

Abstract

BOGOMOLETEC, EKATERINA. Are We Entering the Second Cold War? Media Agenda and Public Opinion in Russia. (Under the direction of Dr. Andrew Binder).

From 2014-2015, the number of Russians who dislike the U.S. increased from 50% to 81%. In other words, millions of people changed their views about America. What happened in this time period? In 2014, the crisis in Ukrainian government resulted in the reintegration of the Crimean Peninsula into Russia. Some scholars stated that this situation provoked media coverage of America that directly affected the way Russians perceived the U.S. Moreover, some even labeled the media agenda of 2015 as the “Second Cold War.” This study investigates whether the changes in public opinion about America in Russia can be attributed to media agenda in Russia from 2012-2015. Using the method of content analysis, I examined 572 TV news stories to find out if Russian media depicted the U.S from 2012-2015 in a similar manner to the way Russian media depicted the U.S during the Cold War (1947-1991). I also analyzed if the reintegration of the Crimean Peninsula into Russia actually caused any changes in the way Russian media portrayed the U.S., i.e., if Russian news stories after Crimea differed from the media agenda before Crimea. In addition, I relied on public survey data to see if there were correlations between media agenda and public opinion about America in Russia. The analysis showed that Cold War narratives were used by Russian media in 30% of news stories to depict the U.S. However, it would be inaccurate to refer to the media coverage of the U.S. from 2012-2015 as a full-blown Second Cold War because the news media agenda also had a number of new features. In addition, the study demonstrated that a negative media framing of the U.S. correlates to more negative public opinion about America.

© Copyright 2017 by Ekaterina Bogomoletc

All Rights Reserved

Are We Entering the Second Cold War? Media Agenda and Public Opinion in Russia

by
Ekaterina Bogomoletc

A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
North Carolina State University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science

Communication

Raleigh, North Carolina

2017

APPROVED BY:

Andrew R. Binder
Committee Chair

Kenneth S. Zagacki

Ryan J. Hurley

Biography

Ekaterina Bogomoletc is a graduate student and graduate teaching assistant in the Department of Communication at North Carolina State University, USA. She received her M.A. in Journalism in 2013 and B.A. in Journalism in 2011, both from Saint Petersburg State University (SPSU), Russia. Ekaterina's research interests include mass communication, semiotics, nature and development of communication technologies, framing, image building, political communication, and cognitive science. Her bachelor's and master's research papers were aimed to define features of military image-building in social media and press. While pursuing her master's degree in communication at North Carolina State University, Ekaterina is exploring mass media effects. She seeks to find out how media impact people's views on a particular topic.

Besides her studies, Ekaterina has a valuable work experience in the field of public relations, Internet marketing, and teaching. She was working as a social media marketing manager from 2011-2015 for business companies in Russia. She was also teaching Digital-PR course in the Department of Journalism at SPSU from 2013-2015. Ekaterina was an instructor in Internet marketing in the frame of workshops for Russian and Finnish students, and Russian business companies from 2014-2015.

Table of Contents

List of Tables	v
List of Figures	vi
Chapter 1. Introduction	1
Goals of the study	5
Chapter 2. Literature Review	7
Public opinion about America in Russia.....	7
Media and messages that shape public opinion in Russia	18
Chapter 3. Methods	31
Sample.....	31
Measures	35
Analytic framework	38
Chapter 4. Results	40
Media coverage before and after the annexation/reintegration of Crimea	40
Media coverage and public opinion.....	40
TV channels and meanings of myths	41
Cold War myths and framing of the U.S. in Russian media.....	42
Discussion	42

Contributions of the study.....	43
Limitations	49
Implications and recommendations for future research.....	51
Chapter 5. Conclusion.....	54
References.....	55
APPENDICES	78
Appendix A. Media agenda (English)	79
Appendix B. Media agenda (Russian).....	88

List of Tables

Table 1. Crosstabulation of media coverage tone and a period of time (before and after the annexation/reintegration of Crimea).....	69
Table 2. Crosstabulation of TV Channels and meanings of myths.....	70
Table 3. Crosstabulation of TV Channels and Cold War myths.....	71
Table 4. Pearson’s correlation for the tone of media coverage and perception of the U.S. in Russia.....	72
Table 5. Population (N) and sample size (n) of media data per year.....	73
Table 6. Perception of the U.S. in Russia from May, 2012 – November, 2015 (N=1600)	74

List of Figures

Figure 1. The correlation between negative news coverage and public opinion..... 76

Figure 2. The correlation between positive news coverage and public opinion..... 77

Chapter 1. Introduction

The topic of American-Russian relations always received an enormous attention from social science scholars, and communication researchers. This interest lies in how America and Russia are traditionally perceived as super powers competing for control over global politics (see, e.g., Dukes, 2002). The rhetoric around American-Russian relationship is considered to be a reflection, and, sometimes, even a predictor of future changes in the world (Medhurst, Ivie, Wander, Scott, 1997). Much of the research concerning American and Russian relations examines specific aspects of American-Russian relations such as Soviet and anti-Soviet propaganda (see, e.g., Becker, 2002; Medhurst, Ivie, Wander, Scott, 1997;), building the image of an enemy (see, e.g., Shiraev & Zubok, 2000; Fateev, 1999), rhetoric around American-Russian “Reset” (see, e.g., Roberts, 2012), and Putin’s rhetoric regarding the U.S. (see, e.g., Mogensen, 2015; Sperling, 2016). It might seem that the topic of American-Russian relations and communication surrounding these relations has been studied from all possible perspectives.

Yet, changes happening around the globe raise new questions about the nature of American-Russian relationships as well as about communication that surrounds these relationships. In fact, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, the war in Syria, and the American presidential election brought the topic of communication between Russia and America back to scholars’ attention and brought up questions about how Russians and Americans perceive each other, and what exactly affects these views. From the communication scholars’ perspective, these events opened up an intriguing area of studies concerned with how communication impacts the way Russians and Americans see each other, and what role

media play in the process of shaping public opinion. The latter seems to be more prominent as the events listed above overlapped with dramatic shifts in public opinion about America in Russia. Without any direct conflict, the U.S. has returned as the number one enemy of Russians according to public polls (Levada center, 2015a). Russians started producing offensive cartoons about American politicians (Barabanov, 2014) and some Russians refused to buy American products or announced that they would not sell their products to Americans; even McDonald's had to review its communication strategy and start promotion under the slogan "Made in Russia. For Russians" (Birnbbaum, 2015). In 2015, an interview with an American sociologist John Smith about differences between Russians and Americans, was listed among the best articles of the year (LentaRu, 2015).

The article (LentaRu, 2015) started with a disturbing statement, Americans and Russians. There are so many anecdotes about how different they are, and even more anecdotes appeared over the last year. However, over this time, misunderstanding [between Russians and Americans] reached a level when it is not funny anymore.

LentaRu's journalist had reason to be concerned. In fact, from 2014-2015, the number of Russians disliking the United States of America increased from 50% to 81% (Levada center, 2015a). To put it another way, millions of people changed their views about America. What happened in this time period? 2014 had a historical meaning for the Russian Federation (Putin, 2014). The crisis in the Ukrainian government permitted Russians to annex/reintegrate Crimea. However, Russian "victory" came at a price – world isolation for Russia, an economic crisis, and a food embargo. Some scholars and experts state that this

situation resulted in an informational warfare that actually affected the way Russians perceived America. Moreover, some even named the media agenda of 2015 the Second Cold War (Pochepcov, 2015; BBC, 2016, Ziegler, 2014). However, it is not quite clear what exactly the Cold War label stands for. Did Russia and America actually go back to the rhetoric of the Cold War? Was the valence of news stories about the U.S. as negative as during the Cold War times? Did the images that were used in the times of the Cold War re-emerge 26 years later? Or maybe these were all false assumptions, and there was no comeback of the Cold War rhetoric at all? What if today, a brand new rhetoric around American-Russian relationship is being created?

Anyone studying communication and public discourse about America and Russia would readily agree that there is a trend of describing American-Russian relations by bringing back the ghost of the Cold War (Roberts, 2012). In fact, the label of the next Cold War was brought up by both parties in case of any tensions between Russia and America (see, e.g., Bayulgen & Arbatli, 2013; Simes, 2007; Lucas, 2008). This can be explained by the fact that the Cold War was the most strained period of American-Russian relation, and all the new negative turns in American-Russian relations were explained through already well known terms. In other words, American-Russian relations of 21st century are explained using the framework of the 20th century. The ghost of the Cold War has been following both countries for 26 years. However, neither new governments in Russia or the U.S, nor changes in media systems manage to counteract the fear of going back to the Cold War rhetoric and Cold War relations. Moreover, when speaking about the rhetoric of the Second Cold War, a direct link between media coverage and public opinion is implied.

Media coverage and public opinion. Some may challenge the view that there is a linkage between media coverage of the U.S. in 2014-2015 and the dramatic shift in public opinion about America in Russia. First, although the linkage between media coverage of a particular topics and public opinion is a popular way to explain changes in public attitudes, there are a number of approaches arguing that there is no direct link between media coverage and public opinion, and that the connection between media coverage of topics and their corresponding public opinion is more complex than simple cause and effect relations (see, e.g., Kolezev, 2016; Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973). In addition, few studies were conducted in order to prove that the link actually exists when it comes to public opinion about foreign countries (Zhang, Meadows, 2012). Besides that, to my best knowledge, communication scholars studying American-Russian communication do not conduct studies about how Russia's media agenda about America is connected to public opinion about America in Russia today. Normally, when it comes to the topic of American-Russian relations, studies focus on either the media agenda or public opinion, but not both. Communication scholars either analyze media agenda and assume the direct link to public opinion without providing evidence to back up this point (see, e.g., Kazun, 2016), or research focuses on public opinion, assuming the direct link between media coverage and shifts in the way Russians perceive America (see, e.g., Volkov, 2015). This leads to several goals of my study.

Goals of the study

The first goal of the thesis is to examine the media discourse of 2012-2015 and to analyze if it resembles Cold War rhetoric. I want to find out if in 2012-2015, America was described by Russian media in the manner as it was described 26 years ago or if there was a new rhetoric around American-Russian relations. In order to achieve this goal, I intend to answer a number of questions. How was America portrayed during the time of the Cold War? Was the Cold War wording used to depict America in 2012-2015? What are the features of presenting America in Russian media in 2010s? Was it really a comeback of the Cold War rhetoric in 2015 or was it a new, completely different public discourse?

Second, I will examine if the situation in Crimea actually changed the way Russian media portrayed America. I will answer the questions about how America was presented before the Crimea situation and if this way of portraying America was different from how America was depicted by Russian media after Crimea situation.

Third, I will analyze Russian oppositional media features, (i.e., not controlled by the government) and how it impacts how America is portrayed in Russian media.

Lastly, I will analyze if public opinion about America in Russia is actually connected to the way America is portrayed by Russian media. I want to find out if the dramatic shift in public opinion about America in Russia from 2012-2015 can actually be attributed to media coverage of the U.S. after the Crimea situation. I also want to see what goes first: does media agenda result in a certain public opinion about America or vice versa?

This thesis is organized into five chapters: introduction, literature review, methods, results, and conclusion. First, I address historical origins of Russian anti-Americanism.

Second, I provide possible reasons why the Crimea situation could possibly change the way Russian media portrayed the U.S. Then I provide a theoretical basis for the connection between the media agenda and public opinion. After that, using public polls data and the results of media content analysis, I examine the connections between media agenda and public opinion about America in Russia. Finally, I provide implications for future studies concerned with media agenda, connections between media agenda and public opinion, and features of Russian media and their role in forming public opinion about foreign countries.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

Public opinion about America in Russia

Public opinion. Public opinion is one of the more popular and yet one of the more controversial concepts in the social sciences. Some scholars define public opinion as “a rational, information-based phenomenon in which the best ideas will percolate to the top of the public agenda” (Glynn & Huge, 2008). Bourdieu (1979) argued that public opinion simply did not exist. He stated that individual opinions are not equal and, therefore, that the idea of public opinion as a sum of individual opinions does not make sense. Other scholars see public opinion as a social force that impacts the way people express or do not express their points of view (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). In my study, I will rely on scholars who understand public opinion as a distribution/collection of individual opinions regarding a certain topic (e.g., Lippmann, 2004; McCombs, 2004). I will apply this understanding of public opinion in order to analyze the public opinion about America in Russia, which is measured by public polls.

In this section, I will first provide a historical background regarding American-Russian relations and public opinion about America in Russia. This information will allow me to analyze how unusual (or usual) the shift in public opinion about America was in 2015. Second, I will provide possible reasons behind Russian anti-Americanism in contemporary Russia. Finally, both historical background information and studies about contemporary Russian anti-Americanism will support a discussion about the way the annexation/reintegration of Crimea in 2014 could affect Russian perception of America in 2015.

History of Russian anti-Americanism. Before going into the analysis of today's public opinion about America in Russia, it is important to know the history of Russian anti-Americanism. Vladimir Shlapentoch, one of the most well-known Soviet and Russian experts in American-Russian relationships, stated that historically, "the roots of anti-Americanism in Russia do not go very deep" (Shlapentoch, 2011, p. 887). He argued that these feelings can easily be influenced by Kremlin's position both positively and negatively. In other words, the position of regular citizens of Russia about America depends a lot on the official government position regarding the U.S. Indeed, if one looks at the history of American-Russian relationships, as well as at the history of how Russians perceived America, it becomes obvious that Russians have changed their views about America a number of times.

The diplomatic relationship between America and Russia started in 1809 and was mutually beneficial and promising in terms of economy and mutual support on the international arena (Ziegler, 2014; Sidorova, 2012). Emperor Alexander I perceived America as a country that "like his own, opposed British despotism" (Ziegler, 2014, p. 678). Moreover, Alexander I and John Quincy Adams, the first U.S. Minister to Russia, maintained positive non-formal, interpersonal relationships. Alexander I even suggested Adams to become a godfather of his daughter (Ziegler, 2014). However, one cannot assume that this positive start resulted in a positive perception of America by the majority of Russians. At that time, Russian media started their development (Gromova, 2005). Being able to read media was a privilege of a small educated part of the society that were interested in foreign affairs, domestic politics, and culture (Gromova, 2005). This so-called intellectual elite of the Russian Empire tried to find the best path for their beloved country. Among these people,

Russian connections to America as well as Russian connections to Europe became a topic of one of the major arguments of 19th century, which was the disagreement between *zapadniki* (pro-West people) and *slavyanophily* (pro-Slavic people) (Gromova, 2005). *Zapadniki* admired America and other Western countries, and they insisted on taking America for a model (Sorgin, 2013; Gromova, 2005). Unlike them, *slavyanophily* insisted on the necessity for Russia to find its own path (Gromova, 2005). Some scholars state that this disagreement was a start of the ambivalent perceptions of America in Russia (Sorgin, 2013).

The friendly relations lasted until the middle of 20th century (Sidorova, 2012; Gudkov, 2002). There were two main reasons of the lasting friendship between the countries in this period (Sorgin, 2013). First, America and Russia had mutual economic interests. The Soviet government imported American equipment to develop Soviet industrial complexes; they also acknowledged the high development of American technologies and economy (Sorgin, 2013; Sidorova, 2012; Gudkov, 20002). Stalin even suggested to combine “Russian élan” with American creativity, creating a combination of energy and business approach in order to achieve higher levels of development of the Communist system (Shlapentoch, 2011; Sidorova, 2012; Gudkov, 2002). Second, the American-Russian friendship was based on shared military interests (Sorgin, 2013; Sidorova, 2012). In 1943, the Russian government declared that the United States and Russia maintained long-lasting positive relationships based on mutual need. They needed each other first to oppose themselves to Britain in 19th century, and later to create an opposition to Germany and Japan in 20th century (Sidorova, 2012).

Everything changed after World War II. With the start of Cold War, anti-Americanism became an inseparable part of Soviet propaganda (Gudkov, 2002; Shlapentoch, 2011). Moreover, the concept of the American enemy became a part of the identity of Soviet people. Soviet people started identifying themselves through the opposition of the concepts “we”, USSR, and “them”, America (Gudkov, 2002; Sidorova, 2012). For Russians, anti-Americanism became the way to understand themselves; it was a “touchstone” used to demonstrate the superiority of Soviet system (Gudkov, 2002; Shiraev & Zubok, 2000). In fact, the idea of catching up and surpassing America lived a long life in Soviet minds. Stalin was the first to develop this idea; then it became Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s slogan; and it lasted until the end of the Soviet system, being a part of Gorbachev’s rhetoric during *perestroika* (Gudkov, 2002; Sorgin, 2013). However, it is worth noting that Gorbachev changed the way Russians perceived the idea of catching up to America and the way Russians perceived America in general (Sorgin, 2013).

Starting from 1989, the U.S. became one of the more popular role models for Russians. Soviet people started acknowledging achievements of the U.S., they became interested in American culture, and they started perceiving Americans as part of “one civilization” with Soviets (Sorgin, 2013; Sidorova, 2012). An example of the change in perceptions about Americans could be the reaction about one of the most recognized American symbols: McDonald’s. In 1990, the first McDonald’s restaurant was opened in Moscow. It was the biggest McDonald’s in Europe, but it was not able to serve all its guests. Around 30 to 40 thousand people visited the famous fast food restaurant every day. A popular Russian publicist Leonid Parfenov in his documentary “Намедни” (*Namedni*) says

that Russia “ruined the whole McDonalds’ philosophy of the fastest place to eat”. In Moscow, it became a place of attraction (Namedni, 1998).

The pro-American and pro-Western discourse continued gaining supporters over the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Hopf, 2016; Sidorova, 2012; Sorgin, 2013). Boris Yeltsin, then president of Russia, built his political program on Western (American) values and won the election (Sorgin, 2013). American culture continued penetrating Russia with Barbie dolls as symbols of happy American life, and *Santa Barbara* which was the most popular TV series in Russia in 1990s (Namedni, 1998; Namedni, 1999). However, at the end of 1990s, America and Russia faced a new turn in their relationship.

The economic crisis of 1998, corruption, and the rise in violence made Russians question the new democratic system. Russians blamed not the way they implemented democracy, but democracy itself (Sorgin, 2013; Lynch, 2016; Becker, 2002). In addition, America was blamed for undermining the Russian economy (Sidorova, 2012; Sorgin, 2013). Russians came up with a term “Washington *obkom*” (Washington regional committee) to name a group of people that stands above the countries’ governments and is in charge of all events in the world (Sidorova, 2012). Combined with NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, these attitudes resulted in a dramatic change in how Russians perceived America. America was accused not only of attempts to undermine Russian economy but also in imperialist ambitions (Sidorova, 2012; Gudkov, 2002; Lipset & Shlapentokh, 1999; Hopf, 2016). In fact, starting from this period, anti-Americanism came back to Russian public discourse (Sidorova, 2012; Sorgin, 2013).

Over the next 18 years, American-Russian relationships had ups (e.g., “Reset” of Obama and Medvedev in 2009) and downs (e.g., War in Georgia in 2008). By 2015, Russians started to perceive America as the enemy once more (Sidorova, 2012; Sorgin, 2013; Gudkov, 2002). According to the official government position, the anti-American rhetoric in Russian public discourse is justified by the American imperialist ambitions such as the intentions of the U.S. to promote American values and the way of life all over the globe (Sorgin, 2013; Sidorova, 2012); and American intentions “to destroy, or at the very least reduce, the Russian Federation’s role in the international arena” (Shlapentoch, 2011 p. 886). Besides that, the U.S. was criticized by the Russian government for double standards. For example, one can see how Russian government often refers to America when talking about political repressions in Russia (Sorgin, 2013).

Reasons behind Russian anti-Americanism. Some scholars assert that anti-Americanism is an attitude “artificially” promoted by the Russian government (Sidorova, 2012; Gudkov, 2002). They state that anti-Americanism serves as a tool to boost Russian government’s power and America is used as a scapegoat in case of any failures of Russian policies (Sidorova, 2012). In addition, scholars state that anti-Americanism in Russia became one of the major concepts of a “new Russian ideology” (Sorgin, 2013; Sidorova, 2012). Without having an official and comprehensive ideology, Russians choose to dislike America as it is the idea that is able to unify them (Sidorova, 2012; Gudkov, 2002). The list of reasons why non-Americans including Russians dislike America is long. Among the others, scholars state that Russians dislike America because America is rich, because America is powerful,

because America has weight in international affairs, and because America is impactful in science and culture (Gudkov, 2002).

Ultimately, while negative perceptions of the U.S. historically do not have deep roots in Russian culture (Shlapentoch, 2011), they still can be triggered by Russian domestic and foreign policies. In fact, dramatic shifts in public opinion regarding America have occurred over time. For example, in 1997 only 18% of Russians had negative perceptions of America while the number of Russians disliking America increased to 54% in 1999 (Levada Center, 2016). The Russian 1998 economic crisis and NATO's invasion to Yugoslavia happened between these two public opinion polls. In 2009 and 2010, with the "reset" of American-Russian relationships, the number of Russians who negatively perceived America went down to 27% (Levada center, 2016). Starting from the end of 2013, Russian anti-Americanism gets stronger, and it reaches its peak in 2015 with 81% of people having negative perceptions of the U.S. In the next section, I describe possible triggers that could cause the last shift in public opinion.

Crimea situation as a turning point in Russians' perceptions of America. In 2015, one could witness a dramatic shift in public opinion about America in Russia (Levada center, 2016). Millions of Russian citizens changed their views about America from positive or neutral to negative and highly negative perceptions (Levada center, 2015a). Moreover, the number of Russians describing American-Russian relations as "hostile" in 2015 increased 10 times in comparison to 2014 (Levada center, 2015a). Some scholars connect the changes in the way Russians perceived America in 2015 to the Crimea situation in 2014 (see, e.g., Bykov, 2016; Sperling, 2016; Volkov, 2015).

It is worth noting that Russian and American governments provide completely opposite views on the Crimea situation. According to the perspective of the U.S. government, Crimea was annexed by Russia against international laws. As it stated on the website of the U.S. Department of State, the official position of the U.S. is that “In February 2014 Russian forces entered Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and occupied it militarily. In March 2014 Russia announced the peninsula had become part of the Russian Federation following a sham referendum that violated Ukraine’s constitution” (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Moreover, the Department of State assigns human rights violations to the Russian intervention. Among others, the Department of State names such problems as kidnapping and physical abuse of the opposition to the occupation, oppressions of specific ethnic groups (Crimea tatars), and suppression of freedom of media as crimes committed by Russia (U.S. Department of State, 2016).

At the same time, according to the official perspective of Russian government, the Crimean government asked Russia for help because they could not resolve the problems that resulted from the crisis in Ukrainian government on their own (Tass, 2014). In this situation, Russia defended Russian “fellow citizens” who constituted the majority of Crimean population (MID, 2014a). Russian Department of Foreign affairs stated that Kiev was in charge of “provocations” aimed to destabilize Crimea (MID, 2014b). Moreover, Western countries, i.e., Europe and the U.S., were blamed for aggravating the situation. The U.S. was criticized very harshly for trying to dictate their laws to other nations, for being in charge of “bloody Maidain,” and for implementing double standards when it comes to international law (MID, 2014a). The Russian president asked the Russian government to deploy Russian

troops in Crimea to defend Russian citizens and Russian military located in Crimea (President of Russia, 2014). Ultimately, according to the official Russian position, Crimea was not occupied; rather it was saved by the Russians and *reintegrated* with Russia. Moreover, since the word “annexation” has a negative connotation in Russian language, Russian government and media prefer to use the words “reintegration” and “acquisition” when describing what happened (see, e.g., Vesti, 2016).

Media framing of Crimea situation. Both of these positions resulted in specific ways of presenting the Crimea situation in media. Scholars state that after annexation/reintegration of Crimea, Russian media framed the whole situation as a defense of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians from NATO, American imperialistic ambitions, and Ukrainian fascists sponsored by NATO and America (Orzeață, 2015; Luxmoore, 2014). As stated by a Russian sociologist Volkov (2015), Russians did not believe in independence of Ukrainian government, “on Russian TV and in the minds of the Russian TV viewers, they [Ukrainian government] looked like West’s puppets”. Framed this way, Russia and particularly Putin are presented as defenders of all Russians including those who live in Crimea (Laruelle, 2015; Sperling, 2016). Moreover, all the negative outcomes of annexation/reintegration of Crimea as well as all the miseries that were not connected to the Crimea situation such as economic crisis, European and American sanctions against Russia, food embargo – all of them were framed as a result of Russian defensive actions (Kazun, 2016; Sperling, 2016). In the end, the framing of the annexation/reintegration of Crimea resulted in a surprising situation in which the Russian economy faltered and people were unable to buy European food, but the majority of the population still supported the existing

government. Trying to explain this paradox, scholars and journalists suggest that the Crimea situation boosted Putin's popularity among Russian citizens (Bykov, 2016; Kazun, 2016). Some scholars, journalists, and politicians name the annexation/reintegration of Crimea *a small victorious war*¹ and argue that it proved to be an efficient way to sidetrack attention from the current economic and political issues in a certain country and to strengthen a leader's position (Bykov, 2016; Arzamascev, 2014; Kimura, 2016). Others say that in this crisis, Russian government played the "divided nation" argument so well that Russian citizens supported the annexation/reintegration of Crimea to save "their people" left in Ukraine after the collapse of Soviet Union (Laruelle, 2015). Finally, some experts suggest that the support of Russian government was also boosted by the idea of the "restoration of Russia' place in the world" (Hopf, 2016; Sperling, 2016). Combined together, these messages create a worldview where America is presented as an imperialistic aggressor, as a rival for the title of the major superpower. According to this worldview, Russia defends a piece of "the divided nation" in Ukraine from hostile America with whom Russia actually has a "small victorious war" (Hopf, 2015; Laruelle, 2015).

Ultimately, the Crimea situation resulted in picturing the U.S. in media as an imperialist threatening Russians and Ukrainians on the territory that historically belonged to Russia. The annexation/reintegration of Crimea was presented as a necessary step to defend Russia and Ukraine from NATO's (America's) control. I believe that such framing of the Crimea' annexation/reintegration resulted in a more negative media coverage of the U.S.

¹ *A small victorious war* is an idiomatic expression coined by Russian minister of foreign affairs Vyacheslav Pleve in 1904. Pleve stated that Russia needed a war with Japan to avoid revolution in Russia. Russians use this expression to describe politicians who start a war to strengthen their positions within the country (Serov, 2003).

after the Crimea situation in comparison to the media coverage of America before the Crimea situation.

H1: News coverage of the U.S. after annexation/reintegration of Crimea will be more negative than news coverage of the U.S. before annexation/reintegration of Crimea.

Given the media coverage observed by previous studies, it may not be surprising that public opinion about America has been changed after the Crimea situation. However, before making such claims, one should analyze if these changes can actually be attributed to effects on public opinion.

Conclusions. A number of studies on the topic of American-Russian relationships show how unstable and choppy these relationships have been. One day, these countries support each other and consolidate against a mutual enemy; the next day they are enemies themselves. These changes in policies result in shifts in public opinion about America in Russia. Millions of Russians change their views about America within couple years or even months. In respect to communication, these shifts raise questions about how public opinion about America in Russia is connected to media agenda. The years 2012-2015 present an interesting period of time to analyze possible connections between international policies, media, and public opinion in Russia. This period covers the controversial Crimea situation, the dramatic shift in public opinion in Russia about America, and an intriguing media situation when America and Russia frame Crimea crisis in a completely opposite way. Understanding of the communicative aspect of this complex situation requires a

communication framework concerned with connections between media agenda and public opinion. This framework will be covered in the next section.

Media and messages that shape public opinion in Russia

Media and public opinion in Russia. Russian experts in sociology and political science consider informational warfare to be one of many factors which shaped public opinion about the U.S. in Russia in 2014-2015 (Levada Center, 2015b; Volkov, 2015). In fact, Russian researchers, experts, and politicians refer to the broadcasting of messages by Russian media in 2014-2015 as “Cold War II” (Pochepcov, 2015; BBC, 2016, Ziegler, 2014). This often refers to the number of propagandistic materials and to persuasion methods. Other factors that have shaped public opinion include the belief that Western countries stand behind the war in Ukraine, the hope that Russia will become a great empire again, and the belief that Western countries are trying to undermine Russia as a strong competitor (Levada, 2015b; Volkov, 2015; Luxmoore, 2014). Also, one could speculate that the so called “Soviet heritage” has shaped Russian perceptions of the U.S., and today’s perceptions of the U.S. could simply be a result of Soviet ideology and these beliefs (BBC, 2008; Gudkov, 2002). Some experts and journalists name the American invasion to Yugoslavia and the American critique of Russians in Chechnya as turning points in the dynamics of how Russians perceive the U.S in contemporary Russia. (Volkov, 2015; Namedni, 1999; Gudkov, 2002; Shlapentock, 1999). Such scholars believe that was the exact time when “the formula that explains all the miseries in Russia by Western intrigues was brought back to Russian propaganda.” (Volkov, 2015)

However, surveys show that Russian anti-Americanism has reached its peak in 2015 and the number of Russians disliking the U.S. has grown over the last 25 years (Levada center, 2015a). In 2015, 81% of Russians marked their perceptions of the U.S. as negative, and the number of people who considered America the main enemy dramatically increased compared to 2014 (Levada center, 2015b). So, even if the “Soviet heritage” or the memory about Yugoslavia were among the factors of public opinion about America in 2015, one might speculate that there might have been another catalyst in the process of shaping public opinion.

Statistics show that most Russians use state television as their main source of news (Artemiev, 2014; Volkov, 2016). This might be attributed to the fact that the government TV channels are provided to Russian citizens for free; to the fact that there are very few oppositional media in Russia; or to the fact that state television channels provide high quality, dramatic TV news that meet expectations of their publics (Kolezev, 2016). Besides that, sociologists suggest that although a number of Russians have an access to alternative sources of information (meaning, the Internet, oppositional TV, foreign news sources), the majority of Russians refuse to take alternative points of view into consideration (Volkov, 2015). Research shows that as a result, “average Russians accept the Kremlin's...version of events as portrayed in the state-dominated mass media, blaming US...for popular demonstrations across the globe, from the Arab Spring to Ukraine's Maidan movement” (Ziegler, 2014, p. 674). Drawing upon such data I believe that media coverage might be the catalyst in the process of building a negative image of the U.S. in Russia today. Framing theory would be a relevant scope to analyze this media effect.

Theoretical framework: Framing theory. Framing theory is aimed to explain how media impact the way people think about certain issues (Entman, 1993; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Chong & Druckman, 2007). The process of framing is based on selection of certain issues and making them salient, “more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable” in the minds of media audience (Entman, 1993, p. 53). Frames define how media audience describes and interprets certain issues, they highlight specific aspects of reality and conceal the rest of the aspects. In other words, through framing, media promote a certain world view, a certain way to interpret the reality.

The process of framing happens in several locations of a communication process which defines different approaches in the field of framing studies (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999). First of all, framing happens when *communicators* select the information to broadcast via media and word the information in a specific way (Entman, 1993). Scholars who study framing on the level of communicators are concerned with factors that impact the selection process and the way journalists word certain aspects of reality (Scheufele, 1999). Another approach to study framing is to analyze *texts* (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999). The studies examine frames “which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain key-words, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments.” (Entman, 1993, p. 52) In addition, scholars study *receivers* of frames (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999; Chong & Druckman, 2007). Studies of this type define what impacts the way media audiences interpret frames and how specific frames affect public opinion. Finally, frames are reflected in *culture* which is

“the stock of commonly invoked frames.” (Entman, 1993) In my study, I will focus on texts and how media frames impact public opinion.

When it comes to media agenda and public opinion, a number of studies show that framing affects the way people perceive certain countries (Bayulgen & Arbatli, 2013; Kiosis, Wu, 2008). However, researchers point on a lack of studies examining relations between media agenda and perceptions of foreign countries and international news (Bayulgen & Arbatli, 2013; Kiosis, Wu, 2008). Moreover, some experts from the field of communication even question if this approach can be applied to perceptions of other nations and countries. For instance, Russian Department of communication and mass media upholds the position that media do not promote certain perceptions of a country (e.g., anti-Americanism), rather they try to meet expectations of their publics and broadcast the ideas that are already popular in a society (Kolezev, 2016).

In fact, research shows different results regarding correlations between the media agenda and public opinion about certain countries. Some studies reveal that predispositions regarding foreign countries can be stronger than “any kind of information offered.” (Lustig & Olego, 2016, p. 252) On the other hand, a number of studies show a correlation between the media agenda and public opinion about certain countries (Bayulgen & Arbatli, 2013; Zhang, Meadows, 2012). However, research did not reveal a correlation between a positive coverage of a foreign country and public opinion (Wanta, Golan, and Lee, 2004; Zhang, Meadows, 2012). Drawing upon these findings, scholars assume that “negative coverage is more influential than positive coverage with regard to foreign affairs.” (Zhang, Meadows, 2012, p. 88)

H2: There is a correlation between:

- a) negative framing of the U.S. and public opinion about America in Russia;**
- b) positive framing of the U.S. and public opinion about America in Russia.**

However, neither positive coverage nor negative coverage change public opinion right away. When examining relations between media agenda and public opinion, researchers see time-lags – time periods between a publication of news about a certain country and the time when people change their perceptions of the country according to the news. Different scholars name different lengths of time-lags ranging from a few days and up to several months (Wanta, Golan, and Lee, 2004; Kioussis, Wu, 2008).

Conclusions. Although there is a number of possible factors that could have shaped the way Russians perceived America in 2015, media might have been a catalyst in the dramatic shift in public opinion about the U.S. First, according to statistics, TV news is the main source of information about international and domestic affairs for most of Russians. Given the fact that the free TV channels are provided by the government for the Russian citizens, one might speculate that these TV channels promote the official position of Russian government regarding domestic and international politics including Crimea situation. Besides that, a number of scholars and political experts refer to the media situation from 2012-2015 as to the “second Cold War” because of the number of anti-American media messages and persuasion methods used by media to portray the U.S. In sum, then, it is assumed that informational warfare caused the raise of anti-Americanism in Russia in 2015. However, the existing research provides controversial results regarding the connections between media coverage of a foreign country and public opinion about the country. Framework theory seems

to be a relevant scope to analyze if there are connections between media coverage of the U.S. and public opinion about America in Russia from 2012-2015.

Cold War Frames and Public Opinion in Russia. If media do have an impact on public opinion, it is reasonable to ask what exactly Russian media say today about America., i.e., what messages are broadcasted. Giving the number of experts describing the media agenda from 2012-2015 as the second Cold War, one might speculate that this description refers not only to the number of media messages but also to their meanings. This might lead to the idea that Cold War way of framing American-Russian relations, originating in the years 1947 to 1991, actually laid the foundation for today's information warfare.

The Cold War is known all over the world for Soviet government propaganda. Art, literature, sports, and science became the Soviet government's tools showing the superiority of Soviet system in comparison to America. But, of course, media were the main channel of persuasion. After analyzing personal diaries and memories of Soviet people, Russian immigrant and scholar Alexey Yurchak (2014) concludes that there was a shift towards form in Soviet propaganda: people looked at intonations and emotions, not at the literal meaning of messages. Drawing upon Bakhtin and Jakobson, Yurchak calls this phenomenon a "performative shift" (Yurchak, 2014, p. 25). *The way* you say something was more important than *what* you actually say. In my opinion, this is relevant to Barthes' (2001) idea of myth. Unlike conventional understanding of myths as popular beliefs, Barthes' (2001) concept of myth refers to connotations and associations evoked by signs (including media signs such as texts, pictures, videos and other content). According to Barthes (2001), a myth does not have any deep meaning but persuades masses because of its impressive form.

Barthes (2001) asserts that one of the main characteristics of myth is the ability to transform a meaning into form. Myths tie an object and a meaning in our mind, whether this object has the characteristics that people assign to it or not. Furthermore, myths in media seek to simplify broadcasted events. Barthes' (2001) point is that people perceive a myth as common sense, as something natural, myth "organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth." (p. 143)

Soviet propaganda relied on myths to frame both domestic and international policies. In Soviet system, media were the main channels to promote myths as they were controlled by the Soviet government and broadcasted the pro-government ideology (Zhirkov, 2001). Moreover, government censorship controlled both the production of the media and the reaction of people to the media (Zhirkov, 2001). Often, people reproduced dominant myths by publishing newspapers or producing speeches for their work meetings (Yurchak, 2014). They did it because they considered reproducing myths as a condition for achieving their personal goals. Thus, myths were produced by the government to promote a particular worldview, to frame the reality in a way that leads to support of Soviet regime by Soviet citizens. These myths were reproduced by Soviet people for their own purposes. As a result, a system of Soviet myths was created.

Although there was a huge number of myths describing Soviet life, from the "recommended" food for Soviet families, to the way the Soviet leader should or should not speak; I will refer only to the myths concerning foreign countries and the USSR foreign policy. This review will help me to find out if Cold War myths were used to frame the United States of America in Russian media from 2012-2015.

The first Cold War myth can be described as the *ruling circles*. Basically, it states that there is a small group of people in a hostile capitalistic world who rule the domestic (USA) and foreign (all other world) policies in their own interests. According to this myth, all the events that take place in the world are part of one chain, prescribed by this group of people (Glaser, 1956). An iteration of this myth was presented in a previous section of the thesis when I was describing the concept of *Washington obkom*.

The second myth is *inevitable historical laws*. It is the assumption that external circumstances force people (politicians) to make certain decisions. Hence, this interpretation of the reality releases such people from the responsibility for how they behave (Glaser, 1956). The essence of this myth could be described by such statements as “this would have happened anyway” or “this should have happened”.

The two-category world is another way of simplifying the reality by the Soviet government. According to this idea of Soviet propaganda, there were only “good” things and “bad” things, “heroes” and “enemies”, “truth” and “false,” and nothing in between. Thus, the owner of the “bad” characteristics cannot be described in a positive way and vice versa. Being a positive character, the Soviet Union accuses the United States of being a negative character (Glaser, 1956; Haladewicz-Grzelak, 2010; Pochepcov, 2002). This myth states that Soviet enemies are against the Soviet Union living in a “*happy future*” which is also an important part of the mythological system of the USSR (Pochepcov, 2015; Gudkov, 2002). Another myth, which serves as an extension of the two-category world myth, is the “*two camps*” myth. The myth of “two camps” describes the capitalist and the communist world, the Soviet Union and the West. Soviet propaganda created and reinforced the negative image

of the West as the West was a camp of enemies (Becker, 1996; Glaser, 1956; Haladewicz-Grzelak, 2010).

Another is the “*capitalists are imperialists*” myth. It states that USSR values the voluntary way of cooperation while the other side (the U.S.) relies on intervention and force (Glaser, 1956; Gudkov, 2002; Shiraev & Zubok, 2000). The concept of “imperialism” is tied closely to this idea. Lasswell (1951) maintains that “the strategy of Russian propaganda is to identify imperialism... with capitalism” (p. 76). According to the Soviet mythological system, the aggressive imperialists use armed forces, economic penetration, and propaganda to expand their power throughout the world (Becker, 1996; Glaser, 1956; Becker, 2002). An iteration of the imperialistic myth is the conspiratorial myth that America seeks to secretly control the whole world. In addition, there is the myth that war is a neutral tool to maintain Soviet interests. The essence of this myth is that there are no values or moral background in a war (Glaser, 1956). The war is simply a way to support Soviet power.

The myth that goes hand-in-hand with this myth is the *powerful enemy* myth. This “enemy” (the U.S.) contests the USSR in the arms race. Therefore, the USSR should be ready to defend the country and should surpass America when it comes to weapons and readiness for a war. At the same time this “powerful enemy” has its weaknesses such as poverty and workers’ strikes (Lasswell, 1951; Pochepcov, 2015).

Finally, there were several myths regarding Western culture and values, the so called *rotten Western culture* myth. It was assumed that countries ruled by “greedy capitalists” should have had relevant “rotten” values. “Rotten Western values” is a notion which came to USSR from the 19th century and was adjusted for the needs of Soviet ideology (see, e.g.,

Saltykov-Shchedrin, 1970). Today it is an idiomatic expression in post-Soviet countries. This myth is based on the idea that Western societies have prominent negative characteristics such as racism, greediness, violent natures, and a lack of value towards human life while Russian culture is described as a “high” culture, “spiritual” culture. (Yurchak, 2006; Gudkov, 2002).

The transfer of myths from one historical period to another. What happened to all these myths? Could they just disappear in a moment? Research shows that sometimes myths come back. Some myths transform, some do not change. For instance, the British myth of the Blitz spirit shows that a myth can be transferred without changing and evoke strong feelings among a new audience (Kelsey, 2012). Likewise, Russia has had long-lasting myths about the West being a source of disasters (Pochepcov, 2015). Moreover, studies show that sometimes, old myths are used in political advertising and propaganda to strengthen someone’s political position (Kania, 2013; Koçer & Yalkın, 2016).

Going back to the description of the media coverage of the U.S. in 2015 as the second Cold War, I wonder if I can find Cold War myths mentioned above in the framing of the United States by Russian media from 2012-2015.

RQ: To what extent the aforementioned Cold War myths were used by Russian TV news broadcasts to frame the U.S. from 2012-2015?

Media system in Russia. In order to answer the research question accurately, the current state of media system in Russia needs to be taken into account. In Soviet Union, media served as a tool “which would help the Communist Party to build communism” (Becker, 2002, p. 1). Media were neither expected nor allowed to critique the government or to reflect needs of Soviet people. Soviet media openly promoted the official position of

Soviet government regarding all aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign politics (Zhirkov, 2001). Today, media situation in Russia is more complex. Research shows that after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, Russian media experienced transformations leading to democratization of media system (von Seth, 2012). However, despite its many changes, Russian media still differs from traditionally Western democracies in its level of state controlled media. Some studies refer to the current state of Russian media system as to the “two-tier system” where the majority of media, especially national television, remain under Kremlin’s control and the second tier, mostly Internet-based media, “have been permitted a significant degree of freedom.” (Dunn, 2014, p. 1449) This point aligns to the description of Russian media system as a “hybrid” media system, which, by analogy with political hybrids, is semi-free (Bodrunova & Litvinenko, 2013). As stated by Russian communication scholars Bodrunova and Litvinenko (2013), this system is characterized by tight “state control of TV channels and high polarization of the digital public sphere, with the formation of the new cluster of alternative online media outlets targeting the group of urban liberal intellectuals.” (p. 44) Ultimately, in today’s Russia there are media controlled and funded by the government but there are also relatively independent media that are able to frame domestic and foreign policies without supporting Russian government’s point of view. These are oppositional media funded by subscribers and independent investors.

I suggest that I will find myths presented in different contexts depending on the source of broadcasting. I predict that the oppositional media will put the myths listed in the previous section *in ironical, non-literal, context*, seeking to show the absurdity of the myths in the present day. When speaking about irony here, I mean the traditional understanding of

irony as “saying one thing but meaning the opposite.” (Bailin, 2015, p. 102) Besides that, in order to consider the use of a myth as irony, “*situational contrast and an implied critical attitude*” need to be present in a news story (Neuhaus, 2016, p. 119). Situational contrast can be defined as “difference between what is said and what is expected by the interlocutors to be meant in such a situation” story (Neuhaus, 2016, p. 120). A critical attitude suggests that by using irony, a person either evaluates a certain phenomenon or tries to distance him(her)self from a certain position (“I do not hold this view” position) (Neuhaus, 2016). Thus, I believe that in case of the oppositional TV channel, journalists will acknowledge the existence of the Cold War myths in the current Russian media agenda, but they will make fun of the fact of their existence and they will make it explicit that they do not try to promote those myths. At the same time, the pro-government TV channel (i.e., owned or funded by the Russian government) is expected to broadcast the Cold War myths in their literal meaning.

H3: When broadcasted by the pro-government TV channel, the proportion of Cold War myths in their literal meaning will be higher whereas the proportion of Cold War myths in a non-literal meaning will be higher when broadcasted by the oppositional TV channel.

Conclusions. Soviet propaganda had a well-developed system of myths that described both domestic and international Soviet policies. Research provides seven major myths describing America as an aggressive country with low values. In order to suggest that the “second Cold War” was really happening in Russian media from 2012-2015, an analysis needs to be conducted to determine if media framed the U.S. from 2012-2015 the same way as they did it during the Cold War period from 1947 to 1991. In other words, I need to

examine if Russian media use the same myths when framing America. When conducting the analysis of how Russian media framed the U.S. in 2012-2015 I will keep in mind that sometimes, myths actually come back to media discourse, and that Russian media situation has changed since the Cold War times: today, Russia has not only pro-government but also oppositional media.

Chapter 3. Methods

Sample

In this study, two types of data were analyzed: media content data and public opinion survey data.

Media content data include news stories broadcasted from 2012-2015 by Russian TV channels Дождь (*TV Dozd/TV Rain*) and Россия 1 (*Russia 1*). By picking these two channels I demonstrate differences between the way America is portrayed by a pro-government channel (Russia 1) and a channel which is considered to be oppositional (TV Rain). The choice of the pro-government channel is justified by its popularity among Russian audience (TNS, 2016). Russia 1 was started in 1991 (RussiaTV, 2016). The TV channel is a part of a Russian government television and radio company that owns more than 80 regional TV channels and five federal TV channels (BBC, 2014a). Russia 1 is one of the national TV channels provided to Russians for free. For now, it is one of the two most popular national TV channels in Russia. According to the TV channel's website, Russia 1's audience consists of 98.5% of all Russians (RussiaTV, 2016). Owned by the Russian government, Russia 1 is considered to be a pro-government TV channel that aims to promote official government positions around certain topics. The TV channel is best known for its news and analytics (RussiaTV, 2016).

TV Rain has become a part of data as the only oppositional TV channel in Russia. The TV channel was started in 2010 as the first Internet TV channel in Russia. Later, it started broadcasting via cable networks. The TV channel proclaimed itself to be independent from the Russian government and was known as "the first actually honest TV channel for

viewers with active social stands” (RBC, 2014). In 2014, after TV Rain broadcasted a survey about the Siege of Leningrad that many deemed inappropriate and offensive (BBC, 2014), TV Rain’s partners terminated their contracts and forced the TV channel to go back to the Internet. Some journalists and experts claim that in fact, the TV channel was silenced due to its oppositional views (BBC, 2014). Today, TV Rain’s sources of income remain unclear. In 2013, the estimated amount of investment received by TV Rain was around \$40 million. This money was invested by the owner of the TV channel and her husband (Forbes, 2013). Some suggest that TV Rain is also funded by American government (see, e.g., RiaRu, 2016), others claim that TV Rain receives funding from Russian government (see, e.g., Izvestia, 2015). Also, part of the TV Rain’s income is based on paid subscriptions for some of the TV shows (TV Rain, 2016).

From these two TV channels, two TV-broadcasts became a source of data for my study: *Vesti Nedeli* [*Weekly news*] broadcasted by Russia1, and *Zdes i Seichas* [*Here and now*] broadcasted by TV Rain. *Vesti nedeli* is a weekly news broadcast, and it is the leader among the TV-broadcasts of its genre (information and analytics) in Russia (TNS, 2016). Also, an author and anchor of this broadcast, Dmitrii Kiselev, is considered by professional journalistic community to be the face of Russian propaganda (Ennis, 2014). As a “chief propagandist”, Kiselev even became a victim of European sanctions that mostly targeted politicians (Ennis, 2014).

Zdes I seichas is a daily news broadcast. I acknowledge the fact that different frequency of broadcasting may raise concerns about comparability of the news stories. However, news stories broadcasted by these TV shows seem to be relevant to my purposes of

comparison of the two channels in terms of genre for two reasons. First, the news stories are comparable in terms of length: they are all approximately 6-8 minutes long. Second, both of these TV-broadcasts enable their journalists not only to present raw facts, but also to express TV channel's position regarding a particular story. Finally, I did not intend to find out *how many* stories about the U.S. are broadcasted by TV channels but I seek to find out *how* they are broadcasted. Thus, frequency was not considered as a relevant criterion to pick a TV broadcast.

The access to data was gained through websites of the TV channels. A single news story was a unit of analysis. In order for a news story to be considered it should meet the following requirements: be published from May 2012-December 2015, include key words such as USA, America, American, Americans, and Obama, and include video content. News stories from the *Zdes I Seichas* TV broadcast were retrieved using a special computer script created for the purposes of the current study. The script parsed the website of the TV Rain Channel, analyzed all the stories published under the name of *Zdes I Seichas* TV broadcast using the criteria mentioned above, collected the relevant stories, and saved them in a specially designed database that included the information needed for the current study such as TV Channel's name, Headline, Date of Publishing, and a clickable URL. The news stories from the *Vesti Nedeli* TV broadcast were collected manually using the same criteria. The script was not able to collect relevant stories from the website of the Russia1 TV Channel due to the features of the website.

After conducting the search on the TV channels' websites, I collected 747 stories about the U.S. broadcasted by TV Rain and Russia 1 from 2012-2015. In order to conduct the

study, a simple random sampling technique was employed for each year of the news broadcasts ($N = 572$). First, using Krejcie and Morgan's (1970) approach, I defined a sample size for each of the TV channels and each of the years separately (e.g., "TV Rain-2012"). This step permitted me getting a representative sample of each channel's population within each of the years. Second, simple random sampling technique was used to pick stories from each of the TV channels' population within each year: stories were picked using a special computer script. When done sampling, this sample represented how TV channels Russia 1 and TV Rain portray the United States of America from 2012-2015. A part of the sample taken from Russia 1 basically represents what image of the U.S. is broadcasted by the most popular informational and analytical TV show among Russian audience while a part of sample retrieved from TV Rain shows how the U.S. is presented within a Russian oppositional media television channel.

Public opinion survey data include the results of public surveys conducted by Levada Center organization from May 2012-December 2015. The data include the reports of surveys about how Russians perceive the United States of America (6 reports per year except for 2013 which has only 5 reported results). In their surveys, Levada center uses stratified quota sampling technique (Levada center, 2017). They survey 1600 people from 47 (before 2015) or 48 (starting from 2015) regions of Russia. This covers 134 (before 2015) or 137 (starting from 2015) areas including 15 cities with population bigger than one million people, 15 cities with population from 500 thousand to one million people, 31 cities with population from 100 thousand to 500 thousand people; 38 towns with population under 30 thousand people, and

38 rural areas. The surveys are conducted in person and then get double checked by phone, by a repeated survey or by mail. The data also get double checked by computer software.

The access to data was gained through the Levada center's website. The time period for data collection was aimed to show the dynamic changes in media agenda, framing and public opinion in Russia. The data enable me to track the changes starting from the Putin's election in 2012 (Russia before annexation/reintegration of Crimea) and finish with the media discourse of the peak of anti-Americanism in 2015 (Russia after annexation/reintegration of Crimea).

Measures

Independent variables

Proportion of negative news about the U.S. The variable was counted based on the results of content analysis (N = 572). News stories were coded as negative if they portrayed the U.S., American citizens or American government in a negative way (37% negative news). For my study, I suggested a time-lag up to a month between news publications and changes in public opinion. Therefore, I analyzed the proportion of negative news within a month before the months when the surveys were conducted. For example, to analyze the survey data of November 2012, I counted a proportion of negative news from October 2012. The proportion of negative news was counted based on the overall number of news published within a month and the number of negative news published within the same month.

Proportion of positive news about the U.S. The variable was counted based on the results of content analysis (N = 572). News stories were coded as positive if they portrayed the U.S., American citizens or American government in a positive way (3% positive news).

For my this variable, I also used a time-lag up to a month between news publications and changes in public opinion. The proportion of positive news was counted based on the overall number of news published within a month and the number of positive news published within the same month.

Date of publication (before or after 02/23/2014). The variable shows the date of publication of a news story. The news stories were divided into two groups: news stories published before 02/23/2014 (N = 324) and news stories published after 02/23/2014 (N = 248). The date was chosen based on the unofficial date of the start of annexation/reintegration of Crimea (BBC, 2015). The information about the date of publication was retrieved from the websites of the TV channels.

TV channel's position regarding the Russian government. In order to define TV channels' position regarding Russian government (i.e., pro-government or oppositional), I used the data about the owners of the TV channels (Russia TV, 2016; TV Rain, 2016). Owned by the government, Russia 1 is considered to be pro-government TV Channel while TV Rain is considered to be oppositional since it is owned by a private organization.

Dependent variables

Public opinion about the U.S. This variable was based on the results of the Levada center's survey (see Table 6). The data of the Levada center was converted into five-point ordinal scale with 1 = highly negative perception of the U.S. and 5 = highly positive perception of the U.S. Means of the scale represented public opinion about the U.S. for a certain month.

Proportion of negative news about the U.S. (before and after 02/23/2014). The variable was counted based on the results of content analysis (N = 572). Based on date of publication, the news stories were divided into two periods: before and after 02/23/2014. The proportion of negative news was counted based on the overall number of news published within a period and the number of negative news published within the same period. The date was chosen based on the unofficial date of the start of annexation/reintegration of Crimea (BBC, 2015).

Myth. The news stories were coded as having *no myth* (70%), having the *ruling circles* myth (0.9%), the *two camps* myth (0.7%), the *happy future* myth (0%), the *capitalists are imperialists* myth (18%), the *powerful enemy* myth (2.4%), the *inevitable historical laws* myth (0%), or the *rotten Western values* myth (9%). The news stories with the *ruling circles* myth broadcasted the idea that there is a small group of people in USA who rule the domestic (USA) and foreign (all other world) policies in their own interests. The news stories with the *two camps* myth presented the world as two groups of countries: Russia and post-Soviet countries versus the West (USA and Europe). The news stories containing the *happy future* myth would communicate the idea that Russia will be living a happy future despite all the difficulties that the country faces today. The *capitalists are imperialists* myth in a news story would suggest that the U.S. are aggressive imperialists who use armed forces, economic penetration, and propaganda to expand their power throughout the world. The news stories with the *powerful enemy* myth broadcast messages about the military power of the U.S. The news stories with the *inevitable historical laws* myth would portray foreign policy of Russia as something prescribed by history. Finally, the stories with the *rotten Western values* myth

reinforce negative characteristics of Americans such as racism, greediness, violent nature of people or the assumption that Americans do not value human's life. The news stories where no of the aforementioned myths were found were coded as having *no myth*.

Meaning of a myth. Meanings of myths were coded with literal as 0 and not literal as 1 depending on the context of usage and perceived intentions of a TV broadcast (84% of news stories containing a myth broadcasted the myth in its literal meaning). To be coded as a myth with a literal meaning, a news story should have been broadcasted to promote the myth. Myths broadcasted with a non-literal meaning were broadcasted with irony or an expressed disbelief.

Analytic framework

In this study, quantitative content analysis was employed. Media content data was coded using the coding sheet (see Appendix A and Appendix B) based on a news story's tone, myth, and meaning of a myth. In order to establish reliability scores, Krippendorff's (2004) alpha with reliabilities established .81 for the tone, .83 for the myth, and .89 for the meaning of the myth. A second coder was a Russian speaker with background in media and communication. First, the second coder received instructions in Russian (see both English and Russian editions in the Appendices section). Second, the second coder and I coded training data which included news stories from TV Rain and Russia 1 TV channels broadcasted before May 2012 and after December 2015. News stories were retrieved from TV Rain and Russia 1's websites using the same TV broadcasts and keywords as for the actual media content data. Training sessions were conducted via Skype. After that, the

second coder received a list of links to news stories (the reliability data). The reliability data were as large as 20% of data whose reliability is in question.

In order to test H1 (News coverage of the U.S. after annexation/reintegration of Crimea will be more negative than news coverage of the U.S. before annexation/reintegration of Crimea) a chi-square test will be conducted. In this analysis, the results of the content analysis will be used. In order to test H2 (There is a correlation between a) negative framing of the U.S. and public opinion about America in Russia b) positive framing of the U.S. and public opinion about America in Russia) the correlation tests will be employed. For these tests, the results of content analysis will be used, and the public surveys data will be used. In order to test H3 (H3: When broadcasted by the pro-government TV channel, the proportion of Cold War myths in their literal meaning will be higher whereas the proportion of Cold War myths in a non-literal meaning will be higher when broadcasted by the oppositional TV channel) the chi-square test will be used. In this analysis, I will use the results of the content analysis. Finally, for answering the research question, chi-square test will be employed. For this purpose, I will use the results of the content analysis.

Chapter 4. Results

Media coverage before and after the annexation/reintegration of Crimea

My first hypothesis suggests that news coverage of the U.S. in Russian media after annexation/reintegration of Crimea is more negative than news coverage of the U.S. in Russian media before annexation/reintegration of Crimea. The results of the chi-square test in the Table 1 indicated a significant association between the period of time (before or after Crimea situation) and media coverage of the U.S. ($\chi^2(2) = 35.44, p < .001$). My analysis confirms H1 showing that after the annexation/reintegration of Crimea, 50.4% of news stories framed the U.S. in a negative way as opposed to only 26.5% of news stories framing the U.S. in a negative way before the Crimea situation. In addition, the proportion of neutral news stories about the U.S. declined from 69.1% before the Crimea situation to 48.0% after the Crimea situation. The proportion of positive news stories also declined: from 4.3% before the Crimea situation to 1.6% after the Crimea situation.

Media coverage and public opinion

After running the two-tailed correlation tests, the H2a (There is a correlation between negative framing of the U.S. and public opinion about America in Russia) was supported while H2b (There is a correlation between positive framing of the U.S. and public opinion about America in Russia) was not supported by the data. The first correlation test analyzed the relationship between *negative* news coverage of the U.S. in Russian media and the shifts in public opinion about America in Russia. The results in Table 4 show that variables proved to be significantly correlated ($r = -.669, p < .01$). Figure 1 demonstrates that there is a negative linear relationship between the proportion of negative news stories and public

opinion about America in Russia. In other words, with the increasing proportion of negative news stories in Russian media, the scale average representing public perception of America in Russia goes down, i.e., there are fewer Russians perceiving America in a positive way and more people with negative views about America.

The second correlation test analyzed the relationship between *positive* news coverage of the U.S. in Russian media and the shifts in public opinion about America in Russia. The results in Table 4 did not reveal a significant correlation between the variables ($r = .177$, $p = .482$).

Figure 2 shows that the relation seems to be positive when it comes to the proportion of positive news and public opinion about America in Russia. However, the statistical test reveals that the relation is not significant. This might be due to the fact that the proportion of positive news stories about America in Russia was permanently low from 2012-2015 (4.3% before Crimea, and 1.6% after Crimea). Hence, small changes in the proportion of positive news stories remain unnoticed by Russian audience.

TV channels and meanings of myths

The third hypothesis concerned the meanings of myths based on TV channel. The results of the chi-square test in Table 2 indicated a significant association between TV channels and meaning of myths ($\chi^2 (2) = 321.56$, $p < .001$). The results revealed that when Russia 1 frames the U.S., one can see Cold War myths in their literal meaning in 67.9% of news stories and Cold War myths in a figurative meaning in 0.5% of news stories. TV Rain frames the U.S. using Cold War myths in their literal meaning only in 0.6% of news stories and myths in a figurative meaning in 7.2% of cases. This finding provides support for H3

which posited that the proportion of myths in a literal meaning will be higher when myths are broadcasted by the pro-government TV-channel than when broadcasted by the oppositional TV channel.

Cold War myths and framing of the U.S. in Russian media

The results of the chi-square test are shown in Table 3 ($\chi^2(5) = 250.221, p < .001$). The results reveal that TV Rain TV Channel used Cold War myths in 7.7% of news stories while Russia1 TV Channel used Cold War myths in 68.4% of news stories to frame the U.S. *Capitalists are imperialists* was found to be the most popular myth to frame the U.S. both by Russia 1 and TV Rain (42.1% of news stories and 4.1% of news stories respectively). The myth about *rotten Western values* holds the second place. Russia 1 framed the U.S. using this myth in 18.2% of news stories, and TV Rain broadcasted 1.9% of news stories containing this myth. Some myths such as the *happy future* myth and the *historical laws* myth were not used to frame the U.S. by Russian media at all.

Discussion

This current study was concerned with media framing of the U.S. and possible impacts of media framing on public opinion. The findings of this thesis lead to several conclusions regarding media agenda, media effects, and future studies about framing of foreign countries.

First, this thesis reveals possible connections between the world's political agenda and media agenda about the U.S. in Russia. Second, the study provides data regarding the similarities and differences between Cold War framing of the U.S. and the framing of the U.S. from 2012-2015 in Russia. In addition, the study sheds some light on differences in

framing of the U.S. by Russian pro-government and oppositional TV channels. Finally, this thesis shows features of correlation between media agenda and public opinion about foreign countries.

Contributions of the study

First, this study contributes to the body of knowledge about media agenda by discovering that crises happening around the world, such as the annexation/reintegration of Crimea, can shape Russian media agenda about the U.S. even when such crises do not directly involve the U.S. After the annexation/reintegration of Crimea, the proportion of negative news stories after the Crimea situation almost doubled in Russian media in comparison to the news coverage of America before the Crimea situation. Besides that, one might witness a significant decrease in the proportion of neutral news stories about America broadcasted by the Russian media after the Crimea situation. Interestingly, the proportion of positive news about the U.S. in Russian media was small both before and after the Crimea situation. This leads to the idea that when it comes to media coverage of America in Russia, only negative and neutral news stories make a difference in the way the U.S. is depicted in news stories. Meanwhile, the proportion of positive news remains almost constant and does not impact the overall rhetoric around American-Russian relations in Russian media. What does this finding mean for communication scholars? First, this finding suggests that framing of a foreign country A by media of a country B might be skewed by events happening in a third country, C. What factors contribute to media framing of a country that is not involved in a crisis? Drawing upon previous studies (Shlapentoch, 2011; Sidorova, 2012; Gudkov, 2002), I conclude that the historical relationship between Russia and the U.S., the domestic

political situation in Russia, and the official government position regarding the situation in Ukraine, contributed significantly to the media framing of the U.S. Moreover, the finding about the negative framing of the U.S. supports previous studies about framing of the Crimea situation as Russians' attempt to save Crimea from imperialistic America (Orzeată, 2015; Luxmoore, 2014).

One of the more intriguing contributions of the study is a finding regarding specific myths used (or not used) to frame the U.S. in Russian media from 2012-2015. This finding questions the popular description of the media situation in Russia from 2012-2015 as the second Cold War (Pochepcov, 2015; BBC, 2016, Ziegler, 2014). Out of seven major myths used by Soviet propaganda to frame foreign countries and, specifically the U.S., only two myths consistently appeared in Russian media from 2012-2015. The most popular myth was about *imperialistic ambitions* of the U.S. that was used in 42% of news stories about the U.S. by the pro-government TV channel and in 4% of news stories by the oppositional TV channel. This finding provides additional support to previous studies about the framing of annexation/reintegration of Crimea (Orzeată, 2015; Luxmoore, 2014). For instance, in one of the news stories (Vesti, 2014), Kiselev, the anchor of Russia 1, states,

This is not new though... The U.S. do not hesitate to rule [the world]... While Obama is standing behind a UN podium and telling us a story about girls who need to go to school, a government machine of American...imperialism is spinning the gears thus breaking someone's bones.

America was framed as an imperialistic aggressor who did not have a moral right to critique Russia's actions in Ukraine, and the myth that states that capitalists (meaning, Americans) are imperialists perfectly fits this worldview.

The second popular myth was about *rotten Western values*. It was used in 18% of news stories about the U.S. by the pro-government TV channel and in 2% of the news stories by the oppositional TV channel. Its popularity may be explained by several reasons. First, this is one of the most long-lasting myths about Western countries in Russian culture (Saltykov-Shchedrin, 1970) as it started during *slavyanophily* in 1840s, and lasted even during the first half of 20th century when America and Russia had positive relations. Then the myth was tailored by Soviet propaganda to the needs of the Cold War (Yurchak, 2006; Gudkov, 2002), and now the myth appeared again in 2012-2015. Unlike the overall anti-Americanism that, according to researchers, does not have deep roots in Russian history (Shlapentoch, 2011), the myth about Western values does have a long history of being a part of Russian culture. Of course, today, this myth is centered around other issues than the same myth of 1840s or even in the times of Cold War. For example, with the text "grimaces of tolerance" behind him, Kiselev introduces a *Vesti nedeli's* reporter who is in the U.S. (Vesti, 2013a). The journalist critiques how American children from a young age are exposed to homosexual relations and homosexual love,

A number of children see these bright tutorials before they get familiar with ABC books. It is sort of an ABC book too, but it is an ABC of homosexual love. It is made for children starting from two years old...

Then the journalist gives a microphone to Kevin Snyder, a head of Pacific Law Institute who states that Americans “*are trying to normalize something that is not normal*” (Vesti, 2013a). The news story illustrates that American values are wrong for the “traditional” Russians, and the whole news story makes it clear that one should not be an expert in international relations to come to this conclusion. In fact, while foreign politics is a complicated matter that might be too complex for understanding by regular Russian citizens, values present a domain in which an average Russian could evaluate whether the U.S. is really irrelevant to the Russian way of life. Therefore, using the myth about rotten Western values seems to be a reasonable way to frame America in a negative way.

Other myths were not used as often. The myth about a powerful enemy appeared in 7% of news stories about the U.S. broadcasted by the government TV channel. In these stories, Russian media demonstrated the achievements of Russian armed forces and made references to a potential enemy or compared their weapons to American armed forces. In some cases, news stories explicitly named the U.S. as a potential enemy. For example, in a news story broadcasted on November, 1, 2015, Kiselev refers to a military training exercise of Russian armed forces as to an “anti-war message to America” (Vesti, 2015). Surprisingly, the myth about powerful enemy was not used by the oppositional TV channel at all. This might be due to the complex nature of arms race between the two countries or to the fact that the topic of representation of America as an enemy was broadly discussed by other media, and TV Rain tried providing original content. However, since there are no studies which explain this phenomenon, I would prefer to leave this question open to further investigation.

The myth about *two camps* appeared rarely in news stories broadcasted by both of the TV channels. This difference with the Cold War rhetoric makes sense since with globalization, it became harder to promote an idea of bipolar world. The myth about *ruling circles* was used by the oppositional TV channel only. This might be due to the fact that the opposition often gets accused of being controlled by the American government (see, e.g., Izvestia, 2014).

Some Cold War myths were not used by the TV channels at all. These are myths about *happy future* and myths about *inevitable historical laws*. This might be explained by the fact that both of these myths relate to domestic policies as well as international relations. Therefore, since the pro-government TV channel focuses more on the U.S. rather than on Russian domestic politics when broadcasting news stories about the U.S., I was not able to locate these two myths.

It is worth noting that the study revealed differences in broadcasting of the Cold War myths between the pro-government and oppositional Russian TV channels. In the most cases, the oppositional TV-channel addresses the same myths as the pro-government TV channel but shows them with irony or with an expressed disbelief. In other words, the oppositional TV channel reflects ideas broadcasted by the pro-government TV channel but this reflection looks more like x-rays where journalists break down myths showing their inconsistency. For example, in a news story about gay marriages in America (Vesti, 2015), Kiselev states,

With the American straightforwardness, John Kerry, the Secretary of State has announced right after [the legalization of homosexual marriages] that their [American] new standard should be promoted all over the world. In other words, the

legal competence of American court should cover all the planet... It is hard to understand though how American court should control love all over the Earth.

This idea of Americans trying to control other cultures is reflected by the oppositional TV channel. In a news story dedicated to legalization of gay marriages, the anchor states, In Russia, it [legalization of gay marriages] received a specific feedback starting from sayings that if tomorrow some country wouldn't approve gay marriages, the country will be exposed to a "humanitarian bombardment". We all know what side this feedback comes from (*sarcastic face expression*) (Zdes i seichas, 2015).

Not only does oppositional TV channel provide an alternative view on America but it also breaks down "an official" media agenda that comes from pro-government TV channels. By predicting possible reactions of the government and pro-government media, TV Rain demonstrates inconsistency of the "official" pro-government media agenda. This way, the position of Russian government and pro-government media looks predictable and banal.

Finally, the study contributes to the body of knowledge regarding relations between media agenda and public opinion. More specifically, the thesis provides the corroboration of a strong correlation between negative media coverage of a foreign country and public opinion. Not only does this finding support previous studies showing that negative media agenda provokes shifts in public opinion (Bayulgen & Arbatli, 2013; Zhang, Meadows, 2012), but this finding also questions studies showing that when it comes to perceptions of foreign countries, people's predispositions might have a stronger impact than media effects (Lustig & Olego, 2016). Given the one-month time-lag that was used to analyze connections between media coverage and public opinion, I may conclude that in Russia, a one-month

long negative coverage of the U.S. is enough to shift public opinion toward more negative perception of America. In addition, the thesis supports previous findings showing a lack of correlation between positive media coverage of a foreign country and public opinion about the country (Zhang, Meadows, 2012).

Taken together, the aforementioned findings might be helpful in explaining dramatic shifts in public opinion about the U.S. that were observed by researchers during the previous conflicts that involved Russia and did not directly involve the U.S. such as the war in Georgia in 2008 (Levada center, 2016). Basically, these findings demonstrate that, first, media coverage of the U.S. in Russia might become more negative because of a crisis happening in a third country. Second, these findings demonstrate that media coverage of the U.S. might be based on myths known to Russian audience from the Cold War Era. In addition, media framing of the U.S. might be different depending on the source of broadcasting (pro-government versus oppositional television). Finally, the study shows that such a negative media coverage might result in negative perceptions of the U.S. by Russians. However, before going into final conclusions about the media agenda of 2012-2015 and public opinion, I should address several limitations of the current study.

Limitations

The first limitation of the study is concerned with the supposed causal relations between media agenda and public opinion about America. First, the conclusions regarding connections between media agenda and public opinion are based on the correlation test and the assumption that media audience passively perceive information that impacts their views. However, based on communication theories and approaches suggesting an idea of active

audience and audience's conscious choice of media content (see, e.g., Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973), one might speculate that the relations between media and public opinion are more complex.

Also, the thesis examines only news stories and does not consider other TV or media content which could greatly impact the way Russians perceive Americans. Comedy shows, TV series, political cartoons, and other media formats could indeed cause shifts in public opinion about America as well. Besides that, the study does not examine other factors that could possibly cause shifts in public opinion about America such as predispositions about the U.S., personal contact with Americans, travels to America, or interpersonal communication.

The second limitation of the thesis concerns the generalizability of the results. According to the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media, there are hundreds of Russian TV channels including national TV channels and regional media (RKN, 2016). I analyzed the content of two TV channels only, and although my choice of the TV channels was justified by their popularity, it is hard to generalize the findings and suggest that the results represent all of Russian media. Before making any claims about presentation of the U.S. in Russian media as a whole, further investigation is needed.

Third, the findings about myths that were used to frame the U.S. by the two TV channels might lead to the idea that TV Rain and Russia 1 have strategies and/or guidelines regarding how they frame the U.S and include myths within their stories. However, to make such claims, a further investigation including interviews with journalists and analysis of TV channels' documentation is needed. This limitation is especially true for the oppositional TV

channel that does not necessarily try to reflect the myths broadcasted by the pro-government TV Channel. It might be the case that TV Rain refers to popular myths introduced not by media, but by the government (via news releases, for example). Therefore, the assumption about possible connections between oppositional media coverage of the U.S. and the coverage of the U.S. by the pro-government TV channel requires further investigation.

Finally, there is the limitation related to data analysis. Although Levada center had slightly different sample sizes for each month (from 1600-1604 people), I used the sample of 1600 people for each month in my analysis. The choice of the number was dictated by the fact that, in many cases, Levada center reports the results for several months without specifying the sample size for each of them separately. Therefore, I had to rely on the description of Levada center's survey method that Levada center provides on the website of the organization (Levada, 2016). On this webpage, Levada center states that the sample size for their surveys is 1600 people. Although the differences in the sample size reported by Levada center for specific months and the sample size that they report on the webpage about their survey method does not make a big difference when it comes to percentage of responses, I have to acknowledge that it might be a limitation of my study.

Implications and recommendations for future research

Overall, the study clarifies a number of questions regarding media agenda and public opinion in Russia as well as a number of questions about framing theory in general. First, the study shows that the media coverage of the U.S. after the Crimea situation actually resembles Cold War rhetoric. However, several aspects of Russian media coverage of America from 2012-2015 must be taken into account. First, although Cold War myths appeared in almost

70% of news stories broadcasted by the pro-government TV channel, the majority of the news stories promoted only two out of seven Cold War myths: *capitalists are imperialists* and *rotten Western values*. Moreover, the *rotten Western values* myth is not originally a Cold War myth but this myth has a long history of being part of Russian culture. In other words, although a Russian pro-government TV channel in 2012-2015 used the same frames as Soviet media from 1947-1990, framing of the U.S. was mostly focused on two myths that were relevant to Russian culture and to the current political situation.

In addition, the majority of news stories broadcasted by the oppositional TV channel had no Cold war myths at all. Having 31% of news stories without Cold War myths broadcasted by the pro-government TV channel and 92% of news stories without Cold War myths broadcasted by the oppositional TV channel, raises questions about what the media used instead of Cold War myths to frame the U.S. This opens up a promising avenue for future studies. There appears to be a need to identify new myths that Russia used to depict the U.S in 2010s.

Second, the study sheds some light on the features of media coverage in Russia in general. While there were no other points of view broadcasted by Soviet media except for the one approved by the official propaganda, the oppositional TV channel provides an alternative perspective on the U.S. Moreover, this TV channel plays the role of x-rays that break down the official media agenda and show its discursive strategies. However, it remains unclear if the oppositions' attempts to undermine the pro-government TV channel's position result in any noticeable shifts in how Russians view America. Studies investigating the specific role of oppositional media in shaping public opinion in Russia will contribute greatly to

understanding the connections between media agenda and public opinion about America in Russia.

In addition, the study shows that, with certain limitations, dramatic shifts in public opinion about America in Russia from 2012-2015 can actually be attributed to media coverage of the U.S. in Russia. Moreover, the results provide intriguing data regarding the fact that if the shifts in public opinion were actually caused by media agenda, they were impacted mostly by negative and neutral news stories. Future studies should focus on finding out what role (if any) positive media coverage of the U.S. plays in shaping public opinion about the U.S. in Russia.

Finally, the study provides a number of implications for framing theory in general. First, the study shows that media framing of a foreign country might be impacted by events happening in a third country. A future investigation of factors that in case of a crisis shape media framing of foreign countries that are not directly involved in the crisis will add to the developing body of research about media agenda. Second, the study demonstrates that there is a correlation between negative media agenda and public opinion. Future studies should be focusing on finding out if there are actually cause-and-effect relations between the two variables. Finally, the thesis shows that there is no correlation between positive framing of a foreign country and public opinion about the country. This opens up a promising area of research about what could possibly shape positive views about foreign countries.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

The findings of the current study demonstrate that today, one might see a new media agenda about the U.S. in Russia. Framing of the U.S. in Russian media of 2010s is dynamic, fluid, and unpredictable. It may be skewed by events happening around the globe starting from the crisis in Ukraine, and by domestic politics in Russia. In Russian media of 2010s, the U.S. is framed both with older myths familiar to the Russian audience and with frames unfamiliar to Russians, which raises questions about new features of Russia's depiction of American in its media. Besides that, the U.S. gets framed completely differently by pro-government and oppositional TV channels in Russia. Hence, Russian citizens get a chance to look at the official framing of the U.S. from another perspective. In addition, the study demonstrates that the negative part of the media agenda about the U.S., comes mostly from pro-government media and correlates to public opinion about America. This data shows the need to find a new approach to studying the rhetoric around American-Russian relations. Besides that, the changes happening on a global political landscape raise questions that still need to be answered. How does the U.S. look in Russian media now, three years after the annexation/reintegration of Crimea? Is the election of Trump changing the way Russian media frame the U.S.? Do any of the possible changes in the way the U.S. is framed today get reflected in public opinion about America? Answering these questions as well as finding new frameworks to study communication around the American-Russian relationship will help us better understand the complex nature of media effects, public opinion, and American-Russian relations in 2017. Apparently, the time has come to stop explaining the relations between America and Russia in the 21st century using the framework of the 20th century.

References

- Artemiev, A. (2014). Rossijane verjat tol'ko novostjam federal'nyh SMI o sobytijah na Ukraine [Russians only trust federal media when it comes to Ukraine situation]. Retrieved June, 29, 2016 from:
<http://www.rbc.ru/politics/12/11/2014/5460bfd5cbb20f7879b2a48b>
- Bailin, A. (2015). On the characteristics of verbal irony. *Semiotica*, 2015(204), 101-119.
doi:10.1515/sem-2014-0087
- Barabanov, O. (2014). Posle Kryma: vizual'nyj grotesk rossijskih social'nyh media [after Crimea: visual grotesque of Russian social media]. Retrieved February, 2, from
http://www.globalaffairs.ru/ukraine_crysis/Posle-Kryma-vizualnyi-grotesk-rossiiskikh-sotcialnykh-media-16683
- Barthes, R. (2001). *Mythologies* (A. Lavers Trans.). New York: Hill and Wang
- Bayulgen, O., & Arbatli, E. (2013). Cold war redux in US-russia relations? the effects of US media framing and public opinion of the 2008 russia-georgia war. *Communist and Post - Communist Studies*, 46(4), 513.
- BBC (2008). "Chto nam v nih ne nravitsja": korni antiamerikanizma [what we do not like about them. The roots of antiamericanism]. Retrieved June, 28, 2016 from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/russian/international/newsid_7631000/7631806.stm
- BBC (2014a). Kto vladeet smi v Rossii: vedushhie holdingi [Who owns media in Russia: leading holdings]. Retrieved December, 20, 2016 from
http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/07/140711_russia_media_holdings

- BBC (2014b). Telekanal “dozhd” pod ugrozoy prekrashhenija veshhanija [tv rain is at risk of shutting down]. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/01/140129_tv_rain_conflict
- BBC (2015). Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226>
- BBC (2016). Medvedev zajavil o novoj holodnoj vojne mezhdou Rossiej i NATO [Medvedev announced a new cold war between Russia and NATO]. Retrieved February, 2, from http://www.bbc.com/russian/news/2016/02/160213_medvedev_munich_new_cold_war
- Becker, J. (2002). *Soviet and Russian press coverage of the United States: press, politics, and identity in transition*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan in association with St. Anthony's College
- Becker, J. A. (1996). A disappearing enemy: The image of the United States in soviet political cartoons. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 73(3), 609-619.
doi:10.1177/107769909607300308
- Birnbaum, M. (2015). Russia’s anti-American fever goes beyond the Soviet era’s. Retrieved February, 2, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russias-anti-us-sentiment-now-is-even-worse-than-it-was-in-soviet-union/2015/03/08/b7d534c4-c357-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html?tid=pm_world_pop_b&utm_term=.87d8c7e160c1
- Bodrunova, S., Litvinenko, A. (2013). Hybridization of the media system in Russia: Technological and Political Aspects. In Vartanova E. (Ed.). *World of media 2012* (pp. 37-50). Moscow: Moscow State University

- Bourdieu, P. (1979) Public Opinion Does Not Exist. In A. Mattelart and S. Siegelau (eds). *Communication and Class Struggle* (pp. 124-30). New York: International General
- Bykov, I. (2016). Mobilizacija političeskih storonnikov cherez izmenenie povestki dnja v SMI [Mobilization of political supporters by changing media agenda]. In Achkasova, V. and Melnik, G. (Eds.). *Kommunikativnye tehnologii v processah političeskoj mobilizacii* [*Communication technologies in processes of political mobilization*] (p.107-121). Moscow, Russia: Flinta, Nauka.
- Conway, B. A., Kenski, K., & Wang, D. (2015). The rise of twitter in the political campaign: Searching for intermedia agenda-setting effects in the presidential primary. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 20(4), 363-380. doi:10.1111/jcc4.12124
December, 3, 2016, from <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2015/eur/252913.htm>
- Dukes, P. (2001). *The Superpowers: A Short History*. New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Dunn, J. A. (2014). Lottizzazione russian style: Russia's two-tier media system. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 66(9), 1425. doi:10.1080/09668136.2014.956441
- Ennis (2014). Dmitry Kiselyov: Russia's chief spin doctor. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26839216>
- Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51.
- Fateev A.V. (1999). *Obraz vruga v sovetskoj propagande, 1945-1954* [*an image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda, 1945-1954*]. Moscow: RAN, Institute of Russian history

- Fernando, A. G., Suganthi, L., & Sivakumaran, B. (2014). If you blog, will they follow? using online media to set the agenda for consumer concerns on “Greenwashed” environmental claims. *Journal of Advertising*, 43(2), 167-180.
doi:10.1080/00913367.2013.841088
- Forbes (2013). Na kakie den'gi sozdan telekanal “dozhd” i pochemu on tak i ne stal biznesom [on what money does tv rain exist and why has not it become a business]. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from <http://www.forbes.ru/kompanii/internet-telekom-i-media/241075-na-kakie-dengi-sozdan-telekanal-dozhd-i-pochemu-tak-i-ne-st>
- Garanenko, A. (2015). Obshego u nas tol'ko ruki, nogi i prochie chasti tela [the only things that we have in common are hands, legs, and other body parts]. Retrieved February, 2, from <https://lenta.ru/articles/2015/04/12/rusvsusa/>
- Glaser, W. A. (1956). The semantics of the Cold War. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 20(4), 691-716. doi:10.1086/266670
- Glynn, C. J. & Huge, M.E. (2008). Public Opinion in *The International Encyclopedia of Communication*. Retrieved December, 5, 2016 from http://www.communicationencyclopedia.com/subscriber/tocnode.html?id=g9781405131995_chunk_g978140513199521_ss124-1
- Gromova, L. (2005). *Istorija russkoj zhurnalistiki 18-19 vek [the history of Russian journalism in 18-19 century]*. Saint Petersburg: Publishing house of Saint Petersburg State University
- Gudkov, L. (2002). Otnoshenie k SShA v Rossii i problema antiamerikanizma [Russians’

- perceptions of America and the issue of anti-Americanism]. Monitoring. Retrieved Decemember, 4, 2016, from <http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/otnoshenie-k-ssha-v-rossii-i-problema-antiAmerikanizma>
- Haładewicz-Grzelak, M. (2010). The mythopoeia in stalinist propaganda of post-war poland. *Semiotica*, 2010(182), 175. doi:10.1515/semi.2010.056
- Hopf, T. (2016). Crimea is ours: A discursive history. *International Relations*, 30(2), 227-255. doi:10.1177/0047117816645646
- Izvestia (2016). Rospechat' profinansirovala telekanal "dozhd'" na 30 mln rublej [Rospechat has invested 30 million rubles into tv rain]. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from <http://izvestia.ru/news/585059#ixzz4YL91urcG>
- Kania, M. (2013). Old myths, new tradition: The "Spectacle of power" in the politics of peru and bolivia at the beginning of the 21st century. *Ad Americam. Journal of American Studies*, 14(14), 63-80.
- Katz, E., Blumler, J. G., & Gurevitch, M. (1973). Uses and gratifications research. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 37(4), 509-523. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/stable/2747854>
- Kazun, A. (2016). Framing sanctions in the Russian media: The rally effect and Putin's enduring popularity. *Demokratizatsiya*, 24(3), 327.
- Kelsey, D. (2012). Pound for pound champions: The myth of the blitz spirit in british newspaper discourses of the city and economy after the 7 july bombings. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 9(3), 285-299. doi:10.1080/17405904.2012.688299
- Kiousis, S., & Wu, X. (2008). International agenda-building and agenda-setting. *The*

International Communication Gazette, 70(1), 58.

Koçer, S., & Yalkın, Ç. (2016). Invented myths in contemporary Turkish political advertising. *Society*, 53(6), 603-607. doi:10.1007/s12115-016-0087-4

Kolezev, D. (2016). Ja by ne govoril pro chrezmernoe vlijanie telekanalov na obshhestvennoe mnenie [I wouldn't speak about a huge impact of tv channels on public opinion]. *Znak*. Retrieved December, 3, 2016, from https://www.znak.com/2016-11-10/zamglavy_minkomsvyazi_aleksey_volin_o_gosudarstvennom_pr_agressii_na_telekanalah_i_uvolennyh_zhurnal

Krejcie, R. V., & Morgan, D. W. (1970). Determining sample size for research activities.

Educational and Psychological Measurement, 30, 607-610. doi:

10.1177/001316447003000308

Krippendorff, K. (2004). *Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage

Laruelle, M. (2015). Russia as a "divided nation," from compatriots to crimea: A contribution to the discussion on nationalism and foreign policy. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 62(2), 88-97. doi:10.1080/10758216.2015.1010902

Lasswell, H. D. (1951). The strategy of Soviet propaganda. *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, 24(2), 66-78. doi:10.2307/1173235

Levada center (2015a). Vrazhdebnost k ssha v Rossii sohranyaetsya. [The hostility of Russians

towards the U.S. stays the same]. Retrieved November 20, 2015 from

<http://www.levada.ru/2015/10/14/vrazhdebnost-k-ssha-v-rossii-sohranyaetsya/>

- Levada center (2015b). Plohoj mir [bad world]. Retrieved June, 22, 2016 from <http://www.levada.ru/2015/02/09/plohoj-mir/>
- Levada center (2016). Otnoshenie k ssha [Perception of the U.S.]. Retrieved December, 20, 2016 from <http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam/>
- Levada center (2017). Metodologija obshherossijskogo issledovanija [The methodology of Russia wide studies]. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from <http://www.levada.ru/zakazchikam/omnibus/>
- Lippman, W. (1997). *Public Opinion*. New York: Free Press Paperbacks
- Lipset, S. M., & Shlapentokh, V. (1999). Essay: The Balkan war, the rise of anti-Americanism and the future of democracy in Russia. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 11(3), 275.
- Lustig, C., & Olego, T. (2016). Public opinion and framing effects of argentine foreign policy toward Brazil: evidence from a survey experiment in urban centers in argentina. *Contexto Internacional*, 38(1), 241-275. doi:10.1590/S0102-8529.2016380100007
- Luxmoore, M. (2014). Defensive imperialism: The evolution of russia's regional foreign policy.
- Lynch, A. C. (2016). The influence of regime type on russian foreign policy toward “the west,” 1992–2015. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 49(1), 101-111. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.12.004

- McCombs, M. (2005). A look at agenda-setting: Past, present and future. *Journalism Studies*, 6(4), 543-557. doi:10.1080/14616700500250438
- McCombs, M. E. (2004). *Setting the agenda: mass media and public opinion*. Retrieved from <http://www.ebib.com>
- Medhurst, M., Ivie, R., Wander, P., Scott, R. (1990). *Cold War Rhetoric*. Michigan: Michigan University Press
- MID (2014a). Kommentarij oficial'nogo predstavitelja MID Rossii A.K.Lukashevicha v svjazi s «faktologicheskimi vykladkami» Gosdepartamenta SShA po situacii na Ukraine [A comment by an official representative of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs A.K.Lukashevich in regards to “factual notes” about the situation in Ukraine made by the U.S. Department of State]. Retrieved December, 3, 2016, from http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/kommentarii_predstavatelya/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/71994
- MID (2014b). Zajavlenie MID Rossii po sobytijam v Krymu [A Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' announcement regarding Crimea events]. Retrieved December, 3, 2016, from http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/ua/-/asset_publisher/ktn0ZLTvbbS3/content/id/72890
- Mogensen, K. (2015). International trust and public diplomacy. *International Communication Gazette*, 77(4), 315-336. doi:10.1177/1748048514568764
- Neuhaus, L. (2016). On the relation of irony, understatement, and litotes. *Pragmatics & Cognition*, 23(1), 117-149. doi:10.1075/pc.23.1.06neu
- Noelle-Neumann, E. (1984). *The spiral of silence: public opinion, our social skin*. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press

Orzeata, M. (2015). The influence of media on the evolution of the crisis in Ukraine. *International Journal of Communication Research*, 5(2), 108.

Parfenov, L. (Producer). (1998). *Namedni 1990*. [Television broadcast]. Moscow: ATV Production. Retrieved April, 26, 2016 from <https://goo.gl/8PDGaO>

Parfenov, L. (Producer). (2000). *Namedni 1999*. [Television broadcast]. Moscow: ATV Production. Retrieved June, 28, 2016 from <https://goo.gl/QpcHBr>

Pochepcov, G. (2002). *Semiotika [semiotics]*. Kiev: Vakler.

Pochepcov, G. (Ed.). (2015). *Informacionnye voiny. novyi instrument politiki [informational wars. the new asset of the politics]*. Moscow: Algoritm.

President of Russia (2014). Vladimir Putin vnjos obrashhenie v Sovet Federacii [Vladimir Putin submitted a plea to the Federation council]. Retrieved December, 3, 2016, from <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20353>

Putin, V. (2014, December 31). Novogodnee obraschenie k grazhdanam rossii [The new year address to the citizens of Russia] [video]. Retrieved December 12, from <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47446/videos>

RBC (2014). Ot rascveta do zakata: istorija telekanala “dozhd” [From sunset to sunrise: the history of tv rain]. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from <http://www.rbc.ru/society/04/03/2014/570418c79a794761c0ce7782>

RiaRu (2016). U “dozhdja” i rbc nashli istochniki finansirovaniya v SShA [tv rain’s and rbc’s sources of funding were found in the U.S.]. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from <https://ria.ru/mediawars/20160512/1431589293.html>

- Roberts, K. (2014). Détente 2.0? the meaning of russia's "Reset" with the united
- Russell Neuman, W., Guggenheim, L., Mo Jang, S., & Bae, S. Y. (2014). The dynamics of public attention: agenda-setting theory meets big data. *Journal of Communication*, 64(2), 193-214. doi:10.1111/jcom.12088
- RussiaTV (2016). O telekanale [About the tv channel]. Retrieved December, 20, 2016 from https://russia.tv/article/show/article_id/7481/
- Saltykov-Shchedrin, M. (1970). *Sobranie sochinenyi [collected edition]*. Moscow: Hudlit
- Scheufele, D. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of Communication*, 49(1), 103-122. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x
- Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda setting, and priming: The evolution of three media effects models. *Journal of Communication*, 57(1), 9-20. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00326.x
- Serov, V. (2003). Malen'kaja pobedonosnaja vojna [a small victorious war]. In *Slovar' krylatyh slov i vyrazhenij [dictionary of]*. Retrieved June, 29, 2016, from http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/dic_wingwords/1429/%D0%9C%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F
- Shirayev, E., Zubok, V. (2000). *Anti-Americanism in Russia: from Stalin to Putin*. New York: Palgrave
- Shlapentokh, V. (2011). The puzzle of russian anti-americanism: From 'below' or from 'above'. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63(5), 875-889. doi:10.1080/09668136.2011.576030

- Sidorova, E. (2012). Fenomen antiamerikanizma v Rossii [the phenomenon of anti-Americanism in Russia]. *Pravovoe gosudarstvo: teorija i praktika*. Retrieved December, 3, 2016, from elibrary.ru
- Simes, D. K. (2007). *Losing Russia: The costs of renewed confrontation*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Sorgin, V. (2013). Menjajushheesja vosprijatie SShA v postsovetskoj Rossii [changing perceptions of the U.S. in post-Soviet Russia]. *Obshhestvennye nauki i sovremennost*. Retrieved December, 3, 2016, from elibrary.ru
- Sperling, V. (2016). Putin's macho personality cult. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 49(1), 13-23. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.12.001
- states. *International Studies Perspectives*, 15(1), 1-18. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2012.00504.x
- Tass (2014). *Premier-ministr Kryma poprosil Putina o pomoshhi [Crimean prime minister asked Putin for help]*. Retrieved December, 3, 2016, from <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1013127>
- TNS (2016). Dannye po auditorii telekanalov [Data regarding TV channels' audience] towards the U.S. stays the same]. Retrieved November 20, 2015 from
- TV Rain (2016). Podpiska [Subscribe]. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from <https://tvrain.ru/podpiska/>
- U.S. Department of State (2016). 2015 Human Rights Reports: Ukraine (Crimea). Retrieved December, 3, 2016, from <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2015/eur/252913.htm>

Vesti (2013a). Amerikanskih shkol'nikov lishili lichnogo prostranstva [American students got

deprived of personal space]. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from

<http://vesti7.ru/video/1498262/episode/17-11-2013/>

Vesti (2014). Amerikanskij imperializm: SShA bezzastenchivo ruljat mirom [American imperialism: the U.S. rules the world without shame]. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from

<http://vesti7.ru/video/1487712/episode/04-10-2015/>

Vesti (2015a). Uchenija jadernoj triady Rossii stali antivoennym poslaniem SShA [military training of nuclear trine became an anti-war message to the U.S.]. Retrieved February, 2,

2017 from <http://vesti7.ru/video/1487787/episode/01-11-2015/>

Vesti (2015b). Obama blagoslovil odnopolye braki i reshil navjazat' ih vsemu miru [Obama blessed same-sex marriages and decided to implant it all over the world]. Retrieved February,

2, 2017 from <http://vesti7.ru/video/1487567/episode/28-06-2015/>

Vesti (2016). Putin: nuzhno uvazhat' vybor zhitelej Kryma [Putin: we need to respect the choice of Crimea's citizens]. Retrieved December, 3, 2016, from

<http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2823969&tid=106314>

Volkov D. (2016). Rodina vne kritiki [one does not critique their homeland]. Retrieved June, 28, 2016 from <https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/03/18/634111-rodina-kritiki>

Volkov, D. (2015). Istorija rossijskogo antiamerikanizma: pochemu v Rossii stali schitat' SShA vragom [The history of Russian anti-Americanism: why did Russians started

considering USA to be their enemy]. Retrieved June 19, 2016 from

<http://carnegie.ru/2015/05/27/ru-60220/i9kf>

von Seth, R. (2012). The language of the press in soviet and post-soviet russia: Creation of the citizen role through newspaper discourse. *Journalism*, 13(1), 53-70.

doi:10.1177/1464884911400844

Wanta, W., Golan, G., & Lee, C. (2004). Agenda setting and international news: Media influence on public perceptions of foreign nations. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 81(2), 364-377. doi:10.1177/107769900408100209

Yang, J., & Stone, G. (2003). The powerful role of interpersonal communication in agenda setting. *Mass Communication & Society*, 6(1), 57-74.

doi:10.1207/S15327825MCS0601_5

Yurchak, A. (2006). Everything was forever, until it was no more: the last Soviet generation.

Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ

Zdes i seichas (2015). Tol'ko v Rossii raduzhnaja avatarka — znak solidarnosti, v Amerike jeto simvol prazdnika [Rainbow profile picture means solidarity only in Russia. It's a symbol of holiday in America]. Retrieved February, 2, 2017 from

https://tvrain.ru/teleshov/here_and_now/tolko_v_rossii_raduzhnaja_avatarka_znak_solidarnos-390122/

Zhang, C., & Meadows, C. W., III. (2012). International coverage, foreign policy, and national image: Exploring the complexities of media coverage, public opinion, and presidential agenda. *International Journal of Communication (Online)*, 76.

Zhirkov, G. (2001). *Istoriya censury v rossii 19-20 vv. [the history of the censorship in russia in 19-20 century]*. Moscow: Aspect Press.

Zhou, Y., & Moy, P. (2007). Parsing framing processes: The interplay between online public opinion and media coverage. *Journal of Communication*, 57(1), 79-98.

doi:10.1111/j.0021-9916.2007.00330.x

Ziegler, C. E. (2014). Russian–American relations: From tsarism to putin. *International Politics*, 51(6), 671-692. doi:10.1057/ip.2014.32

Table 1. Crosstabulation of media coverage tone and a period of time (before and after the annexation/reintegration of Crimea)

	Negative tone	Neutral tone	Positive tone	Total
Before Crimea	26.5%	69.1%	4.3%	100%
	(86)	(224)	(14)	(324)
After Crimea	50.4%	48.0%	1.6%	100%
	(125)	(119)	(4)	(248)

Table 2. Crosstabulation of TV Channels and meanings of myths

	No myth	Literal meaning	Figurative meaning	Total
TV Rain	92.3%	0.6%	7.2%	100%
	(335)	(2)	(26)	(363)
Russia 1	31.6%	67.9%	0.5%	100%
	(66)	(142)	(1)	(209)

Table 3. Crosstabulation of TV Channels and Cold War myths

	No myth	Rulin g circle s	Two camp s	Happy future	Capitalist s are imperiali sts	Powe rful enem y	Inevita ble historic al laws	Rotten Wester n values	Total
TV Rai n	92.3% (335)	1.4% (5)	0.3% (1)	- (0)	4.1% (15)	- (0)	- (0)	1.9% (7)	100% (363)
Rus sia 1	31.6% (66)	- (0)	1.4% (3)	- (0)	42.1% (88)	6.7% (14)	- (0)	18.2% (38)	100% (209)

Table 4. Pearson's correlation for the tone of media coverage and perception of the U.S. in

Russia

	Negative media coverage	Positive media coverage
Perception of the U.S.	-.669**	.177

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5. Population (N) and sample size (n) of media data per year

	2012 (since May)		2013		2014		2015	
	N	n	N	n	N	n	N	n
Russia1	21	20	54	48	60	53	112	87
TV Rain	135	101	205	134	120	92	40	37

Table 6. Perception of the U.S. in Russia from May, 2012 – November, 2015 (N=1600)

	Highly positive	Mostly positive	Undecided	Mostly negative	Highly negative	Scale Average
May-12	240	3264	672	864	96	3.21
Jul-12	400	3264	576	768	128	3.21
Sep-12	240	2752	720	992	112	3.01
Nov-12	320	3136	624	896	96	3.17
Jan-13	240	3200	624	896	96	3.16
Mar-13	400	2752	624	1024	112	3.07
Jul-13	320	3136	528	928	112	3.14
Sep-13	240	2432	672	1152	208	2.94
Dec-13	240	2880	720	992	96	3.08
Jan-14	160	2624	624	1152	128	2.93
Mar-14	160	2048	480	1408	192	2.68
May-14	240	960	528	1280	496	2.19
Jul-14	160	1024	432	1088	640	2.09
Sep-14	80	1024	480	1376	480	2.15
Nov-14	80	1088	432	1344	512	2.16
Jan-15	160	704	336	1344	624	1.98
Mar-15	160	1088	384	1216	560	2.13
May-15	80	896	576	1312	512	2.11
Jul-15	240	1024	528	1248	496	2.21

Table 6. Continued

Sep-15	160	1216	576	1312	432	2.31
Nov-15	160	1216	480	1472	384	2.32




Figure 1. The correlation between negative news coverage and public opinion




Figure 2. The correlation between positive news coverage and public opinion

APPENDICES

Appendix A. Media agenda (English)
Codebook

General instructions

You are provided with a set of news stories picked from the Russian TV Channels: TV Rain and Russia1. Please complete the following steps in order to code the stories:

1. Open a link with the first story;
2. Read the questions below. This step will help you be more focused on the goals of the study. Basically, you will know what you will be looking for while watching the story;
3. Watch the story from the beginning to the end;
4. Complete the Red Section of your Excel file;
5. Re-watch the story if you are having any troubles with filling the Red Section;
6. Fill the parts of the Red Section that you couldn't fill for the first time;
7. Repeat the same steps for all the stories in the set.

Instructions

Read the questions, watch a news story and fill out the Red Section in your Excel file (G, H, and I columns)

G. Valence

(How is America presented in a given news story? Please insert a number in the Excel file)

0 = Neutral

1 = Negative

2 = Positive

Decision rules:

0 = Neutral – a news story provides raw facts and/or shows both positive and negative sides of America. To be coded as “neutral”, a news story should represent any of these points or the points similar to those that are mentioned below:

- ✓ A journalist/a TV host does not use emotionally descriptive words which show America either in a positive or negative way;
- ✓ A story represents raw facts about America without judgments;
- ✓ A story presents both negative and positive sides of America, American life, Americans or American politicians;
- ✓ America is not used as an example to highlight positive or negative sides of Russian life (or a life in another country)

- ✓ Etc.

Example: https://tvrain.ru/teleshov/here_and_now/itogi_13_ijunja-411279/

1 = Negative – a news story portrays the U.S., American citizens or American government in a negative way. To be coded as “negative”, a news story should represent any of these points or the points similar to those that are mentioned below:

- ✓ A journalist/a TV host uses emotionally descriptive words describing America in a negative way;
- ✓ A journalist/a TV host highlights negative sides of American life, culture or politics;
- ✓ America is accused in any negative consequences of any actions being discussed;
- ✓ America/American life/American political activities are compared to Russia or another country as an example of wrong decisions or actions (*“It is so good in Russia, and it is so bad in America”*)
- ✓ Americans/American politics are presented as dumb people with low values;
- ✓ Etc.

Example: <http://vesti7.ru/article/354502/episode/05-06-2016/>

2 = Positive – a news story portrays the U.S., American citizens or American government in a positive way. To be coded as “positive”, a news story should represent any of these points or the points similar to those that are mentioned below:

- ✓ A journalist/a TV host uses emotionally descriptive words describing America in a positive way;

- ✓ A journalist/a TV host highlights positive sides of American life, culture or politics;
- ✓ America/American life/American political activities are compared to Russia or another country as an example of right decisions or actions (*“It is so good in Russia, and it is so bad in America”*).
- ✓ Americans/American politics are presented as smart, open minded people with right values;
- ✓ Etc.

Example: https://tvrain.ru/teleshov/here_and_now/predvaritelnye_vybory_v_ssha-402866/

1. Myth

Which of the following myths (if any) is presented in a story? (Please insert one number in the Excel file. If you recognize several myths pick the one that a news story is focused on)

0 = No Cold War myths – there is no Cold War myth in this story.

1 = Ruling circles – a news story states (explicitly or not) that there is a small group of people in USA who rule the domestic (USA) and foreign (all other world) policies in their own interests. All the events that take place in the world are presented as a part of one chain, prescribed by this group of people. Nowadays, possible iterations of the myth could be represented by popular belief about “group of masons” or “group of Jews” ruling the world from America. More likely, this myth would be focused on economics (*e.g., speculation on finance market to undermine Russian economy because someone is not interested in Russia to be powerful*).

2 = Two camps – a news story presents the world as two groups of countries: Russia and post-Soviet countries versus the West (USA and Europe). Being a positive character, the Russian camp accuses the West in being a negative character. A possible iteration of this myth could be represented by claiming that today new camps are formed (ex: China+Russia vs America+Europe; Russia+post-Soviet countries vs European Union etc.). The essence of this myth is the distinction between two camps one of which includes Russia as a member. Such options as “the U.S. goes against Russia” WOULD NOT be an example of this myth because we are looking for groups of countries. “The West against the post-Soviet countries” would be a good example of this myth.

3 = Happy future – a news story states that later, Russia will be living a happy future despite all the difficulties that the country faces today. These hope can go hand-in-hand with accusations towards enemies who do not let Russia live in these “happy times” now. Today, this myth can be presented by news stories about sanctions that Russia needs to go through during the next several years. However, later, Russia is expected to become great again despite the enemies.

4 = Capitalists are imperialists – a news story portrays America as aggressive imperialists who use armed forces, economic penetration, and propaganda to expanse their power throughout the world. All the accusations in organizing Maidan or orange revolutions go here as well as the accusations in sponsoring Russian opposition and media. Also, sponsorship of ISIS by America or attempts to gain power in Syria for sake of American interests are also part of this myth. The accusations of supporting terrorists to strengthen American positions also illustrate this myth. The news stories about the U.S. intervening

other countries and starting wars would also be examples of the myth. Overall, the myth suggests America's military and ideological pressure on other countries and interference in someone's business.

5 = Powerful enemy – a news story broadcasts messages about the military power of the US. This power could be compared to Russian military forces. This myth also could be represented by a reverse story when the focus is on Russian military power and the US serve as an example of an enemy who can be defeated by Russian weapons. In case of the reversed myth, the story may compare American and Russian weapons to demonstrate the superiority of the Russian weapons.

6 = Inevitable historical laws – a news story portrays foreign policy of Russia as something prescribed by history. The message here is, "it should have happened anyway". Russians' actions are portrayed as historically meaningful. Annexation/reintegration of Crimea presented as part of history which would happen anyway one day is a great example of this myth.

7 = Rotten Western values – a news story reinforces negative characteristics of Americans such as racism, greediness, violent nature of people or the assumption that Americans do not value human's life. All the stories about gay propaganda, shootings, greediness, violent actions towards animals or children as well as child porn go here. In addition, this myth may be concerned with American political elite. In this case, a news story would claim that American politicians are dumb or about millions that they spend on something inappropriate. Corruption would be another example of low American values.

Recommendations:

1. If you are trying to decide between different myths, it might be helpful to take a look at the headline of a news story. Often, the main idea of a news story gets reflected in a headline.
2. If you doubt if a myth is present in a news story, do not make it up. It is better to insert zeros in your Excel file.
3. If a news story provides facts without judgements it is likely that there is no myth in the news story. For example, TV Rain can state that the U.S. imposes a veto on Palestine's decision to start a separate state. Could we consider it as imperialism? Yes. But this is not important in our case. The only thing that matters is how TV Rain judges this situation. If TV Rain does not provide any judgment, and you do not feel that TV Rain tries to promote the idea of Americans being imperialists but rather TV Rain simply provides facts – it is most likely that there is no myth in the news story.
4. Overall, it is always good to ask yourself after watching a news story, “What was the news story about? According to journalists, what should I have thought after watching the news story?”
5. If a myth is broadcasted in its literal meaning, it is most likely that the valence of a news story is not neutral. Any myth has negative or positive connotation. If a myth is broadcasted in its non-literal meaning, the valence of a news story might be neutral.

2. Meaning of a myth

How is the Cold War myth presented in the story?

0 = No Cold War myths – there is no Cold War myth in this story.

1 = Literal – a Cold War myth is broadcasted in its literal meaning. A news story is aimed to promote the myth.

Example: <http://vesti7.ru/video/1501411/episode/27-03-2016/>

2 = Non literal – a Cold War myth is broadcasted with irony or explicitly expressed disbelief. In this case, a journalist acknowledges that a particular myth exists but (s)he is making fun and/or being ironic about the fact of its existence in Russian public discourse. Another case of such broadcasting will be an analysis of a myth broadcasted by state TV to show its inconsistency.

Example of analysis of a myth:

https://tvrain.ru/teleshov/here_and_now/im_nuzhny_ne_sojuzniki_a_vassaly_putin_remchukovu-385867/

Example of an ironic intonation (“I do not mean what I say”):

https://tvrain.ru/teleshov/here_and_now/tolko_v_rossii_raduzhnaja_avatarka_znak_solidarnosti-390122/

Appendix B. Media agenda (Russian)

Codebook

Общие инструкции

Перед Вами список телесюжетов с российских телеканалов «Дождь» и «Россия 1».

Пожалуйста, выполните следующие шаги для того, чтобы осуществить кодирование этих сюжетов:

1. Откройте ссылку с первым телесюжетом;
2. Прочитайте вопросы ниже. Этот шаг поможет сфокусироваться на целях исследования: Вы будете знать, на что обратить внимание при просмотре телесюжета;
3. Посмотрите сюжет от начала до конца;
4. Заполните Секцию, выделенную красным в вашем бланке в Икселе;
5. Пересмотрите сюжет, если у Вас возникли какие-либо трудности при заполнении Красной Секции;
6. Заполните те части Красной Секции, которые у Вас не получилось заполнить с первого раза;
7. Повторите эти же действия для всех телесюжетов из Вашего списка.

Красная Секция. Что Вы видите в телесюжете?

Прочитайте вопросы, посмотрите сюжет и заполните Красную Секцию в своем файле Excel (колонки G, H, I)

G. Тональность

(Каким образом Америка представлена в данном сюжете? Пожалуйста, вставьте число в файл Excel)

0 = Нейтрально

1 = Негативно

2 = Позитивно

Как принимать решение:

0 = Нейтрально – телесюжет представляет сырые факты и/или показывает и позитивные, и негативные стороны Америки. Кодировать историю как «Нейтрально», если видите в ней один из признаков ниже или что-то, похожее на эти признаки:

- ✓ Журналист/ведущий не использует оценочную лексику, которая показывает Америку в положительном или отрицательном ключе;
- ✓ Телесюжет транслирует сырые факты об Америке безо всяких суждений;
- ✓ История показывает одновременно положительные и отрицательные стороны Америки, американской жизни, американцев или американских политиков;

- ✓ Америка не используется как пример, призванный подчеркнуть позитивные стороны России или любой другой страны;
- ✓ И т.д.

Пример: https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/here_and_now/itogi_13_ijunja-411279/

1 = Негативно – телесюжет показывает США, американцев или американское правительство в отрицательном свете. Кодировать сюжет как «Негативно», если в ней содержится любой из признаков ниже или признаков, похожих на них

- ✓ Журналист/ведущий использует оценочную лексику, описывающую Америку в негативном свете;
- ✓ Журналист/ведущий подчеркивает негативные стороны американской жизни, культуры или политики;
- ✓ Америка обвиняется в любых негативных последствиях обсуждаемых в телесюжете событий и действий;
- ✓ Америка/американская жизнь/американская политика сравнивается с Россией или любой другой страной как пример неправильных решений и действий («*в России хорошо, а в Америке – плохо*»);
- ✓ Америка/американские политики представлены как тупые люди с низкими ценностями;
- ✓ И т.д.

Пример: <http://vesti7.ru/article/354502/episode/05-06-2016/>

2 = Позитивно – телесюжет показывает США, американцев или американское правительство в позитивном свете. Кодировать сюжет как «Позитивно», если видите в нем признаки, указанные ниже, или признаки, похожие на них:

- ✓ Журналист/ведущий использует оценочную лексику для описания Америки в позитивном ключе;
- ✓ Журналист/ведущий подчеркивает позитивные стороны американской жизни, культуры и политики;
- ✓ Америка/американская жизнь/американская политика сравнивается с Россией или любой другой страной как пример правильных действий и решений («в Америке хорошо, а в России – плохо»);
- ✓ Американцы/американские политики представлены как умные, открытые люди с правильными ценностями;
- ✓ И т.д.

Пример: https://tvrain.ru/teleshov/here_and_now/predvaritelnye_yybory_v_ssha-402866/

Н. Миф

Какой из данных мифов транслируется в телесюжете (если транслируется)? (Пожалуйста, впишите одну цифру в файл Excel для каждого сюжета. Если вы видите сразу несколько мифов в одном сюжете, выберите тот, который можно было бы назвать основным для данного сюжета)

0 = мифа Холодной войны нет – в данном сюжете нет никакого из мифов Холодной войны (если Вы ставите ноль в этой графе, то в графе «значение мифа» автоматически ставится ноль!)

1 = Правящие круги (мировая закулиса) – в сюжете утверждается (открыто или нет), что существует небольшая группа людей в США, которые управляют внутренней (американской) и иностранной (остальной мир) политикой в интересах США и этой группы людей. Все события в мире представлены как звенья одной цепи, которые контролируются этой группой людей. Возможные вариации этого мифа сегодня – популярная в России версия о группе масонов или группе евреев, которые правят миром, находясь в Америке. В этом мифе акцент, скорее всего, будет идти на экономику (пример: спекуляции на рынке, чтобы подрвать силу России, потому что «кому-то» невыгодно, чтобы Россия была сильной).

2 = Два лагеря – сюжет представляет мир как две группы стран: Россия и постсоветские страны против Запада (США и Европа). Российский лагерь в этом случае выступает как положительный герой, в то время как западный лагерь представлен в негативном свете. Возможная вариация этого мифа сегодня может быть представлена предположением о создании новых лагерей (например, Россия+Китай против Запада, Россия и постсоветские страны против Европейского союза и т.д.). Суть мифа заключается в разделении мира на два лагеря, в одном из которых состоит Россия. Вариант «США против России» - НЕ ПРИМЕР этого мифа, потому что это не группы. Вариант «Запад против постсоветских стран» - наш идеал.

3 = Счастливое будущее – в сюжете говорится о том, что позже Россия будет жить счастливо, несмотря на все нынешние (временные!) сложности. Этот миф может транслироваться вместе с обвинениями врагов, которые не позволяют России жить в этом «счастливом будущем» уже сейчас. Возможные вариации мифа сегодня – рассуждения о том, что России надо потерпеть несколько лет санкций, но зато позже она станет великой «назло врагам».

4 = Капиталисты – это империалисты – в сюжете Америка представлена как агрессивные империалисты, которые используют вооруженные силы, экономическое давление и пропаганду, чтобы насадить свои порядки по всему миру. Все обвинения в том, что США организовали Майдан и оранжевые революции, обвинения в чрезмерном распространении американских военных баз, обвинения в том, что США спонсируют русские оппозиционные СМИ, обвинения в том, что США прослушивают весь мир с целью управлять им – это все часть данного мифа. Сюда же идут обвинения в адрес США в том, что они спонсировали ИГИЛ, чтобы захватить власть в Сирии в интересах США. Сюда же – обвинения в любой поддержке террористов с целью укрепить позиции США на мировой арене. Сюда же – сюжеты о том, что США вторгается в другие страны и развязывает войну. Миф предполагает военное и идеологическое давление со стороны США на другие страны, вмешательство США не в свое дело.

5 = Сильный/могущественный враг (гонка вооружений) – сюжет рассказывает о военной мощи США. Военная мощь США может сравниваться с российскими вооруженными силами. Этот миф может также быть «перевернут»: когда сюжет фокусируется на военной мощи России, а США приводится как пример врага, который

может быть уничтожен российским оружием. В случае «перевернутого» мифа может также быть представлено сравнение российского и американского оружия с целью подчеркнуть превосходство российского оружия.

6 = Историческая предопределенность – сюжет показывает российскую зарубежную политику так, будто она предписана историей. Основной посыл сюжета: «Это бы в любом случае произошло». Российские действия представлены как исторически значимые. Присоединение Крыма, показанное как часть истории, которая в любом случае должна была произойти, - отличный пример этого мифа.

7 = Гнилые западные ценности – сюжет подчеркивает негативные характеристики американцев, такие как расизм, жадность, тупость, низменность и примитивность интересов, продажность, подлость, лживость (включая измены), жестокая природа людей или предположение о том, что американцы не ценят человеческую жизнь или свободу. Многие сюжеты о гей-пропаганде, стрельбе, жадности, жестоком обращении с детьми или животными, а также сюжеты о съемках детского порно в США транслируют этот миф. Также этот миф может касаться политической элиты США. Речь может идти или о том, какие американские политики тупые, или о миллионах, которые политики тратят на что-то, на что они их тратить, по мнению русских журналистов, не должны. Еще один вариант низких ценностей американцев – коррупция.

Рекомендации:

1. В случае сомнений по поводу того, какой миф является основным в сюжете, бывает полезно посмотреть на заголовок новости – обычно в него выносятся главная идея.
2. В случае сомнений, есть ли миф вообще, не надо ничего «притягивать за уши», лучше поставить нули.
3. Если в сюжете идет перечисление фактов БЕЗ ОЦЕНКИ происходящего, то, скорее всего, мифа нет. Так, например, телеканал «Дождь» может сказать, что США накладывает право вето на решение Палестины отделиться в суверенное государство. Можно ли это расценивать как империализм? Да. Но это не так важно. Важно, какую дает оценку «Дождь». Если дождь НЕ ДАЕТ ОЦЕНКУ, и вы не чувствуете, что вам пытаются навязать идею о том, что американцы империалисты, а просто транслируют факты – значит, мифа нет.
4. В целом, всегда полезно себя после просмотра спросить: «О чем был этот сюжет? Что, по мнению журналистов, я должна была подумать после его просмотра?».
5. Если миф транслируется в буквальном значении, то тональность НЕ нейтральная, так как миф сам по себе несет какую-то коннотацию (отрицательную или положительную). Если миф транслируется не в буквальном значении, то тональность может быть нейтральной.

I. Значение мифа

Каким образом миф представлен в сюжете?

0 = мифа Холодной войны нет – в данном сюжете нет никакого из мифов Холодной войны

1= Буквально – миф Холодной войны представлен в его буквальном значении. Цель сюжета – «навязать» этот миф.

Пример: <http://vesti7.ru/video/1501411/episode/27-03-2016/>

2 = Небуквально – миф Холодной войны показан с иронией или недоверием. В этом случае журналист признает, что миф существует, но смеется над самим фактом его существования в российском публичном дискурсе. Другой вариант показа мифа в небуквальном значении – анализ мифа, показанного государственным каналом, с целью подчеркнуть несостоятельность этого мифа.

Пример анализа мифа:

https://tvrain.ru/teleshov/here_and_now/im_nuzhny_ne_sozuzniki_a_vassaly_putin_rechukovu-385867/

Пример показа с иронией (“Я не верю в то, что я говорю, и вы это знаете”):

https://tvrain.ru/teleshov/here_and_now/tolko_v_rossii_raduzhnaja_avatarka_znak_solidarnos-390122/