British attempts to bring Afghanistan to heel through military power achieved nothing and gave the empire humiliating defeats.

The British finally tried to bring the Afghan government into its vassalage through economic dependence. The British started providing monetary subsidies to the Afghan government of Dost Mohammad after the Anglo-Afghan War. Some Afghan historians, like Hanifi, argued that this was a form of economic subjugation, making the Afghan government dependent on the British, giving them a dependable ally and border state.[551] This is partially true; as mentioned in chapter 2, the Afghan government used British money as an independent source of revenue to pay for and supply their army. This made where British blockades on military goods a problem

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[546] Dalrymple, 412–13.
[547] Dalrymple, 375.
[548] Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907; a Study in Diplomatic Relations*, 88.
[549] Ali A. Jalali and Lester W. Grau, "Expeditionary Forces: Superior Technology Defeated the Battle of Maiwand," *Military Review* 81, no. 3 (June 2001): 80.
[550] Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907; a Study in Diplomatic Relations*, 58–59.
[551] Jawan Shir Rasikh, "Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and State Formation on a Colonial Frontier, Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-8047-7411-6 (Pbk), 270 Pp.," *Iranian Studies* 54, no. 5–6 (December 2021): 1013, https://doi.org/10.1080/00210862.2020.1792611.

for the government. However, the Afghan government consistently pursued its political goals, even against British interests.

An example of this came with the Afghan government under Sher Ali, which started to move his foreign policy toward an alliance with the Russians (mainly from 1869-1872) and supported the Turkish government against the Russians in 1877-1878 over British objections.[552] Rahman Khan, for his part, often portrayed the British as a dangerous force that he opposed in his public speeches and writings.[553] To sum up, the British gave money to Afghan Emirs, but those Emirs did not feel obligated to follow British policy because of it.

A Supreme Monarchy: Emir Rahman Khan and the creation of political borders

This section will discuss the creation of the political boundary of Afghanistan. To begin this discussion, it is essential to dispel the myth that Afghanistan and its government were isolated and ignorant. In opposition to this, Emir Rahman Khan was in contact with European political ideas and leaders throughout his life, which this thesis argues gave him a good understanding of the European international order. The following paragraphs discuss why the Afghan government wanted to be incorporated into the British international border. These reasons range from concern about national defense to limits of British influence and guarantees of British subsidiaries. This paper discusses the various methods that the Afghan government used to push its political claims over territory, including, but not limited to, involving other European powers, creation of national maps, and placing government officials over regions of the border. The Afghan Emir makes it clear that he knows how the British saw borders as the

[552] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 106–13.
[553] Gregorian, 130.

limits of a nation's influence, as stated in his autobiography and the Treaty of Gandamak.[554] These methods allowed Afghanistan to reclaim territory slated to the Russian or British and keep some areas on the borders opaque about who owned it. However, much of what the Afghan government had claimed went to the British, so it had to rule it through other means.

Many Afghan historians' dominant narrative of Afghanistan was that it was an isolated state ignorant of the outside world.[555] This originates in some of the earliest western Afghan historians, such as Louis Dupree, who tended to argue that Pashtun tribalism kept them from engaging with the outside world.[556] This is far from the case, and as mentioned above, Hanifi argues that the migration of people and ideas is a near constant in the history of Afghanistan.[557] Abdul Rahman Khan's life was very much in line with this. Abdul Rahman began his political career as his father's servant, Afzul Khan, who had served as governor of Balkh. Rahman Khan received military and surgical training from his father's head of the military, an English soldier who adopted the name Shir Mahomed Khan.[558] After the death of his grandfather, Abdul Rahman supported his father and uncle's claim to the throne in Kabul, which proved unsuccessful.[559] Fleeing the victorious Sher Ali, Abdul Rahman Khan and his retainers ended up in the Russian Empire. While in the empire, Abdul Rahman Khan met and communicated with many Russian officials. He became friends with General Abramoff, who asked him to accompany a Russian military expedition against Shahr-i-sabz.[560] In this military invasion, Rahman Khan saw firsthand how the Russians practiced war. He was close not only to Russian military leaders but also to political leaders. While in the empire, he was friends with a Russian

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[554] Edited and annotated by Clive Parry, *The Consolidated Treaty Series.*, vol. 155 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. : Oceana Publications, [1969]-<c1981 >, 1969), 107, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU76508; Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:241.
[555] Shah Hanifi, "The Pashtun Counter-Narrative," *Middle East Critique* 25 (July 18, 2016): 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2016.1208354.
[556] Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 248–50.
[557] Hanifi, "The Pashtun Counter-Narrative," 5.
[558] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:5.
[559] Khan and Khan, 1:105.
[560] Khan and Khan, 1:145–46.

governor, and they would visit each other 5 to 6 times a day for three weeks while the governor was in Jaeak.[561] Abdul Rahman Khan had a great deal of contact with European powers.

Emir Rahman Khan depended on his knowledge of European politics to achieve his political aims, so discussing them is essential. As said in the last chapter, Rahman Khan wanted to be the undisputed leader of a unified state. To do this, he would need several things. First, he needed to guarantee that the European states would not swallow up his country. Rahman Khan had come to see Russia as the biggest threat in this regard, partly due to his experience with the Russian government while in exile. Secondly, he would need to eliminate or limit the ability of the European powers to exert influence over the domain, partly due to his need to crush the various semi-independent political entities in his country, some of which had been allies of the British. Thirdly, the Afghan government needed capital. This could come about in two ways: one, regaining the territory claimed by the Sikhs in the early 1830s, which had been a main tax base for the Durrani Empire, or two, by getting the British to bankroll the Afghan government. Emir Rahman Khan believed that the Afghan army and tribal militias could not defeat the British decisively in conventional warfare, which meant that diplomacy was the primary means of reclaiming any territory. This leads to my fourth point, Abdul Rahman Khan wanted the European empires to recognize Afghanistan as a nation worthy of independence. As mentioned in the last chapter, this could be accomplished by using a military force to show his “effective control” over Afghanistan’s border regions; however, while the military was the most common means, other government officials, such as governors and tax collectors could also be sent to the border as a means of showing “effective control.”

The Afghan government faced an expanding Russia throughout the early reign of Emir Abdul Rahman Khan. While in exile, Rahman Khan saw the Russian government consume Shahr-i-sabz, bring the area under its direct control, and move the Empire up to the borderland of the

[561] Khan and Khan, 1:149.

Emirate of Afghanistan.[562] This problem was compounded by the fact that the territory between Bokhara and Afghanistan was a borderland, where tributary relationships and military forces dictated control, not internationally recognized borders. In fact, as a young man, Abdul Rahman Khan had fought on the border while serving as a military leader under his father. That conflict started when Mir Atalik swore loyalty to the king of Bokhara, not the Emir of Afghanistan, leading to a conflict between the two nations over the territory.[563] In 1884, this problem came to a head when the Russian army sent a cavalry division to take Panjeh, a critical territory disputed by the Russians and Afghans.[564]t The Russians wanted to gain control over Panjeh before the demarcation. The Russians sent a cavalry brigade to contest the Afghans, who had sent a small military force to show effective control over the area.[565] The last chapter described the battle, but for this chapter, it is important to understand that Emir Rahman Khan saw involving the British as essential. This was because he wanted a powerful European state to bully the Russians. However, this was a dangerous game, and the Emir knew this involvement of the British had angered the Russians. The Emirs of Afghanistan had signed the Treaty of Gandamak with the British in 1879.[566] This treaty mandated that the British would provide military assistance to the Afghans if they were invaded; however, the treaty did not define what constitutes the territories of Afghanistan. This gave the British some leeway in deciding what constitutes an attack, which is one of the reasons why they did not provide Afghan assistance in the battle at Panjeh.[567] The Emir, however, used this defeat to his advantage, pushing the British to give him more money and munitions for the defense of Afghanistan, which the British considered essential for the defense of India. Several months later, the British, Afghans, and

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[562] Khan and Khan, 1:147.
[563] Khan and Khan, 1:9.
[564] Khan and Khan, 1:242.
[565] Khan and Khan, 1:241.
[566] Edited and annotated by Clive Parry, *The Consolidated Treaty Series.*, vol. 155 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. : Oceana Publications, [1969]-<c1981 >, 1969), 107, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU76508.
[567] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:151.

Russians signed an agreement that fixed the border of Northern Afghanistan in the area and started the border demarcation process across the entire Russian border.[568]

Besides money and weapons, how did the demarcation of the Afghanistan-Russian border help Afghanistan? With the formation of the border, any invasion of Afghanistan would activate the Treaty of Gandamak, which would lead, at the very least, to the Afghans getting a flood of British equipment and money, and at the other extreme, the British military would attack the Russians.[569] This strategy can be seen in Emir Rahman Khan's autobiography: "The Russians were irritated by the fixing of the boundary between us, which meant putting a check to their further advance, and especially because I was settling these boundaries through the medium of the English."[570] The fixing of the border checked the Russian advance into Afghanistan by marking where further advance would lead to a British response.

Another primary reason, as mentioned above, for fixing the border was to limit the influence of the Europeans on internal affairs in Afghanistan. In the previous Afghan wars, the British had used financial assistance to bring tribal leaders into alliances, at least temporarily.[571] In the First Anglo-Afghan War, the Afghan Lohani tribe provided a backbone for British logistics.[572] In the second Anglo-Afghan War, the British placed a puppet of their Wali (governor), Sher Ali, in charge of Kandahar, and they hoped he would hold it in trust for them.[573] This type of meddling was unacceptable, for the Emir wanted a much more centralized state than his ancestors, and independent deals with foreign powers would undermine that. The Treaty of Gandamak had a clause that theoretically limited British meddling: "... and the British Government on its part undertake that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness' dominions."[574] But this value was limited because the treaty did not define the Afghan

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[568] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:152–53.
[569] Parry, *The Consolidated Treaty Series.*, vol. 155, 107..
[570] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:151.
[571] Durand, *The First Afghan War and Its Causes*, 286.
[572] Hanifi, *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan*, 8.
[573] Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907; a Study in Diplomatic Relations*, 76–78.
[574] Parry, *The Consolidated Treaty Series.*, 155:107.

domains. The definition of the Afghan government's borders which were critical to checking British interference.

The Afghans wanted a border for a reason mentioned above, especially on the British side. The Afghans wanted to gain direct political control over as much strategic territory as possible. To achieve this goal, the Afghan government used a variety of techniques. The first was stalling. During the demarcation of the Durand line, the Afghan commissioner, the Afghan Commander-in-Chief Ghulam Haidar, stalled negotiations for months during the demarcation (1895-1896) due to a conflict over which Afghan or British map would be used to define the boundary.[575] To get talks going again, the British gave the Afghan government Pahal Kotal, which the British Durand agreement granted to the British. The Afghan government pulled this tactic again with discussions of the boundary between Khawaja Amran and Chaman.[576] This stall eventually led to the Afghan Emir and Durand discussing this issue directly, winning another concession for the Afghan government. Stalling was an effective method the Afghan government used to force concessions out of the British government due to the British giving into some Afghan demands to convince the Afghan government to begin the demarcation process.

The Afghan government would also place officials in charge of the border to show effective control over territory on the border. In his memoirs, Colonel Holdich said that as the British were demarcating the Russian-Afghan border, the Afghan government had placed a governor, or Naib, over a territory on the border to lay claim.[577] This was probably due to the Afghan government wanting to establish “effective control” over this territory, which, as discussed earlier, centered around the Afghan military but also included Afghan governmental officials. The British considered showing “effective control” an essential step to having a claim over the territory.[578] In general, the Afghan governors on the border also had another role in the Afghan

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[575] Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907; a Study in Diplomatic Relations*, 153.
[576] Singhal, 154.
[577] Holdich, *The Indian Borderland, 1880-1900*, 111.
[578] Ram Sagar Rastogi, *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.* (Lucknow : Nav-Jyoti Press, 1965., 1965), 43–45, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/trln/DUKE001823310.

government's claim over the border, keeping documentation of tax revenues and statements of loyalty from border leaders and providing the Afghan government with official documents showing “effective control” over the border. An example of this was Abdul Ghani Khan, the governor of Akcha, who used tax collection receipts and lists of former governors and vice governors to show Afghan control over the border.[579] These statements were taken during the demarcation, providing evidence to the Afghan government’s claims. The Afghan government used border governors to show “effective control” through various means.

Another method the Afghan government used to lay claim to territory was having leaders in disputed areas declare their support for the Emir. One of the most prominent examples of this was Asmar, where the leader, Timur Mirza Shah, had made an oath of allegiance to Emir Rahman Khan in 1887.[580] This gave the Afghan government cover to occupy the territory in 1891 when Timur died, an occupation which, though protested, was upheld in negotiations with the British.[581] Taking Asmar was considered especially important because the Emir considered it essential for defending the key Chitral and Pamirs roads and serving as the gateways to Kunar, Lakhman, Kafiristan, and Jalalabad. The Afghan government used Timur’s oath of allegiance to them to claim control over a strategically vital territory on his border. The Afghan government had other examples of using loyalty oaths to assert territory control. In the documents about border disputes with Russia, the Afghan government submitted evidence for its claim on Akcha. This included the testimony of the head of a unit of Turkmen cavalry (sowars in Persian) saying, “During the last 36 years that the Afghans have occupied Akcha, we have been servants and in the employ of the governor of Akcha.” This was an oath of allegiance to the Afghan governor.[582] The Afghan government used oaths of allegiance to defend its claims on the Afghan border.

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[579] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 38.
[580] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:158.
[581] Khan and Khan, 2:159,161.
[582] “Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.,” 40.

The region had been mapped for the Durand Agreement in 1893, but the process had been hasty.[583] The Emir used this to his advantage. In negotiations with the British, Emir Rahman Khan sent his ambassadors a map different from the one the British used. Emir Rahman Khan argued that the British rushed creation of the map creation process, which had led to mistakes. This led to the stalls in the talks mentioned above and the concessions that came out of them. However, the issue of a proper map continued even further. When the Afghan and British began to demarcate the frontier, the Afghan and British argued over the Bashgal valley, which the Afghans argued was part of Kafiristan, and therefore theirs. The British argued it was part of the Chitral state and, consequently, theirs.[584] This led to a stall in negotiations, but the British eventually admitted that their maps were flawed and gave the valley to the Afghans.[585] The Afghan government used maps, both their own and the flawed British ones, to gain territory in their negotiations with the British.

The Afghan government's third reason for wanting to come to terms with the British about the Afghan border was money. Specifically, as mentioned above, the Emir of Afghanistan wanted to create a much more centralized state than his predecessors, requiring capital to hire more bureaucrats and pay for the centerpiece of his government, a new army.[586] Traditionally, the Afghan government did not have much room for raising new taxes. For example, the Emirs could not raise taxes on Durrani landholdings and several other products owned by the Durrani people, such as their cattle and fruit trees.[587] This meant that former administrations' military and government reforms were nearly impossible financially. [588] The other problem was that the Emir Did not want to depend on his subjects for his military might, especially in comparison with his predecessors. Dost Mohammad tribal leaders had almost killed him during the 1st Anglo-

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[583] Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907; a Study in Diplomatic Relations*, 153.
[584] Singhal, 154.
[585] Singhal, 155.
[586] Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan*, 89.
[587] Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India*, 513; Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 47.
[588] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 80.

Afghan War forcing his initial surrender, due to his defeats by the British.[589] The same was true for his uncle, Emir Azim, whose arrogance drove many to the side of his then-defeated rival, Sher Ali, giving him a new army.[590] As mentioned before, Rahman Khan's experience was that his father's professional army, paid and trained following European methods, had served him well in terms of performance and loyalty.[591] Rahman Khan was not the first emir; however, to realize these advantages and to succeed where his predecessors had failed, he would need more capital so that his army could be well-equipped and paid.

The British, in this scheme, provided the money. The British began giving payments to Dost Mohammed, but Emir Rahman Khan wanted more, and by playing ball with the British, he got more. Dost Mohammed received 100,000 rupees a month from the British government, while Rahman Khan's agreement with the British at the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War netted him over 200,000 rubles a month.[592] After the Durand agreement, the British gave him a 50% increase as payment for his cooperation during the endeavor.[593] It was not only money; the British government also acted as his broker for international weapons and even gave him weapons when he faced rebellion.[594] This access to weapons and money gave the Afghan government an excellent reason to work with the British since at least working with them gave them access to capital and goods that did not tie to their tribal leaders.

The fourth reason for setting boundaries in Afghanistan was that the Emir of Afghanistan wanted to prevent the division of his country into many smaller states, which could be consumed by the British. In his autobiography, they said that Afghanistan has two paths, it "will either rise to be a powerful, famous kingdom or will be swept altogether from the surface of the earth."[595] In another passage, the Emir expands, explaining that for Afghanistan to disappear

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[589] Durand, *The First Afghan War and Its Causes*, 294.
[590] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:101.
[591] Khan and Khan, 1:32.
[592] Hanifi, *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan*, 101.
[593] Hanifi, 102.
[594] Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan*, 102–3.
[595] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:167–68.

from the earth, it would first have to break into many smaller kingdoms, allowing the British and Russians to consume the individual kingdoms without the problems of conquering all of Afghanistan. This was a significant concern for the Emir, as he saw that the power of past emirs of Afghanistan power did not expand beyond the city of Kabul.[596] The Emir believed that the first step to keeping a united Afghanistan was the definition of the boundaries of Afghanistan because, as mentioned above, the creation of border avoided European influence, gave the Afghan government a source of income independence (the British increased its subsidies after the demarcation due Afghan government support of the endeavor) of its “great men” which could be used to suppress said “great men,” and stopped the advance of the Russian empire.[597] It also allowed him to implement reforms in Afghanistan, unifying and strengthening his government and country. To explain this to further generations of Afghan leaders, the Emir said that if Afghanistan is like a house, then the borders were the strong wall around it, the first essential step to bringing order and safety. The Emir saw this border creation as necessary to keeping Afghanistan united, strong, and independent of the great powers.

Emir and Padshah of Yaghistan: control of Afghan space beyond its political borders

The Emir had brought as much as possible of Afghanistan into the political state that his new borders would envelop; however, this would not include the entirety of what he considered his rightfully. The part of Afghanistan that the British knew as *Yaghistan*, or land of the unruly, remained beyond the Emir’s control.[598] This was not a new problem. Afghanistan had not controlled this territory politically for the better of the 19th century. This section will briefly discuss this territory's history, how the Afghan leaders use the title Emir to have direct relations

[596] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:227.
[597] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:168.
[598] Khan and Khan, 2:157–59.

to this territory, and how the Afghan Emirs showed their influence over this territory. The British were not unaware of the Afghan government's authority over this territory. Even though they had political control over this territory, they felt like “strangers in a strange land.” This was seen in personal accounts that demonstrated British awareness that, although, *Yaghistan* was part of their political territory, but they did not have control over it on the ground.

To begin discussing *Yaghistan*, let's first define the territory of *Yaghistan* and its history. Traditionally called *Yaghistan*, at least by the British, this area included the territories of Chitral, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas, and Waziri (note parts of Waziri did end up in the political territory of Afghanistan). [599]This territory was considered part of the heartland of the Durrani empire, the ancestor of the Emirate of Afghanistan. Specifically, Peshawar served as a tax center for the Durrani empire and a winter palace for the *padshah,* or king, of Afghanistan.[600] This territory was lost to the Afghan government in 1834 when the Sikhs kingdom under Ranjit Singh annexed the territory from the Afghan king, Shah Shuja.[601] This loss of territory led to a series of battles, but the Afghan government could never take the territory of *Yaghistan* back from the Sikhs.[602] The Afghan desire to regain *Yaghistan* also led to some of the first diplomatic overtures from the Afghan government to the British, who they hoped would help their campaigns against the Sikhs.[603] The British never took up this cause in any significant way. However, the British gained control over *Yaghistan* after they annexed the Sikhs kingdoms after two wars with the Sikhs in the 1840s.[604] This led to the Afghan government directly pushing the British to return this territory to Afghanistan. Sher Ali had even tried get the Russians to support militarily the moved on to this point without much success.[605] It had also been the wisdom since the time of Dost Mohammed that the invasion of British territory would be a mistake, a point

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[599] Khan and Khan, 2:159–61.
[600] Clifford Edmund Bosworth, *Historic Cities of the Islamic World* (BRILL, 2007), 427.
[601] Dalrymple, *The Return of a King*, 85.
[602] Dalrymple, 86–87.
[603] Dalrymple, 103.
[604] *The Victorian Empire, 1837-1901; a Pictorial History.*, 74–75.
[605] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:151.

reinforced by the destruction of the Afghan professional army by the British during the Second Anglo-Afghan War.[606] The territory of *Yaghistan* had been an essential part of the Durrani Empire and the Emirate but remained out of the government's hands since 1834.

The quest to regain *Yaghistan* would help create a new title for the ruler of Afghanistan, to enforce a claim over the people beyond just historical precedent, Emir. As mentioned in the last paragraph, the original title for the leader of the state of Afghanistan was *padshah* or king. This title, while granted to Dost Mohammad when he gained control over modern-day Afghanistan, was different from the title he widely used. Instead, he often is addressed as Emir, a shorter version of "Emir al-Mu'min in." [607] This title translated into "commander of the faithful." [608] This title had an apparent religious connotation, which I argue was supposed to give the Emir authority over parts of Afghanistan that were not under his political control. The first proclamation of the new Emir was the declaration of jihad against the Sikhs kingdoms, specifically to reclaim Peshawar. This directly ties the title of Emir to the Afghan government's attempts to exert authority over *Yaghistan*. The title of Emir would continue to be used by other Afghan leaders to claim authority over a wider area than their political state. Abdul Rahman Khan would claim as Emir: "As to these frontier tribes known by the name *Yaghistan*, if they should be included in my dominions, I should be able to make them fight against any enemy of England and myself, by the name of a religious war, under the flag of their co-religious Muslim ruler(myself)."[609] This again shows how the Afghan government could use its religious authority, through the title of Emir, to be a legitimate form of authority over an area it had not controlled for around 50 years. The Afghan government's adoption of the title of Emir for its leadership

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[606] Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan*, 95; Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 84.
[607] Noelle, *State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan*, 16.
[608] Saurav Sarkar, "The Taliban and Al-Qaeda: Enduring Partnership or Liability?," *The Diplomat* (Tokyo, United States: Tribune Content Agency LLC, June 15, 2020), 1/4, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2413639614/abstract/62BDABEF517A46FAPQ/1.
[609] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:157–58.

became tied to its efforts to reclaim *Yaghistan* and its continued claims of authority over this area.

The Afghan government of Emir Rahman Khan did not just talk about its theoretical rights to control *Yaghistan* but also actively expressed its religious sovereignty over the area in various ways. The first was through the support of mullahs on the border financially. This was not a new phenomenon; when Dost Mohammed called his jihad against the Sikhs, he wanted the Afghans in the Sikh areas to join him.[610] To gather support, he sent Islamic ministers to rally support. One of these ministers was Abdul Ghaffur, a *pir* (teacher or saint) who rallied many holy warriors (*ghazis*) and students to the Emir's cause. Emir Dost Mohammed gave him land in Swat, Lundkhwar, and Mardan for this service. This was a sign of direct sovereignty over the territory since the territory he gave was in the Sikhs kingdom. Emir Rahman Khan would continue this tradition by assisting his agents with the Mulla Hadda Sahib, who led an armed uprising against the British at the time.[611] This support included 25000 rupees sent to Sahibzada Jilam of Kama; more money was sent through his Commander-in-Chief, foodstuffs (5 kharwars of barley and 200 kharwars of wheat) and weapons (a limited supply of Martini-Henrys and ammunition).[612] Financial support for the religious leaders was one way Afghan Emirs exercised authority.

It was not only weapons, food, and cash that Abdul Rahman Khan sent to mullahs; he also sent manuscripts.[613] The two he sent were the *Targhib-ul-Jehad* and *Taqwim-ud-din*. *Targhib-ul-Jehad* was a pamphlet about the need for Muslims to be prepared to fight jihad against the Christian powers. At the same time, *Taqwim-ud-din* was a work by 13 Islamic scholars divided into three sections: 1) the virtues of jihad 2) why an emir is necessary and you must follow him

[610] Haroon, *Frontier of Faith*, 37.
[611] Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, 198.
[612] Edwards, 198, 267.
[613] Edwards, 198.

3) denouncing Wahhabism.[614] These pamphlets focus not only on jihad but also on the importance of the emir for both jihad and Islamic government. These pamphlets made it clear that for *jihad* to be correctly declared, it had to be declared by the Islamic leader of the realm, which Rahman Khan believed was the Emir.[615] These pamphlets were not only lessons for the Afghan fighters in the 1897 Uprising about jihad but a physical, undeniable symbol of the Afghan government's claim of authority.

The Afghan government legitimized its authority through not only religious means but also historical ones. While Abdul Rahman Khan usually went with the title of Emir, he still inherited the title of *padshah* from his predecessors. As mentioned above, the Afghan government had considered the territory of *Yaghistan* as part of its empire, as established by its founder, Ahmad Shah Durrani.[616] The Afghan government might have accepted that the British control over the area had made its conquest impossible since the time of Dost Mohammad. Still, there were other methods that the Afghan government could keep expressed control over its separated territories, namely through the use of agents on the frontier, the Afghan government calling of tribal leaders to Kabul, the Afghan government negotiating with the British on behalf of the tribes, and the giving of gifts to border tribal leaders.

The Afghan government has long used agents to push its agenda in the border area. Dost Mohammed's agents on the border worked through the Badshah of Kunar. He acted as the primary agent of Dost Mohammed among the Bajur and Mohamad tribes.[617] Another important figure was the Khan of Lalpura, who in return for several gifts, agreed to allow the Emirate to have a say in who would be Khan after him. Abdul Rahman Khan had several types of agents operating ya*ghistan*. First, he had his agents in the city of Peshawar, such as his agent over his almond monopoly, his *qafilbashi,* a caravan agent in charge of making sure that Afghan

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[614] "Afghanistan Digital Library Newsletter," Newsletter (New York, NY: New York University, July 1, 2004), 1, http://afghanistandl.nyu.edu/pdf/ADL2004.pdf.
[615] Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, 199.
[616] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 74.
[617] Haroon, *Frontier of Faith*, 15.

government goods made it from Peshawar to Kabul, and his postmaster in Peshawar.[618] Secondly, he had his military agents, which included not only his Commander-in-Chief mentioned above, but he also sent Afghan soldiers and militias in plainclothes to support the 1897 Uprising.[619] The third type of agent was an ambassador that the Emir would send to the British side of the border to maintain a relationship with the leaders of the frontier.[620] The Afghan government used a variety of agents to show its control over *Yaghistan*.

Another way for the Emir Rahman Khan to express authority over *Yaghistan* was to call representatives from the border area to court in Kabul and intervene with the British on their behalf.[621] An example of this was in 1891, the Emir called and received representatives of the Afridi.[622] The calling of these representatives was a way to show that the Afghan government considered these people its subjects no matter what the border said. The fact that they sent people to pay homage to the throne suggests that these tribes felt a continued obligation to the Afghan government. This went a step further. When the Orakzai and Afridi saw that they were losing the 1897 Uprising, they sent ambassadors to the Emir to ask him to negotiate with the British.[623] Again, this demonstrates that in *Yaghistan*, the tribes still considered the Afghan government their protector, which speaks to the Afghan government's influence in *Yaghistan*.

The Afghan government continued giving gifts to the tribal leaders of *Yaghistan*. As seen above, the Afghan government under Dost Mohammad gave gifts of land to its agents on the border to keep the Afghan Emir’s influence alive. As for Rahman Khan, he often gave out gifts to visiting tribal leaders from the frontier.[624] In his autobiography, Emir Rahman Khan talked about how these border chiefs would come to the Afghan Emirs in the summer months and

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[618] Hanifi, *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan*, 108.
[619] Kakar, *Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan, 1863-1901*, 189.
[620] Rastogi, *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 180.
[621] Rastogi, 180.
[622] Rastogi, 169.
[623] Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907; a Study in Diplomatic Relations*, 161.
[624] Rastogi, *Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900.*, 180.

make oaths of friendship in return for robes of honor and money.[625] Now, these same leaders would make similar oaths to the British for payment; however, the fact the British had very little connections with the Afghans in their political territory, either historical or religious and the fact that the British dealt with a continuous rebellion among these tribes while the Afghan emirs had little trouble from these same groups on their border, suggests that the tribal leaders were being more truthful to the Afghan Emir.[626]

The British government was not oblivious that the Afghan Emirs held a great deal of influence while they did not. The first way you can see this is the paranoia that marked the British imagination about *Yaghistan*. Colonel Brazier Creagh said in 1893-1894, "When we went to the frontier, it was called *Yaghistan* (plundering); it was forbidden land, and no Englishman has ever been there before…It was impossible to go [inside], and if you did, your bones would be left there."[627] The British saw the frontier zone as the land of fanatics who violated the "Pax Britannica" and only understood force.[628] It was not only in the British mindset but in their frontiers policies that showed the British uncomfortableness on the frontier. The British never incorporated the frontier into the colonial system, instead relying on the *jirgas* (some like a local community meeting) and the government only getting involved in some instances.[629] The British also paid off tribal leaders in return for military assistance, and most importantly, they did not cause trouble for the British.[630] The British also never felt comfortable in *Yaghistan*, seeing the area as dangerous and having to govern not as a colony but as a land of danger.

In much of the writing, the British describe the *yaghistan* as a land of fanaticism.[631] This concern goes hand in hand with the Emir's control over the border. As said by Churchill, the Emir paid mullahs and distributed religious material to raise trouble in the British Raj among the

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[625] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:149.
[626] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 1:287.
[627] Haroon, *Frontier of Faith*, 29.
[628] Edwards, *Heroes of the Age*, 181.
[629] Haroon, *Frontier of Faith*, 24–25.
[630] Haroon, 22–23.
[631] Haroon, 39.

Afghan tribes.[632] As stated throughout this work, religion was a central element of an Emir's legitimacy, so why didn't the British talk more about the Emir's influence? To speculate here, since it was never said in the primary sources of this work, the British considered the Emir an important blocking force against Russian influence and movement towards Afghanistan, and they had repeatedly seen the waste that came with invasion. The Emir also would vocally come out against tribal uprisings when they became doomed to failure, and publicly he was careful not to support specific uprisings.[633] This ambiguity divided the Indian administration, but when the Emir sent military forces to supposedly prevent the revolt from getting out of hand, the British government felt that proved his innocence.[634] It was not for nothing, however, that this conclusion, even with evidence of his involvement, allowed the British publicly side with an Emir that opposed Russian expansion, which they saw as a significant threat to their holdings in the Indian subcontinent.

Conclusion

In their work on the theoretical underpinnings of the history of borders, borderlands, and frontiers, Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel said that states created borders to centralize power in themselves, especially in the post-colonial world.[635] They also defined "frontier" as expanding a "civilization" into empty space.[636] Despite the British calling their side of the Afghan border the Northwest frontier, it did not match the definition found in Baud and Schendel's work since the borderland had been part of the Afghan and Sikh kingdoms. The Afghan government took a unique approach to border creation. While in his work, Winichakul argued that the

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[632] Allen Packwood, *The Cambridge Companion to Winston Churchill* (Cambridge University Press, 2023), 55.
[633] Singhal, *India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907; a Study in Diplomatic Relations*, 158–59.
[634] Singhal, 162.
[635] Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, "Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands," *Journal of World History* 8, no. 2 (1997): 214, https://doi.org/10.1353/jwh.2005.0061.
[636] Baud and Schendel, 213.

creation of “scientific” borders in Thailand saw the rulers abandon their religious conceptions of their country. The Afghan government of Emir Rahman Khan, however, used the creation of European-style borders as a way to strengthen the central government and limit European influence. It also maintained its religious concessions to its nation, allowing it to exert significant influence over parts of “Afghan space” that were not part of the Afghan nation-state.

The traditional telling of the creation of borders in Afghanistan is that of colonial powers fixing borders for the Afghan government, but this is untrue. Through two brutal wars, the British saw the impossibility of forcing the Afghan government into compliance and decided to negotiate for the border creation. The Afghan government wanted borders for its purposes, such as national defense, and as part of a larger plan of consolidating power in the central government; however, the Afghans did not want to give up territory to the Europeans that it did not have to. The Afghan government used various tactics to maintain political control over strategic territories, such as stalling and appealing to the European obsession with maps. The British gained a great deal of Afghan territory from the conquest of the Sikhs, but the Afghan government kept practical control of this “Afghan space.” The first way was through religious means; as the Emir, or “commander of the faithful,” the Afghan leaders claimed command over the Muslim population in the nation-state of Afghanistan and *Yaghistan*, both of which make up “Afghan space.” This was expressed through the support of religious leaders on the border and the passing out of religious pamphlets. These actions represented the supremacy of the Emir. The Afghan king also expressed authority as the traditional head of state over the area, using his agents, interactions with border leaders, and giving gifts to express this more historical authority. The British recognized that despite international law saying they had complete authority over the area, they were “strangers in a strange land,” and their claim of power was limited. This realization is seen in their caution for the area,

Conclusion Unruly Land: The Borderland and Afghan Space

In 1901, Emir Rahman Khan died of natural causes, and power passed peacefully to his firstborn son, Habibullah Khan. This peaceful transfer of power was the first since the overthrow of Shah Shuja. It helped demonstrate the strength of the Emir's centralized government since no other claimant could find a source of opposition to build up their power. This is even more impressive given that only a fraction of the Afghan landowners supported him, and he was opposed by Rahman Khan's highborn wife, Bibi Halima.[637] This was due in large part due to the support that his father's army gave him.

Habibullah had experience in governance, serving his father during his reign.[638] His father gave him jurisdiction over much of the government, overseeing the government durbars, the military, and civil administration.[639] He also had a similar vision to his father, looking to use Western technologies to strengthen his government against western powers and internal rivals. He hired an American engineer to build the first hydroelectric plant, along with other factories.[640] He also followed in his father's footsteps of continuing to use his titles of "Emir" and "padshah" to exert his influence over "Afghan Space" beyond the limits of the nation-state. His brother and commander of the Army, Nasrullah Khan, encouraged attacks on the British by Afghan tribes on the British side on the border.[641] Emir Habibullah supported these endeavors by allowing this support and supporting mullahs on the border preaching against the British. Emir Habibullah continued his father's strategy of using European technology with Afghan titles to increase the power of the government in and outside the nation-state.

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[637] Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, 98.
[638] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001, 2:99.
[639] Khan and Khan, 2:100.
[640] Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, 101.
[641] Youngerman, 102.

Despite all this support, this hybrid strategy's ultimate expression was seen during Emir Amanullah Khan's early rule. Emir Amanullah Khan came to power in 1919 with the assassination of his father, Habibullah Khan. The British were reeling from the first World War, and the Indian population was unrested due to the pro-independence movements, famine, and the 1918 flu outbreak.[642] The young Emir saw in this distress an opportunity to strengthen his position and to force concessions out of the British, so on May 6, 2022, he began the Third Anglo-Afghan War.

The war started not with the Afghan army, though it would play a significant part. Instead, the battle began with a tribal uprising. In his recollection of the war, Lt. General Molesworth said that in April, there had been unrest among the people of the frontier, strengthened by the recent activity in Punjab.[643] In his reports, the Afghan tribes, specifically the Afridi tribe, provided the main fighting force for the Afghan government.[644] The regular army, however, would form the nucleus of resistance. In the Frist Battle of Bagh on May 9, 1919, a force consisting of infantry and artillery from the Afghan regular army repelled an attack by the British 1st Infantry Brigade.[645] This defeat strengthened the support the Afghan government got from the Afridi and Shinwari tribes and led to attacks on the British by the Khaibar tribe.[646] In the “central front,” the Afghan general Nadir Shah used his regular army to recruit the tribal armies (lashkar) from the Wazir.[647] These laskhars would support the Afghan army, allowing the capture of several villages during Nadir Shah’s offensive.[648] Afghan army was also sent to other fronts, such as the

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[642] Youngerman, 103.
[643] Lt. General G.N. Molesworth, *Afghanistan 1919 : An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan War.* (Bombay ; New York : Asia Pub. House, [1962], 1962), 37, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU550036.
[644] Molesworth, 123.
[645] Molesworth, 47.
[646] Molesworth, 47–49.
[647] Molesworth, 114.
[648] Molesworth, 116–17.

Upper Kurram valley and the Northern Baluchistan, again to promote uprising among the tribes of the British frontier.[649]

The war began in British territory, and while the British got the better of most engagements, the Afghan government got much of what it wanted in the peace. This was due to several reasons. The Afghan army, while not as well trained or equipped as the British, had shown to be able to fight and occasionally win against the British military.[650] Secondly, many British soldiers in India did not want to fight. This was because the soldiers had been conscripted into World War I, and they did feel obligated to fight in the British colonial war.[651] The British also did not have much international leg to stand. This was because the complete independence of the Afghan government had been proclaimed in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, which the German, Turkish, and Soviet governments signed.[652] These factors led to the Treaty of Rawalpindi, which recognized the Afghan government as independent in internal and external affairs.[653]

This declaration of Afghanistan's complete independence achieved several goals of the Afghan government. First, Amanullah's popularity in Afghanistan went through the roof, with many seeing him as gaining the freedom of Afghanistan and as a leader of Muslims worldwide.[654] He was even on a shortlist for being the caliph after the end of the Ottoman Emir. He told the British government in the Treaty of Rawalpindi that he would respect the Durand Line.[655] This guarantee had the same weight as Emir Rahman Khan gave the British, which is nothing. He patronized the mullahs on the British side of the border loyal to him, inviting them to Afghan *jirgas* and giving them money or weapons.[656] He also encouraged and financed conflicts

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[649] Molesworth, 123,155.
[650] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 231.
[651] Molesworth, *Afghanistan 1919*, 87.
[652] Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, 230.
[653] Gregorian, 231.
[654] Leon B. Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929; King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society* (Ithaca [N.Y.] : Cornell University Press, [1973], 1973), 47, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU184905.
[655] Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, 103.
[656] Haroon, *Frontier of Faith*, 111.

between the border tribes and the British.[657] As seen in this work, this strategy of supporting Afghan tribes on the British side of the Durand Line was the same as Emir Rahman Khan, and the indirect rule of parts of Afghanistan is a model that goes back to the beginnings of the Afghan state.

The story of the third Anglo-Afghan war is relevant to this paper because it showed how Emir Rahman Khan's policies continued into the 20th century. These policies would continue even after Amanullah Khan was overthrown in 1929.[658] Prime Minister Shah Mahmoud continued pushing Afghanistan's right to the Tribal Areas of Pakistan under the idea of Pakhtunistan, especially after Indian independence in 1947.These long-term impacts of the Emir policies demonstrate their effectiveness. The Afghan government continues to push its claims on the area and rule it indirectly through a subsidiary to local leaders.

If the reader does not get anything else from this paper. The first chapter discusses British political legitimacy during the imperial era. In that case, it should be noted that Emir Rahman Khan used a combination of European and traditional Afghan governmental strategies to create the nation-state of Afghanistan and to exert his control over parts of Afghanistan that were not part of his nation-state. The British rule over territory had two components. One was ideological, which is to say British political philosophy was that it was good for "civilized" countries to conquer "uncivilized" countries so that said countries could be civilized. The second was material; the Indian army allowed the British to exercise power over vast swabs of the world, using force to control the Sikhs' kingdom, Sudan, and parts of China. In India, these strategies impacted Afghanistan during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The justification for the Second Anglo-Afghan War was the pure power politics that came with being such a great power. The British felt they could take whatever they wanted to in the name of national security, but when that did not work out, the British came up with the treaty of Gandamak, which allowed the British

[657] Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, 104.
[658] Youngerman, 118–19.

to control Afghan foreign affairs. This treaty was built on the British political ideas of gaining some control over a barbarian country to protect it.

Emir Rahman Khan played this game. He would become the civilizing monarch. As Emir, he clamped down on his country's many political power centers, centralizing power in his government. He also created a uniform set of laws and stressed their implementation throughout his kingdom. He even justified his violence by pointing out that the British had used violence to civilize their domains. The British recognized these efforts by the Emir and gave him honors, such as becoming an honorary member of the order of the Bath in 1893. This strategy also got him more money from the British government, the ability to purchase British weapons, and assistance solidifying their borders.

The Afghan government was quite different from the centralized, powerful government of the British, at least early on. Most historians draw the origins of the current Afghan government to the Durrani Empire, founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani. Durrani gained power after being elected by the other leaders of the Durrani family. The critical decision was made after a religious leader placed a piece of grain into his turban and said that Durrani was the only person worthy of being king. This story demonstrated the Afghan state's two centers of power: the Afghan tribes and religion. Now the term tribe is a complicated and nuanced term, and in Afghanistan, it is specifically about political entities that revolve around a common lineage and their dependents. Pashtun, the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan, had a political system that decentralized power. This was because political leaders had to entice the majority of their followers. Those followers could split away from their leader if they felt mistreated or if other political leaders offered better benefits for their loyalty. An example of this was the overthrow of Shah Shuja, who was overthrown in a civil war won by the more numerous Barakzais family. Influential leaders inside Afghanistan had essential roles in the government as a way to buy their loyalty. Their duties included helping to select the next king, sitting on the Emir’s royal Jirga, and having important positions in the royal government.

Religion was also necessary for Afghan kingship when the Barakzais came to power. It became a more critical part of kingship due to his emphasis on the title Emir, or “commander of the faithful,” over the more traditional title of padshah, or king in Dari. This was partly due to separating himself from the dethroned Shah Shuja so that he could declare a jihad against the Sikhs' kingdom to reclaim the Afghan winter palace of Peshawar. In recognition of their importance, Afghan kings gave them subsidiaries through direct cash payments or the granting of royal lands. Religious leaders also acted in a judicial role in towns and cities under royal authority. Finally, critical royal positions such as Peeshnumauz and Imaum Paurikaub could only be filled by mullahs.

Rahman Khan brought drastic changes to the Afghan government, much of which was influenced by his early life before becoming Emir. The first significant influence was his time as a military leader for his father and uncle. Trained by a former British soldier, the young Rahman Khan commanded his father's professional forces, and he saw its effectiveness, especially against nonprofessional forces. He also saw how loyal this skilled force was. These factors made him stress military reform as Emir, expanding the professional army and improving its pay, equipment, and logistics. At the same time, the Emir saw the value of militia (what he calls tribal). They could be effective fighters, but he did not trust their loyalty like his professional army. He ensured that in emergencies, he could recruit and train these “militias” but also that they were not as well trained or equipped as the professional army. Emir Rahman Khan would also provide honorary titles to tribal leaders who would pay to keep up their force of irregular cavalry.

The second lesson Emir Rahman received from his childhood was the importance of Islam. As a young man, Rahman Khan believed in divine intervention and said that some of his military victories were due to such intervention. He also saw how religious objects like the Koran had political uses, such as reading the sovereign name in the Friday prayers or using Korans to take pledges. As stated above, the use of religion has a long history for the Afghan government, but

Emir Rahman Khan went above. As he recounts in his autobiography, he had a dream where the prophet gave him the right to rule Afghanistan. This made the Emir claim that he was a “viceregent of God” and as the such rebellion was practically heresy. It also gave his regime a necessary religious justification for its existence, namely the reformation of Afghan society to go more in line with Islamic teachings and to protect the Islamic faith against the infidel powers.

Religious claims like this had another use for this Emir: the centralization of judicial power. As mentioned, towns and cities under royal authority often used mullahs for judicial decisions. However, this left out rural areas, where a community meeting usually carried out justice, or jirga, and event in royal towns and cities. There was no standard for Islamic education or theology. So, the emir started to use his new power to enforce his interpretation of sharia law. He also began to enforce through his new governors a policy of all judicial decisions being handled by his new judges, certified religious scholars. He also started implementing certifications for any religious leader who wanted government support—bringing religious leaders to a primary and government-approved level of competence. These teachers, in turn, would serve a judicial system that would centralize and decisions traditionally left to local decisions, weakening the power of these local institutions and consolidating power into the Emir’s interpretation of Sharia law and to religious leaders that passed his state exam.

The third lesson the Emir learned was the benefits of working with and being vocally against the British. Rahman Khan's rise to power was mainly achieved through his communications with the British occupying Afghanistan. For little more of agreeing to the Treaty of Gandamak and allowing the British to leave unharmed. For this agreement, Rahman Khan got most of Afghanistan, a repayment of money that the British took out of the Afghan, a return of Afghan artillery, and he got to keep the forts that the British built near Kabul. He also began to receive payments from the British government, which provided a source of income independent of his subjects that he could use to pay for the Afghan army that he would use in part to suppress them. The British also helped him recruit specialists to jumpstart his industrialization program.

Support by the British, however, had its problems, with Ayub Khan and his supporters using it to raise an army to take Kandahar. So, the Emir devised a solution, publicly denouncing the British while still taking their money. He began to release official decrees arguing that he was a defender of Afghanistan against the British, who he painted as a predatory, infidel power that sought to conquer Afghanistan and destroy their culture. This had expected results, with his autobiography not recording any more charges of him being a British pawn. This worked so well that during the Ghilzai rebellion, they sent a letter to the British asking for their assistance, even though the British considered the Afghan government their ally.

The third chapter of this book focuses on the organization that combined British and Afghan ideas of governance and was an essential part of setting up the border of the Afghan state, the Afghan national army. Military affairs have played an indispensable role in Afghan history, primarily due to western bias, since Western countries often invade Afghanistan. In this era, the Afghan army played an essential role in uniting the country, keeping it unified, and providing proof of “effective control.”

As you have read, the Emir did not have complete control of all of Afghanistan. The British guaranteed the Rahman Khan that they would not interfere if he wanted to take Herat, but they would not assist. He also had to retake Kandahar, which he considered essential to his state after Ayub Khan took it. He also had to use the army to take over parts of Afghanistan that, while officially part of his nation-state, had been more independent. Kafiristan had been a territory that, while considered part of Afghanistan, had not been ruled by Kabul but by local leaders. The territory also was a holdout of shamanic religion, so Rahman Khan invaded with his regular army, supported by religious militias, converting and migrating the local population and replacing it with retiring soldiers.

It was not only in conquering territory on the border, but the Afghan army also served in gaining control over the interior of Afghanistan. During his reign, the Emir faced ethnic groups and tribes that had not been under firm government control, so Emir Rahman Khan’s campaign

of building up government control did not go over well. This led to many rebellions, including three major ones, the Ghilzai rebellion and the rebellion of the governor of Afghan Turkistan, Mahomed Ishak. To deal with the uprisings, the Emir used his main army as the heart of his response, with it often performing admirably in that role. To support it, he would use divisions and grudges that different groups had against each other to raise irregular militias. With these campaigns, the Emir prevented the overthrow of his regime or the limitation of his power by powerful groups inside Afghanistan.

The Afghan army at the time served a third purpose, to secure the borders of Afghanistan internationally while they were being negotiated. One of his biggest hurdles was showing “effective control” over territory to the British and Russian Border commission. For these commissions, hearing reports about the Afghan army carrying out essential roles such as defending against raiders and escorting Afghan officials became an excellent signal that the territory was under Afghan authority. The Afghan military also attempted to protect the border against foreign invasion. The Afghan army contested Russian army units invading Afghanistan, famously at Pamirs. Controlling territory was also crucial for the Afghan army since it allowed the recruitment of militias, especially irregular cavalry, that could carry out essential activities such as fighting raiders while not costing the government as much as the regular army.

The fourth chapter of this book discusses the diplomatic creation of the nation-state of Afghanistan and how the Emir used his titles to exert control over “Afghan space” or territory that was under British political control but that the Afghan government, for religious and historical reasons, felt was part their domain. In creating the borders of Afghanistan, it must be remembered that the British, a country with maybe the most significant influence in creating the borders of Afghanistan, were in a difficult position. The British had tried to invade Afghanistan Twice. Both times, the British army's initial success, continuous guerilla war, and significant defeats before withdrawing, so the British saw violent force as an ineffective way of getting concessions out of the Afghan government. On the other hand, the Afghan government had the

problem that parts of what they saw as their territory to the Sikhs in the early 19th century were then taken by the British, who expanded into Yaghistan, where the Afghan government had limited control.

The Afghan government took a two-pronged approach to border negotiations, and the first was to use a variety of political ploys to gain political control over strategic Afghan territory. One was to play the favorite game of the British of map creation challenging British maps of their territory with their own. This often led to delays in the demarcation of the Afghan frontier, with the British often conceding some territory since their maps needed to be revised. Another important strategy was simple stalling. Stalling, the British achieve the same goal as map creation, with the British willing to give a city in return for negotiation to continue. A third strategy was to play the great power against each other. The Afghan government brought the British into the talks on their northern border as a guarantee against further Russian aggression.

Despite these negotiations, the Afghan government could not get everything it wanted. As said before, the Afghan government had lost territory to the Sikhs and the British. However, they had various means to keep their power in the Afghan regions, even though they were not part of their nation-state. The Afghan leader was “Emir al Mu’min in,” which means “commander of the faithful” this title is religious. Afghanistan has a long history of military action related to religious goals, such as when Emir Dost Mohammed Khan called jihad against the Sikhs kingdoms in 1836. Emir Rahman Khan used this title to claim religious authority over the Afghans on the British side of the border, spread through religious pamphlets he sent to the border. He also did this through financial support to religious leaders on the border. The other title of Rahman Khan was Padshah or king, which had ties with leadership over the traditional land of the Afghans. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Afghan king controlled went over any group that respected his rule. He kept up this relationship with the people on the British side of the border, inviting them to Kabul and acting on their behalf in dealings with the British. He also maintained official agents in the border region, including military agents that would give weapons to the tribes.

The British were not ignorant of the level of control that the Emirs of Afghanistan had on their side of the Durand line; they lived in terror of it. British colonial officers, in their writings, express their fears of the borderland. In their mind, this was a frontier beyond their control, and Churchill specifically thought that much of the turmoil on the border was caused by the government in Kabul. This was also seen in the government policies on the border. The Frontier Regulations treated “Afghan space” not like the rest of the British Raj but instead militarized it to deal with the trouble. Most of the time, however, the British tried to leave it alone or to pay off its leaders not to cause problems. The British felt uncomfortable in “Afghan space” and lived as strangers in a strange land, even in their empire.

This paper pushed against one of the longest-lasting ideas of Afghan historiography. This is the inward-looking country seen by historians like Louis Dupree. This view argues that throughout Afghanistan’s history, its people and government resisted new ideas and absorbed its problems. However, this paper demonstrates that Rahman Khan used a nuanced combination of Afghan and British tools to unite and border his country to his advantage. The Afghan Emir traveled abroad; his tutors and some influential ministers were foreign-born. The Afghan government of Rahman Khan was not fanatic but instead pragmatist. They used all the tools at their disposal to achieve their goals of uniting and centralizing the country and avoiding assimilation by one or both great powers. In achieving these goals, they were largely successful.

Borders and the Colonial World

This paper has focused explicitly on Afghanistan and the reign of Emir Rahman Khan. However, to move beyond this view for a moment, a question can be asked, how does this impact the larger fields of colonial and border history? For colonial history, this paper is part of a larger effort to move beyond the stereotype that indigenous governments either had to radically change their governance to adapt to these new European powers or were subjugated by them.

However, in the case study of Afghanistan, the government adapted European tools into their systems to achieve a centralized government, which had been a long-term goal of Afghan leaders since Ahmad Durrani. The Afghan government, during this era, skillfully played the European game to secure its independence and to gain the resources it needed for its internal projects. So future studies of how independent states in the colonial era dealt with the Europeans and how they incorporated their dealings into their internal objectives.

Along with the ties between indigenous government dealings with the colonial powers and their internal policies, the main focus of this paper was border creation. In traditional telling of borders creation in the colonial world, the European forced borders onto African and Asian nations, which affected not only the colonies but independent nations, forcing them to adopt European ideas of borders to prevent European incursion.[659] Also, while Europeans discussed the importance of borders encapsulating the territory's sovereignty, they often considered independent states as part of their “area of influence.” Lord Curzon said unequivocally that the British would invade Afghanistan if the Russians intervened.[660] While this, if history is any guide, was unwise and probably unlikely since the same book stressed the ability of the Afghans to defend their own country, it does show the British willingness to violate borders in their interests. Much has been made about how the traditional borders of countries like Afghanistan and the Kingdom of Siam had a form of sovereignty based on a relationship between the central government and local power centers. However, little work has been done on how said indigenous governments could use this idea of sovereignty after contact with European colonialism. The Afghan government used this system in its continued influence over *yaghistan,* using its religious and historical influence to indirectly influence the territory, even though it was under British rule. It would be interesting to see if this was a more uniquely Afghan government

[659] Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen, *Borders: A Very Short Introduction*, Very Short Introductions (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 51–52.
[660] H Caldwell Lipsett, “Lord Curzon in India: 1898-1903 (1903),” n.d., 14.

strategy or how other indigenous countries used similar strategies and the difference between them and the Afghan strategy.

Finally, as said in chapter 3, the border of a country locks in a population as much as it keeps outsiders out. The Afghan government used multiple parts of the demarcation of the border to consolidate control over the country. He used a variety of strategies to gain control of essential territory on the border as it was being demarcated. He levied the creation of the Durand line to get British weapons and funding, which he used to consolidate power. He used the sovereignty gained over the unruly areas of his country, many of which had used the chaos before his reign to become independent or reject his rule. He also worked to get outside support. Much of border history is about how borders create others or how people on the border interact with them. My contribution would be that the border was used to create a nation-state beyond creating an image community. It allowed the state government to have free reign in their territory because they became part of the international system.

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APPENDINCES

Appendix 1: glossary

Abdul Rahman Khan-Emir of Afghanistan from 1880-1901. His expansion of the government tax based, bureaucracy, and military, along with his curtailing of the power of local leaders, created the modern nation-state of Afghanistan.

Emir- a short version of the title *emir al mu'min in* (translated to commander of the faithful). This title was first adopted by Dost Mohammad and is tied to the religious authority of the Afghan king.

Emir Sher Ali-Emir of Afghanistan from 1863-1866 and from 1868 till 1879. His hardline diplomatic efforts and friendship with the Russians led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the rise of Abdul Rahman Khan as Emir.[661]

Hazara-Mongolian descended ethnic group. The vast majority follow Shiite Islam

Mingbash-the head militia officer of a district.[662]

Mohammad Ayub Khan- Emir of Afghanistan from October 12, 1879, to May 31, 1880. He is considered an Afghan hero for his victory over the British at the Battle of Maiwand. He briefly took control of Kandahar until his defeat by Emir Rahman Khan in 1881.[663]

Nur-ud-dan-a civil and military official for the Afgan government on the border. By 1885 he is a head Accountant for the border area.[664]

Padshah- Translated from Dari (Afghan Persian) into king. Traditional title of the Afghan monarch.

Pashtun- Pashtuns are the majority ethnic group of Afghanistan. They speak Pashtun and are known to be warlike. The Majority follow Sunni Islam[665]

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[661] Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 415.
[662] "Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.," 63.
[663] Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 410,418.
[664] "Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.," 45.
[665] Tate, "The Kingdom of Afghanistan: A Historical Sketch," 15.

Tajik-A Persian-speaking ethnic group known as agriculturalists and traders. The majority are Sunni Muslims.

Shi'a- an offshoot of the more orthodox Sunni Islam, do not accept the legitimacy of the first three caliphates, believing that Ali (Mohammad's son-in-law) and his descendants were the only faithful successor[666]

Sunni- The more orthodox sect of Islam believes Mohammad's successor should be elected from the Quraish tribe.

Yuzbashi-the commander of each militia subdivision.[667]

[666] Dupree, *Afghanistan*, 101.
[667] "Afghanistan Boundary Disputes Etc.," 63.

Appendix 2: Map of Afghanistan, yaghistan highlighted in yellow[668]



[668] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001.

Appendix 3: Image of Emir Rahman Khan[669]



[669] Khan and Khan, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2001.

Appendix 4: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan[670]

[670] Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, [1978], 1978), 58, https://catalog.lib.ncsu.edu/catalog/NCSU514170.